SECTION 20
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
CASES
**Lozano v. Martinez - 146 SCRA 323 (check)
FACTS: This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila declared the law
unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the
constitutional provision on non- imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional. BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
The “debt” contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts No one is going to prison for nonpayment of contractual debts. However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes is punishable. This is precisely why
the mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a valid exercise
of police power. The Supreme Court however also explained that the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the
violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Caram Resources v. Contreras - 237 SCRA 724 (check).
Facts: Teresita Dizon obtained a loan from Caram Resources payable in installments. She issued a promissory note and
postdated BPI checks, four of which were dishonored when presented to the bank as the account against which they
were drawn had been closed. A complaint was filed against Dizon for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also known
as the Bouncing Checks Law. The respondent stated that to hold her liable there under "would violate the cardinal rule
under the Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt" and that the postdated checks
were without consideration and were in the nature of "guarantees to ensure the monthly collection" despite Dizon's
admission that they were payments for the loan and that she herself closed her account resulting in the dishonor of
the checks upon presentment,
Issue: WON there is a violation of the cardinal rule under the Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for
failure to pay his debt.
Held: NO. It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more specifically, that it does not
transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. The offense is committed by
the very fact of its performance, i.e. the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The offense is malum prohibitum. An
act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum, pursuant to the State’s exercise of police power.
Tiomico v. CA – GR 122539 March 4, 1999 (trust receipt)
FACTS: Tiomico opened a Letter of Credit with BPI for the importation of 2 forklifts. Upon maturity of the trust receipt
Tiomico made partial payments, leaving a balance. Failing to pay the balance, he was accused for violation of the trust
receipt law. Tiomico was found guilty.
ISSUE: WON the Trust Receipt Law violates SEC 19 Art III of the Constitution.
RULING: No, TRL punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice
of others regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan.
Recuerdo v. People, GR 133036, Jan. 22, 2003 (Check)
FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the
jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon
failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends
that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez where it was held
that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of debt or obligation
which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the
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prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public
order.
SECTION 21
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
RULES
CASES
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
DISMISSAL AT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NO JEOPARDY; ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
*People v. Ylagan - 58 PHIL. 851
Facts: Against the appellee, Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries was filed. After preliminary investigation, where
the provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant
pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial
fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the defendant said
nothing about the dismissal of the case. Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the
same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same offense of serious physical injuries. After
another preliminary investigation, the case was again forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information
filed in the justice of the peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double
jeopardy.
Issue: w/n there is double jeopardy in this case.
Held: It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal
jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to
the complaint of information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. It is true that in United States vs. Ballentine, and in other
subsequent cases, this court had held that there is WHEN WILL DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACH?
1. The first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second 2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated 3. The second
jeopardy must be for the commission of the same offense or the second offense must include or is necessarily included
in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof no jeopardy until the investigation
of the charges has actually been commenced by the calling of a witness; but we are now convinced that such a view
should be abandoned . There is no provision or principle of law on jeopardy. All that
the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue
properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has
entered a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and
vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary
investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial . The rule against double jeopardy
protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but against
being again tried for the same offense. Counsel for the government, however, contends that the
previous case brought against the appellee was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase "without the
consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the
objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". We cannot accept such a theory. We believe it a sound
rule to lay down, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not
constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right not to be
put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important as the other
constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and
should not, be predicated on mere silence.
People v. Balisacan - L-26376
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Facts: The accused was charge with homicide. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of
guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
Issue: whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
Held: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true,
the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to
prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo
recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him
to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It
follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the
court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution
any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack
of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The
acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at
all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
Cinco v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 726
Facts: The petitioners were charged in Sandiganbayan for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The accused filed a motion to quash, praying that the said informations be dismissed for lack of authority on the part
of Tanodbayan. Balana requested the re-filing of the cases, and in view thereof, the accused, through counsel, in turn
requested, that she did so 'under separate and distinct charges in accordance with the new rules of preliminary
investigation' so that the respondents can refute her charges and specific evidences she may present in support of
each separate charge.
Issue: w/n there is double jeopardy in this case.
Held: Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged with informations or crimes other
than the crime imputed in the dismissed cases is baseless. There could be no double jeopardy for the simple reason
that they have not year pleaded to the offense Beside, a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double
jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc v. Resultan that: Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and it is often that only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complain or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty therefor,
and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
People v, Vergara - 221 SCRA 560
Facts: The accused were charged with frustrated murder. They all pleaded not guilty. Again, 2 new Informations for
frustrated murder against the same accused after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations; and, whether the
first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of
any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and
anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It is undisputed that valid
Held:
Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against Salde, et. al. before the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being
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properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is whether the cases against them
were dismissed with their express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move
for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the
dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no
express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations. While it may
be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these
cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was
the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused.
The spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely
defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to
prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and
who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic
that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be
contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the
other hand, are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal
action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the
motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to
pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside
or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order,
and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e.,
(a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these
cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan - 234 SCRA 175
Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational School found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA
demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial
investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the certification on the fund
shortage in the absence of a counsel.
Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial Court
Held: Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court, pleads
double jeopardy. We cannot agree. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following
requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3)
The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.* When all the
above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt
to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which
necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be
barred. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an
arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it
dismissed.
Galvez v. CA - 237 SCRA 685
Facts: Petitioners were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide.
Before the petitioners could be arraigned respondent prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw informations in said cases
which was granted by the judge. The cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day,
four new informations were filed against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms. No bail having been recommended for the crime of
murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for
lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos. However, it was denied by the judge. Petitioners
contend that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected
their right to bail. Also, Petitioner said that respondent prosecutor should have amended the original informations
instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. Petitioner claimed that there was a double jeopardy when the
new informations were filed against them.
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Issue: Whether or not there was a double jeopardy when the new informations were filed against the Petitioners
Held: No. The court held that the propriety of the withdrawal of the original informations, there having
been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly,
in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners
were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at
such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be
prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet
attached. Consequently, it was held that although the offenses charged under the three new
informations necessarily include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of
informations was not a fatal error. In the case at bar, criminal charges filed against the Petitioners did
not amount to their acquittal. Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence
petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover, such dismissal does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were
not prejudiced by the filing of the new informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet
become final. Neither did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.
Cunanan v. Arceo - 242 SCRA 88
Facts: An information for Murder was filed against petitioner Ferdinand Cunanan. The Information alleged that
petitioner was a member of the PNP; it contained no averment that he had committed the offense charged in relation
to his public office. Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the evidence adduced during the trial, petitioner had
committed the offense charged while in the performance of his official functions. He then held that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try this case and that, accordingly, any decision it may render thereon would be null and void. . Judge
Arceo dismissed Criminal Case No. 5708 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan," pursuant to the Asuncion ruling. Upon
motion by the prosecution, Judge Arceo inhibited himself from further hearing the case and raffled the case to
Respondent Judge Sunga, He denied petitioner's Opposition to the Order directing the transmittal of the records of his
case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also contend that Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the present case, since here
trial had already ended and the case was already submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was promulgated. A
transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will, accordingly, expose him to double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.
Issue: Whether or not a transfer of Petitioner’s case to Sandiganbayan will expose him to double jeopardy
]Held: No. Defense of double jeopardy does not become available to petitioner upon transfer of his case
to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy by the commencement
and trial of Criminal Case No. 5708 because the RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to try the
case in the first place. Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of murder. By the
same token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an
acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the
fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had no
jurisdiction to try the case at all.
People v. Tampal - 244 SCRA 202
Facts: Respondents were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the RTC of
Zamboanga. The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Guantero moved for
postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from the
defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent
judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a legal
holiday for Muslims and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by
respondent judge and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The Solicitor General contends that
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the
criminal case for failure to prosecute despite the fact that the public prosecutor's absence was for a valid cause. He
also claims that since the dismissal of the case is void, the case may be reinstated without placing the private
respondents in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the Private Respondents was placed in Double Jeopardy
sHeld: No. Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The three (3) requisites of
double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea
has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise
5
terminated without the express consent of the accused. . In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this
case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State.
Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
People v. Montesa - 248 SCRA 641
Facts: Accused Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz were charged with the offense of Falsification of Public Document.
Private Respondents filed a petition for reinvestigation of the case. At the reinvestigation conducted by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rutor, the accused presented what it considered new material and relevant evidence which
consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she was the one responsible for the preparation
of the questioned public document. In his resolution Rutor recommended the dismissal of the case, the respondent
Judge court issued an order dismissing the case on the basis of the Rutor resolution. However, private prosecutor, Atty.
Edwin P. Cerezo, who received a copy of the dismissal order, filed a motion for its reconsideration. He alleged therein
that the Rutor resolution was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who, on the contrary, directed Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rutor to proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever
foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy.
Held: No. The Court held that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's recommendation to dismiss the
case on the ground of want of probable cause because of the "admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused
spouses had no participation in the preparation of the questioned document, despite knowing that said resolution was
disapproved by provincial prosecutor, he still ordered the arraignment of the private respondents and dismissed the
case. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private respondents. Presumably,
he thought that the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose,
on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case. For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to
present its evidence and prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge dismissing the case is a null and
void.
De La Rosa v. CA – 253 SCRA 499
Facts: Nine separate informations were filed against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of B.P. Big. 22. At the
arraignment Petitioner failed to appear due to his illness which was granted by the court. Several trials were
postponed. On November 17, 1992, Counsel for private respondent, in open court, moved for the postponement of the
trial set on that date on the ground that private respondent had doubts “as to his inability to bring out the details of
the transaction”. Petitioner objected to the postponement and invoked his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Consequently, the trial court dismissed all the nine cases against petitioner in its questioned order dated November
17, 1992. Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the CA, which rendered a Decision setting aside the two orders of
the trial court and reinstating the cases. Now Petitioner contends that since the dismissal of the cases against him by
the trial court was based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would
place him in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement and remand of the dismissed case based on petitioner’s right to speedy trial
would place him in double jeopardy.
Held: No. The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the case at bar, the
fourth requisite is lacking. Since the dismissal of the case was upon motion of the petitioner that the case be
dismissed, invoking the constitutional right of the accused for speedy trial. There being no violation of the double
jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution of the case may still resume in the trial court, as decided by the Court of Appeals.
People v. Leviste - 255 SCRA 238
FACTS: An Information was filed against the accused, Arnulfo Talisic, for allegedly causing the publication in the Sun
Star Daily, which is damaging to the complainant. The counsel for the defense filed a petition to dismiss since there
was no crime charge on the said information. The trial judge, herein respondent dismissed the said complaint. The
prosecution filed for a MR, however, also dismissed due to lack of merit. The Private respondent, contends that the
dismissal of the case was based on the right of the accused to speedy trial as the prosecution was not ready and could
not present any other witness on the day set for hearing. He further avers that a reopening of the case will place him
in double jeopardy as the dismissal was without his express consent.
ISSUE: Would the reversal of the trial court’s assailed Orders place the accused in double jeopardy?
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HELD: NO. The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
that in the first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise ‘terminated without the express consent of the accused.” “It is true that in an
unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to
an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however,
that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable
to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by
the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.”
People v. Cawaling – 293 SCRA 267
FACTS: This was an appeal from the decision of the RTC which convicted former Mayor Cawaling and Policemen
Tumbagahan, De los Santos and Cajilo for the crime of murder. Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all
the appellants, an administrative case had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen
Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Fontamillas were charged with the killing of
Ronie Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo
and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice. In seeking their
acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the first
jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), which
was allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted.
ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy
HELD: There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:
(1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the present case, the appellants have
presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military
commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely offered as evidence
certain disposition forms and a letter, dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants
Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet and record of arraignment
and trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy.
Cudia v. CA – 284 SCRA 173
FACTS: Petitioner was charged by the City Prosecutor of Angeles for illegal possession of fire arms and ammunition. It
was raffled to Branch 60 RTC of Angeles City, however the court called the attention of the parties since the crime was
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Then, the case was reraffled to Branch 56, a branch assigned to criminal cases
committed outside the city. On the other hand, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information with the same charge
against the accused and it was raffled to Branch 56. The petitioner contends that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy
HELD: In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. In determining
when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a)
Court of competent jurisdiction (b)
Valid complaint or information (c)
Arraignment (c)
Valid plea (e)
The
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused. The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was
not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of
jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients
thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is
Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before
Branch 60, not Branch 56. In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition
against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the
absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been
convicted on the strength thereof. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing
it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, November 16, 1999
7
FACTS: Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private complainant also filed a civil case
against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. A complaint
was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.” It was subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that
being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.
ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy.
HELD. NO. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of the foregoing applies
to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be
stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.
The administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which
were the subject of the administrative complaint.
Dimatulac v. Villon – GR 127107 October 12, 1998
FACTS: On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 95360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were
probably guilty thereof. The YABUTs opposed petitioners’ Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had
already been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor -- not the
private prosecutor -- had control of the prosecution of the case.
HELD: It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case is void, hence double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea
of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.
People v. Maquiling – GR 128986 June 21, 1999
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the Solicitor General assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals acquitting the accused, herein private respondent, who was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of the
crimes of Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. The Court of Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense of the
accused which was rejected by the trial court. The Solicitor General questioned the review by the appellate court of
the trial court’s assessment of credibility of witnesses despite its not having been raised as an issue in the appeal brief
and its misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of CA and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process
and because it committed grave abuse of discretion .
HELD: Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such
cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other
words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The rule on double jeopardy,
however, prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on
the merits of the case. Double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1) the accused individuals are
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or
the case is dismissed without their express consent. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence
of the first, third and fourth elements.
Petitioner, however, questions the presence of the second element and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process
and because it committed grave abuse of discretion. It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may
be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A denial of due process
likewise results in loss or lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or complaint is purely
capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be heard.
People v. Nitafan – GR 707964-66 February 1, 1999 !31
46
FACTS: three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos relating to a series of transactions”
devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth. Then, without
private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent judge issued an
order requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates
8
private respondent’s right against ex post facto law. On the same day, respondent judge issued another order
requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations should not be dismissed on the
ground that private respondent’s right to double jeopardy was violated. Respondent judge further stated that to
separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy.
Respondent judge dismiss the criminal case on the ground that the consolidated case is a violation of private
respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy is proper
HELD: NO. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has
neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are:
(a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated,
and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy
terminated. Section 7, Rule 117 the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent
court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. respondent
judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those
cases pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to
those cases, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Private respondent was not convicted, acquitted nor the
cases against her dismissed or otherwise terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the
first jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of private respondent under
the three informations pending would violate the former’s right against double jeopardy.
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999
FACTS:G.R. No. 128136 (2nd part of the consolidated case for purposes of the topic of double jeopardy) Vice-Mayor of
San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also
officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent
municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of the Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual
Central School. Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan but such was filed in RTC. Later, a
group of concern citizen filed an action against the petitioner for overpricing thereby a violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of R.A. No. 3019, so Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging
petitioners with such. another information was filed for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for
the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court will expose the petitioners who are accused
therein to double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
they had already pleaded “not guilty” to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in
the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the
accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.
