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Title:
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
SAMPLE FOR ARTICLE:
Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
ELEMENTS.
1.
STAGES.
1. Consummated
2. Frustrated
3. Attempted
DOCTRINES.
Art. 168. asas. – Any
Title:
Liwanag vs. People
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
The CA convicted Ruben Liwanag for the crime of falsification of public document. On July 3,
1994, a vehicular accident occurred in Bifian, Laguna. Petitioner's son, Ruben Liwanag, Jr. drove
a Kia Pride car which collided with a military jeep driven by Noel Agcopra. Ruben Liwanag, Jr.
was not able to present a valid driver's license but showed Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP)
No. 02774452-A instead to the investigating officer, Conrado Tamayo of the Philippine National
Construction Company (PNCC). The TOP showed that it was issued on June 10, 1994 to "Ruben
Rubio Liwanag" who was purportedly born on June 27, 1974. It also appeared that petitioner
issued the TOP to his own son. During the investigation, it was discovered that per certification
by the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Ruben Liwanag, Jr. indeed did not have a driver's
license. At the time of the accident, Ruben Liwanag, Jr., who was born on June 27, 1977
according to his birth certificate, was still a minor and was not eligible to hold a driver's license.
His birth date on the TOP, however, was "June 27, 1974." In view of the dubious entries on the
TOP, Nelia Enoc and Noel Agcopra, owners of the military jeep, filed an affidavit-complaint for
falsification of public document against petitioner, which led to his indictment therefor in
court. C/Insp. Antonio Salas, who was also a police officer at the Western Police District
Command, testified that when a driver commits a traffic violation and his driver's license is
confiscated by the apprehending officer, a TOP is issued. TOP permits the violator to drive for
the period that his actual license is not in his possession. The TOP is valid for fifteen days.
C/Insp. Salas further stated that TOP No. 02774452-A was part of the booklet issued to him by
the LTO. He denied ever issuing the TOP in question and he only came to know of its issuance
when the same was traced to have come from him. In truth, the TOP in question was among
the other TOPs which were detached from the LTO booklet issued to him. He also confirmed
that petitioner was a fellow officer at the Western Police District Traffic Command. He and
petitioner used to share a room together at their headquarters and he sometimes forgot to
secure his locker where he kept his TOP booklet.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the appellant.
RULING & DOCTRINE
No. Falsification of a public document is defined and penalized under Article 171 19 of the
Revised Penal Code. It requires the following elements: 1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) he falsifies a
document by committing any of the aforementioned acts. In falsification of public or official
documents, the presence of intent to gain or intent to injure a third person is not necessary.
For what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed. Here, petitioner was indicted for and convicted of falsification of
public document under Article 171 (par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code because when he issued
TOP No. 02774452-A he made untruthful statements in a narration of facts, i.e. a) he entered
his son's name "Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr." on the TOP; b) he made a false entry pertaining to
his son's birthdate i.e. June 27, 1974 instead of June 27, 1977 (his son's true birthdate); and c)
he altered his badge number from "04580" to "50480," thus, making it appear that he had
authority to issue the subject TOP. To be convicted under Article 171(par. 4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him; and 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
Petitioner does not deny the presence of these elements here. He, nonetheless, insists on his
plea that he had no malicious or wrongful intent to injure a third person. On this score, suffice
it to state that intent to gain or intent to injure is not an element of the crime of falsification of
public document. Nor is it a valid defense. Typoco, Jr. v. People is apropos: In addition,
petitioners argue that damage to the government should have been proven considering that
this was alleged in the Information. We do not agree. In falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation
of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. The law is
clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential
element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons,
it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person
for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In
falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at
least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Art. 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of
prison correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not more than 1 Million
shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
3. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or
to the damage of another who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any
of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in
degree.
Acts punished Under Art 172:
1. Falsification of public, official or commercial document by a private individual
2. Falsification of private document by any person
3. Use of falsified document
Elements of Falsification under Par 1 of Art 172
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position
2. That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art 171
3. That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document
-
The offender should not be a public officer, employee or notary public, who takes
advantage of his official position
The acts of falsification are the same as those in Art 171
-
-
-
Four
kinds
of
documents
falsified
1. Public document - any instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public
official with the solemnities required by the law. Official receipt prescribed by the
government to be issued upon the receipt of money for public purposes is a public
document.
2. Official document - a document which is issued by a public official in the exercise of the
functions of his office. All pleadings filed with the court are public or official document.
3. Private document - a deed or instrument executed by a private person w/o the
intervention of a notary public or other persons legally authorized by which document
some
dispositions
or
agreement
is
proved
or
evidenced.
