B
HOWARD UNIVERSITY
The Paradoxes of Turkey’s Role Model Status in the Debate on
Its Accession to the European Union (EU):
A Critical View of the Power of Representation
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School
of
HOWARD UNIVERSITY
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science
by
Ravza Kavakci Kan
Washington, D.C.
July 2013
UMI Number: 3592973
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HOWARD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
___________________________________________
John Cotman, Ph.D.
Chairperson
____________________________________________
Ben K. Fred-Mensah, Ph.D.
____________________________________________
Mervat Hatem, Ph.D.
____________________________________________
Marilyn Lashley, Ph.D.
__________________________________________
Kilic Bugra Kanat, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Penn State University, Erie
____________________________________________
Mervat Hatem, Ph.D.
Dissertation Advisor
Candidate: Ravza Kavakci Kan
Date of Defense: July 12, 2013
ii
DEDICATION
To My parents G. Gulhan Kavakci and Dr. Yusuf Z. Kavakci for raising me physically,
emotionally and intellectually,
To My husband Dr. Osman Kan and our daughter Erva Kan for their continuous patience
and support,
To all members of the Kavakci family for their academic and emotional support and the
Kan family and friends for their inspirational prayers
And to my late grandparents Kadriye Gungen and Ibrahim Ethem Gungen for teaching
me how to be a better person
May Allah be pleased with them all.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When I heard that the institution I was working for would sponsor the graduate
studies of eligible employees, I immediately realized that the prayers of my parents and
my older sister had been answered. My sister, Dr. Merve Kavakci, a Howard alumnus,
helped me get started with the application process immediately. Four years, many
sleepless nights, long conversations with family and friends and lots of prayers have
enabled me to achieve something I could not even imagine a few years ago.
I am grateful for Dr. Mervat Hatem for academically mothering me through the
challenges of becoming a student of political science as I was trying to learn a totally new
language. No words can suffice to express my gratitude for her contribution to my
academic and intellectual growth. She has been wonderful in pushing me when I needed
to be motivated and calming me down when I panicked.
I am grateful to Dr. John Cotman, for his patience as he walked me to the world
of comparative politics. His generosity and support is very much appreciated. I am also
thankful to Dr. Ben K. Fred-Mensah for all his kind contributions related to classical
international relations theories and his encouragement throughout my time at Howard
University and Dr. Maryln Lashley, especially for her valuable guidance while
structuring the proposal. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Michael Frazier
for his feedback and to Dr. Kilic Kanat for his contribution as the external member.
I am grateful to my family for their academic and moral support, especially my
parents, my sisters, my nieces, my daughter and my husband. I am thankful to Allah (swt)
for having created the circumstances that enabled me to earn such a valuable academic
and personal experience.
iv
ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the paradoxes of Turkey’s role model status and how it
offers an orientalist representation of this Muslim country influencing its membership
application to the European Union. Through a postcolonial analysis of the various
internal and external power relations associated with being a role model, it offers an
examination of the changes in the Turkish Republic’s discourses of secularism,
modernization and westernization as important parts of this discussion as well as the
development of the transformative discourses of political Islamic movements.
Longitudinal historical analysis is utilized to examine the emergence of the
Turkish Republic’s identity, and the concepts of secularism and westernization, which
constituted the basis of its role model status and its desire to become European. Critical
discourse analysis is also used to trace the evolution of the history of the republic
focusing on the changes in the internal and external power relations that shaped its
definition of itself and its foreign policy. The dissertation traces and uses the history of
Turkey's quest first for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and
then the European Union (EU) as a case study of the unequal power relations among key
national, regional and international actors. Special attention was also offered of the
transformative discourse of and the role played by the Justice and Development Party,
which challenged the Orientalist representations of Turkish society and its international
relations. The representations of the Muslim ‘other’ are analyzed in detail, especially with
respect to the emergence of Justice and Development Party as a dominant Islamic
v
political actor and how its role in pushing Turkish membership in the EU had major
implications for the democratization of Turkey.
Research findings suggest that the Justice and Development Party experience
redefined the problematic power relations between the Occident and the Orient with
which Turkey continued to be identified. It also challenged the system of power relations
that tied both together by changing the representations and the definition of the relations
between East and West.
In the light of the recent developments in the Middle East contextualized as the
Arab Spring, Turkey has presented itself as a model to others, but it has also witnessed its
own protests against the so called increasing authoritarian tendencies of the Justice and
Development Party leadership. What this indicated is that that Turkey needed to continue
to work on building a sound democratic system that accommodates the demands of the
minority in addition to the majority.
vi
Table of Contents
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................... xiii
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ........................................................ xiv
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Research Problem ................................................................................ 1
The Significance of the Research Problem ..................................................................... 6
Review of the Literature ............................................................................................... 10
The Construction of Turkish National Identity (Modern, Secular, Westernized) .... 10
Turkish-EU Relations ............................................................................................... 20
Turkish Membership to the European Union............................................................ 28
Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 36
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 61
Analyzing the Data ................................................................................................... 64
Delimitations and Limitations................................................................................... 71
Organization of the Dissertation Study ......................................................................... 72
vii
CHAPTER 2. THE BIRTH OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC FROM THE ASHES
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE .................................................................................... 77
Consequences of Ottoman Defeat in World War I ....................................................... 80
Kemalist Principles ....................................................................................................... 88
Nationalism ............................................................................................................... 88
Secularism ............................................................................................................... 105
Republicanism......................................................................................................... 114
Statism/Etatism ....................................................................................................... 115
Populism ................................................................................................................. 116
Revolutionalism/Reformism/Transformationism ................................................... 118
From Kemalist Principles to “Kemalism” .............................................................. 118
Role Model Status of Turkey ...................................................................................... 121
Secularism and Turkey’s Role Model Status .............................................................. 126
Reflections of the Role Model Status on Foreign Policy............................................ 129
CHAPTER 3. TURKEY IN BETWEEN POLITICAL/MILITARY
AUTHORITARIANISM, ROLE MODEL STATUS, NATIONAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRACY .............................................................................................................. 132
Prelude to the Second Republic (1940-1960) ............................................................. 132
Introduction of the Multi-Party System ...................................................................... 136
The Second Republic (1960 and 1980) ....................................................................... 143
Emergence of Islamic Political Parties ................................................................... 150
The General Overview of the Multi-Party System ................................................. 156
Signing of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement ................................ 159
viii
Beginning of the Third Republic: the Coup d’état of 1980 and the Relations with the
EEC ............................................................................................................................. 164
The Post-Ozal Period .............................................................................................. 173
Highlights of Turkish Foreign Policy after the 1980 Coup and in the 1990s ......... 175
Exceptions to the European Criticism of Human Rights Record of Turkey........... 183
The Copenhagen Criteria ........................................................................................ 185
The Post-Modern Coup D’état of February 28 1997 .................................................. 189
CHAPTER 4. THE EMERGENCE OF JDP AND MILESTONES IN RELATIONS
WITH THE EU ............................................................................................................. 196
European Commission’s Progress Reports on Turkey ............................................... 197
Conferral of Candidacy Status and the Emergence of AK Parti ................................. 209
The First Major Foreign Policy Challenge of the JDP ............................................... 217
The Cypriot Accession and Its Consequences ............................................................ 221
Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy with the JDP ....................................................... 226
Relations With the Muslim World During the JDP Administration’s First Years ..... 232
The Decision to Start the Accession Negotiations and an Evaluation of the JDP
Government................................................................................................................. 237
CHAPTER 5. TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY INTO A MAJOR PLAYER IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND THE NEW EU MEMBERSHIP
OUTLOOK .................................................................................................................... 245
Depth of the Turkish National Transformation Under the JDP .................................. 246
Commencement of the Accession Negotiations ......................................................... 254
2007 General Elections and Gul Presidency............................................................... 264
ix
Closure Case Against the JDP .................................................................................... 268
Re-introduction of the Role Model Argument in Relation with the Middle Eastern
(Islamic) States............................................................................................................ 279
Relations with Israel Vis-à-vis the Gaza Blockade..................................................... 287
The Arab Spring and the Role Model Argument ........................................................ 294
Change in Civilian-Military Discourse and the Role Model Status ........................... 301
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: TO BE OR NOT TO BE AN EU MEMBER: THAT
IS THE RHETORICAL QUESTION ......................................................................... 303
Transformation of Turkish National Identity: From Mimicking the West to Identity
Searching..................................................................................................................... 303
Postcolonial Reading of the Turkish Role Model Status ............................................ 305
The Dramatic Change in the Turkish National Discourse with the JDP .................... 310
Transformation of the Turkish Foreign Policy ........................................................... 313
Revisiting the Turkish Model in the post-Arab Awakening Period ........................... 316
Future of the Role Model Status ................................................................................. 321
Future of Relations with the EU ................................................................................. 325
Contribution to the Postcolonial Enterprise ................................................................ 328
Future of the Role Model Status (Post-Gezi Parki Protests)....................................... 329
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 334
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. World Value Survey, Turkey 2007 How Proud of Nationality?..................p.98
Table 2. World Value Survey, Turkey 2007 Are you a religious person?...............p.113
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Map: “The Decline of the Ottoman Empire”……...……………………p. 81
Figure 2. Map of Member States of the European Union………………………..p. 303
Figure 3. “We have increased Turkey’s prestige in 10 years”…………...……....p. 324
xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
EU……………………….European Union
EEC……………………..European Economic Community
EP……………………….European Parliament
ECHR……………………European Court of Human Rights
CU………………………Customs Union
JDP………………………Justice and Development Party
AKP………………………Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
RPP………………………Republican People’s Party
NSC………………………National Security Council
NATO…………………….North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN………………………...United Nations
xiii
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
1914 First World War
1918 Start of Turkish War of Independence
1923 Establishment of Turkish Republic
1924 Abolishing of Caliphate
1937 Secularism (Laiklik) officially mentioned in the Turkish Constitution
1938 Death of Kemal Ataturk
1946 Transformation into the multi-party system
1947 Launching of Truman Doctrine
1949 Turkish membership to the Council of Europe
Turkish recognition of the Israeli state
1950 First time a party other than Republican People’s Party is elected (Menderes’
Democratic Party)
1952 Turkish membership to NATO
1958 Turkish membership to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation
1959 Turkish application to European Economic Community (est. 1957)
1960 Military coup
1963 Ankara Association Agreement signed with the European Economic Community
1970 Signing of the Additional (Ankara) Protocol with the European Economic
Community
1971 Military coup (“Coup by high command”)
xiv
1973 First time an Islamic political party wins seats at the parliament (Erbakan’s National
Salvation Party)
1974 Cyprus crisis
1980 Military Coup
European Economic Community’s suspension of relations
1981 Official establishing of the headscarf ban towards university students and public
servants
1982 European Economic Community’s decision to freeze relations
1983 Beginning of Ozal period
Establishing of the Republic of Northern Cyprus
1986 Restoration of relations with the European Economic Community
1987 Application to membership to European Economic Community
1989 Rejection of membership application by the European Economic Community
1993 Establishing of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
Establishing of the Copenhagen Criteria
1994 Municipal victory of the Islamic Welfare Party in the local elections
1996 Turkish entry to the Customs Union
1996 Erbakan’s becoming first prime minister from an Islamic political movement
(Welfare Party)
1997 Military coup (“post-modern” coup of February 28th)
1999 Merve Kavakci’s election to the Turkish parliament (recognized as “soft coup”) and
the EU’s silence towards the incident
European Union’s recognition of Turkish candidacy
xv
2001 Establishing of the Justice and Development Party
2004 Rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots against the support of the Turkish
Cypriots
Decision of the European Union to start accession negotiations with Turkey
2005 Initiation of the accession negotiations with the European Union
2007 Election of Abdullah Gul to presidency
Opening of the closure case against the Justice and Development Party
2008 European Union’s support against closure
2010 Flotilla Crisis with Israel
Start of the Arab Awakening/Spring Period
2013 Start of the peace talks with Kurdish separatists
Taksim/Gezi Parki protests and discussion of “ballot box” democracy concept
xvi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Research Problem
A secular and modern Turkey has been presented as a role model to the rest of the
Muslim world, especially to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa by a
number of Western powers including the European Union. This Euro-centric
representation of Turkey reflects the complex power relations between the parties
involved at various levels. The implications of these power relations as well as the
representations that are produced within the process can especially be observed within the
framework of the ongoing debates on Turkish membership to the European Union.
Membership to the European Union has been a very important pursuit for Turkey
as a part of the overarching aim of modernization through Westernization upon which the
Turkish Republic has been founded. Turkey has continually been praised by the West for
having risen as a secular republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, which was
labeled by the Europeans as the “sick man of Europe” in its years of deterioration.1
However, as Turkish efforts to pursue the membership goal accelerated, the European
resistance to Turkish membership has simultaneously increased, especially within the last
decade. Turkey has become a country with a one of a kind EU membership journey, still
waiting for the crowning moment of accession to the EU, as an important milestone in the
Turkish modernization quest and discourse.
1
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 239.
1
Even though Turkey is presented as a role model to the Middle East and North
Africa, by the European Union itself,2 it still is not good enough to be admitted to the
European club. The clichéd argument that “Turkey is too big, too poor, and too
different” is still widely vocalized by the political elite in Europe as an impediment to
membership. No matter how hard Turkey tries to keep up with the growing membership
criteria, the European Union unilaterally holds the authority to immediately accept or
indefinitely prolong the accession of Turkey to the Union.
This dissertation will analyze the power relations emerging from the
representation of Turkey as a role model for some, but not good enough in relation to
Europe in the discussion of the Turkish EU membership. It examines the Turkish
modernization process, which is intertwined with Westernization and secularization
processes. It discusses the impact they had on the creation and evolution of the new
Turkish national identity. It also uncovers the Orientalist perceptions and perspectives
that are active within the Turkish membership debates including the ones that are
embedded in the arguments presented by the Europeans and the ones that are internalized
within the process of creation of the new Turkish identity.
Its theoretical framework utilizes a postcolonial critique focusing on the
representation of Turkey as a role model and the related power relations that are involved
in this process. It also sheds light on the systematic logic behind the creation of the
modern Turkish identity. The binary oppositions between the traditional and the modern,
the religious and the secular, the backward and the developed, as well as others are
2
The European Parliament, “European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2011 on
Turkey's 2010 progress report,” Strasbourg, March, 9, 2011, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20110090+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed on April 6, 2011.
2
internalized by the Turkish political elite as they construct the new identity which takes
the Western model as “the norm.” The new Turkish identity is constructed to be aligned
with the Western one, detaching itself from all its previous non-Western Islamic
characteristics. The Western reactions to this new identity are also analyzed from a
postcolonial perspective, with special focus on the EU membership process. The
autonomy of the EU as the superior, decision-maker who can change the rules of the
game whenever it wishes and its overall treatment of Turkey through labeling it as
“good” at times and “not good enough” at other times, is very much connected to the
arguments of postcolonial discourse. It will also be extended to the examination of the
internal and external aspects related to the emergence of Justice and Development Party3
as an Islamist labeled political force.
This research includes the discussion of the Turkish political elite’s
conceptualization of Westernization as the “mimicking” of the Westerner, their extremist
definition of secularism that is tailored specially for the “exceptional case” of Turkey and
the conflicts that these (mis)perceptions yield in form of a democratic deficit.
The following hypotheses will be tested in this dissertation:
(1) The Turkish Republic’s definition of itself as a secular state in the quest for
national modernization was based on subordinating its Muslim identity. The
resulting new Turkish Republican identity was stripped of most of its religious
characteristics.
3
Justice and Development Party (JDP) is the English name for Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi, which is also known by the Turkish acronyms AK Parti and AKP.
3
(2) European representation of the Turkish Republic’s success in national
modernization (its secular ideal) as a role model reflects European power over
Turkey such that it:
a. determines and promotes Muslim self definitions that reproduce the
European experience;
b. marginalizes the role that religion plays as a marker of identity;
c. possesses the authority to unilaterally approve or reject Turkish quest for
membership in the European Union
d. thereby, demonstrates the how of power in intellectual and politicaleconomic terms.
(3) Turkey’s internalization of its own version of the secular ideal inspired from the
French model was a source of the national power and legitimacy of the state such
that:
a. the Turkish secularist elites were empowered over the religious masses in
the Turkish society subordinating them;
b. Turkey assumed a position of power over the Muslim world as a role
model in which Islamic practices and Western values can coexist.
(4) The Justice and Development Party’s enthusiastic support of Turkey’s
membership to the EU destabilized classical Orientalist assumptions about the
incompatibility of Islam and Western both at the national and international levels
based on:
a. its commitment to passing reforms to enhance the quality of democracy,
4
b. having assumed a new leadership position in the region and emerging as a
major actor in the international arena,
c. its commitment to the EU membership project albeit its Islamist roots;
d. the fact that the highest level of progress in the EU membership project
has been achieved during their administration.
Operational definitions:
The Turkish Republican definition of secular state is a model based on an extreme
version of French laïcité, and is perceived as the authority of the state to interfere with
religious practices within the public realm as well as some areas of private lives of the
citizens.
Turkish westernization quest was based on mimicking Western values and lifestyles
that associated all religious and traditional values with backwardness.
Turkish national modernization was that process aimed at the creation of a new
Turkish Republican national identity through secularization and westernization.
Turkey assumed a role model status among Muslim nations as a secular democratic
republic in a region with many struggling democracies. Western nations, and especially
the European Union have also presented Turkey as a role model to the Muslim world, the
Middle East and North Africa.
The Justice and Development Party (also known with the acronyms JDP, AKP and
AK Parti) is the majority party that has been in power in Turkey since 2002. It is known
for its Islamist roots as well as having achieved significant progress economically and
politically at national and international levels.
5
One of the classical Orientalist assumptions about Islam argues that it is opposed to
and incompatible with Western/European values such as democracy, secularism, respect
for human rights and the rule of law, etc. in their generalized definition. This argument is
based on the belief that Islamic values are essentially different from those of the West.
The Significance of the Research Problem
Membership in the European Union has been an ongoing pre-occupation for
Turkey as the ultimate measure of success along the path of modernization. However, the
obstacles in the route to membership have increased with special requests made of
Turkey in addition to the growing criteria and the acquis communautaire (the body of
laws already adopted by the EU).4 As the European Union itself continues to evolve as a
supranational entity, its treatment of Turkey, from the days of the Customs Union to
official acceptance of its candidacy, has been very different from that of any other
candidate or member. As Europe considers and questions whether its institutions can
handle the accession of a new member which can change the socio-economic and
political balances within the Union, Turkey is becoming increasingly skeptical of the
sincerity of EU in keeping its promise of eventually letting Turkey in. At the same time,
Turkey has never seriously considered or voiced the possibility of giving up on the
membership pursuit, despite a few incidents of past political crises.
EU membership, which is seen as an “official recognition” of Turkey’s
Europeanness and therefore Westernness, has been a long–standing Turkish goal. Turkey
has been eager to join the “European Club” ever since the beginning of the European
4
John McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 72-73.
6
Union project, i.e., the days of European Coal and Steel Community.5 However, the
official initiation of the Turkish journey to EU membership took place upon the signing
of the Ankara Protocol in 1963.
In order to fully understand the continuing Turkish eagerness and commitment to
the EU membership process despite its obstacles, it is important to look at what
membership in an exclusive European Club has meant for the country. The Turkish
interest in Westernization as a gateway to modernization and development dates back all
the way to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Westernization was perceived as a means of
“catching up and dealing with the West” throughout the nineteenth century, dating to
1839.6 This interest became a fundamental and nonnegotiable part of the Turkish national
narrative upon the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. The Turkish
Republic constructed its national identity as one that yearns for the Westernization of all
aspects of life. This became the ultimate goal, not only within the economic, industrial,
and political realm but also at a cultural level. Membership to the European Union
therefore continues to constitute a very important indicator of the success of the Turkish
modernization and westernization projects.
One of the most confusing issues for the Turkish side of the membership debate is
the EU’s bestowal of a role model status to the country. The Turkish policy makers, who
happily welcome EU’s approval in comparing Turkey to other non-Western actors, are at
the same time confused in the face of EU’s rejection. After the publication of each new
5
“History of Turkey-EU Relations,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Relations
Website, available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2, accessed on August
18, 2011.
6
Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political identity in Turkey: Rethinking the
West and Westernization." Turkish Studies 6, no. 1, Spring, 2005, p. 23.
7
Progress Report where EU recognizes some progress while listing the existing or new
areas where reforms are needed, the Turkish side has traditionally continued the efforts to
keep up with the requirements. However, the level of skepticism towards the intentions
and the sincerity of the EU in keeping its side of the bargain has increased with more and
more people arguing that EU has a double standard in the case of Turkey.
From the European perspective, Turkey is still perceived as “the other” and many
of the arguments against Turkish membership are based on several Orientalist
assumptions. It seems like no matter what Turkey does to fulfill the membership criteria,
its cultural differences, especially its Muslimness is an impediment to the possibility of
ever becoming European. This research gives the readers familiar with the arguments of
Orientalist thinking more insight on the policy extensions of Orientalism within the
Turkish membership discussions. The discussions that point out the Occident’s
perspectives as well as how Turkey has internalized Orientalist perspectives are
fundamental to the postcolonial critique of the main arguments that the EU-Turkish
debate offers.
When these and other arguments related to Turkish role model status are
evaluated, one can observe the power of representation in action and how knowledge can
assist in unpacking it. The power relations relevant to this research can be categorized as:
1) the power EU has over Turkey, 2) the power the Turkish state has over the internal
forces that has shaped the construction of its history and those challenge it, and 3) the
power Turkey has over the non-Western world, especially Muslims.
The process of building the new Turkish Republican national identity has been
based on a system of promoting and enforcing the newly developed modern, secularist,
8
pro-western citizen model which declares the old traditional, conservative, religious
Ottoman model as ‘the other.’ The citizens who resisted the new model have been
marginalized by the regime that has utilized the representations of citizens who fit the
new model to dominate and marginalize the others. This gives a quick overview of the
internal power relations within the Turkish Republic. The people who adapted the new
secular Turkish identity and adhered to its requirements were rewarded by the regime
while the ones who could not give up their religious and traditional values and therefore
resisted transformation to the new identity were seen as “the other” by the system. They
were oppressed and treated as second-class people who were incapable of progress.
The European Union displays power over Turkey with the ability to accept or
decline its membership through affirmation or rejection of Turkey’s role model status.
Turkey accepts and therefore reinforces this power hierarchy by continuing to seek EU’s
approval for membership as well as welcoming and acting upon its position as a role
model. The Turkish state has internalized this role model status. It has also used it to
exercise power in the region, especially among other Muslim countries as a means of
legitimizing itself in the eyes of the citizens. Finally, it has used this European sanctioned
representation of itself in advancing its quest for EU membership. In this last endeavor,
Turkey has transformed itself into an active agent vis-à-vis the West with mixed
consequences that can be seen in the long march towards EU membership.
The foundational basis for the discussion will build upon the analysis of the
success of the Turkish modernization paradigm with special emphasis on the existing and
newly produced representations that make certain characteristics empowering while
others a basis for a subordinate position. The concept of Westernization – perceived to be
9
synonymous to modernization in the Turkish case – will also be given a similar
discussion. Last but not least, the construction of Turkish secularism, as a more radical
version of French laïcité7 and its practices, contributed other representations and power
relations that will also be discussed in detail. Secularism and Westernization as part of
the modernization process in Turkey have been the principles that have initially
constructed and continue to be uncontested as central aspects of Turkish national identity.
They are the main reasons behind the European bestowal of the role model status to
Turkey. One of the ironic points regarding the European approval and encouragement of
Turkish secularism and Westernization practices is embedded in Europe’s disregard for
their side effects which led to a significant democratic deficit. This democratic deficit is
due to the implementation of secularism, which limits basic human rights such as
freedom of belief and expression. This dissertation will also question the practice of
Turkish secularism, arguing that secularism is not a universal and homogeneous process
and that the Turkish case is one that contradicts the very values upon which the general
concept is based. Another issue that will be expanded upon is the perception of
secularization as a form of oppression of religion, and as a prerequisite to modernization.
Review of the Literature
The Construction of Turkish National Identity (Modern, Secular, Westernized)
Modernization through Westernization has been an overarching aim for Turkey,
especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The project of
establishing the modern Turkish state was one that was premised upon stripping Turkey
7
Merve Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey A Postcolonial Reading, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.16.
10
of its Ottoman past, which was very much aligned with Islamic history and the Muslim
identity of its people. The decline and eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire was
believed to be caused by the strong traditional and religious values which were also
blamed for the underdevelopment and backwardness. Therefore, the Turkish Republic’s
modernization project was based on the creation of a new secular Turkish identity that
would replace the old Muslim one. Modernization and Westernization were coupled with
development in the overarching goal of catching up with the European countries that
represent “contemporary civilization.” Suna Kili explains that the Turkish revolution led
by Ataturk “rejected the religious basis of legitimacy, striving instead to place legitimacy
on a laïc and national foundation.”8 Kili also argues that one of the achievements of
Ataturk’s Revolution was the replacement of the traditional, ethnic, familial and religious
authority by a unitary, national and laïc one which Samuel Huntington considers to be the
prerequisite to political modernization.9 This view was very much in line with the
dominant claims of the modernization theorists.
At the outset Turkish Westernization was based on Eurocentrism. According to
Samin Amir, one of the conspicuous claims of Eurocentrism was “that the only West was
rational and capable of modernity”10 and that the non-Western world was “spiritual,
traditional and stagnant.”11 Haldun Gulalp argues that the nationalists’ instinctive
reaction to this argument was to disprove it by demonstrating that the Turkish nation was
8
Suna Kili, The Ataturk Revolution: A Paradigm of Modernization, (Istanbul: Turkiye Is
Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, 2007), p. 101.
9
Ibid, p. 100.
10
Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1989).
11
Haldun Gulalp, “Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey,” in Rethinking
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds.,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 56.
11
competent enough to “replicate the Western experience.”12 The Turkish nationalist
project welcomed all the Eurocentric characteristics that were perceived as reflections of
Western superiority including the nation-state system, the economic development model
and rationalism.13 This is was why Turkey initially was ready to do whatever it took to
receive the approval of Europe.
Alex Inkeles and David Smith argue that in addition to economic progress,
development “requires a transformation in the very nature of man, a transformation that is
both a means to yet greater growth and at the same time one of the great ends of the
development process.”14 They argue that the development process involves
transformation from traditionalism to individual modernity.15 According to their
definition, the modern man is an informed and active citizen who has personal efficacy, is
autonomous of traditional influences, and open minded.16 These arguments can help
explain the logical framework of the Turkish modernization project in which the
traditional and everything that it entailed was seen as an obstacle to modernization.
Resat Kasaba, describes modernization to be “the freeing of individuals and
communities from some of their traditional obligations, enabling them to take part in the
market society.”17 Esra Ozyurek, in her discussion on the Turkish perception of
modernization, makes reference to Daniel Lerner’s presentation of the Turkish case as an
12
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 56- 57.
14
Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, “Becoming Modern” in Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality, Mitchell A. Seligson and John
T Passe-Smith, eds, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) p. 210.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, p. 211.
17
Resat Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities” in Rethinking
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds.,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 4.
13
12
“ideal model” of a Muslim country, which proves that the modernization model
developed for the West can work for any modernizing country in the world including all
races, beliefs and ethnicities.18 Ozyurek agrees that the self-initiation and rapid
development of the Turkish modernization project are characteristics that are rarely seen
except for the self-initiated examples of China, Japan and the Soviet Union.19 She also
adds that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Turkish modernization process
was the fact that its starting point was its nineteenth century initiation by the elite of the
Ottoman Empire, reaching its climax during the authoritarian republican regime.20 This
imperial past distinguished Turkish modernization from other such projects which arose
in colonial settings. 21 Further in the discussion, she also agrees with the arguments of
Serif Mardin, Fuat Keyman, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba stating that the Turkish
modernization process has been based on a top-down model in which the collective
interests of the public have been defined by a modernizing elite, whose views were
developed in the nineteenth century.22
Upon the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the modernizing elite was led by
the founder of the republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who took the last name “Ataturk”
which literally means “the father of Turks.” Ataturk, who became an icon of the
modernization process believed that religious rule “kept Turkey from joining the civilized
nations.”23In this view, the uncivilized people were bound to be stepped on by the
18
Esra Ozyurek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in
Turkey, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p12.
19
Ibid, p. 13, 185 (end note 13).
20
Ibid, p. 12.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid, p. 90.
23
Lewis, pp. 267-268.
13
civilized, and that “civilization” was synonymous with “the West.”24Ataturk argued that
“… the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show and prove
that they are civilized by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way
of living.”25 Haldun Gulalp suggests that the “nationalist statist developmentalism in
Turkey was identified with ‘Kemalism.’”26 Bernard Lewis commends Ataturk for having
realized that fundamental changes in the culture and overall structure of the society were
necessary for modernization to reach true success.27 This structural change involved the
disdain of all things religious and traditional and commending all things Western. It is
important to emphasize that this process involved two other components that were linked
to each other and essential in achieving real progress in the complete modernization of
Turkey. One of them is the internal acceptance and the dissemination of the Oriental
perspective of superiority of the West, which Merve Kavakci explains to be a form of
self-Orientalization of the Orientals.28 The “Orientalized Oriental” is a “non-Western
subject who makes her/himself largely in the image of the West, its experiences, its
designs, and its expectations.”29 He/she is an active member of the “orientalization”
practice in whose perspective the West is always more attractive.30 However, even
though the Orientalized Oriental feels closer to the West emotionally and intellectually,
24
Ibid, p. 268.
Ibid, pp. 268-269.
26
Gulalp, p. 34.
27
Lewis, p. 292.
28
Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 124.
29
Nevzat Soguk, “Orientalized Orientals,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 18,
No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 363.
30
Ibid.
25
14
she/he is always a “stranger” to the Western eye and never can become one of “us.” 31
The Turkish Orientalized Orientals consist of the pro-Western Kemalist, secularist elite;
act as the “vicegerent and representative of the European man,”32 as they attempt to
subjugate all religious and traditional characteristics of the society with a condescending
attitude. They also struggle to establish the other component of modernization through
the recreation and reenactment of all aspects of Western life in the Turkish stage in form
of westernization.
Authors like Daniel Lerner and Bernard Lewis have presented Turkey’s success
in adopting Western norms, systems and culture as a perfect example of the ability of
modernization process to deliver the complete transformation of even a strong Muslim
population.33 Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba explain that even though Lerner’s The
Passing of Traditional Society and Lewis’s The Emergence of Modern Turkey became
standard texts on the “success” of modernization, after the 1960s the number of critics
who viewed “the Kemalist path of modernization” to be “a historical failure that
undermined the normative order in Ottoman-Turkish society”34 increased. The mere
forced imitation of Western practices led to resistance within the Turkish society and this
resulted in a society that was subordinated rather than modernized. Therefore the Turkish
modernization process stood, ready to collapse when faced with even a minor challenge.
In her discussion of Turkish modernization, Kavakci explains that after the First
World War “the defiance against potential colonial forces and the transformation into
31
Ibid, pp. 363-364.
Kavakci Islam, p. 125.
33
Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Modernity and
National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds., (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1997), p. 4.
34
Ibid.
32
15
republicanism occurred in tandem.”35 She argues that while this resistance was perceived
as a religious war against the West, the belief in the superiority of the West was the basis
for the founding elite’s adaptation of the westernization process.36 Another important
point she makes is related to the Turkish exceptionalism. She argues that the Turkish
people’s belief that they carried a “distinct noble blood” in the form of exceptionalism
“was wielded to distance Turks from the rest of the Muslim world, rendering it a unique
Muslim-yet-secular country.”37 In her discussion of the formation of Turkish national
identity, Kavakci argues that the two prongs of Turkish nationalism are “the belief in
Turks’ innate superiority as a people,” making reference to the work of Umit Kirimli and
“the uncontested commitment to westernization.”38 In conclusion, she submits that the
Turkish national identity contained both a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West and a
superiority vis-à-vis the Muslim world. From then on Turkey, perceived itself to be
“invariably better than the Arab Middle East but never as good as the European West,”39
which it sought to emulate. This crucial argument by Kavakci is also extremely important
in the discussion of the power relations between Turkey and Europe, Turkey and the nonWestern world as well those between the various internal actors.
In his discussion of Turkish nationalism, Caglar Keyder submits that it
represented an extreme example of a case that was led by a modernizing elite who did not
take the high level of popular resentment coming from the silent masses into
35
Kavakci Islam, p. 6.
Ibid, p. 7.
37
Ibid, p. 12.
38
Ibid, p. 15.
39
Ibid.
36
16
consideration.40 This rejection of the masses enabled the creation of a new nationalist
identity that would have the dual functions of serving as a basis upon which the
legitimacy of the new regime would be built as well as sustaining its alignment with the
“transcendent logic of the West.”41 In addition to the transformation of the state and
administrative structures, this new national identity adopted a western way of life
including styles of clothing, culinary practices, gender relations and music, etc.42 Keyder
explains that the Turkish nationalist project, “placed special emphasis on the vulnerability
of the new community, on its precarious viability in the face of hostile external forces.”43
This logic made the utilization of authoritarian measures a necessity to promote a sense
of national solidarity44 in a newly defined or newly imagined community. Keyder
concludes that this type of top-down modernization produced a modernized nation
composed of un-modernized individuals in the face of the tradition of strong state.45
Although the Turkish modernization process was almost synonymous with
westernization, Serif Mardin argues that modernization was not initially and historically
perceived as a means for Westernization, but as a means for maintaining the power of the
state.46 However, on the issue of the Turkish accession process, some experts argue that
modernization of the Turkish society is the main aim of EU membership.47 In his
discussion Caglar Keyder argues that the modernizing elite identified modernization with
40
Caglar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s,” in
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat
Kasaba, eds., (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.43.
41
Ibid, p. 44.
42
Kasaba, p. 25.
43
Keyder, pp. 45-46.
44
Ibid, p. 46.
45
Ibid.
46
Ozyurek, pp. 12- 13.
47
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 129.
17
Westernization as to enable their entry into European civilization. He adds that according
to the conceptualization of Turkish modernizers, modernity was a comprehensive project
of “embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe modern.”48
Keyder further argues that this process was not limited to structural, technical and
political changes, but it also called for total societal transformation which did not tolerate
any modification on the western model, leaving almost no place for religion, culture and
tradition.49 He adds that the opponents of this rigid perception of modernization as
westernization proposed a non-western modernization process which would consist of
organizational transformation, stripped from the commitment to the Enlightenment
process.50 Keyder, as a supporter pro-Enlightenment camp51, submits that the determining
influence of the tradition of allegiance to the state, caused the modernizers to interfere
with the scope of modernity provided by the western model, weakening the unequivocal
aim of westernization.52
Laiklik, the Turkish version of secularism that is based on the French model,
laïcité, has played a fundamental role in the project of Turkish modernization through
westernization. In Kavakci’s words, it “lies at the center of modern Turkey’s state
edifice.”53
Laiklik has played a key role in the execution of the project of creating a new
national identity. It created a new society to replace an old one in which religion and
traditions had shaped almost all aspects of social, economic and political life, through the
48
Keyder, p. 37.
Ibid.
50
Ibid, p. 38.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid, p. 39.
53
Kavakci Islam, p. 4.
49
18
state’s containment of the private sphere as part of the top-down nationalization process.
This offered a contrast to the clichéd, classic perception of secularism that it is a mere
separation between the affairs of the state and religion.
Dietrich Jung explains that, while the European perception of Turkish secularism
is that it is another manifestation of the separation of political and religious spheres, “the
secular principle has served as a means of rigid state control over the religious field” in
Turkey.54 He further asserts that laiklik evolved into an ideological crux of Kemalist
doctrine, which was utilized in the legitimization of the undemocratic practices of the
secularist ruling party and the military.55
Within the Kemalist discourse, any challenge or criticism was legally and socially
out of the question with the preservation of secularism becoming synonymous with
defending the Kemalist principles and therefore the republican state’s integrity.56 Jung
agrees with Cengiz Candar who argues that due to its secular extremist practices,
Kemalism has evolved into a form of “state religion.”57 As the Kemalist ideology
executed the modernization process58 in an authoritative manner, the religious people
(later on labeled as Islamists) were treated as “others” who were perceived to be threats
to the integrity of the state.59
Commitment to laiklik, as one of the fundamental characteristics of the new
Turkish national identity was based on orientalizing the religious and traditional at the
54
Dietrich Jung, “A Key to Turkish Politics,” in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU
Accession,” Dietrich Jung, Catharina Raudvere, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), p. 118.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid, pp.118-119.
57
Ibid, p. 119.
58
Ibid, p. 132.
59
Ibid, p. 133.
19
cost of creating huge scars in the democratization process, another important part of
modernization. This included ‘secular’ measures like limiting religious and traditional
practices through a coerced process of Westernization60 that limited democratic rights at
many levels. Jung explains that “although secularism was associated with positive
attributes such as modern, progressive, Western or civilized, the excluded other was
branded as backward, fundamentalist, or hostile to democratic values.”61 This system of
orientalization helped legitimize the state practices, which intruded on the religious lives
of the citizens, causing an ongoing conflict between the secularist elite and the religious
people as well as those who want a better democracy.62 In conclusion, the Kemalist
modernization project stretched the notion of secularism to ensure a new Turkish national
identity that would be compatible with westernization, in which there was absolutely no
place for even the smallest trace of Islam or any religious tradition associated with it.
Turkish-EU Relations
Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen explain that the initial application of Turkey
to the European Economic Community in 1959 was based on political and economic
reasons. They assert that the political rationale behind it was premised upon a Turkish
foreign policy that gave priority to becoming a member of all Western institutions such as
NATO and Council of Europe.63 The Turkish application, which came right after that of
60
Kavakci Islam, p. 20.
Jung, p. 133.
62
Ravza Kavakci Kan, “Laiklik: Secularism in Turkey: Not Just a Means For State to
Control Religion, but an Endless Source of Social Conflict,” in An Anthology of
Contending Views on International Security, David Walton and Michael Frazier, eds.,
(Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 2012), p. 4.
63
Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Introduction: Prospects for a Difficult
Encounter,” in Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Esra
LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 3.
61
20
Greece, eventually resulted with the signing of the association agreement, known as
Ankara Agreement, in September of 1963.64 The agreement was aimed at achieving
economic integration, establishing free movement of workers as well as extending social
relations.65 La Gro and Jorgensen point out that the agreement served both as a legal
document between Turkey and the six European Community member states as well as an
international agreement between Turkey and the European Community.66An Additional
Protocol that defined the technical details of the necessary economic, legal and political
process of fulfilling the Customs Union requirements was signed in 1970.67 It took
Turkey a while to keep up with its side of the agreement due to factors such as European
criticism of human rights practices, economic crises, terrorist attacks in the 1970s and the
implications of the military coup of 1980, etc.68 In the meanwhile, Greece had become a
full member in 1982, five years after its application for full membership.69 Turkey
eventually applied for full membership to the organization in 1987 and got rejected in
1989. The next major step in European-Turkish relations was the eventual and delayed
adherence to the European technical requirements for the Customs Union in January of
1996. In the meanwhile the European Economic Community had become the European
Union, upon the signing of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that was aimed towards gradually
achieving a complete political union in Europe.70After this development, in 1993 the
64
Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid, pp. 4-5.
69
Ibid, p. 4.
70
McCormick, pp. 72-73.
65
21
European Council decided on a new set of EU membership conditions that came to be
known as the “Copenhagen Criteria.” These conditions required the applicant states to:
(1) be democratic, with respect for human rights and the rule of law, (2) have a
functioning free-market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive
pressures of capitalism and (3) be able to take on the obligations of the acquis
communitaire.71
The second application of Turkey to membership was accepted after a year and
Turkey was officially given a candidate status in 1999 after which the accession
negotiations started in 2004.72 In the meanwhile, Turkey had to deal with the additional
responsibility of adhering to the newly introduced criteria while at the same time facing
the challenge of keeping up with the growing acquis. Since then the accession
negotiations on various chapters of the acquis communautaire have been continuing with
ups and downs, with successful completion of the negotiations on a few chapters and
with delays or indefinite interruptions due to political crises on the others. The accession
negotiations consist of detailed “screening” of the existing Turkish legislation and
administrative structures with respect to each of the thirty five chapters that deal with a
variety of areas related to economic, political, social, administrative, structural,
environmental legislation which constitute the EU standards that each candidate country
is expected to adopt and enforce.73
Many scholars such as Dietrich Jung and Catharine Raudvere,74 Kemal Kirisci,75
Daniella Kuzmanovic,76 Nilufer Gole,77 Ozlem Terzi,78 Harun Arikan79 Talip
71
Ibid, p. 73
Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, “Turkey: European Dimensions and the Status
of Islam,” in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession,” Dietrich Jung, Catharina
Raudvere, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 11.
73
Kerem Yildiz and Mark Muller, The European Union and Turkish Accession, (Ann
Arbor: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 24.
74
Jung and Raudvere, in “Turkey: European Dimensions and the Status of Islam,” p. 3.
72
22
Kucukcan,80 Yannis A. Stivachtis,81 Mirela Bogdani,82 Knud Erik Jorgensen,83 and many
other intellectuals agree that the Turkish EU membership journey is very different from
those of the other member states. Harun Arikan argues that “Turkey has been treated
differently, compared to other applicant countries for EU membership.”84 He also adds
that lack of clarity and certainty of the EU policy towards Turkey has made Ankara’s
efforts to meet the EU standards less effective.85 Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere
argue that the overall analysis of the EU membership process would yield that Turkey is
the only candidate who is under constant interrogation with respect to its Europeanness.86
It should also be noted that there are other examples such as the cases of United Kingdom
which became a member after being rejected twice87 and Poland which faced strong
opposition due to its size, population, level of democratization, religiousness of its
75
Kirisci, “Religion as an Argument,” pp. 28-29.
Kuzmanovic, “Civilization and EU-Turkey, pp. 54-55.
77
Nilufer Gole, “Europe’s Encounter with Islam: What Future?” Constellations, Volume
13, No 2, 2006, p. 284.
78
Ozlem Terzi, The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy,
(Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), p. 137.
79
Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for the EU Membership?,
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), p.3
80
Talip Kucukcan, “Turkish Migrants, Social Capital, and Culturalist Discourse in
Turkey-EU Relations,” in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession, Dietrich Jung,
Catharina Raudvere, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 204-205.
81
Yannis A. Stivachtis, “Europe and the ‘Turk’: An English School Approach to the
Study of EU-Turkish Relations,” in Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas,
Opportunities, and Constraints, Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds,
(New York: Lexington Books, 2008), pp. 17-36.
82
Mirela Bogdani, Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession: When Religion Meets
Politics, (New York: I.B. Tairus & Co Ltd, 2011), pp. 159-168.
83
Knud Erik Jorgensen, “The Politics of EU Accession Negotiations,” in Turkey and the
European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Esra LaGro and Knud Erik
Jorgensen, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 11.
84
Arikan, p.3.
85
Ibid.
86
Jung and Raudvere, p. 6.
87
Jorgensen, p. 11.
76
23
society, etc.88 However, the Turkish case stands out due to various factors which will be
discussed in this dissertation.
Since the Turkish membership process has been an extremely lengthy and
controversial one, the membership criteria of the EU and the related specific demands of
EU toward Turkey have also increased at an extremely high rate. When Turkey initially
applied to membership to the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the
European Union, right after Greece, both states received an affirmative response and the
details of the Athens and Ankara association agreements reflect that both states were
treated equally at the outset.89 Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen argue, however, that
there were significant differences in the implementation of these two agreements.90 They
add that the negotiations on the Ankara agreement took a long time while Greece had
already been accepted to membership and the process of meeting the economic, social
and political requirements was delayed for Turkey as the country was struggling with a
variety of internal crises.91 In the meanwhile the European criticisms regarding the
human rights record of Turkey were escalating with time, causing tension between the
parties.92 In 1996, immediately after the Customs Union agreement came into effect, at a
time when the EU decided to expand relations with Turkey, a crisis erupted between
Turkey and Greece regarding ownership claims of each country to the islands of Kardak
88
An Schrijvers, “What Can Turkey Learn From Previous Accession Negotiations?” in
Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Esra LaGro and
Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 30.
89
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 4.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid, pp. 4-5.
92
Ibid.
24
in the Aegean Sea.93 The conflict resulted in the blocking of the Customs Union
agreement by Greece, which initiated a period of deterioration of the political relations
between Turkey and the EU.94 This period continued with the re-emergence of the
narrative that presents the EU as a Christian Club in which a Muslim state like Turkey
had no place.95 LaGro and Jorgensen assert that “this discourse has been among the main
debates in some of the EU member states,” which present Islam as a key argument
against Turkish membership, ever since then.96 Once, what became to be known as
“Kardak crisis” was resolved, Turkey became the only state in the Customs Union that
had not yet been admitted to the EU.97
Knud Erik Jorgensen, in his analysis of the history of EU enlargement, agrees
with many analysts that enlargement processes have traditionally consisted of “politics
and law, administrative systems, socio-economic interests, grand bargains, phases of
adjustment and EU self-reform,” while the “cultural factor” has dominated the debates in
the Turkish case.98 He highlights that more than a dozen previous accessions were
culture-free.99
LaGro and Jorgensen further argue that as the speed of democratization increases
“demands from the EU and its member states seem to be increasing exponentially.”100
The democratic improvements refer to the fact that Turkey has adopted and started to
93
Ibid, p. 5
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Pulat Tacar, “Socio-ciltural Dimensions of Accession Negotiations,” in Turkey and the
European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Esra LaGro and Knud Erik
Jorgensen, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 126.