Limpangog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134229, November 26, 1999
FACTS: Three Informations, one for murder and two for frustrated murder were filed against Petitioners Lito Limpangog
and Jerry Limpangog before the Regional Trial Court sentencing him to: 1.
imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of TEN (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum 2.
2nd Criminal Case, RECLUSION PERPETUA 3.
3rd Criminal Case TEN (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) years of reclusion temporal.CA: declared itself to have no jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal of their
murder conviction but still ruled that the accuse are convicted for frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case
ISSUE:WON there is a violation of double jeopardy against the petitioner
HELD:NO. judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates
no rights and produces no effect. The Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal; hence, the
challenged Decision is null and void. Under Article VIII, Section 5 (2)(d) of the constitution, the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over appeals of final judgments in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher Leaving no doubt that the CA had no jurisdiction over the two cases. the Court of Appeals acted without
jurisdiction in resolving the appeal of the conviction for frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case. Hence, the
CA’s acquittal of the petitioners on charges of frustrated murder is void and with the voiding of the CA Decision and
the review by this Court of the RTC judgment, petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, because they were never
legally in danger of conviction by the Court of Appeals.
9
Flores v. Joven, GR 129874, Dec. 27, 2002
FACTS: petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against respondent Navarro and nine other
persons. After preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro and his other
co-accused of the crime of Rape. before all the accused can be arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it does not sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. Similar Informations for Rape were likewise filed against the other accused. Respondent
Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended Information so the trial court issued the assailed Order granting
the motion to quash, finding that Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that
the Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime. Navarro escaped from detention.
Seubsequently, petitioner filed a petition alleging that during clarificatory hearing respondent/accused Navarro was
identified as one of those nine (9) persons who sexually abused petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated
HELD: NO.In Mosquera vs. Panganiban: “the right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which
deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would
place the accused in double jeopardy.” Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to
appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to ‘any party,’ except when the accused is placed
thereby in double jeopardy. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The
third requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned.
MIRANDA V. TULIAO 486 SCRA 377
FACTS: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program. Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC
of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced
them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large.
Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. In Sept. 1999, Maderal was
arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the
victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued
a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on
the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and
executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and 36-3524.
HELD: NO. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment. In any
case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed.
CABO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 491 SCRA 264
FACTS: An information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed
against petitioner Jocelyn E. Cabo and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. Claiming that she was deprived of her right
to a preliminary investigation as she never received any notice to submit a counter-affidavit or countervailing evidence
to prove her innocence, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the
court’s permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. The Sandiganbayan granted the same. Petitioner returned
from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded its reinvestigation and found probable
cause to charge her with violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment
of petitioner and her co-accused. On the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation With Motion praying that “she be allowed to [re]iterate on her previous plea of ‘not guilty’ x x x entered
during her conditional arraignment held last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excused from attending the scheduled
arraignment for October 12, 2004.” It does not appear, however, that the Sandiganbayan acted upon the said motion.
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution sustaining Balahay’s contention that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart from the failure to allege that Balahay had
to officially intervene in the transaction pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted and received the
money “for himself or for another.” The information was thus defective in that it failed to allege every single fact
10
necessary to constitute all the elements of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the
immediate quashal of the information. Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended
information. Petitioner was likewise notified of her re- arraignment which was set on April 14, 2005. However, on April
11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the ground that the amended information
pertained to Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended information
since substantial amendment of an information is not allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the “not guilty” plea entered by petitioner on the
original information.
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set forth the conditions for
petitioner’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel abroad. Among the conditions
specified in said order is “if it should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the
accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her
constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy.” Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the
conditional arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal consequences of such conditions. In fact, she
signed the minutes of the proceedings which could only signify her informed acceptance of and conformity with the
terms of the conditional arraignment. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner’s “conditional
arraignment” on the first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or
plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated
without his express consent. The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar. It should be noted that
the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to allege all the essential elements of violation of Section
3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective. A
valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger
of being convicted when she entered her plea of “not guilty” to the insufficient indictment.
ROMUALDEZ V. MARCELO 497 SCRA 89
FACTS: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of
24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first
time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus,
this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal
Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription. In
its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does
not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the
complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with
the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines
from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. For its part,
the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No.
3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be
applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.
HELD: YES. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326
which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG. In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong
body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods. When the Office of
the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by
11
requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed.
Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
PEOPLE V. TERRADO 558 SCRA 84 (acquittal not reviewable)
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the April 6, 2001 Decision of Honorable Judge Salvador P.
Vedaña of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5813, People v. Joseph Terrado, a.k.a. “Hapon,”
finding the accused “Hapon” not guilty of Carnapping (punished under Republic Act 6538, otherwise known as the
“Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972”).
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction as the
judgment of acquittal was rendered on dubious factual and legal basis.
HELD: NO. It should be remembered that, as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by the Supreme
Court in a certiorari proceeding. The present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental
aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which
is extra ordinem – beyond the ambit of appeal. At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of
jurisdiction correctible by the special civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment, which is correctible by a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of
certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, and more serious than the procedural infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the
findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is
tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and
irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the principle is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and to safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. This Court cannot
rule any other way. Accused Joseph Terrado, after being acquitted of the crime charged, must be afforded the
protection against repeated attempts for conviction, in faithful adherence to the constitutional rule against double
jeopardy.
PEOPLE V. CA – 626 SCRA 352
FACTS: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 24,
2003 Decision and October 3, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985. An Information
for Arson was filed against Wilson Cua Ting, Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega, John Doe and Peter Doe, of
the crime of arson. The RTC dismissed the case. The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of
its observation that the sworn statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC. Then petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71985. However, CA issued a Decision denying the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s contention is correct that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil
action is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or more importantly, a lapsed appeal.
HELD: YES. It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when,
“there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” and certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,certiorari not being a
substitute for a lost appeal. While petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot escape this
Court’s attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the case by
the RTC, on the basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court however, will defer to the
findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight and respect, more so because the same were affirmed by
the CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the instant case is a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not
entertained. The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondent’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon. An error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari. The dismissal of herein
petition does not preclude petitioner from availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that
the case was dismissed. Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a
ground for the dismissal of the case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.
TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION
*Bulaong v. People - 17 SCRA 746
12
FACTS: Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna with the crime of rebellion. Trial
did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong until 1958 for he was then at large. Meanwhile Congress enacted the
Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act 1700) which took effect on June 20, 1957.Agaton Bulaong was then arrested. The
information for rebellion was filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Another information was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Manila charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section 4 of the AntiSubversion Act. The case for subversion is still pending in the CFI of Manila; while the case for rebellion has already
been decided by the CFI of Laguna adversely against the accused. Accused Bulaong appealed to the Court of Appeals
which in turn affirmed the decision of CFI. At bar is his appeal from said judgment of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: whether or not accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this case in view of the filing
against him of the information for subversion in the Court of First Instance of Manila which allegedly involves the same
facts obtaining in this case.
HELD: NO. Under Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either
convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent. Such is not
the situation in this case. For accused has not been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First
Instance against him for subversion. Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as
stated, it is still pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
Bustamante v. Maceren - 48 SCRA 155
FACTS: The petitioner was accused of murder in an information filed with the Court of First Instance. Upon
arraignment petitioner entered a plea of guilty, the Court finds the accused Danilo Bustamante guilty of the crime of
murder sentenced to serve (1) year imprisonment.A motion for Modification of Penalty and Motion for Withdrawal of
Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Commitment was filed. When the case against petitioner was reassigned to the sala
presided over by the Honorable Maximo Maceren, Villanueva was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide he is sentenced to suffer an
When is the defense of double jeopardy not available?
GR: Double jeopardy is not available when the case is dismissed other than on the merits or other than by acquittal or
conviction upon motion of the accused personally, or through counsel, since such dismissal is regarded as with express
consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double jeopardy.
XPNs: 1. Dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence 2. Dismissal because of denial of accused’s right to speedy trial
3. Accused is discharged to be a State Witness
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indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ISSUE: WON the accused can raised the defense of double jeopardy. HELD: Considering that defense counsel raised the
question of double jeopardy in favor of petitioner during the new trial and before Judge Maceren rendered judgment
based on said new trial, it is believed that the above principle can be applied to this case by analogy and that said
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, should have entertained said plea of double jeopardy in the interest of justice,
especially since at the time such plea was made, petitioner had already fully served the one-year straight sentence
imposed upon him by Judge Coquia on December 14, 1970, and was already entitled to be released from custody after
such full service of his penalty under said judgment." Thus it would appear there is no legal bar to the remedy prayed
for by petitioner. NOTE: No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving
his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha waived in writing his appeal;
withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.
People v. Obsania - L-24447
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said
motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In
the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
“doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
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consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his
action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he
thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but
even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against
him is revived by the fiscal.
Rivera, Jr. v, People - 189 SCRA 331
FACTS: After several postponements because of the unavailability of witness accused moved for dismissal of the case
on the ground of denial of the right to a speedy trial after the judge verbally dismissed the case and proceeded to hear
another case, the witness arrived. Upon explanation by the prosecution, the judge resumed hearing the verbally
dismissed case.
ISSUE: WON the accused was place in double jeopardy
RULING: No, the verbal dismissal is not final, not until written and signed by the judge.
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People - 234 SCRA 63
FACTS:5 unidentified masked armed persons ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal
properties including cash of certain Encarnacion. They were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at
the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan. Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
. Pamintuan was found guilty for violation of Presidential Decree 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 14 years of prison mayor to 18 years of reclusion temporal. No
civil liability was imposed in view of the recovery of the items. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty
imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence to determine
the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate
penalty.
ISSUE: WON a remand for further reception of evidence would place her in double jeopardy.
HELD:NO. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first. Such a concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to
the trial court.
COMELEC v. CA - 229 SCRA 501
Facts: An information was filed by the Commission on Elections before the RTC charging respondent Locsin with
violation of Section 261 (f) of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. Respondent Locsin was accused of
intimidating the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Albuera, Leyte during the canvassing of election
returns in said province and preventing them from performing their functions and duties. When arraigned, respondent
Locsin entered a plea of not guilty and trial commenced accordingly.
Issue:
Held: The granting of the demurrer to evidence by the court produces a different effect altogether. The case is ordered
dismissed, and the order of dismissal being on the merits, is equivalent to an acquittal from which the prosecution
cannot appeal, as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals upheld the Solicitor General's
recommendation to dismiss Criminal Case No. B-1588 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. In so doing, the Court
of Appeals reviewed the evidence of the prosecution and found it insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of
the accused. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded: As such, when respondent Judge denied the petitioner's demurrer
to evidence, he committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to consider the testimonies of the witnesses presented,
thus certiorari lies against him. Being a decision on the merits, this dismissal amounts to an acquittal of the accused
from the offense charged. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the
dismissal of the case, this cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy Double jeopardy
attaches when the accused, charged in a valid complaint or information before a competent court, is acquitted or
convicted or the case is unconditionally dismissed without his express consent after he has been arraigned and
entered a plea Nevertheless, even if the motion to dismiss the case is made with his consent or by the accused
himself, double jeopardy may be attached in two instances: (i) when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution, and (ii) when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial
People v. Bans - 239 SCRA 48
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Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the order of respondent Judge Esther Bans granting the
Demurrer to Evidence filed by private respondents and acquitting them of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
and the order of the same court, denying reconsideration thereof. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied by respondent judge on the ground that any reconsideration of the aforesaid order will place
private respondents in double jeopardy; the order granting the demurrer having resulted in the acquittal of private
respondents.
Issue:
Held: In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the
latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule
admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial. In the case before
us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after a finding that
the search warrant was illegally issued. Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double
jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the
accused. Furthermore, the present petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which calls only for a
review of any error arising from the exercise of jurisdiction or lack thereof and not a review of an error of judgment. A
review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused lies outside the function of
certiorari as it intrudes into the prerogatives of Rule 45, under ordinary appeals, where an alleged error of judgment
may be subjected to review. A review of the judgment of acquittal of private respondents under this petition for
certiorari (Rule 65) would place the accused in double jeopardy which is not allowed.
State Prosecutors v. Muro - 236 SCRA 505
Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11
cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and
of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s
decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in
effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu
propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper
has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on
his part.
Issue:
Held: It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected
the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal
was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications
and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in
the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against
falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared: It is settled doctrine that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . . Where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . .
People v. Bellaflor - 233 SCRA 196
Facts: Private respondent was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment, private respondent
pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the parties rested their case. In the
instant petition, petitioner claims that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the motion for reconsideration of private respondent and acquitting the latter. On the other hand, private
respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and
executory and a reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy.
Issue:
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Held: Private respondent's reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is misplaced. In order that a defendant may
successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge. Generally, protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are
only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was dismissed with the express
consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial. None exists in the case at bar. Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the
dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover
him.
Guerrero v. CA - 257 SCRA 703
Facts: An Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner. Due to several
postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally able to start presenting its evidence on
September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his pleas of 'Not Guilty.’ On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor
submitted copies of the duplicate originals of the testimonies. The private prosecutor manifested that he had
communicated with one of the stenographers on record, who promised to look into her files and hopefully complete
the transcription of her stenographic notes. On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses’
testimony on October 24, 1990. On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the testimonies was reset to November 9, 1990
due to petitioner's failure to appear on the scheduled hearing. On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial has been violated. On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge denied
the motion to dismiss and reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990. On November 16, 1990,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 21, 1990. The presiding judge set anew
the retaking of the testimonies to December 5, 1990. Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus for the review of the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20, 1990
anent petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for reconsideration. The petition was anchored on the
alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.
Issue:
Held: Anent petitioner's contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy, suffice it to say that there
has been no termination of the criminal prosecution - i.e. of that "first jeopardy." For double jeopardy to attach, the
following elements must concur: “x x x It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).” [ In the present case, there has
not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element - dismissal or termination of the case without the express
consent of the accused - is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the retaking of
testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of
double jeopardy is utterly without basis.
Teodoro v. CA - 258 SCRA 603
Facts: The petitioner was charged in four separate informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It was
alleged that the petitioner, together with Melania Guerrero, who produced a special power of attorney claimed
establish have been executed by the late Clemente Guerrero, had conspired with their co-accused in selling some
properties of the decedent to the widow's sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious deeds of sale notarized by the
petitioner. The motion to dismiss to was eventually denied by the trial court, as so was the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner questioned the denial of the motions. Petitioner unabashedly admits that the motion to
dismiss in the instant criminal cases was filed after the arraignment so that the cases could not be refiled again
considering the principle of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the double jeopardy has attached in petitioner’s motion to quash
Held: No. When the Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss after the arraignment, he failed to attach the double jeopardy.
