REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
PO3 DAKILA,
Accused-Appellant,

versus -
CA-G.R. No. ________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
x--------------------------------------------------------------x
BRIEF FOR ACCUSED-APPELLANT
Accused-appellant, by counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully files this brief for the appellant.
PREFATORY STATEMENT
A violation and disregard of the right of the accused-appellant to
due process and a proper appreciation of the facts are abound in the
instant case.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 143, in its
decision rendered on 05 February 2021 found the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of homicide based on unsupported allegations and
insufficient evidence violative of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
The Honorable Supreme Court, on such premise, pronounced in
a case brought forth:
“The court finds occasion to remind courts and quasi-judicial
bodies that “[a] decision should faithfully comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision
shall be rendered by any court [or quasi-judicial body] without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and
the law on which it is based…. It is a requirement of due process
and fair play that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court [or quasi-judicial body]. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party,
who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court [or
quasi-judicial body] for review by a higher tribunal.”
THE PARTIES
PO3 DAKILA is the accused-appellant as represented by
FLORES and ROXAS LAW OFFICES where process and notice from
this court may be served at Room No. 2021 Bede Towers, Zapote, Las
Pinas City, while THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES is the appellee
as represented by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL
Accused-appellant received on 08 February, 2021 the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court dated 05 February 2021. A Notice of Appeal
was timely filed on 19 February, 2021. Accused-appellant received on
20 June, 2021 the Order from the Court of Appeals directing him to file
his Appeal Brief within fifteen (15) days from receipt. Hence, this timely
compliance.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Accused PO3 DAKILA was charged with the crime of Murder in
an Information dated 20 December 2019, reciting as follows:
“That on or about 29 January 2018, along Epifanio De Los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Balintawak, Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, taking advantage of his position as a Police
Officer, conspiring with deceased Police Officer 3 MOISES, with
intent to kill, qualified by abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSHUA, by
then and there shooting him several times with the use of their
firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter five (5) mortal, serious
and grave gunshot wounds, four on different parts of the body
including one on the left chest and one at the back of the right
leg, which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim
JOSHUA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
When arraigned on 20 January 2020, assisted by his counsels
of choice, the accused-appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accordingly,
pre-trial and trial ensued.
PO3 DAKILA was solely charged as his alleged co-conspirator
PO3 MOISES committed suicide during the investigation, after
submission of his Counter-Affidavit before the NBI and DOJ but prior
to arraignment.
On 05 February 2021, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 143, found the accused-appellant GUILTY of homicide and
sentenced PO3 DAKILA to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
of prison mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.
The accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the
late JOSHUA the sums of:
1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) as civil indemnity;
2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for moral damages;
3. One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php
189,150.00), as actual damages; and
4. Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (Php
2,240,000.00), for loss of earnings.
The above monetary awards bear interest at six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the finality of the court’s decision until full
satisfaction.
II
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The trial court committed the following errors:
1. The prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant PO3 DAKILA beyond reasonable doubt;
2.
The trial court erred in its imposition of moral damages
unsupported by law as well as civil indemnity and indemnification in
the form of calculated loss of earnings.
III
ARGUMENTS
1. The accused killing the
victim continues to be
unproven.
While the trial court in citing murder under the Revised Penal
Code, was correct to appreciate the first and fourth elements which are
ostensibly present, in that the victim was indeed killed and the crime is
neither parricide nor infanticide; the second element had only found
basis in the decision by mere deduction and “logical inference.” By
lengthily listing and gathering choice pronouncements of testimony
across the prosecution’s witnesses, the trial court projects the unlikely
illustration of a killing predicated on everything other than an act of
killing in itself. The act of having killed the victim, still heretofore
unattributed to the accused-appellant beyond any sliver of doubt, is not
at all clearly defined in the instant case more than the circumstantial
conjecture the trial court had arrived at in its decision.
The third element of murder - which is the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength - was nowhere
near satisfactorily proved. Hence the change of the charge the
accused-appellant is convicted of from murder to homicide. The
lingering cloud over the presence of the accused-appellant killing the
victim, however, still persists.
2.
The two other gunshot
wounds sustained by the
victim were unfairly attributed
to the accused-appellant.
The trial court relied on mere inference in determining that the
two other gunshot wounds sustained by the victim were caused by
accused-appellant. The conclusion is based on collated select
prosecution testimony among which include PO3 Moises’ statement
that he only fired two shots, in the judgment of the trial court meaning
that the two other wounds inflicted on the victim must now be from the
accused-appellant PO3 DAKILA. Such a line of logic is dangerous to
the dispensation of justice. The Rules of Court states that:
“Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.”
Although it is clearly stated in the above provision that proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty, the
Supreme Court has stated:
“While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish
absolutely impervious certainty, the quantum of proof required in
criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a
certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience.
While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is
borne, not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:
“This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing
the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own
evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an
accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis
not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional
presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden,
it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be
acquitted.”