4. Commercial document - any document defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce. Ex.: Letters of exchange, letters of credit, trade acceptances, checks, book of
accountscash files, deposit slips and bank statements
Cash disbursement vouchers or receipts evidencing payment to borrowers of the loans
extended to them are not negotiable instruments and are not defined and regulated by
code of commerce.
Aprivate document may acquire the character of a public document when it becomes part
of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly athorized by law.
The possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the author of the falsification
Elements of Falsification under Par 2 of Art 172
1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification except those in par 7 of Art
171
2. That the falsification was committed in any private document
3. That the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage
Elements
of
Falsification
under
Par
3
of
Art
172
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person
2. That the false document is embraced in art 171 or in any subdivisions no 1 or 2 of rt 172
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding
Art 177 - Usurpation of authority or official functions - Any person - who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or
agency, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer of the Philippines Government or of any foreign
government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
2 ways of committing Art 177:
1. By falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippines Government or of any foreign government,
2. By performing any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippines Government or of a foreign government or any agency thereof, under
pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so.
-The mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer is sufficient and the
performance of an act pertaining to a public officer is not necessary.
Art. 179 Using Fictitious Name and Concealing True Name
First, by Using fictitious name
(1) Offender uses a name other than his real name;
(2) He uses the fictitious name publicly;
(3) Purpose of use is to conceal a crime, to evade the execution of a judgment or to cause
damage [to public interest – Reyes].
Second, by Concealing true name
(1) Offender conceals his true name and other personal circumstances; (2) Purpose is only to
conceal his identity.
-
Only the name registered in the Civil Registry can be used as a name.
- If the purpose is to cause damage to private interest, the crime is estafa under Art.
315(2a).
- Anti-Alias Law – allows the use of pseudo- names for literary, radio, television, show
business,
or
sports.
-
A
petition
to
change
name
-
TheelementofpublicityisnecessaryinPar.
can
only
be
1,
but
not
availed
in
once.
Par.
2.
Art. 179. Illegal Use of Uniforms or Insignia
1. Offender
makes
use
of
insignia,
uniforms
or
dress;
2. The insignia, uniforms or dress pertains to an office not held by such person or a class
of
persons
of
which
he
is
not
a
member;
3. Said insignia, uniform or dress is used publicly and improperly.
- Improper – the offender has no right to use the uniform or insignia or that the uniform
was
used
maliciously.
- Use of PNP uniform in TV shows – there must be an authority to use such uniforms. If
without authority, the producers may be prosecuted under a special penal law.
- The provision is not limited to public uniforms. Uniforms of private entities are
included
(eg.
Jollibee
uniform).
Exact imitation is unnecessary. A colorable resemblance calculated to deceive the
common
run
people
is
sufficient.
Section Two. – False Testimony
What is False testimony?
False testimony is committed by a person who, being under oath and required to testify as to the
truth of a certain matter at a hearing before a competent authority, shall deny the truth or say
something contrary to it.
What are the three forms of false testimony?
1. False testimony in criminal cases. (Arts. 180 and 181)
2. False testimony in civil cases. (Art. 182)
3. False testimony in other cases. (Art. 183)
Nature of the crime of false testimony.
Falsehood is ever reprehensible; but it is particularly odious when committed in judicial
proceedings, as it constitutes an imposition upon the court and seriously exposes it to a
miscarriage of justice. (People v. Reyes)
Art. 180. False testimony against a defendant. – Any person who shall give false testimony
against the defendant in any criminal case shall suffer:
1.
The penalty of reclusion temporal, if the defendant in said case shall have been
sentenced to death;
2. The penalty of prisión mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to reclusion
temporal or reclusion perpetua;
3. The penalty of prisión correccional, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to any
other afflictive penalty; and
4.
The penalty of arresto mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to a
correctional penalty or a fine, or shall have been acquitted.
In cases provided in subdivisions 3 and 4 of this article the offender shall further a fine not to exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000).
Elements: CFKF
1. That there be a criminal proceeding;
2. That the offender testifies falsely under oath against the defendant therein;
3. That the offender who gives false testimony knows that it is false.
4. That the defendant against whom the false testimony is given is either acquitted or
convicted in a final judgment. (People u. Maneja, 72 Phil. 256)
Penalty depends upon the sentence of the defendant against whom false testimony was given.
Ex. a witness testifies falsely against the accused charged with murder.
· If the accused is convicted and sentenced to death and the witness is prosecuted and
convicted, the penalty to that false witness is reclusion temporal.
· If the accused is acquitted, the penalty to the false witness is arresto mayor.
The four cases enumerated in Article 180 uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or
acquittal.