98
Jorgensen, “The Politics of EU Accession Negotiations,” p. 11.
99
Ibid.
100
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 2.
94
25
implement radical reforms such as revoking the death penalty,101 increasing freedom of
expression, prevention of torture, improvement of individual privacy, freedoms and
security, strengthening civil society, increasing freedom of communication and
movement, improving gender equality, promoting freedom to establish associations, etc.,
especially over the last decade.102 However, even though the EU has recognized that
Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria,103 the membership journey is far from
having a happy ending.
Kemal Kirisci also agrees that the European resistance to Turkish membership
continues to increase as the quality of Turkish economy, democracy and pluralism
increases.104 Although the European Commission progress reports emphasize that
“Turkey continues to sufficiently fulfill the political criteria,”105 the political tensions
between the two parties cause the already slow process to come to halt. These political
crises range from the freezing of political dialogue by Turkey upon the Commission’s
1997 declaration that Turkey should not be listed as a candidate country106 to the ongoing
tensions related to the Cyprus issue, which was the main factor that led to the suspension
of accession negotiations in November 2006, only five months after their start.107
101
Jorgensen, p. 13.
Ravza Kavakci Kan, “Turkish Challenge to the Orientalist Narrative of the European
Union,” in History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey, Kilic Bugra Kanat, Kadir
Ustun, and Nuh Yilmaz, eds., (Ankara: SETA Publications, 2011), p. 84.
103
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 2.
104
Kemal Kirisci, “Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish EU Membership,”
in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession, Dietrich Jung, Catharina Raudvere,
eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 28.
105
“Key Findings of the 2010 Progress Report on Turkey ,” 9/11/2010, available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/562, accessed, April
1, 2011.
106
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 6.
107
Ibid.
102
26
Even though the political relations with the European Union have gone through
periods of interruption, Turkey has continued to change laws and adopt new policies as a
part of the EU harmonization process, especially after the official start of the membership
negotiations in 2006. It is important to note that the EU membership process, especially
the part about keeping up with EU standards played a key role in the overall
transformation of Turkey.108 Kirisci argues that the EU membership goal has helped
Turkey to deal with many controversial issues such as increasing minority rights,
removing the death penalty, restraining the influence of military on policy making as well
as enhancing the freedom of expression.109 Dietrich Jung agrees with Kirisci as he argues
that one of the benefits of the EU membership process is the adaptation of pluralistic
European norms, specifically, the standards on religious freedoms which caused the
Turkish state to lose its monopoly over religious expression.110
In his discussion of the anti-Turkish sentiment within the EU, Kirisci argues that
even though EU is aware of the great transformations in Turkey, it is “wavering in the
grounds that Turkey is not European, which has become a code word for saying that
Turkey is not Christian.”111 He continues by referring to the famous statement by Oli
Rehn that European values need to be witnessed in all aspect of societal life in the whole
country for Turkey to be able to join the Union.112 After pointing out the lack of
definition of “European Values,” and whether they include Christianity, Kirisci highlights
the fact that the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria made no reference to religion as a requirement
108
Kirisci, p. 20.
Ibid, p. 28.
110
Jung, p. 119.
111
Kirisci, p. 28.
112
Ibid, p. 29.
109
27
for EU membership.113 If one were to take Kirisci’s criticism of secular Europe’s
rejection of Turkey based on religious grounds to a more polemical level, this particular
behavior by Europe could be labeled as un-European.
The definition of “European identity” and the exact content of “European Values”
are still matters of discussion within the EU itself. The debates around to these terms get
heated especially when the issue of Turkish membership is brought to the table. As
Europe tries to define the characteristics and limits of its own identity, “its self-definition
shapes the perception of Turkey.”114 Kirisci argues that the religious characteristics of
Turkey, especially its “Muslimness” are used in the construction of an EU identity that is
premised upon excluding Turkey and Muslims from the Union.115 Nilufer Gole also
agrees that Europe is establishing its self definition dichotomously relative to that of
Turkey as she asserts that “othering Turkey became a way of identifying Europe.”116 She
explains that Turkish membership issue became a controversial concern for European
states when it was considered within the framework of “Europe’s frontiers, values and
future.”117 She asserts that the othering of Turkey as a part for the “need for an alterité,”
was premised in historical events such as the Turkish siege of Vienna.118
Turkish Membership to the European Union
Daniella Kuzmanovic explains that in the post-Cold War period, the historical
relationship between Europe and the Muslim world specifically in relation to the Ottoman
113
Ibid.
Ravza Kavakci Kan, “Turkish Challenge to the Orientalist Narrative of the European
Union,” p. 79.
115
Kirisci, p. 21.
116
Nilufer Gole, “Europe’s Encounter with Islam: What future?” Constellations, Volume
13, no 2, 2006, p. 255.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
114
28
Empire, the predecessor of modern Turkish Republic, has reappeared presenting Islam as
“the ultimate other” of Europe.119 She adds that the historical evolution of the European
identity has generally been shaped by the struggle between Christianity and Islam,
producing a “central cultural distinction between a Christian self and Muslim other,”120
that appear in the European discourse. The strong representations of the Ottoman Empire
as barbaric, evil, violent, non-Christian and non-European121 were inherited by its
successor.
An interesting quote that reflects the representation of Turkey as the other of
Europe and therefore the EU is a widely cited one by former French president Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing in 2001, stating that accepting Turkey would lead to “the end of the
European Union,” calling the European supporters of Turkish membership “the
adversaries of the European Union.”122 He argued that Turkey had “a different culture, a
different approach, a different way of life.”123 This statement received negative reaction
within the EU as well as in Turkey. It is extremely important as a reflection of the
strength of the existing representations in the policy world.
Influential political leaders such as French President Nicholas Sarkozy, and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel are also known for their anti-Turkish positions. Their
119
Daniella Kuzmanovic, “Civilization in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Religion, Politics
and Turkey’s EU Accession,” Dietrich Jung, Catharina Raudvere, eds., (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 54.
120
Kuzmanovic, p. 55.
121
Ibid.
122
Stephen Catle, “Giscard Predicts ‘end of EU’ if Turkey joins,” The Independent,
November 9, 2002, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/giscard-predicts-end-of-eu-if-turkeyjoins-603661.html, accessed on May 5, 2011.
123
Ibid.
29
respective remarks on Turkey not belonging to Europe due to its difference in culture124
and that therefore it is “not suitable for EU membership,”125 are good examples of this.
The EU President Herman Van Rumpoy has also made statements in the past that
strongly oppose Turkish membership, warning that it would lead to dilution of the
Christian heritage of Europe, insisting that Turkey is not and will never be a part of
Europe.126 Although many European leaders strongly resist the allegations that EU is a
Christian Club, another reason behind their anti-Turkish position may be based on the
fear that accepting Turkey to the EU could open the way for possible applications from
other Muslim countries in the Middle East and East Africa.127
Ten days after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian
Prime Minister, stated: “Western civilization was superior to Islamic culture.”128 He
argued that the West should be conscious of this superiority, “which consists of a value
system that has given people widespread prosperity… and guarantees respect for human
rights and religion.”129 He added “West would continue to conquer peoples” in order to
124
Martin Kuebler, “Turkey not fit for EU accession: Sarkozy,” DW-World.de
DeutcheWelle, February 26, 2011, http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,,14875593,00.html, accessed on March 31, 2011.
125
“Turkey’s EU Bid Overshadows Angela Merkel Visit,” BBC News, March 29, 2010,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8592170.stm accessed on May 1, 2011.
126
Bruno Waterfield, “EU president: Herman Van Rompuy opposes Turkey joining,” The
Telegraph,” November 19, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/6600570/EU-president-HermanVan-Rompuy-opposes-Turkey-joining.html, accessed on March 27, 2011.
127
Kuzmanovic, p. 56.
128
“Storm over Berlusconi ‘inferior Muslims’ remarks,” The Independent, September 27,
2001, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/storm-overberlusconi--inferior-muslims-remarks-670971.html, accessed on April 6, 2011.
129
Bruce Johnston, “Islam is Inferior, Says Berlusconi,” The Telegraph, September, 28,
2001, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/1357860/Islam-is-inferiorsays-Berlusconi.html
30
“extend to those who are 1,400 years behind the benefits that the West enjoys.”130
Paradoxically, Berlusconi later became an advocate of Turkish membership, even
suggesting the fast-tracking of Turkish membership.131 In 2006, in response to the
remarks that questioned Turkish membership, upon the murder of a Roman Catholic
priest in Trabzon, Turkey, he argued that EU membership of Turkey could not be
questioned, emphasizing the commitment to secularization and westernization, adding
that "the relationship between our two civilizations, the Western one and the Muslim one,
should be one of mutual respect and dialogue."132 This change of attitude was a
reflection of the improvement of the relationships between Italy and Turkey as well as the
progress Turkey achieved in harmonizing its laws with those of the EU.133
Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere assert that cultural “otherness” of Turkey
has been emphasized by some European observers, depicting “a variety of dichotomies
and problematic political relationships such as Muslim Turkey versus Christian Europe.”
134
They add that the supporters of Turkish membership offer Turkey “as a litmus test for
the compatibility of Islam and Western-style democracy.”135 They further suggest that
both the opponents and the supporters of Turkish membership utilize “the prejudiced
accessed on February 27, 2012.
130
Ibid.
131
“Italy wants to fast-track Turkey’s EU membership,” Euractiv, November 13, 2008,
available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/italy-wants-fast-track-turkey-eumembership/article-177146, accessed on May 5, 2011.
132
“Berlusconi: Turkey’s EU Membership Not in Question,” The New Anatolian,
February 8, 2006 available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/25676/berlusconiturkey-s-eu-membership-not-in-question.html accessed on February 27, 2012.
133
Ibid.
134
Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, “Turkey: European Dimensions and the Status
of Islam,” in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession,” Dietrich Jung, Catharina
Raudvere, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 4.
135
Ibid, p.5.
31
assumption that there is an inherent problem between Islam and the values and norms of
the European project.”136
From the European perspective, Turkish membership has been a controversial
issue from the very beginning. The clichéd argument that Turkey is “too big, too poor
and too different” to be a part of Europe has been presented over and over again by
various actors from the EU. The “too big” argument mainly refers to its growing Muslim
population (75 million at present), making the Europeans afraid that if admitted, Turkey,
would disturb the balances in the EU system in institutions like the European Parliament
or that its young majority population would resort to mass migration to European
countries, taking European jobs away. If Turkey were an EU member, it would be the
second most populous member state after Germany. Julio Crespo MacLenan argues that
with the current population growth rate, Turkey will become the most populous in the EU
within two decades.137 One of the European concerns regarding this issue is that as a
member Turkey would have more parliamentary seats and thus more votes than the major
powers in EU such as Germany and France.138 Needless to say, having a Muslim country
as the biggest member state, influencing policies was also a major concern with respect to
preservation of Western values that EU is founded on.139
The “too poor” argument is based on the belief that Turkish economy is not up to
the economic standards of the EU even though Turkey has been a long time member of
the Customs Union since 1996. This argument is also linked with the financial cost of
136
Ibid.
Julio Crespo MacLenan, “ The EU-Turkey Negotiations: Between the Siege of Vienna
and the Reconquest of Constantinople,” in Turkey’s Accession to the European Union:
An Unusual Candidacy, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, ed., (Berlin: Springer, 2009), p.24.
138
Ibid.
139
Ibid.
137
32
accession of a relatively poor and large Turkey to the EU.140 However, according to the
recent Eurostat figures the GDP per capita in Turkey has been higher than Bulgaria and
equal to or higher than the values for Romania between 2007 and 2010.141 If Turkey were
to immediately become an EU member, the value of its GDP per capita would be greater
than those for Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania at the time of their
membership entry.142 In addition, Turkey may “become one of the ten largest economies
by the year 2023.”143 According to United Nations Human Development Report of 2010,
Turkey is also categorized among the states with High Human Development Indexes
along with EU members Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, and candidate Croatia.144
The “too different” argument refers to the religious and cultural characteristics of
Turkish society, which is very much linked to argument on the lack of compatibility
between Islam and western values. This has constituted the premise for afore quoted
statements by Giscard d’Estaing, Van Rumpoy, Sarkozy, Merkel and Berlusconi. Kemal
Kirisci asserts that “the culturally too different” argument is a “polite code word for
opposing Turkish membership on the grounds that Turkey is not Christian and hence is
140
Kirsty Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” A
Friends of Europe Working Paper, European Policy Summit, June, 17, 2004, p. 18.
141
Eurostat, “GDP Per Capita, Consumption Per Capita and Comparative Price Levels,”
European Commission, December 2010, available at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita,_consum
ption_per_capita_and_comparative_price_levels#Main_statistical_findings, accessed on
September 13, 2011.
142
“EU Data Rules Out ‘Too Poor to Join’ Theory for Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, June 23,
2011, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-248204-eu-data-rules-out-toopoor-to-join-theory-for-turkey.html, accessed on September 13, 2011.
143
Ibid.
144
“Human Development Report 2010 The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human
Development,” United Nations Development Program, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
pp. 143-144.
33
not European and cannot actually become European.”145 This is one of the most popular
and most frequently used arguments by the anti-Turkish camp since “Islam has
consistently been one of the key arguments against Turkish membership.”146 Leaders of
the Christian Democrat Party have argued: “there was no place for a country like Turkey
in the EU.”147 Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen emphasize that the fact that Turkey
is not a religion-based state is constantly overlooked the membership debates.148
Jorgensen further argues that the “cultural factor” was introduced “as a key nodal point in
public and political discourse, while the previous accessions were “culture-free.”149
Mirela Bogdani also asserts that EU has been more concerned about religion and culture
rather than the fulfillment of the Criteria with Turkish accession boiled down to the
“question of accepting a Muslim, and culturally different, people into a Western club.”150
Oliver Roy concurs that the reason behind the skepticism in European public opinion
towards Turkey is “largely linked to it being a Muslim country.”151 Elizabeth Hurd takes
the argument suggesting that even if Turkey were to meet all the membership criteria, the
anti-membership attitudes in Europe will persist due to the cultural and religious aspects
of the Turkish case, “as it involves the potential accession of a Muslim-majority country
145
Kemal Kirisci, “Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish EU Membership,”
in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession,” Dietrich Jung, Catharina Raudvere,
eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 20.
146
LaGro and Jorgensen, p. 5.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid, p.6.
149
Knud Erik Jorgensen, “The Politics of Accession Negotiations,” in Turkey and the
European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, EsraLagro and Knud Erik
Jorgensen, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 11.
150
Bogdani, p. x.
151
Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004), p. 16.
34
to an arguable, at least historically, Christian Europe.”152 Luis Lugo, the director of the
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, during a 2005 debate titled
“Does Muslim Turkey Belong in Christian Europe?” argues that while the secular
Europeans are concerned that having a Muslim country in EU would threaten gender
equality and different life styles, the traditionalists in Europe believe that “Turkish
accession threatens the very idea of Europe as a Christian civilization.”153 Former
German chancellors Helmut Kohl and Helmut Schmidt, were also strong opponents of
Turkish membership who argued that Turkey “represented a different culture and
religion” and that “Turkey should be excluded from the EU due to its unsuitable
civilization,” respectively.154 Last but not least, Former Agricultural Commissioner Franz
Fischer asserts that Turkey is “far more Oriental than European.”155
In response to the “too different” argument, it is important to note that with its
modernization and development compass pointed to the West, Turkey has been a good
ally of the powerful western countries such as the United States and Great Britain. It has
played an important role in international projects such as being a founding member of
European Organization for Economic Cooperation (EOEC), which was the predecessor
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).156 It has also
been long-time member of organizations such as the NATO, the European Council, and
United Nations. Statements like the aforementioned ones fail to recognize the decades
152
Elizabeth Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and the Prospects for
Turkish Accession to the EU,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 32, no. 3, July 2006,
p. 409.
153
Bogdani, p. 70.
154
Ibid , p. 102.
155
Ibid.
156
Jung and Raudvere, “Turkey: European Dimensions and the Status of Islam,” pp. 1011.
35
long standing of Turkey as a powerful ally and a loyal member of various important
Western international organizations.
Theoretical Framework
Theories of Orientalism and postcolonialism are utilized in this dissertation.
Orientalism is used to explain the construction of the modern Turkish identity, how this
identity is represented internally, and how it is received by the national and European
audiences. It enables the elucidation of Europe’s historical and current perceptions of
Muslims, Islam and Turkish people. Postcolonialism facilitates the critiquing of the
systems of representation and the power relations active in aforementioned discourses
within the Turkish EU membership debates.
One of the contributions this dissertation hopes to make is to use new frameworks
for the discussion of international relations that include Edward Said’s critique of
Orientalism and representation as a form of power in the study of international issues and
postcolonial studies. This builds on Said’s critical work by examining the continuities
that exist between colonial and postcolonial experiences especially their systems of
representation. In addition, postcolonial studies is equally preoccupied with the study of
how categories like gender, race and ethnicities serve as markers of existing and changing
national, regional and global hierarchies.
Edward Said defines Orientalism as a “style of thought based upon an ontological
and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the
Occident.’”157 This distinction renders hegemonic superiority to the Occident and an
essentialist inherent inferiority to the Orient and the Oriental. Dominic Strinati defines
157
Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 2.
36
hegemony to be a system in which dominant groups “maintain their dominance by
securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate groups… through the negotiated
construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant
and dominated groups.”158 This hegemonic structure consisting of dominant and
subordinate groups that Strinati mentions are the backbone of Orientalist thinking.
The Orientalist system is one that utilizes the power of knowledge displayed in
form of dichotomous representations of the “self” and the “other.” According to Said,
Orientalism is
a collective notion of defining “us” Europeans as against all “those” nonEuropeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European
culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe:
the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the nonEuropean peoples and cultures…. Orientalism depends for its strategy on this
flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of
possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper
hand.159
Orientalism emerged out of the European fascination and obsession with the
Muslim Orient as an “other.” It reflected the “problematic European attitude towards
Islam.”160 The early Orientalists treated Islam as a threat and saw Orientalizing Muslims
as a practical means of dealing with this issue. Orientalists, saving Islam from its
‘strangeness’ and ‘hostility,’ were presenting the Islamic Orient as “a category denoting
the Orientalists’ power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as
history.”161
158
Dominic Strinati, Gramsci’s Political Though: An Introduction, (London: Lawrence
and Wilshart, 1991), p. 165.
159
Said, p. 7.
160
Ibid, p. 74.
161
Ibid, p. 87.
37
“Islam was militant hostility to European Christianity”162 and Orientalizing of
Islam and Muslims was a means of legitimizing the methods of dealing with this
hostility. Orientalism in its essence had nothing to do with the truth of the Orient, it
offered a representation of the Orient as constant, unchanging as part of a binary
opposition to the West.163 In Said’s words, “Orientalism overrode the Orient,”164 and the
Orient presented by the Orientalist was not “the Orient as it is, but Orient as it was
Orientalized.”165 The Orientalist was like “a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity,
alienation, and strangeness”166 which he had detected. Said makes reference to Abdel
Malek’s characterization of the master-slave relations within the Orientalized Orient, in
which Orientals are considered as a non-participant “object” of study that is inherently
othered and the “normal” man who is the point of reference is the European man,167 who
“unlike the Oriental is a true human being.”168 The Oriental other is stripped of all his
human characteristics and reduced to “a kind of human flatness” by the Orientalist.169
Orientalism has produced and reproduced knowledge related to the Orient on the basis
that the Orient is a radically peculiar object which is homogeneous and remains
unchanged. Orientalism in addition to dehumanizing the other culture sees the Orient as
an act that is frozen in time, only to be displayed over and over on the Western stage,
162
Ibid, p. 91.
Ibid, p. 98.
164
Ibid.
165
Ibid, p. 104.
166
Ibid, p.121.
167
Ibid, p. 97.
168
Ibid, p. 108.
169
Ibid, p. 150.
163
38
only for a Western audience.170 “The West is the spectator, the judge and jury of every
facet of Orientalist behavior.171”
While, Orientalism in its initial stages emerged in form of fascination with Islam
and other cultures that were categorized as Oriental,172 this fascination was later replaced
by an attitude of degradation that viewed the Orient as “under-humanized,
antidemocratic, backward, barbaric, and so forth.” 173 The Orient became stereotyped as a
homogeneous collective identity that was under intellectual domination of the West.174
The Orientalist belittles and looks down on the Orient, presenting himself as a brave
scientist who should be recognized and commanded for having unselfishly “uncovered,
brought to light, rescued” a great amount of obscure matter for his students to examine.175
All his assumptions are based on the system of representations that are founded on the
belief in “Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”176
This representation of European “positional superiority” is the basis for
Orientalist thinking. The Orientalist perceives and represents the Oriental as the inferior,
backward, uncivilized, irrational, depraved, childlike, different ‘other’ while the
European Orientalist, is the superior, civilized, rational, mature and “normal.”177 This
positional superiority is what gives Europeans the position of power that enables them to
decide the level of “Europeanness” of non-European countries, to bestow a role model
status to Turkey, etc. From the Turkish perspective, the acceptance of this same superior
170
Ibid, p. 108.
Ibid, p. 109.
172
Ibid, p. 150.
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid, p. 152.
175
Ibid, p.127.
176
Ibid, p. 42.
177
Ibid, p. 40.
171
39
position of Europe is displayed through a constant struggle for European approval
through membership in the European club.
Said explains that the Orientalist transforms the Oriental from one form to another
as he sees fit. He may do this because of his self-interest, to protect his culture or for the
sake of the Oriental, in some cases. This systematic conversion process is supported by
the dissemination of knowledge-based representations to reinforce the domination of the
political and cultural norms of the West.178 This leads to another important point related
to the Turkish EU discourse. As the EU reshapes and redefines the ‘otherness’ of
Turkey, it also transforms its stand on secularism, with some of its prominent leaders
couching the anti-Turkish argument based on religion, challenging the very foundations
of European secularism. This offers another example of how the implication of the
Orientalist discourse in which EU acts like an Orientalist who controls it all and holds the
authority to even go against the unquestionable Western values such as secularism which
it imposes on the Oriental. Since the EU is the representative of the superior West, it has
the right to manipulate and change the rules of the game to fit its particular needs and
wishes for its own sake or for the sake of the Oriental.
The foundations of Orientalist thinking date back to colonialist mentality. Said
argues that the Orient is where Europe’s oldest colonies are located and the basic images
of the other are founded.179 Said states that Orientalism is very much intertwined with the
idea of Europe defined by Denys Hay, since it is “a collective identifying ‘us’ Europeans
against all ‘those’ non-Europeans” based on the “idea of European identity as a superior
178
179
Ibid, pp. 67-68.
Ibid, p.1.
40
one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures.”180 The hegemonic
European superiority over the backwardness of the Oriental is constantly reiterated.181
This process continues without any glitches, due to the fact that Orientalism is based on a
system of exteriority in which the Orientalist enables the Oriental to speak to the West
with no interest or concern for the Orient, leaving the Orientalist outside the Orient
existentially and morally.182 From this perspective the Oriental could even be expected to
be grateful for the Orientalist for sharing “information” about him with the rest of the
World. Based on this Said argues that Orientalism is especially important as a form of
European-Atlantic power over the Orient.183
The colonialist narrative which inspired Orientalism was based on this idea that
the colonized people were inherently inferior, uncivilized, barbaric and backwards. The
colonialists actually believed that they were doing the poor uncivilized colonized people
a favor by ruling them, since they were incapable of ruling themselves. Said states that
the category of knowledge of the Orient which emerged at the end of eighteenth century
under the hegemony of the West, was a means of “reconstructing the colonial office”
among other things.184
The Orientalist system is one based on exteriority. The Orientalist, as the
intelligent outsider is the sole speaker and the Oriental has absolutely no voice.185 In our
case, the non-Westerner does not have a say in how he or she is labeled and is unable to
act without the approval of the West. The Orientalist’s only concern for the Orient is
180
Ibid, p.7.
Ibid.
182
Ibid, p.21.
183
Ibid, p. 6.
184
Ibid, p. 7.
185
Ibid, p.23.
181
41
what he sees and interprets for his audience. There is no concern for what the truth or the
reality of the Oriental is.
Said argues that Orientalism is a kind of “intellectual power,” a systematic
collection of information that archives ideas and values that explain Oriental behavior,
enabling the Europeans to study this phenomenon.186 As far as the Orientalist is
concerned, the Oriental is “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’; thus the
European is rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal.’”187 Orientalists initially point to the
contradicting differences between their culture and the Oriental culture and then call on
the West “to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and
accommodating power) the Other.”188 The Orient was crafted, processed and produced
thanks to the efforts of the Orientalist. The Orientalist’s rescuing the Orient and
presenting it to the Occident brought the Orient closer to Europe, where it was consumed
in its entirety, freed from its shortcomings.189 The Orient initially needed “to be known,
then invaded and possessed, then re-created” by the Orientalists.190 Said argues that
Orientalism needs to be viewed as “a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern
over the Orient,” which has transformed into an imperial institution from its initial state
as a scholarly discourse.191All of these arguments of Orientalism help explain the logic
behind the Western projects such as developmental projects, modernization and
secularization, which were imposed on the non-Western world.
186
Ibid, pp.41-42.
Ibid, p. 40.
188
Ibid, p. 48.
189
Ibid, p. 87.
190
Ibid, p. 92.
191
Ibid, p. 95.
187
42
Orientalists took pride in trying to teach concepts such as “liberty” and
“propriety” to Muslims who were viewed as a “cult that was civilization’s enemy,”192 by
early Orientalists, long before Huntington. The Orientalists believed that these were
concepts Muslims were completely ignorant about,193 since they were lazy, futureless,
capricious and shamelessly passionate.194 The Orientalist mentality was closely linked to
that of the colonizers since they believed that “a Western conquest of the Orient was not
conquest after all, but liberty,” and that the Orientals needed constantly to be under the
rule of conquerors, who would “do heavenly justice.”195 The Orientalists argue that just
like the colonized others the Orientals should be grateful to the Europeans who care
enough to study them and show them what civilization is. They are the masters of
Oriental knowledge who inform and contribute to the “voice of European ambition for
rule over the Orient.”196According to Said, the Orientalist could celebrate his success like
a “secular creator” after “having transported the Orient into modernity.”197The Western
intellectual occupation of the Orient starting from 1880s has transformed into a process
of production of controlled knowledge, which constantly reproduced itself.198
At the outset of his discussion in Orientalism, Said submits that international
relations is a Eurocentric field by definition. Power, which is the major concern in
international relations, is classically defined in terms of military, economic and political
terms within conventional international relations. Said utilizes a Foucauldian approach as
192
Ibid, p. 172.
Ibid.
194
Ibid, p. 178.
195
Ibid, p. 172.
196
Ibid, p.196.
197
Ibid, p. 172.
198
Ibid, p. 197.
193
43
he discusses the contribution of power in the production of knowledge as he presents the
arguments that underline the power of representation practiced by the Orientalists. From
this perspective, the controller of the power of knowledge is in control of everything.
Foucauldian insight that knowledge is profoundly connected by power as well as the
concept of discourse is utilized by Said in Orientalism to reorganize the study of
colonialism.199 Said borrows the Foucauldian notion of discourse in his discussion of
Orientalism as he explains: “Orientalism was a discourse about the non-West in which
issues of power were inextricable from those of knowledge.”200
Said is critical of Orientalism for its essentialist manner of defining the Orient and
the Occident, placing them outside of history. He is also critical of the fact that
Orientalism is premised on assumptions and definitions that the Occident has about itselfbased on its superiority, and what it thinks of the Orient- based on its inferiority. As Said
critiqued Orientalist behavior, there were a number of critics of Said who presented
arguments Orientalism.
Bernard Lewis is one of the strongest opponents of Said’s arguments in
Orientalism. Lewis argues that the works of the Orientalists who shared their experience
should be valued since there are no primary sources produced by Oriental scholars or
those who are “anti-Orientalists.”201 After accusing Said of distorting202 the historical
and philosophical contexts of various areas in the field and limiting the scope of
199
AniaLoomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 42.
Krishna, p.75.
201
Bernard Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” The New York Review of Books, June
24, 1982, p. 51
202
Ibid, p. 53.
200
44
Orientalism, he questions the scholarly quality of some of Said’s arguments.203 Lewis
completes his critique by accusing Said of racism and accusing him of making peculiarly
inaccurate statements.204
Basim Musallam starts out by criticizing Said for generalizing Europeans and for
not having deconstructed the Orientalist representations by presenting evidence
disproving them.205 He gives credit to Said, for producing “the most powerful radical and
complete statement” response to Orientalists.206 After arguing that Said’s perspective is
limited due to his personal experience related to his Palestinian Arabic heritage,207 he
commends Said for his arguments that Orientalism is an imperialist tradition.208 In
conclusion, he asserts that Orientalism gives too much importance and emphasis to
Orientalists that it fails to realize that struggle against Orientalism does not mean
combating colonialism or imperialism.209
Sadiq Jalal al-‘Azm a Marxist critic of Said starts by arguing that Said attempts to
reveal the link between Cultural-Academic Orientalism to Institutional Orientalism. Al‘Azm defines Institutional Orientalism as European expansion through a combination of
theory, ideology, practice, beliefs, images, literature, assumptions, rationalizations, as
well as political and economic interests.210 He objects to Said’s argument which links the
origins of Orientalism to historic figures such as Homer and Dante, arguing that
203
Ibid, p. 51.
Ibid, p. 54.
205
Basim Musallam, “Power and Knowledge,” Merip Reports, 1979, Issue: 79, p. 20.
206
Ibid.
207
Ibid.
208
Ibid, p. 22.
209
Ibid, p. 26.
210
Sadiq Jalal al-‘Azm, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” in Orientalism: A
Reader, Alexander Lyon Macfie, ed., (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p.
349.
204
45
Orientalism is a relatively new concept, accusing Said of being essentialist211 and
ahistorical.212 Al-‘Azm is extremely critical of Said’s discussion of Marx. Ironically, he
attempts to explain that Marx’s comments about the Indians colonized by the British
were influenced by many factors such as the representations and generalizations,213 which
had nothing to do with Orientalism.214 Al-‘Azm labels Said’s definition of Orientalism as
an ahistorical, antihuman and anti-historical doctrine of “Ontological Orientalism.”215 It
is “the foundation of the image created by modern Europe of the Orient.”216 He argues
that “Orientalism in Reverse”217 is the belief in the ontological superiority of the
Orientals, concluding that Orientalism in Reverse is as reactionary, ahistorical, antihuman as Orientalism.218
Zackary Lockman explains that according to Said Orientalism was a discourse in
the Foucauldian sense which studies the Orient based on specific premises, rules and
claims to truth.219 He adds that “Orientalism as a form of knowledge simultaneously
produced by, and perpetuated, certain power relations, in this case power which Western
states and authoritative individuals exercised (or sought to exercise) over the Orient.”220
Lockman explains that Said makes reference to the emergence of Orientalism as a
coherent discourse consisting of a powerful and durable system of Western knowledge on
211
Ibid, p. 352.
Ibid, p. 351.
213
Ibid, p. 361.
214
Ibid, p. 362.
215
Ibid, p. 367.
216
Ibid, p. 366.
217
Ibid, p. 367.
218
Ibid, p. 376.
219
Zackary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of
Orientalism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 186.
220
Ibid.
212
46
the Orient that did not have much to do with the realities of the Orient.221 In the
conclusion of the discussion on Orientalism, Lockman explains that Orientalism
constituted the foundation of postcolonial theory in the 1980s.222 Said wanted
Orientalism to enable accommodation of a new way of conceptualizing the side effects of
war, hostility and imperial practices.223
Said’s Orientalism set the basis for postcolonial theory as it presented a
controversial critique of European imperialism drawing attention to “how the concepts of
knowledge and power relate to the imperial enterprise of the ‘Orient’.”224 Orientalism
helps explain the basis for the misperceptions and representations that are still active
between the countries, which are classified as the West, the developed countries, super
powers, etc. However, postcolonial theory enables further elucidation of the recently
emerged representations as well the various power relations that are active in the existing
world system and the discourses that have contributed to its development.
There is almost a unanimous consensus that Edward Said’s Orientalism
constitutes a canonical text to the field of postcolonial theory. Sankaran Krishna asserts
that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak can be listed along with Said and Homi Bhabha as
members of the “indispensable troika of postcolonial theorists.”225 Geeta Chowdhry and
Sheila Nair also consider Albert Memni and Franz Fannon to be among the forerunners
who have influenced the field of postcolonialism together with Edward Said.226 They
221
Ibid, p. 188.
Ibid, p. 210.
223
Ibid, p. 213.
224
Chowdhry and Nair, p.12.
225
Sankaran Krishna, Globalization &Postcolonialism Hegemony and Resistance in the
Twenty-first Century, (Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield, 2009), p. 98.
226
Chowdhry and Nair, p.12.
222
47
assert that Edward Said’s Orientalism set the pace for postcolonial theory as it presented
a controversial critique of European imperialism drawing attention to “how the concepts
of knowledge and power relate to the imperial enterprise of the ‘Orient’.227” Leela
Gandhi, agrees that Orientalism was the initial phase of postcolonial theory.228 Gayatri
Spivak labels it as “the founding text” which enabled “marginality” to be perceived as a
discipline among Western academia, enabling the people who have been labeled as
“marginal” to speak.229Ania Loomba argues that Orientalism inaugurated a totally new
perspective in the study of colonialism.230
Chowdhry and Nair argue that “by focusing on the political production of
knowledge, and the dialectical relationship between knowledge production about the nonWestern world and Western colonial ventures, Said has demonstrated the centrality of
racialized knowledge in the spread and maintenance of imperialism.”231 They also add
that Said’s Foucaldian and Gramscian inspirations in his interpretations have yielded
different results within postcolonial theory.232
Postcolonial studies as a critical international relations field emerged upon the
inability of conventional international relations theories in addressing and explaining “the
situation of the Third World- the injuries done to it through conquest and colonialism and
the justice of its demands.”233 Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney argue that the
field of international relations lacks the ability and the necessary resources to explain
227
Ibid, p.12.
Gandhi, p. 64.
229
Ibid, p.65.
230
Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 43.
231
Chowdhry and Nair, p.12.
232
Ibid, p.13.
233
Naeem Inayatullah, David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of
Difference, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.1.
228
48
how economic and political competition leads to a culture that looks down on nonWestern lives.234 This may help explain the Eurocentric nature of the field. They argue
that both conventional neorealist and neoliberal theories of international relations
overlook the fact that the existing international system produces a competition of cultures
that utilize principles such as sovereignty and self interest to justify the inequalities and
subjugate the non-Western people.235 After criticizing classical theories for the ignoring
the need for a confrontation of colonialism,236 they also highlight that cultural
differentiation has produced relations of domination and subordination.237
A glossary listing of “postcolonialism” defines it as “an interdisciplinary
perspective that encompasses economic, political, social and cultural aspects of
decolonization and afterwards, highlighting the importance of race, gender and ethnicity
in understanding anticolonial struggles.”238 Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair argue that
power politics and security as the main foci of conventional international relations
theories naturalize the existing hierarchies and therefore continue to reproduce the status
quo.239 These hierarchies enable the continuity of colonial practices at national and
international levels. The classical theories connect the intersections between national and
international levels of power. Very specifically, they reproduce and update existing
representations that in turn strengthen the power of the West. The non-Western world is
234
Ibid, p.2.
Ibid.
236
Ibid.
237
Ibid, p. 8.
238
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, (New York:
Longman, 2009), p. 471.
239
Geeta Chowdhry, and Sheila Nair, “Introduction Power in a postcolonial world: race,
gender and class in International Relations,” in Power Postcolonialism and International
Relations,” Geeta Chowdhry, Sheila Nair, eds., (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.1.
235
49
constantly judged and evaluated in comparison to Western standards and values without
any consideration of the differences in specific historical, social, economic, political, and
cultural circumstances. Postcolonial studies offer a different perspective that allows the
exploration of concerns related to areas such as race, gender and class,240 the discussion
of which is very important in deconstructing various hierarchies and explaining various
power relations. Although postcolonial theory “offers a unique insight not found in
conventional or critical IR,” there still is a lot of controversy around the name
“postcolonial” as well as the exact definition of the term.241
Jane Hiddlestone explains that ‘anti-colonialism’ refers to the collection of
various resistance movements against colonialism, while ‘postcolonialism’ offers an
ongoing explanation of the multilayered effects of colonial rule.242 Chowdhry and Nair
further assert that “postcolonial” does not indicate the end of colonial era, but it reflects
the continuous persistence of practices and implications of colonialism together with the
limits and extent of danger it presents at the present. They argue that therefore the
postcolonial “provides insight into the ways in which the imperial juncture is implicated
in the construction of contemporary relations of power, hierarchy and domination.”243 In
other words, postcolonial signifies the continuity and persistence of the practices of
colonization together with their ongoing implications. These implications include the
Western attitudes towards the non-Western world as well as the evolving representations
that see the latter as subordinate. Some postcolonial studies focus on intellectual
240
Ibid.
L. H. M. Ling, “Cultural Chauvinism and the Asian Crisis,” in Power Postcolonialism
and International Relations,” GeetaChowdhry, Sheila Nair, eds., (New York:’
Routledge, 2004), p.137.
242
Jane Hiddleston, Understanding Postcolonialism,” (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009), p. 1.
243
Chowdhry and Nair, p.12.
241
50
colonization where a collection of dominant and subordinate attitudes still continues at a
variety of levels with the representations of everything Western as the norm and defining
the non-Western counterparts as binary oppositions. The result yields an international
discourse that presents a dominant West over a subordinate non-West. Chandra Talpade
Mohanty, and Gayatri Chakravorty argue that Western hegemony is maintained through
dichotomous representations of the West and the East, self and the other that essentialize
identity and difference. They discuss the relationship of Western representation and
knowledge with Western political power and material power, emphasizing how they are
supported by constructions of race, gender and class.244 They conclude there is a need to
analyze the relationship between power and the problem of representation as well as the
gendered and racialized implications.245
Leela Gandhi also highlights the fact that the colonial past has been ignored by
the scholars in the West. She reminds that Orientalism “argues that in order to fully
understand the emergence of the ‘West’ as a structure and a system that we have also to
recognize that the colonized ‘Orient’ has helped to define Europe as its contrasting
image, idea, personality, experience.”246 She asserts that “if postcoloniality can be
described as a condition troubled by the consequences of a self-willed historical amnesia,
then the theoretical value of postcolonialism inheres, in part, in its ability to elaborate the
forgotten memories of this condition.”247 She adds that according to Homi Bhabha
“memory is the necessary and sometimes hazardous bridge between colonialism and the
244
Ibid, p.15.
Ibid, p.16.
246
Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory A Critical Introduction,” (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), p. 73.
247
Ibid, pp.7-8.
245
51
question of cultural identity.”248 Based on this logic, Gandhi concludes that postcolonial
theory evolves into a process of “historical and psychological ‘recovery.’”249 What is
being recovered is the continuing impact of colonialism, which has been ignored by the
existing conventional works. This is among the many factors, which make the field
controversial, as it challenges the existing power hierarchies. Shampa Biswas argues that
while discussing the “representative devices that produce hierarchies” it is important to
keep in perspective “the material and structural bases of international power.”250
Robert Young views postcolonialism as “the political, cultural, economic, and
intellectual resistance of people in the third world to Western domination.”251 Young
argues that the classifications of Western and non-Western are “dialectically related” and
“mutually constitutive” entities.252 The final part of Young’s statement sheds more light
on the evolved logic of Orientalist dichotomous representation process. From the
perspective of a Said’ian analysis, the West defines itself through the definition of the
‘non-Western other’ who represents every negative attribute that is the binary opposition
of every positive characteristic of the West. Naturally, as these definitions are
disseminated and become prevalent in the non-Western societies, the West’s powerful
position is reinforced. Ania Loomba explains that the dichotomy between Europe and its
‘others,’ simultaneously laid the foundation for the creation of the European culture while
also enabling the preservation and spread of European hegemony over the lands of the
248
Ibid, p. 9.
Ibid, p.8.
250
Shampa Biswas, “Secularism and Orientalism in IR,” in Power Postcolonialism and
International Relations,” Geeta Chowdhry, Sheila Nair, eds., (New York: Routledge,
2004), p.201.
251
Gandhi, p.67.
252
Ibid, p. 69.
249
52
others.253 She also adds that Said wanted to delineate how ‘knowledge’ related to nonEuropean others was utilized as a systematic means of maintaining power over them,
demystifying the status of “knowledge,” causing the distinctions between ideology and
objectiveness gradually disappear.254
Sankaran Krishna argues that postcolonialism’s sensitivity to cultural domination
is among its very significant aspects. He argues that Eurocentrism in form of Western
domination of the production of knowledge and culture in the world is a lasting
complication of colonialism adding that postcolonialism suggests that the reversal of the
economic domination of the West is related to cultural decolonization.255 Based on this
argument, he submits that poscolonialism is a “discursive or theoretical standpoint that
opposes Eurocentrism in all its forms, not just when deployed by a geographically
demarcated West upon a non-West.”256 When this argument is applied to the Turkish
case, postcolonial theory is utilized in explaining how Eurocentrism was applied by the
Kemalist elite in Turkey as a means of convincing the masses of their inferiority to the
West represented by Europe and as a means of “Europeanizing” and therefore
modernizing the country by imposing the Eurocentric model from the top. Vilay Mishra
and Bob Hodge observe that just like the colonial and postcolonial experiences in settler
and non-settler countries, postcolonialism, as a category is not homogeneous across all
253
Loomba, p. 43.
Ibid.
255
Krishna, 64.
256
Ibid, p.4.
254
53
postcolonial societies.257 The Turkish experience of modernization and westernization
also need to be evaluated under the light of this argument.
Krishna also emphasizes the fact that the neoliberal model introduced by the West
and imposed on the non-Western world as the only possible choice for development has
had major side effects that have led to increasing resistance in societies all over the
world. According to Krishna, postcolonial thought challenges the side effects of
modernization, development and globalization.258 The West-centric concept of
modernization which is linked with a process of industrialization, secularization,
establishment of neoliberal democracies with free capitalist markets, etc., has been and
continues to be imposed on the underdeveloped and developing world in an Orientalist
manner with the hope and promise that they can eventually take their place among the
developed and civilized nations. Although Turkey has never been “technically”
colonized, it has been under the physical and mental influence of the many social,
economic and political models that were imposed by the West. The arguments presented
by Krishna are extremely valuable in understanding the logical framework behind the
establishment of the new Turkish national identity through the absolute belief in the
superiority of the West and internalization of self-inferiority, trying diligently to produce
a Turkish replica of the superior identity.
There are also criticisms towards the arguments presented by postcolonial
theorists. According to Gandhi, “anti-postcolonial criticism repeatedly foregrounds the
irresolvable dichotomy between the woolly deconstructive predicament of postcolonial
257
Vilay Mishra, Bob Hodge, “What is Post(-)colonialism?” in Colonial Discourse and
Post-colonial Theory A Reader, Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 288-289.
258
Krishna, p. 4.
54
intellectuals and the social and economic predicament of those whose lives are on the
margins of metropolis.”259 Ania Loomba expresses that the basic criticism argues that
postcolonial theory and postcolonial critique are insufficient for understanding and
fostering change because they are both a product of post-modernism.260
Aijaz Ahmad and Arif Dirlik, in their Marxian critique denounce postcolonial
theory as “commodification of otherness” as they argue that postcolonialist theory
obfuscates particular material conditions through its focus on culture.261 They argue that
postcolonial theorists obfuscate the repressive practices they oppose by overlooking the
reality of global capitalism.262 They also vigorously criticize postcolonialist theorists for
having disregarded Marxist principles critical of the inequalities between the West and
the non-Western World and promoting Foucauldian considerations for “discursive truth
regimes and representations.”263
Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that from an intolerant stand postcoloniality can
be perceived as a condition of “comprador intelligentsia,” by which he refers to a small
group of writers with Western education who try to mediate the cultural assets of global
capitalism in the periphery.264 They offer their Africa to the West and present their West
259
Gandhi, p.56.
Loomba, p. 204.
261
Hiddleston, p. 183.
262
Ibid.
263
Chowdhry and Nair, pp. 21-22.
264
Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Is The Post in Postmodernism The Post in
Postcolonialism?”, in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, Padmini Mognia,
ed., (London: Arnold, 1996), pp. 62-63.
260
55
to their African compatriots with whom they had invented an Africa to be offered in the
first place265.
According to Gandhi, Aijaz Ahmed’s polemic is particularly opposed to
postcolonialism’s preoccupation with the formation of subjectivities.266 Arif Dirlik asserts
that postcolonialism is a product of postmodernism, which emerged only after academic
intellectuals from the Third World started to come out as cultural critics.267 Dirlik
explains that postcolonial theory is appealing because it unveils the existing power
relations that can consolidate and contain resistance possibilities.268 He asserts that even
though postcolonial critics produce valid criticisms of ideological hegemonies of the past,
they fail to address the current cases. He argues that this is due to their perception of
problems of subjectivity to be material problems of daily life.269 However, Dirlik
asserts, that no practice of resistance can succeed without the realization that capital is the
main actor that structures the World.270 He accuses postcolonial critics of conceptual
disorganization regarding the colonial past that has limited colonialism to local logic,
rendering the continuing historical colonial legacy irrelevant.271 He concludes by taking
Appiah’s argument to another level as he adds; “postcoloniality is the condition of the
intelligentsia of global capitalism.”272 He explains that the issue is not whether this global
intelligentsia should reprioritize their national allegiances; it is whether they can go
265
Ibid.
