21/07/2021
“Perils at sea with X-Press Pearl as a case study” - The Morning - Sri Lanka News
In the case of the MV X-Press Pearl, the following are the facts of the Vessel and her voyage in question i.e.
MV X-Press Pearl is a three month old ship, 186 metres in length, 34.8 metres in breadth and 17.9 metres in depth with a 37,000 metric tonnes (MT) carrying
capacity and the ability to accommodate 2,700 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs)
The Vessel is operated by the X-Press Feeders of the Sea Consortium Group and was employed in a regular service connecting Singapore, Tanjung Pelepas
(Malaysia), Jebel Ali (United Arab Emirates {UAE}), Port Hamad (Qatar), Hazira (Gujarat, India), Colombo and Port Kelang (Malaysia) on an approximately 30 days
round voyage
This was the third time the MV X-Press Pearl called on the Colombo Port in her short life of three months
The ship’s crew had noticed a leak from a container after leaving Jebel Ali in UAE for Port Hamad in Qatar. It was identified to contain nitric acid
In Hamad, Qatar, the ship’s captain had requested the Port to arrange the discharge of the container which had been refused owing to the unavailability of
resources
The Port of Hazira, another Port in Gujarat, India, refused to discharge the said container for reasons unknown; perhaps due to insufficient time
Finally, She arrived in Colombo, Sri Lanka, anchorage as the next scheduled Port and not as “a port of refuge”
What happened thereafter is widely publicised but with numerous speculations. Let us explain the standard practices.
When a Vessel calls on a scheduled port of call on her regular service, she would comply with
normal port entry formalities which includes the notice of arrival, International Ships and Ports
Security (ISPS) Clearance – a responsibility delegated to the Navy (SLN) in Sri Lanka, the
declaration of cargoes, stores (items for the ship’s use), and the crew’s effects. As for the
cargo, there could be much more detailed information declared by the ship’s operator, 48 hours
before arrival when possible, through electronic means or through the local agent, including a
declaration of dangerous goods.
Having complied with such formalities and agents having attended to the required advance
payments to the port authority and/or to the applicable container terminal where the Vessel
would be berthed, she would be listed in the schedule of berthing. On arrival in the vicinity of
the port, the Vessel would be either berthed directly if the scheduled berth is available or
instructed to anchor at a designated anchorage outside the harbour, awaiting the berth.
It must be pointed out that the carriage of dangerous cargo onboard ships is a very common
occurrence. Identifying the dangers involved in the process, the entire membership of States of
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) which is the body of the United Nations (UN) on
maritime matters, has agreed to adopt and comply with a set of mandatory requirements
named the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) which deals with all the dangerous cargoes carried on ships in packaged form, the world
over. They are listed by their UN numbers and categorised into nine different classes, namely explosives, gases, compressed, liquefied or dissolved under pressure,
flammable liquids, flammable solids or substances, oxidising substances (agents) and organic peroxides, toxic and infectious substances, radioactive substances,
corrosives and miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles, and describes the methods of packing, labelling, segregation and emergency procedures in the
case of a fire or a spill.
No country can handle dangerous cargo in packaged form without adhering to the said IMDG Code. The responsibility of shippers is to ensure that the cargo is
correctly packed, labelled, separated and segregated from possible contaminants or reactors as described in the Code. The smaller, individual packages of cargo are
then packed into containers, if they are to be shipped by container ships. If a container is loaded with dangerous cargo, what other cargoes can be carried in the
same shipping container is described in the Code and to be strictly complied with. Thereafter, how different shipping containers with dangerous cargoes can be
loaded onto a Vessel with proper segregation, etc., as described in the Code, is to be adhered to and pre-planned by the cargo planners of the shipping line or on
behalf of the shipping line, by a competent party like terminal operators. What dangerous cargoes can be carried together in the same hold, what must be carried in
separate holds or what cannot be carried even in adjacent holds, what has to be carried on deck, or what cargoes cannot be carried unless special safety and
pollution prevention arrangements are available on the Vessel, etc., are all described in the IMDG Code. The compliance with the provisions of the IMDG Code is to
be ensured by the ship’s master before loading any dangerous cargo onto the ship.