Defendant must be sentenced at least to (1) a correctional penalty, or (2) a fine, or (3) must be
acquitted.
Problem: A is accused of slight physical injuries punishable by one month of imprisonment. B
falsely testified against him. A is convicted and sentenced to 15 days of arresto menor. Is B guilty
of false testimony? No. Article 180, par. 4, provides that the defendant in the principal case shall
be sentenced at least to a correctional penalty or a fine, or shall have been acquitted.
The witness who gave false testimony is liable even if his testimony was not considered by the
court.
Reason: It would seem that the law intends to punish the mere giving of false testimony.
Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendant. - Any person who shall give false
testimony in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period of prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), if the prosecution is for a felony punishable
by an afflictive penalty, and the penalty of arresto mayor in any other case.
False testimony favorable to the defendant is equally repugnant to the orderly administration
of justice.
While false testimony in favor of an accused may be less obnoxious than false testimony against
him, both forms of false testimony are equally repugnant to the orderly administration of justice,
and deserve to be rigorously repressed. (People vs. Reyes)
Reason for punishing the crime of false testimony.
False testimony is punished not because of the effect it actually produces, but because of its
tendency to favor or to prejudice the defendant. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of Spain)
False testimony by negative statement is in favor of defendant.
A witness who falsely testified that he neither saw nor was present at the killing of the deceased,
is guilty of false testimony because by not testifying for the prosecution, he favored the accused.
(Dec. Ct. of Spain)
The false testimony in favor of defendant need not directly influence the decision of acquittal.
The false testimony favorable to the defendant need not benefit the defendant.
Under Art. 181, it is sufficient that the false testimony was given with intent to favor the
defendant. In the case of People vs. Reyes, C.A, such intent is indicated by the repeated
statement of the accused that he was not interested in the prosecution of the defendant in the
criminal case where he gave the false testimony.
A statement by a witness that he is an expert in handwriting is a statement of a mere opinion,
the falsity of which is not sufficient to convict him.
Conviction or acquittal of defendant in principal case, not necessary.
· Note: Art. 181, it is sufficient that the defendant in the principal case is prosecuted for a felony
punishable by afflictive penalty or by other penalty.
· But the gravity of the crime for which the defendant was prosecuted in the case where the
false testimony was given should be shown in order to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed on the false witness.
The defendant who falsely testified in his own behalf in a criminal case is guilty of false
testimony favorable to the defendant.
Held: It must not be forgotten that the right of an accused person to testify in his own behalf is
secured to him, not that he may be enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to
enable him to spread upon the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will
tend to establish his innocence. (U.S. vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)
Note: It would seem that the ruling in the Soliman case should apply only when, as in that case,
the defendant voluntarily goes upon the witness stand and falsely imputes to some other person
the commission of a grave
offense. If he merely denies the commission of the crime or his participation therein, he should
not be prosecuted for false testimony.
Rectification made spontaneously after realizing the mistake is not false testimony.
On direct examination, the witness stated that the accused told him to get up for he had killed a
person. On cross-examination, the witness changed his testimony and stated he did not hear
clearly what the accused said.
Held: The witness is not liable, there being no sufficient evidence that he acted with malice or
with criminal intent to testify falsely. (People vs. Ambal, 69 Phil. 710)
Art. 182. False Testimony in Civil Case. - Any person found guilty of false testimony in a civil
case shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000), if the amount in controversy
shall exceed One million Pesos (P1,000,000), and the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000), if the amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount, or
cannot be estimated.
ELEMENTS
1. False testimony is given in a Civil Case;
2. Testimony Relates to the issues presented in sad case;
3. Offender knows that the testimony is false;
4. Testimony is Malicious; and
5. It was given with intent to affect the issues in said case.
Suspension of Criminal Action
Pending the determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies in the civil case, the criminal
action for false testimony must be suspended.
Art. 183. False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. - The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correctional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly make untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of
the falsehoods mentioned made it this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall
suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
Acts Punished
1. Falsely Testifying under oath; or
2. Making a false affidavit.
Note: The False testimony should not be in a judicial proceeding.
PERJURY, definition
A crime other than false testimony under Arts. 180 - 182; it is an offense which covers false oaths
not taken in the course of judicial proceedings.
ELEMENTS OF PERJURY
1. Offender Makes a statement under oath or executes an affidavit upon a material matter;
2. Statement or affidavit is made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oaths;
3. Offender makes a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in the statement or
affidavit;
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is Required by law; made for legal
purpose.
OATH, Definition
Any form of attestation by which a person signifies that he is bound by conscience to perform an
act faithfully and truthfully.
