RULE 18
PRE-TRIAL
Section 1. When conducted. – After the last responsive pleading has
been served and filed, the branch clerk of court shall issue, within five
(5) calendar days from filing, a notice of pre-trial which shall be set not
later than sixty (60) calendar days from the filing of the last responsive
pleading.
Section 2. Nature and purpose. – The pre-trial is mandatory and
should be terminated promptly. The court shall consider:
a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to
alternative modes of dispute resolution;
b) The simplification of the issues;
c) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts
and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
d) The limitation of the number and identification of witnesses
and the setting of trial dates;
e) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a
commissioner;
f) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist;
g) The requirement for the parties to:
1. Mark their respective evidence if not yet marked in the
judicial affidavits of their witnesses;
2. Examine and make comparisons of the adverse parties’
evidence vis-a-vis the copies to be marked;
3. Manifest for the record stipulations regarding the
faithfulness of the reproductions and the genuineness
and due execution of the adverse parties’ evidence;
4. Reserve evidence not available at the pre-trial, but only
in the following manner:
i.
For testimonial evidence, by giving the
name or position and the nature of the
testimony of the proposed witness;
ii.
For documentary evidence and other
object evidence, by giving a particular
description of the evidence.
No reservation shall be allowed if not made in the
manner described above.
h) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
action.
The failure without just cause of a party and counsel to appear during
pre-trial, despite notice, shall result in a waiver of any objections to
the faithfulness of the reproductions marked, or their genuineness
and due execution.
The failure without just cause of a party and/or counsel to bring the
evidence required shall be deemed a waiver of the presentation of such
evidence.
The branch clerk of court shall prepare the minutes of the pre-trial,
which shall have the following format: (See prescribed form).
Section 3. Notice of pre-trial. – The notice of pre-trial shall include
the dates respectively set for:
(a) Pre-trial;
(b) Court-Annexed Mediation; and
(c) Judicial Dispute Resolution, if necessary.
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party [if
he] or she has no counsel. The counsel served with such notice is
charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him or her.
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Non-appearance at any of the foregoing settings shall be deemed as
non-appearance at the pre-trial and shall merit the same sanctions
under Section 5 hereof.
Section 4. Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties
and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial, court-annexed mediation,
and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary. The non-appearance of a
party and counsel may be excused only for acts of God, force majeure,
or duly substantiated physical inability.
A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but must be fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit
to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. – When duly notified, the
failure of the plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause when
so required[,] pursuant to the next preceding [S]ection, shall cause the
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant and counsel shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his or her evidence ex parte within ten (10) calendar days from
termination of the pre-trial, and the court to render judgment on the
basis of the evidence offered.
Section 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties shall file with the court and
serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their
receipt thereof at least three (3) calendar days before the date of the
pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among
others:
(a) A concise statement of the case and the reliefs prayed for;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The main factual and legal issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The propriety of referral of factual issues to commissioners;
(e) The documents or other object evidence to be marked, stating
the purpose thereof;
(f) The names of the witnesses, and the summary of their
respective testimonies; and
(g) A brief statement of points of law and citation of authorities.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial.
Section 7. Pre-Trial Order. – Upon termination of the pre-trial, the
court shall issue an order within ten (10) calendar days which shall
recite in detail the matters taken up. The order shall include:
(a) An enumeration of the admitted facts;
(b) The minutes of the pre-trial conference;
(c) The legal and factual issue/s to be tried;
(d) The applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence;
(e) The evidence marked;
(f) The specific trial dates for continuous trial, which shall be
within the period provided by the Rules;
(g) The case flowchart to be determined by the court, which shall
contain the different stages of the proceedings up to the
promulgation of the decision and the use of time frames for
each stage in setting the trial dates;
(h) (h) A statement that the one-day examination of witness rule
and most important witness rule shall be strictly followed; and
(i) A statement that the court shall render judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment, as the case may be.