According to the SC, a person who does not move to quash a complaint or information until after he has pleaded is
deemed to have waived all objections then available which are grounds of a motion to quash. However, this is subject
to exception. By express provision of Sec. 8 of the same rule, failure to assert certain grounds in a motion to quash
filed prior to the plea does not operate as a waiver of the right to invoke them later. Even after arraignment, a motion
to dismiss the information may be filed if it is based on the ground that: (a) the information charges no offense; (b) the
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trial court has no jurisdiction; (c) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (d) that double jeopardy has
attached.
Cuidia v. CA – 284 SCRA 173
Facts: An information was filed by City Prosecutor of Angeles City against the petitioner for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. During pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the
information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Thereafter, the case was
assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was
likewise raffled to Angeles City. This prompted the city prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash a 2nd information on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the first information and which had
been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the first jeopardy did not attach because the first information filed
against the accused was not valid.
Held: No. In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence
of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction (b) Valid complaint or information (c) Arraignment (c) Valid plea (e)
The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. In the case at bar, the first jeopardy did not attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an
essential element of jurisdiction. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
People v. Lising – 285 SCRA 595
Facts: Two (2) Amended Informations for carnapping and kidnapping with double murder were filed in court against
Lising, Manalili, Garcia, Dizon, Manga, and Ligaya Fausto. The RTC acquitted all the accused in the crime of carnapping
because it appearing that the use of the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight Illegal
Detention. When Lising was apprehended, he implicated Garcia and Manalili. Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon
Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili began. One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise and Beebom fell into the
hands of the authorities. Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named Pat. Enrico Dizon as the
companion of Lising when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde Lodge. He refused to
make a statement or give further information until Rodolfo Manalili was arrested.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of Manalili and Garcia for kidnapping would violated their constitutional right
against double jeopardy
Held. Yes. Since they were already convicted and met the requirement in order that double jeopardy mayexist. The
decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the
accused guilty for the crime of Slight Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the
accused should be equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can no longer convict Manalili and
Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention should be qualified
to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code considering that a female victim was involved.
People v. Araneta, GR 125894 December 11, 1998, 95 OG 4556
Facts: Respondents were charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder for the death of Datoon, Jr.
Accused Narito Araneta posted a bond of P40,000.00 and pled not guilty. The other accused, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel
Araneta and Marvin Deogluis, remain at large. The charges against Joebert Araneta, an active member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person. RTC found the accused guilty of the
crime charged. He appealed to the Court of Appeals and continued to be free on the same bailbond he had posted with
the trial court. While the case is pending accused, the court receive a copy of the return of the warrant of arrest. It
stated that the police failed to effect the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Gustilo as they could not locate accusedappellant and his whereabouts were unknown.
Issue: Whether or not the Court should proceed to exercise jurisdiction over his appeal.
Held: Yes. The court held that dismissal of accused-appellant’s appeal at this stage will result in injustice. In Criminal
Case No. 34642, the Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of homicide and sentencing him to a minimum of
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prision mayor to a maximum of reclusion temporal will become final. The findings of the Court of Appeals that he
should instead be convicted for murder and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua can no longer be acted upon by
this Court. And in Criminal Case No. 34643, accused-appellant will be acquitted from the charge of frustrated homicide
as found by the Court of Appeals. In fine, accused-appellant will be benefitted by his act of jumping bail. To avoid this
mockery of justice, the court resolved to continue exercising jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 34642. The acquittal
of accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 34643, however, can no longer be reviewed in view of the rule on double
jeopardy.
Cuison v. CA – 289 SCRA 159
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Facts: The RTC was found the accused Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased.The accused
elevated the decision on a petition for review but the Supreme Court denied the said petition and remanded it to RTC
of Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated the decision of only with
respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his
sentence. Petitioner submits that the trial court’s promulgation of the CA Decision “cannot be set aside and a second
promulgation be ordered. Because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. He contends
that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over
the case.
Issue: Whether or not to pursue with the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused’s constitutional right against
jeopardy.
Held: No. SC held that the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation
was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially
incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. The court
emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal
cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper
as a defense.
People v. CA (MAQUILING), GR 128986 June 21, 1999
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the Solicitor General assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals acquitting the accused, herein private respondent, who was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of the
crimes of Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. The Court of Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense of the
accused which was rejected by the trial court. The Solicitor General questioned the review by the appellate court of
the trial court’s assessment of credibility of witnesses despite its not having been raised as an issue in the appeal brief
and its misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of CA and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process
and because it committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such
cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other
words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The rule on double jeopardy,
however, prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on
the merits of the case. Double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1) the accused individuals are
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or
the case is dismissed without their express consent. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence
of the first, third and fourth elements.
Petitioner, however, questions the presence of the second element and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process
and because it committed grave abuse of discretion. It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may
be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A denial of due process
likewise results in loss or lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or complaint is purely
capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be heard.
People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 135451, September 30, 1999
FACTS: The Supreme Court, in the exercise of supervision over judges and court employees, had initiated this action in
consequence of the palpably erroneous ruling of Judge Pepe P. Domael who rendered decision acquitting the accused
on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his answer, he said that he
gave due course to the appeal because the prosecution cited Memorandum Circular No. 3 dated April 1, 1997 of the
Department of Justice pertaining to appeals of decisions of acquittal by the trial court, he admitted that he was
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“caught off-handed” by the “novel action taken by the prosecution in appealing a decision of acquittal in a criminal
case. The Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the appealed case for violation of the rule on double jeopardy and
required Judge Domael to explain why he should not be dismissed from office for gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: YES. It is elementary that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal on
the merits. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an
appellate court, will put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense. The Constitution itself provides that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Such a constitutional guarantee prohibits an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and the law does not provide for exceptions other than deprivation of due process
or grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. The preclusion against appeal by the government from
judgments of acquittal applies even though the accused did not raise the question of double jeopardy. Although the
accused Danilo F. Serrano, Sr. did not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, Judge Domael should have
known that granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy.
Barangan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123307, November 29, 1999
FACTS: On 22 August 1989 a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against BIYAYA's Chairman Federico Castillo, ViceChairman Samuel Barangan, and Board Members Efigenia Marquez, Merlinda Topinio, Gualberto Ola, Federico Sison Jr.
and Rolando Remigio. The complaint alleged that these seven (7) accused feloniously solicited investments from John
Gatmen in the sum of P31,200.00 where he would be paid 300% in dividends after (15) fifteen days plus another 200%
in dividends after (21) twenty-one days, and on such dates the capital would be returned. But, despite repeated
demands, John Gatmen was never paid his investment and guaranteed profits. On 30 August 1989 another complaint
for estafa was filed by Leovino Jose similarly alleging that he was defrauded by the same accused by convincing him to
part with P43,500.00 and to deposit the amount with the Biyaya Foundation. But far from complying with their
promise, the money was misappropriated and misapplied to their own use and benefit. Thus, Leovino Jose never
recovered what he invested, much less its promised returns. Petitioner Samuel Barangan now comes to us contending
that respondent appellate court committed a reversible error in holding without evidence that Leovino Jose invested
any amount with the BIYAYA and in holding him together with the other accused jointly and severally liable to pay
Leovino Jose. Barangan argues that there was no evidence at all that Jose actually invested any amount with BIYAYA.
His claim that he was given slots for his investment should not be given credence in view of his failure to present any
of the slots in evidence. He did not even know the name of the employee of BIYAYA to whom he gave the money nor
could he remember the amount he invested in his name or in the name of his relatives.
HELD: It has been proven time and again that schemes such as in the instant case - innocuously denominated as a
paluwagan - are but rackets designed to victimize the gullible public. We want to clarify, however, that a paluwagan,
which operates as a trust fund from which members can draw money in case of need, is not illegal per se. But if it
becomes a device to entice investments, usually with the promise of enormous dividends, when in truth the ultimate
objective is to swindle the investors, then the scheme is transformed into an illegal activity. It is undisputed that
BIYAYA was engaged in one such activity which was cloaked in the guise of a paluwagan. Jose's investment of
P43,500.00 was not returned because the officers of BIYAYA went into hiding after the authorities raided its office. For
having engaged in an illegal transaction, the officers and the members of the Board of the Biyaya Foundation who had
actual knowledge of the transactions and thus tacitly approved and acquiesced thereto, should be made to answer
criminally and civilly. It is indeed difficult to fathom why the accused were acquitted considering that BIYAYA could not
have possibly undertaken the illegal transactions without the imprimatur of its officers and board members. Yet our
hands are now tied by the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy, hence, their acquittal must stand.
People v. Velasco, GR 127444, September 13, 2000
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FACTS: The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission
of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso
Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez,
the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered,
would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently
gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is
urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of
guilt.
ISSUE: WON the contention of the petitioner would prosper?
HELD: NO. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent
court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. It
bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial
court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction.
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Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal
trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. (Galaman v. Sandiganbayan)
Tupaz v. ULEP, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999
FACTS: On January 10, 1991, State Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City an
information for the alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979 against Petronila C.
Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation. The said case was raffled
to Branch 105, presided over by respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep. However, on July 25 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died.
Then, on September 20, 1994, Petronila C. Tupaz was arraigned and she pleaded not guilty to the information. On April
16, 1996, State Prosecutor Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed a motion to withdraw information, thinking that the accused was
charged for nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax but found that the accused was exempted from paying said tax.
Consequently, Judge Ulep granted the motion and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On May 28,
1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to reinstate information on the ground that the motion to
withdraw information was made through palpable mistake and was the result of excusable neglect. Over the objection
of the accused that it would place her in double jeopardy, Judge Ulep granted the motion and ordered the information
reinstated. Hence, this petition. She contends that by reinstating the information, the trial court exposed her to double
jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court obtained her permission before the case was dismissed. She was
placed in jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a competent court and the case
was dismissed without her express consent. When the trial court reinstated the information charging the same
offense, it placed her in double jeopardy.
HELD: The Court sustained petitioner’s contention. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double
jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted,
acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant
case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case
at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or
presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. As petitioner’s
consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing
of the case.
Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in
violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. DISSENT JUSTICE DAVIDE WHEN AN ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED TO THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION BUT WAS NOT ARRAIGNED ON THE AMENDED INFORMATION, THE
ERRONEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF INFORMATION AND ITS SUBSEQUENT REINSTATEMENT WILL NOT PLACE THE ACCUSED
IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. - As shown in the summary of facts in the ponencia petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on 20
September 1994 to the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- 17321. But, the information was amended by the
prosecution to indicate therein the date of the commission of the offense, to wit: “on or about August 1994 or
subsequently thereafter.” The amended information was admitted by public respondent Judge in the order of 2 March
1995. There is at all no showing that petitioner was re-arraigned on the amended information. On the contrary, on 5
December 1995 she filed a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation, which the trial court granted
in its order of 13 December 1995. Not having been re-arraigned on the amended information, which validly supplanted
the original information, the erroneous withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 and its
subsequent reinstatement cannot place the petitioner in double jeopardy. Firstly, the withdrawal had no legal effect
since the information was amended. Secondly, petitioner was not arraigned on the amended information. And, thirdly,
petitioner is estopped on the matter since she had asked for a reinvestigation on the basis of the amended
information.
People v. Verra, GR 134732
FACTS: respondent Acelo Verra was charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo. Subsequently,
the case was dismissed. Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting incident appeared after learning of the
dismissal of the case and manifested their willingness to testify. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Order of Dismissal which was granted by the RTC. CA: held that when the trial court issued its order of
dismissal, as far as the court is concerned, the case was ended. To revive the case against the same accused or to
prosecute him anew for the same act imputed to him, the government has to file a new case or information for the
reason that the dismissed case had already been terminated, definitely and finally.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of double jeopardy
HELD: YES. to revive the case against him would be violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
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competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
There are however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by
the accused himself: First, is when the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution; and second is when the
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial. In the case at bar, we find all
the above-cited requisites present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, Second, the Regional Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the
respondent. Third, he was arraigned with the assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourth, during the arraignment, he
entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid termination of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to
Dismiss the case. While it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double
jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
Merciales v. CA, 379 SCRA 345
FACTS: Criminal cases for rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales, were
filed against the private respondents. RTC: acquitted the accuse for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. CA: dismiss. The case was set for oral argument
ISSUE:WON the re opening of the case would constitute a violation of rights of theaccuse against double jeopardy
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HELD: NO. It should be noted that in the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient
evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the
case, he deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the
prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties.
More specifically, the public prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby causing
prejudice to the offended party. Indeed, the family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales, could do nothing during
the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do was
helplessly watch as the public prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, renege
on that obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty. it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court.
Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases.
Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same
is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.
even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is,
in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
Poso v. Mijares, AM No. RTJ-02-1693, Aug. 21, 2002
FACTS:
A complaint for administrative sanctions against Judge Mijares for allegedly railroading the criminal case
against a self-confessed killer and admitting him to probation, which unduly obviated the accused’s otherwise definite
date with prison was charged against the said accuse. The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings
for murder, “People v. Virgilio de Guia,” where the victim, a certain Lito M. Galupo, was a relative of complainant Oscar
M. Poso. There is a question in the said case, whether the accused truly moved for reconsideration of the penalty
imposed on him by respondent Judge Mijares. Complainant averred that respondent Judge had acted upon an unsigned
motion which the accused did not even file
ISSUE: WON there was a violation against double jeopardy
HELD: NONE. The proceedings beginning with the issuance of the Resolution reducing the penalty of the accuse upon
the allege motion for reconsideration are patently void and therefore produce no legal effects whatsoever. From the
lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance,
and finally the grant of probation, the orders of respondent Judge arising from these proceedings do not compel
respectability and finality to constitute double jeopardy. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without
due process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple
reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.
People v. Alberto, GR 132374, Aug. 22, 2002
FACTS: RTC convict petitioner Lucio Alberto of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. On June 26, 1996,
the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits.
The said order was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the change of the ruling of RTC via a motion for reconsideration constitute a violation of right against
double jeopardy
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HELD: NO. The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. As to the first jeopardy, it only
arises (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not valid and cannot be used as basis for a claim of
double jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of law. We agree with the OSG’s contention that the
trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence
there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to
dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the
testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely
corrected itself.
Condrada v. People, GR 141646, Feb. 28, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently pending before the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2. When he was arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him. Due to several postponement of the hearing, petitioner moved for a temporary dismissal in which the
prosecution did not object, thus, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the case. Subsequently, the
prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case. Petitioner opposed the motion
contending that the revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the revival would constitute a violation of double jeopardy because the dismissal is permanent in
character, having been made in consideration of his right to speedy trial.
HELD: NO. A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting
in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecution’s failure to
prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the
Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial court was
a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to
speedy trial had been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. the trial court expressly stated that
the same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal. the Court finds that
the reinstatement did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes
that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his
acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice
put in jeopardy with the reinstatement, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus,
the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case.
