A.C. No. 5624
January 20, 2004
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly
violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and
bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the
legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are
estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely,
Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years
old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the
annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case
related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of
Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v.
Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s
residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two
minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an
alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion
for temporary child custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed
her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the
resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November
29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to
respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the
ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men,
suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children.
He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter
could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be
entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally
served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order.3 In order to diffuse the
tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night
on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was
entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI
Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van
arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to
Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room,
where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, a verified petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his
right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution.
In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification dated January 18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had
been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did
not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’
Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused
the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBPCBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of
suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking
the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This,
however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution
several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No.
3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second,
when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to
recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.1âwphi1 The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that
counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must
never be at the expense of the truth.8 Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should
be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a "sly
manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures
to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.
However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension
for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense
committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo,
p. 1.
2 Id.,
p. 14.
3 Id.,
p. 9.
4 Id.,
p. 10.
5 Id.,
p. 13.
6 IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline Report and Recommendation, p. 9.
7 Rollo,
p. 10.
8 Muñoz
v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, 28 September 1973, 53 SCRA 190.
9 Surigao
Mineral v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, 9 January 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In
re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v.
Gica, G.R. No. L-36800, 21 October 1974, 60 SCRA 235; In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
376 [1922]; Sulit v. Tiangco, G.R. No. L-35555, 20 July 1982, 115 SCRA 207;
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. L-79690-707, 7 October 1988, 166 SCRA 316.
10 National
Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610; People v. Taneo, G.R. No.
117683, 16 January 1998, 284 SCRA 251.
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent. [A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
FACTS:
Complainant and Respondent are estranged couple with two children ages 5 and 3 who are in the
former's custody. Sometime in December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody but he failed
to show the original copy of such. Complainant's lawyer did not also receive any motion filed by
respondent. Upon close examination, found out that it bore two dates, sensing something amiss
she refused to give custody of the children. In Jan. 15, 2002, respondent accompanied by armed
men supposed to be NBI arrived and demanded for the surrender of custody while the
complainant and children are in the school. Complainant then sought the assistance of the Tanjay
City Police and at the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate
courts resolution/order. In order to difuse the tension complainant allow children to sleep with
the respondent within the City. She later on received information that the children were to be
taken to Bacolod City which prompted her to go to the hotel where the children are and
transfered to other room. Respondent filed with RTC Dumaguete a verified petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged
Court of Appeals resolution meanwhile the complainant was able to obtained a Certificaiton
from the CA that no such resolution had been issued. Respondent did not appear during the
hearing. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in
and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted
to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and
attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Ruling: Yes. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The
time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could
easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost
zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the
Code of professional Responsibility states: Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or
oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may
be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly
manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondents actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is
prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120074 June 10, 1997
LEAH P. ADORIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, respondent.
PHILIP SEE, intervenor.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to set aside the Order of Judge
Lucas P. Bersamin1 dated May 5, 1995 insofar as it holds petitioner in direct contempt
and sentences her therefor. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion For Inhibition And For Re-raffle Of Cases is
hereby granted.
The complainant Philip See y Go and his former private prosecutor, Atty.
Leah P. Adorio, of the King & Adorio Law Offices, with address at No. 40
Landargun Street, Quezon City, are hereby found guilty of direct contempt
of this Court for disrespect to the Court and its Presiding Judge and are
accordingly sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) days in the City
Jail of Quezon City and to pay a fine of P200.00 each.
For the purpose of the execution of their sentence, complainant Philip See
y Go and Atty. Leah P. Adorio are hereby directed to appear in person
before the Court on May 23, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
Pending execution of the sentence, the transmittal of the records to the
Honorable Executive Judge, through the Office of the Clerk of Court, for
purposes of re-raffle shall be held in abeyance.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner was counsel for Philip G. See, the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22 pending before the sala
of respondent Judge.3
Pre-trial in these cases was concluded on January 16, 1995. Upon agreement of the
parties, trial on the merits was set on March 8, 15 and 22, all at 8:30 a.m.4
Unknown to petitioner, counsel for the accused filed several requests addressed to the
Branch Clerk of Court for the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum requiring officials of
several banks to bring before the court on March 8, 1995 at 8:30 a.m., microfilm copies
of various checks. The subpoenas duces tecum were issued on February 6, 7 and 14,
1995. 5
On March 8, 1995, which petitioner supposed to be the date of the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence, petitioner came to court and was surprised by the presence of
the bank officials therein.6 During tile hearing, respondent Judge called for a recess to
enable counsel for the accused to confer with the bank officers.7 When the case was
again called, the following arguments took place:
Atty. Adorio:
Before we call our witness, your honor, may I now make of
record that I was surprised with the move this morning of all
the bank officers, I was not informed about any request for
subpoena to the bank officers today. No copy of such
request was given to the Private Prosecutor. And I also
notice, your honor, that the subpoena or rather no copy
issued by this court was ever given to the private prosecutor.