Gandhi, p.56.
267
Loomba, p. 205.
268
Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global
Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter, 1994), p.355-356.
269
Ibid, p. 356.
270
Ibid.
271
Ibid.
272
Loomba, p. 206.
266
56
through a process of self-criticism and challenge their own class-position within the
existing global capitalist system of which they are a product.273
According to Gandhi, both Ahmed and Dirlik’s objections emerge from the
acknowledgement of a “radical split between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ realm of
human/social experience.274” Both critics support the view that ‘feelings’ should be kept
out of the public realm due to their ‘inwardness’.275 Gandhi asserts that according to their
analysis “it is the intellectual work and content of postcolonialism which comes to
occupy the space, and thereby earn the stigma conventionally reserved for the luxury of
‘feeling’.”276 Arif Dirlik defends the idea that the actors of postcolonial theory are the
elite of the third world who have come to the West, and postcolonialism which is limited
to their views, is far from being a global phenomenon.277 Aijaz Ahmad’s argument, as
summarized by Gandhi complements those presented by Dirlik. He argues that the
intellectuals of postcolonial theory are simply “ ‘radicalized immigrants located in the
metropolitan university,’ who are uniformly marked by a ‘combination of class origin,
professional ambition, and a lack of prior political grounding in social praxis.”278
Sankaran Krishna, in his detailed discussion on the critics of postcolonial theory,
submits that they argue: “the emphasis on the history of colonialism and
underdevelopment as explanations of third world poverty is misplaced, and suggests that
free markets, scientific rationality, and individualist ideology in the rise of the West were
273
Dirlik, p.356.
Gandhi, p. 57.
275
Ibid.
276
Ibid, pp. 57- 58.
277
Ibid, p. 58.
278
Ibid.
274
57
more important.”279 Most of the critiques of postcolonial studies mentioned by Krishna
are of Marxist or materialist nature and perceive postcolonialism “as an ideational
derivative of the materiality of neoliberal globalization at the present time.”280 There are
also others such as David Scott who argues that postcolonial theory is no longer relevant
or accuses indigenous theorists who criticize postcolonial theory for being more
“attentive to metropolitan theory” and less concerned for indigenous rights.281
In response to the critiques, Ania Loomba reminds that strategies of inclusion and
exclusion always operate together and cultural differences have set the basis for “past and
present geo-political tensions and rivalries.”282 As the discussion about Orientalism
reemphasizes, countries with traditions, societies, cultures that are ‘different’ from the
West are incommensurable with the Western world.283 Loomba asserts that at a time
when people have multilayered global identities, postcolonial studies is the field of study
that has studied and revealed the relationship between cultural forms and geopolitics and
therefore concludes that the role of postcolonial scholarship in making these links visible
has become more important than ever.284
An analytical hybrid of social constructivism for method and postcolonial theory
for an interpretation of politics, postcolonial IR reconciles these apparent
paradoxes of power and rationality, capital and civilization, hegemony and
development.285
279
Krishna, p. 105.
Ibid, p. 119.
281
Ibid, p. 130.
282
Loomba, p. 211.
283
Ibid, pp. 217- 218.
284
Ibid, p. 218.
285
L.H.M. Ling, p.116.
280
58
[I]nternational Relations reflects a collectivity or intersubjectivity of agentstructure relations (in constructivist terms) that sustain and reflect multiple
identities and subjectivities (in postcolonial terms).286
Constructionism “is the idea that most sociopolitical phenomena are constructed
by human social interaction and the resultant shared understandings of their value and
meaning, as opposed to being naturally occurring.”287 The term “constructivism” was
coined by Nicholas Onuf in his famous 1989 book, The World of Making.
Constructivism is aimed at explaining and theorizing about the process of construction,
within the framework of agent-structure relations.288 Constructivism can be viewed as “a
constructive response to the challenge of the ‘post’ movement,” as it “maintains that the
sociopolitical world is constructed by human practice, and seeks to explain how this
construction takes place.”289 Constructivist analysis is premised on the belief that political
actors and institutions exist within communities of meaning such as norms, shared values,
cultures, etc. that are constructed which have relations with one another. 290
Constructivist thought with its variations, examines how social facts are constructed and
their effects on world politics. 291
While constructivism is a social theory concerned with agent-structure relations, it
is not a substantive theory and therefore scholars have to circumscribe the principal
286
Ibid.
Daniel M. Green, “Constructivist Comparative Politics: Foundations and Framework,”
in Constructivism and Comparative Politics, Daniel M. Green, ed., (New York: M.E.
Sharpe, 2002), pp. 6-7.
288
Ibid, p. 7.
289
Vendulka Kubálková, Nicolas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, “Construcing Constructivism,”
in International Relations in a Constructed World, Vendulka Kubálková, Nicolas Onuf,
and Paul Kowert, eds., (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 20. (cited in Green, p. 15)
290
Green, backcover.
291
Vincent Poliot, “The Essence of Constructivism,” Journal of International Relations
and Development, (2004) vol. 7, p. 320.
287
59
actors, their interests and capacities, as well as the content of normative structures to
produce substantive claims.292 Constructivism draws from existing sociological theory to
display the means of how social science could enable delineating the significance of
identity and norms within world politics.293 Constructivists draw from various theories
like organizational theory and discourse analysis and important thinkers like Michel
Foucault.294 Constructivism focuses on human consciousness and its functions in the
international arena.295 Alexander Wendt argues that idealism and holism constitute the
core of constructivism, which is suggested in the commitment to human consciousness.296
Constructivists have made very important contributions to the discussion of power in
international relations. In constructivist framework, “the effects of power go beyond the
ability to change behavior.”297 The concept of power also entails how knowledge,
establishing the contents of the definitions, and the construction of identities appropriate
differential rewards and capacities.298 According to constructivist thinking “knowledge
shapes how actors interpret and construct their social reality.”299
Postcolonial theory together with some constructivist arguments, helps delineate
how the modernization process was received by the Turkish political elite and how it was
292
Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations, Fifth Edition, John Baylis, Steve Smith and
Patricia Owens, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 154.
293
Ibid.
294
Ibid.
295
John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in
Multilateralism Matters, John Gerard Ruggie, ed., (New York: Columbia University
Press), p. 856 (cited by Barnett, p. 155).
296
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
297
Barnett, p. 157.
298
Ibid.
299
Ibid, p. 159.
60
imposed on the population in form of republican principles and revolutions that intended
to regulate every aspect of the citizens’ lives. The theories enable the deconstruction of
the power relations between various actors and the importance of knowledge as a form of
power. The Kemalist reforms were imposed on the people under various ideals of which
westernization and secularization were the most prevalent. Postcolonial theory also offers
the tools that can be utilized to deconstruct the evolving power relations between Europe
and Turkey, between Turkey and other actors in the region, and in between the various
actors within Turkey.
Methodology
The research methodology employed in this study uses a qualitative approach.
Qualitative research tries to explain the reasons behind the formation of certain events,
ideas, identities, attitudes, behavior, etc. Qualitative research consists of “both micro- and
macro analyses drawing on historical, comparative, structural, observational, and
interactional ways of knowing.”300 It enables the researcher to question a vast range of
social issues and develop theories that are descriptive and explanatory.301 The primary
concern of qualitative research is the process of how and why something happens a
certain way. It is both descriptive and interpretive.302 In qualitative research, the
researcher studies the “process, meaning, and understanding gained through words and
pictures.”303 From this perspective qualitative research can further be defined as “a form
300
Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, “Distinguishing Qualitative
Research,” in Approaches to Qualitative Research, Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and
Patricia Leavy eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.1
301
Ibid, p. 13.
302
John W. Creswell, Research Design, Qualitative & Quantitative Approaches (CA:
SAGE Publications Inc., 1994), p. 147.
303
Ibid, p. 145.
61
of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning.”304 Therefore, qualitative researchers
“study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret,
phenomena, in terms of the meanings people bring to them.”305
This research analyzes the power relations that are active within the Turkish EU
membership debates, focusing on the role model status of Turkey. The explicit and
implicit definitions of hierarchy reflected in the construction of the systems of
representation where the EU exercises power over Turkey through dictating the terms of
the debate are analyzed. It also probes the reasons behind the Turkish acceptance and
internalization of West’s and Europe’s powerful position and the related representations
through scrutinizing the historical formation of Turkish national identity. This is done
through an analytic discussion of the processes and the discourses of modernization,
secularization and westernization. The theories of Orientalism and postcolonialism are
utilized in unraveling the systems of representation that are active through these
processes and in the creation of the power hierarchies.
The research data is gathered from various English and Turkish primary and
secondary sources. These sources include books, academic articles, official EU
documents that are open to public, official documents that are published by the Turkish
government, master theses and dissertations, national and international official surveys
and reports as well as those that are administered by non-governmental organizations,
visual materials and newspaper articles. There is a plethora of academics studies –
304
Gary D. Shank, Qualitative Research. A Personal Skills Approach, (New Jersey:
Merrill Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 5.
305
Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of
Qualitative Research” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, Norman K. Denzin and
Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p.3.
62
including field research – published on the Turkish EU membership journey that discuss
a variety of aspects of the process. Works by Dietrich Jung, Beril Dedeoglu, Hakan
Yilmaz, Kemal Kirisci, Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Nilufer Gole, Ihsan Dagi, Ozlem Terzi,
Umit Cizre, Nathalie Tocci, Cengiz Aktar, Fuat Keyman, Omer Taspinar, Beyza C. Tekin
have contributed to the vast literature on Turkish-EU relations. Academic journal articles
from Turkish political and international relations studies, European studies, European
Union studies, as well as Middle East studies have also contributed to the literature. I will
also examine the official EU documents including the EU Commission’s progress
reports, official statements published by other EU institutions, results of Eurobarometer
surveys, World Values Surveys, etc. Official Turkish state documents include all the EU
harmonization packages that have passed through the Turkish National Assembly, all the
documents produced by the newly established EU Ministry and its predecessor EU
General Secretariat as well as official statements made by the President, the Prime
Minister and EU Minister. Reports, studies and surveys by Turkish nongovernmental
organizations such as Economic Development Foundation, Economic Policy Research
Foundation of Turkey, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, etc. and international organizations
such as Center for European Policy Studies, European Policy Center, etc.
Newspaper articles written by important columnists, visual materials including
television interviews and news footages, cartoons, pictures, posters and billboard images
are among the secondary sources. Sources from print media will be utilized rigorously
63
since they constitute “rich sources of data for research in the social sciences.”306 Some of
the material is obtained through the utilization of the World Wide Web.
Analyzing the Data
Analysis of data is an activity that is implemented simultaneously with “data
collection, data interpretation and narrative reporting writing.”307 This research employs
the following techniques to examine the data derived from the sources: (1) longitudinal
historical analysis, and (2) critical discourse analysis.
Longitudinal historical analysis is employed in the analysis of the project of Turkish
modernization. The start of the Turkish modernization project in form of westernization
and a unique understanding of secularism dates back to the days of the Ottoman Empire.
Longitudinal historic analysis is utilized in guiding the reader through the time period
that starts with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, continuing to the establishment of the
Turkish Republic to the present day, putting into perspective the significance of the EU
membership prospect as an unequivocally anticipated milestone in the Turkish
modernization and westernization discourses. It also enables unraveling the critical nature
of the role the secularization aspect of modernization plays in bestowal of the role model
status to Turkey. It helps explaining the important events that have shaped the modern
Turkish national identity, including the reforms that were made under the leadership of
Kemal Ataturk, the utilization of westernization as a state policy that is implemented at
all levels from state principles to personal lives of the citizens, the military coups that
have led to interruptions in the democratic system, the moments of interruption as well as
306
Gerlinde Mautner, “Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media,” in
Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, Ruth Wodak and Michal
Krzyzanowski, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 48.
307
Creswell, p. 153.
64
strengthening in the Turkish- EU relations. Longitudinal historic analysis helps
understand the background of the ideas and events that have led to the establishment and
the evolution of Turkish national identity as well as providing a chronology of significant
historical occurrences.
Discourse is “a socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” practice.308
Michel Foucault has been the name associated with discourse analysis. He asserts that
knowledge is much more than the reflection of reality “since “truth is a discursive
construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false.”309 As
Foucault studies the structure of various knowledge systems, he also focuses on power as
a constructor of knowledge and discourse.310
Foucault argues that production of knowledge is a form of power and power produces
discourses of knowledge producing various systems of truth.311 As the discourses change
the definition of true and false also change.312 While performing discourse analysis, this
research utilizes these Foucaldian perspectives on the relations between power and
knowledge.
308
Norman Fairclough, and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in T. A. Van
Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies: A multidisciplinary introduction: Vol. 2. Discourse as
Social Interaction.(London, UK: Sage Publications, 1997), pp. 257-258.
309
Phillips and Jorgensen, p. 13.
310
Ibid.
311
Kimberly Hutchings, “Foucault and International Relations Theory,” The Impact of
Michel Foucault on the Social Sciences and Humanities, Moya Lloyd and Andrew
Thacker, eds., (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 105.
312
Ibid.
65
According to Michel Foucault, a discourse consists of set of relationships between
various discursive events.313 Discourses emerge and operate as a means of struggle while
they are also analyzed and restrained by a sequence of controls.314 A discourse “finds its
meaning by reference to an ideological position,” and therefore “can be a direct
instrument of ideological subjection.” 315 A Foucauldian approach reveals some of the
implications of discourse with respect to the practices of subjection.316 Foucault’s studies
do not go too much into the materialist discussion of the production of the actual
discourse, since they concentrate on the forms of subjugation that emerge as effects of the
discourse.317
Foucault argues that discourse production is controlled in every society through
procedures aimed at subduing its possible powers and dangers and to evade the dangers
of its extreme materiality.318 He believes discourse not to be representative in form of
mirroring reality but to be productive in constituting reality.319 He believes that “power
means relations” and he analyzes the domination of power through subordinating.320 He
313
Ruth Wodak, “Discourse Studies- Important Concepts and Terms,” in Qualitative
Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski, eds.,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.5.
314
Diane Macdonell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Inc., 1986), p. 98.
315
Ibid, p. 110.
316
Ibid.
317
Ibid, p. 113.
318
Wodak, “Discourse Studies- Important Concepts and Terms,” p.5.
319
Florian Oberhuber and Michal Kryzanowski, “Discourse Analysis and Ethnography,”
in Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, Ruth Wodak and Michal
Krzyzanowski, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 194-195.
320
Macdonell, p. 121.
66
was the one who introduced the argument that knowledge and power are mutually
constructive.321
Discourse analysts unpack the mechanisms that are at work within a particular
discourse,322 revealing the relative power relations. This research utilizes these
Foucauldian observations related to the production of knowledge as a form of power. The
role model status bestowed on Turkey by the EU is an example of knowledge production
that also reflects the various power relations among the various actors in and/or between
EU, Turkey and the region.
Discourse analysis investigates the ways representation and language produce
meaning, as well as the how the connections between power and knowledge produced by
a discourse emerge.323 While a discourse-historical approach views discourse as
“structured forms of knowledge,”324 critical discourse analysis studies how dominance,
inequality and power abuse are activated, reproduced and resisted.325 It focuses on “the
ways discourse structures enact, confirm legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of
power and dominance in society.”326 The focus on power is one of the most important
321
Oberhuber and Kryzanowski, p. 195.
Mautner, p. 38.
323
Stuart Hall, “The Spectacle of the ‘Other’,” in Representation: Cultural
Representations and Signifying Practices, Stuart Hall, ed., (London: SAGE, 1997), p. 6.
324
Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda,
Theory and Methodology,” in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, eds. Ruth Wodak
and Michaels Meyer, (London: SAGE Publicatons, 2009), p. 6.
325
Teun A. Van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in The Handbook of Discourse
Analysis, Eds. Deborah Schriffin, Deborah Tannen and Heidi E. Hamilton, (Malden:
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 352.
326
Ibid, p. 353.
322
67
characteristics of this form of analysis that sets it apart from semiotic approach.327
Discourse analysis aims to deconstruct representations and their means of dissemination
as well as the characteristics and range of representations that take part of a specific
discourse within a particular time frame.328 It also analyzes the connections between
power and knowledge, looking especially into means of acquiring knowledge related to
the world.329 The meaning of a discourse is ever changing since its meaning is dependent
upon its relationship to other discourses which also go through constant transformation.
The power structure of a discourse can be located through an analysis of the inherent
power relations within it.330 Based on the definition that “knowledge is power to define
others,” Michelle Pace argues the ones who have autonomy over knowledge also hold the
power to regulate the meaning and define others.331 She adds that power struggles emerge
because power leads to resistance. 332 All these simultaneous processes of defining and
knowledge production within the discourse lead to the generation of various ‘truths’ or
‘realities.’333 According to Gerlinde Mautner, the identifying possible contribution of
qualitative discourse analysis lies in “making explicit the linguistic means through which
representations of reality and social relationships are enacted.”334
327
Beyza C. Tekin, Representations and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of
Turkey in the EU Context, (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), p.
15.
328
Michelle Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean,
(New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 46-47.
329
Ibid, p. 47.
330
Ibid.
331
Ibid, pp. 47-48.
332
Ibid, p. 48.
333
See Foucault, Hall (293), Pace (48).
334
Mautner, p. 48.
68
Alan Bryman explains that the discourse is much more than a tool for
communicating a meaning, and therefore discourse analysis is interested in the various
strategies involved in the creation of various types of effect, leading to an action-oriented
analysis.335 He argues that the three questions formulated by Potter336 need to be
answered in the action-oriented discourse analysis: “What is the discourse doing? How is
the discourse constructed to make this happen? What resources are available to perform
this activity?”337
Critical discourse analysis, in particular, analyzes the role of discursive practices
in establishing and sustaining unequal relations.338 It aims to depict and explain how
power abuse is activated and reproduced by dominant actors.339 Critical discourse
analysis especially focuses on how certain actors are privileged at the expense of others,
causing the latter to be marginalized within that particular discourse.340 From a
Foucaldian perspective, this analysis also examines how changes in the discourse produce
different results, reassigning the roles of advantaged and disadvantaged, in some cases.341
There are a variety of possibilities within critical discourse analysis including one on the
process of production of political strategies and how they affect the discourse.342
335
Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.
370.
336
Jonathan Potter, “Discourse Analysis,” in Handbook of Data Analysis, Melissa A.
Hardy and Alan Bryman, eds. (London: Sage, 2004), p. 609.
337
Bryman, p. 270.
338
Fairclough and Wodak.
339
Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse, Power and Access,” in Texts and Practices, C. R.
Caldas-Coulhard and M. Coulhard, eds., (London: Routledge, 1996), p.84.
340
Phillips and Hardy, p.25.
341
Ibid.
342
Ibid, p.26.
69
In this dissertation, critical discourse analysis is employed in explicating the
Turkish modernization discourse that is intertwined with the westernization and
secularization discourses as well as the discourse on Turkish EU membership prospect.
The Turkish role model status is utilized to point out and analyze the power relations that
emerge and are reinforced within these discourses. Discourse analysis is employed in
interpreting the overlapping discourses of Turkish modernism, and Westernization which
are immersed with Orientalist power structures since it helps trace the links between the
dominant and the subordinate elements and it examines how power works within this
system.343
Within the analysis, the power relations that emerge within these discourses and
their intersections will be analyzed with respect to Turkish EU membership with special
focus on the role model status of Turkey. At the outset, historical analysis will be
employed to discuss the emergence of modern Turkish Republican identity from the
ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. The critical analysis of the discourses of
modernization, westernization and secularization will be presented concentrating on the
Turkish EU membership journey. The period in question will be analyzed starting with
the first attempt of Turkey to become a member of the European Economic Community
in 1959 until the present. The issue of Turkish role model status will be analyzed as a part
of the discourse of Turkish relations with the EU. The various power relations that
emerge in relation to the role model status will be analyzed in detail, putting their
historical transformations into context. The various hierarchies that emerge will be
examined. To put it very shortly, the power EU has over Turkey, the power Turkey has
343
Loomba, p. 45.
70
over the region and the internal hierarchies within Turkey that give the secular elite
power over the religious citizens.
Critical discourse analysis will further be utilized in analyzing how the power
relations change and the role various representations play in this process, affecting the
flow of the discourse. It will help reflect on the production of knowledge within each
discourse and related to the role model status of Turkey. It will also enable
deconstruction of how the changes in the discourse affect the roles of various actors,
defining them as advantaged, disadvantaged, dominant, subordinate, good, evil,
marginalized, etc. It will also enable unravel the Orientalist factors that are involved in
constructing the representations that contribute to the knowledge production.
Delimitations and Limitations
Delimitations specify “how the study will be narrowed in scope.”344 The scope of this
research is narrowed to the examination of data gathered from secondary sources, the
relative printed and visual documents that are available in English and Turkish.
The limitations of a study refer to its potential weaknesses.345 Qualitative research
gives the researcher more room to make judgment than quantitative research,346 which
while strengthening the uniqueness of the study,347 may also cause the researcher not to
maintain objectivity during the discussions.
One of the limitations of the study is related to the interpretive nature of discourse
analysis. Since there is no single standardized methodology to perform discourse
344
Creswell, p. 110.
Ibid.
346
Earl Babbie, Observing Ourselves: Essays in Social Research (CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1986), p. 93.
347
Creswell, p. 159.
345
71
analysis, this research will develop its own approach that incorporates some of the
existing practices but also includes new interpretive factors introduced by the researcher
that are particularly related to the power relations within the discourses that are being
discussed. This may be perceived both as a limitation to the study and as a richness of the
study, at the same time.
Organization of the Dissertation Study
Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter, presenting the hypotheses. It explains the
contribution of this research to the field. It presents the reader the theoretical framework
used, the methodology employed and the organization of the research, giving an
overview of each chapter. The chapter also includes a literature review on Turkey’s role
model status in relation to modernization, westernization, secularism, as well as their
critique. The chapter also gives a review of the literature related to the emergence of
Turkish national identity, emphasizing the importance of EU membership prospect as a
milestone that would indicate the success of the modernization project, once acquired.
Finally, the literature review on power relations and production of knowledge as a form
of power with respect to Turkish role model status will be presented.
Chapter 2 discusses the foundations and the context upon which the Turkish
Republic emerged. The events and the perceptions related to the historical
transformation from the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire to the position of “the Sick Man
of Europe” to the building of a new nation that denounced and distanced itself from most
characteristics its predecessor. The chapter explicates the emergence of Turkish Republic
after giving background information on the regional and the international context. The
new Turkish Republic emerges and develops during a time of conflict, wars and
72
revolutions. An independence war, ended with the declaration of the republic,
establishing of the parliamentary system followed by drastic reforms under the leadership
of Ataturk. This will enable the reader to understand the national context. The chapter
also introduces the discussion about the role model status of Turkey, with special
emphasis on its relation with Turkish secularism and its reflections on Turkish national
and foreign policy.
Chapter 3 discusses the details of the creation of a new Turkish identity through
the adaptation of modernization, westernization and secularization as a means of taking
the new state to the level of contemporary states. It looks at the period between the postAtaturk years of the Republic in the late 1930s and late 1990s. This is a period during
which Turkey struggles between military rule and democracy, during which the official
start of the EU membership journey takes place. The chapter attempts to reveal the
internal power relations that are reflected through the dichotomies of modern versus
traditional, secular versus religious and western versus eastern, etc., among many others.
These dichotomous representations are produced and constantly reinforced during the
process of building the new Turkish identity. The chapter also draws special attention to
the suppression of the Muslim characteristics on the quest of creating the new secular
Turkish identity. As Kemalist reforms are enforced as part of the numerous attempts to
“catch up” with the West the official state rhetoric presented a citizen model that was
forcefully enforced. The creation of this model was based on Orientalist representations
that were utilized to produce power relations that rendered citizens who willingly
followed the new model as “good” and the ones who resisted as “evil.” This chapter tries
to present a snapshot of the formation of this new Turkish Republican identity to enable
73
the readers to understand the various power relations as well as the emergence and
transformations of the related discourses.
The role model status bestowed upon Turkey constitutes the basis for the
discussion on power relations that are involved within the international context, the
regional context and the national context. The popularity of the Turkish model among
some leaders and thinkers in the Middle East dates all the way back to these early years
of establishment of the Republic.348 The Turkish passion and commitment to
modernization was inspirational especially for Afghanistan, Iran and Tunisia.349 Although
the impact of this status faded after the Second World War upon Turkish membership to
NATO, which was perceived as a sign of its commitment to the West and the
westernization process,350 it became increasingly stronger after late 1990s, as Turkey
started to gradually give signs of emerging as a powerful player in the international arena.
The West has seen Turkey as role model for Muslims since 1950s. 351 However, this
became more widespread especially after the attacks of September 11th. The gradual
progress in the Turkish EU membership process has also re-enforced the role model
status. The chapter analyzes the role model status in relation to national and international
developments as Turkey deals with periods of going back and forth between democracy
and military takeovers.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the Turkish- EU relations, discussing the
importance of EU membership for Turkey, with special focus on the representations and
348
Meliha Benli Altunisik, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the
Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, no. 2, 2008, p. 41.
349
Ibid, p. 42.
350
Ibid.
351
Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,” The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 2004, p. 51.
74
the power relations that are involved. The EU membership goal, once achieved, will
constitute an extremely important milestone in the modernization and westernization
journey of Turkey. The chapter analyzes the arguments for and against Turkish
membership at the European level as well as the Turkish national level. Some of the
Orientalist assumptions and representations are pointed out during this discussion. The
Turkish EU membership discourse is one in which EU is the party of power and has the
unilateral ability to talk and decide for itself and on behalf of Turkey.
The chapter highlights the challenges that are posed to the existing representations
and the power relations, during the administration of the Justice and Development Party
(JDP). The JDP is known for its Islamist roots and has been suspected of having a “secret
Islamist agenda” to overthrow the secularist Kemalist regime. Ironically, the most
progress in the EU membership discourse has been achieved during their
administration.352 The commitment of the Justice and Development Party administration
to the EU harmonization process realizing it as a national quest that is not necessarily
solely related and limited to fulfilling the membership criteria has been among the
challenges to the existing internal, regional and international power relations. This issue
will also be analyzed in detail in this chapter.
Chapter 5 looks at the period after the official start of the accession negotiations
with the European Union. As the popular support for the JDP increases with each
election, the power relations and the classic representations of Islamic political actors are
challenged. This is seen through the constant struggle between the Kemalist elite
supported by the military and the democratic rule upheld by the JDP. The transformation
352
Kirisci, p. 19.
75
in the democratic discourse and its reflections on the role model status are discussed in
detail. The transformation that the JDP and the Turkish society go through and its
reflections on the discourses of Turkish Republican identity, Turkish secularism as well
as Islamic political discourse are analyzed in detail. The reflections of these changes in
the national and foreign policies of Turkey are examined in relation to the role model
argument.
Chapter 6 offers the conclusion. The transformation of Turkish national identity
under the JDP and its implications on Turkish foreign policy practices are revisited with
respect to the post-Arab awakening period. A short preliminary analysis of the
Taksim/Gezi Parki incidents is also presented under the light of the arguments related to
the shortcomings of majoritarian democracy in Turkey and its authoritarian tendencies.
Looking at the existing European representations related to Turkey and the hierarchy of
the power relations related to the role model status of Turkey, I conclude that this
fictional status is nothing more than a tool which reinforces the power relations by
strengthening the representations further. This tool is used by both Turkey and the West
in defining their relations with each other as well as the Muslim world. Therefore, in
addition to the shortcomings of the Turkish model, which keeps it from truly deserving
an exemplary status, this status continues to be a virtual marker that reflects the
inconsistencies within the Turkish membership debates.
76
CHAPTER 2. THE BIRTH OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC FROM THE ASHES
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
This chapter starts by presenting an overall understanding of the international and
national conditions under which the Turkish Republic emerged, highlighting the
connections between the two, the scholarly and political production of Orientalist
representations and knowledge of a specific Oriental identity within a particular historical
instance. This historical moment included the defeat in World War I and the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, as a representative of classical imperial power and
the triumphal emergence of republican Turkey upon the War of Independence between
early 1900s and late 1930s. The resulting nationalist narrative that accompanied the
defeat of the old intellectual and political systems and the establishment of the new ones
internalized many orientalist concepts and assumptions about the Ottoman Empire, Islam
and Turkey. By acknowledging their defeat as a sign of their inferiority as representatives
of the Orient, the founding elite who established the Turkish Republic paved the route for
accepting the superiority of the Occident as a political and social model to be followed.
The new republic’s self definition was based on subordinating its Muslim identity.
The Occident was also presented as compatible with the founding myths of
Turkishness, establishing a thread of continuity between the old and the new, i.e. the
superiority of Turkish quest for civilization through history, which led to the embrace of
the Occident as its latest representative. This perception of the Occident as a
homogeneous entity was also an Orientalist one that overlooked the existence of
competing ideologies such as fascism, liberal democracy, social democracy and
Bolshevism.
77
This dual history and critique is what distinguishes this dissertation’s postcolonial
understanding of the Turkish case. Among the main contributions of this chapter is its
emphasis on the fact that it was the multi dimensional international defeat that led to the
construction of a new Turkish national identity.
This chapter discusses how the new republican identity, which internalized the
dominant orientalist representations, using them as the basis for the nationalist narrative,
failed to acknowledge that the new republic no longer had the powerful imperial position,
but was downgraded to the ranks of the developing nations. While the nationalist
narrative was based on an acceptance of the orientalist definition of Occidental
superiority, the devolution of all Islamic elements within and without in relation to the
other Muslim nations in the international system was seen as a path to becoming
European. The first decades of the new republic, that witnessed the attempts to become
“European” proved to be only partially successful. The anti-individualist and antidemocratic nature of the principles enforced by the founding elite, which were designed
to make Turkey modern and European yielded political and social systems that ended up
unintentionally distancing itself from its definition of Europeanness. The new Turkish
regime used the state machinery in authoritarian ways that the “ideal European model” of
liberal and social democracy that emerged after the Second World War never did.
Based on these reasons, the new elite defined and positioned the Turkish political
identity closer to Europe and distant to Muslims, in the early days of the republic. This
chapter presents an analysis of Europeanization as a consequence of Turkish national
defeat. It discusses the international aspect of Europeanization by examining the
redefinition of “Turkishness” as a response to military, political and social defeat at the
78
end of the Ottoman era. The international consequences led to national changes as the
Kemalist elite set their goal “to heal Turkey from its inferiority against the European
states and to heave Turkey up to the standard of modern civilization.”353 As Selim
Deringil suggests, the process of reform that had started in early nineteenth century
Ottoman Empire should be analyzed “as an engagement with, and largely inadvertent
internalization of, European representations, as much as a reaction to superior European
military and technology.”354 The leading factor of Turkish defeat in the international
arena was neither recognized nor addressed as an issue within the context of Turkish
Republic. Although Turkey was never colonized, the ongoing attempts for
Europeanization upon the collapse of the empire were based on a complex mentality of
loss of imperial status, and being demoted to the ranks of the underdeveloped nations,
therefore unexpectedly becoming a part of “the Orient.”
The chapter also examines the hypothesis related to the subordination of the
Muslim identity as part of the creation of a new secular national identity. In addition it
critically develops the arguments related to the role model status of Turkey. In conclusion
it presents an analysis of the truth and validity of this status and its utilization by both the
Europeans and the Turks with respect to the relations between Europe and Turkey,
Europe and the Muslim World, Turkey and the Muslim world as well as the relations
between the republican elite and the religious masses in Turkey.
353
Johannes-Christian Reinhardt, Pan-Ottomanism in Light of Two Centuries of
Europeanization: Why EU Membership Remains Turkey’s Ultimate Goal,” p.2, available
at http://www.academia.edu/1497063/PanOttomanism_in_light_of_two_centuries_of_Europeanization_Why_EU_membership_re
mains_Turkeys_ultimate_goal, accessed on December 26, 2012.
354
Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No.
3 (June 2002), pp. p. 769. (768-796). [Refering to Selim Deringil, Well-Protected
Domains, p. 165].
79
Consequences of Ottoman Defeat in World War I
The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 in the lands that were left over
from the Ottoman Empire. A little before the beginning of the French revolution in the
late eighteenth century, the Ottomans ruled over the Balkans -consisting of Albania,
Bulgaria, Greece, Former Yugoslavia, most of Romania- most of the Arab World consisting of Syria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya, parts of Saudi Arabia, and Anatolia- consisting of modern Turkey.355 (Figure 1)
The powerful position of the Empire in the international arena had started to decline in
1600s as it lagged behind the military, economic and technological advancement of the
nascent nation states in Europe.356 It became more apparent after a series of wars most of
which ended with defeat and territorial losses.357 As the Empire, began its slow decline, it
was labeled as “the sick man of Europe” by the Russian Emperor Tsar Nicholas I in
1844,358 which became a term associated with the Turks until the present time. The
Ottoman defeat in the First World War, led to the final loss the provinces in the Middle
East and Balkans. The Empire with a legacy of six hundred years as the leader of the
Muslim World with control over most of Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea faced a
violent finale.359 There are thinkers who suggest that the loss of the holy lands of Mecca
355
Zurcher, p. 11.
Ibid, p. 21.
357
Ibid.
358
Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, (New York:
Overlook Press, 1997), p. 39.
359
Ibid, p. 35.
356
80
in 1916 and Jerusalem to the English at the end of 1917360 constituted the final blow to
the empire.361
Figure 1. Map: “Ottoman Empire” 362
After having suffered a great defeat, the Turks had to pay a very high price for
having sided with Germany during the war. The allied forces were getting ready to
distribute the remaining lands amongst them.363 After a long struggle, Turkey managed
to re-gain independence after having defeated the Greeks backed by the French, the
British and the Americans and after the signing of international treaties with British,
French, Italian, Greek and other members of the Allied forces.
360
Ismet Uzen, “Osmanli, Kutsal Yerleri Korumasiz Birakmadi,” Habervaktim.com,
December 10, 2012, available at http://www.habervaktim.com/haber/osmanli-kutsalyerleri-korumasiz-birakmadi-276815.html accessed on December 10, 2012.
361
Necip Fazil (published with code name Dedektif X), “Filistin Bozgunu,” Buyuk Dogu
Dergisi, September 8, 1950, No. 25, p. 3. Referred to by Habervaktim.com, December
10, 2012, available at http://www.habervaktim.com/haber/osmanli-kutsal-yerlerikorumasiz-birakmadi-276815.html accessed on December 10, 2012.
362
“Map- Ottoman Empire,” accessed on July 18, 2013, available at
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=956
363
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 52.
81
As the new Turkish identity was in the process of creation, the tension between
the Turkish and the European forces was still escalating. The British had invaded the
Ottoman capital, Istanbul in early 1920.364 Armenians were being fought in the Eastern
part of the country while Greeks were approaching Ankara.365 The fighting came to an
end with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, which symbolized the first
international recognition of the new Turkish Republic as a state in making.366 By the
time the official declaration of Turkish Republic was made, the war-torn country was in
need of a new identity367 that would constitute the very foundation of the new republic.
The Republic was established in a post-war atmosphere as the people were trying
to overcome the shock of having lost many lives, extremely valuable geographic
resources and the end of the Ottoman era. It was especially challenging to digest the fact
that the six-centuries long rule over Eastern Europe, Middle East, and North Africa had
come to a drastic end with the Empire partitioned amongst the Allies.368 The new
republic was founded by a group of former Ottoman soldiers under the leadership of
Mustafa Kemal, through the organization of an independent republican movement that
would distanced itself from its predecessor. Its founders of the new regime decided that
building a new Turkish identity erased the memories of the Ottoman legacy.369 The new
364
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 55.
Ibid, p. 57.
366
Ibid, p. 58.
367
Ibid, p. 59.
368
Esra Ozyurek, “Introduction” in The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey, Esra
Ozyurek, ed., (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007), p. 3.
369
Ibid.
365
82
regime was established “as a homogeneous and secular nation-state that rejected the
multi-cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and its emphasis on Islam.”370
Esra Ozyurek argues that a process of self-administered “organized amnesia” was
utilized by the Kemalist reformers to wipe out the remains and memories of the
empire.371 Kemalist reformers perceived the Islamic Ottoman past as part of a dark age,
except for a few significant events such as the conquest of Istanbul and believed that
Mustafa Kemal who was given the title of Ataturk would initiate an age of enlightenment
through the creation of a modern Turkey through his reforms.372 The dissemination of
this perception of a “dark Ottoman past” relied on the production and reproduction of
Orientalist system of representation.
The Kemalist reforms included obligatory changes in all aspects of life as they
initiated “new and state-administered ways of dressing, writing, talking and being for the
new citizens of the Republic.”373 These reforms were part of Westernization,
modernization and secularization projects, which would enable Turkey to catch up with
the West. To enable complete secularization, the founders of the new republic wanted
religion to be under the control of the state, to cut all ties with the past and to establish
good relations with Europe.374
For the founders of the new republic the creation of a new identity required the
production of new forms of behavior that would abolish all existing traditions and habits
that existed in the immediate past. The new forms of behaviors employed a system of
370
Ibid.
Ibid.
372
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 51
373
Ozyurek, p. 4.
374
Ibid.
371
83
Orientalist representations, which defined the past as dark and backward. The founding
elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, used these dichotomous categories to justify
the reforms, the abolition of the caliphate system, the wearing of traditional fez,
substituting them with European style hats, adopting the Western calendar system instead
of the Islamic calendar system. A new script replaced the existing alphabet based on
Arabic script with a new one that was based on the Latin script. The implementation of
these reforms led to dramatic societal changes. One of the more obvious examples is the
script reform through which people with high-level Ottoman education became illiterate
overnight. One of the arguments in favor of the new script was that the alphabet based on
the Arabic script was too difficult to understand and left much room for mistakes and
misunderstandings.375
Another striking example is related to men’s and women’s dress. Initially, the hat
reform and the accompanying dress reform did not make any reference to women’s attire,
however, after the reform women who continued to wear veils were harassed on the
streets376 while the ideal republican woman’s clothing imitated what elite Western
woman wore. Women were pressured to wear clothes that were strange to their
traditions, beliefs and life styles. The religious and traditional attires for both men and
women were deemed backward, uncivilized and repulsive while those of the west were
dichotomously presented as civilized and modern. The citizens who followed the new
reforms were categorized by the state, as good citizens while the rest were perceived as
375
I remember during my elementary school years all the students were taken to the
auditorium to listen to a long lecture about how “backward” the Arabic script was. I
remember a specific anecdote about a note sent by the sultan regarding “welcoming” a
guest and because of the small mistake of the calligrapher the note ordered “beheading”
the guest.
376
Ozyurek, p. 4.
84
not worthy. Therefore in the new republic, the citizens who dressed in Western style
clothing were given power over the others based on the constructed system of
representations.
The adaptation of the Gregorian calendar system was helpful in breaking from the
Ottoman past making it “difficult to locate”377 and more importantly, enabling “the
Turkish Republic to move from the ‘Oriental’ flow of time, which the reformers
disdained, toward an ‘Occidental’ one, to which they aspired.”378 Also, with the change
in the system of calendar the new republic distanced itself from the Muslim world as it
adopted Saturday and Sunday as the weekend holidays while the Muslim states mostly
recognized Fridays as the day of worship as part of their weekend. The process of
disestablishment of Islam was finalized with the 1928 decision to delete the clause that
declared the religion of Turkish state as Islam, per request of the Republican People’s
Party, yielding a legally and constitutionally secular and modern Turkey.379 The initial
intention of Kemalists was to minimize the role of Islam to a level of the role of religion
in modern Western nation-states and to produce a more modern and nationalized
version.380
While the new identity was being constructed around “Turk-ness,” European
attitude towards the Turks was shaped by the Christian World’s initial perception of the
Ottoman Turks was that they had a very disciplined, courageous and high quality
377
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 5.
379
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 276.
380
Ibid, p. 412.
378
85
army.381 They believed that God was punishing Christians through Turks,382 therefore,
declared them the subject of the Crusades,383 and constantly kept fighting against “the
Grand Turk”384 who had mighty power.385 As the empire declined, the European
aspirations to “chase the Infidel from Europe and share out its territory”386 started to
escalate, as early as early seventeenth century.387 The Europeans visualized the Ottomans
as representative of the whole Islamic World388 and thus as “enemy of Christians,”389 and
“Christendom.”390 Similar representations still exist in European minds and come up
during the discussions related to Turkish membership to the European Union.
Based on this perception of Turks as the Muslim enemy of the Christian West, the
Europeans could not be more enthusiastic about the eventual collapse of the old empire.
The British Prime Minister Lloyd George, in a 1914 statement argued that Turks
resembled a human cancer that had spread in the lands that they misgoverned.391 In 1917
Andre Mandelstam, the French historian asserted that Turkish people were soulless
people who had absolutely no contribution to civilization and their historic mission was
to destroy.392 Some American views mirrored these attitudes including a 1919 article that
381
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean: And The Mediterranean World in the Age of
Philip II, Volume II, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p.665.
382
Ibid.
383
Ibid, p. 667.
384
Ibid, p. 1059.
385
Ibid, p. 968.
386
Ibid, p. 702.
387
Ibid.
388
Ibid, pp. 1240, 1102, 1156.
389
Ibid, p. 1198.
390
Ibid, p. 968.
391
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 59.
392
Ibid.
86
described Turkish people as “a parasite and stench in the nostrils of civilization.”393 One
extremely racist comment even suggested that Turks should be “dealt with” through
placement in reservations like those of the American Indians.394 Needless to say,
European countries continued to perceive the new republic as a descendant of the empire
and therefore still an enemy despite its transformation into a new Western-like identity.
For the European powers, the collapse of the Empire had implications that went beyond
the lands of Near and Middle East, as it brought an end to the Eastern Question that had
been a major concern in European politics and diplomacy.395 The Great Powers were to
deal with the new Turkish state, from a position of strength.396 They believed in their
innate superiority and the Turks’ inherent inferiority. The collapse of the empire and the
new identity, which recognized the superiority of Europe, offered related Orientalist
representations.
Within this framework, Mustafa Kemal’s ideology that molded the new
republican identity came to be known as “Kemalism” (or “Ataturkism”) was based on the
six principles: nationalism, statism, republicanism, secularism, revolutionalism, and
populism.397 Even though each of these inter related principles were indispensable to the
Kemalist republican identity, secularism and nationalism stood out as the main guarantors
of the new republic. Especially the maintenance and protection of the principle of
secularism was equated to that of the actual Republic.
393
Ibid, p. 60 (reference to citation by Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the
Second World War: An Active Neutrality, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
394
Ibid.
395
A. I. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire: 1908-1923, (London: Addison Wesley
Longman, 1998), p. 234.
396
Ibid, p. 235.
397
Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 189.
87
Kemalist Principles
Nationalism
Nationalism is a term that has a plethora of definitions. One of these definitions
describes the term as a “mindset glorifying a particular state and the nationality group
living in it, which sees the interests of the state as a supreme value.”398 It can be based on
“language, symbolism, a sociopolitical movement and an ideology of a nation.”399 As an
ideology, nationalism comprises of a belief of superiority of one’s own national identity.
This ideological perspective of nationalism can clearly be observed in the Turkish case,
since an extreme version of nationalist ideology based on constructed historical myths
was utilized in the creation of the new Turkish identity.400
According to Benedict Anderson, understanding nationalism requires its
alignment with the enormous cultural systems that afore existed, out of which- and
simultaneously against which- it emerged.401 Nationalist movements emanate from
cultural systems of religious community and the dynastic realm,402 as Turkish Republican
nationalism was born in opposition to the perception of Ummah that used to correspond
to the worldwide Muslim population during the Ottoman rule. The Kemalist elite
constructed Turkish nationalism as a multi-sided process that grew from “universal
Ottomanism” and Islamism into a particular ethnic Turkishness and Turkism.403 It was
398
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Shannon L. Blanton, World Politics: Trend and
Transformation, 12th ed., (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010), p. 577.
399
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, 2nd ed., (Malden: Polity Press, 2001), p.6.
400
Zurcher, p. 189.
401
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, (London: Verso, 1983) , p.12.
402
Ibid.
403
Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and
Community in the Late Ottoman State (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.13.
88
due to an unexpected “structural transformation, special differentiation, and migration, as
much as the product of the state’s efforts to direct the identity-forming process toward a
predetermined end.”404 Turkish nationalism aimed to simultaneously establish “the search
from a national Turkish identity which among Ottoman Turks has been lost for a long
time; and the construction of reinforcement of a social unity by the awakened Turks.”405
Turkish nationalism and principles of the new republic arose as communism
emerged in Russia, and dictators like Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin were in power. Some
ideologies such as communism due to its anti-imperial position, fascism especially with
respect to its perception of statism were effective in the construction of the new Turkish
identity. Ataturk initially considered Italy, under the leadership of Mussolini as a “great
friendly country,”406 and praised Stalin to be the “most important statesman” among
dictators,407 however, took an anti-dictatorship position later, arguing that dictatorship
would be an option only for a “short time” period.408
In the new republic, nationalism, together with secularism constituted the most
important pillars of Kemalism.409 It was constructed in a way to complement the
Westernization process, which was intrinsic to success of attaining the level of
contemporary nations. Turkish revolutionary narrative, therefore, utilized a language of
404
Ibid.
Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992),
pp. 4-5.
406
Taha Parla and Andew Davison, Corporalist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey, (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 264.
407
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ataturk’un Soylev ve Demecleri: 1918-1937 Vol. 3, Nimet
Arsan, ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1961), p. 51.
408
Mary R. Beard, Woman as Force in History, (London: Collier-MacMillian, 1946), p.
22.
409
Udo Steinbach, “Ataturk’s Impact on Turkish Political Culture since World War II,”
in Ataturk and Modernization of Turkey, Jacob M. Landau, ed., (London: Westview Press
Inc., 1984), p. 78.
405
89
nationalism and Westernization simultaneously.410 As Mervat Hatem argues, nationalism
utilized a “narrative of progress that viewed modernization and westernization as part of
process of building new societies.”411 The aim of Kemalism was to produce a nationalist
identity that was proudly aligned with the West, to replace the one with the inferiority
complex of being Muslim placed in the same category as the Muslim East. The Kemalist
ideology perceived nation building and modernization as synonymous to progress and
inevitable advancement of civilization.412
The new national identity was constructed around Turk-ness, which had been used
by the Ottomans as a derogatory ethnic term to refer to the poor and ignorant Anatolian
peasants.413 The Ottoman Empire was known for having been the home of numerous
national, ethnic, religious and racial identities. A small reflection of this multiplicity of
identities still existed within the shrunken borders of the new republic. There was still a
considerable population of Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Jews among other minorities.
A top-down process of creation of the new republican identity founded on Turk-ness was
therefore not an easy task. Ataturk started a process of “citizenship from above.”414 The
nationalist message was forced by the elites upon the passive masses whose resentment
410
Lewis, p. 485.
Mervat Hatem, “Modernization, the State and the Family,” in The Social History of
Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East, Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E.
Tucker, eds., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), p. 67.
412
Deniz Kandiyoti, “Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of
Turkish Modernity,” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel
Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds., (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.
113.
413
Lewis, p.1.
414
Yesim Arat, “On Gender and Citizenship in Turkey,” Middle East Report, 198 (Jan.Mar. 1996), pp. 28-31.
411
90
was of no concern.415 The modernizing elite produced new definitions of practices,
relations, habits, manners, identities and specific lifestyles that would be considered
‘modern.’416 This entailed denouncing and inveighing the traditional values that had
been in existence.417 Due to the lack of popular support, this Western-oriented
nationalism project became an authoritarian and totalitarian process of marginalization
and destruction of all traditional values.418 This process entailed the production of new
Orientalist representations by Turks to serve as a part of their new history and identity.
One of the major reasons behind the lack of enthusiasm towards this new identity
that was imposed by the elites was the fact that the new model borrowed or copied from
the West was strange and foreign to the long-time existing characteristics of the society.
The traditional, conservative, religiously motivated practices in the society were forcibly
transformed into acts that imitated European attitudes. The transformation in the sartorial
practices was among the most visible examples. The fact that the modernizing elite had
no concern about accommodating the popular resentment419 also added to the challenge
albeit the silence of the masses. The Western model was presented as the “ideal type,”420
and all the remnants of the traditional model that had a plethora of links to Islam and nonTurkish elements such as other languages, cultures and traditions were wiped out in a
415
Caglar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity: Turkey in the 1990s,” in
Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat
Kasaba, eds., (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 43.
416
Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Modernity and
National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds., (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1997), p. 10.
417
Peter Alter, Nationalism, (London: Hodder Headline Group, 1994), p. 25.
418
Kandiyoti, “Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish
Modernity,” p. 114.
419
Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity: Turkey in the 1990s,” p. 43.
420
Binnaz Toprak, “Religion and Turkish Women,” in Women in Turkish Society,
Nermin Abadan-Unat, ed., (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), p. 281.
91
process of Orientalization. The Western traditions, manners, culture, etc. were utilized in
reproducing binary oppositions in which all that was of the West was good and their
existing non-Western counterparts were deemed bad and not tolerated by the new regime.
The lack of resistance or rather the inability to resist this transformation of identity from
an Islamic empire to a Westernized and secular nation-state in the wake of two wars,
caused the Turkish and Western observers to deem it as a successful example of nation
building.421 Assessing the level of nationalism or how good a Turkish nationalist citizen
was done by looking at the success in adapting western modernity at every aspect of life,
public and private. A major social transformation was in progress to ensure this change
at the individual level. Republic’s efforts to “liquidate the institutions of Ottoman state
and establish republican notions of citizenship” were essential in the construction of the
new national identity.422 From a psychological perspective especially during the early
days of the republic, there was a constant attempt to overcompensate for the “national
inferiority complex” of having been the “sick man” of Europe.423 One of the methods
utilized to overcome this complex was an escape mechanism of blaming all of Turkey’s
disorders on the previous rulers, and the religious institutions of Sultanate and
Caliphate.424 The systematic vilification of the Ottoman past was embedded in the new
national identity and constantly reinforced by the new institutions, the most effective of
which were the educational institutions and the printed press. Naturally, Islamic elements,
which were a significant factor in the Ottoman Empire were also demonized and
421
Ibid.
Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women, Islam and the State,” Middle East Report, Gender and
Politics, 173, Nov.-Dec., 1991, pp.9-14.
423
Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish
Transformation, (Menasha: The Collegiate Press, 1939), pp. 163-164.
424
Ibid, p. 164.
422
92
suppressed to get rid of the inferiority complex. The great masses who quietly insisted on
not giving up their practices were punished through imprisonment, physical harassment,
public ridiculing, etc. depending on the “severity” of their resistance to the new Turkish
identity. One of the many extreme examples is the execution of Iskilipli Atif Hoca for
refusing to wear a Western style hat, after being tried at the Istiklal Mahkemesi,
“inquisitional tribunals established in 1920 to prosecute dissidents of treason.”425
The pro-Western founding elite and their supporters occupied new positions of
political power terms as well as the production of representations. They belittled the
majority of the society who had a hard time giving up their old practices that were now
classified as backward and uncivilized. For instance, Ataturk, in his speeches ridiculed
traditional attire, labeling them as “uncomfortable,” “wasteful,” and “barbarous,”
therefore “unworthy of a civilized people.”426 He argued that Turkish people who
established the new republic are “civilized in history and in reality,” and therefore “the
people of the Turkish Republic who claim to be civilized, must show and prove that they
are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of
living.”427 The sartorial aspect of the new national identity required an imitation of the
Western attire, which was proof of being civilized. Everything else was deemed
uncivilized and thus marginalized.
The demonization of the Ottoman Empire and Islamic elements was a technique
that was often used by the Kemalist elite, to detach the new identity from that was
identified with the previous “imagined community” of Muslim peoples under Ottoman
425
Kavakci Islam, “Headscarf Politics in Turkey,” p. 19.
Lewis, p. 268.
427
Soylev, ii. 212-213; Hist. Rep. Turque, p. 230 (cited by Lewis p. 268-269).
426
93
rule, namely the Ummah.428 Print media was utilized by the elite as a “technical means
for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community.”429 The Young Turks movement,
which was originally initiated by students, was effective in promoting European lifestyle
among Turks. The movement represented the reactions and demands of the social groups
that the Ottoman ruling class had estranged.430 They played an important role in the
initiation of a new imagined community that would be based on Turk-ness. The
“imagined community” would enable the production of “a sense of comradeship among
people who have never met, define boundaries that are not given by nature but by
convention, and persuade people that they have the right to determine their future.” 431
This new “imagined community” would have ethnic basis of Turk-ness unlike its
predecessor, Ummah which was belief based. The first connection that initiated a new
sense of community with a common aim was overcoming the Western invaders in 1920
and the second was the initial establishing of the Republic of Turkey, three years later.
Anderson’s discussion around the concept of “simultaneity” that starts with the
arguments of Erich Auerbach432 elucidates the process.433 “The idea of a sociological
organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue
of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily
428
Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the
Turkish Republic, (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 18.
429
Anderson, p. 25.
430
David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, (London: Frank Cass and
Company Limited, 1977), p. 6.
431
Gregory Baum, Nationalism, Religion and Ethics, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001), p. 115.
432
Anderson refers to Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: Representation of Reality in Western
Literature, p. 54.
433
Anderson, pp. 24-27.
94
down (or up) in history.”434 Although the citizens of this nation may never actually meet
one another, and are unaware of each other’s activities at any given time, they are
confident in the others’ “steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.” 435 The Turkish War
of Independence and the founding of the republic created a sense of belonging to a
smaller empowered community, which defeated the Europeans. The language used in the
print media helped strengthen this sense of belonging since it enabled “growing numbers
of people to think of themselves in profoundly new ways,”436 as part of the “imagined
community of the new republic, in the Turkish case.
The new nation was “imagined” as one with transcendental characteristics
through “attendant creation of historical myths,”437 which stress “the continuities between
present-day nations and much earlier social formations.”438 This primordialist approach
asserts that ethnicity and an associated propensity to prefer members of the same ethnic
group could be interpreted as ‘natural’ inherent attributes of humanity that were not
created.439 It assumes that in all societies there are “certain primordial, irrational
attachments based on blood, race, language, religion, region, etc.”440 This is emphasized
in “Turkish Historical Thesis” which argues that Turks were the ones who created the
great civilizations of the world,441 in accordance with the holistic approach to the
434
Ibid, p. 26.
Ibid.
436
Ozkirimli, p. 148.
437
Zurcher, p. 189.
438
Jeff Pratt, Class, Nation and Identity: The Antropology of Political Movement,
(London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 12.
439
Paul Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory, (Harlow: Pearson Education
Limited, 2005), p. 181.
440
Joseph R. Llobera, Foundations of National Identity: From Catalonia to Europe,
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), p. 29.
441
Zurcher, p. 199.
435
95
existence of Turks.442 Turkish Historical Thesis was propounded for the first time during
the first congress of the Society for the Study of Turkish History (later known as ‘Turk
Tarih Kurumu’), which was one of the many institutions established in 1931 to enhance
and strengthen the new national identity under construction.443 After the alphabet reform,
the Kemalist elite initiated the transformation of language accompanied by the creation of
a new historical narrative. The Turkish Historical Thesis argued that Turks who had been
originally living in Central Asia when faced with drought, had to relocate in Europe, Near
East and China, founding the outstanding civilizations in world history.444 This myth
supported by Mustafa Kemal, “aimed to give Turks a sense of pride in their past and in
their national identity, separate from the immediate past, that is to say the Ottoman
era.”445 Emphasizing that Turks had inhabited Anatolia since ancient times restrengthened geographic relationship of the citizens with the shrunken boundaries of the
new republic. This emphasis was utilized by the Kemalists to help construct the new
identity and a robust “national cohesion.”446 Although the nationalist nature of this
argument seemed to “contradict the admiration for and imitation of Western ways” which
was an important aspect of Kemalist policies, it facilitated their adoption through
simultaneously distancing the new identity from its Islamic past and creating a sense of
superiority which justified following in the footsteps of the “civilized” European
nations.447
442
Fahri N. Tas, Ataturk Ilkeleri ve Inkilaplari Tarihi II., (Istanbul: Sahhaflar Kitap
Sarayi, 1995), p. 10.
443
Zurcher, p. 199.
444
Ibid.
445
Ibid.
446
Ibid.
447
Ibid, pp. 199-200.
96
There were many parallel arguments that claimed the superiority of the Turks.
One claimed that Turks founded the civilizations in Anatolia, Aegean, Egypt and Iraq,448
while others argued that the lineage Turks went back to the tribe of Kayi Khan of Oguz
Turks, who were believed to be descendants of Japhet, the son of Noah.449 Turks were
proud for having established the Great Hum Empire in 318 BC, whose traditions were
supposedly passed on to the existing generations.450 And now they were ready to the
inaugurate Turkish Republic after having established sixteen empires and states
represented by the sixteen stars on the Presidential Seal.451 The traces of prevalent
arguments of Nazism and fascism could be observed in this new rhetoric. This belief in
the innate superiority of Turkish race452 at the level of jingoism is still very prevalent in
the existing national culture. It was both a cause as well as an effect of the nationalist
project. Presenting nationalism as an ideology and sentiment that makes people visualize
themselves as superior to others is a method that states have resorted to with the aim of
preserving unity and fueling nationalist ambition.453 The Turkish case is a perfect
example. Turks were characterized as inherently courageous, just, with high level of
integrity,454 and in Ataturk’s words, they also carried a “noble” blood.455 This belief in
Turkish superiority is still very much prevalent within the Turkish society. According to
448
Poulton, p. 102.
Kushner, p. 27.
450
Tas, p. 10.
451
Ibid.
452
Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 67-68.
453
Baum, p. 89.
454
Tas, p. 12.
455
Ataturk, “Address to Turkish Youth,” October 20, 1927.
449
97
2007 World Value Survey, more than eighty percent of Turkish population is very proud
of their nationality. (Table 1)
Table 1. World Value Survey, Turkey 2007 How Proud of Nationality?
How proud
are you of
your
nationality?
Very proud
Percentage
15-29 years
Percentage
30-49 years
Percentage
50 and older
Total
78.0
82.6
85.5
81.3
Quite proud
19.0
13.3
10.9
15.1
Not very
proud
Not at all
proud
2.4
3.2
3.6
2.9
0.6
0.9
-
0.6
Although the Western model of modernization was unquestionably accepted as
the right model to mold the new Turkish republican identity, its logic contained many
ironic arguments that conflicted with each other. The new regime was based on Turkish
exceptionalism with uncompromising process of westernization in the name of
modernization.456 Embedded in this exceptionalism was the incontrovertible nationalist
belief that Turks were innately superior.457 This belief in the superiority of the Turks was
utilized in the nationalist project and constituted the basis for the state ideology.458 It was
also a means of separating and distancing the new Turkish identity from the rest of the
Muslim world as a superior “other” whose commitment to westernization and secularism
456
Merve Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 15.
457
Ozkirimli, pp. 67-68.
458
Kavakci Islam, p.15.
98
was entrenched within.459 Ironically, Turkey’s ongoing emphasis on westernization as a
means of taking its place among the “civilized” nations also strengthened the existing
“inferiority complex,” as it was in the process of trying to “catch up.”460 Therefore,
“Turkish national identity came to accommodate both inferiority and superiority
complexities contemporaneously within its construction,” causing the new identity to
view itself as “invariably better than the Arab Middle East but never as good as the
European West.”461 The belief in Turkish superiority presented a new republican identity,
which was superior with respect to the Ummah it identified itself with for centuries.
However, the West still remained superior and the new republic had to grapple with a
profound number of issues to catch up with the Western civilization.
The interpretation of nationalism as “the general imposition of a high culture on
society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority”462 fits
perfectly with the nineteenth century history of the Ottoman Empire and the early history
of the Turkish Republic. During the days of decline of the Empire, the ruling elite
categorized the Islamic culture practiced by the people under the Ottoman authority as
low culture, while the westernizing culture of the Ottoman elite like the high culture.463
Ziya Gokalp was among the prominent thinkers and writers who contributed to the
national quest to transform the existing low cultures to the level of high cultures that
would yield a new national identity. He defined his mission as uncovering “the Turkish
culture which has remained in the people, on the one hand, and to graft Western
459
Ibid.
Ibid.
461
Ibid.
462
Ernest Geller, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 57.
463
Poulton, p. 84.
460
99
civilization in its entirety and with all its living forms on to the national culture, on the
other.”464 During the implementation of revolutionary measures, Ataturk would also
argue that his aim was to save the Turkish nation from all the institutions that caused it to
be left behind and build new institutions that would enable the nation to become one of
the highly civilized nations.465 Among the institutions that caused the nation to be left
behind were those that were based on religion that appealed to the popular classes.
Although Islam had been utilized as a catalyst that unified the nation in the fight against
internal and external foes, it “was to be discarded as a component of Turkish
nationalism.”466 Islamic terminology utilized to motivate the soldiers during the war of
independence was no longer resorted to. Ataturk still is the only president in republican
history, who gave a khutbah (Friday sermon) while in office. In this sermon, which took
place in Balikesir in 1927, Ataturk presented nationalist and scientistic arguments.467
Ataturk’s speeches sometimes presented arguments that actually hailed Islam while
discrediting it in others.468
Within the republican nationalist narrative, the Ottoman period that had been
associated with Islam was “presented as a retrograde phase, and the Ottoman experience
as alien and non-Turkish.”469 All the achievements and the legacy of the Ottoman period
were disregarded in favor of promoting pride in narrow Turkish-ness. To help achieve
464
Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, translated by Niyazi
Berkes (West Port: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 289.
465
Ayse Afetinan, Ataturk Hakkinda Hatiralar ve Belgeler, (Ankara: Turkiye Is Bankasi
Yayinlari, 1968), p. 259.
466
Poulton, p. 101.
467
Sukru Hanioglu, Ataturk: An Intellectual Bigraphy, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2011), p. 145. (Referencing “Balikesir’de Halkla Konusma, 7.11.1923,” in
Ataturk’un Soylev ve Demecleri, Vol. 2, pp. 93-95.)
468
Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey, p. 19.
469
Poulton, p. 106.
100
this goal, a secular national basis for legitimation was generated as the major ideological
parameter for the new collectivity replacing religion.470 Since it was impossible to
completely wipe out Islam from national memory, they tried to produce “a kind of
turkified Islam which they thought would help consolidate the national idea of
Turkey.”471 They were also aware of the fact that religion could come in handy in cases
of social instability since it could be utilized to unite various factions in the society. With
this in mind, the elite wanted to “eliminate” the broad-based elements of Islam and the
Ummah that contradicted the nationalist narrative (such as the belief in the superiority of
the Turkish race) yielding a cultural belief system specially created for Turks.
Modern Turkish nationalism sought to create a homogeneous society, in terms of
race, language and belief, overlooking all the various ethnic, religious, national
minorities, including the 20% Kurdish population that had been living under Ottoman
authority. The transformation from the pluralistic Ottoman community to that of a
homogeneous nation that framed under “Turkish-ness”472 needed a new national language
that would replace the Ottoman Turkish, which was highly influenced by Arabic and
Persian. Efforts in that direction begun in the nineteenth century were now coupled with
the change in the alphabet. The Society for the Study of Turkish History (Turk Tarihi
Tetkik Cemiyeti later Turk Tarih Kurumu)473 and the Society for the Study of the Turkish
470
S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Regime and Modernization,” in Ataturk and the
Modernization of Turkey, Jacon Landau, ed., (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1984), p. 9.
471
Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in Ataturk and the Modernization
of Turkey, Jacon Landau, ed., (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1984), p. 30.
472
Rachel Simon, “Mustafa Kemal in Libya,” ,” in Ataturk and the Modernization of
Turkey, Jacon Landau, ed., (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1984), p. 31.
473
Zurcher, p. 199.
101
Language (Turk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti later Turk Dil Kurumu)474 were established to
accommodate the language transformation accompanying the new identity. This was
extremely important since language provided a medium through which memories,
history, common experience, tradition, culture could be “imagined.” The creation of the
People’s Houses “were a part of an effort to create a national Turkish culture to replace
the Islamic culture which the reformers sought to sweep away.”475 Just like the other new
institutions, they were established within the framework of the principle of populism,
with the aim of bridging the gap between the people and the intelligentsia through
“indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime.”476 They
provided free education to adults to service the part of the population not covered
National Schools, which resulted in an increase of the literacy rate from 8 percent to 20
percent by 1935 within a period of seven years.477
Turkish Historical Society, established in 1931, introduced the “Turkish
Historical Thesis” a year later, which became a part of the standard history education in
schools and universities.478 The historians among the Kemalist elite abstained from
investigating the other versions and details of history in this search for a single feature,
theme or hero.479
474
Ibid, p. 198.
Kemal Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 219.
476
Kemal Karpat, “The Peoples Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth,” Middle
East Journal, Vol. 17, no. ½ Winter-Spring 1963, p. 55 (pp. 55-67).
477
Orhan Tekelioglu, “Modernizing Reforms and Turkish Music in the 1930s,” Turkish
Studies, Vol 2., No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 94-95.
478
Zurcher, p. 199.
479
Sabri A. Akural, “Kemalist Views on Social Change,” in Ataturk and the
Modernization of Turkey, Jacon Landau, ed., (Colorado: Westview Press Inc, 1984), p.
132.
475
102
To use Jean-Francois Lyortard’s term, Kemalist historiography is a
“metanarrative,” influencing the investigation and meaning of the past, and
legitimating domination and control of the existing power structure by confining
definitions of development, progress, nation, and democracy to narrow
boundaries.480
The Kemalists picked and chose certain events from history as they saw fit,
constructing a common historical memory for the new nation. They chose to leave out the
details of early decades of the twentieth century from conventional historiography to
strengthen the myth of the new republic.481 This can also be observed in the speeches of
Ataturk, which disregarded the earlier periods of national resistance and presented the
struggle for independence as a movement to establish a new Turkish state, rather than one
that sought to save pieces of the Ottoman Empire, contributing an obvious “distortion of
historical truth.”482
Within this framework, Turkish Republican history was born as an abrupt,
“flattened account of a march from darkness to light,”483 which falls under Bernard
Lewis’ historical categorization of “remembered history” as the nation remembers what it
“chooses to remember as significant both as reality and symbol.”484 This was categorized
by some, as a major attack on Turkish history and its detailed recreation.485
480
John M. Vanderlippe, The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the
Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1939-1950, (New York: State University Press of
New York, 2005), p. 5.
481
Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 6.
482
Zurcher, p. 183.
483
Akural, p. 132.
484
Bernard Lewis, History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1975), p.12.
485
Deniz Kandiyoti, “Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic
Pawns?,” in Women, Nation and State, Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) p. 142.
103
Upon the establishing of the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language (also
known as the Turkish Linguistic Society) in 1932 by Ataturk,486 publishing in a language
other than Turkish was banned.487 The Turkification of the language process taken on488
by the Kemalist elite tried to get rid of all the non-Turkish words from the existing
language. Seeking to abrogate all the linguistic links to the Ottoman past, since they
perceived of the Persian and Arab influences Turkish culture to be “an insidious plague,
and considered Near Eastern civilization inherently inferior to European civilization.”489
This Orientalist approach set the pace for the Turkish nationalist discourse,
declaring all internal and external non-Western entities and cultural elements inherently
inferior. As the founding elite rigorously worked to invent new vocabulary, they were
also trying to “save its language from being under servitude to foreign languages”490 in
the words of Ataturk.491 This entailed simultaneous processes of creating new
representations that label the traditional Ottoman languages as uncivilized and also
production of new knowledge through the fabrication or invention of a totally new
language.
Ataturk listed the characteristics of the backbone of Turkish nation as “political
unity, linguistic unity, territorial unity, unity of lineage and roots, shared history, and
shared morality.”492 This unity in all aspects of life entailed a coerced homogeneity under
486
Tas, p. 177.
Douglas A. Howard, The History of Turkey, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), p.
104.
488
Akural, p. 131.
489
Ibid.
490
“…Turk Milleti dilini de yabanci diller boyundurlugundan kurtarmalidir.”
491
Ataturk’un Soylev ve Demecleri, Cilt:II, (1952), p. 278.
492
Nurhan Tezcan, Ataturk’un Yazdigi Yurttaslik Bilgileri (Istanbul: Cagdas, 1989), p.
20.
487
104
Turk-ness, excluding all elements that did not fit in this new definition. An ideal Turk
would believe in Republican history, speak only Turkish, Westernize every possible
aspect of his life and practice his belief in private, to the degree allowed by the republic.
This system of assimilating the population into a homogeneous Turkish society was not
an easy task due to its multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual nature.
E. J. Hobsbawm argues that “the basic characteristic of the modern nation and
everything connected with it is its modernity,” and he also adds that the opposing
argument that “national identification is somehow so natural, primary and permanent as
to precede history” is still very prevalent.493 The Turkish nationalist project seems to
support both arguments without their contradiction.
Secularism
Secularism, which Turks call laiklik constitutes the basis for the state edifice of
modern Turkey.494 Secularist drive constituted one of the most important pillars of
Kemalist reforms.495 Turkish secularism has been an imperative part of modernization
together with westernization.496 The European mind perceives secularism as a “marker of
progressive modernity,”497 since in almost all advanced industrialized nations there has
493
Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Second Edition, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 15.
494
Kavakci Islam, p. 4.
495
Zurcher, p. 194.
496
Roger Owen, “Modernizing Projects in the Middle Eastern Perspective,” in Rethinking
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba, eds.,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 249.
497
Sampa Biswas, “The ‘New Cold War’ Secularism, Orientalism and Postcoloniality,”
in Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and
Class, Geeta Chowdry and Sheila Nair, eds., (New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 201.
105
been a transition towards more secular orientations.498 Laiklik, as a version of secularism
specially tailored for Turkey played an extremely important role in establishing the new
national identity. It was a vital part of the westernization process, since from a European
theoretical perspective nation states were required to have a sufficient kind of rationality,
democracy, industrialization, and most importantly secularism.499 In the making of nation
states, modernity has been associated with the secularization of the public domain, based
on the progressive modernity narrative, which argues that the constituting principles of
modern condition require the separation of religion from politics and science.500
Much of the social theory based on the modern narrative of progress and reason,
whether liberal or Marxist, premised itself on the inevitability of the regression of
religion from public/political life. If the Enlightenment principle of secularism
that banishes religion away from the public realm of politics had never been as
firmly entrenched as expected even in the Western liberal democracies where it
took root, many expected this to be a sign of and incomplete modernity that had
not fully blossomed worldwide.501
While the classical definition of secularism presents it as an “expression of the
separation of religious and political spheres,”502 the practice of secularism also entails a
“displacement of the authority of religion.”503 In Turkey, religion was perceived as a
major obstacle in the process of modernization and development,504 with the Kemalist
498
Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 204.
499
Biswas, “The ‘New Cold War’ Secularism, Orientalism and Postcoloniality,” p. 185.
500
Ibid, p. 193.
501
Ibid, p. 187.
502
Dietrich Jung, “A Key to Turkish Politics,” in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU
Accession, Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), p. 118.
503
Ayse Saktanber, Living Islam: Women and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey,
(London: I. B. Tairus, 2002), p. 3.
504
Ravza Kavakci Kan, “Laiklik: Secularism in Turkey: Not Just a Means for the State to
Control Religion, but an Endless Source of Conflict,” in An Anthology of Contending
Views on International Security, David Walton, and Michael Frazier, eds., (New York:
Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2012), p. 75.
106
elite utilizing secularism in “dismantling of the previous social order,”505 that was
deemed as backward because it was framed by Islamic belief and traditions.
Turkish modernization process would not be satisfied until complete
secularization was achieved.506 The Turkish Republic, similar to other non-Western
practices of secularism, overemphasized manifestations of modernity as well as its
accomplishments in the way of modernization, such as exorbitant secularism.507 In the
context of Turkish modernization, “the public sphere is institutionalized and imagined as
a site for the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life” which was a
process of “authoritarian modernism.”508 The production of practices or “performances of
belonging to modernity”509, as Nilufer Gole calls them, would amplify through the
implementation of secular ideals. This process involved “eradicating all religious traces
from political and social life,” 510 and produced a new system that denigrated them. To
become modernized and take its place among the civilized nations, Turkey had no
alternative, but to adopt secularist principles.511 During the days of the Empire, state and
religion were perceived to be inseparable; “the state was conceived as the embodiment of
505
Maxine Molyneux, “Women in Socialist Societies: Problems of Theory and Practice,”
in Of Marriage and the Market: Women’s Subordination Internationally and its Lessons,
Kate Young, Carol Wolkowitz, Roslyn McCullagh, eds., (London: Routledge, 1981), p.
60.
506
Caglar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity: Turkey in the 1990s,” p. 37
507
Nilufer Gole, “Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries,” Public
Culture, Vol. 14, Issue: 1 (2002), p. 184. pp. 173-190.
508
Ibid, p. 176.
509
Ibid, p. 184.
510
Kavakci Kan, “Laiklik: Secularism in Turkey: Not Just a Means for the State to
Control Religion, but an Endless Source of Conflict,” p.74.
511
Webster, p. 169.
107
religion and religion as the essence of the state.”512 The new republic needed to get rid of
all the barriers in the way of modernization by secularizing itself, which meant divorcing
the state as well as the society from all religious elements. This was done through
Orientalization of the religious representations. The founding elite began to advertise
religious practices as “uncivilized, backward, unintellectual, primitive, etc.” The practices
and performances that were secular, modern and imitating the West were recognized as
civilized, modern, developed. The implementation of the policies supporting this change
in attitude towards Islam was not an easy task to perform.
The Turkish elite adopted the term laiklik to refer to the Turkish version of
laicism, which is the differentiation of laity and clergy513 took its place in the Turkish
Constitution in 1937,514 but secularist principles had been molding the Kemalist
revolutions since 1920s. In time, laiklik evolved into a politically and socially charged
concept that became an intrinsic part of representations of the national identity as well as
the state. Laiklik can be defined not as a “neutral paradigm,” but “state’s preferred selfrepresentation,” a “state ideology,” and also a “hegemonic discourse.”515 The significance
of Laiklik goes much beyond its role in the revolutionary reforms, as it constitutes an
essential component of the process of reaching the level of contemporary civilizations.516
It is deployed as an active political strategy for actual change in the society. It is utilized
as a means to contain religion by the state. At the individual level, the perceptions and
512
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1964), p. 7.
513
Berkes, p. 5.
514
Tas, p. 160.
515
Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public life in Turkey
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 6.
516
Hikmet Kirik, Kamusal Alan ve Demokrasi: Ortunme Sorununu Yeniden Dusunmek,
(Istanbul: Salyangoz Yayinlari, 2005), p. 125.
108
practices were shaped in a way that made the implementation, promotion and practice of
laiklik at all possible aspects of life a very valuable commodity for the members of the
Turkish society who wanted to be socially and politically promoted.
It was Laïcité, the French version of secularism that inspired Ataturk to come up
with laiklik. Similar to the French experience, the Turkish institutionalization of
secularism adopted a militant course at the outset.517 Laïcité, aspired to confine religion
to the private life, segregating it from the state. 518 However, the deinstitutionalization of
Islam was a challenge due to its simultaneous meddlesome nature in all aspects of life,
private and public.519 Therefore Turkish laiklik was designed not to neglect religion, but
to keep it under control,520 utilizing secular principles, as “a means of rigid state control
over the religious field.”521 For this reason in the Turkish case there was never a true
separation of religion and state.522 Laiklik, which lacked a clear definition, was
“inconsistent, that it did not yet separate state from religion and it did not let religion
have its own autonomous existence.”523 Religion was protected by the state as long as it
was subordinate, i.e., it did not lead to any political or social change524 so that the Turkish
state would maintain exclusive control and authority over religion, acting as a
517
Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and the Secular State in Turkey,” in Turkey: Political, Social
and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, Cigdem Balim, Ersin Kalaycioglu, Cevat
Karatas, Gareth Winrow, Feroz Yasamee, eds., (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 91.
518
Massimo Introvigne, “Turkish Religious Markets: A View Based on the Religious
Economy Theory,” The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,
Hakan Yavuz, ed., (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 37.
519
Ibid.
520
Ibid.
521
Dietrich Jung, “A Key to Turkish Politics,” p. 118.
522
Elise Massicard, “Islam in Turkey: A ‘Secular Muslim’ State,” in Turkey Today: A
European Country?, Oliver Roy, ed., (London: Anthem Press, 2004), p. 54.
523
Berkes, p. 479.
524
Ibid, p. 499.
109
manufacturer of religious norms to be imposed on the society.525 The preservation of
Laiklik eventually became identified with defending Kemalist principles and the integrity
of the republic, legitimizing undemocratic practices of the ruling elite including the
military.526
The secularization process of Kemalist reforms took place in three stages:527 The
initial stage was aimed at the secularization of state, education and law that was done
through an “attack on the traditional strongholds of the institutionalized Islam.”528
Abolition of the caliphate system, adapting of Swiss civil code, Italian penal code,
secularization of family law and switching to the European calendar system were among
the changes that took place.529 The second phase was the “attack on religious symbols
and their replacement by the symbols of European civilization,”530 which constituted the
main sartorial aspect531 of the reforms. The secularization reforms were strengthened and
enhanced in the final phase, through the secularization of all aspects of social life and
“the attack on popular Islam” that it brought about.532 This phase aimed to confine all
Islamic practices exclusively to the private realm, and the “hearts of the people.”533 The
attack on Islamic values constituted the Orientalization of religious elements and creation
of new power relations in which the followers of secular principles were among the
525
Massicard, “Islam in Turkey: A ‘Secular Muslim’ State,” p. 55.
Dietrich Jung, “A Key to Turkish Politics,” pp. 118-119.
527
Zurcher, p. 194.
528
Ibid, p. 194.
529
Ibid, pp. 180-181.
530
Ibid, pp. 194-195.
531
Ibid, p. 181.
532
Ibid, p. 195.
533
Kavakci Kan, “Laiklik: Secularism in Turkey: Not Just a Means for the State to
Control Religion, but an Endless Source of Conflict,” p.74.
526
110
privileged benevolent class and the ones who insisted on holding on to their religion were
inferior and therefore subordinate to them.
Unlike many other Muslim states, Turkey was never colonized and therefore
never had to deal with imperial rule or domination.534 This is among the factors why it
did not produce “the most persistent anti-imperialist ideologies”535 like in other states.
This might explain why there was not much resistance to secularism in the beginning.
The transformation from empire to the republic involved implementation of multiple
policies simultaneously. While the international agenda was focused on the tragedy of
First World War politics, the ordinary traditional practices were briefly suspended during
the struggle for independence.536 The change in the traditional gender roles in the society
was an example. Women stepped out of their traditional roles and took active part in the
war. The people had no choice but to unite against the enemy. As the new nation was
trying to get back on its feet in this chaotic atmosphere, it was not difficult for the
founding elite of the new republic to adopt strict secular measures in all its attitudes as
practices in 1928.537 Islam had been utilized by Ataturk as a “rallying cry against the
foreign invaders” during the independence war to help mobilize the people.538 Once the
war was over, and the allied forces were forced out of the republican borders, the
“victorious” nation ignoring the fact that it was in also the “defeated’ empire, adopted
534
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. xx.
535
Keddie Nikki and Lois Beck, “Introduction,” in Women in the Muslim World, Nikki
Keddie and Lois Beck, eds., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) p. 13.
536
Elizabeth Fernea and Basima Qattan Bezirgan, “Introduction,” in Middle Eastern
Muslim Women Speak, Elizabeth Fernea and Basima Qattan Bezirgan, eds., (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1977), p. xxxii.
537
Ibid, p. xxxiv.
538
Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981),
p. 63.
111
secularism, as a means of detaching itself from “international bonds which might become
embarrassing to its freedom of action and individual development,” which were the
strong historical ties with Islam, as the former home of the acting leader of the Muslim
World for six centuries.539 The war-exhausted population had no other choice but to
follow their new “victorious” leader in the conquest of building a new Turkish nation.
The imperial mindset was still prevalent even though the new republic was the offspring
of a defeated empire. The masses were led to believe that Turks still had the capacity to
join the global winners, not realizing that there was no way to imperial status.
The effect of secularist policies as well as the impact of other republican reforms
varied depending on geography.540 The reforms passed by the Turkish Parliament were
not all immediately and successfully implemented. While the elite urban population
blithely internalized the reforms, the rural population seemed to maintain a position of
indifference. This might elucidate the reason behind the lack of large-scale active
contestation of implementation of secularism, except for a few notable exceptions.541 It
was also important to note that the roots of aspirations to secularization as a part of
modernization dated back to the days of the Empire. Although this militant version of
secularism was new “traces of what might be called anti-clericalism can be found in
earlier periods of Ottoman history. The ancient chronicles, for example, reflect the
resentments of the frontiersmen at the being subjected to the hierarchy and restraints of
Islamic orthodoxy.”542 Secularist and positivist ideas gained some popularity, later,
539
Webster, p. 169.
Steven Vertigans, Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey: Understanding and
Explaining the Muslim Resuregence, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), p. 47.
541
Ibid.
542
Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 402.
540
112
during the Young Turk period,543 between 1890 and 1918.544 From the first days of the
new republic, Ataturk’s main aim was to establish a secular and modern Turkey that
would have the potential to catch up and triumphantly compete with other states at the
“highest level of contemporary civilization.”545 He believed that the new republic could
only achieve the level of contemporary civilization through an adamant adherence to this
strict form of secularism.
Although secular principles continue to be implemented in a very exaggerated
manner, the role of religion in people’s lives has not diminished as more than 75 percent
of Turkish population classify themselves as religious people according to World Value
Survey of 2007 (Table 2).
Table 2. World Value Survey, Turkey 2007 Are you a religious person.
Are you a
religious
person?
A religious
person
Not a religious
person
A convinced
atheist
Percentage
15-29 years
Percentage
30-49 years
Percentage
50 and older
Total
77.8
83.7
90.4
82.6
21.5
15.8
9.2
16.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.5
543
Ibid.
Durdu Mehmet Burak, “Osmanli Devleti’nde Jon Turk Hareketinin Baslamasi ve
Etkileri,” OTAM, Sayı. 14, Ankara, 2003, p. 291.
545
Jacob M. Landau, “Ataturk’s Achievement: Some Considerations,” in Ataturk and the
Modernization of Turkey, Jacob Landau, ed., (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1984), p.
xiii.
544
113
Republicanism
Republicanism as a concept has its original roots in ancient Rome and is derived
from the Latin term “Res Publica,” which means “public good.”546 It indicates a system
in which welfare of specific individuals, groups or classes is secondary to the welfare of
the society as a whole.547 Republicanism is based on a system in which individuals are
active participants in political life, and this system intends to promote the autonomy of
the citizens by advocating civil virtue through strengthening their ties with the political
community.548 In the Turkish case the term “republic” connotes the principles that
“sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation,” and “president is directly or
indirectly elected by the nation.”549
The concept of “republic” was introduced in post-independence war Turkey by
adopting the article that read “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation,” and
“government is based on the principle of people’s direct rule over their destiny” were
mottos repeated by Ataturk numerous times to emphasize the importance of
republicanism. Turkish Republicanist narrative utilized a democratic language. Ataturk
asserted that republicanism denoted democratic governance,550 listing republicanism as a
virtue.551
546
Tas, p. 26.
Hamza Eroglu, Turk Inkilap Tarihi (Istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanligi, 1982), p. 382.
548
Duncan Kelly, “Reforming Republicanism in Nineteenth Century Britain: James
Lorymer’s The Republic in Context,” in Republicanism in Theory and Practice, Iseult
Honohan and Jeremy Jennings, eds., (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 41.
549
Eroglu, p. 381.
550
Ayse Afetinan, Ataturk Hakkinda Hatiralar ve Belgeler (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,
1959), p. 251.
551
Ataturk’un Soylev ve Demecleri, Cilt II (Ankara: Turk Inkilap Tarihi Enstutusu, 1989),
p. 234.
547
114
Since the welfare of the republic was perceived as a priority that could override
individual liberties, the republican elite did everything necessary to never allow the
nation to “fall behind” the civilized nations, like before. A “modernizing
authoritarianism”552 developed imposing a new language, a new history, a new culture,
thus an overall new life style that intended to create sameness among citizens. The
republican identity promoted a European-influenced nationalism model together with the
values of Western positivist sociology and philosophy,553 but not its democratic political
practices. The republican ideals were introduced all at once to avoid the backlash
aroused by the “scandalous reforms,”554 therefore getting categorized as a “revolution for
the people, in spite of the people.”555
Even though Turkish Republicanism was premised on being antithetical to its
predecessor, that was not the case. From a Tocquevillean perspective “the old regime
provided the revolution with several of its patterns,” yielding a Kemalist Republic that
adopted centralism as well as the “condescending and bludgeoning paternalism of the
Ottoman Father-State.”556
Statism/Etatism
Although Kemalism initially seemed to support economic individualism,557 the
state become the largest industrialist in Turkey controlling all aspects of industry and
552
Jean-Francous Bayart, “Republican Trajectories on Iran and Turkey: a Tocquevillian
Reading,” in Democracy Without Democrats?: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim
World, Ghassan Salame, ed. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 282.
553
Ibid, p. 283.
554
Ibid.
555
Ibid, p. 285.
556
Ibid.
557
Webster, p. 167.
115
labor, which brought it close to the status of totalitarian regimes.558 Statism was a newly
introduced strategy that referred to the “recognition of the preeminence of the state in the
economic field.”559
Among the main duties of the Turkish Republic was to act as the protector of the
entire nation, which entailed an unlimited source of power. Statist policies were
important in sponsoring economic development and following the technological
developments in the world in the struggle against imperialism. It also helped strengthen
the power of the state an ensure control over areas not limited to economy but also in the
social and legal arenas that were going under the process of transformation. In addition,
the increase in dictatorial movements in some Eastern European states damaged the
prestige of economic and political liberalism, making it easier for the regime in Turkey to
gain and exert new political powers that complement the new economic duties.560 Statism
was important for the Turkish Republic because economic independence was the
prerequisite of national independence and the only means of establishing economic
independence was through building a national economy under the protection of the
regime.561 This model of statism was not necessarily the dominant model in Europe, but
one developed after the Russian model that was embraced by industrializing nations.562
Populism
Populism as an idea was first vocalized during the First World War and referred
to national solidarity and the act of prioritization of the interests of the nation before the
558
Ibid, p. 169.
Zurcher, p. 190.
560
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 469.
561
Berkes, p. 335.
562
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 471.
559
116
interests of any class or group in the society.563 According to a high school sociology
textbook published in 1936, populism is not based on a “theory but the conscience of a
nation.”564 Populism emphasized a classless society in which all people are treated equal
with no regard to their financial status, family background, occupation or place of
residence.565 Islamic teachings came handy at this point, and were utilized even though
secularization was still in progress.566 Islamic teachings related to the equality of all
members of the society, one in which there were not classes, no citizen was privileged
over the other based on economic, social, political status were very much in harmony
with the arguments of populism.567 The Kemalist elite utilized this potential as a vertical
mobilizer568 and the republic subordinated the Islamic principles to its project.
Populism is perceived as a natural outcome of Turkish nationalism.569 It was often
presented by Kemal Ataturk as an alternative to capitalism and imperialism.570 It is a
“tribute to the communitarian ideals of a Muslim world view”571 which also denies
“the idea of a pluralist society in favor of an organic view of society and people.”572 This
anti pluralist Islamic interpretation is in fact the opposite of the Ottoman Islamic system
of government that was pluralist. Populism has three components:573 First component is
563
Zurcher, p. 189.
Necmettin Sadak, Sosyoloji [Lise Textbook], (Istanbul: Devlet Basim Evi, 1936), p.
69. (Cited in Webster, p. 165, footnote 5).
565
Webster, p. 166.
566
Ibid.
567
Ibid.
568
Ibid.
569
Tas, p. 69.
570
Eroglu, p. 420.
571
Kramer, p. 5.
572
Ibid.
573
Tas, p. 73.
564
117
the ultimate sovereignty of the nation. Second is equality for all citizens before the law
and the final component is rejection of class struggle.
Revolutionalism/Reformism/Transformationism
Kemalists explicitly defined their project as a “transformation” in contrast to a
“revolution.” Mustafa Kemal himself was wary of using the concept revolution because
he believed that it may have signaled an association between Kemalism and communist
movements in the Soviet context that he was eager to avoid.574
What set revolutionalism apart from all the other Kemalist principles was that it
was responsible from securing and maintaining of the other five components of Ataturk’s
reforms. It had two main components.575 One was that all the changes to be introduced
upon the social needs of the society had to be an output of positivist scholarship. The
other was making sure that all newly introduced thought systems were in accordance with
the preceding Kemalist principles. This helped maintain the legitimacy and strength of
Kemalist principles and provided a checks and balances system which assured that no
idea contradicting afore mentioned principles would ever survive in the republic.
From Kemalist Principles to “Kemalism”
All the Kemalist principles were brought to life through enactment of laws that
enabled the required social, political, cultural and economic changes. These principles
constituted clear interfaces of Turkish nationalist project and particularly the
westernization process. The Kemalist principles laid the foundation of the new republic’s
struggle to reach the level of contemporary civilization, which depended for their
574
575
Parla and Davison, p. 126.
Ibid, p. 92.
118
legitimacy on the absolute success of the westernization project. The principle of
secularism played an especially colossal role in ensuring the success of westernization in
Turkey as it enabled the transformation of the society from an Islamic one to that which
dressed and behaved like the European nations that were already modernized. Secularism
was also perceived as the guarantor of Kemalist principles and therefore the most
important cornerstone of the new republic. Simultaneous processes of systematic
Orientalization of Islamic elements, and the creation of knowledge and new
representations of the republic as European civilized and modern, resulted in the creation
of new power relations among the various actors within the republic as well as
privileging external relations with other states, especially in Europe.
From a national perspective, the newly created representations led to the
emergence of a secular Kemalist elite who, together with their followers became more
powerful over the old Ottoman elites and masses who still could not part way with their
religious and traditional practices. They were known for promoting and imposing the
adaptation of western ways on every aspect of life. This republican secular elite and their
followers were presented by the new system as “good citizens,” and the rest of the people
had to become just like them in order to achieve the status of “good citizens.” The
definition of good citizenship is very much alike to that of “good Muslim” in Mahmood
Mamdani’s book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.576 Within this framework, a “good Muslim
citizen” was one that believed in and followed Kemalist principles, leading a secular life
by imitating the European life style in every way possible. S/he would display no traces
of Islamic behavior, dress in European attire, enjoy classical Western music, go to balls,
576
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the
Roots of Terror, (New York: Three Leaves Press Doubleday, 2005).