PEOPLE V. ROMERO GR144156, March 20, 2003
FACTS: Before the trial court rendered a decision, the prosecution, on August 30, 1999, moved for the re-opening of
the case on the ground that the appellant violated one of the above conditions when he refused to pay the amount of
P30,000 to the father of the victim. Instead, the appellant proposed to pay the lesser amount of P20,000, conditioned
on his being set free upon payment thereof. The trial court granted the motion of the prosecution and ordered the
commencement of trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s right against double jeopardy was violated when the trial court granted the
prosecution’s motion to re-open the case after it approved his plea to the lesser offense of homicide.
HELD: NO. The trial court was correct in holding that there was no double jeopardy in this case, considering that it was
not terminated as a result of appellant’s acquittal, conviction or dismissal. The order approving the guilty plea to
homicide, with conditions, was not a judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion of the said order which in part
reads “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision,” clearly shows that the trial
court still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of the appellant. The said order merely approved
the agreement between the parties on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the conditions attached to
it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the
victim.
PEOPLE V. ESPINOSA GR 153714, Aug. 15, 2003
FACTS: Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed before the SBN by the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then provincial administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez;
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and (3) Romeo Sanano. While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a Motion for Leave to
Travel Abroad. As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion to Travel. The OMB -through the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent.
The SBN granted the Motion. Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation of Public
Funds against Espinosa and several others. Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double
jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to
Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without his express consent. Petitioner countered that the
arraignment for the two previous cases was “conditional,” because it was made solely for the purpose of
accommodating private respondent’s request to travel abroad while the matters were pending reinvestigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy in the light of his allegedly
“conditional” arraignment.
HELD: NO. A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical, knowing and
intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express,
informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional. The right against
double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution. This constitutionally mandated right is
procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim
for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
“x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is
an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
“And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.” Private respondent has
amply shown that he learned of the Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal,
having been secured by petitioner without the express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the
right against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such
right.
ORIENTE V. PEOPLE 513 SCRA 348
FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide. However, on November 12,
1999, before the foregoing judgment became final and executory, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio setting aside
the said judgment because of a mistake in the “judgment proper” and requiring both petitioner and his counsel to
appear before the court on November 17, 1999. On the latter date, the RTC promulgated its second Decision dated
November 15, 1999, convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide.
ISSUE: Whetheer or not petitioner’s argument that the RTC promulgated two decisions and, by doing so, he was
placed in double jeopardy is correct.
HELD: NO. Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice.
This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate amendments that are substantial in nature.
They merely cover formal changes or such that will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction of
typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make substantial amendments in their decisions
without affording the other party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration. The
Court finds that the change in the penalty by the RTC in the instant case did not involve the consideration of any new
evidence but a mere “correction” of the penalty imposed to conform with the Revised Penal Code and The
Indeterminate Sentence Law. And as the Solicitor General correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its
Decision dated November 15, 1999 before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated
November 4, 1999 which was promulgated on November 10, 1999. Noteworthy is that it was the RTC’s second
Decision dated November 15, 1999 which the petitioner elevated on appeal to the CA. It is well settled that when an
accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy,
and, as discussed above, throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to
render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the
subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly
takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.
PACOY V. CAJIGAL 534 SCRA 338
FACTS: On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the
crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide”
and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory
portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling
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of the victim’s name from “Escuita” to “Escueta.” The date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was
to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent,
resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder,
the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy. The respondent judge
denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double
jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was
merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the
allegation of aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,” the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit
and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, that, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original
information charging the crime of homicide stands.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
HELD: NO. It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information. A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that “disregard of
rank” is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly
corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor
acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
SUMMERVILLE V. EUGENIO 529 SCRA 274
FACTS: The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed by petitioner against private
respondents Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho. Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000; however, on June
22 of the same year, private respondents filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), assailing the
May 31, 2000 Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. The DOJ affirmed the resolution. Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondents, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez issued Resolution which recalled and
set aside the August 17, 2000 Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but without however issuing a ruling on the
propriety of the complaint and merely indicated that the case would be further reviewed and the corresponding
resolution would be issued. The trial court issued an Order holding in abeyance all pending incidents to await the final
resolution of the motion filed before the DOJ. Private respondents Khos filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the trial court has all the facts necessary to resolve the pending incidents. The Khos filed a supplemental motion
insisting that the case be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would constitute double jeopardy.
HELD: NO. For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a valid complaint or
information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to
the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without
the express consent of the accused. Since the court held that the October 24, 2001 Order granting the withdrawal of
the Information was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a
valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and acquittal of the
accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not
set in.
Herrera v. Sandiganbayan – 579 SCRA 32
66
FACTS: Petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio, together with the other
accused, Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the Parañaque Police Station, were charged
with two (2) counts of murder, FOR THER KILLING OF Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan, before public respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16674 and 16675. Petitioners insist that respondent Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting them for the crime of murder under the amended informations as they had earlier been arraigned under the
original informations for murder and their rearraignment under the amended informations placed them in double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the rule on double jeopardy applies.
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HELD: NO. Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the informations and made it of record that
the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed
automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by
virtue of petitioner’s plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his express consent. In the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to
the original informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were
committed "in relation to their office." On the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations
accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations against the
petitioners were valid, has not been complied with. The fourth element was lacking. Petitioners cannot be validly
convicted on the basis of the original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes
were committed "in relation to their office." Petitioners were thus not placed in danger of being convicted when they
entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information. Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the
case against petitioners.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan – 599 SCRA 324
FACTS: Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information.
Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On
October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javier’s
motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public fund she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against
double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON there was double jeopardy.
HELD: NO.Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by
different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge.
In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet
arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter
information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the
Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her. It is well settled
that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before
a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[38] The third and
fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
Co v. Lim – 604 SCRA 702
FACTS: City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila issued a Resolution dated 7 December 2001 recommending the prosecution
of Lim for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612. On 7 March 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC of
Manila charging Lim with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, Lim moved for a reinvestigation of his case before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, which was granted by the RTC. RTC granted the motion and consolidated
the criminal cases against respondents. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dismissed Criminal Cases No. 01-197839
and No. 03-213403 against respondents Harold Lim y Go (Lim) and Avelino Uy Go (Go), respectively, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84703, which sought the reversal of the Resolution dated 16 January
2006 of the Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to
withdraw the informations filed against the respondents
ISSUE: THE RIGHTS OF THE TWO (2) ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATED, CONSIDERING THAT THEY
EXPRESSLY MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THEM.
HELD: NO. The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in: (1) there is a valid complaint of
information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to
25
the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused. The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the
defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel,
had given their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite,
which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval,
was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.
Lejano v. People – 639 SCRA 760
FACTS: On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the
accused in this case of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to
reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts;
unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."
ISSUE: WON judgment of acquittal can be reconsidered.
HELD: NO. A judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. To
reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he
has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the
State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense
after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
Bangayon v. Bangayon, GR 172777, October 19, 2011 38
FACTS: City prosecutor recommended the filing of an informationfor bigamy against Benjamin Jr and Resalie for having
contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go.RTC dismissed the
criminal case against Benjamin and Resally for insufficiency of evidence.Sally Go filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA . CA grant the petition. Benjamin then filed a petition before the SC.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy
HELD: YES. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against
the petitioner, they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently the case was dismissed after the
prosecution had rested its case. The CA erred in reversing the trial courts order dismissing the case against the
petitioners because it placed them n double jeopardy.
Goodland v. Co, GR 196685, December 18, 2011
Facts: Goodland filed a case against respondents for falsification of public document. After the prosecution formally
offered its evidence and rested its case, herein private respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer
to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that they
are guilty of the crime charged. Private respondents alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the second and
third elements of the crime as the prosecution was unable to provide any proof that private respondents caused it to
appear in a document that Mr. Gilbert Guy participated in an act and that the prosecution failed to establish that Mr.
Gilbert Guy did not participate in said act. Thus, private respondents alleged that the prosecution’s evidence itself
showed that Mr. Gilbert Guy signed the REM, delivered the original transfer certificates of title to AUB and that Mr. Guy
was duly authorized by Goodland’s Board of Directors to execute the REM. They likewise claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove that the REM was submitted as a comfort document as the testimonies of the witnesses proving this
matter were hearsay and lacked probative value. Also, the prosecution failed to present direct evidence showing the
involvement of private respondents in the alleged falsification of document. The prosecution opposed the Demurrer
to Evidence contending that it was able to prove [that] Mr. Guy did not participate in the execution of the REM because
Goodland did not consent to the use of its Makati property to secure a loan and it has no outstanding credit for any
peso loan. The loan of Smartnet was not secured by any collateral. The REM shows signs of falsification: Mr. Guy
signed the REM in blank in the presence of Atty. Ignacio and before the adoption of the board resolution authorizing the
use of the subject property to secure Smartnet’s credit; the REM filed in Pasig City is different from the one filed in the
Makati Register of Deeds; and the CTCs appearing in the REM (particularly of Mr. Gilbert Guy) were issued in 2001
when the REM was executed on 2000. Atty. Pelicano also denies having affixed his signature in the notarization.
Issue:
Held: It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the
dismissal of the case, nor can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature.
One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law. Another exception is when the trial
26
court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence.
If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double
jeopardy.
69
However, the present case is replete with evidence to prove that the CA was correct in denying Goodland’s certiorari
on appeal. We emphasize that the Orders of the MeTC were affirmed by the RTC, and affirmed yet again by the CA. We
find no grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s affirmation of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313.
RULE ON “SUPERVENING FACTS”
*Melo v. People - 85 PHIL. 766
Facts: Petitioner was charged with frustrated homicide. Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the
first information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged in the former
and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense.
Issue:
Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to article III, section 1
(20) of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our
Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It
must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense,
the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same
offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the
same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between
the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction
for the other. This so called "same- evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only
when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit
the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting
the latter. This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does
not put him twice in jeopardy. Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included
in another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no
jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same
cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such
circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such
condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as
not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that exceptions
have been intended to their language which would avoid results of this character.
*People v. Buling - 107 PHIL. 712
Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on
complaining witness Balaba, which according to the complaint would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10
to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for the game
period of time." However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so, the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information against the accused charging him of serious physical injuries.
Issue: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second
prosecution for serious physical injuries.
Held: Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new ruling? In other words, has a new fact
supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the offense into one which was
not in existence at the time the case for less serious physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new fact
supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. What happened is that the first physician that examined the
wounds of the offended party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised, wrist
lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated (the
27
wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on
December 8, 1956, defendant- appellant was found guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc. But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the
offended party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. Counsel for the
appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been
ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the same when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been
disclosed in the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the previous examination may be
attributed to the incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We find much reason in this argument. What
happened is no X- ray examination of the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was merely
superficial. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the
right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography. Under the circumstances above indicated,
we are inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or
occurred, which has transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
SAME OFFENSES
*People v. Tiozon - 198 SCRA 368
Facts: In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for violation of
Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Pre-trial was conducted and
thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision promulgated, the trial court found Tiozon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery. According to the trial
court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of PD 1866, as
amended", should have been imposed. Tiozon filed a motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was denied by
the court. Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal. Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by
murder or homicide, bars prosecution for murder or homicide, in light of the right against double jeopardy.
Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
"upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense
penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however,
follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a
malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to
stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to
separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article
249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise,
the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Lamera v. CA - 198 SCRA 186
Facts: 2 informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. Issue: whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code
Held: The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and
categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of
the two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In
any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional
Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his
arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that
the accused must have been arraigned in the previous case. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Since the informations were for
separate offenses — the first against a person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. The two informations filed against petitioner are
clearly for separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the
28
sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The
second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code. Quasi
offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against
petitioner.
Gonzales v. CA - 232 SCRA 667
Facts: Two separate informations were filed against petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera involving the crimes of
attempted homicide and violation illegal possession of firearms. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the petitioner of
the offense of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Issue: Whether
or not the petitioner is indeed guilty of the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Held: Yes. There is no doubt that the petitioner is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed an unlicensed firearm.
The testimony of the petitioner that he came into possession of the firearm only after a scuffle, is a lame defense
which cannot overcome the solid evidence presented by the prosecution proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On this score, we note that a prosecution witness testified that petitioner pulled the gun from his waist and fired a shot
aimed at Jaime Verde’s foo.
People v. Turda - 233 SCRA 702
Facts: Respondent was charged with illegal recruitment and two (2) counts of estafa. Accused-appellant Gener Turda,
on his part, denies having ever engaged in illegal recruitment activities. He claims that he was himself a victim of the
illegal recruitment activities of his co-accused. He was sentenced a penalty of life imprisonment. In joint decision, the
trial court found guilty the appellant of illegal recruitment and estafa. However, appellant argued that the trial court
erred in imposing upon him a life sentence based on the new law on illegal recruitment which was not yet in force at
the time the alleged acts were committed.
Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in imposing to a petitioner a life sentence
Held: Yes. The penalty shall be modify. Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa necessarily
establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in scope and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment
activities. More importantly, the element of damage, which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal
recruitment. Where two different laws define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is no obstacle to that of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. The safest general rule is that the two offenses must be in substance precisely the
same or of the same nature or of the same species, so that the evidence which proves the one would prove the other;
or if this is not the case, then the one crime must be an ingredient of the other.
People v. Manungas - 231 SCRA 1
Facts: In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo
Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando required the
applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi
however, and upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants
filed complaints of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Manungas. Manungas maintained that he
was not illegally recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only because
the job openings was subsequently awarded to another recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not
able to leave for Saudi.
Issue: Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the circumstances.
Held: Yes. A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because
illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction
while estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.
People v. Deunida - 231 SCRA 520
Facts: Accused was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms in two separate informations. However,
after a reinvestigation which the court ordered upon motion of the accused and for lack of the requisite prior
preliminary investigation, the prosecution moved for the withdrawal of the information for murder and the amendment
of the information for illegal possession of firearms on the ground stated in the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor that the filing of two separate informations was erroneous since what the accused had committed is only
29
one offense, viz., the violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm.
Issue: Whether or the crime of murder or homicide is not absorb in the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Held: The court ruled that the accused who had been charged with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition
under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was not placed in double jeopardy when he was also charged
in another case with murder because the former offense is a different offense punished by a special law while the
latter offense is defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. We reiterated that the constitutional right
against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense and that when the
subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there
is no double jeopardy.
People v. Fernandez - 239 SCRA 174
Facts: Appellants was convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. They contend that no buy-bust was
conducted, but a frame-up instigated by Police Officer Bermo who brought the bag, which contained the white
crystalline substance. The police forcibly entered Rms. 3-B and 4-B without the necessary warrant to do so a few
minutes after Bermo’s arrival. He was brought to the police station but he was not charged with any crime. For these
reasons, accused insist that they should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not appellants were guilty of the offense charged.
Held: Yes. The testimonies on the buy-bust operation are supported by the expert testimony of Forensic Chemist, Sr.