Atty. Rivera knows, he had already entered his appearance
and he knows my address, why did he not furnish me a copy
of his request for subpoena, your honor, considering that I
have the right to examine his request, the materiality of his
request. I would like also to make of record, your honor, why
they keep it as a secret, as a rule, the opposing party must
be a party to whatever paper the other party may file, it
seems that Atty. Rivera is hiding something from us.
Whatever he wants to ask the Court, I am entitled to know.
Atty. Rivera:
I don't think there is a reason or there is a need to be
furnished with my request for subpoena, that is the reason
why she was not furnished, your honor. Besides, my request
for subpoena this morning is not a litigated motion. I made
this request for advance in order that, when the defense turn
to present evidence, it won't be delayed because of nonavailability of these exhibits.
Atty. Adorio:
This is our day of presenting evidence, your honor. This is
only my observation, your honor and may I request Atty.
Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court.
Atty. Rivera:
May I request for particular rule for that. . . .
Atty. Adorio:
Your honor, copies must be given to the opposing counsel,
there is a ruling on that your honor. . . . .
Atty. Rivera:
This is not a litigated motion your honor
Court:
What is the problem of Atty. Adorio?
Atty. Adorio:
My only observation, your honor. And may I request Atty.
Rivera to give us all copies he submits to the Court.
Atty. Rivera:
May I request for that particular rule for furnishing request for
subpoena to the other counsel, your honor. . . .
Court:
What is this rule, will you cite the rule so that we can
examine your protest you are insinuating to the Court that
there was something here, we don't even know the request
for subpoena. If anyone of my staff is. . . . towards the other
side, you call me I can discipline them. . . .
Atty. Adorio:
There was an instance, your honor, when this case was
called by the Clerk for arraignment, the Clerk would say that
the accused would be coming. And one time, your honor, the
Court already issued an Order of arrest, and it was already
past 10:00 o'clock in the morning when the accused arrived.
. . .8
Petitioner was apparently referring to an incident that allegedly occurred on July 13,
1994, the date set for the accused's arraignment. According to petitioner, the accused
failed to appear in court on said date even after the third call at around 11:00 a.m.
Consequently, the Court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
confiscation/cancellation of the accused's bail bond. The clerk in charge of the record
then went to the door separating the courtroom and the staff's office and whispered to
someone in the office. After two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her seat, went
back to the door, and announced to the Court that the accused would be late.
Respondent Judge replied that the Court will wait for the accused.9
However, on March 8, 1995, Philip See allegedly examined the record but found that
the incidents which purportedly transpired during the arraignment were not reflected
therein. 10
The above revelations by Atty. Adorio prompted the following response from respondent
Judge:
Court:
Will you call everybody, all the staff inside . . . and you point
to me who is that . . . ? If you want me to be disqualified in
these cases, you make it in writing. You file your motion to
inhibit, I will disqualify myself because I don't want to hear
such accusations. Any participation of my staff which I am
now parading before you. . . I don't like that kind of
accusation.
Atty. Rivera:
I will join the court.
Court:
Order
As prayed for, the private prosecutor is hereby directed to
file a Request for inhibition in writing stating the grounds.
Pending consideration of the Request for Inhibition, hearing
is hereby suspended.
So ordered. 11
Pursuant to said order, petitioner filed a "Motion for Inhibition and for Re-Raffle of Case"
in behalf of her client, alleging that:
The filing of the request for issuance of subpoena duces tecum and the
issuance of the subpoena without notice on the private prosecutor were
irregular for the following reasons:
[a] The pre-trial of the case had been terminated and the evidence for the
prosecution was scheduled to be heard on March 8, 1995. Thus, it was
plaintiff's turn to present evidence. Whatever request defendant wanted to
make with the court which would affect the right of the plaintiff to present
evidence on the date scheduled would therefore be of notice to private
prosecutor so that no surprises would result and so that plaintiff could also
prepare questions for these bank officers involved and make use of their
presence.
[b] The act of the Court in issuing the subpoena for the bank officers to
testify on March 8, 1995 upon request of the defendant when it was not
yet his turn to present evidence is disruptive of orderly court procedure
and shows bias on the part of the court. It shows the control of the
accused over the court and court procedure.
[c] This control was also manifest on July 13, 199[4], when accused was
scheduled for arraignment, when the latter failed to appear before the
court despite the third call at about 11:00 a.m. The Court then issued an
Order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
confiscation/cancellation of the bail bond. After this Order was given orally
in open court, the clerk who took charge of the records went to the door
between the sala and the office and whispered something to someone in
the office. After about two minutes, the same clerk again rose from her
seat and went back to the door and thereafter, she announced to the
Court that the accused would be late and the accused would be arriving.