The direct testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff shall be in the form
of judicial affidavits. After the identification of such affidavits, crossexamination shall proceed immediately.
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Postponement of presentation of the parties’ witnesses at a scheduled
date is prohibited, except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure
or duly substantiated physical inability of the witness to appear and
testify. The party who caused the postponement is warned that the
presentation of its evidence must still be terminated within the
remaining dates previously agreed upon.
Should the opposing party fail to appear without valid cause stated in
the next preceding paragraph, the presentation of the scheduled
witness will proceed with the absent party being deemed to have
waived the right to interpose objection and conduct crossexamination.
The contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
proceedings, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 8. Court-[a]nnexed [m]ediation. – After pre-trial and, after
issues are joined, the court shall refer the parties for mandatory courtannexed mediation.
The period for court-annexed mediation shall not exceed thirty (30)
calendar days without further extension.
Section 9. Judicial [d]ispute [r]esolution. – Only if the judge of the
court to which the case was originally raffled is convinced that
settlement is still possible, the case may be referred to another court
for judicial dispute resolution. The judicial dispute resolution shall be
conducted within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days
from notice of failure of the court-annexed mediation.
If judicial dispute resolution fails, trial before the original court shall
proceed on the dates agreed upon.
All proceedings during the court-annexed mediation and the judicial
dispute resolution shall be confidential.
Section 10. Judgment after pre-trial. – Should there be no more
controverted facts, or no more genuine issue as to any material fact,
or an absence of any issue, or should the answer fail to tender an
issue, the court shall, without prejudice to a party moving for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34 or summary judgment
under Rule 35, motu proprio include in the pre-trial order that the
case be submitted for summary judgment or judgment on the
pleadings, without need of position papers or memoranda. In such
cases, judgment shall be rendered within ninety (90) calendar days
from termination of the pre-trial.
The order of the court to submit the case for judgment pursuant to
this Rule shall not be the subject to appeal or certiorari.
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RULE 19
INTERVENTION
Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (1)
Section 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of
the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.
Section 3. Pleadings-in-intervention. – The intervenor shall file a
complaint-in-intervention if he or she asserts a claim against either or
all of the original parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he or she
unites with the defending party in resisting a claim against the latter.
(3a)
Section 4. Answer to complaint-in-intervention. – The answer to
the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed within fifteen (15) calendar
days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different
period is fixed by the court. (4a
CASES
1. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, vs. MAXIMO D. SISON (G.R.
No. 185954, February 16, 2010)
COMPARE WITH OMBUDSMAN VS.
CHAVEZ (NEXT CASE)
FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel
Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a lettercomplaint accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public
officials of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D.
Sison, before the Office of the Ombudsman relative to the alleged
highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to
several millions of pesos. The alleged calamity funds were expended
without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and
that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were
substantially overpriced. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.The
Office of the Ombudsman found basis to proceed with the
administrative case against the impleadedprovincial officials of Samar.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations and
asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification
that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding
amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He averred
that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the
minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding and that not one of the
documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his
signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and
several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and dismissing him from service. Aggrieved, Sison
appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43. CA
rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman against Sison. The Office of the Ombudsman
filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA
in its assailed resolution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to
intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered
by the CA?
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HELD: No. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a
Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the
court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
intervention, thus:
“SECTION 1. Who may intervene.—A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.—The motion to intervene may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of
the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.”
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not
originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject
matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose
their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties,
nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
This Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a
government agency to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in
administrative cases.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to
intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached.