AFFIDAVIT, Definition
Sworn statement in writing; declaration in writing, made upon oath before an authorized
magistrate or officer.
NO PERJURY THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR IMPRUDENCE
This is because of the requirement that the assertion of a falsehood be made WILLFULLY and
DELIBERATELY. Hence, good faith or lack of malice is a defense in perjury.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY
Subornation of perjury is committed by a person who knowingly and willfully procures another
to swear falsely and the witness suborned does testify under circumstances rendering him guilty
of perjury as a principal by inducement.
No perjury if statement is not important
There is no perjury if the sworn statement is not important, essential or material.
Title:
JASON ALVARES PARAN, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MANGUIAT
and THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
GR:
G.R. Nos. 200021-22. Date:
Ponente:
August 28, 2019.
Ticker:
FACTS
On March 22, 2008, between 10PM and 11PM, a Barangay Tanod from Brgy. Solis, Municipality
of Balete, Province of Batangas, visited the Balete Police Station and reported a dead person
lying on the street of Brgy. Solis.
[Three policemen] SPO2 Melencio Landicho (SPO2 Landicho), SPO1 Paran, and three
more policemen stationed at the Balete Police Station, proceeded to the alleged crime
scene to verify the report.
In Brgy. Solis, the policemen found the lifeless body of Damiano M. Manguiat (Damiano)
sprawled on the roadside near the store of Brgy. Captain Vicente Bathan (Brgy. Captain
Bathan), the Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Solis. Later, the policemen found the cadaver of
Damiano’s older brother, Victorio M. Manguiat (Victorio), in the forest.
The widow of Damiano, Erlinda, filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit wherein she accused
Brgy. Captain of Bathan and six other persons for the killing of his late husband and his brother
based on the following:
● On the night of March 22, he asked his sons to fetch their father and uncle at the house
of “Lando.”
● When his sons returned, they told her that they saw the Brgy. Captain together with
several Tanods and private persons mauling and shooting Damiano and Victorio.
● Fearing that they would suffer the same fate, they decided to leave and fled.
Erlinda and Lary filed their respective affidavits to believe the statements made by SPO1 Paran
saying that he was the one who personally informed the family of their father and uncle’s
death. Lary claimed that he does not know and never talked to SPO1 Paran and it was only
Landicho who went and talked to him.
Erlinda filed before the Ombudsman an administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Oppression, and a
criminal complaint for perjury.
Ombudsman: Guilty of simple dishonesty and suspended Paran for one month and one day
without pay. Further in its resolution, they ruled that there is probable cause to believe that
Paran committed Perjury thus the recommendation of filing before an appropriate court.
ISSUE
WON the Ombudsman seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
there is probable cause to believe that SPO1 Paran committed the crime of perjury.
RULING & DOCTRINE
The Court denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
In finding probable cause, the Ombudsman in effect ruled that these elements of
Perjury are likely present in this case. There is no compelling reason for the Court to
interfere with these findings.
First, it is not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit wherein he declared that
he personally informed Lary that his father was killed. It is also not disputed that SPO1
Paran executed the said affidavit after he learned that Lary executed an affidavit
claiming that he witnessed how his father and uncle were killed. As observed by the
Ombudsman, SPO1 Paran's affidavit in effect refuted the statements made by Lary by
suggesting that the latter did not actually witness the incident and that in fact he was
in shock at that time. The purpose of SPO1 Paran's affidavit, therefore, is to attack the
credibility of Lary, who claims to be an eyewitness. Thus, there is reason to believe that
SPO1 Paran's affidavit was executed upon a material matter.
Second, it is clear from SPO1 Paran’s affidavit that the same was sworn before the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Province of Batangas, a person authorized to
receive an oath. Further, it is also clear that it was filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas in Tanauan City, Batangas.
Third, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood in his affidavit. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, Lary’s statement that
he only talked with SPO2 Landicho, and no one else, was cor- roborated by SPO2
Landicho himself in his own affidavit. Further, contrary to SPO1 Paran's allegations,
Lary's admission that SPO2 Landicho indeed went to his house on March 23, 2008 at
around 2:00 a.m. did not automatically confirm his own insinuation that Lary's actuation
at that time was of a person who was shocked to learn of his fatherÊs death rather than
a person who had witnessed the incident.