The evidence presented by the prosecution does not even meet
the requirement of moral certainty, and the reliance of the trial court on
the same for a conviction has no place in our legal system.
3.
The
trial
court
is
mistaken to equate conduct
indicative of flight
The prosecution presented evidence that PO3 MOISES did not
bring the victim JOSHUA to the hospital and that it was a certain PO2
Paul who signed the Emergency Consultation sheets. Thereafter the
prosecution stated that such conduct is indicative of flight, yet in later
paragraphs below, elaborate how both alleged co-conspirators PO3
MOISES and PO3 DAKILA surrendered to investigation. The trial court
contradicts itself in this manner.
4.
The trial court used the
accused-appellant's behavior
to determine guilt.
The trial court pointed out that the testimony of the prosecution
witness said the accused-appellant had washed his hands as soon as
he arrived at Camp Crame - jumping to the conclusion that this is a
sign of guilt. However, such an act of washing one’s hands is not
simply because he wanted to clean up and rid his hands of dirt. The
prosecution also relied on witness testimony that accused-appellant
was very worried, equating the same as an indication of guilt. This is
mere hearsay as the witnesses are not proven to be expert witnesses
on psychology and behavior of humans. In another instance, the failure
of accused-appellant PO3 DAKILA to submit himself to paraffin testing
is also mentioned by the trial court as an indication of guilt. Again, the
trial court is quick to jump to a conclusion that is not based on evidence
but mere conjecture. Lastly, the fact that accused-appellant did not
submit a medical certificate due to him being head-butted by the victim
is again used by the trial court as an indication of guilt. The accusedappellant’s inaction should not automatically be deemed as an
indication of guilt as there is no law nor jurisprudence backing up this
fallacy of a statement.
5. The trial court determined
the existence of another gun,
without proving for sure there
was another gun.
The trial court stated that another gun was used by accusedappellant in inflicting the gunshots. It, however, failed to produce said
gun in evidence. This is another reliance of the trial court on
prosecution testimony based on mere inferences and unsound
conclusions. Such considerations are untenable.
6. Jurisprudence has upheld
the Rules of Court in
maintaining convictions that
are complete with its requisite
elements.
The Honorable Supreme Court has, in a catena of cases, upheld
the conviction of an accused based on circumstantial evidence. This
is based on the Rules of Court which states under Rule 133, Section 4
that, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if the
following requisites are proven:
1. There is more than one circumstances;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The first requisite is present, in that there are many circumstantial
pieces of evidence against the accused, in fact most of them being
circumstantial in nature, if not all. However, the second and third
requisites are not present.
As to the second requisite, the facts from which the inferences
derived by the prosecution are nowhere near proven. In the above
paragraphs, it is explained that most of the inferences made by the trial
court come from unsubstantiated suggestions, inferred from
uncorroborated behavior, and mundane acts blown out of proportion
by the trial court in order to suit its sought conclusion.
As to the last requisite, the combination of circumstances are
definitely not enough to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. There can really be no combination construed from the
circumstances presented by the prosecution as there is no correlation
between them. They are but mere extrapolations and insinuations
from normal acts done by any human that can lead to nothing that may
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
7. The imposition of damages
and civil indemnity has no
basis.
Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides:
“That the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to more xxx
damages xxx before the court may consider xxx.”
Damages are never presumed and must be proven by competent
evidence, which the prosecution has failed to do so.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellant respectfully prays that the
Decision of the trial court be reversed, set aside, and nullified, and that
judgment be rendered in favor of the accused-appellant as prayed for
in his answer; to dismiss the charge against accused-appellant for his
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant also prays for such other reliefs as may be
just and equitable.
30 June, 2021.
ATTY.JULIO GABRYEL A. ROXAS
Counsel for Accused-Appellant
IBP Lifetime No. 12345
Roll No. 12345
MCLE II Compliance No. 0001234
FLORES and ROXAS Law Offices
Room No. 2021 Bede Towers,
Zapote, Las Pinas City
VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION
I, PO3 DAKILA, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Angeles City,
Pampanga, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, do
hereby depose and say:
1.
I am the accused-appellant in the foregoing Brief;
2.
I caused the preparation of the foregoing pleading;
3.
I have read the same and the allegations therein are true and
correct of my personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
4.
I have not commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court or different divisions thereof or any other
tribunal or agency.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my signature this 30th
day of June 2021 at Quezon City.
PO3 DAKILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of June, 2021
at Manila, Philippines. Affiant exhibited to me his Driver’s License No.
N26-123456 issued at Angeles City, Pampanga.
ATTY. JUAN DELA CRUZ
Notary Public
Notarial Commission until Dec 30, 2021
PTR NO. 023456
01/05/10/Manila
Doc. No.: 1
Page no.: 2
Book no.: I
Series of 2021
Copy Furnished:
ATTY. MARITONIE RENEE D. RESURRECCION
Office of the City Prosecutor
Quezon City, Metro Manila
EXPLANATION
Pursuant to Section II, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the
foregoing Brief is sent by registered mail due to lack of messengerial
personnel and time constraint in the filing thereof.