More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not
an advocate. It is an established doctrine that judges should detach
themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher
court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is the fact that
judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave
the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the
appellate court to decide the issues without the judges' active
participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their
judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become
adversarial instead.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO M. DE
CHAVEZ, ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR., DR. PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA,
ROLANDO L. LONTOC, JR. AND GLORIA M. MENDOZA,
G.R. No. 172206, July 03, 2013
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision dated February
14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005 found
herein respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory
penalties. Pursuant to the Order from the Deputy Ombudsman to
enforce said Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, the BSUBOR issued a resolution, to implement the Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for injunction
with prayer for issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Batangas City, against the BSU-BOR. The gist of the petition
before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing
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the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution
because the same are still on appeal and, therefore, are not yet final
and executory. However, such petition was dismissed for lack of cause
of action. De Chavez filed a notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance
of TOR and/or Injunction with the CA. The CA issued a Resolution
granting respondents’ prayer for a TRO enjoining the BSU-BOR from
enforcing its subject resolution.
Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene
with the Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order. Respondents
opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA denied the motion of the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether an injunction is proper to prevent BSU-BOR from
enforcing the Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision dated
February 14, 2005 and Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005
HELD: No, in this case, the assailed Resolution of the CA is patently
erroneous, and that granting the Office of the Ombudsman the
opportunity to be heard in the case pending before the lower court is
of primordial importance. Here, since its power to ensure enforcement
of its Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution is in danger of being
impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in
defending its right to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently
erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for
intervention.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of
the court after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits
in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in
disregard of law and the Constitution. For the CA to issue a
preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the
rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the
Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory
the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
2. MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN
DESANTIS NERI, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G.
JALANDONI (G.R. No. 178221, December 1, 2010)
FACTS: Rodolfo died. His brother filed at RTC Petition for Issuance of
letters of administration. Anonuevo et al intervened. They said their
mother Sylvia was daughter of Isabel and john. But at the time of
Rodolfo’s death, their grandmother Isabel was the lawful wife of
Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s brother opposed
their intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that
Isabel and John were married. Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo
was null and void. Anonuevo et al however argued that the entries in
the birth certificate of Sylvia could not be used as proof that Isabel and
John were indeed married. Further, such statement of marriage in the
birth certificate is just to save face and is customary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Añonuevo et al intervene?
HELD: No. They have no personal standing to intervene. The birth
certificate of Sylvia which shows that Isabel and John were married is
sufficient proof that indeed they were married. Therefore, Isabel’s
marriage to Rodolfo is void since at that time Isabel was still married
to john. Being not married to Rodolfo, Isabel and her descendants have
no share in the estate of Rodolfo.
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While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. The reason
“face saving/ customary” is without merit. The court cannot take
judicial notice of a folkway.
3. BARBARA RODRIGUEZ, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R.
No. L-29264, August 29, 1969)
FACTS: On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of
Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125
hectares, located in San Mateo, Rizal. On November 16, 1965, the CFI
rendered a Decision evaluating the evidence presented by the parties
as follows: It has been established that the parcel of land under
consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and
possessed by the several people, all of whom in January 1960,
executed instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of them
executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded
the conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the benefits provided
by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended. The CFI confirmed the
title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to the parcel of land under
consideration and orders the registration thereof in her name and
personal circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the
Director of Lands was dismissed. Upon finality, a TCT was issued
instead of an OCT. After several sales, respondent Philippine Chinese
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), under TCT No. 482970, became
owner on July 15, 1975. MEANWHILE, A. Doronila Resources Dev.,
Inc. (ADRDI) instituted Civil Case No. 12044 entitled A. Doronila
Resources Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was still pending before the RTC of
Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject
property. While still pending in court, ADRDI subsequently transferred
the subject property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No.
70589 was issued on March 25, 1983. On November 14, 1996,
Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez
(Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
On May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion alleging therein
that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated
December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N- 5098 which
confirmed Landicho’s title over the subject property has not been
executed alleging that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
Landicho’s name. As Landicho’s successor-in- interest to the subject
property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of Deeds for Marikina
City issue OCT in his name. Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but
alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued
on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the
hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970
and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection
therewith. On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a
Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.
PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable
party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as the
registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI
likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT
No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI
averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus
Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being
no direct action or final court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguez’s
Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI,
which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently,
PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No.