The Court then said that it will wait, if Alvin Tan is coming. It is puzzling
how the clerk knew that Alvin Tan would be coming when he was not even
present in court. However, none of these facts appeared in the Order or in
the Constancia. 12
Petitioner prayed that (1) the judge inhibit himself from hearing
the criminal cases; (2) said cases be re-raffled to another court; and (3) the hearing of
said cases be suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Inhibition. 13
The trial court granted said motion in an Order dated May 5, 1995. In the same order,
declared petitioner and her client, in direct contempt. He explained thus:
The imputation that the Court has come under the control of the accused
on account of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum upon his request
but without notice to the complainant or the public prosecutor is most
unfair and disrespectful to the Court and is a highly irresponsible
accusation on the part of the private complainant and the private
prosecutor (who had meanwhile withdrawn from the case). The issuance
of a subpoena at a party's instance is not subject to prior or simultaneous
notice to the adverse party of the request therefor, for, such notice is not
required by the Rules of Court. The grounds for disqualification are
unworthy of any consideration. The questioning by the private prosecutor
of the issuance of the subpoena is unfounded and due to a misplaced
sense of procedural requirements.
xxx xxx xxx
As far as the text and language of the motion are concerned, the Court
considers them to be irresponsible and disrespectful, especially the
accusation that the Court had come under the control of the accused and
had committed an irregularity of procedure. These statements amount to
an unmitigatedly disrespectful attitude towards the Court and its Presiding
Judge. They also display the dangerous tendencies of a party and counsel
who probably think of themselves as beyond reproach. There is therefore
no recourse but to find both the complainant and his former private
prosecutor guilty of direct contempt. 14
On May 22, 1995, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. This Court, in a Resolution dated June 5, 1995, issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing the impugned
order.
A perusal of the trial court's order reveals that what respondent judge found particularly
contemptuous were petitioner's statements in her motion alleging that (1) the issuance
of the subpoenas duces tecum was irregular; and (2) the court and court procedure
were subject to the "control" of the accused.
Whether or not these statements constitute direct contempt is the issue which confronts
this Court.
We rule in the affirmative.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, there was nothing "irregular" in the issuance of the
subpoenas duces tecum. Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not
require notice to other parties to the action. No violation of due process results by such
lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the
witnesses and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court. 15
Petitioner however argues that:
On March 8, 1995, the prosecution was scheduled to present its first
witness, the private complainant, Philip See, after a very long pre-trial
period which started sometime in September 1994. The regular [as
against the "irregular"] procedure would have been for the prosecution to
proceed with the presentation of evidence pursuant to Rule 119, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. The prosecution was not, however, able to move
along, due to the presence of numerous bank officials from various banks
who appeared pursuant to the subpoenas issued to them by the court.
Moreover, the person who requested for the subpoena was the counsel
for the accused. The regular or usual procedure would have been for the
subpoena to be issued during the pre-trial stage or during the time that the
defense is presenting its evidence and not during the time of presentation
of evidence by the prosecution as what happened in this case.
We do not find any merit in petitioner's contentions. Rule 119, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court which prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases does not preclude the defense
from procuring subpoenas duces tecum during the time of the prosecution's
presentation of evidence. In this case, counsel for the accused felt that he needed the
documents subject of the subpoenas for his cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses. Accordingly, respondent judge called a recess to enable said counsel to
secure said documents from the bank officials. The order of trial was not in any way
altered; counsel for the accused did not even attempt to call any of the bank officials to
the stand. Under these circumstances, the resulting delay cannot be considered
unreasonable nor "irregular."
Nor do we find anything "irregular" in the accused's arraignment. As counsel for the
accused points out:
. . . the fact that the Presiding Judge issued a warrant of arrest and
ordered the cancellation of the accused's bond shows that he gives no
special favor to the accused. And it is of common knowledge that orders
like that are easily reconsidered/lifted even for excuses like traffic, ill
health or failure to remember the hearing. The fact that the Presiding
Judge opted to wait for the accused upon information that the latter is
coming only shows that he was very aware of the common practice.
Waiting saved so much of the court's and parties' time as it did away with
the usual motion for reconsideration and the necessity for a resetting.
. . . Court personnels [sic], practitioners and even judges know, of course
that it is not uncommon for litigants, especially those coming for trial late,
to call the court's office by phone. It is likewise not uncommon for litigants
who follows-up [sic] matters in the office (like bailbonds, [sic] release of
rulings, etc.) to get acquainted with — or even become friends of — court
clerks, secretaries, typists, stenographers or sheriffs, in the office.
. . . Besides, if the plaintiff found it necessary to have those matters stated
in the Order or placed on record, there were two (2) lawyers (the private
and the public prosecutors) who could have stood up and made the proper
manifestations or requests. But that incident happened way back 13 July
1994 and it is only now, in their motion of 15 March 1995, that they
mention the same in their vain attempt to create an issue on the
impartiality and fairness of the Presiding Judge. . . .16
Petitioner's allegation that the proceedings before the trial court were "irregular"
therefore lacks basis. Such statement, when read with petitioner's remark that the socalled irregularities "show the accused's control over the court and court procedure," is
nothing short of contemptuous.
The latter statement is particularly alarming for it implies that court proceedings are a
mere farce, and the court a mere stooge, a marionette subject to the manipulation of the
opposing party. It suggests that the judge was moved by considerations other than his
sense of justice and fair play thereby calling into question the integrity and
independence of the court. Such statement tends to bring the authority and
administration of law into disrespect and constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically:
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported
by the record or having no materiality to the case.
Consequently, we rule that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt.