119
have no problem with consuming alcohol, etc. Promotion of “good Muslim citizenship”
was done through simultaneous promotion of European lifestyle and a more severe and
systematic rejection of traditional Islamic lifestyle.
The result was the methodical Orientalization of Islam, Islamic culture and
practices as characteristics and forms of behavior of the traditional and religious masses
that were “aberrant, underdeveloped and inferior,”577 therefore not fitting the superior
nature of the new republican identity. The Orientalist perception that Orientals lacked the
capacity to change or improve shaped their attitude to the religious masses who were
forced into transforming themselves into the “good Muslim citizens” as prescribed by the
Kemalist elite. The effects of this system could be seen in the dominant Turkish
nationalist, republican, secularist, modernization and westernization narratives that
survive at present. The Kemalist secularist elite have presented themselves as the real
owners of the Turkish republic and have portrayed the people who wanted to practice
their religion as inferior and subordinate. Up until the rise of the AKP, the former had
occupied positions of power in the material or physical sense as well as in the exercise of
the power of representation. The definition of what they stood for as well as the ability to
define their competitors relied on the state system to claim to be reputable good citizens
who suffer among the ignorant, inferior others in the society. As to the inferior others, the
“bad Muslim citizens,” the only way for them to become good citizens would be through
copying everything that the good citizens did. They could be well educated, technology
literate, modernized in most aspects of life but they could never aspire to the status of
577
Ibid, p. 32.
120
good citizens unless they strip themselves of religious practice. Until then, they would be
confined to second grade citizenry.
Among the Kemalist principles, secularism was the one that was the most
prominent in relation to the role model status of Turkey. It was the main characteristic
that enabled the republic to be “like” Europe at least in appearance.
Role Model Status of Turkey
From a historical perspective, the Ottoman Empire played an extremely important
role as the representative of the Muslim world both in the eyes of the Europeans as well
as the Muslims under Ottoman rule. For the Europeans, the Ottoman Empire was
synonymous with Islam and the Muslim world. It was unique due to its status as “the
only Muslim great power” and the only “European Muslim power,” that had “emerged as
the single most serious threat to European Christendom” during a time of European
expansionism and colonization.578 As for the Muslims, especially after the Ottoman
conquest of Egypt in 1517, it became officially the home of the caliph, who had religious
authority over the Muslim population all over the world.579 A super power, the Ottoman
Empire continued to be a major player at the international arena until their final days.
This feeling of confidence and leadership also embodied a sense of superiority that was
passed on to the republic. The republic, ignoring the fact that it was the successor of the
empire, and was now lowered to the ranks of the weak underdeveloped nations, still
visualized and presented itself as a model for the Muslims to follow.
578
Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimization of
Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), p. 1.
579
Caesar E. Farah, 2009. “Great Britain, Germany and the Ottoman Caliphate,” Der
Islam. Vol. 66 Issue. 2. Retrieved 14 Dec. 2012, from doi:10.1515/islm.1989.66.2.264, p.
193.
121
The role model status of Turkey was constructed in relation to the power relations
involved within the national context, the regional context and the international context.
Turkish arguments regarding their role model-ness can be linked to the concept of
“Ottoman Orientalism” introduced by Ussama Makdisi.580 According to Makdisi, the
term refers to “a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of
Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of
progress and the East, writ large to be a present theater of backwardness.”581 The
Ottoman reformers believed that they were essentially different from the West due to
their Islamic identity, articulating that it was necessary for a modern Ottoman nation “to
lead the empire’s other putatively stagnant ethnic and national groups into an Ottoman
modernity.” 582 Islam was the main factor that represented the commonality of the empire
with its Muslim subjects within a “discourse that justified Ottoman Turkish rule over
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, over Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Bulgarians, etc.”583
The classical self-representation of the Ottoman Empire was as an “orthodox Islamic
dynasty superior to all other empires.”584 This perspective of “Ottoman Orientalism,”
with most of its arguments was inherited by the republic. The republic, with its
commitment to westernization took the necessary steps to become European, presenting
itself again as an example for the Muslim nations to follow.
580
Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” American Historical Review, Vol. 107, No.
3 (June 2002), pp. 768-796.
581
Ibid, p. 769.
582
Ibid, p. 769.
583
Ibid, pp. 669-670.
584
Ibid, p. 771.
122
From the regional perspective, the Turkish republican model became popular in
the Middle East since its establishment.585 The Turkish Republic’s commitment to
modernization was inspirational for Afghanistan, Iran and Tunisia.586 Upon proving its
commitment to Westernization, many Western nations also presented Turkey as role
model for Muslims since 1950s.587 The rhetoric on role model-ness of Turkey was
repeatedly invoked following many important international incidents that challenged the
West culminating with the attacks of September 11th and the process of Arab awakening.
Merve Kavakci’s dissertation introduces strong arguments questioning “the ‘role
model’ status of Turkey with respect to the advancement of female agency in the secular
context with a specific reference to the women with headscarves.”588 She argues that
Turkish model cannot serve as a role model to other Muslim nations due to its
mistreatment of the women who wear headscarves in the name of serving its commitment
to firm secularist principles based on an Orientalist foundation.589 Kavakci asserts that
the Turkish secularist intellectuals and Western thinkers present Turkey as a role model
to the Muslim world due to its commitment to the modernization process.590 However,
she argues, Turkey cannot be accepted as a model Muslim modernized country, while it
is oppressing the women with headscarves who also constitute a significant part of the
population.
585
Meliha Benli Altunisik, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the
Middle East,” p. 41.
586
Ibid, p. 42.
587
Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,” p.51 .
588
Merve Kavakci, Questioning Turkey’s Role Model Status: A Critical Examination of
the Social and Political Implications of the Headscarf Ban in Turkey, PhD, Howard
University, Washington, DC, 2007.
589
Ibid.
590
Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey, p. 4.
123
She explains that the Turkish republican elite have implemented extreme
secularist measures that have denied these women their basic citizenship rights,591 which
is not a characteristic that normally falls under the category of “exemplary.” She is
critical of the role model concept in the context of gender, as it excludes the marginalized
Muslim woman. While Kavakci analyzes the role model-ness of Turkey within the
framework of national politics, she does not go into the discussion of the overall
problematic and contentious nature of the very role model status of Turkey. Neither does
it present a Turkish foreign policy perspective in relation to it.
This dissertation presents a different and broader approach to the analysis of role
model status of Turkey. At the outset, the fictional nature of the concept of Turkish role
model is presented. As one of the most basic indicators of democracy and the sine qua
non of becoming a developed nation Turkish secularism marginalized a large segment of
its population. The republican policies implemented in the name of Europeanization have
produced an authoritarian and anti-individualist history and legacy under the leadership
of Ataturk. Based on these shortcomings, and taking Kavakci’s arguments related to the
contentious nature of Turkish role model-ness, this dissertation adduces that role model
status of Turkey is an imagined and invented status, which was utilized by both the
republican elite and the Western nations for various reasons. It argues that Turkey
claimed to be European, however, it was only Europeanized on the surface, marginalizing
an important part of the population, and therefore in reality represented a different
European model. At the national level, the role model argument was utilized by the
591
Ibid.
124
republican elite to legitimize their position, and to justify and strengthen their policies,
therefore defeating any possible local resistance.
This dissertation also looks into the foreign policy aspect of the “fictional” role
model status and how it constitutes and/or affects the relations between the Turkish
Republic, Europe and the Muslim states. By declaring the republic’s European
aspirations as the basis of its role model status, Europe does not consider it as an equal
but sets it apart from the other Muslims by declaring it “the better Muslim” with the
highest potential and capacity to come close to imitating European behavior. By doing
this, Europe praises Turkey for having adopted western ways in most aspects of life,
while at the same time reinforcing the differences by evaluating Turkey within the
category of Muslim others and therefore reemphasizing the impossibility of its recategorization as “European.” Despite its fictitious nature, Europe utilizes Turkish role
model status in constructing and regulating its relations with Turkey, as well as the
Muslim nations. Europe highlights the type of state that is “tolerable,” even though it is
Muslim. The Turkish Republic’s enthusiastic acceptance of the European support of this
status reflects Turkey’s ultimate defeat by Europe giving priority to “becoming”
European, giving new meaning to its historical duty of leading the Muslim world. Both
Europe and the republican elite utilize the role model status of Turkey as an instrument
against Islam.
Turkey resorts to putting the role model rhetoric into use in its relations with the
Muslim world. During the days of the empire it was the natural leader of many Muslim
nations, which it ruled over and also served as the home of the Caliph, and its control of
the Muslim Holy Lands. At the present, it offers itself as a modern secular republic, in
125
which democracy and Islamic values coexist. While doing this, all the limitations
brought to religious practices by the republican elite and the accompanying oppressive
measures are overlooked. Turkey has continued to exhort its model of democracy and
secularism to other Muslim nations until the present time,592 in a way similar to the
Western nations’ imposing of the neoliberal economic system on the underdeveloped
nations. The underlying paradox from the international perspective is that Turkey has
distanced and isolated itself from the Muslim world while it was supposed to act as a role
model for it.
Both Europe and Turkey promote the role model status of Turkish Republic as an
absolute truth and they employ it in ways that serve their own interests, their relations
with one another as well as their relations with the Muslim world. This is instrumental in
the regulation of power relations between the parties without having to deal with any
catechism about the authenticity of the role model status. This continues to be the case as
observed in the recent debates regarding the Arab Awakening. One of the main questions
discussed has been whether Turkey could be a role model for particular Arab states and
not whether Turkish role model status was genuine.
Secularism and Turkey’s Role Model Status
Turkish commitment to secularism has been celebrated by the Western nations,
not as a member of the European privileged core, but as a follower in the periphery.
Bernard Lewis applauds Turkish adoption of secularism, identifying it as “a final break
592
Nuray Mert, “Erdogan’s Secularism or ‘Secularism as Disaster,’” Hurriyet Daily
News, October 18, 2011 available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=erdogan8217ssecularism-or-8216secularism-as-disaster8217-2011-09-18, accessed on December 24,
2012.
126
with the past and the East to the final incorporation of Turkey into the civilization of the
modern West.”593
The adoption and ardent implementation of secularism in Turkey became one of
the major reasons for Turkey to be presented by the West as a role model for the Muslim
developing world. It made it possible for Turkey to strip itself of its Islamic
characteristics in the hope of taking its place among the nations of the West. It has been
seen the main reason for the Turkish Republic’s reputation as a success story in the
international arena, making it “a Muslim state that functions relatively more successful
than any other,” and therefore the “most promising model in the Muslim world.”594
Turkey’s consecration of its commitment to secularism and republicanism in the
republican constitution was welcomed as a good example of a “potential successful
democracy in the Muslim world,” which can promote and lead the others in a process of
liberalization.595 Turkey was also commended on its unique secular experiment in the
Muslim world with the potential to reap rewards from its appealing model among the
other Turkic nations as well as the nations of the Middle East.596
If laiklik were to be analyzed taking religion and state as the two main focal
points,with religious extremism and secular extremism as the two end points, it would
593
Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 279.
Graham Fuller, “The Erdogan Experiment in Turkey is the Future,” The American
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No:3 (Summer 2005), p. 66.
595
Phillips David, “Turkey’s Dreams of Accession,” Foreign Affairs, 83, (SeptemberOctober 2004), pp. 86-97.
596
Ustun Erguder, “Turkish Party System and the Future of Turkish Democracy,” in
Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, Cigdem Balim, Ersin
Kalaycioglu, Cevat Karatas, Garet Winrow, Feroz Yasamee, eds., (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1995, p. 66).
594
127
fall in the middle between absolute secularism and secular extremism/fundamentalism.597
Laiklik, which initially aspired to separate religion from the state, ironically yields a state
system that has to deal with religious issues. Through the promotion of laik measures as a
part of the new modern Turkish Republican identity, laiklik eventually becomes a belief
system598 that intends to replace religion. The leader of this belief system would naturally
be Ataturk who has already been given a divine like status and perceived as “halfGod.”599 In modern day Turkey, Mustafa Kemal is considered to be a
demigod whose every important utterance, and many that are not, must be learnt
by heart by school children. Indeed, critics of his fiercely statist and secularist
policies claim that the republican establishment has turned Kemalism into a form
of religion.600
Secularism, as promoted by the republican elite under the leadership of Ataturk,
served as the hauling force behind the creation of the new republican identity as well as
the manufacturing of the role model status of Turkey. Turkish Republic’s practices of
secularism, in form of laiklik, were employed to devalue and subordinate Islam. This was
useful in the creation of the new secular republican identity, which also had reconstructed
the international relations of the new republic, distancing it from the Muslim World and
supposedly bringing it closer to the European nations. Secularism constituted the most
valuable factor in the embrace of the politically fictious role model status.
Turkish Republican elite employed laiklik as a part and parcel of the role model
status in the marginalization of Islam at various levels. That is why they welcomed,
597
Merve Kavakci, “Put This Woman in Her Place!,” QNEWS, 353 (January, 2004), pp.
30-32.
598
Merve Kavakci introduced the concept of “state religion” (referring to the utilization
of Islam by the state) at an address to British Parliament, House of Lords in November
2000.
599
Zeki Unal, Anarsi: Kainat Nizami Anarsiyi Reddeder (Ankara, 1992), p. 17.
600
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 51.
128
strengthened, reproduced and disseminated all the knowledge and representations that
support this status without having to address its validity and reality. This was valuable for
the republican elite in maintaining and strengthening their legitimacy internally.
Receiving approval and support from Europe by being presented as a role model to the
Muslim world was the proof that they were on the right track in the Europeanization
process. They used it to further marginalize Islam in the society and completely divorce
the new republican identity from it. It also served as a practical means to display the new
international position of the nascent republic that was much different from that of the
empire. The new republic turned its face to Europe, turning its back on the Muslim
nations. The desire for Europeanization was a de jure admission of the end of the empire.
The new republic did everything it could to prove that it wanted to become European in
every sense of the term, making every possible attempt to act together with European
nations in the international arena.
Reflections of the Role Model Status on Foreign Policy
The republican elite never addressed the painful loss of Turkey’s imperial status.
The break with the Ottoman past was one attempt to recognize the end to the empire, an
important part of which constituted its relation to the Muslim World. The loss of the
imperial status was especially difficult to digest due to the fact that the mighty empire
had to deal with the humiliating experience of seeing its provinces join its enemies in
search of independence and eventually partitioned among the winners. The republican
elite under the leadership of Ataturk was silent on how Turkey now joined the ranks of
developing nations and chose instead to embrace the new goal of Europeanization as if
the new republic could eventually join the winners by becoming European.
129
Turkey utilized the role model status as a medium for reflecting the realities of a
new world in which it was to see Europe as a mentor and distance itself from the Muslim
nations. This set the tone for the new foreign policy strategy of Turkish Republic.
Distancing itself from the Muslim nations helped break the connections with the notion
of Ummah, the Islamic world community. This served the republican strategy in a
number of ways. First of all, it contributed to the process of divorcing the Turkish
national identity from Islamic roots. The end of the empire severed its ties with its
Muslim neighbors who subsequently become British and French mandates, which was
the UN designations given to them. This created a gap between the Muslim nations and
Turkey that was to increase, leading Turkey to diverge from them with Turks working
towards being members of the European club, which was based on their subordinating
their affiliation with the Muslim world. The Republic claimed that its inevitable isolation
from the Muslim world as an inevitable component of successful Europeanization.
The Empire, which had been perceived as an adamant enemy of Europe was now
replaced by the new smaller republic, which was fearful of being partitioned and seemed
ready to placate the West and pay any price to become European. This placed Europe in a
powerful position with Turkey, acknowledging the value of European authority to
represent it as a role model to the Muslim nations. This had implications for Europe,
Turkey and the Muslim nations. By representing Turkey as a role model for Muslims,
Europe was representing itself as powerful enough to “label” or “categorize” the new
republic just as it had represented the mighty Ottoman Empire as the sick man of Europe.
This indicated the continuation of European power over Turkey as well as the Muslim
world. In labeling the Turkish Republic with its mixed political legacy as a role model,
130
Europe supported a fiction that further marginalized Islam and Muslims, regulating its
foreign policy goals.
As an acknowledgement of European military and political victories, the Turkish
Republic welcomed the role model status with no questions and re-presented itself to the
Muslim world as a model that enjoyed European “approval.” This approval and
endorsement of European power over Turkey was in exchange for an imagined and
“constructed” powerful position of the new republic over the Muslim world. This final
instance of power relations between Turkey and the Muslim world may have reproduced
similar hierarchical relations to those that prevailed during the times of the empire,
however, the terms and the content of the power relations changed. The new republican
narrative was one that has embraced secular, modern, Western terminology and no longer
utilized the Ummah terminology.
In its embrace of this new status and through its obsessive desire to be European,
republican Turkey also unintentionally demonstrated that it is in fact not European. It did
everything possible as an outsider to seek European approval. This desire to become
European was limited to a mere mimicry of some European social and political practices
while simultaneously imposing oppressive authoritarian policies over its population that
contradict European ideals. The new republic, having lost its position as an imperial
power was ambitious to join the ones it could not defeat at military, economic,
technologic and political arenas.
131
CHAPTER 3. TURKEY IN BETWEEN POLITICAL/MILITARY
AUTHORITARIANISM, ROLE MODEL STATUS, NATIONAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRACY
Chapter 3 discusses the details of the development of a new Turkish identity
shaped by modernization, westernization and secularization and its use for the building of
a new state. It highlights the production and the evolution of the related power relations
and representations between Turkey on the one hand, and the European and Muslim
states on the other. It analyzes the authoritarian legacy of Ataturk and the continuing
involvement of the military that (in the form of coup d’états), which showed how the role
model status departs from the Turkish reality. The policies and actions of secular actors
such as the Kemalist elite and the military contributed to the paradoxical character of
Turkey’s role model status. The emergence of an Islamic political movement that was an
advocate for democratization and its gradual transformation from its initially antiWestern position into a pro-European Union added a new set of paradoxes.
Prelude to the Second Republic (1940-1960)
By the 1930s the structural deficiencies of the republican state became clearer.
They included “the repression, the intense national paranoia, the shortcomings of its
democracy and the over-reliance on the army.”601 While promoting westernization,
Ataturk also had autocratic tendencies, which when combined with the militaristic
tendencies of the newly founded state, showed the republic’s failure to deliver
democracy.602 This was a time when Europe was also dealing with the autocratic regimes
601
602
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 64.
Ibid, pp. 64-65.
132
of Mussolini and Hitler.603 Turkey continued to have a one party system until the late
1940s and all the various political attempts to produce oppositional movement were
unsuccessful.604 As the Second World War began, Turkey was trying to recover from the
death of Ataturk in 1938. Ismet Inonu, a former military officer and an influential
political figure who negotiated the treaty of Lausanne, became the second president of the
Turkish Republic, taking the title of “National Leader” as the leader of the Republican
People’s Party in the single-party system.605
Due to a failing economy and poor military conditions, Turkey managed to stay
out of the war through various concessions, signing numerous treaties and playing a
complete international political version of three monkeys (a practice of see no evil, hear
no evil, speak no evil),606 making promises to both sides and acting as if they were
unintentionally slow in delivering. As a result, the republic got away with making
concessions to the Allies while maintaining friendly relations with the Germans, and
when asked to fulfill the promises that were made or when faced with new demands, they
“displayed a ‘diplomatic deafness’ in their relations with both sides.”607 Both Germany
and the Allied forces, especially the British had been pressuring Turkey to enter the war
on their side from the very beginning and the pressure escalated as the war progressed.
However, Turkey managed to keep all parties waiting and ended up making it through the
war without officially picking sides between Germany and the allied forces who were
603
Ibid, p. 66.
Ibid, p. 67.
605
Ibid, p. 73.
606
Ibid, pp. 73-76.
607
Ibid, p. 74.
604
133
joined by the Soviet Union.608 The ambivalent position of the republic came to an end
with its symbolic siding with the allied forces in February 1945, as the conflict came to
an end.609 While the diplomatic stalling games sometimes categorized under the label
“active neutrality”610 were successful in keeping Turkey out of the war, some argued that
it damaged the country’s international reputation.611 Some Europeans believed that these
games proved that the Turks did not deserve to be a part of the Western alliance,
however, others asserted that the late involvement of Turkey assured its place among the
nations that founded the United Nations.612
Following the end of the war, the unpopularity of the republican regime reached
its peak among the masses as the standard of living deteriorated, the inflation increased
due to poor economic policies and tax collection seemed to be the only stable policy
implemented by the Inonu administration.613 These socio-economic problems led to
nationwide discontent.
In the international arena, “the defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World
War was in itself a victory for democratic values,” and the emergence of the United
States, a capitalist, pluralist democracy, as a super power impressed the rest of the world
nations including Turkey.614 Turkey had made a good impression on the Western nations
for having “discarded its past” and seeking to join the West as a Muslim country from
608
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 77.
610
Ibid.
611
Zurcher, p. 214.
612
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 77.
613
Zurcher, pp. 215-216.
614
Ibid, p. 217.
609
134
1930s to the1950s.615 The post-World War II period was time for Turkey to clarify its
position by deciding whether it was to become an ally of the Soviet Union, or the West.
Throughout 1920s and 1930s, keeping close relations with the Soviet Union constituted
the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy,616 despite the historical Soviet interest in the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the passageway to the Black Sea.617 Turkey and the
Soviet Union had good relations after the Turkish the war of independence, a period
when Turkey was not on good terms with the Western states. This was a time period
when Turkey did not trust the West, and therefore keeping good relations with the
Soviets was a foreign policy priority, leading to the signing of a friendship agreement
which went into effect in 1935 and lasted till 1945.618 The Soviet’s increasing demands
for a revision of borders and claims on lands in north eastern part of Turkey brought the
relations to a deadlock in 1946 and with the encouragement of the United States Turkey
assertively refused Soviet demands once and for all.619
The increasing spread of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was among the
factors that led the United States to take Turkey under its wings, with the launching of the
“Truman Doctrine” in 1947. This gave the United States Congress the power to give
military and financial support to Greece and Turkey, to “help defend ‘free nations’ whose
existence was threatened by foreign pressure or by militant minorities.”620 Turkey
strengthened its ties with Western nations, especially with the United States, committing
itself to the democratic principles in accordance with the United Nations Charter it had
615
Ibid, p. 201.
Ibid, p. 217.
617
Ibid, p. 218.
618
Ibid, p. 210.
619
Ibid, p. 218.
620
Ibid.
616
135
signed as a founding member in 1945.621 The poor economic conditions and the
autocratic tendencies of the regime left Turkey vulnerable to external influences. The
United States attached strategic importance to Turkey.
Turkey’s new position as an ally of Western nations, led to increasing Turkish
interest in the Western values. The Unites States’ emergence as a pluralist, capitalist and
democratic super power after the Second World War was impressive for many among the
Turkish elite. These international factors when combined with the internal socioeconomic instability and the widespread discontent with the Inonu regime, explained the
embrace of some measures of political liberalization.
Introduction of the Multi-Party System
The first important step in the Turkish democratization process came in 1946 with
the emergence of an opposition party, the Democratic Party that ended the political
monopoly of Republican People’s Party.622 The Democratic Party won the elections in
May 1950 by a landslide and the republic witnessed a powerful transition from a
dictatorship to democracy after it adopted the multiparty system.623 Adnan Menderes
assumed the position of prime minister as well as the leadership of the party. Although
Menderes himself was not a religious man, he addressed the demands of the religious
rural population who became his electoral base. His party’s rule was the beginning of a
period when “the politics started moving away from the state control to the common
people in the street.”624 1950 elections became a turning point for Turkish politics.
621
Ibid, p. 217.
Ibid, p. 221.
623
Ibid, p. 228.
624
Ali Yasar Saribay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960,” in Political Parties and
Democracy in Turkey, Metin Heper, Jacob M. Landau, eds., (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991),
622
136
During the previous Republican People’s Party governments, the party organizations
were utilized to control the society, while the Menderes government aimed to utilize the
state to meet the demands of the people, especially the rural population.625
In a few years, growing economic problems, lack of support by some of the
intellectual and military elites and unrest due to allegations of increasing authoritarianism
of Menderes within the party led to big problems.626 The Democratic Party still came out
as a winner at the 1957 elections with the declining yet continuing support of the
countryside. The village population gave Menderes another chance hoping for economic
improvement similar to the economic boom after the 1954 elections.627 However, the
military and the bureaucratic elites were unhappy with the administration’s alliance with
traditional elements, which it viewed as offering a challenge of the principle of
secularism as well as the modernist-positivist ideals of Kemalism.628
Military gained power during the democratization process. Financial and training
assistance of the United States and Turkey’s membership in NATO helped the Turkish
army to become an important power internally and regionally. The Democrats had
traditionally been cautious in their relations with the army because of the close ties
between key officers with the former president Inonu and the old regime in general. After
a 1950 purge of military leadership, the echelon remained loyal to the government until
pp. 119-133. (cited by Cihat Goktepe, “The Menderes Period (1950-1960),” The Journal
Of Turkish Weekly, May 10, 2013)
625
Cihat Goktepe, “The Menderes Period (1950-1960),” The Journal Of Turkish Weekly,
May 10, 2013.
626
Zurcher, p. 241.
627
Ibid, p. 240.
628
Ibid, pp. 243-244.
137
later in the decade.629 Some influential military officers who were exposed to the
conditions of the outside world through NATO exchange programs realized the socioeconomic gap between Turkey and other nations.630 This triggered increased criticism of
the government policies, leading to the emergence of plots against the government by
mid 1950s.631
Turkish foreign policy during the Menderes period was security-focused; as he
believed that substantial economic development was dependent on it. He believed that
Turkey had to come to terms with the fact that it was underdeveloped, and that days of its
praised past were over, in order to be able to focus on its future.632 Turkey became a
member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation that was established
under the Marshall Plan in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949, which aimed to
promote democracy and human rights in Europe. It applied for NATO membership
before the democrats came into power in 1950.633 Approval of Turkish NATO
membership in 1952 was welcomed as a response to the Soviet threat and a sign of
acceptance by the West as an equal, as well as a guarantor for the continuation of
Western financial, political and social support.634 In the meanwhile Turkish relations with
the Middle East and the Balkans were unstable due to various crises that erupted in these
areas.635 Turkish relations with the Arab states were strained because of Turkey’s
629
Ibid, p. 250.
Ibid.
631
Ibid.
632
Ercument Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Dis Politika, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinlari, 2000), p.
20 (cited by Cihat Goktepe, “The Menderes Period (1950-1960),” The Journal Of Turkish
Weekly, May 10, 2013)
633
Zurcher, p. 245-246.
634
Ibid, p. 246.
635
Ibid, pp. 246-248.
630
138
recognition of the Israeli state in 1949. The British had expectations regarding Turkey’s
role in the Middle East. The 1955 wave of Arab nationalism, the Suez Canal incident in
1956, tension between Turkey and Syria, British intervention in Jordan, the successful or
failed attempts by western nations to form alliances in the region, military coup in Iraq in
1958 contributed to an overall instability in the region affecting relations with Turkey. In
the Balkans, tense relations with Soviet-backed neighbor Bulgaria, the US imposed
alliance between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece, the unsuccessful attempts to find a
solution to the Cyprus issue were among the issues that shaped Turkish foreign policy in
that region.636
The perspective of security as a priority for continuation of effective foreign
policy was maintained by its alignment with the West through its membership in
organizations such as NATO “to protect its independence and democratic principles” and
taking part in treaties such as the Baghdad Pact with the participation of Britain, Iran,
Iraq, and Pakistan.637 The western orientation of the government’s foreign policy as
criticized by the Republican People’s Party, especially for their complete alignment the
American policies on the Middle East. Although the Menderes period was one based on
seeking alliances, its pro-western and especially pro-American focus caused security
concerns for the Middle Eastern nations.638
During the Menderes decade security-based foreign policy focus was utilized as a
means to maintain internal economic and social stability. It also marked the first time in
republican history that the citizens exercised their true democratic rights by making a
636
Ibid, pp. 248-249.
Cihat Goktepe, “The Menderes Period (1950-1960),” The Journal Of Turkish Weekly,
May 10, 2013.
638
Ibid.
637
139
choice. The 1950 elections also mark the first time sanctification of secularism takes the
back seat to demands for more religious freedom as an outcome of democratic elections.
The Menderes government attempted to change the state’s subordination of the Muslim
identity in the quest of modernization, for the first time in the history of the republic. The
internal power relations in which the secularist Kemalist elite were always at the top were
destabilized to a certain extent with the increasing power of the religious masses.
The main foreign policy priority of alignment with the west was dominated by the
influence of the United States. The western nations displayed a positive approach to the
democratic progress in Turkey, which was reflected through their willingness to
cooperate with Turkey especially on issues related to the region. The Menderes
government, by choosing to adopt a western oriented foreign policy perspective for the
Middle East and the region, disassociates itself from the other Muslim nations, at the cost
of being perceived as a traitor. By seeking to utilize Turkish alliance with respect to the
relations to the Middle East, the Western nations ascribe Turkey a new role that
differentiates it from the other Muslim nations. These factors constitute the underlying
foundations that lead to the development of the role model argument. With the support of
the West, Turkey was disassociating itself from other Muslims, while “othering” the
Muslim nations at the same time.
Another significant highlight of the Menderes period was the fact that the people
chose to vote for the Democratic Party instead of the Republican People’s Party that was
supported by the military. This meant that the mass population wanted more democratic
and religious freedom and were not happy with the authoritarian mindset that had been
prevalent.
140
As a member of NATO and Council of Europe as well as a founding member of
the United Nations, Turkey applied for membership in the European Economic
Community right after Greece in 1959. The driving force behind this application was
both political and economic.639 Turkish membership in the European Economic
Community would be an official recognition of Turkey’s belonging to Europe providing
success in the Europeanization/westernization process. By getting the approval of one of
the most influential supranational organizations in the West, Turkey would prove itself
internally, regionally and internationally. Obtaining membership of all Western
institutions was among the main Turkish foreign policy priorities.640 Turkey was already
tied to the United States through a plethora of military and economic agreements,641 and
the EEC application served to enhance ties with Europe, the second prong of Turkish
foreign policy. It would also help decrease the dominating influence of the United States
by incorporating the policy priorities related to Europe.
By mid 1960s, building close ties with the European Community was believed to
serve the aim of decreasing Turkish dependency on the Americans. Turkey’s relations
with the Soviet Union, and the Islamic world were deemed less important.642 The
popularity of the United States began to decelerate in late 1950s. One of the reasons was
the financial and political burden of the agreement that enabled the United States to build
military bases and installations in Turkey.643 While the deteriorating economy increased
dependency on foreign aid, leftist intellectuals began to protest the dependency on the
639
Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Introduction: Prospects for a Difficult
Encounter,” p.3.
640
Ibid.
641
Zurcher, p. 287.
642
Ibid, p. 290.
643
Ibid, p. 287.
141
NATO and the United States.644 This set the beginning of the process of orienting Turkey
with Western democracies other than the United States.
The application to the EEC was seen as serving the economic interests of Turkey
providing a permanent solution for the waves of instability that plagued the republic. The
transformation from a statist and autarkist economic system to liberal free-market
economy had started during the Inonu administration in 1947, however it was the
Democratic Party under the leadership of Menderes that prioritized the interests of the
farmers as the most important step in liberalizing the Turkish economy to which
agriculture constituted the biggest contribution.645 The agricultural consignments of the
Marshall Plan had been coming in since 1949, and the Democrats were aware that the
agriculture industry would constitute the point of emergence of the modernization drive
of Turkey, an argument supported by the United States.646 Menderes government became
the first government in Turkish history to prioritize the interests of the farmers.647
By early 1959 the national unrest reached its peak with the increasing tension
between the Democratic and the Republican People’s Party backed by the military in the
face of growing number or riots among the students and members of the different
academics.648 Menderes was accused of using his position to gain public support for his
party by utilizing the national resources like the radio and of preventing Inonu from
campaigning against him.649 In the morning of May 27th 1960, as Prime Minister
Menderes, was getting ready to announce the results of the investigation on the possible
644
Ibid, p. 288.
Ibid, p. 234.
646
Ibid.
647
Ibid.
648
Ibid, p. 251.
649
Ibid.
645
142
links between the army and the Republican People’s Party, the army took over all
government institutions, arresting all cabinet members from the Democratic Party
including the ministers, the prime minister and the president.650
The Second Republic (1960 and 1980)
The 1960 coup instilled the practice of military interventions, which led to major
setbacks in the democratization process. The 1950 election of Menderes against the
Republican People’s Party, which represented the powerful secular Kemalist elite and the
influence of the military, and its annihilation by the military in 1960 reflected a paradox
that became characteristic of Turkish democratization process. Progress in
democratization, in the Turkish context, was usually associated with a struggle against
the extreme secularist principles imposed from the above against the will of the religious
masses, serving the interest of the Kemalist elites. In some instances this turned into a
power struggle in which as the rural masses reflected their demands through taking part
in free elections or protest, the military reciprocated by taking control of the state. This
explains why religion eventually emerged as a political metaphor for this majority, which
led to the emergence of religious parties. These religious parties became the key political
and cultural representatives of the opposition. Menderes’ election on a ticket of
promoting religious rights and freedoms showed the significance of religion as a valuable
yet delicate commodity in Turkish politics with the embrace of multi-party system.
By early 1961, the republic was ready to go to elections in the post-coup d’état
period with a new constitution that included a bill of civil liberties as well as the
establishment of ‘National Security Council’ which gave military what seemed initially
650
Ibid, p. 252.
143
as a symbolic role but ended up as an institutional means for military to influence
government policies and take active part in the decision-making process.651 The growing
economic and social instability, accompanied by Menderes administration’s extreme
tolerant and accommodating attitude towards the religious demands of the population
constituted a major impetus that led the military to gradually build up its political power.
After the transformation into the multi-party system, the extremely oppressive
approach of the regime in the 1930s and 1940s had to be revised by the new and existing
political actors to maximize the Muslim votes.652 During this period, even the Republican
People’s Party had to take a more tolerant approach towards religious practices, having to
cave in to the demands to their possible potential voters. Menderes administration’s
support for religious freedom, taking important initiatives such as a legal return to the call
for prayer in Arabic and accepting the political support of various religious movements
were deemed as a challenge to Kemalist principles. They were represented as a source of
concern for the army, “which regarded itself as the keeper of Ataturk’s heritage.”653 The
military declared itself opposed to allowing another administration to “damage” the
integrity of secularism as the Democratic Party had done. This position was supported by
the Kemalist elite which neither wanted to lose its monopoly of the “state machinery” nor
allow any other party to threaten their cultural hegemony.654
Based on these reasons, the National Security Council was utilized as providing
the constitutional basis for the Turkish military’s duty to guarantee the Kemalist
principles of the republic, especially secularism. Although technically it is the president
651
Ibid, pp. 257-258.
Ibid, p. 244.
653
Ibid, p, 245.
654
Ibid.
652
144
who chairs the committee and holds the most powerful position in the committee, in
reality the opinions of the military members of the council always weighed more and
were perceived as “orders” rather than “suggestions” on issues related to internal and
external security.
The military takeover and the new constitution set the beginning of the period
known as the second republic, according to historian Erick Zurcher.655 While the
Kemalist regime had a clear anti-Islamic bent from the early days of the republic through
the 1940s, the move to stabilize democracy by the second republic was based on a
modernized version of Islam through the schools and utilization of institutions such as the
Directorate of Religious Affairs.656 The public’s positive response to the use of religious
language by the previous government led the new regime to follow a similar path,
claiming the sole authority controlling the utilization and practice of religion. The 1961
constitution redefined and increased the range of authority of the Directorate of Religious
Affairs, which had been established in 1924.657 The Directorate dictated the topics and
the text of the Friday sermons, which reflected the regime’s enlightened version of Islam.
This enabled the utilization of the potential of religion to galvanize masses, which
became a means of the state to contain and control them.
It is fair to say that the 1960 constitution was more liberal than its predecessor in
its accommodation of a wider political spectrum from the left and the right. In the
meanwhile the Democratic Party was closed, many of its members were imprisoned and
655
Ibid, p. 253.
Ibid, p. 259.
657
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi, “Kurulus ve Tarihi Gelisim,” available at
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyanet-Isleri-Baskanligi-Duyuru-8221.aspx,
accessed on January 13, 2013.
656
145
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was tried and hanged with two of his ministers,658 after
they were prosecuted for corruption and treason. Menderes’ “staged” trial and execution
later became one of the most important events of political history of Turkey with
Menderes considered as a martyr of democracy.
In early 1961, the ban on political activity was lifted, and elections were held a
few months later. Republican People’s Party came out with a disappointing 36.7 percent
of the votes and Justice Party, which had been established after the closure of Democratic
Party, received 34.7 percent of the votes, with two other parties left behind.659 The
results of the elections reflected the public support and power given to the democrats. In
the mean while a referendum was held and the new constitution was approved with
almost forty percent opposition. This was considered a major setback for the organizers
of the coup, whose rigorous propaganda was not swaying the Menderes supporters.660
The military continued the lookout for any possible threat to secularism. They
worked closely with the Republican People’s Party as watchdogs of secularism as the
most important tenet of Kemalism. The military leaders believed they had to protect the
nation from all internal threats in addition to external ones. Their definition of “threat”
conformed to Republican People’s Party, which perceived religion to be one of the
biggest dangers to the Kemalist regime. The military and the Republican People’s Party
partnership lasted till the present time as protectors of secularism. They utilized the
control and containment of religious activities to carryout this task.
658
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 84.
Zurcher, p. 259.
660
Ibid, p. 258.
659
146
With the new constitution, the governments of the 1960s replaced the policies that
oppressed religion with ones that propagated a rationalist and modern version of Islam,
which was much different from what was practiced.661 It acknowledged the influence of
religion among the population, which it could not ignore, and wanted to utilize to
maintain stability in the country. This practice of “controlling religion” became one of the
defining characteristics of Turkish laiklik as a means for state control of religion.
The coup d’état caused a destructive interruption in the democratization process,
presenting a crisis in Turkish-EEC relations because it reflected vulnerability of the
democratic institutions of the republic.662 The negotiations for the association agreement
with the EEC could not be implemented due to the 18-month suspension of parliamentary
activities after the coup.663 The military’s willingness to interfere each time it was
dissatisfied with the level of stability, the ongoing limitations on certain basic rights and
freedoms, and the political institutions’ and elected officials’ insecurity were among the
factors that contributed to this vulnerability. However, the main reason behind the lack of
progress in the relations with the EEC was the fact that the EEC had did not have anyone
to negotiate with more than the actual the democratic deficiencies revealed by the coup.
Although the coup caused the interruption of democratic civilian rule, it did not cause the
republic to discontinue its westernization process.
The politics of the Second Republic was affected by the rise of a new political
actor, Suleyman Demirel and his Justice Party, which won the absolute majority with
661
Zurcher, p. 259.
Mehmet Ugur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma,
(Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), p. ix.
663
Ali Aybey, “Turkey and the European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment,”
Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 2004, p. 22.
662
147
52.9 percent of the votes in the 1965 elections. Demirel managed to reconcile the army
with civilian rule, however, at the cost of almost granting them full autonomy,664 which
meant that he would make sure his government did not produce any policies that the
army would oppose. Demirel, aware of the extreme sensitivity of the situation, made sure
to be on the military’s good side through out his political life.
1963 to 1969 were times of stability and economic growth for the nation, however
political polarization between various factions in the society was also escalating.665 The
freedoms granted by the 1961 constitution increased social and physical mobility that had
reflections on the growing industrial proletariat and blooming student population.666 In
addition to the Kemalists, leftist groups like the Marxists, communists, Maoists, and
groups like ultranationalists, Islamists, on the right side of political spectrum were posing
a challenge to the Demirel administration, which was already struggling to manage the
balance between democratic civilian rule and the influence of the military. Demirel’s
party was moving more towards the center, which got opposition from the right wing
conservatives in his party, eventually causing him to resign.
In the meanwhile, both Turkey and Greece received positive responses to their
application for association agreements with the European Economic Community. The
agreements were signed in 1963. Although the content of the Ankara and Athens
association agreements received showed the equal treatment accorded to them at the
outset, the details of the implementation of the agreements yielded “significant
664
Zurcher, p. 263.
Ibid, pp. 263-270.
666
Ibid, p. 266.
665
148
differences.”667 The 1963 Ankara Agreement was an international document with the
individual of each of the European Economic Community member states, and envisaged
free movement of workers and an eventual socio-economic integration.668 It also marked
the prospering of economic relations with Europe.669
In the 1960s European Community became the most important trading partner of
Turkey, a position that was formerly held by the United States.670 By the end of the
decade, Turkey also began to make attempts to rebuild cooperation with the Arab nations
relations with which had been unfriendly due to Turkish support of Israel.671 The 1967
Six Day War led to increased support for the Palestinians in among the leftists, the
official state machinery was uninterruptedly sided with the Israeli state. There was
another attempt to establish economic cooperation with the Arab states after the 1973 oil
crisis, however, it was not possible due to the incompatibility of the export-oriented
Turkish economy and the trading practices of the two parties.672 The increase in the
public opposition to the government’s internal and foreign policies further fuelled the
existing social distress.
By the end of 1960s, there was a robust population consisting of university
students supporting views of socialism, communism, Kemalism, Marxism, Nationalism
and religious conservatism, etc.673 Emergence of these various political and social
ideologies was in parallel to the emergence of similar movements in the international
667
Esra LaGro and Knud Ekik Jorgensen, p. 4.
Ibid.
669
Zurcher, p. 290.
670
Ibid.
671
Ibid.
672
Ibid, pp. 290-291.
673
Ibid, pp. 265-270.
668
149
arena. The increasing tension and violence among these groups in form of riots and
violent protests in university campuses spilled over to the streets. Different Marxist
groups were mainly concerned about the current revolutionary stage of Turkey, offering a
variety of hypotheses on how the revolution would develop, while some amongst the
Maoist groups promoted armed propaganda.674 The radical nationalists taking a panTurkist stance called for a unification of Turks in Asia and were ready to fight
communism on campuses and streets.675 Religious conservatives criticized Demirel’s
party for serving the demands of freemasons and Zionists, as well as turning their back on
Islam.676 The weakness of the Demirel administration in containing the violent clashes
between the various groups was met by a military ultimatum, which came in the form of
a memorandum from the chief of the general staff to Prime Minister Demirel.677 A new
cabinet was formed after this “coup by the high command”678 of March 12, 1971, and
Turkish democracy was “reinstated” under the shadow of the military authority.
Emergence of Islamic Political Parties
In the meanwhile, the Middle East witnessed the rise of political Islamic
movements in the late 1960s679 and just like the many other social and political
movements that emerged in the international arena, this had an equivalent in Turkey, as
well. Necmettin Erbakan, founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in
January 1970, emerging as the leader of the first movement inspired by political Islam.
674
Ibid, pp. 268-269.
Ibid, pp. 269-270.
676
Ibid, p. 270.
677
Ibid, p. 271.
678
Ibid.
679
Are Knudsen, “Political Islam in the Middle East,” CMI Reports, Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Norway, 2003. p. 1.
675
150
He had been critical of the Demirel government for having abandoned Islamic values and
got elected to the parliament on an independent ticket. Erbakan was a practicing Muslim,
an academician with a PhD from a German University. He was known for his antiWestern positions, arguing that the Europeans, through the process of making the Turks
blindly imitate them, caused the nation to lose their identity and nobility.680 He did not
trust the western nations who perceived the Muslim Ottoman Turks as the enemy for
centuries and took every opportunity to take advantage of the weaknesses of the republic,
after the collapse of the Empire. Erbakan was unhappy with the republic’s economic
dependency on the west as well the western cultural influence. He believed that the
understanding of westernization as a mere imitation of western behavior was what led to
the oppression and loss of Islamic values. He believed that the Western nations wanted to
subjugate Turkey by changing its Muslim identity. He openly expressed his nostalgia for
the Ottoman Empire, arguing that under the rule of the National Order Party immorality
would be banished and “an honorable, moral Muslim Turkish state” would be established
“just like it used to be in the past.”681
Erbakan blamed the West for imposing western values and lifestyles on the
Turkish people. He also criticized the Kemalist mentality that executed the westernization
process. In his initial analysis Erbakan was overlooking the Turkish republican ideal of
achieving Europeanization, and criticizing the Western nations like the United States for
interfering in the internal business of the nation through economic aid programs or as part
of membership requirements in international organizations. He did mention, however,
that there were accomplices from within who helped making the Turks replace their
680
681
Kavakci Islam, pp. 45-46.
Jenkins, p. 131.
151
identity with that of the Europeans. He did not openly attack Kemalist ideals due to the
laws that banned their criticism. According to Erbakan, having Turkey on “its knees”
willing to do whatever they wish was a great victory for the Europeans against the Turks
who avoided defeat through the crusades and many other attacks.682
Erbakan argued that the success of this Europeanization project was possible
through the help of its local supporters.683 Aware of the promotion of the Orientalist
assumptions by some Turkish actors, he stated that he “did not believe in the superiority
of the West, hence he challenged the very premise that the republic was predicated
upon.”684 Erbakan was the first political leader in the republican history, who publicly
challenged the orientalist representations by taking a position against the model of “good
citizen” that the republican narrative attempted to create. The “local supporters” Erbakan
refers to who spread and imposed the westernization process based on Orientalizing the
religious people, could be categorized as the “Orientalized Orientals” that Kavakci refers
to. Erbakan labeled these Orientalized Orientals as “mimickers of the west,” which he
often used in his speeches as a derogatory term. He was openly critical of the republican
regime’s oppressive measures towards the Muslim populations. He believed that the
Muslim nations needed Turkish people to go back to their historical roots and take a
position of leadership that was clearly needed. Therefore, Erbakan believed and promoted
the need for Turkey to take a leadership and role model position for all the Muslim
nations. The support for Erbakan increased rapidly. The facts that he was an intelligent,
western-educated engineer who came from an upscale religious family made him popular
682
Kavakci Islam, p.46.