Insp. Julita de Villa, and the physical evidence consisting of the seized plastic packets of white crystalline substance
which yielded positive to Methamphetamine Hydrochloride and the marked P500 bills recovered from ELEONOR and
GAUDENCIO after their arrest. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction. Material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
People v. Quijada – 259 SCRA 191
FACTS: The accused was charged and convicted of the crime Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of the accused with two distinct offenses is barred by constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy
HELD: NO If an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at
the same time laid down the rule that these are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal
Code and the second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. For,
undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of
homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former
is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the
subject provision would violate the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
People v. Ballabare – 264 SCRA 350
FACTS: The case arose from the killing of two brothers, Juan Tacadao and Leonardo Tacadao, Jr., in the afternoon of
September 16, 1990, at Sitio Isumbo, Barangay Pulot II,Municipality of Brooke’s Point, Province of Palawan. Accused74 appellant Gerry Ballabare and his brother, Eder Ballabare, were charged with double murder with the use of
illegally possessed firearms.The accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding
him guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He points out that both offenses arose out of a single incident
and that as a result of the decision finding him guilty of separate crimes, he was placed in double jeopardy. He cites
the case of Lazaro v. People, in which it was held that conviction of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm is a bar to
another prosecution for Parricide committed with the use of the unlicensed firearm under the rule on double jeopardy.
HELD: The argument has no merit. In the case of People v. Deunida, the Court declared Lazaro v. People “no longer
controlling in view of our decisions in People v. Tac-an, [182 SCRA 601 (1991)], People v. Tiozon, [198 SCRA 368
(1991)], and People v. Caling [208 SCRA 821 (1992)]” and held that Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition
does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and therefore does not bar the
simultaneous or subsequent prosecution for the latter crime. It is true that in the later case of People v. Barros, this
Court again ruled that a person who commits homicide or murder through the use of an illegally possessed firearm, is
liable solely for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm as defined in P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2. This
decision, however, has since been overruled by the Court en banc in People v. Quijada in which it was held that one
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or
murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2.
30
People v. Calonzo – 262 SCRA 534 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy
FACTS: REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and five (5) counts of
Estafa by Bernardo Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer Clamor, Belarmino Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula. On 5
April 1994 the Regional Trial Court of Pasig found the accused guilty as charged. Accused-appellant in this appeal
assails his conviction by the trial court. He claims that the court below erred in disregarding the testimony of Nenita
Mercado, an employee of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), who categorically stated that
their records indicated that Calonzo never processed complainants' applications for employment abroad. He
concludes from that fact alone that he cannot be deemed to have engaged in the recruitment of workers for
employment abroad. As regards the estafa cases, accused-appellant contends that the court a quo erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses considering that the amounts claimed to have been collected by
him did not correspond to the amounts indicated in the receipts presented by the complaining witnesses.
HELD: As regards the conviction of Calonzo for estafa on five (5) counts we ruled in People v. Turda, G.R. Nos. 9704446, 6 July 1994, 233 SCRA 713, that recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting
permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where some other crimes or felonies are
committed in the process, conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes.
People v. Benemerito – 264 SCRA 677 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy
FACTS: This is an appeal by accused-appellant Alexander “Alex” Benemerito from a Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 91, convicting him of illegal recruitemnt and three counts of estafa.
HELD: The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another: (a) by abuse of confidence, or
(b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person. All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant deceived the
complainants into believing that he had the authority and capability it send them abroad for employment; that there
were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be hired; and that by reason or on the strength of such
assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the various processing and placement fees. As all
these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
thus applicable.
75 To prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need be shown, viz., (1) the person charged with the crime must
have undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as
amended); and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so. It is not required that it be shown
that such person wrongfully represented himself as a licensed recruiter. A license is a document issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency,
while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment agency. It is settled in out jurisdiction that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convected of illegal recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as the former is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In short, a
conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.
People v. Tobias – 266 SCRA 229 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy
FACTS: On 10 January 1991, the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Isabela an information ] charging the accused with "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm Used in Murder. The RTC
found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of unlawful possession of firearm aggravated by murder.
HELD: Just like the trial court, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that as of 5 October 1990, the accused
did not have a license, temporary or regular, to possess the firearm he used in killing Jojo Lim. The trial court thus
committed no error in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of life
imprisonment. The penalty imposed in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of such unlicensed firearm is death. It is settled that one who kills another with the
use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
People v. Manoyco – 269 SCRA 513 FACTS: Accused-appellant Nestor Mañozca y Almario was charged with the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of Article 38(a) in relation to Article 39(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018; and with two (2) counts of estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph(2)
(a), of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: WON there is a violation of right against double jeopardy upon being punished
on the same offense HELD: NO. The crimes herein are considered as distinct and separate. The conviction of an
accuse for illegal recruitment under the labor code does not prohibit the court in penalizing the accuse of estafa under
RPC. The crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction.
People v. Tan Tiong Meng – 271 SCRA 125
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FACTS: Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
six (6) counts of estafa. The informations for estafa claim substantially the same allegations as information for illegal
recruitment
ISSUE: WON petitioner was violated for being punished for same offense
HELD: NO. The 2 crimes was proven and ruled to be independent with each other. The POEA having certified that
accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, it is clear that the offense committed
against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal recruitment in large scale punishable under Article 39 (a) of the
Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Accused-appellant's
guilt of six (6) separate crimes of estafa has likewise been proven. In People v. Calonzo: “the Court reiterated the rule
that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present.”
76 Both elements have been proven in this case.
People v. Sadiosa – 290 SCRA 92
FACTS: Accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa was convicted by the trial court guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1920 and 2018
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of double jeopardy for being punished for same offense
HELD: NO. There is only one crime punished. While on its face the allegations in the information may constitute estafa,
it merely describes how accused-appellant was able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment - through false and
fraudulent representation by pretending that she was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure employment for
complainants in Kuwait. A person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa
is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted
under the Labor Code may be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws. However, any person or entity which in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement, when the persons recruited are three or more, the crime becomes illegal recruitment in large scale
under Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code. In both bases, it is the lack of a necessary license or permit that renders such
recruitment activities unlawful and criminal, fortunately, accused-appellant could have been validly charged separately
with estafa under the same set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have been
so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly avers all
of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale.
People v. Sanchez – 291 SCRA 333
FACTS found all the accuse guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and
sentenced each one of them maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua on raping and killing Eileen and Allan.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation for double jeopardy for being prosecuted for same offense
HELD: NO. RTC had penalized the accuse not on 2 different crimes but one complex crime which one act that
produces 2 or more offense. It was proven in the facts that the accuse had beaten the victim and subsequently raped
the victim and allan was hit by fist blow and thereby hitting the pavement resulting its death
People v. Saley – 291 SCRA 715 !32
FACTS: "illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract
workers. RTC find appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal
recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was deprived of its right against double jeopardy for being punished for same offense
HELD: NO. There is 2 and separate and distinct crime that was committed by the petitioner and all the facts pertaining
to each crime was sufficiently proven, thus, convicting them of the said crime. Any person who commits the prohibited
acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a). Conviction for these various
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum
prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se
which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction.
PEOPLE V. JUEGO GR 123162 October 13, 1998
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FACTS: Nenita Juego and Wilfredo Gaerlan were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual complainants. In addition, Nenita and Wilfredo were also
charged with three (3) counts of Estafa by three (3) of the twenty-six (26) offended parties. Only Nenita stood trial as
Wilfredo has eluded arrest and remains at large.
77 Of the twenty-six (26) complainants, only six (6) pursued the illegal recruitment case. Five (5) complaining
witnesses were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but refused to sign the subpoena due to lack of interest to
prosecute the case. The rest of the complainants were likewise duly notified but failed to appear and testify.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable
by other laws.
HELD: YES. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315, of The Revised Penal Code, as the
offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. In other
words, a conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other
laws. The elements of this kind of estafa are: (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (b) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, i.e., he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and, (d) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. All
these elements are present in the instant case: accused-appellant Nenita T. Juego deceived the complaining witnesses
into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available
jobs for them in Taiwan for which they would be hired although there were none; and, that by reason or on the strength
of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fee.
All these
representations of appellant were actually false and fraudulent; consequently she should be made liable under par.
2 (a), Art. 315 of The Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. GANADIN GR 129441 November 27, 1998
case :)
*Sorry po Atty, hindi ko po talaga makita yung
PEOPLE V. BALASA GR 106357 September 3, 1998
FACTS: Sixty-four informations, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1689, were filed
against Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo Francisco, Analina Francisco and eight other
persons, mostly incorporators and employees of the Panata Foundation, before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan.
Fourteen cases, including Criminal Case Nos. 8429 and 8751, were raffled off to Branch 52. Two more cases, Criminal
Case Nos. 8704 and 8749, were similarly assigned to it. Of the sixteen casts assigned to Branch 52, eight were, with
the consent of the accused, provisionally dismissed for lack of evidence. On March 31, 1992, Branch 50 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan issued a joint decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8734 and 8428 finding the accused guilty of the
crime charged and of having acted in conspiracy in committing the same. On the other hand, Branch 52 rendered
separate decisions in the cases assigned to it. Thus, on October 14, 1991, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8429
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and of having acted in conspiracy in committing
the same. Although Branch 52 rendered separate decisions in the cases assigned to it, all had essentially the same
disposition — imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon each of the convicted accused — only the name of the
offended party and the amount to be restituted varied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting appellants despite their prior conviction for the same offense
in Criminal Case No. 8429.
HELD: NO. Appellants cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy for which the following requisites must concur: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. In the instant case, the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 8429 is different from the offense charged in the other cases. While these cases
arose out of the same scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were committed against different persons, hence they do
not constitute the same offense.
PALUAY V. CA 293 SCRA 358
FACTS: Petitioner seeks a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a petition for annulment of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 20974 which he had filed in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28. Petitioner
contends that the trial court decided the case outside the issues made out by the pleadings and, therefore, acted
without due process. Consequently, the Court of Appeals should have annulled the trial court’s decision. The trial
court rendered a decision finding private respondent Domingo Pulmones guilty of serious physical injuries through
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reckless imprudence. Petitioner filed this case for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The case was,
however, dismissed. In its decision rendered on December 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not
validly file a petition for annulment of
78 judgment without the approval of the Solicitor General; that the petition was an attempt to secure review of a final
and executory decision of the trial court; and, that a review of the case would expose the accused to double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has personality to file a petition for annulment of judgment.
HELD: NO. The question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual question that cannot be
reviewed not only because the decision of the trial court is now final but also because a review of such question at the
instance of the prosecution would violate the right of the accused against being placed in double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act.
PEOPLE V. MERCADO 304 SCRA 504
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLI, finding accused-appellant
Vicente Mercado y Mercado alias Vicente Tan guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large scale and sentencing
him to suffer life imprisonment, pay a fine of P100,000.00, and indemnify private complainants in actual damages
amounting to a total of P190,000.00; and (2) estafa for which he was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
ranging from six (6) years and two (2) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Nelson Tamares in the sum of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.
Another case for estafa filed against accused-appellant was dismissed for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of illegal recruitment in
large scale and of estafa.
HELD: YES. The Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be
convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa, provided the elements of the crime are present.
The elements of the crime were stated, thus: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. Both elements have been proven in this case. The evidence for the prosecution shows that accusedappellant was able to make private complainant Nelson Tamares part with his hard-earned money upon his fraudulent
misrepresentation that he can provide Tamares with work abroad.
People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 115719, October 5, 1999
FACTS: Appellant Yabut was charged with 8 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale. The trial court
acquitted him of the 8 counts of estafa but convicted him of illegal recruitment in large scale. He appealed his
conviction to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: May the appellant be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his
acquittal of the crime of estafa?
RULING: YES, the appellant be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the crime of estafa.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction
for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely,
conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38
FACTS: Dao Lan Ong appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of numerous counts of robbery,
kidnapping and related charges stemming from his conduct over a three-week period in 2007. On appeal, Ong does
not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, but asserts that the trial court made several
sentencing errors. We conclude that some, but not all, of Ong's contentions are meritorious. Ong contends that
execution of sentence for the robbery convictions in counts 6 and 18 must be stayed because section 654 precludes
punishing him for kidnapping to commit robbery and for the ensuing robberies. He also contends that punishing him
for possession of a firearm by a felon, as alleged in count 21, and possession of ammunition by a felon, as alleged in
count 22, violates section 654's multiple punishment bar because the ammunition was in the firearm.
ISSUE: WON there is violation of section 654's multiple punishment
HELD: YES. Section 654 prohibits punishment for two offenses arising from the same act or from a series of acts
constituting an indivisible course of conduct. `Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise
to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the
34
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more
than one.' On the other hand, if the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives that were independent and not
incidental to each other, he or she `may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each
objective' even though the violations were otherwise part of an indivisible course of conduct`"The principal inquiry in
each case is whether the defendant's criminal intent and objective were single or multiple."A defendant's criminal
objective is `determined from all the circumstances .
People v. Meris, GR 117145-50, March 28, 2000
FACTS: RTC finds the accused, Meris GUILTY of six (6) counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large scale. On
appeal Meris assigned errors regarding accused-appellant’s culpability for the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment
in large scale are closely interrelated.These alleged errors boil down to the issue of credibility.
ISSUE: WON Elements of both crimes are present in the case.
HELD: YES. Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.All the three essential elements are present in the case at bar. As earlier discussed, accusedappellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration certified that
neither accused- appellant nor Julie Micua is licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. A crime of Estafa
was also established. This is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damages.
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
FACTS: Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3) separate informations. Regional Trial Court convicted the
appellant of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of the crime of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: YES. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code
may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.
Potot v. People, GR 143547, June 26, 2002
FACTS: Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the trial court
convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the
Decision. However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set
aside and that the case be heard again because “there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which
caused miscarriage of justice.” The trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and
ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the
evidence and to file the corresponding
80
charge”. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the
order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order “would place the accused in double jeopardy.” This was
denied for the reason that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy
does not attach.”
Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double jeopardy will be violated
upon re-trial of the same case.
Ruling: Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modifiedor set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penaltyis imposed, a judgment becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused haswaived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.Only the accused
may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. Andthis he must do before the said judgment
becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no
appeal is seasonably filed bythe accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital
penalty; (b)when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right toappeal the
35
judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or
revoke it.In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has
the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.
People v. CA, 423 SCRA 605
Facts: Assailed in this petition is the judgment of acquittal rendered by the CA convicting private respondents Claudio
Francisco y Recto and Rudy Pacao y Parone of the crimes of homicide and attempted murder, respectively.
Issue: WON an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution.
Held: As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the permissibility of appeal
after a verdict of acquittal in view of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In our jurisdiction, the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated
in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.
The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States “(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.” Noteworthy is the case of People v.
Velasco where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant
by the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said
petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we clarified that in
the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at
the Court of Appeals. We are not inclined to rule differently. Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having been
found not guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated attempts by
the State at conviction and their anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be accorded finality in
faithful adherence to the rule against double jeopardy.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 375
Facts: Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute and/or cause the
prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land,” Ombudsman Investigators of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on
their findings, the following may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 the petitioners.
The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman
Investigators, which issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148
counts of violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be
dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability in light of this Court’s ruling in Arias
v. Sandiganbayan
Issue: whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both estafa through falsification of a public document and violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Held: In the instant cases, the requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because there are as many
criminal intents as there are anomalous transactions, causing grave damage to the government at each instance.