However, we find the penalty imposed by respondent Judge upon petitioner too severe.
Punishment in contempt cases are meted on a corrective principle to vindicate the
authority and dignity of the courts and the administration of justice.17 Accordingly, we
reduce the same to a fine of P200.00.
While petitioner's client, Philip G. See, did not question the contempt order against him
— his motion for intervention and the accompanying motion for issuance of clarificatory
order merely questioned the scope of the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court — the reduction of the penalty in favor of his former counsel should likewise
benefit him. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the judgment of the appellate court
shall affect even those accused who did not appeal insofar as said judgment is
favorable and applicable to
them. 18 By analogy, this rule should apply in contempt cases. Contempt partakes of
the nature of a criminal offense, 19 and the mode of procedure in contempt proceedings
is assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. 20
WHEREFORE, the Order dated May 5, 1995 issued by respondent Judge is MODIFIED
in that the penalty of imprisonment for Two (2) Days and a fine of Two Hundred Pesos
(P200.00) imposed on petitioner Leah Adorio and intervenor Philip See is REDUCED to
a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) only. The Temporary Restraining Order is
LIFTED and Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-55933 to Q-94-55957 is ordered re-raffled to
another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in
his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with
reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our
faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him,
as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client
was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become
responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and
will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our
pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry
return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the
plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition
thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS,
as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal)
does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the
appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30,
1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying
for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the
appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between
this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this
Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by
the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion,
the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion
to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein
was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June
24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory
and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring
the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity
case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in
issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case,
and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on
his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited
for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn
over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this
Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is
now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen
to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open
and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also
asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear
him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology.
Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of
lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St.
Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why
dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to
thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first
cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you
also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned
in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated,
compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and
has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT
but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our
various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word,
DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court
that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the
way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: —
"the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the
ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We
were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry
but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance
of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President.
... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses,
but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last
resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in
all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of
our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe
the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members
of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our selfsacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as
a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware
of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and
to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought.
For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by
this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do
exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition
we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from
time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on
their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is
to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court
in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the
U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom
is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure
by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general
by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such
notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon
all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case
the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules
themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment,
he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of
appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor
on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each
time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the
bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for
law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act
or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous
to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to
become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No
class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal
the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty
to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits
of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all
good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally
for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to
rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are
as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment
That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is
others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a
court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed
the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction
of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false
and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a
fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to
belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the
general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the twoyear suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to
two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity,
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585,
15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer,
could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my
name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases
involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public
interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and
the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt
to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and
the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the
Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter
of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise
of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of
speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not
exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that
an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the
profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the
discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of
justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his
duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges
to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged,
and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring
possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally
concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or
by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court,
and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to
try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is
of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial
capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free
speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good
by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly
established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and
money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by
an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of
the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it
than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a
fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that
the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright,
active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will
gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him.
This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him
and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates
in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify
the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such
an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words,
oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to
the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury.
"The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused
of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts
charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as
he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the
principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon
a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction
made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the
court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of
any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own selfrespect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or
else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would
hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment
may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining
of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133
App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It
is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of
80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt
under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the
court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the
heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and
with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before
the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances
in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy
one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at
law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received
by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein
the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the
attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect
due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath
as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7
Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa.
14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for
18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being
under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There,
the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as
a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime
or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate
disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases
of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights
of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom
Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking
said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of
the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that
one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him
in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of
free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court,
and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and
if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen"
into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of
the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain
import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining
the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures
this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of
and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the
members — and some former members of this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
18
which, in the
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in
line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now
seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had
written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of
its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for
a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief
Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that
them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said
Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against
the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose
their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt
therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending
a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude
from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any
court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that
power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all
that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it
becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one
of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against
this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle
the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot
be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting
to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the
"complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding
at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not
involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against
the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities
are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration
of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be
visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court,
these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion
to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by
the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never
be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from
the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen
to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any
time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to
take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General
and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
In Re: Vicente Almacen 31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts
Facts: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in
said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of
said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his
motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed
with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an
appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution. This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s
certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k
without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” The Supreme Court did not
immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually
surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now
argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give reasons and
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.”
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic. ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be
disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The
proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals’ opinion. On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged
by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As
a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify
the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be
entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON
G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del
Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in
contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused
the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and
relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review
the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied
due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary
to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is
to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico
del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the
Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica
(the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal
complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch
VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil
Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found
that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo
meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo
five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages
and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No.
R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada
but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica
and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S.
Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G.
Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance
of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must
prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from
Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its
decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as
damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as
counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision
with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence",
and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the
Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24,
1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court
rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be
deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language
cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar
persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court,
made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of
the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the
proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its
admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive
language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to
assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear
on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said
that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but
only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same
date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals
informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a
copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said
letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with
that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of
the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against
Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision
rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it
again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar
seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and
justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and
justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to
assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and
construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in
accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5,
1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of
respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its
decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar,
instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a
reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in
their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright
aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be
criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through
ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any
man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if
he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do
or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New
Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those
justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that
there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there
was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called
civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding
even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the
New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that
"counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00
and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let
certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We
upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension
from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial
Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the
Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno
S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the
three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case
for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar
himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and
the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the
defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not
only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his
threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they
decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure
conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October
10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the
Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case
No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages
filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration,
turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25,
1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of
this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the
resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his
motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit
in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1,
1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you
that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two
Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the
Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court
of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed
for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with
a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them
and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language
certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again
made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our
judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a
pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our
other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del
Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the
contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have
committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to
make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion
in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or
"buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the
former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate
Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on
the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore,
what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya"
(He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in
G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision
in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the
Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact
which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became
final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he
should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1,
1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he
is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy
marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N.
Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of
as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not
for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless.
As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his
contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents
reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del
Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in
CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to
appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On
September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein
he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and
outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human
efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down
justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous
contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is
utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances
that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in
and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss
to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding
condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal
profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped
by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are
absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial
Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a
motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said
directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had
been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a
memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that
there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with
Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del
Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him
dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is
faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all
mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that
"blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices
thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he
persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision;
justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate
Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his
school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes
and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have
himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his
pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and
physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant
justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the
Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the
affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling
cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which
was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the
Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still
remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now,
there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time
pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive
respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in
practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus
making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of
whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act
which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in
defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to
deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly
with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to
the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their
younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is
an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil.
595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment.
That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is
others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed
by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive
(Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20
SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17
C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to
the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a
view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed
attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's
acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the
judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that
nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar,
constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards
the court so essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis
supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs.
C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in
G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found
no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances,
both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under
their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but
pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming
that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to
erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration
of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification
for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive
terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not
to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of
others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be
wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's
mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with
deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We
expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness
and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in
evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at
that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to
close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor
but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of
law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to
this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney
owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated
March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as
implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall
be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court,
such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18,
1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Montecillo and Atty. del Mar v. Gica
G.R. No. L-36800. October 21, 1974
Doctrine:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of
the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity,
according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Facts:
Francisco M. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation and a civil case for damages
against Jorge Montecillo after the latter called the former "stupid" or a "fool." The civil case for
damages eventually reached the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals wherein it ruled in favor of
Gica and awarded him damages. Atty. Quirico Del Mar, as Montecillo’s counsel, moved for a
reconsideration of said decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the RPC on
"Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment" and "Judgment Rendered through Negligence", and
the innuendo that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. When the motion was denied, the CA
remarked that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the CA rendered an unjust judgment,
that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to
remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Despite this, Atty. del Mar persisted and in his second motion for
reconsideration, made another threat by stating that his next appeal would be addressed to the
President of the Philippines. Because of such behaviour, the CA, through a resolution ordered
Atty. del Mar to explain why he should not be punished for contempt of court. Atty. del Mar
made a written explanation wherein he said that the CA could not be threatened and he was not
making any threat but only informing them of the course of action he would follow. He also
informed the CA that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy
thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter. Not
content, Atty. del Mar sent another letter to the CA wherein he reminded them of a civil case he
instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a
decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it
again but would do so if provoked. The CA, through a resolution, concluded that Atty. del Mar is
guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the
practice of law. In response to the CA’s decision, Atty. del Mar filed a civil case for damages
against the 3 Justices of the CA’s 4th Division, trying to hold them liable for their decision in the
earlier civil case. Said case for damages was eventually terminated by compromise agreement
after Atty. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint, apologized to the CA and
the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay damages in favor of the Justices. Not giving up on his
case, Atty. del Mar, filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court praying to
reverse the CA’s decision on the civil case of Gica against Montecillo. The SC denied the
petition and in response, Atty. del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter to the
SC’s Clerk of Court requesting the names of the Justices of the SC who supported the resolution
denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for
reconsideration. Such motion was denied and Atty. del Mar, aggrieved, made a manifestation
before the SC, stating that had the Clerk of Court given him the list he asked for, he would have
filed the same suits against the SC Justices like he did with the CA Justices.
As a reaction, the SC ordered Atty. del Mar to explain why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation. In response,
Atty. del Mar gave a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements and attached the
criminal and civil case he filed against the CA Justices as a veiled threat. In the mind of Atty. del
Mar, there is rampant corruption and injustice in the government, and those that denied his
motion are among the corrupt. Finally, when the SC was executing the suspension order of Atty.
del Mar from the earlier CA resolution, Atty. del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration. Atty.
del Mar was given the chance to explain and stated that he was suffered repeated strokes and
high blood pressure which rendered him physically and mentally unstable. He apologized for the
mistakes he might have committed but persisted in his view that he was justified in filing cases
against the Justices of the CA and SC. In the end he stated that due to sickness and old age, he
decided to retire from the practice of law and asked the permission of the SC to release him from
the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases. With full
realization that a practicing lawyer facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the
court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, the SC denied said prayer
of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients. Issue:
Whether Atty. del Mar should be held in contempt of court and be suspended from the practice
of law? Held: Yes. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court
to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against
the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Atty. del
Mar’s actions in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand
in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
insolence for said tribunals. It is manifest that Atty. del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment.