The narration of the incident
In the case of the MV X-Press Pearl, with a leaking nitric acid container, it seems that the Master of the Ship has acted prudently in reaching out for shore assistance
from the subsequent ports of call when there was still no fire on board. Then, the following events unfolded in Colombo.
On arrival in Colombo on 19 May midnight or in the early hours of 20 May, the Vessel had been asked to drop anchor North West of the Colombo Harbour as her
scheduled berth at the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) was not available until the late evening of 20 May. During that stay at anchor, on 20 May
morning, the Local Agent of the Vessel was supposed to have informed the Harbour Master of Colombo by electronic mail that there is a leaky nitric acid container
onboard which needed reworking upon berthing. A little after that, the Master of the Vessel was also supposed to have informed the Port Control by very high
frequency (VHF) about a probable fire in the cargo hold number two. Subsequently, the Master had reported that the ship’s crew had released carbon dioxide from
the fixed firefighting system of the Vessel into the No. 2 cargo hold in an attempt to douse the fire. On 20 May afternoon, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) and the
SLN, in consultation with the other relevant agencies, had sent a team to inspect the situation on board the Vessel in order to decide the next course of action.
By late evening the same day, the ship had again reported a fire onboard and requested assistance upon which the SLPA and the SLN had dispatched the firefighting
tug and some other Vessels which apparently managed to contain the fire in about two hours by applying foam. Boundary cooling had continued throughout the night.
The wind had been very strong and the sea very rough by this time. In the prevalent weather, the SLPA had deployed two more tugs in turns to assist with the
boundary cooling. Unfortunately, by 21 May, the fire had reignited, which the SLPA managed to keep under control until the evening of 22 May, when a specialised tug
operated by the salvage company that was appointed by the Vessel Owner arrived at the scene and took over the firefighting. On 24 May, extremely strong winds that
prevailed by then had rendered the fight against the fire an impossible task. On the morning of 25 May, the explosion of some containers had taken place and the
Ship’s crew and some members of the salvage party who were onboard at that time decided to abandon the Ship. The Vessels deployed by the SLPA carried out the
evacuation.
In the next few days, the fire engulfed the entire Ship, destroying practically all containers on deck and the accommodation too. The heat emanated by the fire and the
explosions that happened onboard may have impacted the structural integrity of the Vessel.
Why did the Ship Owner not make arrangements to discharge the leaking container long before the matter escalated to the level it finally did? What stern actions
could the Master have taken to mitigate the situation with a leaking chemical container, in order to ensure the safety of the crew, the Vessel and the environment?
Could the Ship’s Agent in Colombo have done something differently to obtain earlier assistance for the Vessel, had he known the exact situation on the Vessel? What
could the SLPA have done if such a request was made? What level of a situation could Sri Lanka have handled with the available resources? Does Sri Lanka have a
proper response plan to handle the kind of maritime emergencies the country would have to face in its journey to become a maritime hub as envisaged? Does Sri
Lanka have the necessary regulatory and legal framework to deal with such maritime emergencies? These seem to be some of the questions that are circulating in
the public domain in the aftermath.
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions can be rather complex and need a holistic understanding of all the circumstances, taking into account the practicalities,
limitations, available resources, other possible risks involved in handling such matters and both internal and external laws and obligations.
However, in that context, it is our opinion that the following areas need immediate attention and actions following the lessons learnt from not only the MV X-Press
Pearl incident but the MT New Diamond, MSC Daniela and numerous other incidents that have happened in and around Sri Lanka.
https://www.themorning.lk/perils-at-sea-with-x-press-pearl-as-a-case-study/
1/1