N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests over the
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subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in- Intervention; and
to deny Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit. RTC
favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is
proper even though it was filed after rendition of judgement by the
trial court.
HELD: YES Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion
to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several
cases, viz: “This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have
been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme
Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory.” In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests
on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances.
We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. The
particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of
the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both
PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI
Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
became final and executory. Second, as previously discussed herein,
both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence,
the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of Landicho who prayed for the execution of
the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene
in the case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground
that the subject property is already registered in its name under TCT
No. 482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the
RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action
was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to
prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
and OCT in Rodriguez’s name.
For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of
PCCAI.
4. SPOUSES FLORENTINO L. FERNANDEZ AND VIVENCIA B.
FERNANDEZ, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 83141
September 21, 1990)
FACTS: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson
were elected to the board of directors of NADECOR. In a regular
stockholder’s meeting where two groups were vying for control over the
company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez,
Nitorreda, Engle were Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as
Corporate Secretary. Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be
stockholders of record, sought to annul the said meeting held. They
filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG. Ricafort/s alleged that they
were not given due notice of the said meeting thus they were not
present and were not able to exercise their right. RTC agreed with the
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Ricaforts. Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the
members of the board with the CA, all with application for a TRO
and/or preliminary injunction.
The CA denied such applications, but on the same day
nevertheless, the 11th division issued a TRO. During the effectivity of
the TRO, the old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new
one in order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the
corporation. All the CA petitions were consolidated as well as the other
cases. On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed their
Comment Ad Cautelam to the petition in CA-G.R. No. 122784.The
petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) urgent motions to resolve
their application for writ of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on
May 22, and again on June 6, 2012. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was
questioned. Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA’s Special 14th Division. Complainants
also filed an Administrative case against the Justices of the 14th
Division of the CA.Alleged in this administrative complaint that the
respondent Justices are guilty of grave misconduct, conduct
detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, and manifest partiality.
ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA 14th Division.
HELD: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action.—Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot
be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction.
Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger. Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original
proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be
permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ.
Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court
or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme
Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the
lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order. In this
Court’s Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. Nos. 202218-21,
entitled “Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v. Court of Appeals [Special 14th
Division], et al.,” involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. NalenRoseroGalang, also questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that
persons who are not parties to any of the consolidated petitions have
no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution, also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in
G.R. Nos. 202257-60, a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
herein complainants to assail the validity of the writ of preliminary
injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA petitions, we likewise
dismissed the petition due to lack of personality of the petitioners,
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since they were non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA
petitions. We pointed out that they should first have intervened below,
and then filed a motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA
order. On September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for
reconsideration from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants have no
personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
CA’s former Special 14th Division, we cannot now permit them to
harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that
the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a
magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every
discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that “a
Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.”
5. LINCOLN L. YAO vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO (G.R.
No. 53828- October 24, 2003)
FACTS: On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision
rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and
ordering PR Builders to refund Lincoln Yao(Yao) the amount of
P2,116,103.31, as well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders.
Persuant to the writ, the sheriff levied on a parcel of land located in
Laguna which is registered under the name of the private respondent
Bernardine Villarin(Villarin).
Villarin then filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the
public auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the
property subject of the execution sale; that the property regime
between private respondent and her husband was complete separation
of property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case, hence,
the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate
liability of her husband. Later on, such petition was granted.
Aggrieved, Yao then filed a motion for intervention which was denied
for being filed too late.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yao has the right to intervene
HELD: No. Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is
without basis. Nothing in the Rules require the inclusion of a private
party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to
allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b)
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether
the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or
not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important
than the second.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioner’s right as a
judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on
the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces
of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case
that can be levied upon. Moreover, even granting for the sake of
argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must
exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefor. As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way
beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution
granting private respondent’s petition for prohibition and lifting the
levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April
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6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already
become final and executory.