In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the
law, in disposing of the case of his client. Atty. del Mar was ordered to be suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law.
[A.C. NO. 7062 : September 26, 2006]
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and
FREDILYN BACULBAS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE A.
SUING, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing
(respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.2
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 000403180-98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union
President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil
and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal,
while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case was
consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated
v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike.
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos
dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of
respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is
dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby
declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the
dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the
respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are
directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with
full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement
computed as follows:
3. CRISANTO CONOS
Backwages:
Basic Wage:
2/21/98 - 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30
10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10
13th Month Pay:
1/12 of P239,236.40
SILP
2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12
=
1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12
=
1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12
=
xxxx
=
P104, 504.40
=
69, 732.00
=
65,000.00
P239,236.40
=
19,936.36
852.22
1,117.50
2,083.33
4,053.05
P263,225.81
7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)
8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos)
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)
Total Backwages
263,225.81
263,225.81
263,225.81
P2,370,674.38
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the abovementioned backwages including the various monetary claims stated
in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of
overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all sums owing to
complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter
issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution.5
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and
Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to
by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case
before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were
concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004.6
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed
the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn
to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received
the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative
complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with
his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation
of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the
spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for
Falsification against respondent, together with his clients Johnny
and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City
where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.7
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation
of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that
respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be
disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently
disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so
he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests
the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one
hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against a member of the
Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice
or negligence, while in the performance of his duties as his counsel,
and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and
preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over
and considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity
and due execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND
QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and
Falsification are PENDING resolution in their respective venues.
Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the
identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the
complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to
ascertain true and real identities of person executing Release Waiver
with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is
that presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise, such was
proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent
actually committed the despicable act would seem to be fairly
debatable under the circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend
the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by
Petition12 filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution.
The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail
the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel
received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it
when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not reach
him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to
another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the
3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of justice,
this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does
not deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner
Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor
Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004.13 He hastens to add though
that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not
attending the hearings before Arbiter Santos.14 Complainants15 and
their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan16 claim otherwise,
however. And the Minutes17 of the proceedings before the National
Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor Dispute," which minutes bear
respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim
that he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor
Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who "told
him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the
office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims and
waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of
ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the Release
Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients'
interest, especially given the amount allegedly given by them in
consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to the
clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however,
show that he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money
of your client would go to the deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as
you call it before a precedent in February of 1998 when my client
directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen
original complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po
ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is my belief that the
best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties
is that we let them do the discussion, we'll let them do the
settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to say,
when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the
dispute does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter
Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter
Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the documents of
Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone
as a lawyer will represent them in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you
and yet there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no
complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that
there is a voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what
you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are
talking and it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your
Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at
Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of
Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money
intended for the payment of these workers?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of
1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of
Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and
Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor,
is only a single document where all the signatories named are
present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that
each of them will be there together and they will identify
themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong
magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing
took place in February of 2004 it was made for any [sic] individual,
Your Honor, no longer the document that I prepared when all of the
seven will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the
changes?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was
there, there are already people there, the seven complainants plus
another woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to
go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive
witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he
was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert
vigilance to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he
acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office of Labor
Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these
document[s] are properly signed and that these people are properly
identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of
complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients
in which he "did not participate" and from which no problem arose
did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going
to the Labor Arbiter's office - "that [the complainants] are properly
identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was
entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims.20 That should have alerted him to
especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients'
interest. But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given
situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his
client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of
men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest
of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure
that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules
of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the
price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence
(exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use
for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of
a bonus pater familias. x x x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the
answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba
sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nagabot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga
dokumentong ito or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na
English. Ito bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa
nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga
officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?
MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay
Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL:
Si attorney po.
ATTY. SUING:
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking
kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL:
Yong mga tao.
xxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot
ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
ATTY. SUING:
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang
abogado mo.
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL:
Opo serious po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.
ATTY. SUING:
Your Honor,'
COMM. HABABAG:
Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong
natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him
to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him
(respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was
not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied
claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the
money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct.23 While the
Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action
being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of
its officers or an examination into his character.24
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty
of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court
found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession."
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is
reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in
order.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of
negligence and gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
CANON I - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
2
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or
settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
CANON 10. - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
mislead by any artifice.
CANON 12. - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER
IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
3
Rollo, pp. 8-20.
4
Rollo, pp. 17, 19-20.
5
Id. at 21-23.
6
Rollo, p. 102. The Order reads:
Finding the Motion To Dismiss filed by respondents to be sufficient in
form and substance, the same is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, let this case be, as it is hereby
considered DISMISSED in sofar [sic] as the seven complainants
namely Crisanto Conos, Alex Patola, Dionisio Patola, Noel Saletaria,
Ron[al]d Sambajon, Fredelyn Baculbas and Reinerio [sic] Sambajon
are concerned.