In his affidavit, SPO2 Landicho stated that Lary did not immediately say anything after
he told him of his father’s demise. Instead, Lary only replied later that he will just go
after them to Brgy. Solis. While it is true that Lary's reaction may be interpreted as
shock, the same reaction may also be viewed in other ways, such as fear. Lary's reaction
may even be interpreted as a realization, after confirmation by the police officers, that
what he had witnessed was indeed the brutal killing of his father. What is clear is that
Lary's response to SPO2 Landicho, as well as his initial nonresponse, are insufficient to
conclude that Lary only learned of the incident from SPO2 Landicho. Consequently, the
likelihood that SPO1 Paran deliberately lied in his affidavit to discredit the statements
made by Lary still subsists.
This likelihood is sufficient for purposes of filing of the Information as probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt.
It is enough that the pieces of evidence engenders a well- founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.27
Lastly, it is clear that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was made for a legal purpose. After all, he
would not have filed the subject affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Batangas if this was not the case.
In fine, the Court opines that there is sufficient basis for the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause for Perjury against SPO1 Paran. Further, SPO1 Paran failed to show that
the assailed Ombudsman resolution and order were tainted by grave abuse of
discretion. Instead, the instant petition is bereft of any statement or sufficient allegation
purportedly showing that the Ombudsman exercised its power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Consequently, the instant petition
must be denied.
NOTES
- Elements of Perjury as discussed in the case:
-
In this regard, the following are the elements of the crime of Perjury, to wit: (1) that the
accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
(2) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath; (3) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (4) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Title:
LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO UMALE
GR:
168437
Ponente:
VELASCO, JR., J. Ticker
Date:
January 8, 2009
Kungwari may nangyaring meeting pero wala talaga
FACTS
·
On the basis of the affidavit-complaint of Manuel Torralba and two other members of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. Cabanbanan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, the Office of the Ombudsman
for Luzon filed an information for falsification of public document under Art. 171(2) of the RPC
against petitioners Laurinio Goma and Natalio Umale.
·
Specifically, the complaint alleged that Laurinio and Natalio, as barangay chairperson and
secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution, allocating the amount of PhP 18,000 as
disbursement for a seminar for the two officials.
·
prosecution presented the three complaining witnesses, who testified that, for lack of
quorum, no actual session of the sanggunian of Brgy. Cabanbanan took place on the day the
disputed resolution was allegedly passed.
·
On that day, according to the three, they went to the barangay health center to attend a
pre-scheduled session which, however, did not push through as, apart from them, only one
other member.
·
On the face of the resolution appears the signature of Natalio and Laurinio, in their
respective capacities as barangay secretary and chairperson. It also bore the official seal of the
barangay.
·
the sanggunian held a special session during which it passed a resolution therein stating
that no session was held
·
In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting having affixed their signatures on
the adverted falsified resolution, alleged that said resolution was nothing more than a mere
proposal or a draft which Natalio, as was the practice, prepared and signed a week before the
scheduled September 24, 1995. They also alleged that the same resolution was not the
enabling instrument for the release of the seminar funds.
RTC and CA
·
Guilty for falsification of public documents under art 171
ISSUE
(a) whether Res. T-95 is a public document (Yes)
(b) whether they violated Art. 171(2) of the RPC (Yes)
RULING & DOCTRINE
·
public documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country."
·
Verily, resolutions and ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian panlalawigan,
panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come within the pale of the above provision, such issuances
being their written official acts in the exercise of their legislative authority.
·
As a matter of common practice, an action appropriating money for some public purpose
or creating liability takes the form of an ordinance or resolution.
·
a public document as "a document of public interest issued or published by a political
body or otherwise connected with public business."
The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, as above defined and
penalized, are:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public
2. That he takes advantage of his official position
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.
·
All the elements are present in the case
·
A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying certificatory and attestative
signatures, let alone impressed with the dry seal of the barangay.
·
It would not also include such particulars as the attendance of all members of the
sanggunian and the identity of the moving and seconding kagawads relative to the passage of
the resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they have been rehearsed or planned
beforehand.
·
Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of the false
document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act.
·
Erring public officers’ failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not
determinative of their guilt or innocence.
·
The simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of
a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes
the crime of falsification.
·
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third
party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to
maintain a charge for falsification of public documents.
·
What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the undermining of
the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein.
·
the controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the existence
of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial.
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Title:
Lumancas vs. Intas 347 SCRA 22
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Title:
Recebido vs. People 346 SCRA 881
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
-
Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
Separate opinions
Title:
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. People
GR:
G.R. No. 192565
Date:
Ponente:
BRION, J
Ticker
FEBRUARY 28, 2012
FACTS
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe.. The first complaint filed before the RTC of Pasay. The second complaint was filed to the
MeTC, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that
she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the
Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and
not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that
has jurisdiction over the perjury case
she argued: the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of
perjury—the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood—was not alleged with particularity
without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another
court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false
testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case
since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati
City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.