6. ALBERTO G. PINLAC et. al, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et. al.
G. R. No. 91486, September 10, 2003
FACTS: Petitioners filed a Petition for Quieting of Title over three vast
parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 was covered by
TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT
No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. The trial court rendered a
Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and against the defendants who
were declared in default, including respondent owners of VilmarMaloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2.
The defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court, which was
granted.
The appellate court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondents because of defective service
of summons by publication. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the said decision was also denied. Consequently, it filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court, but the Court only affirmed CA’s
decision. Aggrieved, petitioner then, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
contending among others that the disposition of the trial court with
respect to Lot No. 3, should not have been annulled by the Court of
Appeals because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the
respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. The Court then, issued a
Resolution partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by
reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the trial
court’s Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3. However, the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be
rendered declaring among other that, the OCT No. 333 was a valid and
existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had
already rendered, hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether a Motion for intervention and a Petition-InIntervention filed by the Republic were proper taking into account that
a partial Resolution by the Supreme Court has already been rendered?
HELD: Yes. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure
is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness
of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has
allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the
trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the
petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for
decision in the Supreme Court. In Mago v. Court of Appeals
intervention was granted even after the decision became final and
executory, thus:
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the
intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion
in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say, this
discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after consideration
of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
The intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest
as well as government properties located and projects undertaken on
Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can
certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party
to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against
arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to
protect its properties.
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7. NILO V. CHIPONGIAN, vs. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No.
162692 August 26, 2015)
FACTS: The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian,
the petitioner’s sister. Isabel had predeceased Vicente. The couple had
no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and petitioner executed
an extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the
latter waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente.
According to petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the
same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel. Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria
Benitez (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Vicente in the RTC. In its order dated May 13, 1994,
the RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’s estate. On
May 20, 1994, it issued the letters of administration to Feodor.
The petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings. He sought the
partial revocation of the May 13, 1994 order in order to exclude the
paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of
Vicente. He cited the affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial
revocation. Petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the
paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente’s estate. The RTC
granted the Motion and admitted the complaint-in-intervention of the
petitioner. The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-inintervention, holding that petitioner was negligent in asserting his
right within a reasonable time which warrants the presumption that
he had either abandoned it or declined to assert it but also cast doubt
on the validity of his claim. It took note of the fact that purported
affidavit was executed simultaneously with the deed of extrajudicial
settlement which was published but the affidavit was not and why it
was only after 12 long years that he brought it out.
The RTC went on to cite Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules which provides a
limitation of 2 years after the settlement and distribution of an estate
in accordance with either Sec 1 of the Rule, within which an heir or
other person deprived of his lawful participation in the estate may
compel the settlement of the said estate in the Courts for the purpose
of satisfying such lawful participation. The petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the judgment but was denied. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal which was denied due course for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. He filed a MR vis-à-vis the order
denying due course his notice of appeal. Petitioner instituted a petition
for certiorari in the CA which affirmed the order of the RTC. The
petition was dismissed. Petitioner sought a reconsideration but was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether the present petition for review should be denied for
failure of petitioner to file a record on appeal, as mandated under Sec.
2 (a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. Intervention is “a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which
may be affected by such proceedings. If an intervention makes a third
party litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in- intervention
should form part of the main case.
Accordingly, when petitioner intervened in the Special Proceeding, his
complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of
the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the
rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109
of the Rules, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Section 1 Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that
an appeal “may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
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declared by these Rules to be appealable.” In the context of the final
judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable
orders and judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal
to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular
matter in the case.
The dismissal of petitioner’s intervention constituted a “final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,”
that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister.
As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Sec. 1 of Rule 109, because it
had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as
well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1 because it was a final
determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with
either or both paragraphs, the dismissal was the proper subject of an
appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing of
his intervention.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special
proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. This is
pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Under Section
3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in
special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final
order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not a
only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the
approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party.
Considering that petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in
accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of
the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal
became final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself.
The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict
compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As such,
his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was
mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect appeal within
the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and beyond review on
appeal.
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