There was no need for the accused to perform another or other delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents
maintain that petitioner was motivated by separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in
character; hence, it is but proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of
falsification committed. Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters
addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner
and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado
or classified as concurso de delitos; or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve
factual issues. Such factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being
tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or
triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which,
however, is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the present
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hardly the appropriate remedy and forum for
petitioner to ventilate the issues he has raised, as only jurisdictional issues can be resolved therein. As eloquently
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expressed by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals: If, as petitioners seem to
apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of multiple prosecutions for the same
offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is neither the procedural stage nor the proper
occasion to pass upon that possibility. For, squarely imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and
a grossly defective presentation of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and at this time. It must
be stressed that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose petitioner’s right to ventilate
the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan: However, this observation would not foreclose relief to
petitioners if at the trial of this case the evidence presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the
supervening fact that indeed there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule
117, they can still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases
therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on the nature and the nonidentity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing
records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since none has been adduced.
People v. Comila – 517 SCRA 153
82
Facts: An information for Illegal Recruitment by a syndicate was filed against the respondents. On the same date – April
5, 1999 – and in the same court, twelve (12) separate Informations for Estafa were filed against the same accused at
the instance of the same complainants.
Issue:
Held: It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum
in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both appellants represented
themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do
not have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that induced the complainants
to part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees. Such act on the part of the appellants clearly
constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code.
Diaz v. Davao – 520 SCRA 481
Facts: Diaz owned a hotel. While DLPC is a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat and power to its
customers in Davao City and the municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen, in Davao del Norte. Diaz filed a
petition for mandamus before the RTC, Davao City. He alleged that as a holder of a certificate of public convenience,
DLPC is mandated by law to provide him with electric service; the grounds relied upon by respondent Orig in denying
his application are anchored on bias and prejudice, since he (Diaz) is one of the stockholders of Diaz and Co. Inc., the
owner of the Davao Imperial Hotel; and the civil case filed by DLPC is against Diaz and Co., Inc. and not personally
against him. DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application for preliminary mandatory injunction in the same case to
compel the removal of the electric Meter which Diaz had installed without DLPC’s consent and authority. Thereafter the
parties entered into a compromise agreement.
Issue: WON the compromise agreement entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting further
actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509;
Held: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to settle the
claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by
compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion,
though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is
committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law
imposes for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability. As can be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and
DLPC merely agreed to (1) reduce the latter’s total claims to only P385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims
against Diaz; and (3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to immediately install the necessary electric service to the
building. The parties likewise agreed to the dismissal of Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 for being moot and academic.
Nowhere in said agreement did the parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any further action involving 2
electric Meters
Merencillo v. People – 521 SCRA 31
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Facts: This petition for review assails the decision of the Sandiganbayan in affirming the omnibus decision RTC in
Criminal Cases finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.
Issue:
Held: One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for
the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised
Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section
3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. A comparison of the
elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two
offenses. Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery.
While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of
those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is
enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or
present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to
contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act
constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed
from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached
since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
Lapasaran v. People – 578 SCRA 658
Facts: Feliciano Lapasaran and others were accused in the Court of First Instance of Davao of a violation of Republic Act
No. 947 which consists in entering and occupying portions of a public agricultural land which were covered by a sales
application of the Oriental Farming Corporation through force or stealth and without permit from the Director of Lands.
Counsel for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the information, as amended, do
not constitute the offense defined and penalized by Republic Act No. 947 for that Act merely punishes the unlawful
entry and occupation of public lands granted to natural persons and not to juridical persons as in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the allegations against the accused do not constitute the offense penalized by RA 947
Held: Considering the procedure laid down by law relative to the purchase of a portion of public land as above outlined
in the light of the allegations of the amended information we are of the opinion that the violation charged comes within
the purview of the law for it is clearly alleged therein that the accused entered and occupied illegally a portion of
public agricultural land which is merely covered by the sale application of the Oriental Farming Corporation without
mentioning if the land applied for has already been awarded to said applicant. In order that a land applied for by a
private individual may be given the protection of the law, it is necessary not only that it be applied for but that it be
actually awarded to him
84 even if the title still remains in the Government. Since the amended information merely mentions that the land
illegally occupied by the accused was covered by a sale application and has not been actually awarded as yet, the
same is still a portion of public agricultural land the protection of which from forcible entry or occupation is the main
aim of the law. Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to determine if the words “private individual”
mentioned in the law can be interpreted as to include juridical persons as contended by the Government. The order
appealed from is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
*Ivler v. Modesto – 635 SCRA 191
Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner charged before the MTC of Pasig City, with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Ponce; and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
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Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage.
Held: Yes. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts,
were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
People v. Ocden – 650 SCRA 124
Facts: The RTC found accused-appellant Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and of the crime of estafa.
Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of the prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to
prove that she was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers. No certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not accused can be convicted of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa separately
Held: Yes. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa. The
offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction
for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
People v. Lalli, GR 195419, October 12, 2011 (trafficking in person)
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Facts: RTC of Zamboanga City was found appellants guilty of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in
Persons committed by a syndicate. During the tria, the accused, likewise, tried to prove that Lolita was a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO) in the Philippines with four children fathered by four different men. However, the trial court
found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal prosecution. These circumstances, even if true, would
not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a POEA
license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate.
Issue: Whether or not the act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a
prosecution under one be a bar in a prosecution under the other.
Held: No. When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a prosecution
under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. The constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to
risk of punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance. The prohibition on
double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting different offenses.
NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL; INSTANCES OF VOID ACQUITTAL
People v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74
Facts: Private respondents were charged with having violated Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. During the trial instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their respective motions for
leave to file their demurrer to evidence based substantially on the following grounds: (i) that Atty. Pagunuran had no
personal knowledge of the transactions involved and so her testimony was hearsay; (ii) that the prosecution failed to
prove that the questioned contracts were indeed overpriced as Atty. Pagunuran merely relied on the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) table of “Typical Construction Costs, 1999” without more; and (iii) that the ruling of
the Court of Appeals in an administrative case (C.A. G.R. SP No. 62084), which upheld the validity of the direct
negotiated contracts, even in the absence of a public bidding, was already the law of the case. In their respective
comments on the petition, the respondents are one in questioning the propriety of resorting to this present petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 on the ground that it places them in double jeopardy.In its Reply, petitioner argued
that the right of the accused against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the issues presented for resolution
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are purely legal. In resolving the legal issues, there is no need to reevaluate the evidence already adduced before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners also lament the fact that the Sandiganbayan ignored the legal dictum that the dismissal of
the administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar act/s subject of the
criminal case. Under that doctrine, a criminal case already filed must proceed in the normal course of litigation.
Issue: Whether or not prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused
Held: Yes. The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is
equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended with grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. The
rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The following are the recognized
exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law, and (ii) when the trial court commits grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’
demurrer to evidence. As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
complaint or information. However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by
the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant, and (2)
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the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.
Yuchengco v. CA, 376 SCRA 531
FACTS: Before us is the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify and set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21351 acquitting herein private
respondents of the crime of libel. Petitioner Alfonso Yuchengco alleges in essence that the contents of the two (2)
published articles, subject of the Information, which branded and portrayed him as a “gadfly,” a “corporate raider” and
a “crony” of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos were derogatory and libelous per se, hence, malice need not be
proved since the same is presumed pursuant to Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, the derogatory
publications cannot be considered as privileged communications as no public interest could be served by maligning
him since he was neither a candidate nor did he campaign for any of the candidates in the June 29, 1993 elections for
OPMC Board of Directors. In addition, the appellate court’s adoption of the opinion of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 139, in its decision in Criminal Case Nos. 93-10988 and 93-10989 is highly irregular for the reason that the
latter is an inferior court and that the complainant in said criminal cases was Atty. Leonardo Siguion-Reyna, who was a
candidate in the then forthcoming elections of the board of directors of the OPMC.
HELD: We stress that a judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it happens at
the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. This means that a review of alleged errors in the said judgment
arising from misappreciation of facts and the evidence adduced cannot be made without trampling upon the right of
the accused against double jeopardy which is firmly established in this jurisdiction. In any event, we find that the
appellate court committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
assailed decision in the case at bar. All the evidence adduced and the issues and arguments raised by the parties in
their respective pleadings were exhaustively and correctly addressed by the appellate court in its 54-page assailed
decision. Consequently, the said judgment of the Court of Appeals acquitting herein private respondents of the crime
of libel in Criminal Case No. 93-10985 may not be reviewed, much less reversed, without violating their constitutional
right against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
San Vicente v. People, GR132081, Nov. 26, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On June 11, 1995, at around
5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon
City after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the
automatic teller machine. During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report. Meanwhile, petitioner begged
leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a
Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of
the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent,
hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt. On
October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for
insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground, among
others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision dated July 25, 1997, the appellate court
40
nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a
Resolution dated January 2, 1998. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON double jeopardy had set in.
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HELD: YES. Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against
petitioner.
People v. CA, GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002
FACTS: Nercy M. Demeterio, Excel Mangubat, Ma. Lourdes Deutsch alias “Lyn,” and the spouses Numeriano Rabadon
and Leonila Burlaos were charged with Estafa. On August 4, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision finding Deutsch,
Demeterio and Mangubat to have conspired with one another to deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa.
Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat interposed a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November 17, 1997, the
Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s judgment. Accused Ma. Lourdes Deutsch whose crime has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is hereby ACQUITTED. Petitioner likewise denies that Deutsch would suffer double jeopardy
should this petition be granted. Relying on People vs. Castañeda, Jr., 165 SCRA 327, she explains that since this
petition is merely a continuation of the case before the trial court and not a new one, no jeopardy has yet attached.
Deutsch likewise argues that a review of her acquittal would place her in double jeopardy under Section 2, Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court. She claims petitioner erred in relying on People vs. Castañeda, Jr. since in said case the facts
completely differfrom those in the present case.
HELD: While it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a decision acquitting the
accused, it is likewise true that an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and therefore does not terminate the case. There can be no double jeopardy if the
said acquittal is based on a void indictment. A tribunal, board or officer is said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an erosion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. In acquitting Deutsch, the Court of Appeals merely interpreted the evidence presented before
the trial court, as it deemed fit. Note, however, that the acquittal of Deutsch is based only on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, considering the circumstances, it is without prejudice to whatever civil action might be
appropriately taken by petitioner Wilson in regard to respondent Deutsch.
People v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 185
FACTS: Dominador T. Belac (then Provincial Governor of Kalinga) and Noe V. Dannang (then Provincial Budget Officer)
were charged with falsification of an official document as defined in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The said
accused, together with Juan M. Boguen (then Provincial Treasurer of Kalinga) and Thomas B. Tubban, Jr. (Officer-InCharge of the Office of the Provincial Accountant), were charged with technical malversation under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment acquitting all the accused of the crimes
charged. Outraged by the acquittal of all the accused, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, sought relief from this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted contrary to law and applicable jurisprudence and with grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in acquitting all the accused of all the charges, considering that
proof beyond reasonable doubt had been adduced to prove the guilt of the accused for all the crimes charged. In any
event, respondents insist, the petition should be dismissed outright since the judgment of the Sandiganbayan
acquitting them of all the charges can no longer be reversed or even modified on appeal under Rule 45 or even in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without placing them in double jeopardy. In reply, petitioner avers that, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
in order to resolve the legal issues, such as where there was palpable error or grave abuse or misapplication of facts
by the lower court. It also insists that a judgment of acquittal
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may be reversed without violating the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy on the ground that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: When a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove
its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction. One other
reason why further prosecution is barred to appeal an acquittal is that the government has already been afforded one
complete opportunity to prove a case of the criminal defendant’s culpability and, when it has failed for any reason to
41
persuade the court not to enter a final judgment favorable to the accused, the constitutional policies underlying the
ban against multiple trials become compelling. It matters not whether the final judgment constitutes a formal
“acquittal.” What is critical is whether the accused obtained, after jeopardy attached, a favorable termination of the
charges against him. If he did, no matter how erroneous the ruling, the policies embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause require the conclusion that further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues on the elements of
the offense charged are barred. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is
burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in
contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misapplication of
facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. In this case, the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The People had its day in court and adduced its evidence.
There was no collusion between the prosecutor and respondents. The anti-graft court extensively analyzed the
evidence of the parties and made its findings and conclusions based thereon. Assuming that any error was committed
in the Sandiganbayan’s review of the evidence and the records, such errors are mere errors of judgment and not errors
of jurisdiction.
People v. CA – 516 SCRA 383
FACTS This petition for certiorari assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated May 22, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23605,
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Ramon Galicia y Manresa,” on the ground that said decision was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The decision reversed the trial court’s conviction of herein private respondent Ramon Galicia, and
acquitted him. In his Comment, Galicia contends that there was no grave abuse on the part of the Court of Appeals,
and adds that any mistake or error in the appreciation of facts, evidence or law is merely an error of judgment and not
an error of jurisdiction, and hence, not a subject of a petition for certiorari. Most significantly, the defense for private
respondent points out that to give due course to the instant petition and review the acquittal by the appellate court of
Galicia would constitute double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Would a review of the acquittal of Galicia constitute double jeopardy?
HELD: YES. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using
its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. This is not to say that the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is without exceptions. For there are two recognized exceptions: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. However, in this case, we find that the exceptions
do not exist. Firstly, was there a deprivation of due process, or a mistrial? The records show that during the trial, both
parties had
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more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal. The
State represented by the prosecution had not been deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case. Second, has there
been a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to
extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. Its aim is to keep the inferior court within
the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in
such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
People v. Laguio – 518 SCRA 393
FACTS:3 informations was filed against accuse Lawrence C. Wang for violation of section 16, article 3 in relation to
Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); Violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166
(COMELEC Gun Ban) which the RTC had acquitted the accuse. People, moved that such ruling be reversed
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ISSUE: WON the decision of RTC maybe appealed
HELD: NO. Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused
in double jeopardy. Thus, any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy,
thus, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the
Court has previously made some exceptions. it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence/acquittal. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is
annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused
against double jeopardy is not violated. Unfortunately, what petitioner filed with the Court is an appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari vs appeal: 1.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment 2.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance
with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. 3.
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final
orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action
for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
People v. Dumlao – 580 SCRA 409 (void acquittal)
FACTS:Sandiganbayan dismiss the case against the accuse/respondent Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, being one of the
members of the GSIS Board of Trustees who allegedly approved the lease-purchase of the subject GSIS properties
consisting of three parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters, together with a five-storey building, in favor of
respondent La’o, which lease-purchase agreement was deemed by the Office of the Ombudsman to be grossly
disadvantageous to the government, on violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sandiganbayan held that such contract never had the force and
effect of a valid resolution and did not in effect approve the Lease and Purchase Agreement subject mattersince it was
not approved by the board. the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, thru the Office
of the Special
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Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent Dumlao.