7
Rollo, p. 5.
8
Id. at 323-329.
9
Id. at 326-328.
10
Id. at 330.
11
Id. at 331-336.
12
Id. at 343-366.
13
TSN, January 21, 2005, rollo, pp.225-228.
COMM. HABABAG:
You said you were present when they signed this Release Waiver
and Quitclaim before Cadiente Santos, is that correct?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
As an officer of the court I ask you [a] point.
ATTY. SUING:
Yes.
COMM. HABABAG:
Did you personally see these Ronald Sambajon, Fredilyn Baculbas,
Crisanto Conos and [Reinerio] Sambajon, signed freely th[ese]
Release Waiver and Quitclaim[s] on February 27, 2004 before
Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I saw persons.
COMM. HABABAG:
No, specific ako. Sila ba talaga ang nakita mong humarap, itong apat
na nabanggit ko na pangalan, sila ba talaga?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
I did not know these people, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Hindi. Ibig sabihin sabi mo andoon ka nong magpirma nito?cralaw
library
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Katunayan narinig mo pina[n]umpa sila ni Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
Ang tanong ko ngayon at this point in time sila ba talaga yong nakita
mo itong apat (4) na ito mga complainants na ito noong 2004 last
February 27. Sila ba talaga yong humarap doon o yong ibang
tao?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
I did not see these people, Your Honor, because in the first place I
do not know them. As I said it is not true, Your Honor'
COMM. HABABAG:
Hindi, wag na tayong lumayo. Ang tanong ko lang naman ay itong
apat (4). Samakatuwid maliwanag tayo dito?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
When in time na itong apat (4) na complainants na ito ay hindi ito
ang humarap doon kay Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos?cralaw library
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I will also say that for the first time I saw these
people here. I never saw them before Arbiter Santos before even
when the case was filed, Your Honor. And contrary to what they are
saying these people that they appeared there they did not appear,
Your Honor, it was only this fellow who appeared together with his
wife.
Vide TSN, January 31, 2005, rollo, pp. 270-280.
Vide Respondent's Counter-Affidavit filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, rollo, pp. 34-35, and his Answer filed before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, rollo, pp. 47-52.
14
15
Vide TSN, January 21, 2005, TSN, rollo, pp. 192-193.
Vide TSN, January 31, 2005, rollo, pp. 306-307. Atty. Rodolfo
Capocyan (also spelled Capocquian in some parts of the records)
was the counsel of the complainants in the consolidated labor cases
and a former partner of complainant's present counsel, Atty. Mory
Nueva.
16
Vide Minutes of the NCMB in NS-02-081-98 on March 2, 9, 19, and
20, 1998, rollo, pp. 39-42.
17
18
TSN, January 28, 2005, rollo, pp. 259-270.
19
Id. at 212.
20
TSN, January 28, 2005, rollo, p. 254.
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA
406, 412.
21
22
TSN, January 21, 2005, rollo, pp. 195-204.
Agpalo, Comments On The Code Of Professional Responsibility And
The Code Of Judicial Conduct (2004), 408.
23
24
Agpalo, Legal Ethics (1997 Ed), 416.
25
A.C. No. 6589, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 443.
SAMBAJON vs ATTY. SUING Sept. 26, 2006
FACTS: The complainants sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the
grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case entitled
Microplast, Inc. Workers Union v. Microplast, Incorporated for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and
Illegal Dismissal, while Atty. Suing was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case was
consolidated with NLRC Case entitled "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan," a case for
Illegal Strike. Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, but found
the Microplast, Inc. guilty of ULP. The LA also declared that the 9 complainants were illegally
dismissed. The LA directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former position with full
backwages, and subsequently issued a writ of execution. In the meantime, on the basis of
individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed and sworn to by 7 of the
complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case, in the presence of the respondent Atty.
Suing, the LA dismissed said case insofar as the 7 complainants were concerned. Herein
complainants, 4 of the 7 complainants who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar,
alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients, “frustrated” the implementation of
the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
Complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent together with
his clients. IBP Commissioner Hababag’s Report and Recommendation: - recommended that
respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning - “In the
case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act
would seem to be fairly debatable under the circumstances.” Board of Governors of the IBP: approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner One of the
complainants, Sambajon, filed a petition before the OBC assailing the IBP Board Resolution. On
the other hand, atty. Suing filed a Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, wherein he does
not deny that those whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same
persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos, explaining that he was not familiar with the
complainants as they were not attending the hearings before the LA. During the administrative
hearings before the IBP Commissioner, it was apparent that Atty. Suing was coaching his client
to prevent himself from being incriminated. It was also revealed that the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims allegedly signed were not the same documents originally presented to the employees
to be signed.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Suing may be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of 4 alleged Release
Waiver and Quitclaim by herein complainants who claimed that the same were falsified?