RTC Makati: dismissing the petition for certiorari. It anchored its decision in the case Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy - that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred
ISSUE
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati
City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.
RULING & DOCTRINE
Yes, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - Subject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred
that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of
the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try
and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold.
First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court
can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. 12
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having
an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.
Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should
be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;
thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed
and sworn before a duly authorized person.
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states: Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction
of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.Both provisions
categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance
of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under
oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that
is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at
the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking
of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
NOTES
- Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false document in a
judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where
the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.
-
Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC: It should be noted that
perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised
Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish
origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from
American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace
perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined
in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on false testimony “are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697” on
perjury.”
Title:
Villanueva vs. SoJustice - Will make it shorter - BRB
GR:
475 SCRA 495
Date:
November 18, 2005
Ponente:
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Ticker
Pirmahan ng Agreement
FACTS
On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before
the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain
importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC). The matter involved 151.070 tons of
magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany.
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Dept. of Trade and
Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case for violation of R.A. No. 7843, the AntiDumping Law. In Feb. 1997, the BIS submitted its report to the Tariff Commission, declaring
that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of refractory bricks from
Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as
the normal value of the imported goods.
The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could
respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter
amicably.
A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice Pres. and Assistant General Manager Villanueva
and Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager Von Sprengeisen and
Sales Manager Gonzales, on the other.
During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported by the HTC
at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure
the local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and protracted
litigation. HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its importation and sale of
refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and
regulations. Borgonia prepared and signed a compromise agreement agreed upon which
Villanueva and Borgonia signed. Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the
agreement to HTC by Von Sprengeisen’s approval.
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by
inserting the phrase “based on the findings of the BIS'' in para. 1 thereof. Villanueva and
Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered. Gonzales received the agreement
and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. The agreement already signed by Von
Sprengeisen. Gonzales, who had also signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary
Public De Zuñiga notarized the agreement. Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized
Agreement to HTC.
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997
hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a representative of HTC
appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to
the Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the
BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC
received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the decision
to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and noted that the
normal value of the said importation under the decision of the Special Committee based on the
BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to
Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that
such decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:
1.THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR
THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
2.THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT AGREED UPON WAS
DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that Villanueva violated
Art. 172 of the RPC when he surreptitiously inserted the phrase “based on the findings of the
BIS” in the agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and despite
their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS.
Appended to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which he
alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its Report declaring
that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton;
before HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose
of finding the best solution to the pending case before the Commission; he and Gonzales
attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a compromise, that the parties
will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based
refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the draft of the compromise agreement
prepared by Villanueva, he approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a
compromise agreement already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his review, approval and
signature; believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the contents of the first
compromise agreement, he signed the second agreement without reading it; when he
received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff Commission based on the
compromise agreement of the parties wherein the committee adopted the findings and
recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric
ton), he was shocked because he never agreed to the use of such findings for the reformation
of its price policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva to put behind
them the findings of the BIS; he called up Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him
despite several attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened, he had the draft of the
first compromise agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the same; it was only
sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing the draft and was appalled
to discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first draft of the compromise
agreement; this made him conclude and confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru deceit and
fraud, induced him to sign the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the HTC.
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice
President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against
Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a
complaint-affidavit executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von
Sprengeisen made the following false statements in the Urgent MotionIn his Counter-Affidavit,
Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the other for a conference was not a material
matter. Since the first draft of the Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he
asked the complainant to send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature. He
further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise agreement, he did
not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the same provisions in the faxed copy.
He did not suggest that the phrase “based on the findings of the BIS” be inserted in the hard
copy of the agreement because he and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the normal
price of the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would have been senseless
of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any willful and deliberate assertion
of any falsehood as to any material fact.13
Investigating Prosecutor Supnet found no probable cause for perjury against the private
respondent and recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
Second Assistant City Prosecutor Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and
found probable cause for perjury against the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit
of Merit that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and deceit.
According to the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private respondent
“thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise Agreement” was a deliberate assertion of
a falsehood, designed as it was merely to give the BIS the impression that private respondent
was misled into agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation
was perjurious, considering that the private respondent had sufficient time to pass upon the
Compromise Agreement and could have availed the services of legal minds who could review
the terms and conditions thereof before signing the same; hence, she recommended the
reversal of Prosecutor Supnet’s resolution and the filing of the information. The City Prosecutor
approved the recommendation of the Second Assistant City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an
Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila.
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor on Sep. 20, 2002. According to the Justice Secretary, the
complainant failed to establish the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the said
assertions were willful and deliberate.
“WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila is hereby REVERSED.
The City Prosecutor is directed to withdraw the information for perjury against respondent
Horst-Kessler.
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the resolution of the Justice
Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the said resolution.
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Justice
Secretary.
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment on the
petition, the parties had agreed to put behind them the findings and recommendations of the
BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The appellate court stated that its finding is
buttressed by the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise
agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself “to reform its pricing policy
and structure with respect to refractory products being imported to and sold in the Philippines
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing rules and
requirements.” The CA emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no meeting
of the minds of the parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase “based on the findings of
the BIS” in the revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have been perjury when
the private respondent executed the Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
and/or Vacate Judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the private respondent’s
indictment for perjury.
RULING & DOCTRINE
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an
affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of
the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer
the respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the perjury are:
a. That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.
b. That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer oath.
c. That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
d. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for
a legal purpose.
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be
deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness
that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a
statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to “knowingly.” “Deliberately” implies
meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused knows his
statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A
false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe
those statements to be true.
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by
his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective
falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he
claimed not to know.
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements
of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must
show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.
The term “material matter” is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which
tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen
the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence
of any witness who testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or
tendency to influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or the other.
The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than probability. The
prosecution need not prove that the false testimony actually influenced the Commission.
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC and his affidavit,
that it was the petitioner who invited him to a conference. The truth of the matter is that it
was Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is of de minimis
importance because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having been prodded by the
Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead of going through the tribulations and
expenses of a protracted litigation. No adverse inference (related to the merits of their
respective contention in this case) can be ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After
all, parties are even urged to settle cases amicably.
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her resolution:
“The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent to the meeting may not be a
deliberate lie. Respondent may not have known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able
to talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who extended the invitation.
Moreover, the identity of the one who initiated the meeting is not material considering that
there was a meeting of the minds of the Parties.”
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the copy of the first
agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and that, contrary to the allegations
of the private respondent, such agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by the
petitioner. As gleaned from page two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence
certificates of the petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot
as yet be notarized. As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was transmitted to him for
his personal review, and if he found it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare
and sign the agreement and give it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars
of his community tax certificate indicated in the final copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the compromise
agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private respondent was of prime
importance because only such person should be charged for perjury. The private respondent
erroneously stated in his Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who
prepared the agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia who
prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private respondent cannot be held
liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the agreement and not the petitioner.
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information Group of RCP,
whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice President and Assistant General
Manager, Borgonia’s superior. Unless and until approved by the petitioner, any agreement
prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioner’s imprimatur. Borgonia was
merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner had the
compromise agreement prepared under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be
concluded that the private respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that
the agreement was prepared by the petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim that, during the conference, he and the
private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS report, the normal value of the imported
refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as basis for
the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private respondent had
agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima facie findings of the BIS, the normal
value of the goods per meter ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was
below the fair market value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its
price policy and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No. 7843 and rules
and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to comply with its
undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution without need of demand.
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein the agreement
of the petitioner and the private respondent arrived at during the conference.
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was not only practical
and fair, but in accord with law as well.
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his
Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the petitioner put behind them the BIS report,
and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations implementing the same to
determine the base price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
NOTES
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 76999 is AFFIRMED.
Title:
People vs. Choa 399 SCRA 145
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Title:
Choa vs. Chiongson 253 SCRA 371
GR:
Adm. Mat. No. MTJ-95-1063
Date:
February 9, 1996
Ponente:
Davide, Jr., J
Ticker
[LENI] Kulay rosas ang bukas;
Nahuli na may kabet dahil sa
notary public.
FACTS
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainant’s wife, Leni OngChoa, through the filing of a letter-complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor of Bacolod City.
This arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainant’s Petition
for Naturalization. Alfonso Choa (complainant) was charged with perjury.
Choa claimed a different address from where they are currently staying. They used to stay in
the address he claimed five (5) years ago or earlier - this is contrary to his aforesaid allegations
in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street, Greenplains
Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one
Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children with
her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been
separated from bed and boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods and/or immoral and
improper conduct are grounds for disqualifications [sic] of [sic] becoming a citizen of the
Philippines.
TC found the complainant guilty of perjury.
Deputy Court Administrator dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence this case.
ISSUE
WON Choa indeed committed perjury.
RULING & DOCTRINE
The Court also dismissed the case for lack of merit. Good faith and good motive did not
seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the
questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have
been committed by reason of such untruthful statements.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Bautista
(C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his affidavit before a
competent officer authorized to administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing falsity is required by law.