ISSUE: WON the appeal on sandiganbayan’s decision in acquitting the accuse would constitute a violation of double
jeopardy
HELD:NO.There are exceptions to the general rule of attachment of double jeopardy after the accuse has been
acquitted by the lower court/CA. In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence,
thus, violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its
case and to prove the accused’s culpability. It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case
under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the
case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis and
untimely.
Tiu v. CA – 586 SCRA 118
FACTS:Accuse/respondent Edgardo Postanes was convicted of for the crime of grave threats by the MeTC, reversed by
RTC but which ruling was rendered as annulled by the CA, thus, the accuse was acquitted. Tiu, filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accuse
ISSUE:WON the filing of petition for certiorari constitute a double jeopardy
HELD:YES. The elements of double jeopardy are present in the case at bar: (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction: - the Information filed in Criminal Case against Postanes was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction (2) the court had jurisdiction;
- the MeTC had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case
(3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
- Postanes was
arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without
his express consent.
- the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. There is no showing that the prosecution or the
43
State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have
allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case.
People v. De Grano – 588 SCRA 550
FACTS: On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano
(Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo
Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large. The prosecution’s evidence to prove treachery
and evident premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents’ motion for bail.
Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA which was denied. A motion
for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of
double jeopardy.
HELD: YES. Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
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Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express
consent. Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Under English
common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction,
the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy. Hence, any acquittal or
conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to
attach in the first place.
People v. Nazareno – 595 SCRA 438
FACTS: The People of the Philippines seeks, through this petition for review on certiorari, the reversal of the decision of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in People of the Philippines v. Dir. Gen Cesar P. Nazareno (Ret.), Dir. Gen Everlino
Nartatez (Ret.), and Dir. Gen Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio (Ret.), CRIM. CASE No. 23030. The Sandiganbayan acquitted the
respondents Cesar Nazareno, Everlino Nartatez and Nicasio Ma. Custodio (collectively, the respondents) of the charge
of violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus proscribes the resolution
of the issues raised by petitioner.
HELD: YES. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the State
may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the
double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would
be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete
opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment
of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The petition itself states that it was formally filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and seeks to reverse
and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the petition’s clear and unequivocal intention to seek a review
on the merits of the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal puts it on a direct collision course with the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. This is more than enough reason to deny the petition.
People v. Duca – 603 SCRA 159 (void acquittal)
FACTS: The CA decision reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal
Case No. 2003-0194- D which affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA
promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. Petitioner
argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying
the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the
Solicitor General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is
only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be
44
heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of
due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
HELD: YES. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel
of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the
People. The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A
copy of the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime
Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin
Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The
failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case.
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The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his
comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said
petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity.
*Mupas v. People, GR 189365, October 12, 2011 (void order on demurrer)
FACTS: Petitioner Zafra, Beltran and Roga were charged with malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. She alleged therein that
the prosecution failed to present proof that she and her co-accused had wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously caused the
withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk and appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of
DSWD. Thus, she concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime of malversation under
Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. She likewise contended that the prosecution was not able to present proof that she
and her co-accused had done so in violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. 3019. Public respondent Judge Mupas issued an
Order granting the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra. Public respondent ruled that, after evaluating the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he found them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of
petitioner Zafra under the charges filed against her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her demurrer to evidence,
petitioner was acquitted. The People filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the lower court’s
grant of petitioner Zafra’s demurrer to evidence, resulting in her acquittal. The appellate court, through its Third
Division, promulgated a Decision granting the People’s petition and revoking and setting aside the lower court’s Order
granting private respondent’s demurrer to evidence. In its Decision reversing the trial court’s Order, the CA found that
public respondent Judge Mupas committed grave abuse of discretion through his grant of private respondent’s
demurrer, which consequently resulted in her acquittal. Holding that the prosecution was able to present sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of the crimes in the Information filed against private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent Judge Mupas committed grave abuse of discretion through his grant of
private respondent’s demurrer, which consequently resulted in her acquittal.
HELD: YES. We agree with the CA’s disquisition that the lower court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence of petitioner
Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The prosecution’s evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the
criminal charges filed against her for her inexcusable negligence, subject to the defense that she may present in the
course of a full-blown trial. The lower court improperly examined the prosecution’s evidence in the light of only one
mode of committing the crimes charged; that is, through positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that
the crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or
passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.
As a general rule, an order
granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when
the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled
that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void. Parties
PARTIES
Metrobank v. Meridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 2001
FACTS: The Information dated October 30, 1992 charged the private respondent, Dominador Ong for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 115 (P.D. No. 115, for brevity), otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law in relation to Article
315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. After resting its case, the prosecustion formally offered its documentary
evidence. On December 1, 1993, the defense presented its evidence to show that herein private respondent signed
the trust receipts in blank and that he was acting only in his capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc. Private
respondent also claimed that the contract between Sun Ray Metal, Inc. and the petitioner bank has been novated
when a representative of the bank verbally proposed to restructure the obligation under the trust receipts, to which he
agreed. Private respondent claimed that he paid thrice under the restructuring agreement and showed as proof of the
said novation a receipt evidencing one of his payments to the petitioner bank. The private respondent formally offered
45
his exhibits in evidence. On the same day, the prosecution presented Lucila Uy, as rebuttal witness to refute the claim
of the defense that there has been a novation of the obligation under the trust receipts. On August 5, 1994, the
defense also called the private respondent to the witness stand to testify on sur-rebuttal. Thereafter, both parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he acquitted the private respondent.
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HELD: NO. Conversely, there cannot be a grave abuse of discretion where the trial court gave both parties the
opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in
this case. In other words, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would
merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution
was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham,
a review and consequent setting aside of the trial court’s decision of acquittal will put the private respondent in double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Consequently in such an
event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The record shows that the court a
quo allowed both parties an exhaustive presentation and offer of evidence and submission of their respective
memoranda. If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as argued by the petitioner in this
petition, such are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari proceeding. If at all,
such alleged error by the public respondent was merely an error of judgment, but not an error of jurisdiction.
ORDINANCE AND STATUTE
*People v. Relova - 148 SCRA 292
Facts: On Feb. 1, 1975, police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed without necessary authority from city government. Asst. City Fiscal filed info against
Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits unauthorized wiring installations. Opulencia pleaded not
guilty and filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had already prescribed (offense charged was a light
felony w/c prescribes 2 mos from discovery thereof). Lower court dismissed the case. Acting City Fiscal filed another
info for theft of electric power. Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double jeopardy. Judge Relova
granted motion and dismissed the case. Motion for Recon denied, hence this appeal.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy.
Ruling: A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a metering device to lower his
electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again for theft of electric power
under the RPC. The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22 embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the RPC, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or
different statutes, the inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy is on the identity of offenses charged BUT where an
offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts. Since the dismissal of the case
against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance already amounted to an acquittal, he can no longer charged with an
offense punishable under a statute which arise from the same act.
APPLIED TO IMPEACHMENT
*Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15 and GR 146738, March 2, 2001and MR-GR 146710-15 and 146738,
April 3, 2001
FACTS:After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the President’s
administration started resigning one by one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the
Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President,
which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters – one signifying his
leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.
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ISSUES:Whether there is double jeopardy grounded on the dismissal and termination of the impeachment case against
the petitioner.
RULING:NO. The impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner resigned from the presidency thereby
rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to
the termination of the impeachment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment
proceedings. it was consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of case is made at the instance of the
accused there is NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3) separate informations. Regional Trial Court convicted the appellant
of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of the crime of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: YES. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code
may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.
SECTION 22
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
RULES
an ex post facto law is one –
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action;
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
(e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.(Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR 128096
January 20, 1999)
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. (Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR
128096 January 20, 1999
*People v. Ferrer - 48 SCRA 382
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances ofcontempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended
by AggravatingCircumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party
is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior tofiling of
47
information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty forfurnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in
open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom
if thought, assembly and association.
Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination
to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the
following requisites must be present: 1.) Thestatute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the
case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations
having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this
organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of
the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute
is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This
declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are
weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be
observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN
POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued
pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
*Virata v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 680
Facts: In this case, petitioner is one of the defendants in Civil Case which was filed by PCGG involves the recovery of illgotten wealth amassed by the defendants during the twenty year reign of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and are not averred with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to
effectively prepare his responsive pleading, petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
Issue: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE PCGG ARE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO
DEPUTIZE A COUNSEL TO FILE THE BILL OF PARTICULARS IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC.
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Held: A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more
particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts
recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite party and the court
of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to
set forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect him
against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific proposition for which the pleader
contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of the pleading
which it supplements. It has been held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the
nature of the pleader’s cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim
with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially
gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as required by the terms of the
application and of the order therefor. It should be definite and specific and not contain general
allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will
allow. Guided by the foregoing rules and principles, we are convinced that both the bill of particulars dated November
3, 1993 and the Limited Bill of Particulars of October 22, 1992 are couched in such general and uncertain terms as
would make it difficult for petitioner to submit an intelligent responsive pleading to the complaint and to adequately
prepare for trial. The bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993: Clearly from the foregoing allegation, the Republic
48
failed miserably to amplify the charge against Virata because, instead of supplying the pertinent facts and specific
matters that form the basis of the charge, it only made repetitive allegations in the bill of particulars that Virata
supported and assisted the formation of the corporation concerned, which is the very same charge or allegation in
paragraph 14 (m) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint which requires specifications and unfailing certainty.
As such, the important question as to what particular acts of Virata that constitute support and assistance in the
formation of Erectors Holding, Incorporated is still left unanswered, a product of uncertainty. We now take a closer
look at the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, 1992. The said bill of particulars was filed by the Republic to
amplify the charge of Virata’s being a dummy, nominee or agent stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the expanded
Second Amended Complaint. In the subsequent bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993, the said charge was
qualified by the Republic in the sense that Virata allegedly acted only as an agent. Furthermore, as correctly asserted
by petitioner Virata, the Limited Bill of Particulars contains new matters which are not covered by the charge that
Virata acted as agent of his co-defendants in the expanded Second Amended Complaint. Apparently, as may be
examined from the three paragraphs of the Limited Bill of Particulars, Virata, in so doing the acts, can not be
considered as an agent of any of his co-defendants, on the contrary, the factual circumstances stated in the said bill
of particulars indicate that Virata acted on behalf of the government, in his official capacity as a government officer.
This observation is established by the allegations that Virata acted as a member of the Central Bank Monetary Board,
as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, and, when he
executed the Agreement with Meralco on July 7, 1978 concerning the sale of certain properties, he acted as the
Finance Minister of the government and as a representative of the Republic in the contract. In performing the said
acts, he, therefore, acted as an agent of the government, not as an agent of his co-defendants, which is the charge
against him in the expanded Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the allegations in the Limited Bill of Particulars
are irrelevant and immaterial to the charge that Virata acted as an agent of his co-defendants. As clearly established
by the foregoing discussion, the two bills of particulars filed by the Republic failed to properly amplify the charges
leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or repetition of the allegations set forth in the
expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague, immaterial and generalized
assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural rules. We are of the opinion that the Limited Bill of Particulars
dated October 22, 1992 signed by Ramon Felipe IV and the Bill of Particulars dated November 3, 1993 signed by
Reynaldo Ros are valid pleadings which are binding upon the Republic because the two lawyer-signatories are legally
deputized and authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on Good Government
to sign and file the bills of particulars concerned. Realizing that it can not adequately respond to this Court’s order of
April 6 1993 (G.R. No. 106527) requiring the Republic to submit the bill of particulars concerning the first three charges
against Virata, the Office of the Solicitor deemed it better to seek the help of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government by availing the services of the latter’s lawyer who would directly file the required bill of particulars in
behalf of the Republic. This circumstance prompted the Office of the Solicitor General to manifest before the
Sandiganbayan on August 20, 1993 that it would be the PCGG which would file the required bill of particulars and
move that it be excused from doing so as the PCGG, being in-charge of investigating the case, was in a better position
than the OSG. Armed with this authority given by the OSG, the PCGG, through one of its deputized prosecutors,
Reynaldo Ros, filed the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 to amplify the first three charges against Virata
stated in paragraphs 14 b(ii), 14g, and 14 m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. The action of the OSG in
seeking the assistance of the PCGG is not without legal basis. The Administrative Code of 1987, which virtually
reproduces the powers and functions of the OSG enumerated in P.D. No. 478 (The Law Defining the Powers and
Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General), provides it. Contrary to Virata’s contention, the Solicitor General did
not abdicate his function and turn over the handling of the instant case to the PCGG. Nowhere in the manifestation
and motion filed by the OSG on August 20, 1993 is there an iota or indication that the OSG is withdrawing from the
case and that the PCGG is taking over its prosecution. What the OSG did was merely to call the PCGG for assistance
and authorize it to respond to the motion for a bill of particulars filed by Virata. The OSG was impelled to act this way
because of the existence of the special circumstance that the PCGG, which has the complete records of the case and
being in charge of its investigation, was more knowledgeable and better informed of the facts of the case than the
OSG.
The authority, therefore, of Attorney Reynaldo Ros to sign and submit in behalf of the Republic the bill of
particulars dated November 3, 1993 is beyond dispute because 1) he was duly deputized by the PCGG in pursuance to
its power to prosecute cases of ill-gotten wealth under Executive Order No. 14 of May 14, 1986, 2) the OSG
empowered the PCGG to file the bill of particulars as evidenced by the OSG’s manifestation and motion filed on August
20, 1993, and 3) there was no abdication of OSG’s duty by giving the PCGG the authority to file the bill of particulars.
On the other hand, the deputation of Ramon Felipe IV by the Solicitor General to sign and file the Limited Bill of
Particulars is based on Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 478. The Solicitor General is mandated by law to act as
the counsel of the Government and its agencies in any litigation and matter requiring the services of a lawyer. In
providing the legal representation for the Government, he is provided with vast array of powers, which includes the
power to retain and compensate lawyers on contractual basis, necessary to fulfill his sworn duty with the end view of
upholding the interest of the Government. Thus, the Solicitor General acted within the legal bounds of its authority
when it deputized Attorney Felipe IV to file in behalf of the Republic the bill of particulars concerning the charges
stated in paragraph 17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. At any rate, whether or not the lawyersignatories are duly deputized would not be decisive in the resolution of this case considering that the two bills of
particulars filed by the Republic are mere scraps of paper which miserably failed to amplify the charges against Virata.
For the Republic’s failure to comply with the court’s order to file the required bill of particulars that would completely
and fully inform Virata of the charges against him, the dismissal of the action against him is proper based on Section
3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and the relevant jurisprudence thereon. Simple justice demands that as
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stated earlier, petitioner must know what the complaint is all about. The law requires no less. Although
this Court is aware of the Government’s laudable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by
the defendants, this Court, however, cannot shrink from its duty of upholding the supremacy of the law
under the aegis of justice and fairness. This Court in dismissing the action against the petitioner has
rightfully adhered in the unyielding tenet - principia, non homines - the rule of law, not of men.