Ibid.
684
Ibid.
683
152
around the practicing Muslims in the university as well as the rural masses, who were not
used to see people with his characteristics who were also devout Muslims.
Erbakan was also known for his opposition to the desire to be a part of the
European Economic Community,685 suggesting that it might lead for Turkey to become a
part of Israel,686 implying that Turkey would become a vassal of Israel. He believed that
meeting the demands of Israel was one of the most important priorities for the European
nations and the United States and therefore becoming allies with or membership in
organizations founded by western nations would entail taking the side of Israeli state.
In response to Erbakan’s pro-Islamization and anti-west position, the
constitutional court closed down the National Order Party in May of 1971 on the grounds
that it violated the founding principles of Ataturk and the secular foundation of the
state.687 Next, Erbakan established the National Salvation Party in 1973, which claimed
moral and intellectual Ottoman superiority, blaming the desires of Westernization for the
fall of the empire.688 Another assertion made by the party was that Turkey’s recapturing
the deserved status, as a super power would be possible only through recommitment to
Islamic values. Only then would industrial growth be attained without having to deal with
the side effects of materialism inherent in the capitalist system.689 In the elections held in
October of 1973, his party managed to win 11.8 percent of the votes and 45 of the 450
685
Gareth Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 132.
686
Ibid, [Reference to Necmettin Erbakan, Meclis’te Ortak Pazar, (Izmir: MNP Genclik
Teskilati, 1971), p. 17-18.]
687
Jenkins, p. 131.
688
Ibid, p. 132.
689
Ibid.
153
parliamentary seats, with the support of the religious population consisting mostly of
artisans, small-town traders and peasants.690
Erbakan’s party ended up forming a coalition with the Republican People’s Party,
which come out of the elections as the winner with the 33.5 percent of the votes and 185
seats.691 The new leader of the Republican People’s Party Bulent Ecevit, just like
Erbakan, was known for his anti-capitalist and anti-Western stand as he sympathized with
the Non-Aligned Movement, rather than the Soviet Union and the capitalist West.692
These factors constituted the only common grounds between these two inherently
adversary political movements, ended up bringing them together. Both of these parties,
which represented two polarities of the political spectrum, were ardently opposed to the
membership to the EEC. While the radical left based their opposition on their position
against American imperialism, Islamists viewed the EEC as a Christian club in which
Turkey had no place.693 The radical nationalists of the Nationalist Movement Party also
joined them in the anti-EEC camp, arguing that EEC would interfere in the internal
affairs and eventually divide and take control of the whole country. 694 Once the coalition
enabled by the anti-European position of these two politically polarized parties was
complete, Ecevit became the prime minister and Erbakan assumed the position of deputy
prime minister and there were six other ministers from National Salvation Party out of the
total twenty-five ministries.
690
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 133.
692
Ibid.
693
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” in
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, Constantine
Arvanitopoulos, ed., (Springer: Berlin, 2009), p.55.
694
Ibid.
691
154
The main foreign policy issue that this coalition dealt with was the 1974 Turkish
invasion of Cyprus after the Greek Cypriot military coup. Cyprus, formerly part of the
Ottoman Empire, had been a British colony after 1878 until its independence in 1960.
Greek Orthodox inhabitants constituted eighty percent and Turkish Muslims constituted
twenty percent of the island population.695 By 1954, Greek nationalists who wanted to put
an end to the British control over Cyprus by uniting the island with Greece increased
their violent attacks on the British.696 Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey came together
the next year, trying to negotiate the future of the Island. Turkey was concerned about the
future of Turkish Cypriots as well as the possibility of having Greece as a neighbor. After
a number of other meetings, in 1960 the three countries agreed that Cyprus would
become an independent republic and the Turkey, Greece and Great Britain would be the
guarantors of the territorial and constitutional integrity of the new state.697 By 1964 the
Cypriot administration started to limit the autonomy of the Turkish minority. This caused
tension with Turkey, which threatened to invade the island, causing the Greek Cypriots to
back down. Similar incidents of conflict continued until the 1974 coup aimed to unite the
island with Greece, which ended with its the de facto partition between the Greek and
Turkish populations.698 Turkey reacted to the coup by positioning 35,000 permanent
troops in the Turkish Cypriot part in the North receiving a negative reaction from Europe
and the international community.699 The guarantor-ship agreement between the three
nations gave them the authority to act unilaterally in case they were unable to act jointly
695
Zurcher, p. 248.
Ibid.
697
Ibid, p. 249.
698
Jenkins, p. 133.
699
Ibid.
696
155
in upholding the guarantees.700 Turkey argued that this clause constituted the legal basis
for sending troops to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Later, in 1983 Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus was established as a state recognized only by the Turkish Republic. This
caused the tension in the region to escalade further. As a result, the issue of Cyprus
became one of the most significant foreign policy issues for Turkey especially in its
relations with the European Union. It continues to be utilized as leverage against Turkish
membership by the European Union as a whole and especially members like Greece and
Cyprus in particular.
The General Overview of the Multi-Party System
The transformation into the multi-party system and the events that followed
presented a preview of the main characteristics of the Turkish democratization process as
well as the general atmosphere of the political scene for the years to come. In the Turkish
case, secularist practices and their effects on the religious masses played an important
role in the overall democratization process. Rigorous attempts at democratization had a
tendency to emerge after general elections, especially the ones that followed military
interventions. This process also further revealed the inherent contradictions in the
republican perceptions of modernization, secularism, westernization and democratization.
Each time religious practices were perceived as a challenge and threat to secularism, the
military intervened to maintain secularism. This was followed by periods of transition
back to democratic rule through elections. This process led to the emergence of religion
as a political metaphor, in response to the oppressive policies of the secularists. This
discourse of democratization shaped by the reactions to anti-democratic measures also
700
Zurcher, p. 249.
156
led to the religious parties to become key political and cultural representatives of the
political opposition.
While democratization was an intrinsic part of the intertwined processes of
westernization and modernization, which were associated with secularism, this was not
the case in the Turkish context. Especially the discourse of secularism was maintained by
and produced state authoritarianism. Therefore, secularist discourse, which was supported
by the modernization and westernization discourses, was antithetical to the
democratization discourse. As the multi-party system evolved, the groups that stood
against state authoritarianism, such as the Islamists, suffered harshly in the hands of their
political opponents who were supported by the regime. And paradoxically, the Islamists
who held a strictly anti-western position ended up contributing for the consolidation of
democracy, while the pro-western and pro-modernization Kemalist secularists were
siding with the authoritarian regime.
As the Turkish political system transformed itself from a single-party system into
a multi-party system, the distribution of the political parties representing a variety of
political ideologies gradually found their places in the political spectrum in relation to its
center. Republican People’s Party moved further left of the center in time, increasing its
anti-religious stance and maintaining its pro-Kemalist, pro-secularist position at the cost
of causing setbacks in the democratization process. Parties such as the Turkish
Communist party, the oldest in the left and Workers Party were initially in the extreme
left, however the Republican People’s Party reduced the ideological gap through decades.
The center parties were the pro-democracy parties such as Democratic Party, and
the Justice Party, which did not support the alienation of religious values of the society
157
and tried to stay away from extremist secularist tendencies while simultaneously trying
not to cause tension with the military. They had to deal with a constant fear of military
therefore had limited mobility, however, they always had some public support.
In the far right emerged Republican National Party, which had a similar program
to that of the Kemalists, combined with extreme nationalist ideology with violent
tendencies, also promoting Pan-Turkism.701 The party changed its name to Nationalist
Movement Party in 1969. The party led by Colonel Alparslan Turkes, changed its prosecular stance with the new name and began to promote Islam as a part of Turkish
national heritage.702 However, Islam was placed in the same category as traditions and
cultural practices all of which ranked lower than “Turk”ness, which was a superior
characteristic. The Nationalist Movement Party took its place in the extreme right with its
militant nationalist outlook.
National Order Party, under the leadership of Erbakan emerged as another
political party identified with the right as the representative of the first Islamic movement
in Turkish politics. Erbakan had initially been a member of the Justice Party, until he
decided that it had “turned its back on Islam” and become an “instrument of freemasons
and Zionists.”703 The political Islamic movement initiated by Erbakan and his supporters
prioritized religious conservatism and was considered a de facto threat to secularism and
Kemalism in general. The military therefore kept this movement under close surveillance.
It was not too difficult for the military and the secular elite to suppress the Islamic
political movement, since they utilized their categorization as representatives of Oriental
701
Zurcher, p. 269.
Ibid, p. 270.
703
Ibid.
702
158
backwardness. However, the suppression of the left could not be justified in any other
way but by the defense of authoritarianism. For the opponents of the Turkish European
Project, this demonstrated the orientalist character of Turkish secularism, which had a
different history that was associated with authoritarianism setting it apart from its
Western counterparts. The willingness of the Kemalist secularist elites to go along with
this political authoritarianism had the indirect effect of allowing the European opponents
to argue that it was separate and different, undermining its quest for EU membership.
This was another paradoxical case in which the Kemalist secularists for whom
westernization was on top of the list of priorities, ended up inflicting great harm to the
EU membership project. On the other side were the members of the Islamic political
movement who were deemed backward and marginalized by the Kemalist establishment
who actually contributed to the Europeanization process. What the Turkish Islamists
eventually succeeded in doing by winning elections, maintaining the secular legacy of the
republic and discrediting the military as anti democratic to undermine the orientalist
objections of the European opponents who now found new grounds in the fact that the
advocates of Turkish membership in the EU were Islamists.
Signing of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement
The 1963 Ankara Association Agreement made with the European Economic
Community had anticipated economic integration, free movement of workers, and
strengthening social relations between the parties involved.704 Upon signing the
704
Esra LaGro and Knud Eric Jorgensen, “Introduction: Prospects for a Difficult
Encounter,” p. 4.
159
agreement the European Commissioner stated that Turkey was a part of Europe.705 This
statement reflected Europeans perceived Turkey to be a good model despite the military
takeover, mainly because Turkey managed to go back to the democratic system
afterwards. An additional protocol containing the technical details such as the conditions
of transitional periods, provisional methodologies and the prerequisites for the customs
union was signed in 1970. Up to this point, the European Economic Community was
more concerned about the fulfilling of the technical requirements of the association
agreement and the additional protocol than the domestic politics of the republic. The
Community was willing to continue the process as longs as Turkish side kept its side of
the bargain.
A major political crisis with the Europeans based on technical reasons occurred in
1970 after the signing of the additional protocol, when Turkey realized that the 1963
import-substitution policies of the association agreement were not compatible with the
policies of trade liberalization foreseen by the new protocol.706 Within the next decade,
similar moments of tension arose related to the debates on the scope of unilateral
preferential treatment of Turkish agricultural products, the piecemeal inauguration of the
free movement of workers and the overall flexibility of the implementation of the
requirements of the additional protocol.707 Both agreements introduced the steps to be
taken for the eventual establishing of the Customs Union. Neither made reference to the
provisions of a structured political dialogue, substantially limiting their ability in
705
Diethrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, “European Dimensions and Status of Islam”
in Religion, Politics and Turkey’s EU Accession, Diethrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere,
eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 11.
706
Ugur, p. ix.
707
Ibid.
160
persuading the improvement of the existing human rights record of the republic.708 In
summary, the relations were mainly focused on establishing the technical requirements of
the Customs Union, which were mainly economic.
The western nations and the international organizations kept quiet about the 1960
coup as well as the military intervention on 1971 which reflected their overall lack of
interest in internal politics of Turkey.709 In Europe, even the Council of Europe, which
was known for requiring the existence of a democratic regime for membership, did not
make any public statement regarding the 1960 coup and neither did take any action that
affected Turkish membership.710 The European Economic Community did not react to the
coup. Some European organizations did react to the 1971 coup through actions taken by
some of the member states such as suspending economic assistance and calls for an
immediate return to democracy.711 However, there were no sanctions on Turkey by the
European Economic Community and international organizations such as NATO
continued supporting Turkey.712 In fact Turkey did not receive any substantial criticism
from the Community regarding the human rights issues until some time after the signing
of the additional protocol.713
By the time the 1960 coup took place, the western nations had already bestowed a
role model status to Turkey. The overlooking of and/or the lack of reaction towards the
1960 and 1971 military coups, which led to oppression, torture, imprisonment of many
708
Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, The European Union and Turkish Accession, (Ann
Arbor: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 21.
709
Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and
Democratization, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 141- 142.
710
Ibid, p. 142.
711
Ibid.
712
Ibid.
713
Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen, p. 4.
161
citizens, as well as the execution of ministers and a prime minister, shows that the
Western nations did not really hold Turkey up to the standards they set for themselves.
Despite its commitment to westernization, Turkey was still not more than a “good
Muslim” example amongst the Muslims, therefore it was not expected to be perfect. It
also reflects that they really did not care about Turkey’s level of progress as long as they
had a counterpart to talk to on behalf of the state. It is important to note that this was a
time when Europe still had some struggling democracies of its own as well as trying to
strengthen its own institutions. Having said that, it is still difficult to explain why they
chose not to take any action against the 1971 coup, even though there was widespread
criticism and call for return to democracy. Therefore, it is safe to say that the “role
model” representation of Turkey in the 1960s and early 1970s reflected nothing more
than a “good Muslim” nation that was slightly better among the Muslim “others.”
By late 1970s, the relations with the European Economic Community had come to
a stalemate due to years of economic instability and internal struggles in Turkey.714 The
socio-economic reforms that were planned by the 1971 post-military ultimatum
government including nationalization of mineral industry, introduction of a land tax,
protection of nationally owned industry, etc. received severe opposition from some
representatives the agriculture industry and the business world.715 However, the
opposition was not the reason that the reforms were never completed. The socio-political
instability, the military’s dark shadow that fell on the political system and the power
struggles among the various military, political and civil actors in the society contributed
to the chaos in the political system, making it impossible to establish the political
714
715
Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, p. 21.
Zurcher, pp. 271-272.
162
consensus to pass any economic reforms. Due to the pressure from the National Security
Council, amendments that limited civil liberties including areas such as ending the
autonomy of radio, television and universities, freedom of press, freedom of expression
were made to the constitution in the early 1970s.716 The military wanted to ensure that the
events that led to the coup would not happen again, therefore wanted to limit these rights
and freedoms. The political and social instability naturally had some economic
consequences, as well. The already vulnerable Turkish economy also suffered great
blows from the 1973 oil crisis, the fluctuations in prices that followed, and it was also
badly affected by the recession in Europe.717 The inflation level had gone up to 90
percent by 1979 due to the increasing energy prices and the reckless economic policies of
the successive governments.718
All these developments did not have a positive effect on the relations with the
European Economic Community. The Community openly criticized the human rights
violations, right after the signing of the Additional Protocol;719 only to witness the
worsening of the situation as the decade progressed. In 1980, as Turkey took an initiative
to prepare for membership application, the military coup of September 1980 caused the
European Economic Community to suspend relations with Turkey.720 Military was not
concerned about the reactions in the international area based on the lack of substantial
716
Ibid, p. 273.
Ibid, p. 280.
718
Ibid, p. 281.
719
Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jorgensen, p. 4.
720
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” in
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, Constantine
Arvanitopoulos, ed., (Springer: Berlin, 2009), p.55.
717
163
reaction in the previous cases, however this time the coup came with a high cost for the
international relations.
Beginning of the Third Republic: the Coup d’état of 1980 and the Relations with the
EEC
The alleged basis for the 1980 coup d’état was the continuing economic crisis, the
escalating political violence, concerns about Kurdish separatist and radical Islamist
groups all of which had caused the increasing socio-economic instability.721 The coup
d’état, under the leadership of General Kenan Evren, was done to save “democracy from
the politicians”722 and purge the political system, went much further than its
predecessors.723 The military argued that the politicians were unable to properly lead the
nation and establish political and social stability. They banned all existing political
parties and took control of all government institutions. The National Security Council
dissolved the parliament, the municipal councils, and appointed military officials armed
with almost limitless powers, and controlled many aspects of economic, intellectual and
social life. The freedom of speech and press were restricted to such a level that many
newspapers were closed down and criticism of the policies was outlawed. The
imprisonment people of all ideologies and the use of widespread torture got international
reaction through reports of organizations such as Amnesty International. Political leaders
Demirel and Ecevit were among the ones who got released in a few weeks while Erbakan
and Turkes were released after being acquitted by the court.724 Mass trials were
conducted by military courts against right-wing political parties and left-wing
721
Zurcher, pp. 276-282.
Ibid, p. 292.
723
Ibid, pp. 292-293.
724
Ibid, p. 293.
722
164
organizations.725 A new constitution was voted on at the end of 1982. General Evren
utilized “political terror,”726 banning the criticism of the constitution and he became the
president after 1983 general elections as the country transformed back to civilian rule.
General Evren who had been the chief of staff, a typical military man, was known for his
commitment to Kemalism and secularism. He had no toleration for criticism and believed
that he saved the Turkish people from the economic and political chaos of 1970s through
organizing the coup.727
The first days of Evren’s presidency took on an extremely authoritarian profile.
He talked as if he was “master of all knowledge,”728 and an expert in all areas, including
religion. Evren talked about religious issues very often during his speeches. In fact, he
“employed Islam to promote his secular ideas and policies as well as to expand the social
base of the military government.”729 He utilized religious arguments to help legitimize
and influence public opinion regarding his policies in a wide range of areas including
strengthening national solidarity, promoting birth control, overcoming ethnic and social
tension, etc.730 He used religious terminology and arguments to try to discredit all views
other than his perception of Kemalism as well as to legitimize and maintain his power.
He presented his own nationalist and interpretation of Islam, which became a part of
compulsory education of children starting with the fourth year of elementary school. He
also fine-tuned the laiklik policies to counter damage caused by the population’s exposure
725
Ibid, pp. 294-295.
Ibid, p. 295.
727
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 28.
728
Kavakci Islam, p. 49.
729
Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
p. 70.
730
Ibid.
726
165
to democratic and even Islamist arguments. He also introduced a comprehensive
headscarf ban, arguing that he had read the Holy Qur’an himself and there was no
mention of a command regarding the headscarf in it.731 The headscarf ban was in effect
with the publicized incidents beginning in 1968 and throughout the 1970s,732 however, in
1981 Evren took the ban to a different level through a National Security Council decree
for the university students and through a change in the Federal Employees Law for
government officials, a year later.733
In order to legitimize the ban Evren systematically utilized Orientalist language
that presented the wearing of the headscarf as backward, out dated and uncivilized. He
used the headscarf ban to make sure that girls wearing it were not allowed to enter the
university buildings unless they uncovered.
The next elections were held in November 1983 with only three parties that were
allowed to compete. They were: Party of Nationalist Democracy (supported by the
military), the Social Democrat Populist Party (supported by Kemalists) and the
Motherland Party (closer to the center of the political spectrum representing the silent
majority), which got approval of the National Security Council to participate.734 The
Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Ozal came out as the surprise winner
with an overwhelming 45 percent of the votes, and majority at the parliament. Ozal was a
very charismatic leader who found a way to gain a lot of support from various factions in
the society. Ozal and his Motherland Party received the support of centralists, Islamists
731
The researcher heard this argument a number of times during the televised speeches of
Evren to the public in the early 1980s.
732
Kavakci Islam, p. 47.
733
Ibid, p. 51.
734
Zurcher, p. 296.
166
and rightists votes.735 His personal life-style had characteristics that appealed both to the
Kemalists (pro-Westernization) camp as well as the conservative segments of the
population. During his time as the prime minister between 1983 and 1989, one of the
biggest economic accomplishments was the transforming of the Turkish economy from a
state-run closed market economy to free market economy.
In addition to his economic success, Ozal also eased the oppressive laicist
policies, by accommodating the building of new mosques and through religious
education. He also attempted to lift the headscarf ban at the universities but was faced
with strong opposition from National Security Council and Social Democrat Populist
Party. At the end, President Evren vetoed the bill, reinstating the ban. This tension caused
the re-emergence of the Orientalist rhetoric that negatively represented religious people,
and women who wore headscarves as backward. When the headscarved students
attempted to enter the university, they were stopped and insulted with statements such as
“… You are not even a human being with that attire.”736
Ozal’s persistence in presenting the issue as a human rights issue pressured Evren
to sign the bill the second time around. Evren appealed the bill to the constitutional court,
which revoked it decreeing that secularism could not be compromised to democratic
rights.737 This contributed an interesting paradox, which yielded a ‘clash’ between two
components of the Turkish westernization discourse. Secularism, a political principle of
government imported from Europe as the most important tenant of the Turkish
westernization project, was given primacy over democracy. From the European point of
735
Kavakci Islam, p. 52.
Milli Gazete, October 13, 1989. (Referenced by Kavakci Islam, p. 58)
737
Kavakci Islam, p. 58.
736
167
view, this ‘clash’ and its resulting democratic deficit was a product of extreme secularist
measures, which oppressed Islamic values, consciously making them invisible. The most
obvious example of this ‘invisibility’ was the European silence on the headscarf issue,
which denied democratic rights to women and religious groups in Turkish society.
While Turkey was dealing with the challenges of restoration of democracy the
European Economic Community was continuing to enlarge. In the meanwhile Greece had
applied for membership, becoming a full member in 1981, followed by two other former
southern European dictatorships of Spain and Portugal in 1986.738 The Greek accession
was not good news for Turkey, as Greece would present a major obstacle to the progress
of relations with the Community.
The European Economic Community’s expressed concern regarding the process
of restoration of democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey led to the official
beginning of the “wait-and-see” tactic that the community would follow.739 Each member
state had a different opinion about how the future of the relations with Turkey should be
constructed. Influential states such as Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy did not let
go of Turkey during this period following the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
continuing war in Afghanistan.740 States such as the Netherlands and Denmark believed
that Turkey should be made aware of the possibility of being castigated for its poor
human rights record.741 France which had the additional concern of counter-balancing
the American influence on the European Economic Community’s approach to Turkey,
argued that issuing a warning to Turkey to assure the military to keep its promise of
738
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” p. 55.
Ugur, p. 219.
740
Ibid.
741
Ibid.
739
168
reestablishing democracy by the Commission would help increase European leverage on
Turkey.742
Turkey’s representation as a role model to the Muslim world during this period
was mixed at best. Its secularism could be utilized as a device to influence the behavior
of Islamic states by rejecting religious forms of government in favor of authoritarian
ones. As a secular but authoritarian government, its alienation from Europe made it
difficult for the member states to accept it as a member. The Council of Europe had a
more serious response, threatening to remove Turkey from membership if a return to
democracy did not take place.743 The Community clearly had an ambivalent policy
towards Turkey following the coup.744 The initial decision was to curtail relations but
later to completely freeze relations with Turkey in 1982.745
The government of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal Turkey managed to maintain
economic stability, adopting the free market system and achieving some improvements in
the area of rights and freedoms, despite the continuing political restrictions supported by
President Evren and the Kemalists. While Turkey moved away from “import substituting
industrialization” to “export-led growth strategy,” that contributed liberalization of
financial markets and prioritized foreign trade,746 political liberalization was less
successful.
742
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 220.
744
Ibid, p. 221.
745
Kenan Aksu, “Introduction: A Historical Background to Turkey-Europe Relations,” in
Turkey-EU Relations: Power, Politics and Future,” Kenan Aksu, ed., (Cambridge
Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, 2012), p. 8.
746
Aksu, p. 8.
743
169
The suspended relations between Turkey and the European Economic Community
were completely restored in late 1986, upon Turkey’s return to civilian rule.747 Even
though, the military returned the official power to civilian authorities, it preserved its
upper hand in political decisions. Turkey’s, Turgut Ozal, officially applied for
membership to the European Community in April 1987, using the economic liberalization
process and the economic reforms as arguments to push for membership in the
Community.748 He further argued that:
a democratic and politically powerful Turkey was in the interest of Europe.
Therefore, the EU should promote its own interests by helping Turkey in its effort
to make further democratization.749
With this statement Ozal clarified that Turkey was still committed to
Europeanization and it conceived the membership as a means of advancing
democratization. Ozal also highlighted the importance of having a stable Turkey from the
perspective of European security with Turkey playing a key role on its eastern borders.
The negative response to the Turkish membership application came in December
1989 with the explanation that Turkish membership was still possible in principle,
however, since neither parties were prepared to take on the obligations that this
membership would entail, the commission proposed some intermediary steps to be taken,
foreseeing the completion of the Customs Union by 1995.750 The Commission believed
that Turkey was not ready for the membership obligations based on its political and
economic underdevelopment at the time and the EEC would not be ready to accept any
747
Yilmaz, p. 55.
Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?,”
Second Edition, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), p. 70.
749
Ibid, p. 71, [Reference to The Guardian, June 25, 1987].
750
Yilmaz, p. 56.
748
170
new members before completion of the transition into a single market.751 The
Commission’s report explained that the Turkish application was especially important due
to the size of its population and geography, which were larger than those of other member
states, and at a lower developmental level.752 In addition to listing the economic
requirements that needed to be fulfilled, the Commission argued that the improved
human rights record of Turkey was still not up to the democratic standards.753 It also
commended its modernization efforts.754 The measures suggested by the Commission
were “completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial
cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural links.”755 The policies
regarding trade in Turkish textiles and agricultural products would need to be reevaluated
and the necessary revisions would need to be made to enable proper integration to the
customs union.756 The Commission concluded that under these circumstances “it would
be inappropriate for the Community- which is itself undergoing changes…- to become
involved in new accession negotiations at this stage.”757
Those who were disappointed about the rejection of the membership application
argued that the application itself was more than an “ultimate proof of Turkey’s
commitment to European values,” as it lucidly articulated this “commitment by anchoring
751
Ibid.
Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Opinion on Turkey’s
Request for Accession to the Community,” SEC (89) 2290 Final/2, December 20, 1989,
p. 4. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/, accessed on January 18, 2013.
753
Ibid, p. 7.
754
Ibid, p. 8.
755
Ibid.
756
Ibid.
757
Ibid .
752
171
the destiny of Turkish people to that of Western Europe.”758 The republic did not lose its
ambition to proceed in its path of Europeanization despite the military interventions that
caused periods of complete paralysis. It took every opportunity to demonstrate its
allegiance to European values759 and therefore Europeanization by joining Western
International Organizations such as the Council of Europe (1949), the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (1952, together with Greece), the Organization of European
Economic Cooperation (1958), among others.
In the meanwhile, some argued that the Europeans accommodated Turkish
membership to these organizations despite its shortcomings mainly because of the
pressure coming from the United States.760 The long-time support of the United States for
Turkish membership of the European Economic Community was based on the belief that
it would serve “US interests by spreading stability and economic opportunities
throughout Europe.”761 Some of the supporters of Turkish membership in the European
Union, did not consider fulfilling the requirements of the customs union, to be critical in
insisting that they should have been admitted to the union, just because of its “secular and
democratic ‘role model’ not only for her neighbors but also for the newly independent
countries of the Central Asia.”762 This argument was based on an upgrade of the
“assumption that Turkey’s link with Europe was not only a natural result of the country’s
modernization but also a necessary condition that would reduce the probability of
758
Ugur, p. xi.
ibid, p. 2.
760
Ibid.
761
Vincent Morelli, European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s
Accession Negotiations, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November
26, 2010) p. 12.
762
Ugur, p. xi.
759
172
deviations from that trajectory in the face of internal as well as regional challenges.”763
The logic was built on the understanding that Europe should overlook Turkey’s
deficiencies since the cost of “losing” secularist and pro-Western Turkey to Islamization
would be too high. So, while the supporters of Turkey’s membership represented the
differences to be minimal, the opponents represented them as significant, requiring a
longer waiting period and more proof of Europeanization.
As a result Turkey is on one side of the argument asserting that its role modelness, commitment to secularism, westernization and modernization should be sufficient
for Europe to accept it the way it is. And on the other is Europe, which is has to deal with
the challenge of moving its relations with Turkey while simultaneously criticizing its
shortcomings and pointing to the areas that need to be reformed. It is important to note
that during this process Europe did not give any clear guarantee of not declining Turkish
membership even if all the requirements were met. European recognition of Turkey as a
role model to other nations was not enough to automatically make Turkey European.
The Post-Ozal Period
When Ozal became president in 1989, Mesut Yilmaz assumed the position of
leadership at the Motherland Party. Yilmaz’s leadership led to a drastic change to the
principles and policies of the party. Motherland Party, during Ozal’s leadership, tried to
address the demands and the needs of the people, paying special attention to the voice of
the oppressed groups whose political participation was blocked while simultaneously
trying to keep the relations with the military under control. The party policies under
Yilmaz prioritized doing what ever it took to stay in power. Partnership with the military,
763
Ibid.
173
exclusion of rural and socially conservative segments to please the anti-democratic
Kemalist camp became hallmarks of Yilmaz’s policies. Later on, his administration
became the first in Turkish history to fall due to corruption charges causing for him to be
tried by the Supreme Court. Yilmaz also became famous for his Orientalist statement that
called the people who attended religious high schools “bats.”
In the 1991 elections, the Motherland Party received 24 percent of the votes
while Demirel’s True Path Party came first with 27 percent, Social Democratic Populist
Party received 20 percent, Erbakan’s Welfare Party received 16.9 percent and the
Democratic Left Party received 10.7 percent of the votes. Demirel was back in the
political arena as the leader of True Path Party and the victor of the 1991 elections. He
became president following Ozal’s sudden death in 1993 leaving his party’s leadership as
well as the position of prime minister to Tansu Ciller, first female prime minister of the
republic.
Cilller attracted a lot of attention in the international media as a former professor
of economics with prestigious western education. She was a perfect example of the ideal
republican woman “westernized in appearance, well educated, and affluent,” the face of
the secular elite.764 She represented a welcome opportunity for the Turkish Republic to
save face in the international arena, at a time when the number of women wearing
headscarves in the public sphere was increasing despite the Kemalist elite’s opposition to
them. She also took part in the fight against religious values starting her first days of
active politics, as she warned Washington of rise of Islamic reactionary-isim under Ozal
764
Kavakci Islam, p. 61.
174
administration, during a visit in 1990,765 three years before she took office. This was an
interesting incident with Ciller acting like an informant, “informing” the superior United
States of Ozal’s misdeeds in trying to accommodate the needs of the practicing Muslims
by lifting the limitations on freedom of belief. Ciller was trying very hard to get United
States support for Turkey’s secular elites whose anti-democratic policies relied on the
politics of fear in regards to religious fundamentalism. This provided a marker of
discussion in the Turkish political class regarding the relationship between secularism
and democratic government.
Highlights of Turkish Foreign Policy after the 1980 Coup and in the 1990s
The post-1980 coup period set the characteristics of the relations between Turkey
and Europe. Internal politics of Turkey became an international matter because issues
relating to human rights and democracy766 were central to its application to EEC
membership. Constant European criticism and pressures caused Turkey to take a
defensive position in foreign policy, especially towards Europe.767 During this period
various international actors such as non-governmental organizations, unions, associations
and parliamentary committees that specialized in human rights issues began to play a new
765
Ibid, p. 62.
Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Turkish Politics and the European Union: Dimensions
of Human Rights and Democratization,” in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus: Security Across
the Borderlines of a New Europe, B. Gokay, Staffs, Keele, eds., European Research
Center, 2004., p. 5. Available at
http://www.policy.hu/dagi/leftmenu/files/Transformation%20of%20Turkish%20Politics
%20and%20the%20European%20Union.pdf accessed on February 3, 2013.
767
Ibid, [Reference to Dagi, ‘Democratic Transition in Turkey: The Impact of European
Diplomacy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1996, pp. 124-141.]
766
175
role in Turkish foreign policy.768 The pressure from the transnational organizations such
as Amnesty International put the Turkish government on the defensive and received the
support of the human rights activists in Turkey.769 By 1990, Turkey had signed and
ratified a number of international agreements such as the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment, leading to partial improvements in human rights related policies
such as the rights of the Kurdish population, the issue of elimination of torture, the
deficiencies of the legal and penalty system, etc.770
One of the most significant results of the reforms was the official recognition of
the existence of a “Kurdish Problem” and the initiation of the process of eliminating the
articles related to “thought crimes,”771 which included expression of ideas that went
against the state ideals. In the creation of republican identity the ethnic identities such as
the Kurdish identity were written out of existence. “Turk-ness” was the only national
identity recognized by the republican state, which justified the forced assimilation of the
Kurdish citizens. This led to an eventual eruption of violent resistance by Kurdish groups.
As the citizens of Kurdish heritage, demanded that the republican regime put an end to
oppressive measures such as the ban of the Kurdish language, the state ignored the
demands refusing to recognize the existence of a problem. It was only after 1990 that the
Turkish government recognized that Kurdish ethnicity had been denied since the
768
Ibid (Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Turkish Politics and the European Union:
Dimensions of Human Rights and Democratization,” p. 5).
769
Ibid.
770
Ibid, p. 8.
771
Ibid, p. 9.
176
establishment of the republic.772 The change in the republic’s official policy regarding
the treatment of the Kurdish population was motivated by the quest for EEC
membership.773 These and many other reforms reflect on how the republican national
policies were affected by its foreign policy agenda, particularly relations with Europe.
More importantly, they reflected on the fictional character of the role model status of
Turkey. Turkey acted overconfidently, assuming its role model status to be true, and that
the Europeans would accept it amongst them, without exerting extra effort. Turkey acted
as if the “role model” label, which is mainly based on its practice of secularism, is
sufficient for membership in the EEC. On the other side of the argument is Europe,
ignoring all the human rights violations occurring in Turkey while presenting it as a role
model to the other underdeveloped nations and only paying attention to them when
Turkey claimed membership in Europe. In conclusion, both the European critique of
Turkey on human rights violations and Turkey’s discomfort towards the criticisms and
the belated efforts to improve the record reflect that the “role model” representation was
far from the reality.
The relations between Turkey and the United States in the post coup period was
security-focused while the main focus of Turkish relations with the European Community
and the Council of Europe was the poor human rights record.774 Turkey emerged as a
good ally to the United States, always ready to assist in situations where Muslim nations
were “the enemy.” Maintaining the support of the Unites States as a super power was
more valuable for Turkey than taking the opposite sides with other Muslim nations. This
772
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid.
774
Zurcher, p. 317.
773
177
reflected the Orientalist outlook of Turkey, as it distanced itself from the other Muslim
nations including the ones with whom it shared borders. From the perspective of the
United States, Turkey was a good model of a Muslim partner state that assisted in
maintaining US security interests with its internal shortcomings (authoritarianism) were
not perceived as relevant. The United States was a strong supporter of Turkish
membership in the European Union to the point that the Europeans were displeased with
the pressure coming from the States. The United States did not see or purposely chose to
ignore the anti-democratic tendencies of the Turkish state. Having the unconditional
support of the super power, made Turkey believe its fictional role model status that it
participated in creating.
In the meanwhile Turkey managed to stay out of the war that erupted between
Iran and Iraq. During the same time period the relations with the Balkan nations
continued to be contrived and the relations with Greece was tense as always due to
conflict claims over rights on oil in the Aegean continental shelf.775 The ongoing tension
in the relations with Greece transformed into a new dimension after the Greek accession
to the European Economic Community in 1981. The Cyprus issue also remained
deadlocked despite the United Nations’ continuing attempts to find a solution. Bad
relations with Greece and the inability to resolve the Cyprus issue became two of the
main factors that made Turkish candidacy journey challenging during this time period.
At the beginning of 1990, strong Turkish support of the United Nations operations
after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait led by the United States, buttressed the delicate
775
Ibid.
178
relations with the United States.776 Turkey, under the presidency of Turgut Ozal, aware of
the loss of its geostrategic importance as a buffer zone to the Soviet Union, took the
opportunity to underscore its position as a Western citadel and as the “role model” in the
region, which in turn would have positive effects on its relations with the European
Community.777 Turkey was not the only Muslim state that took part in the first Gulf War
against Iraq; however, the Ozal administration did not want to lose this opportunity to
further strengthen its position as an ally of the West in the Middle East. Ozal’s extremely
pro-American approach with included granting the United States permission to use their
bases against Iraq caused him to receive a lot of criticism internally, especially when the
American aid to fray the costs of the operation did not materialize.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, new nation states emerged in Central Asia,
Turkey sought to build relations with them by presenting itself as a role model, “a
Muslim country with democratic pluralism and a free market economy.”778 The United
States hoped that this would challenge the Iranian influence in the region.779 The United
States was a strong supporter and promoter of secular Turkey as a role model different
from Iran’s Islamic republic that many European states and the United States viewed with
suspicion. Iran was a concern for the Western nations due to its anti-Western policies and
religious form of government. Later on Iran’s close ties with Russia and its anti-Israeli
stand increasingly became areas of concern for the Western nations, in addition to Iran’s
interest in nuclear research.
776
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 317-318.
778
Ibid, p. 319.
779
Ibid.
777
179
The Kemalist rhetoric used Iran to produce Orientalist representations that would
become the basis of fear politics. One of the excuses for the military interventions and the
restrictive political measures used to limit religious and political rights was “to prevent
Turkey from becoming Iran.” Iran represented a backward and dark system in which the
whole society would be forced to practice religion, women would be forced to cover and
reason would be replaced by religious fundamentalism. This particular form of republican
knowledge production was welcomed in the international arena by the Western nations
who were already engaged in the demonization of Iran. Islamic Republic was one part of
the binary opposition with Kemalists/secular Turkey. Iran served as “the oriental other”
that helped define Turkey as “the role model.” Kemalists justified their authoritarian
secularist measures through the narrative coined by the phrase “We do not want Turkey
to become Iran!” In the Turkish republican context Iran was everything Turkey was not.
It was a land ruled by religious extremism where women were forced into wearing
headcovers, and if that kind of extremism had a way of “sneaking into” the republic, it
would take it back to the dark ages. This representation of Iran became a valuable asset
for the production of politics of fear that helped sustain the power of Kemalist elite over
the masses. It also used that discourse to present itsel as a model for others to follow and
to take advantage of the Western nations’ concern about the Iranian model.
To the West, Turkey represented “good Muslims” and a “role model,” while Iran
represented the “bad Muslims” and a model to be avoided, especially in its opposition to
the West. Iran’s increasing power in the region and its anti-Western and anti-Imperial
position increased the strategic importance of promotion of Turkey as a role model.
180
While the membership application of Turkey was rejected, Turkey was back on
the European agenda and it restored Europe as a priority for the Turkish public and
political agendas.780 Human rights issues became the most controversial topic in
European Community-Turkish relations after 1986.781 The major topics of concern
included the anti-democratic regulations of the 1982 constitution, the issue of death
penalty, the code of criminal procedures, the penal code, rights of the Kurdish minority
and the anti-terror law.782 The Ozal administration took the international criticisms into
consideration and tried to address the concerns related to the human rights violations,
while trying to keep a balance between political liberalization and the anti-democratic
role of the military. One of the areas of progress in regards to human rights was Ozal’s
temporary success in lifting the headscarf ban. Interestingly, the policies that limited the
rights of practicing Muslims, such as the headscarf ban at the universities were not
among the many cases of human rights violations that the Community examined.
In the following years, the economic and trade relations continued to develop and
extensive economic and some political liberalization progress under Ozal’s Motherland
Party administration, eventually enabled Turkey to prepare itself for the Customs
Union.783 There were some improvements with respect to human rights such as the
revoking of the ban on using Kurdish language in publications, and some changes in the
penal code, which were introduced in 1991.784 Although some laws were gradually
changed for the better during the Ozal administration, there were still many laws that
780
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” p. 56.
Ugur, p. 226.
782
Ibid.
783
Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” p. 56.
784
Ugur, p. 231.
781
181
constituted the basis for significant human rights violations.785 The anti-terror law
continued to be implemented in a way that enabled the state to prosecute any person that
it linked to any political organization that was deemed terrorist. In many cases, university
students or even underage youth were prosecuted for having connections with terrorist
organizations, which they had never heard. Many of the other laws that limited rights and
freedoms were still in effect.
During that period, European Economic Community members like Belgium,
France and the United Kingdom were “less opposed” to Turkish membership than
Greece, Germany, and the Netherlands.786 The British had a realist approach, highlighting
the strategic importance of Turkey as a commercial center and a stabilizing factor in the
region especially, the Mediterranean and the Turkic republics that used to be a part of the
Soviet Union.787 Greece was one of the strongest opponents of Turkish membership, due
to its decades-long conflict with Turkey, which got worse following the division of
Cyprus.
In 1993, the members of the Community established a monetary union that
anticipated the emergence of the European Union as a supranational entity with the
Treaty on the European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty. In the meanwhile,
Turkey’s application remained in limbo since the European Union’s demands, incentives
and sanctions in regard to the improvement of the human rights record did not give any
signals for possibility of eventual membership, on the rightful basis that Turkey neither
785
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 232.
787
Ibid, p. 233.
786
182
satisfied the requirements for the Customs Union nor improved its human rights
record.788
In early 1990s, the nationalist camp in the republic argued that the European
Union was stalling Turkey and would not be willing to ever grant membership to Turkey.
The Turkish disappointment and confusion caused it to divert its focus on the post-Soviet
geography, the Black Sea Area, Central Asia and Caucasus for possible partnerships.789
Exceptions to the European Criticism of Human Rights Record of Turkey
Even though human rights violations in Turkey were prevalent from the first days
of the republic and peaked especially due to the military interventions in 1960, 1971 and
1980, the European Union’s emphasis on the issue began as late as 1980 mainly due to
strategic reasons.790 One reason for overlooking it earlier was based on the increasing
importance of Turkey in containing the Soviet Union following the withdrawal of Greece
from the military command of NATO in 1972.791 Another was the escalating political
violence in Turkey in mid-1970s, which initially was more of a priority than that of its
human rights record.792 Another factor that caused European nations to overlook
Turkey’s poor record was that the European Community did not have an institutionalized
human rights standard for the member states at that time.793 The first official statement
from the European Community came in 1980 from the European Parliament in form of a
request for investigation of the human rights violations reported by Amnesty
788
Ibid, p. 232.
Ibid.
790
Ibid, p. 216.
791
Ibid.
792
Ibid.
793
Ibid.
789
183
International, a few months earlier.794 By mid-1980s the criticism of Turkey’s human
rights record exponentially increased following the restoration of relations,795 as the
European Economic Community began to watch Turkey more closely in the post-coup
period because of the membership bid.796
It is important to highlight that the majority of European criticisms of the human
rights violations as well as the Turkish responses to them were in areas such as minority
rights including the rights of Kurdish, Alevite, Greek, Armenian populations in Turkey,
freedom of speech, freedom of belief, and also issues related to the penal code, code of
criminal procedures, anti-terrorism law, the death penalty, etc. Many of the issues related
to freedom of religion and freedom of expression for the majority Muslim population
were not vocalized as human rights violations. The anti-European camp used this as a
proof of their argument that there was a European double standard in the treatment of
various factions in the Turkish society. The Europeans seemed to only care for the rights
of the people with whom they shared similar values, while the very basic rights of a
majority were systematically violated.
As already mentioned, the European Union initially had nothing to say about the
discriminatory treatment of women wearing headscarves, and the ban that prevented them
from getting university education, working in state offices or in most private companies,
even causing them to be denied medical treatment because they refused to take off their
headscarves in public hospitals.797 The extreme secularist policies of the republican state
dated back to the very first days of the republic, and the state always displayed a
794
Ibid, pp. 216-217.
Ibid, p. 217.
796
Ibid, p. 226.
797
Kavakci Islam, p. 35.
795
184
xenophobic approach to religious men and women labeling their behavior as irtica, which
literally meant reactionarism (backwardness).798
There were times when the secularist state measures were more “flexible” starting
with the Menderes administration in 1950s,799 however they changed after the military
coup of 1960, as the state started to utilize a nationalized and progressive
“understanding” of Islam, recognizing its potential to galvanize masses.800 Utilization of
religious language in justifying nationalist or even secularist policies was a method that
was utilized in the early years of the republic. A good example is the post 1980 coup
Evren period, when some of the oppressive policies were actually justified through an
Evrenian reinterpretation of holy texts.
Finally, it is instructive to point out that the first time that the headscarf ban was
criticized as a human rights violation by the European Parliament was at the end of
2006.801 Such “indifference” of the European Union towards issues that were for the
religious sensibilities caused the questioning of European sincerity. This indifference was
among the reasons why Muslims initially took a stand against the European Union and
later were hesitant in trusting the intentions of the Europeans.
The Copenhagen Criteria
In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty also known as the Treaty on the European Union
was signed by the ministers of the member countries of the European Community,
798
Ibid, p. 46 [Reference to Aktas, Tanzimattan Gunumuze Kilik Kiyafet ve Iktidar 1, p.
241].
799
Ibid, p. 44
800
Ibid, p. 45.
801
Selcuk Gultasli, “First Time Headscarf Ban in EU Report,” Todays Zaman, September
11, 2006. Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-36418-first-timeheadscarf-ban-in-eu-report.html, accessed on February 3, 2013.