It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made
under oath and before a competent officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the
records. This petition for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent for the
grant of Philippine citizenship.
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Title:
Burgos vs. Aquino 249 SCRA 504
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Title:
Saavedra vs. DOJ 226 SCRA 438
GR:
Date:
Ponente:
Ticker
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING & DOCTRINE
NOTES
- Other details (Definition of an unfamiliar word, detail that may be crucial i.e. color of a
thing mentioned or name of the doctor or judge, etc)
- Separate opinions
Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence
shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48
hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe to in said article.
WHAT IS SPECIAL TIME ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY OF PRISONER?
● Deduction of ⅕ of the period of the sentence of a prisoner having evaded the service of
his sentence during the calamity or catastrophe mentioned in Article 158, gives himself
up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of the proclamation by the
President announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe.
● Deduction is based on the original sentence, not of the unexpired portion.
Article 156. Delivery of prisoners from jails. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove
from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such
person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used, the penalty of arresto
mayor shall be imposed.
If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by
surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
ELEMENTS:
1. That there is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment.
2. That the offender removes therefrom such person, or helps the escape of such person.
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS:
● A public officer has the obligation to see to it that the prisoner does not escape.
● Committed through:
○ Conniving
○ Through negligence
DELIVERING PRISONER FROM JAIL V. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS:
Delivering prisoners
Infidelity in the custody
Both involve prisoners who escaped
The escape was made possible through the acts of another person
May be committed by any person
Offender must be a public officer
EVASION THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
● The prisoner was not intentionally allowed to escape, but through the public officer’s
negligencem the prisoner did so anyway.
OTHER NOTES:
● The person confined may be a mere detention prisoner. Of course, the prisoner may also
be by final judgement.
● This article is applicable even if the prisoner is in the hospital or asylum when he is
removed or when the offender helps his escape, because it is considered as an extension
of the penal institution.
● Offense under 156 is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person
therein confined or helps him escape.
● If offender is public officer who had the prisoner in his custody or charge, he is liable for
infidelity in the custody of a prisoner.
● The guard of the jail, who is off duty, may be held liable for delivering prisoner from jail.
● If the accused removed from jail or penal establishment a person confined therein or
helped the latter’s escape by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery, the penalty is
higher. Hence, it is not an element of the offense.
● The bribery is not the offender’s act of receiving a bribe.
● Employment of deceit is not an element to this offense.
● A person delivering a prisoner from jail may be held liable as accessory if the crime
committed is treason, murder, or parricide because he assists in the escape of the
principal.
Art. 157. Evasion of Service of Sentence
• Elements:
1. Offender is a convict by final judgment;
2. He is serving sentence which consists in the deprivation of liberty;
3. He evades service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment.
• Circumstances Qualifying the Offense:
a) By means of unlawful entry (scaling a wall or barrier)
b) By means of breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roof, floor
c) By using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence, or intimidation
d) Through connivance w/ other convicts or employees of the penal institution
• The following cannot commit evasion of service of sentence:
a) Accuse who escapes during appeal or detention prisoner
b) Minor delinquents
c) Deportees
d) Persons convicted under this article are disqualified from the benefits of ISLaw
• Escape – flee from; to avoid; to get out of the way, as to flee; to avoid arrest
• Art. 157 is applicable to sentence of “distierro
- Construing the word “sufriendo privation de libertad” which means
deprivation of liberty; and, distierro is a deprivation of liberty
> CASE: People vs. Abilong
• Three Forms:
1) Art. 157 – By simply leaving or escaping
2) Art. 158 – By failing to return within 48 hrs. after having left the penal
establishment due to calamities
3) Art. 159 – By violation one’s conditional pardon
Art. 158. asas. – • Elements
1. Offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution;
2. There is disorder, resulting from –
a. conflagration;
b. earthquake;
c. explosion; or
d. similar catastrophe; or
e. mutiny in which he has not participated;
3. He evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is
confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny;
4. He fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of
such calamity
- Offender must be a convict by final judgment
- If the offender fails to give himself up, he gets am increased penalty. Increase of
1/5 of the time still remaining to be served. However, a deduction of 1/5 if he gives
himself up within 48 hours.
- What is punished is not the leaving of the penal institution but the failure of the
convict to give himself up within 48 hours.
- If he did not return within the 48 hours, he shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of his
remaining sentence, which in no case shall exceed 6 months.
- If he gives up himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance
of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe, a
reduction of 1/5 of the period of his original sentence (not the remaining sentence).
- If the convict, despite the calamity or catastrophe, chose to stay in the place of his
confinement, a deduction of 2/5 of the period of his original sentence.