HELD: No. Disbarment is not reasonable. However, the respondent is found guilty of negligence
and gross misconduct. The Court says that a lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting
that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. Diligence is the attention and care
required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence. A lawyer serves his
client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He
thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance
of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall
be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the
practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client. The
practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving
their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence or that degree of vigilance expected of a
bonus pater familias. The Court also noted the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of
his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Hababag Thus, not only
did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt
not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was not the one presented at the Arbiter's
Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the complainants the
money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents. As an officer of the court, a
lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its
cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings
therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an
investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more DOCTRINE:
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence or that "extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving
their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence or that degree of vigilance expected of a
bonus pater familias. .
A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action
against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that
respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza,
Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which
respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner
of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria
was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly
allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to
eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the
Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was
the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the
municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil
cases were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that
complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which
reads as follows:
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding
judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in
fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due
time thru me to be delivered to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia
Mascarinas and all.
Very
truly
yours,
(SGD.
)
CESA
RL
LANT
ORIA
Major
Inf PC
(ret)
Execu
tive
Direct
or 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three
(3) cases, in this wise:
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your
several letters received, which is about the preparation of the three (3)
Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too
much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here
in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say
that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding
me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an
early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for
the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the
(3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge
Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia,
thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not
suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his
suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to
this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs
them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending
to our cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more
vigor and success.
B
r
o
t
h
e
r
l
y
y
o
u
r
s
,
(
S
G
D
.
)
I
R
I
N
E
O
L
.
B
U
N
Y
I
6
C
o
u
n
s
e
l
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria,
dated 04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:
9
2
8
R
i
z
a
l
A
v
e
.
,
S
t
a
.
C
r
u
z
,
M
a
n
i
l
a
M
a
r
c
h
4
,
1
9
7
4
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the
envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and
Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you
please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and
information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the
information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a
need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me,
after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite
receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could
be delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City,
during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in
Butuan City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.
T
r
u
l
y
y
o
u
r
s
,
(
S
G
D
.
)
L
.
B
U
N
Y
I
7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present
administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted
three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that
respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who
unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by
respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the
administrative complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but
explained the contents thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory
and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent,
it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters
received, that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge
Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because
he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular
Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of
Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was
to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft
or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the
Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-standing between the Judge
and the complainant who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so
much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the
said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any
factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in
the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by
default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were
declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the
place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June
1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of
drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction
to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second
paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the
delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude
for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor
General submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that
the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in
all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16
January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing,
the Solicitor General reported the following development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979
sworn to before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be
considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that
complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no
longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent
manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a
witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has
in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint,
and hence, he was not prepared to prove his charges. 10 (emphasis
supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of
respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant,
showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he
submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated
that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he
had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the
case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with
the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil
cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly
unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in
acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding
complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested
that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in
upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the
hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting
on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six
(6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he
would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent
Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said
memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the
decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to
influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his
apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his
preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the
merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of
his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in
question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever
effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present
administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the
acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of
disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with
Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83,
and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that
respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which
were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which
provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a
judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both
the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be
avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the
discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy
and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for
cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the
court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to
influence the court where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this
decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is
directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Cesar Lantoria v. Atty. Irineo Bunyi (1992)
Facts:  An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a member of the
Philippine Bar, on the ground that Bunyi committed acts of graft and corruption, dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming of a member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery  This is
in relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case wherein Bunyi was counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas.
The latter was the owner of the farm and Lantoria is the supervisor and manager of the said farm.
The 3 civil cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment suit of squatters in the said
farm. The defendants in the said cases were declared in default.  Correspondences between
Lantoria and Bunyi showed that Bunyi initially enclosed a letter in an envelope addressed to
Judge Galicia in a confidential and private manner. Judge Galicia thru the mediation of Lantoria
informed Bunyi that he is willing to let Bunyi write the decisions for th 3 civil cases. Lantoria
informed the same to Bunyi which later delivered the 3 decisions thru Lantoria.  Three years
later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi alleging that they won the said cases because
Bunyi wrote the decisions in those cases.  Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge of the
request of Judge Galicia to Bunyi as the said judge had two salas before him. Also, Bunyi
contends that the drafting of the decision was not an idea spawned by him. Furthermore, he
contends that his participation is merely on revision.  The solicitor general investigated the
matters and found that Bunyi prepared the draft of the decisions and that he had previous
communications with the judge regarding drafting the same. Moreover, Bunyi admitted that he
prepared the said decisions and that the subject letters do exist.  The Solicitor General found
Bunyi guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an
officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from
engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.  Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his
withdrawal of the same. Bunyi gave an apology but he denied the allegations of offering a gift to
judge Galicia.
Issue:
WON Bunyi violated the code of professional responsibility for lawyers?
Held:
YES.  The determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding
withdrawal of complaint due to the Bunyi having admitted that the letters in question truly exist,
and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters had on his
duty as a lawyer.  Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on attempts to exert personal influence on the court - A lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or
favor.
 In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01. CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.  Court
finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. Suspended for 1 year.