185
aspiring to establish “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”802 It led to the
development of a monetary union to accelerate the economic and the future political
integration of Europe. Right after taking this step to a establish a political union, the
European Council, during the 1993 summit in Copenhagen, decided on a set of political,
economic and legal standards that would be required as a condition for membership.
These requirements, which came to be known as the Copenhagen Criteria or Copenhagen
Conditions required that
an applicant state must (a) be democratic, with respect for human rights and the
rule of law, (b) have a functioning free market economy and the capacity to cope
with the competitive process of capitalism, and (c) be able to take on the
obligations of the acquis commmunitaire (the body of laws and policies already
adopted by the EU).803
Even though Turkish relations with the European Union dates all the way back to
the days of the European Economic Community particularly to the 1963 Ankara
agreement, the Copenhagen Criteria became the new instrument for the Union to
systematically reflect on the areas in which Turkey needed progress. Especially the
political criteria with the emphasis on human rights, protection of minority rights,
democracy and the rule of law have constituted the basis for the relations between
European Union and Turkey since then. While satisfaction of the new conditions of the
Copenhagen Criteria became the main decisive factor in becoming a member of the
European Union, Turkey was still in the process in meeting the requirements for the
Customs Union agreement.
802
John McCormick, Understanding The European Union: A Concise Introduction,
Third Edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
803
Ibid, p. 73.
186
Although the European Union continued to be severely critical of Turkey’s
deteriorating human rights record,804 in 1995 the European Union decided that the
Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union would be inaugurated as set out
by the Ankara Agreement and the 1970 Additional Protocol as of the first day of 1996.805
The announcement of the start of the customs union came during the time of the coalition
government between two parties that represented the right and left of the political
spectrum of that time. Ciller’s True Path Party, which represented the center-right, was
governing in a coalition with center-left Republican People’s Party under the leadership
of Deniz Baykal. The 1990s for Turkey was a time of economic, political and cultural
crises due to the emergence of public political movements of Alevi, Kurdish and Sunni
identities.806 The increasingly violent attacks of the Kurdish PKK, and the consequent
emergence of extreme nationalist groups with anti-Western and anti-European views,
who believed that the Western governments were directly or indirectly supporting the
terrorists, negatively contributed to the problem.807
The announcement for the European Union’s decision to accept Turkey into the
customs union was welcome news at the time. The Turkish entry to the customs union
was expected to strongly anchor it to Europe and advance its economic modernization.808
After the EU-Turkey Association’s initial decision to initiate the customs union, Prime
Minister Ciller presented the good news as a great victory for which she took credit. She
also announced that Turkey would be granted “full membership to the European Union”
804
Ugur, pp. 232-233.
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” p. 56.
806
Ibid, p. 57.
807
Ibid.
808
Ugur, p. xi.
805
187
by 1998, at the latest.809 What made this statement puzzling was that Prime Minister
Ciller was an experienced professor of economics, who was aware of the basic fact that
the European Union budgetary plans were framed in five to seven year increments. The
European Union’s budgetary system allowed “little flexibility and limited opportunity for
ongoing corrective action,”810 and Ciller’s announcement was made during the second
financial multi annual framework, which was between 1993 and 1999. Even the next
budget for the 2000-2006 period known as the “Agenda 2000” which focused on
enlargement of the European Union811 had probably already been planned when Ciller
expressed her confidence in membership possibility of Turkey by 1998.
Ciller’s statement inflated the success of the Customs Union to increase her
popularity and that of her party for short term of political gains. It purposely misinformed
the public of the European Union membership procedure, which was a complex process
consisting of technical, economic, political, bureaucratic, social, legal components. level.
Another analysis of Ciller’s statement is that Ciller she actually believed in very
mythology created by the Turkish secular elite. Just like many of her predecessors and
successors she may have sincerely believed that Turkey would be granted a free pass by
Europe for being the “good Muslim” country whose “role model” status with its
commitment to secularism and Westernization was enough. The secularist Turks’
obsession with their supposed “success” in westernization and modernization through the
809
“En Gec 98’de Avrupa Birligi’ne Tam Uyeyiz,” Hurriyet, May 7, 1995.
Gabriele Cipriani, “Rethinking the EU Budget: Three Unavoidable Reforms,”
(Brussels: Centre For European Studies, 2007), p. i.
811
Commission of the European Union, “Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF):
Questions and Answers,” Europa Press Release, (June, 29, 2011). Accessed on March
17, 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11468_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom.
810
188
suppression of their Islamic identity led them to critically examine what they have and
have not accomplished. They believed their own ideology and that developed by Europe
to coopt some of Muslim states allied to them.
The Customs Union did establish a free trade area that enabled free movement of
goods between Turkey and the European Union. It facilitated Turkey’s entry to the
European single market awarding Turkey adjustment funds.812 Although Turkey had
already started the attempts at democratization and liberalization by making amendments
to the 1980 military constitution upon the initiation of the customs union,813 there still
was a very long road ahead to fulfill the political requirements of the Copenhagen
Criteria, which was key for membership.
The Post-Modern Coup D’état of February 28 1997
Erbakan continued to be an influential and powerful political Islamic actor, as the
leader of Welfare party, opposing Turkish membership to the European Union.814 His
party gained a lot of support from the general public, especially after their success in the
1994 municipal elections. The Welfare Party was the primary victor of the general
elections of 1995, winning 21.4 percent of the votes, yielding 158 parliamentary seats.
After the unsuccessful trials of forming a coalition, Erbakan’s Welfare Party agreed to
form a coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party in June 1996, making
Erbakan “Turkey’s first avowedly Islamist prime minister.”815
Erbakan government’s foreign policy perspective gave priority to relations with
the Muslim world. His first international visit took him to Iran and then Pakistan,
812
Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, p. 22.
Hakan Yilmaz, “Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007,” p. 57.
814
Jenkins, p. 156.
815
Ibid, p. 160.
813
189
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. He founded the Developing Eight (D-8), which
consisted of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria,
aiming for the development of an eventual monetary and may be political union among
Muslim nations, similar to the European Union.816 The organization was considered as
an alternative to the many similar organizations created by the developed Western nations
including the European Union. Erbakan’s introduction of the D-8 as an economic free
trade organization that would lead to a monetary and eventual political union amongst the
Muslim nations under the leadership of Turkey received a lot of reaction from the
Kemalist elite who perceived it as representing a total drift from the aim of
westernization and a sign of Islamist prioritizing of relations with the Muslim states as an
alternative union ideal.
It is important to note that by initiating the D-8, Erbakan, too reproduced the
representations of the role model status of Turkey. The organization was one that was
established under Turkish leadership due to the historical leadership tradition that can be
traced back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Erbakan believed that Turkey needed to
assume its “natural” leadership role and establish its own organization among the Muslim
states rather than waiting at the doors of the European Union. Erbakan did not believe
that the West was more powerful. He did not make any statements regarding the
superiority of the Turkish people with regard to other Muslims, but his actions reflected
the belief that the Turks had the historical “burden” of assuming the leadership role.
Therefore he ended up reproducing some of the representations related to the role model
status of Turkey.
816
Ibid.
190
At the national level, Erbakan initiated drastic economic measures, introducing a
pool system where all the financial resources would be collected, aimed at putting an end
to the corruption that was prevalent at government institutions. This system suggested
replacing the existing system in which various state organizations borrow money from
state banks at high interest rates with a pool where all of the state’s financial resources
are collected in a single financial institution from which the state institutions and
agencies can borrow with no interest. Erbakan also attempted to pass some laws to
accommodate the needs of the practicing Muslims such as the reorganization of work
hours for the state employees who fast during Ramadan. It was annulled by the State
Council on the basis that it was against the principle of secularism.817 He tried to lift the
headscarf ban at the universities but was unsuccessful. Previously, the ban was lifted and
Islamic practices had been tolerated to a certain extent during the Ozal years (1983 to
1993), however successor governments went back to the original republican policies. All
of these policies were perceived by the military and the Kemalist elite as attacks on the
secular foundations of the republic. Although Erbakan introduced some economic
measures that had positive effects on the Turkish economy, they were overshadowed by
the public campaign against his policies that were considered as a challenge to
secularism. The media played a very important role in presenting Erbakan and his
supporters as the enemies of the secular republic.
On February 28, 1997 the military, during the National Security Council meeting,
presented the government with a list of anti-Islamist measures, coupled with a series of
anti-Welfare Party briefings for the members of the judiciary community, business world
817
Jenkins, p. 161.
191
and the media, asking for their support in saving secularism.818 The military ultimatum
came to be known as “post-modern coup d’état.” Like its predecessors, the coup was
initiated and organized by the military, which considered itself to be the ultimate
protectors of Kemalism and secularism against Islamist attacks on Turkish modernity in
the post-modern era.819 The February 28th intervention was post-modern because it did
not represent the sole intervention by the military, but also included civilian, media and
Kemalist elite participation.820
Erbakan cabinet collapsed within a period of a couple of months and the Welfare
party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998, which banned Erbakan from
politics.821 Tayyip Erdogan, the charismatic mayor of Istanbul from the same party was
also banned from politics after being prosecuted and imprisoned for having read a poem
with religious connotations and message. The head of the National Security Council
announced, “If it is necessary the coup will last for a thousand years.”822 Clearly, the
Turkish military was ready and determined to win its war against Islamism. One of the
masterminds of the coup, General Cevik Bir stated that they were engaged in a process of
“social engineering.”823
As part of this “28 February Process,” the post-Erbakan government took
measures that made life very difficult for the religiously observant population such as
closing down the unofficial religious schools, strengthening the headscarf ban, etc. One
of the striking characteristics of this period was the systematic marginalization of
818
Ibid, p. 162.
Kavakci Islam, p. 69.
820
Ibid.
821
Jenkins, p. 164.
822
Yasin Aktay, “28 Subat’in Onuncu Yildonumu,” Yenisafak, February 24, 2007.
823
Zaman, March 23, 2007.
819
192
religion. It first started with “cleansing” the military from the officers who practiced or
were inclined to practice religion and discharge officer’s whose wives wore a headscarf
or who did not consume alcohol.824 The media played a crucial role in demonizing
religious groups. Mainstream media focused attention on the threat of Islamism and
repeatedly presented news stories about various Islamist fundamentalist activities. Many
of the articles that were printed in newspapers and the news stories on television were
“distorted”825 or completely manufactured. With the encouragement of the military, the
new government began to “purge the civil service of suspected Islamists.”826 State
institutions boycotted Islamist/conservative companies,827 causing some of them to go out
of business. Religious men and women, especially those who wore headscarves faced
discrimination and harassment in their social and professional lives.
There was a new wave of Orientalizing observant Turks and the continued
subordination of religious values in the secular mainstream media. One headline charged
Erbakan with damaging the reputation of the republic as a contemporary –westernizing
nation that was developed over the last 70 years.828 Others criticized his foreign policy
outlook regarding the Muslim nations as well as his personal religious practices. In a
statement, the head of the military used the Iranian example to warn Turks that by the
time the Iranian generals realized that the Khomeini movement was reactionarism itself it
was too late.829 Iran was utilized to foster a fear of the oriental, barbaric, backward,
824
Fatih Ugurlu, “Mazlumlardan ve Magdurlardan 28 Subat’ciglara Balans Ayari,”
Habervaktim.com, February 28, 2013.
825
Jenkins, p. 163.
826
Ibid, p. 163.
827
Ibid.
828
“70 Yillik Imajimiz Gume Gidiyor,” Hurriyet, August 14, 1996.
829
“Karadayi’dan Humeyni Dersi,” Sabah, September 1, 1996.
193
“other” within Turkey. Countless headlines highlighted the threat to secularism and
warned of the demise of the ideal republican citizen.
One of the most extreme initiatives taken during this period included the effort to
change the traditional Islamic practices,830 encouraging women to participate at funeral
prayers together with men.831 According to many scholars of Islam women could take
part in the funeral prayer (salat al janaza). The reasoning used in this case was political,
not religious. In fact, most of the women who took part in these prayers were not properly
covered and looked like they did not know how to perform the prayers. There were also
attempts to promote and spread the reading of the Turkish translation of Qur’an rather
than its recitation in Arabic. Because the public was not interested in this initiative, it was
eventually abandoned, despite the media campaign promoting it.832 The process of
marginalization of religious practices and attempts at manipulating them reflected badly
on the Kemalist elite.
The actions taken to “restore” the republican identity and policies designed to
maintain the hierarchy of power relations between Turkey and Europe, Turkey and
Muslim states were only partially effective during the Erbakan years. The republican
perception of seeing the West, especially the European Union in a position of power
suffered during this period as a result of Erbakan’s personal rejection of the notion of
western superiority with its implications at national, international and at the foreign
policy levels. On the other hand, the power relations between Turkey and the Muslim
world remained the same, with Erbakan claiming a leadership position for Turkey in the
830
Jenkins, p. 163.
Ibid.
832
Ibid, p. 164.
831
194
establishment of an alternative international cooperation organization of Muslim states.
This offered another articulation of Turkish self-image as a role model holding a
powerful position in the Muslim world. While Erbakan did not see the other Muslim
states as inferior, his foreign policy practices reflected the “historical burden” that Turkey
had in assuming the leadership in the Muslim world. This reconfirmed Turkey’s powerful
position among Muslims.
The coups that took place during the period between 1960 and 1980 imply that the
military and its intervention in politics were a part of the political modus operandi of the
Second Republic. The latter also depended on the political alliance between the
republican/secular and Kemalist elite and the military in the name of defense of
secularism. It gave them an excuse to monopolize the political process by limiting the
political representation and the participation of the conservative Islamic actors and
groups. While the international reactions increased with each coup leading to harsher
consequences each time, it did not stop the military to take a step back. The policies of
the military and the Kemalists continued to cause a threat on Turkish democracy.
195
CHAPTER 4. THE EMERGENCE OF JDP AND MILESTONES IN RELATIONS
WITH THE EU
Chapter 4 starts with the discussion of the beginning of the customs union in 1995
and then examines the period after the military coup by memorandum up to the final days
of 2004 when the European Union member states agreed on a date to begin the accession
negotiations. This was a period when the Turkish political landscape went through a
dramatic transformation, accompanied by a process of democratic transition. The postcoup political landscape was dominated by the military’s and Kemalist secularist elites’
fight against the challengers of the republican values, which involved a systematic
suppression of Islamic political actors. One of the biggest new developments in this
period was the transformation of the Islamist political movement following the closure of
anti-Western Welfare Party and its reemergence in the form of the Virtue Party and then
the Justice and Development Party. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi) emerged as a political actor at the center of Turkish politics, with an
enthusiastic attitude towards EU membership. It simultaneously worked on strengthening
relations with its neighbors and the Muslim world. The JDP consciously chose to position
itself in the center of the political spectrum following the footsteps of Ozal, building on
the experience of the previous Islamic political parties, which were positioned on the
right of the political spectrum. All of these national developments contributed to the
change of the foreign policy and the international relations of the republic. The European
Union’s reaction to these developments and towards some of the concerns and demands
196
of the observant Muslims were factors that affected the relations between Turkey and
Europe.
This contributed to the destabilization of dominant Orientalist domestic and
international discourses with their assumptions and representations about Islamic political
actors: their commitment to the EU membership project as well as their commitment to
enhancing the level of democracy in the country. The EU harmonization policy packages
and the reforms that they passed and implemented even in the most controversial areas
challenged the conception of these political movements by Kemalist secularist elites as
well as the Europeans as their “other.” The chapter highlights how the relations with the
European Union reflect on the internal transformation of Turkey and how they in turn
manifested in surprising foreign policy outcomes.
European Commission’s Progress Reports on Turkey
After the initiation of the customs union on the final day of 1995, there was no
mention of Turkey during the enlargement discussions in the December 1997 Summit
meeting of European Union heads of states.833 This did not make the EU supporters in
Turkey happy, especially those who believed in Ciller’s prediction regarding anticipated
membership accession by 1998. At the same time, the European Union also decided to
open membership application to Cyprus and the other CEEC applicants when they were
ready.834 The fact that some of these nations had yet to complete their democratization
process but were considered for their membership deepened the Turkish disappointment
in lack of European consideration for their membership. The supporters of this opinion
833
“Chronology of Turkey-European Union Relations (1959-2009), available at
http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kreppel/chronology.pdf, accessed on February 6, 2013.
834
Neil Nugent, “Turkey’s Membership Application: Implications for the EU,” Jean
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 5, No. 26, August 2005, p. 2.
197
ignored the fact that none of these states had just taken back a step like Turkey by
blessing a new coup. The European Commission announced the “European Strategy of
Turkey” in March 1998, followed by the first “Progress Report” on Turkey in
November.835 This was the first among the reports that analyzed where Turkey stood with
respect to the membership criteria in political, economic as well as technical and legal
areas. During the discussion of human rights and minority rights as part of the political
criteria, a summary of the European Union’s evaluation of the of the Turkish record was
presented, followed by a detailed analysis of the recent situation,836 including the
conditions related to the coup and the continuing role of the military in politics.
During the analysis related to the issue of freedom of religion, the report made
reference only to the rights of the minority groups, i.e. the rights of non-Muslims and
non-Sunni Muslims.837 Nonetheless it did not mention the violations of the rights of the
Sunni Muslims who constituted the majority of the population who were excluded in the
name of the defense of secularism. The report made reference to the number of lawsuits
that Turkish citizens filed at the European Court of Human Rights between the years of
1995 and 1997.838 It did not mention the headscarf ban in Turkey in the freedom of
religion section839 or during the discussion of the status of women.840 This and the
following reports did not make any reference to the lawsuits filed at the European Court
835
Ibid (“Chronology of Turkey-European Union Relations (1959-2009)”)
European Commission, “Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey’s Progress
Towards Accession,” 1998, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/turkey_en.pdf,
accessed on February 8, 2013.
837
Ibid, p. 19.
838
Ibid, p. 18 (footnote 2).
839
Ibid, p. 19.
840
Ibid, p. 17.
836
198
of Human Rights regarding the right to wear a headscarf at universities, or the right to
present a photograph wearing a headscarf in the application process. Leyla Sahin’s case
filed at the court in 1998841, which eventually became one of the most famous cases
related to the headscarf ban in Turkey, was also not recognized.
The emphasis that the initial progress report yields suggested that the European
Union misunderstood the significance of the Kemalist treatment of the Muslim elements
of Turkish identity and the authoritarian consequences of its de facto affirmation of the
construction of Turkish secularist identity through subordination of the Muslim identity.
The headscarf ban at the universities which was instated after the 1980 coup, led to cases
in which women wearing headscarves were “harassed on campuses, were verbally abused
in the classroom by their professors, and disciplinary actions were taken against them.”842
The European Union’s continued indifference to this issue and the European Court of
Human Rights’ anti-headscarf and pro secularist position fuelled the anti-Western attitude
amongst the religious Turks. It also reflected on the European perception and
representation of Turkey through the promotion of Turkish constructions of the European
experience, marginalizing Islamic elements. By picking and choosing between various
characteristics in Turkish society, and promoting or criticizing some forms of behavior
Europe played an important role in shaping Turkish development. The Turkish elite
reinforced this power by striving to become what Europe wanted. This was seen through
the example of the Kemalist elite’s continuous references to the European Court of
841
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment CASE OF LEYLA ŞAHĐN v. TURKEY,
Strasbourg, November 10, 2005, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956#{"itemid":["00170956"], accessed on March 24, 2013.
842
Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading, p. 58.
199
Human Rights’ anti-headscarf decisions to justify the existing practice.843 They argued
that since the Europeans supported the headscarf ban in Turkey through siding with the
state in these cases, this meant that the Turkish republican policies won approval.
European “approval” cherished by the Kemalist elite was utilized as a means for further
excluding of its observant Muslim population. Again, some of the headscarved women
resisted these exclusionary measures by wearing of wigs when forced to remove their
headscarf at entrance of the university campus. In response, university officials would
actually check to see whether it was a wig or the real hair by pulling on it. Ironically this
was all done in the name of westernization, secularization and modernization that denied
the choices made by the Oriental other.
The most controversial and publicized political event that occurred during this
period was the “Kavakci Ordeal.” Its significance requires the discussion of the political
context within which it unfolded and the impact it had on key secular and Islamist
political actors.
Following the collapse of the tripartite coalition in November of 1998, early
elections were held in April 1999. The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the
violent separatist Kurdish group PKK was celebrated as representing the end of a bloody
chapter of Turkish-Kurdish relations by the Turkish population most of which held
Ocalan responsible for more than thirty thousand lives lost over fifteen years.844 Erbakan
was banned from politics with the closure of Welfare Party. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who
843
Tamer Korkmaz, “AIHM Illuzyonunda Inecek Var!” Zaman, March 16, 2004,
available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/null/aihm-illuzyonu-nda-inecek-var_26627.html,
accessed on March 31, 2013.
844
Jenkins, p. 165.
200
had been the “rising star of the Islamist movement”845 and received a lot of support for all
his service as the mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,846 was left politically
inactive. In 1988 Erdogan was imprisoned and banned from politics for having read a
part of a poem by Turkish nationalist Ziya Gokalp, on the charges of “provoking
hatred.”847
In this political context particularly hostile to Islamist actors, The Virtue Party
was established without the charismatic figures of Erbakan and Erdogan. It had a slow
start in its first electoral experience in April 1999. Its approach to both foreign policy and
domestic politics was much different from the classic narrative of political Islamist
movement in Turkey. It adopted a narrative that promoted democracy, individual rights
and the rule of law, abstaining from making references to Islam. It abandoned Welfare
Party’s antagonistic approach to the European Union and the United States, choosing
instead to visit various Western nations to establish political relations and advocated
membership of the European Union.848 In order not to face closure, the Virtue Party
avoided using Islamist language as its predecessors did and emphasized its allegiance to
human rights, democratization, freedom of speech and secularism.849
One of the reasons behind the Virtue Party’s foreign policy switch from an antiWestern and anti-European Union approach to one that promotes westernization was
based on the realization that the European Union could be a source of influence in
diminishing the influence of the military. The European Union was very vocal against
845
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 356.
“Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Latest Islamic Leader is the Country’s Most
Popular Politician,” The Economist, September 20, 2011.
847
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 356.
848
Jenkins, p. 164
849
Ibid.
846
201
party closures. It had been critical of the closure of the Welfare Party by the Turkish
Constitutional Court,850 even though the European Court of Human Rights’ decision
agreed with it as “a threat to civil order and secular democracy.”851 By taking a pro-EU
position, the Virtue Party was not confirming the representations based on European
superiority, but rather was using a very realist approach for protecting the party from the
military.
The 1999 elections yielded a multi party parliament consisting of Democratic
Leftist Party winning 22.2 percent, Nationalist Movement Party winning 18 percent,
Virtue Party (the successor of Welfare Party) with 15.4 percent, The Motherland Party
with 13.2 percent and the True Path Party with 12 percent of the votes.852 Merve
Kavakci, a US-educated young engineer who wore a headscarf was among the newly
elected female members of the parliament from the Virtue Party, along with Nazli Ilicak
and Oya Akgonenc. They were the first women to be elected from the Islamic Political
Movement in Turkey and Kavakci was the first headscarved one. Another headscarved
woman Nesrin Unal was also elected from the Nationalist Movement Party; however, she
removed her headscarf when she entered the parliamentary chambers. Although the dress
code for the parliament did not prohibit the wearing of the headscarf,853 Kavakci’s
election and her headscarf “became the lightning rod for the still rumbling Islamist-
850
Imdat Ozen, “Impact of EU’s Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious
Peripheral Party, Felicity Party, Journal of International and Global Studies, Vol. 2, No.
1, November 2010, p. 87.
851
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Amberin Zaman, “European Court Backs Turkey’s Ban
on Islamists,” The Telegraph, August 1, 2001.
852
Jenkins, p. 165.
853
Kavakci Islam, p. 76.
202
secularist storm.”854 When she entered the parliamentary chamber to take her oath of
office on May 2, 1999, she was faced with the loud protest and chants of “get out”
orchestrated by the Democratic Leftist Party, followed by the infamous speech of the
party leader, Bulent Ecevit stating that women are free to dress the way they like in their
private lives, however the parliament does not belong to the private realm… and not the
place to challenge the state, concluding with the command “…Put this woman in her
place!”855
These words offered the opening salvo of a months-long political lynching
campaign, which led to Kavakci’s removal from the parliament, the denial of her Turkish
citizenship on the grounds of her acquisition of United States citizenship.856 She was
demonized as a militant who was a security threat, leading the state security court to open
a number of cases against her. The media harassed her together with her family friends,
and everyone who stood by her side. At the peak of the “Kavakci Ordeal” the Virtue
Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 “on the grounds that it had
become a center for anti-secular activity” using Kavakci’s attendance of the oath
ceremony wearing a headscarf as evidence. Kavakci was banned from politics for five
years together with four other members of parliament. She took her case to European
Court of Human Rights in 2001 and the court passed a decision in her favor in September
2007.857
854
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 355.
Richard Peres, The Day Turkey Stood Still: Merve Kavakci’s Walk into the Turkish
Parliament, (United Kingdom: Ithaca Press, 2012), p. 130.
856
Nicole and Hugh Pope, p. 356.
857
Peres, p. 232 and Kavakci Islam, p. 79.
855
203
Although the European Court of Human Rights is not an official part of the
institutional structure of the EU, its decisions are taken as a reference by the EU
Commission, especially during the evaluation of human rights record of candidate states.
The decision on the Kavakci vs. Turkey case was the first and only time that the
European Court of Human Rights decided for a headscarved woman. However, it did not
lead to any change in the EU policies towards Turkey or have any effect on the
representation of Turkey as a role model.
The “Kavakci Ordeal” and thus the headscarf ban in Turkey received international
support and recognition from organizations such as Inter-Parliamentary Union (2001),858
the United Kingdom’s House of Lords (2000),859 the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe of the United States Congress (2005),860 and the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom (2005)861 among others. Civil society
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Freedom
House, Amnesty International, and Institute on Religious and Public Policy have since
then have pressured Turkey to lift the ban.862 After the incident at the Turkish Grand
National Assembly, the State Department of the United States made reference to the
headscarf ban in Turkey within the list of global violations of basic human rights in their
reports starting with 2001.863 Many Muslim nations such as Jordan, Iran, Qatar, Sudan
858
Peres, pp. 218, 230, 232.
Kavakci Islam, p. 143.
860
Ibid.
861
Ibid.
862
Ibid.
863
Ibid.
859
204
and Egypt supported Kavakci’s case, some even threatened to suspend relations at
political and economic levels.864
The “Kavakci Ordeal” which was dramatically unfolding at the time, became an
internationally recognized was ignored by the European Union Commission’s 1999
Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, and the reports that followed. Most of
the section that dealt with the recent developments in Turkey and the extent to which they
adhered to European political criteria discussed to the capture of Ocalan, the decree of
death penalty and the earthquake that took place in August.865 The report made reference
to the ongoing closure case against the Virtue Party,866 ignoring how Merve Kavakci’s
entry to the parliamentary chamber wearing a headscarf was represented as a challenge to
the state and the party’s eventual closure.867 There was no mention of the “Kavakci
Ordeal” in the sections on “The Parliament,”868 “Civil and Political Rights,”869 status of
women,870 which challenged the established view of Turkey as woman friendly. There
was no way the Commission missed this event that kept the Turkish society, the legal and
political institutions of the state as well as the international community busy for a period
of months. European sexism aside, the issues raised by the event had political,
sociological and legal implications that affected many people in the Turkish society. An
864
Ibid.
European Commission, “1999 Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey’s
Progress Towards Accession,” November 13, 1999, p.5-8, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf ,
accessed on February 8, 2013.
866
Ibid, p. 8.
867
“Kadinlar Yakti,” Sabahonline, June 23, 2001. Available at
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2001/06/23/p01.html, accessed on February 8, 2013.
868
European Commission, “1999 Regular Report From the Commission on Turkey’s
Progress Towards Accession,”, p. 9.
869
Ibid, p. 11.
870
Ibid, p. 13.
865
205
analysis of European silence with respect to the “Kavakci Ordeal” in particular and the
headscarf issue in general reaffirms the hypotheses that Europe promotes only the
Muslim self-definitions that reproduce European experience or perceives Islam as a
marginal characteristic to be given up with Europe holding the power to judge the
important markers of identity. The silence of the EU towards the events that took place
with Kavakci’s entry to the parliament can be interpreted that it was initially siding with
the state in seeing her as a threat. EU also chose to remain silent on the issue of the
limitations on the Islamic education of children after the February 28 coup. The
outlawing of teaching of the Holy Qur’an to children under 12 years old was not
mentioned in any of the progress reports of the Commission. These cases are
demonstrations of the authoritarian political legacy of secularism. At the same time this
was an attempt to preserve the role model status and its acceptance of the superiority of
the West and the Kemalist model.
The neglect of the headscarf issue also reflected traces of Orientalist thinking,871
which “condones the restriction of the rights” of headscarved women based on the
assumption that “a woman with a headscarf cannot be equal to a man.”872 The European
Court of Human Rights’ decisions, which the Commission upheld, such as the 2005
Leyla Sahin decision, praised the Turkish Republic’s position on the issue, which can be
apprehended as an affirmation of Turkey’s role model status.873 The European Union’s
initial “silence” towards the Kavakci case continued even after the European Human
Rights Court’s recognition of unfair treatment of Kavakci with its 2007 decision. The EU
871
Kavakci Islam, pp. 84-85.
Ibid.
873
Ibid, p. 84.
872
206
was reluctant to give up the useful role model notion, which acknowledged the
superiority of Europe, but it also made it easier for the EU to maintain its position that
Turkey had important deficiencies regarding the membership drive.
In addition to its silence on the headscarf issue, the Commission also kept silent
about the limitations on the Islamic education of children brought by the February 28
coup. None of the Commission reports on Turkey’s accession progress after 1998
mentioned the post-February 28th coup banning of teaching of the Holy Qur’an to
children under 12 privately or institutionally.874 This ban was an issue of concern for
many practicing Muslims including the author of this dissertation, since Islamic tradition
mandates that religious education should begin when a child reaches the age of four,875
content of which changes as the child grows. During this period of time many people
including the researcher took the chance of “illegally” teaching their children the holy
text of Islam, at the privacy of their homes. The reports of adults who were “caught” in
the act of teaching their children Qur’an “illegally” caused some parents to shy away
from giving their children a Qur’anic education.876
This ban only targeted Qur’anic education, and was not pertinent to the teaching
of other holy books like the Old and New Testament.877 The Commission’s lack of
interest and concern for this issue, which limited the basic freedom of religion for the
observant Muslim population in Turkey is another proof of the European Union’s
position that conformed with the position of the Turkish intellectual architects of the
874
Resmi Gazete, “Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi Kur-an Kurslari ile Ogrenci Yurt ve
Pansiyonlari Yonetmeligi,” no. 23982, March 3, 2000.
875
Kavakci Islam, p. 72.
876
Ibid, pp. 73-74.
877
Ibid, p. 73.
207
February 28th coup. Up to this point, the European Union seemed to look the other way
with regards to the anti-democratic policies of the Turkish military and government on a
number of issues that concern the Muslim population, while rigorously criticizing Turkey
on limitations of freedom of religion for the non-Muslim and non-Sunni Muslim
minorities. The European Union’s siding with the Kemalist secularist elite’s position
strengthened the Euroskeptic argument that the European Union has double standards
towards Turkey. The Euroskeptics among the religious Turkish Muslims argued that the
European Union was only interested in the rights of the minorities and not concerned
about the rights of the majority because of their Orientalist view of Muslims. They did
not believe that Europe was sincere in its other concerns for Turkey, either.
At a 2011 conference on Turkish European Union Relations at the Brookings
Institution the researcher of this dissertation had the opportunity to ask a question
regarding the issue of double standard to Mr. Javier Solana, the former European Union
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The question inquired
about the Turkish criticism of the European Union’s human rights concerns of Turkey,
especially in the area of freedom of speech, making reference to the fact that members of
the European Parliament who go to Turkey to observe the cases brought against proWestern authors such as Orhan Pamuk are not interested in attending the cases of
columnists like Abdurrahman Dilipak who is known for his Islamist views. Mr. Solano
gave the following response:
I am willing to accept that sometimes we may give the impression of double
standards. I don’t think we should give that impression but sometimes it is very
difficult. There are many voices. You mentioned the members of the
parliament. Of course you have members of the Parliament. But the policy is what
is important, the policies of the European Union. I don’t think that we have a
double standards vis-à-vis Turkey in human rights. I think a lot has been done in
208
Turkey…. Many other issues have come up in which some people in Turkey or in
the European Union have said that double standards were used. And we try not to
-- at least, I try not to. But we cannot guarantee that you may talk to people that
react in a manner which is not the one I would like to react.878
Conferral of Candidacy Status and the Emergence of AK Parti
In December 1999, the European Union restored Turkey’s candidacy for
membership after the Helsinki summit.879 The new German government’s pro-Turkey
approach, Greece’s surprising realization that it was to its disadvantage to marginalize
Turkey, and United States government’s intensive lobbying activities in EU states in
1998 and 1999 were among the factors that led to the reversal of EU’s position.880 The
restoration of candidacy status received a warm welcome in Turkey, with an incredible
seventy five percent public support for membership.881 The rejuvenation of the interest in
EU membership “restored the European dimension of Turkish politics with a positive
impact on the reform process at home,” leading to the realization that membership would
only be possible if Turkey upgraded its domestic political structure to European
standards.882
878
Javier Solana, “Turkey, Europe and the World in 2011,” Seventh Annual Sabanci
Lecture with Javier Solana, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, May 4, 2011.
Available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/05/04-sabanci, accessed on February
11, 2013.
879
Omer Taspinar, “The US and Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership,” in Turkey and the
European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges, Joseph S. Joseph, ed.,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 207.
880
Ibid.
881
Ihsan D. Dagi, “Transformation of Turkish Politics and the European Union:
Dimensions of Human Rights and Democratization,” in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus:
Security Across the Borderlines of a New Europe, B. Gokay, ed. (Keele: Keele European
Research Center, 2004). p. 11.
882
Ibid.
209
In the meanwhile there was an “unprecedented public display of internal divisions
in the Islamist movement” during the May 2001 congress of the Virtue Party.883 Abdullah
Gul, who had served two terms under Welfare Party and was now a member of the
parliament representing the Virtue Party, challenged Recai Kutan for the leadership
position. While the latter represented the older generation in the Islamist movement,
Abdullah Gul represented the younger generation supported by Erdogan, whose
popularity increased after his conviction and imprisonment. Erdogan had got an early
release from his ten-month sentence for good behavior in July 1999.884 Although he was
not able to participate in politics due to his ongoing ban, he was the mastermind behind
the initiative that challenged the traditionalists. During the 2001 election for the
leadership of the Virtue Party, Kutan narrowly won intensifying the division between the
traditionalists (gelenekciler) and modernists (yenilikciler), which received public
recognition. The 2001 closure of the Virtue Party led to the rise of two new parties: one
was the Felicity Party, which represented the traditionalist wing, under the leadership of
Recai Kutan, and the other was Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kakinma
Partisi ) known with the acronyms AK Parti and AKP,885 led by Tayyip Edogan,
introducing a new discourse aimed at gaining the support of many different segments of
883
Jenkins, p. 166.
Ibid.
885
The researcher of this dissertation study consciously made the choice to use the
English name Justice and Development Party and the acronym JDP to prevent taking
sides in the conflict regarding the proper Turkish acronym. While the party officials use
the acronym AK Parti, in which the word “ak” carries literal meanings white, pure,
pristine, the opponents of the party use the acronym AKP which the party officials do not
accept. The tension between the camps has led to a polarization in the society, such that
ordinary citizens will use one or the other acronym to reflect their position with respect to
the current government. The choice of using the English name and acronym was made
with the intention of preventing having to pick a side in this conflict which would
overshadow the arguments of this research.
884
210
the Turkish society, rejecting the “Islamist” label, presenting themselves as “conservative
democrats.”886 The Justice and Development Party (JDP) succeeded in the 2002
parliamentary elections with 34.3 percent of the votes, winning 363 seats, almost twothirds of the seats in the parliament.887
Hakan Yavuz argued that JDP did not base any agendas on Islam or other
categories of identity, “but acts as an agent of country’s integration into neoliberal
economic and political spaces.”888 This worked because of the Turkish political system’s
transformation from politics based on identity to “politics of service.”889 The Welfare
Party was known for its success in providing high quality service to the public at the local
level at the municipalities that they had won in the elections of 1994. Tayyip Erdogan had
served as the mayor of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 as a
member of Welfare Party and later the Virtue Party, receiving a lot of praise for the
dramatic improvements in municipal services. Many trusted this new conservative
political team given their previous success in the municipalities.
After the launching of the JDP, Erdogan emphasized the need of the party to
concentrate on bringing better services to the people of Turkey, and to follow in the
footsteps of Turgut Ozal, who was known for having made radical improvements in
Turkish democracy, as well as opening the Turkish economy to the world market.
886
Umit Cizre, Menderes Cinar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the
Light of February 28 Process,” South Atlantic Quarterly, Duke University Press, 2003, p.
327.
887
William Hale, Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The
Case of AKP, (Routledge: New York, 2010), p. 5.
888
Hakan Yavuz, “ Introduction: The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation
of the Turkish Islamic Movement,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and
the AK Parti,” Hakan Yavuz, ed., (University of Utah Press: Utah, 2006), p. 3.
889
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
211
Erdogan explained that, just like Ozal whose party opened doors, he would open doors to
citizens from all parts of the socio-political spectrum. Ozal was known for having
supporters from almost all segments of Turkish society during his tenures first as prime
minister and then as president. Erdogan followed in his footsteps.
Even though Erdogan rejected the “Islamist” label for his new party, the secular
political establishment and the national and international media defined the JDP and its
administration as Islamist.890 The Kemalist elite and others who were skeptical of the new
party suspected that the JDP had a “hidden agenda” of transforming Turkey into a
theocracy, while “pretending” to respect the fundamental values of secularism and
democratization to hold on to power and to prevent any further ban. Even though there
was no evidence of JDP’s “intention to use the state power to Islamize the society and
politics,”891 it was constantly viewed and presented as a threat to Turkish secularism
especially during its early days.
Erdogan argued that achieving European Union membership was a “necessary
goal” for the country892 and in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, he embarked on a
“diplomatic whirlwind,” making a series of visits to major European capitals to ask them
to start the accession negotiations.893 He also met with President George W. Bush in
890
Hasan Kosebalaban, “Party With Islamist Roots Set to Modernize Turkey,”
YaleGlobal, August 28, 2007. Accessed on February 17, 2013, Available at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/party-islamist-roots-set-modernize-turkey.
891
Hale and Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of
AKP, p. 29.
892
“Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Latest Islamic Leader is the Country’s Most
Popular Politician,” The Economist.
893
Philip Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a ‘Post-Islamist’
Government and a Kemalist State,” International Affairs, Vol. 83, Issue 2, March 2007,
p. 292.
212
Washington DC in December 2002, who assured the United States’ support for Turkish
European Union membership would continue. Erdogan explained that his party perceived
“the European Union membership as the most important modernization project” of the
republic ever since its establishment.894 During this foreign policy campaign Erdogan’s
only official title was “Chairman of Justice and Development Party,” because he could
not take part in the 2002 elections since he was still banned from active politics. Abdullah
Gul had become Prime Minister, and worked closely with Erdogan until his ban was
revoked enabling him to get elected to the parliament and become prime minister in
2003.
Erdogan knew that Turkish democracy was still vulnerable to military
interventions and the path to ending their power required the strengthening and speeding
of the democratization process at all levels. The Copenhagen Criteria put forward by the
European Union provided a great tool to help achieve this goal without disturbing the
sensitive balances in the Turkish society. Like Erbakan, he did not believe in European
superiority, however, he did not regard the Europeans or other Western nations as the
enemy. He agreed with the view that it was not the West, but the westernizing process
defined by Turkish republican reforms that caused the marginalization of the Islamist
identity to be.895 He promoted cooperation with both Western and the Muslim states.
Erdogan’s strongly supported and expressed commitment to European Union
membership came as a shock to the Kemalist elite who still continued to perceive him as
894
“Remarks By the President in Meeting With the Chairman of Turkey’s AK Party,”
Transcript The White House Office of The Press Secretary, December 10, 2002.
Accessed on February 17, 2013, available at http://www.usembassyisrael.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2002/december/121103.html.
895
Ihsan D. Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the
West and Westernization,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2005, p. 3.
213
an Islamist with an anti-Western agenda. They were surprised to see him utilizing the
same language that the Kemalists used to describe the importance of EU membership.
As the support for JDP increased in successive elections, some among the radical
Kemalists began to take up anti-European positions to distinguish themselves from the
JDP’s successful pursuit of the EU’s membership criteria and how it was strengthening
their political position and increasing their popularity. It was true that Erdogan’s foreign
policy and domestic policies did not seem to introduce a dramatic change to the existing
power relations; however, in time it reflected some major changes that challenged them.
JDP’s persistence in fighting for European Union membership represented a
change from the traditional positions taken by the representatives of political Islam.
Some argued that there was a transformation “from Europhobia and Europhilia”896 due to
the hope that the European Union would “anchor Turkey for democracy and pluralism,
thereby deterring any future military interventions.”897 However, Erdogan put
Westernization in the service of his party’s agenda closely identified with a successful
Turkish democratic transition. The JDP’s prioritization of the European Union came as a
surprise to the Kemalists who were used to dominate all domestic and foreign policy
areas related with the EU. The JDP used the EU to correct the Turkish Republic’s
authoritarianism and against the West’s military and secular allies. He was not naïve
enough to believe the progressiveness of the West, but he used democracy to create a new
political space for the Islamists.
896
897
Robins, p. 292.
Ibid.
214
The period that followed (2002-2005) accomplished the intensive harmonization
of the Turkish laws with those of the European Union. The harmonization of the laws
through the reform process, which the JDP embarked on put foreign policy in the driver’s
seat leading Turkey to a domestic transformation that had legal, economic, social and
political implications. It was as if the JDP stole the magic wand of Europeanization from
the hands of the Europeans and their Kemalists allies to push for new pro-democracy
internal and international alliances that would end the exclusionary Kemalist policies that
marginalized conservative Islamic actors.898
There were a number of confrontations and incidents in the struggle for power
between the JDP government and the Kemalist political establishment, and especially the
military, from their first days of office.899 The incidents of tension between the military
and the JDP cabinet were based on the military’s classical secularist attitudes towards
Islamic political actors who they considered to be “fundamentalists” married to
headscarved women while governing the country. Even the appointment of the new head
of the Turkish central bank was discussed in the media within the framework of the
nominees’ wives’ choices to wear or not to wear the headscarf, rather than the actual
credentials of the nominees.
Another challenge to the JDP came from the secularist and pro-military President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000-2007), who was known for his lack of tolerance for all
religious practices, especially the women’s use of headscarf. Sezer took the headscarf ban
to a totally new level excluding the headscarved spouses of all the Turkish officials from
898
Ihsan D. Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the
West and Westernization,” p. 13.
899
Jenkins, p.170.
215
the celebrations he hosted at the presidential residence. For each reception two sets of
invitations would be sent out. The invitees whose wives wear headscarves would receive
a single invitation, while others would be invited with their spouses. This was not the
practice during Demirel presidency and during the first three years of Sezer presidency
until 2003.900 Sezer extended the ban to non-Turkish citizens as well by not inviting Dr.
Zeynat Karzai, the wife of Afghanistan’s President to a post NATO summit dinner at his
residency in 2003.901 The members of the JDP, under the leadership of Erdogan,
responded by not challenging Sezer, and attending these events without their spouses.
The JDP was determined to avoid responding to the provocations of Sezer, the military
and the Kemalists. They purposely played down the defense of the headscarf issue in
order not to jeopardize their terms in office902 and their political survival.
The headscarf issue was not the only source of tension during Sezer’s presidency.
He utilized his power to veto numerous issues that were not religious in character. He
vetoed bills related to providing assistance to the poor, improving educational services, or
any other services that would increase the popular support for the JDP.903 Sezer’s
Presidency also slowed down the EU harmonization process, vetoing many of the bills
supported EU membership, such as the Ombudsman law backed by the European Union
as a measure of the fight against corruption.904
900
“Literature Nasil Girdi?” Zaman, July 19, 2013. Accessed on May 23, 2013, available
at http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/626053-7-yil-oncesinde-kamusal-alan-mi-vardi
901
Kavakci Islam, p. 88.
902
Ibid.
903
Ibid, p. 81.
904
“Sezer Vetoes EU-backed Ombudsman Law,” Hurriyet Daily News, February 7, 2006,
accessed on March 24, 2013, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=sezer-vetoes-eu-backedombudsman-law-2006-07-02.
216
The First Major Foreign Policy Challenge of the JDP
In February of 2003 Erdogan got elected to the parliament and assumed the
position of prime minister in March. He benefited from the legislative reforms the
parliament passed to harmonize the laws with those of the European Union, which
revoked the restrictions on election of convicted felons to political office.905 Before
Erdogan’s election to the position of prime minister, the main foreign policy issue that
the JDP faced was the United States’ plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein as part of the
Iraq war and the “searching for weapons of mass destruction.” As one of the closest allies
of the United States in the region, and a member of NATO, Turkey was to be engaged in
the war effort. Despite the strong opposition to the United States led invasion among the
general population as well as within the party, the JDP chose not to damage relations with
the United States which constituted an important pillar of Turkish foreign policy.