Trinidad v. CA - 202 SCRA 106
Facts: In an information that was filed in the then CFI, herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was charged with
violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title. Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957
impairs the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the
provision thereof provides retroactive effect.
Issue:
Held: The contention is likewise without merit. Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court aptly
rebutted this argument, thus: Under P.D. 957, after the complainant had fully paid for the lo in question, appellant
(herein petitioner) as administrator of t Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, was legally bound cause the
issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of the buyer. The failure of appellant (herein
petitioner) to do so is punishable under the penal provisions of Section 39 of said decree. Likewise, under P.D. 957, it is
not required that the buyer should pay the taxes. The buyer is only required to pay for the registration of the Deed of
Sale with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the title but it does not mention the payment of taxes. With respect
to th alleged devaluation of the peso, suffice it to state that at the time thde contract was executed, the full price of
the lot was already agreed upon by the complainant and the corporation. Lastly, appellant (herein petitioner)
asserts that P.D. 957 is an ex post facto law as the penal provision thereof provides retroactive
effect. P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act made punishable
thereunder is the failure of the owner- developer or administrator to deliver the title of the lot
or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of a deed of sale or contract to sell
over such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant case although the contract
to sell was executed long before the enactment of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein
petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot upon full payment transpired when the decree was
already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the simple reason that what is being
punished is the failure to deliver such title after the enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976.
People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188
Facts: Respondents were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa in separate
informations . The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale because
only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically testified that their recruitment came after
February 10, 1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large
scale, took effect
Issue:
Held:. P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law to them.
A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent when done, and
retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused. Prior to the said date, recruiting on a large scale was not
yet punished with the penalty imposed in the said decree.
People v. Sandiganbayan – 211 SCRA 241
Facts: Assailed in this petition is the resolution promulgated by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private
respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
on the ground of prescription of the crime charged.
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Issue:
Held: Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No.
3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment
of a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the
"crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused.
It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under
Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To
apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his
disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the
law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as: A law passed after the occurrence of a fact
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or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By
Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions
contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws. An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the
infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of
some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for
his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The
new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval of
B.P. 195.
Co v. CA – 227 SCRA 444
Facts: A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged on the
basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22.
Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22)
was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There
he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be
considered as a valid defense be actively applied.
HELD: No. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against accusedpetitioner was dismissed. It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should
not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated,
who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within
the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to
familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should
override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.
Rosales v. CA - 255 SCRA 123
Facts: Rosales was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar with murder and illegal possession of
firearms. The accused now comes to us on a petition for review. He argues that the killing on 26 September 1982 was
in self-defense. Bulan was trespassing on the fishpond over which he was overseer.[13] The firing of his shotgun into
the air was a reasonable exercise of his authority as overseer and further showed he had no intention to kill. He had to
defend himself when Bulan struggled to wrest possession of the gun since he could have been killed himself. However,
trial court rendered judgment finding accused Leovigildo Rosales guilty of homicide and imposing upon him the
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1866 can be retroactively applied in this case
Held: No. P.D. No. 1866 prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua approved on 29 June 1983 cannot be retroactively applied in this case which
transpired on 26 September 1982 inasmuch as this law is unfavorable to the accused.
Subido v. Sandiganbayan – 266 SCRA 379
Facts: The petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention. In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995. It contended that it was clear from
§4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the
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accused considering that “the basis of its jurisdiction is the position of the accused in the government service when
the offense charged was committed and not the nature of the offense charged, provided the said offense committed
by the accused was in the exercise of his duties and in relation to his office.” The fact then that accused Subido was
already a private individual was of no moment. In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash filed on 9 October 1995, the
petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the information were vague; (2) under Rules of Procedure to
Govern Deportation Proceedings, the grant or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation proceeding was discretionary
upon the Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido was
separated from the service before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive application thereof would be
prejudicial to him.
Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of R.A 7975 to the petitioner would be prejudicial to him.
Held: No. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point is
the time of the commission of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a),
§4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975. That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary
grade of less than “27” at the time of the commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment.
He is prosecuted as a co- conspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused, who held a position
higher than grade “27.”
Sesbreno v. CBAA – 270 SCRA 360
Facts: Petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property constructed on the
said lots for purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60) square
meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was assessed by Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City
under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00.[6] During a
tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor discovered that the
real property declared and assessed under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 was actually a residential building consisting
of four (4) storeys with a fifth storey used as a roof deck. The building had a total floor area of 500.20 square meters.
The area for each floor was 100.04 square meters. The building was found to have been made of Type II-A materials.
Tan two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City.
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Issue. Whether or not CBAA’s assessment was unconstitutional.
Held: Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that the imposition of back taxes on his property is
unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22,= Article III of the 1987 Constitution. When both Public
Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on petitioner's property, they did not violate
the rule that laws shall have only prospective applicability. Respondents were only applying PD 464
which had been in effect since 1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it
may not be considered as an ex post facto law.
People v. Burton – 268 SCRA 531
Facts: Appellant, a British national, was convicted by RTC of Pasig City for attempting to transport 5.6 kilograms of
hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Though caught in flagrante delicto, he
denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that he was not aware that his traveling bags contained the
prohibited drug. He also challenges the credibility of the lawmen who apprehended him. He was found guilty of the
crime charged by the RTC and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not retroactive application of RA 7659 can be applied to the appellant
Held: No. The trial court imposed the penalty of “life imprisonment” plus a fine of twenty thousand pesos
as the crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic Act No. 7659,
imposing the penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, came into effect on December 31, 1993.
Retroactive application of said law would not be advantageous to appellant in view of the increased
range of penalty and conjunctive fine prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited drugs is “750 grams
or more.” A more succint explanation in People vs. Ballagan states: “First, the wealth of jurisprudence in
cases wherein ‘life imprisonment’ is imposed is to the effect that said penalty, unlike reclusión perpetua,
does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that Republic Act No. 7659 is applied retrospectively to
appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusión perpetua but also the accessory penalties.
*Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999
FACTS:
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This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Romeo
Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 – an Act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner and
intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an
ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two
tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
ISSUE: WON RA 8249 is an ex post facto law.
HELD: NO. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one – (a)
which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant. (e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statue, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
People v. Nitafan, GR 107964-66 February 1, 1999
FACTS: Three criminal informations for violation of Central Bank Circular 960, as amended in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, were filed against Imelda Marcos before he RTC of Pasig, to which she pleaded guilty. These
informations were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution with 21 other cases pending before the RTC of Manila
which relate to or form part of a series of transactions devised by then President Marcos and private respondent to
hide their ill- gotten wealth. The cases were re-raffled and were assigned to respondent Judge’s sala. Without any
corresponding motion from private respondent, but after giving the prosecution the chance to show cause why the
cases should not be dismissed, respondent judge muto proprio dismissed the three cases, one of them on the ground
that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law, and the two on the ground that the prosecution of private
respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some people in the government aside from what he
considered as a violation of private respondent’s right against double jeopardy. Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Judge can declare the CB Circular an ex post facto law even though it was not assailed.
HELD: NO. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional.
However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the
lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless
directly assailed in an appropriate action.
Fajardo v. CA, GR 128508 February 1, 1999
FACTS: On May 26, 1988, petitioner Daniel Fajardo was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight months imprisonment. He appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. The Supreme Court likewise denied his petition for review on certiorari of his conviction. Upon the remand
of the record to the lower court, on June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible
for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was
still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had
interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him. But still, the trial court
denied his application for probation. The Court of Appeals also denied his petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON PD 1990, which amend PD 968, providing that “no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” is an ex post facto law.
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HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1990, is valid. Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5, 1985,
was printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985 but said issue was released for
circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P.D. 1990 became effective after fifteen (15) days from July 1,
1986, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986. It is not ex post facto in its
application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto law is one
that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. Presidential Decree
No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character. It may not be considered as an
ex post facto law. In this case, At the time of the commission of the offense charged - violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 - in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of
probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time,
petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal.
Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for probation since
he had appealed.
People v. Valdez, GR 127663 March 11, 1999
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicted as charged the accused-appellant
Rolando Valdez for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and the
prison term of reclusion perpetua, respectively. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution that on September 17, 1995 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, William Montano, Randy Tibule, Jean
Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. rode on a tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia in going
to Sitio Cabaoangan to attend the wedding party of Jean Maries cousin. On their way, they met the appellant and his
companions who were armed with guns, and without any warning, they pointed their guns and fired at them which
caused the instantaneous death of Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano, and Ramon Garcia, Jr. and fatal
injuries to William Montano and Randy Tibule. The appellant denied any participation in the said incident and he
questioned his conviction claiming, among others, that the trial court erred in failing to consider motive on the part of
Bernardo Castro to fire at, as he actually fired at the occupants of the motorized tricycle.
ISSUE: WON RA 8294 is applicable to the accused to be given retroactive effect being favorable to the accused.
HELD: Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21,
1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of
any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In
cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the
case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No.
8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm)
subject of this present review. However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of
Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of
murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of
Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this
new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto
law.
People v. Ringor, G.R. No. 123918, December 9, 1999
FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court in Baguio
City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
ISSUE: WON the RA 8294 which make the “use of unlicensed firearm” as aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide shall be applied in the present case.
HELD: NO. With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms under P.
D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina and reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Ronaldo
Valdez, that in cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate offense.
Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is
committed.In other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. Thus,
before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of unlicensed firearm as an
54
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder committed by accusedappellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed by the trial court. There was yet no
such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise the penalty for murder from
reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of commission of the crime. The amendatory law making the
“use of an unlicensed firearm” as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied
here because the said provision of R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes
an ex post facto law.
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999
FACTS:27 February 1997 RTC convict accused-appellant Charito Isug Magbanua guilty of the crime of rape, described
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise referred
to as the Death Penalty Law, against his own daughter and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON provision for death penalty can be imposed retroactively against the petitioner
HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993, cannot be applied retroactively
because, to do so, would go against the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. For this reason,
in order for the death penalty to be imposable, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish beyond
a shadow of doubt that the case of the accused is already covered by Republic Act No. 7659. In the case
at bar, the prosecution failed to discharge this burden. A perusal of the information reveals that the
alleged rapes were committed in “1991 and the days thereafter.” Clearly, since the time frame specified
in the information antedates the effectivity date of Republic Act No. 7659, said law cannot be made
applicable to the case of appellant.
Republic v. Desierto, GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001
FACTS:The accuse convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)4 initiated the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The complaint alleged, that respondent Cojuangco, Jr., taking
advantage of his close relationship with then President Marcos, had caused the latter to issue favorable decrees to
advance his personal and business interests, had caused the government through the National Investment
Development Corporation (NIDC) to enter into a contract with him under terms and conditions grossly
disadvantageous to the government and that respondents were directly or indirectly interested for personal gain or
had material interest in the transactions requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which they were
members, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to the grave damage and prejudice of public interest,
the Filipino people, the Republic of the Philippines, and the coconut farmers. Subsequently, the ombudsman acquitted
the accuse ruling that RA 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint was file since the prescription period for
violation of the Anti-Graft Practices Act was ten (10) years. The complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before
the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or more than fifteen (15) years after the birth of the allegedly illegal contract. OSG
allege that the action of the state in confiscating ill-gotten wealth are imprescriptible pursuant to section 15, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or their nominees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
ISSUE:WON the imprescriptible act of state under section 15 article 11of the constitution would violate the accused’s
right against ex post facto law.
HELD:YES. The Solicitor General asserts that the dismissed complaint is for violation of R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution thereof is actually a suit intended to recover ill-gotten wealth from public
officials, and therefore covered by R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property
Found to Have been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor"
under R.A. No. 1379 ·
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto: “that Section
15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not
to criminal cases such as the complaint against the respondents” Conversely, prescription of criminal
cases are governed by special laws on prescription. Furthermore, to construe Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution in order to give it retroactive application to the private respondents will run counter to
another constitutional provision, that is, Section 22, Article III
People v. Torres - 501 SCRA 591
FACTS: Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, for
unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug; as well as Section 16, Article III of
the same law for illegal possession of 0.26 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly
known as shabu.
ISSUE:WON RA 9165 increasing penalty for illegal possession of drugs be imposed
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HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased the
penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams ofshabu to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty years and a fine ranging from three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00). However, since this law is not favorable to appellant, it cannot be given retroactive
application in the instant case. This is the mandate of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same. The same law also changed the penalty for illegal possession of 500 grams
or more of marijuana to life imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00.
Obviously, the amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment to death in R.A. No. 9165
cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to the present case since it would also be unfavorable to appellant.
Salvador v. Mapa - ____SCRA 34 [2008]
FACTS:The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), through Atty. Orlando L.
Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition to nullify the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in dismissing the
criminal complaint of violation of SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019, against respondents ruling that: “To reiterate, the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13.
Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of
charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the
Constitution.”
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto
laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent
when done. An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes
it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional doctrine that
outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those
acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative
and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order
No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions.
It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being
penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex
post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative
and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
Republic v. Eugenio - 545 SCRA 384
FACTS: Following the promulgation of Agan case, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3
contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of
petitioner Anti- Money Laundering Council (AMLC). Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an
application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong
before the RTC and ruled in granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause to believe
that the deposits in various bank accounts are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting the AMLC to
investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter
adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that
were committed in relation to the criminal cases involving violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Attached to
the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the accounts is necessary. In response to the letter of the
Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005 which authorized the executive director
of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with
DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. Lilia Cheng, wife of cheng yong, argues
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that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply
to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she
concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry
order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE:WON there has been a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
HELD:YES. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001.
prohibition against ex post facto laws apply to the interpretation of Section 11, a provision which does
not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and
deposits. Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits were involved in activities on
enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality. Prior to
the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of
the depositor or a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter
of the litigation. application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions
entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the ex
post facto clause. Still, we must note that the position submitted by Lilia Cheng is much broader than what we are
willing to affirm. She argues that the proscription against ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any
inquiry into deposits or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to the effectivity of the
AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law had already taken effect.
Valeroso v. People - 546 SCRA 450
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied.
appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. It provides that
"[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." P.D. No.
1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However,
R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court is correct in affirming the modification of the RTC disposition.
HELD: YES. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to
the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based,
and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles
of strict justice." Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its
maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No.
1866. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium
period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months). Hence, the penalty
imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term.
Presidential v. Desierto - 548 SCRA 295
FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). By Memorandum Order No. 61, the functions of the
Committee were subsequently expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study all nonperforming loans, whether behest or non-behest. It likewise provided for the following criteria which
might be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest loan. Several loan accounts were referred to
the Committee for its investigation, including the loan transactions between Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now
Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). After examining and
studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of a behest loan as
defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the
Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned
Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI. The Ombudsman
dismissed the case and so was the motion for reconsideration.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
HELD: NO. The Court do not agree with the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned transactions because
to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law has
been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant; or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was
lawful; or (f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional proscription
of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Administrative Order No. 13 does not
mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order
No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex-post facto laws.
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