Interestingly, the two opposing groups in Turkish politics were in agreement as neither
the formerly Islamist brain trust of the JDP, nor the Kemalists wanted to deal with a
possible war at their borders.906 The general public including the strong supporters of JDP
with conservative religious views did not want Turkey to be involved in an operation that
would result in the loss of lives of fellow Muslims who were also their neighbors. The
leadership of the JDP was left between a rock and a hard place as they had to decide
between keeping the promise of supporting Washington DC and not losing the public
support. The issue was brought to a vote in the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003
allowing the American troops to transit through Turkey enabling them to provide support
905
906
Jenkins, pp. 170-171.
Robins, p. 294.
217
the main invasion force.907 Erdogan had met with the members of the parliament from the
JDP and stated that it was necessary for them to vote in favor of the motion and got
reassurance that they would give their total support.908 He urged them to vote in favor of
the motion repeatedly at the party group meetings as well as during public debates.
However, after the votes were cast, although the motion received the majority of the
votes, it fell short due to a technicality. It was three votes short of a constitutional
majority with almost one hundred JDP parliamentarians voting in opposition along with
the nineteen absentees.909 The initial explanation for the outcome, which caused the
administration to be simultaneously relieved and embarrassed,910 came from Prime
Minister Abdullah Gul, who stated that the whole process took place within a democratic
framework as everyone was watching, and that the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s
decision should be respected by all. He also stressed the fact that Turkey was the only
democratic nation in the region.911 Erdogan’s statement supported Gul’s, explaining that
they did “everything that a democratic administration needed to do,” expressing his pride
of the progress of democratization in Turkey, highlighting that this was the first time in
the nation’s political party history that democratic process was activated internally by the
JDP, by not forcing the parliamentarians to vote as a group.912
907
Jenkins, p. 171.
Ibid.
909
Ibid, p. 172.
910
Robins, p. 295.
911
“Basbakan Gul: Meclis Kararina Saygili Olmaliyiz,” Hurriyet, March 1, 2003,
accessed on February 19, 2013, available at
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/01/255365.asp.
912
“Erdogan: Guven Bunalimi Yok,” Hurriyet, March 2, 2003, accessed on February 19,
2013, available at http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/02/255774.asp.
908
218
Both Erdogan and Gul’s emphasis on the progress of democratization in Turkey at
a time when the US was furious with the outcome came at a high cost. The JDP’s
position in presenting a “democracy-based excuse” was aimed at challenging the
Orientalist assumption that democracy is incompatible with Muslim values to avoid
further backlash from the US. In return, the United States accused the Turkish
government of being mercenary by using the issue to embezzle more aid from it. This
offered a US orientalist perspective on the negativities of the two countries.
Both Erdogan and Gul had started out their political lives as actors of the previous
political Islamic movements, and despite their objections they were considered
“Islamists” because of their reputations as observant, conservative Muslims. Although
they had worked very hard to make sure that the motion to assist the United States would
pass as they had promised, once the parliament voted otherwise, they utilized a language
that reflected their complete acceptance of democratic values. Some skeptics might argue
that the “unexpected democratic outcome” had left them with no choice but to use the
“quality” of the Turkish democratic system as an alibi. However, the case can still be
made that this was a good example of the practice of democratic governance in a majority
Muslim population, under the leadership of a political group, which carried the “Islamist”
label. This was the first major instance of JDP acting in a manner that reflected its
commitment to democracy and indirectly challenged the arguments against Muslim
societies’ capacity to adhere to values like democracy, which are considered to be limited
to Western societies.
It took a while for Turkish relations with the United States to recover from the
results of this vote. In contrast, Turkish relations with the European Union prospered
219
under the JDP government, which passed three European Union harmonization packages
in early 2003 in addition to the series of constitutional amendments passed by the
previous government.913 The amendments increased the number of civilian members in
the National Security Council and the recognition of its decisions as recommendations
rather than orders.914 The 2003 reform package took one more step forward by taking out
the requirement for the secretary general of the council to be a member of military and
also changing meeting frequency from monthly to bimonthly.915 All of these changes of
the National Security Council were revolutionary in decreasing the influence of the
military in Turkish politics. Of course the military and its secular Kemalist supporters
were not ready give up their power and this led to some power struggles between them
and the members of the JDP.916 Out of the eight harmonization packages that were passed
between February 2002 and July 2004, five were passed on JDP’s watch. The JDP
“continued to erode the influence of the military in the state apparatus,” while avoiding
any direct confrontation.917
The JDP’s success in decreasing the military’s influence on government and its
anti-democratic role since the establishment of the republic, coupled with the European
Union harmonization process provided other clear examples of how the JDP challenged
the Orientalist domestic and international assumptions about Islamic political actors’
hostility to democracy and the West. The JDP wielded the EU card up against
sequestering the Kemalist military attempt to exclude them from politics. Their success in
913
Jenkins, p. 172.
Ibid.
915
Ibid.
916
Ibid, pp. 172-173.
917
Ibid, p. 174.
914
220
challenging the Turkish Orientalist construction of Islamic identity can be assessed by the
growing public support for the party from a wide range of people from within the Turkish
society. The continuing pressure of the military and the obstacles produced by the
presidency did not have much effect on the popularity of the JDP, which received a
record 47.1 percent of the votes in 2004 local elections.918
The Cypriot Accession and Its Consequences
One of the major issues of dispute in the Turkish EU membership process
concerned Cyprus. The island was divided between the Greek Cypriot Republic and the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The former was recognized by the international
community, while only the Turkish Republic recognized the latter. Cyprus had applied
for membership to the European Union in 1990 and was scheduled to enter the European
Union as part of the Central and Eastern European enlargement that welcomed ten new
members. Since the international community recognized the existence of a single Cypriot
Republic Turkey would be in violation of territorial integrity of a European Union
member state.919
At the beginning of 2004, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots started to
negotiate the United Nations’ plan known as the “Annan Plan,” which proposed holding
of simultaneous unification referenda on each part of the Island.920 64.5 percent of the
Turkish Cypriots voted for the unification of North and South of the island while 75.8
918
Ibid, p. 173.
Ibid, p. 174.
920
Ibid.
919
221
percent of the Greek Cypriots voted against it.921 The Greek Cypriots rejected it arguing
that the United Nations Security Council provided no security guarantees in the postreunification period.922 Turkish Cypriots supported the plan because it offered a unified
federal two state solution and they did not want to be left out, as the rest of the island was
getting ready for EU accession. Turkish government also supported the plan and
encouraged the yes vote in the referendum. Even though the outcome of the referendum
reflected that the Turkish side was willing to resolve the issue, the European Union did
not keep its promise to end isolationist approach towards the North.923 The accession of
Greek-Cypriots to the European Union in May 2004 took place as planned, making them
representatives of the island as a whole. The EU found a temporary solution to the
problem by not requiring the implementation of the EU law (acquis communautaire) in
areas that were not under Greek control.924
Erdogan repeatedly expressed his disappointment with European Union’s lack of
keeping true to its side of the agreement because of the hindrance of Greek Cypriots. EU
had pledged to lift the isolations on direct trade and financial aid to the Northern Cypriots
after the referenda.925 Erdogan argued that the Greek Cypriots wanted more concessions
then the ones offered in the Annan Plan, and because of their dissent to the plan, the
921
Ibid.
“Greek Cypriot Leaders Reject Annan Plan,” The Guardian, April 22, 2004, accessed
on May 26, 2013, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus
923
Ozlem Terzi, The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy,
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), p. 101.
924
Terzi, pp. 101-102.
925
Ibid, p. 101.
922
222
concessions that Turkish side had agreed to would no longer be valid.926 On the other
hand, the Greek Cypriots President, Tassos Papadopoulos argued that they had not
rejected the reunification per se, but the contents of the solution plan,927 fairness of which
was considered questionable.928 Erdogan, later on stated that Turkey would freeze the
relations with the European Union when the Greek Cypriots took their turn in the rotating
position of European Union Presidency,929 and Turkey did boycott the Cyprus European
Union Presidency by suspending relations with the presidency while continuing relations
with the European Commission.930 Accession of Cyprus before reaching a solution was
perceived as a source of major setback in the Turkish membership journey, which was
already facing continuous criticism from the EU for failing to open its borders to Cyprus.
Erdogan government’s response to the Greek Cypriot vote and the European
Union’s reaction or lack thereof followed by the freezing of relations reflected the
complex dynamics of the power relations within and between the European Union and
Turkey. The JDP representatives with their conservative Muslim identity presented a
much different profile than the administrations before them. They desire to become a part
of Europe, on equal terms, not as subordinates. They do not perceive themselves as
inferiors who have to submit to the superior authority of Europe. They use a language
926
“Era of Concessions Over in Cyprus, PM Erdogan Says,” Todays Zaman, July 19,
2011, accessed on February 23, 2013, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news250928-era-of-concessions-over-in-cyprus-pm-erdogan-says.html.
927
Viola Drath, “The Cyprus Referandum: An Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust,”
American Foreign Policy Interests, 26: 2004, p. 341.
928
Ibid, pp. 347-348.
929
“Era of Concessions Over in Cyprus, PM Erdogan Says,” Todays Zaman, July 19,
2011.
930
“Turkey Sticks to Boycott of Cyprus EU Presidency,” Reuters, June 7, 20012,
accessed on February 23, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-turkey-eu-idUSBRE85615S20120607.
223
that utilizes concepts such as “democracy,” “rights,” and “equality” that does not fit with
the dominant representations of Muslims prevalent in the West in general and Europe in
particular. Their reaction to Greek Cypriot presidency occurred along the same lines: the
JDP did not want to “burn the bridges” with the European Union but made a very
diplomatic strategic move by only suspending relations with the Presidency, not the
whole Union. While the JDP was committed to the EU membership goal, it was aware of
the challenges, which are handled through employing various tactics of diplomacy. This
was different from the Turkish foreign policy practices and its measured behavior pattern
did not fit with the classical Orientalist representations of Islamic governments. The
traditional Turkish position in a similar situation would have resulted with a bigger
political crisis.
After the accession of Cyprus, the European Union clearly stated that possibility
of Turkish accession being dependent on Turkey’s extending the Customs Union to all
the new members of the Central and Eastern European enlargement, including the Greek
Republic of Cyprus, which it never recognized.931 Although new harmonization
legislations were passed, there was still a long way to go with respect to
implementation932 and making them a part of the complex social and political relations
among the member states and their cultures.
The chasm between the cultural outlooks of the European Union and the JDP was
re-exposed through Erdogan’s introduction of a draft bill that included the criminalization
931
932
Jenkins, p. 174.
Ibid.
224
of adultery in September 2004.933 The European Union expressed strong opposition to the
Turkish state’s interference of private lives of citizens, and Erdogan had to withdraw,
after accusing European Union of interfering with internal affairs of the country.934 These
kinds of issues lend themselves to Orientalist stereotyping of Islam and Muslims even
though they tend to be identified with conservative political parties and their cultural
outlooks.
This confrontation fortified the concerns of some of the Turkoskeptics in Europe
who did not trust the JDP as well as the Euroskeptics in Turkey. The Euroskeptic
supporters of the administration buttressed their suspicion that “EU was only interested in
freedom in its own ideals and values,”935 which was elevated by European Union’s
passionate protest of the adultery clause and its lack of reaction to the headscarf ban
introduced in French schools within the same time frame.936 The analysis of European
behavior in this case supports the hypotheses that European Union promoted only
Muslim self-definitions that reproduce European experience, thus upholding adultery as a
matter of personal privacy while ignoring the human rights aspect of the right to wear the
headscarf. The headscarf is a visual representation of privacy that does not correspond to
any value that is a part of standard European identity; therefore the restrictions related to
its practice are irrelevant. By ignoring the issue of headscarf ban in France, the European
Union was continuing the marginalizing religious aspects of Turkish identity through its
position of silence. The European Union demonstrates its power in intellectual and socio-
933
Ibid.
Ibid.
935
Ibid.
936
Ibid.
934
225
political arenas by choosing to react to issues that it likes and ignoring those that may be
sensitive issues to disadvantaged populations.
The JDP’s withdrawal of the bill that criminalized adultery also reflects that the
commitment to the membership prospect outweighs pushing its own agenda. This shows
that the JDP deems the European Union powerful to interfere with the internal issues of
Turkey within the framework of this specific case. Prime Minister Erdogan did not want
to risk the accession negotiation schedule for an issue that Europe is insistent on, at this
point in the process. JDP also did not want to be attacked by the Kemalist elites who were
more furious about the proposal regarding criminalization of adultery. This was a
relatively small, but powerful group with loud voices that could repress other opinions by
utilizing the media outlets most of which held an anti-JDP position. The JDP’s backing
down on this issue made the secular elites once again feel more powerful over the
religious elements in the society. JDP’s withdrawal came at the cost of compromising his
personal religious principles and disappointing his religious supporters. Cultural
sensitivities of the religious conservatives were once again marginalized, this time by a
political party that was led by one of their own that felt vulnerable to a potential cultural
and political backlash by an alliance between national and international actors.
Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy with the JDP
Many foreign policy experts argue that Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s was
dominantly hard power oriented,937 which transformed into a relatively more soft-power
oriented approach that resorts to diplomatic means, not military means as did the
937
Hasan Basri Yalcin, “The Concept of ‘Middle Power’ and the Recent Turkish Foreign
Policy Activism,” Afro Eurasian Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2012, p. 196, and Terzi,
p. 1.
226
former.938 Turkish foreign policy was traditionally premised on tendencies of rigid
realism, which changed with the influence of the European Union and Turkey began to
increasingly recognize the value of soft power.939 During the JDP government the foreign
policy practices increasingly emphasized soft power, pursuing a pro-active diplomacy.940
The system of defining and the methodology to attain national interests also drastically
changed, as seen in the examples of approaches related to Greece and Cyprus.941
Traditionally, Turkey would not be likely to consider any possibility of agreement on the
Cyprus conflict, however, the winds of change enabled Turkey to actually support and
promote a solution through the Annan plan, later. Ozlem Terzi asserts:
not all changes of Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the EU,
especially the changes in the content of the AKP government’s policies towards
the Middle Eastern countries, which necessitates an explanation of alternative
identities and rival realist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy. However, it is
crucial to notice that even the changes of policy towards the Middle Eastern
countries are closely linked with Turkey’s relations with the West in general, and
with the EU in particular.942
Terzi’s analysis can be projected to the argument about the challenges JDP poses
to the Orientalist representations dominant in the West, within the framework of
European Union. Classic Orientalist assumptions represent the Oriental as incapable of
learning and the furthest achievement he makes cannot be more than merely imitating the
practices of the superior West. However, Terzi’s arguments reflect that JDP, who is
Orientalized both by the Kemalist elite and many in the European Union, actually learns
938
Terzi, p. 1.
Ibid.
940
Yalcin, “The Concept of ‘Middle Power’ and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy
Activism,” p. 207. [Reference to Ahmet Davudoglu “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An
Assessment of 2007, “ Insight Turkey, 2008, Vol 10. Issue 1, pp. 77-96].
941
Terzi, p. 2.
942
Ibid.
939
227
the “European ways,” modifies and adapts some of them to its foreign policy making and
even further transforming them into a brand new system custom made for Turkey.
Turkey traditionally followed a foreign policy approach similar to that of its close
ally, the United States. For instance after the attacks of September 11th, the United States’
position was dominated by unilateralism, enforcing rights to make pre-emptive attacks.943
On the other hand, the European Union’s foreign policy outlook promoted
multilateralism, diplomacy, international law and utilization of socio-economic measures
to eliminate terrorism before it starts.944 Under the JDP, Turkish foreign policy reflected
an approach that was similar to that of the European Union. It prioritized building good
relations and cooperation. The relations with the European Union led to a complete
transformation in the foreign policy approach of Turkey, especially after the
announcement of the candidate status and during the JDP administration in particular.
The JDP recognized the difficulty of the task and its relative weakness on the face of
strong opponents and therefore tried to be cautious.
Turkish foreign policy was historically based on the Turkish modernization
outlook, which was equated with westernization. This outlook, which fed on the
Orientalist assumptions, led Turkey to set westernization as the final destination which according to the Kemalist elite- inherently required tearing asunder with the Middle East
and the rest of the Muslim world. Therefore as Turkey “turned its face” to the West, it
also simultaneously “turned its back” to the East. This was supported by the knowledge
production that affirmed this vision, which also helped maintain and strengthen the power
943
944
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 3.
228
relations between the actors involved, giving the West a power over Turkey and placing
the Middle East and Muslim states at the bottom of the power hierarchy.
One of the clichéd statements about Turkey is that it is a bridge between the East
and the West. This constituted the basis of Turkish foreign policy, however, the policies
employed a rhetoric that perceived Turkey as a Western frontier “against” the East.945
Based on this frame of mind, Turkey historically prioritized relations with the Western
World, and structured its relations with the non-Western world taking Western concerns
as a point of reference. This was what the role model status of Turkey required and
fulfilling the requirements was rewarding. In rejecting the role model status together with
its reward style, the Islamist opponents of Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy
traditionally promoted a completely adverse position that was anti-Western, prioritizing
relations with the Muslim nations and other non-Western nations, discerning Europe and
the United states as the enemy. The Virtue Party was the first example, which did not
present anti-Western position and utilized rhetoric of universal human rights and
democracy. However the party did not get a chance to be actively involved in the foreign
policy production at the decision making level, due its short lifespan.
The JDP’s foreign policy vision drew attention to its difference from other
Islamist parties, utilizing a vision similar to the foreign policy objectives of the European
Union. The European Union encourages regional cooperation, promotes human rights,
democracy and good governance, while also trying to prevent violent conflicts and
945
Ibid, p. 9.
229
fighting against international crime.946 According to one perspective, the European Union
foresaw “a virtuous link between human rights, democracy and conflict prevention.”947
One of the main constructs of the foreign policy of JDP was its attempts to build
good relations with both the East and the West, arguing that they did not need to be
mutually exclusive, in response to the demands by its own base. In other words,
according to JDP’s foreign policy outlook, turning Turkey’s face towards Europe did not
necessitate turning its back to the East, especially the Muslim nations. Similar to the
European Union’s foreign policy objectives the JDP also wanted to make sure there was
stability in the region, promoting the “zero-problem policy” with its neighbors.
Traditional Turkish foreign policy perspective discerned its Middle Eastern neighbors
Syria, Iran and Iraq as sources of instability and threat.948 On the other hand, after 2002
Turkish foreign policy was based on the “rhetoric of building friendly relations and
increasing dialogue with all neighbors” which led to extreme progress in relations with
these three neighbors.949 This strengthened their hand nationally.
Ihsan Dagi argues that JDP’s approach to globalization was another factor that
made it stand out among the traditional Islamist movements. Traditional Islamist
movements had an anti-globalization stance; on the grounds that globalization causes
deterioration of local, traditional, cultural and national values.950 The JDP took a proglobalization stand, believing that integration with the rest of the world was necessary for
946
Karen E. Smith, European Union Policy in a Changing World, 2nd Edition,
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 121. [cited by Terzi, p. 3]
947
Terzi, pp. 3-4.
948
Ibid, p. 9.
949
Ibid.
950
Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West
and Westernization,” p. 12.
230
economic growth, the progress of democratization as well as maintaining the basis of
legitimacy for the party.951 This constituted one of the main contributing factors to the
success of the JDP in establishing and maintaining economic stability, even at times of
international crises. Erdogan’s clear commitment towards the EU membership process
and his ambition to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria as well as the revolutionary
changes that his administration brought to Turkish foreign policy practices made it clear
that the JDP would change some of the existing representations related to the previous
Islamist or Kemalist movements in Turkey. Neither JDP’s foreign policy practices nor
national policies fit the assumptions and representations. The success of the JDP in
adapting itself to the global economic and political system in a short time period did not
fit with the representation of observant Muslims as backward and lacked the potential to
improve their conditions. The case of JDP no longer fit the existing Orientalist
representations of political Islamist movements. Therefore both the Turkish population
and the political actors in the international arena had a difficult time placing JDP in the
existing categories.
This dramatic change in foreign policy outlook of Turkey provoked some
suspicion in the international arena, questioning whether there was a “shift of axis” of
Turkish foreign policy from focusing totally on the West to prioritizing relations and
alliances with the East, particularly the Middle East. Many Western states suspected that
Turkey was moving away from Europe. JDP was faced with the challenge of addressing
the concerns and suspicions of the international community. The first signal regarding the
foreign policy priorities of JDP was Erdogan’s visit to Greece, which was his first
951
Ibid.
231
international visit as the Prime Minister.952 The significance of this visit was multifaceted
since Greece was a Western nation, a neighbor, and a member of the European Union
especially one that had been a major opponent to Turkish accession. By making his first
official international visit to Greece, Erdogan acted pre-emptively to address the issues
that hampered the path to Europeanization. The attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue by
supporting the Annan Plan was another indicator that showed that there was no “shift of
axis” as argued. There was however, a change in the foreign policy outlook.
Relations With the Muslim World During the JDP Administration’s First Years
During the first years of JDP administration, the foreign policy was one that
prioritized the European Union accession process. The concerns and debates regarding a
possibility of “shift of axis” did not get vocalized until after 2005, despite the
intensification of relations with the Middle East between 2002 and 2005.953 The
intensification of relations with the Middle East became more apparent after 2009.954 JDP
argued that accession to the union would enable Turkey to serve as a two-way passage
between Europe and Muslim World, “reiterating that Turkey’s European and Muslim
identities are complementary rather than contradictory.”955
The initiation of Turkey’s presentation as a role model to the Arab states in the
region dates back to 1950s. Paradoxically, Turkish Republic did not identify itself as
952
Kilic Bugra Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the
West?,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No.1, Winter 2010, p. 207.
953
Terzi, p. 107.
954
Ibid.
955
Ibid.
232
either Islamic or Middle Eastern state.956 This paradox is another reflection of the fictive
nature of Turkey’s role model status. The Turkish Republic never perceived or presented
itself as a Muslim state. In fact, it proudly claimed to be a secular state that had a Muslim
population, promoting a “culturalized” and distorted understanding of religion that was
limited to the private realm. While distancing itself from the Arab or Muslim nations,
Turkey together with the West was encouraging them to limit and suppress the role of
religion in public life, by adapting a similar Westernization project. Turkey saw itself as a
“working to be Western” nation and therefore it did not seek to nurture its common
identity with other Muslim nations. The contradicting perceptions of Turkish selfidentification made the role model argument problematic. However, Turkey took pride in
its westernization prospect, which it promoted as the most important characteristic of the
republic together with secularism. Turkey saw it self at a superior position in comparison
to the Muslim nations, because of its planned Westernization, which made it an example
they could follow. This system of thought based on the relations between the Occident
and the Orient made Westernized Turkish-ness superior to other identities like Arab-ness
and non-Turkish Muslim-ness, which were orientalized. Ironically, Turkey never
questioned its orientalization by Europe nor its self-orientalization. It ignored the fact that
its “westernization” project was an indicator of a de facto acceptance of its Oriental
status. Accepting the oriental status inherently highlighted that it can only try but never
actually become “Western” or “European.” This identity crisis filled with contradictions
and dichotomous identities was tackled by the JDP government, which had to go through
956
Ibid, p.108.
233
transformations of its own in order to address some of these internal and international
tensions.
The Turkish Republic’s foreign policy that prioritized Westernization focused its
attention on maintaining good relations with Europe and the United States at the cost of
the deterioration of its relations with the Arab and Muslim states. The fact that Turkey
was the first nation with a Muslim population to immediately recognize the Israeli state in
March 1949 caused the Arab countries to dissociate from Turkey during that period.
Sustaining good relations with Israel was part of a Western oriented Turkish foreign
policy until 2003 when the relations started to deteriorate in response to Turkey’s quest
for leadership amongst the Arab nations.957 Until that time the relations between Arab
nations and Turkey assumed a secondary role in regional and international contexts,
depending on which party was in power.
For instance, immediately after the coup d’état of 1960, Turkey wanted to
establish mutual relations based on equality with the Arab states and did not assume a
leadership role to guide them “as a representative of the West.”958 Until early1990,
Turkey adhered to the traditional neutrality policy, staying away from the conflicts in the
region, and actually succeeding in improving trade relations with Iran and Iraq who had
been at war with one another during 1980s.959 The dramatic change came with Turkey’s
involvement in the intervention against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait under the leadership
of the United States in 1990. The increased US involvement in the Middle East was the
main factor that led to increased interest in their neighbors. The operation and the
957
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 109.
959
Ibid.
958
234
consequent sanctions had their side effects on Turkish economy and security, and after
this period Turkey’s relations with its southern neighbors, especially Iraq and Syria
deteriorated.960 The US did not compensate Turkey for the losses that were the result of
the war. During the 1990s these countries were kept under close observation due to
security concerns by the Turkish military.961 On the other hand, Iraqi oil was smuggled
into Turkey and there was a discussion regarding an Iraqi pipeline through Turkey, which
meant that economic relations were thriving. The Kurdish no fly zone in Northern Iraq
continued to be a concern.
Although JDP’s foreign policy towards the Middle East triggered the “shift of
axis” concerns in the West, JDP neutralized the arguments by asserting that Turkey’s
Western and Middle Eastern policies were complementary to each other.962 Erdogan’s
foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davudoglu believed that previous administrations’
prioritization of relations with Europe and the United States had led to a foreign policy
imbalance, which could be fixed through active involvement in the region.963
Davudoglu’s vision was premised upon economic and strategic analysis, while the
implementation by the JDP administration focused on emotional aspects of relations,
focusing on the aspect of religious solidarity.964 Relations with Iran and Syria were
especially strengthened through high level visits starting from 2003 as both countries
shared Turkey’s concerns about regional stability after the invasion of Iraq by the United
960
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 109-110.
962
Ibid, p. 110.
963
Jenkins, p. 175.
964
Ibid.
961
235
States and its supporters.965 Within the next year Turkey and Iran were both faced with
Kurdish nationalist violence, which led to the signing of a security cooperation agreement
between them.966
The possibility of the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq became a
major concern for Turkey. It had been a major decisive factor in the nature of relations
with especially Iraq and Syria. Increasing PKK violent resitance in Turkey and some
European nations’ support for their political initiatives granting them immunity and
refusing to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization negatively affected Turkish
public opinion towards the West. By late 2004, 91 percent of the Turkish population
disapproved Bush’s foreign policy and many Turks believed that EU member states
supported the PKK.967
In the meanwhile, some signs of tension between the JDP government and Israel
began to emerge as Erdogan publicly accused Israel of “state terrorism” in March and
May of 2004 when Israeli forces razed the civilian homes in Gaza on the basis that they
belonged to suspected militants. This was among the many signals that would lead to the
crisis that was to come later. The changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Israel had
major implications on the relations with Muslim nations, especially the Arab world.
965
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 175-176.
967
Ibid, p. 176.
966
236
The Decision to Start the Accession Negotiations and an Evaluation of the JDP
Government
By early 2002, the Turkish economy had already gone back to a growth mode due
to its success in adopting the neoliberal economic model of development. The Turkish
economy managed to bloom despite the political instability due to the tensions between
president Sezer and JDP government. Sezer continued to take every opportunity to block
or delay policies initiated by the government. He acted more like a political opponent
than the president of the nation. He vetoed almost every appointment made by JDP,
especially when the nominee was a religious person, or was married to a headscarved
woman.
The recovery of Turkish economy was accelerated and maintained due to the
stability of having a single-party government as well as the JDP’s support for the
Economic Stabilization Program that was already in place before they took office.968
JDP’s persistence in getting the European Union to set a date for the beginning of the
accession negotiations restored Western confidence in Turkey. This led to a drastic
exponential increase in direct foreign investment, which also led to an increase in
privatization revenue.969 The boom in the stock market drew in further investment inflow.
Finally in mid-December 2004, the long awaited announcement on the European
Union agreement on the opening of official accession negotiations was made on October
3, 2005. This was a bittersweet moment of victory for the JDP cabinet, since Turkey was
reminded that it had to extend the Customs Union to include Cyprus and the European
968
969
Ibid, p. 177.
Ibid.
237
Union had clarified that the commencement of accession negotiations did not guarantee
membership regardless level of adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria.970 This final
statement was “the first time any such caveat had been issued to a potential member.”971
This “separate” treatment of Turkey was familiar Orientalist strategy used to establish
and institute unequal power relations. Through it the European Union exercised
intellectual and political power to change the rules of the game in case of the Turkish
case, at the cost of disavowing the very values it upholds. Turkey, under the leadership of
JDP has no choice of contesting the powerful position of the European Union by
overlooking the stated reservations. This is a time period during which the JDP
administration was struggling very hard to balance stability within and in its relations
with the international community. Although the Copenhagen Criteria enabled some legal
improvements that made party closures more difficult, this possibility was not one that
could be overlooked by this young party most of whose members had already
experienced the devastating side effects of having their parties closed. Based on all these
apprehensions, the decision to begin the accession negotiations came as welcome news,
which strengthened JDP’s basis for legitimacy, increased its popularity amongst the
Turkish population and caused a break in the attacks by the radical Kemalists allied with
the military.
The decision to start the accession negotiations was a major milestone in Turkish
EU membership journey. Many intellectuals were surprised that a political party that had
been associated with Islamism was ironically the one to bring Turkey closest to EU
membership, initiating the biggest democratization reform in the republic’s history, as
970
971
Ibid, p. 175.
Ibid.
238
well as fulfilling its economic criteria.972 European Union membership has been the
major incentive that has motivated these changes. As a result, Turkey was pushed
“through a massive Europeanization process” on the watch of a “supposedly Islamist”
government.973
Kemal Kirisci argues that after JDP came into power in 2002 both domestic and
foreign policies in Turkey have gone through a process of drastic transformation while
Europe was having debates about its own future.974 The preparation and adjustment to
the accession of ten new members in 2004 was not an easy task for the European Union.
With this enlargement the EU welcomed ten of the thirteen states, which had applied for
membership between 1987 and 1996. Bulgaria, and Romania had to wait till 2007 for
accession and Turkey would wait longer.
According to Kirisci while Turkey was going through a complete transformation,
Europe was dealing with the challenges of rising Islamophobia and the growing
uncertainty regarding the future of European integration and the redefinition of the
European identity.975 He adds that Europe was having a hard time adapting to
globalization, which according to some analysts, might cause it to go to war with itself
and eventually become a “fortress Europe.”976 Europe was faced with the challenge of
integrating all the new members to the EU identity and simultaneously enabling the
transformation of its identity to accommodate the new members by remaining loyal to
972
Kemal Kirisci, “Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish Membership,” p.
19.
973
Ibid, p. 20.
Ibid.
975
Ibid.
976
Ibid.
974
239
pluralist democracy.977 Based on this analysis, while Europe was having a hard time
adjusting to globalization and searching for a new definition for its identity; Turkey,
under the JDP leadership was utilizing various agents of globalization to strengthen its
identity, giving signals of its intention to emerge as a regional actor. The JPD government
was successful in displaying that “Islam and pluralist democracy can coexist” while
transforming Turkish economy to became a major anchor of “growth and stability” for
the region.978 The JDP managed to restore economic growth, bring down the inflation
rates that had been chronically high and restore the fiscal discipline in accordance with
the prescriptions of the IMF.979
Although the JDP rejected the “Islamist” label from the very beginning and
diligently refrained from emphasizing Muslim-ness of Turkey, it was still associated with
the conservatively religious life styles of majority of the people in its brain team. Due to
the interventionist and authoritarian practices of the military and the Kemalist secularist
elite, that led to the many examples of party closures in Turkish political life, the JDP
was extra careful to stay away from utilizing religious terminology. As a matter of fact,
when asked about the issue of the headscarf following the establishment of the JDP,
Erdogan stated clearly that the issue was not on the party agenda. Since the headscarf
issue was one of the main factors that contributed to the closure of the last party linked to
the political Islamic movement, he was not willing to take a chance at this point despite
the disappointment it created among the many religious and conservative groups and
especially their women supporters.
977
Ibid, p. 21.
Ibid, p. 20.
979
Hale and Ozbudun, pp. 106-107.
978
240
From a European perspective Turkey was never perceived as anything other than
a “Muslim” nation even during the rule of the most secular Kemalist governments. Even
though it was considered as a “model Muslim” nation for its commitment to secularism,
modernization and westernization, there was no escaping that it was a majority Muslim
country. The European Union considered Turkish membership to be equivalent to the
membership of seventy five million Muslims. Having an “Islamist” party in power and
the fact that the reforms mandated for EU membership were being passed at an extremely
fast rate caused the existing Islamophobic feelings to increase in the EU member states.
A 2004 survey of the Wall Street Journal reflected that more than half of the
Western European population had a suspicious attitude towards the Muslims living in
Europe.980 More than seventy percent of citizens in the Netherlands and Sweden felt the
same way.981 The events of September 11th and the various attacks in London, and
Madrid by some terrorist groups news of which were framed by the Western politicians
and media as linking Islam and terrorism contributed to the increase in the Islamophobic
inclinations in Europe. In addition the failure of many EU member nations in integrating
their Muslim populations to Europe “strengthened the feelings of ‘us’ versus ‘the other’,
‘Islam versus the West’ in these EU countries and confirmed ‘the other’s’ hostility and
willingness to use violence against their host societies.”982 In this atmosphere of having
to face the problems of “its own Muslims” and escalating feelings of discrimination,
980
Ozlem Kayhan and Dan Lindley, “The Iraq War and the Troubled US-Turkish
Alliance: Some Conclusions for Europe,” in Turkey and the European Union: Internal
Dynamics and External Challenges, Joseph S. Joseph, ed., (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006), p. 221.
981
Ibid.
982
Ibid.
241
some European nations could not handle imagining more than 70 million Muslims
joining the EU.
Many prominent leaders of the EU nations have openly voiced concerns related to
Turkish membership, presenting arguments that relied on old and new Orientalist
assumptions about the Muslim Turkish others. In 2002 former French President Valery
Giscard d’Estaing made statements arguing that Turkey is “not a European country” and
that Turkish membership to the EU would bring “the end of Europe,” also calling the
European supporters of Turkish membership as “the adversaries of the European
Union.”983 Erdogan responded by reminding Europe that progress in the EU membership
process would be his party’s top priority.984 He made clear that he was aware of the
existence of those who perceived EU as a “Christian Club.” German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy were also outspoken with their opposition
to Turkish membership, arguing that Turkey was “culturally too different” and therefore
did not “belong in Europe.”985
One of the most controversial statements that caused embarrassment for EU was
one offered by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi immediately after September 11th
attacks. Berlusconi argued that Western civilization is superior in its regard for human
rights and that respect for political and religious rights were characteristics that could not
983
“Turkey entry ‘would destroy EU’,” BBC News World Edition, November 8, 2002,
accessed on April 7, 2013, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm.
984
Ibid.
985
Martin Kuebler, “Turkey not fit for EU Accession: Sarkozy,” DW-World.de Deutche
Welle, February 26, 2011, accessed on March 31, 2011, available at
http://www.dw.de/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593.
242
be found in Islamic countries.986 He also added that the West “is bound to Occidentalize
and conquer new people,” suggesting that this should have been the case for the Islamic
world, which he believed to be “1,400 years behind” the West.987 These statements made
by Berlusconi were part of the Orientalist narrative “that presents the West as the
conqueror of the uncivilized ‘others’ and the Muslim countries as the ones who need to
be rescued.”988 These statements came at a time when the JDP government was hoping to
collect the fruits of all the reforms it had passed as part of the EU harmonization process.
They showed the continued ‘other’ing of Turkey based on Orientalist arguments.
While some European leaders argued that a nation with a Muslim population
could never become a part of Europe, JDP had already adopted and embraced many
values that the Europeans claimed as their own. Their reformist approach yielded a new
discourse, which had both national as well as international implications. JDP, with its
pro-democratic, pro-western and liberal orientation embraced the values as human rights
and rule of law, demonstrating a “discursive shift” from the Islamist discourse producing
a new form of “identity change.”989 They received support from the majority of Turkish
society as they appealed to many segments of the population whose demands had been
ignored by previous governments. The Islamists’ abdication of “their traditional antiWest and anti-westernization position seems to have transformed the Islamic self in
986
Steven Erlanger, “Italy’s Premier Calls Western Civilization Superior to Islamic
World,” The New York Times, September 27, 2001.
987
Ibid.
988
Ravza Kavakci Kan, “Turkish Challenge to the Orientalist Narrative of the European
Union,” in History, Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey,” p. 81.
989
Ihsan D. Dagi, “Transformation of Turkish Politics and the European Union:
Dimensions of Human Rights and Democratization, p. 16.
243
Turkey, opening up new possibilities for the coexistence of Islam and the West.”990 This
ran counter to the Orientalist constructions of the Islamist as a representative of the
Muslim other. This new actor has proven its potential and capacity to transform itself as
well as the rest of the society to embrace some of the basic European values and
standards.
990
Ibid.
244
CHAPTER 5. TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY INTO A MAJOR PLAYER IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND THE NEW EU MEMBERSHIP
OUTLOOK
The chapter looks into the period between the start of the accession negotiations
with the European Union in 2005 until the present time. The internal transformation of
Turkish political landscape under the JDP and its reflections on the foreign policy are
discussed. From their first days in office, the JDP’s foreign policy vision stressed
building and maintaining good relations with its neighbors, based on its concerns
regarding the lack of stability in the region. JDP presented itself as a model to the
countries in the region, taking every opportunity to act as a mediator between the various
groups in areas of conflict. This took the role model status argument to a level of partial
authenticity as the JDP tried to follow a policy that was relatively independent from the
West. In the meanwhile, as the EU harmonization reforms constituted the basis for the
legal change, the societal embrace of the reforms had significant effects on the
representations and power relations at various levels. As the popularity of Turkey and the
JDP government increased in the Middle East after crises that emerge with Israel, Turkey
re-introduced the “role model” argument to the post-Arab Spring nations in the Middle
East and North Africa. By suggesting the Turkish model of an Islamist government
committed to secularism and democracy to the Arab world, the JDP re-produced the
fiction of role model-ness and the related power relations in a new way with the JDP
perceiving itself in a position of power equivalent to those of the Western nations, while
treating the Arab nations as followers.
245
Those who still suspected the Justice and Development Party of having a “secret
Islamist agenda” to overthrow the secularist Kemalist regime were faced with the fact
that the most progress accomplished by Turkish governments towards EU membership
discourse was achieved during their administration.991 The JDP’s commitment to the EU
harmonization process was based on a perception that all the reforms were made as part
of a quest for democratic progress. This, in turn, challenged the existing internal, regional
and international power relations. While progress in legal harmonization continued in
most cases, the various political crises that arose between the EU and Turkey led for the
political relations to slow down and come to a deadlock at a number of instances,.
The changes led to the simultaneous gradual transformation in the Turkish
society. Some of the internal representations were also slowly replaced with new ones.
As a result, Turkey emerged as a dynamic regional actor, that had a position respected
both by the Western nations and Muslim ones. Turkish role model status was promoted
by the JDP to the West in offering to act as a mediator between them and the Muslim
nations, especially the ones in the region. It was also offered to the Muslim states as a
successful example to follow. The main basic divergence from the traditional arguments
about the role model status was that the JDP was a model in which democracy and
secularism was upheld by an Islamist power.
Depth of the Turkish National Transformation Under the JDP
Hakan Yavuz argued that the fact that JDP emerged as a party that did not make
any political claims based on Islam, yet initiated a process of “post-Islamism” in
991
Kirisci, p. 19.
246
Turkey.992 He explained that this process constitutes “the shift from the politics of
identity to the politics of service,” in which politics of service is premised upon
“cooperation” and “compromise” in contrast to politics of identity, which is more
“confrontational” and “conflict-ridden.”993 The leadership of the JDP came from a
tradition and experience of providing high quality municipal services, had a reputation
for being honest. Corruption of politicians had been a major problem for Turkey,
especially at local level. Even some of the supporters of Kemalism overlooked the
historical links of the JDP with the previous political Islamic movements and voted for
them because they simply wanted good services.
Yavuz further asserted that the Islamic political movement had played an
extremely important role in consolidating Turkish democracy through enabling the
marginalized religious groups to participate in politics.994 The Anatolian bourgeoisie
stayed away from confrontational policies and were convinced by the JDP to abstain
from asserting governmental hegemony and to welcome the EU-oriented democratic
reforms.995 The JDP and the state establishment had made a “democratic bargain” which
ironically received more support among Islamic groups than the secularists, who realized
that this was this was their only chance to eventually come to power.996 As a part of this
“democratic bargain,” the JDP acted with caution, especially in its relations with the
military. The growing bourgeoisie was aware of the history of party closures in Turkey
992
M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the
Turkish Islamic Movement,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK
Parti, M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 2.
993
Ibid, p. 3.
994
Ibid.
995
Ibid.
996
Ibid.
247
and they were also aware that the anti-European position that had been prevalent at the
outset of the earlier Islamic political movements had not yielded any benefits. They were
receptive to the pro-EU stand of the JDP also because of their growing business and trade
relations, which enabled them to individually gain international experience independent
from the influence of the existing Kemalist representations that subordinated them.
The JDP’s success in learning from the past experiences of the Islamist political
movement, especially the party closures, and transforming their policies in a way that
enabled them to come to power and stay in power was as important as to the parallel
transformations of the society. The conservative population who felt oppressed,
subordinated, Orientalized, and marginalized found ways of surviving and excelling in
the society without having to sacrifice from their identity. For instance, the women who
were not allowed to get university education because of the headscarf ban found other
ways to get educated. The ones with financial means travelled to other countries, mostly
in Europe or the United States to complete their education. The ones who were unable to
go out of Turkey attended other alternative educational institutions such as the vocational
educational institutions that were first initiated by the Welfare Party Municipalities.
These institutions offered training in areas such as traditional arts, foreign languages,
music, sewing, hairdressing, etc. Some of the businesses that were labeled Islamist and
harassed by the Kemalist establishment began to build partnerships with international
companies, avoiding the handicaps posed by the Kemalist establishment and
strengthening their legitimacy in Turkey.
The EU membership became the driving force behind the integration of
previously excluded groups in Turkey, and paradoxically this took place under the
248
leadership of the people who had an anti-European reputation. More interestingly, the
pro-secularist, Kemalist, and pro-Western elite gradually realized that one of the side
effects of Europeanization, which had been the ultimate republican dream, could be the
outcome of a JDP government that they considered to be a representative of the religious
‘other’. This is why the military, the leftist parties, even Kemalist president Sezer did
everything in their power to stop or delay this process, even if it meant to go against the
republican ideal of Europeanization and Westernization. They still perceived their
understanding of radical secularism to be more important than democracy itself. They
were happy as long as they were in power and they had no tolerance for deep
democratization, especially if it led them to lose power.
Based on these and Yavuz’s arguments, it was clear that the JDP learned the rules
of the game and despite its short history and limited resources when compared to the
Kemalist establishment, it brought changes to the existing system through its conscious
embrace of the Europeanization discourse. This phenomenon can neither be explained
with the classical international relations theories nor does it fit the existing
representations. The JDP was aware that the only way to beat the hegemony of the
military and the secularist elites was through democratization associated with the EU
harmonization process coupled with maintaining the support of the public through
bringing services to satisfy their basic needs.
Yavuz argues that the Islamic bourgeoisie “evolved out of the state’s neoliberal
economic policies that created conducive economic conditions and the emerging of
transnational and financial networks as a result deregulation and the opening of the
249
Turkish economy,” starting from the days of Ozal and booming with the municipal
victory of the Welfare party after the 1994 elections.997 According to Yavuz
The symbiotic relationship between the state and the large Istanbul-based
capitalists had been based on agreement over secularism and Kemalist ideology.
The emergence of an Anatolian-based Islamic bourgeoisie ran counter to the
existing economic and cultural alliance between the state and the Istanbul-based
capitalists.998
This new class consisting of well-educated practicing Muslims began to establish
businesses that served their needs. They established their own financial institutions that
were interest-free, since Islam prohibited interest and usury of any kind. They established
their own media companies including televisions and newspapers. They established
restaurants, which did not serve alcohol as well as supermarkets, etc. They also
established their non-governmental organizations including business associations. All
these establishments, which started to emerge during Ozal’s time also had to deal with a
lot of challenges and obstacles created by the Kemalist regime throughout the years. By
the time JDP came into power, this new conservative bourgeoisie had become an
important economic and social actor, despite the many obstacles they had to overcome.
Yavuz argues that:
This transformation of Turkey’s Islamic movement could be called a conservative
revolution because it wants to maintain Turkey’s generally conservative traditions
and bring local norms and identities to the national level; it is a normative
revolution in that it seeks to moralize the political institutions and networks. By
conservative revolution I mean not advocating wholesale change or a sharp
transformation but rather creating new cognitive spaces for different
imaginations of the past and the reconstruction of the present.999
997
Yavuz, “The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish
Islamic Movement,” p. 5.
998
Ibid.
999
Ibid, p. 7.
250
The new imaginations that Yavuz refers to were a means of the practicing
Muslims who became financially powerful to change some of the existing representations
that had been indoctrinated by the Kemalist establishment since the beginning of the
republic and produce new non-Orientalist representations to define themselves. This new
identity was one that did not fit in the secular republican format. Some members of this
new bourgeoisie were Western-educated, multi-lingual, prominent and well-respected
people in their communities. They were also law-abiding, tax-paying, overall “good”
citizens of the republic. The only characteristic that kept them from being categorized as
an ideal republican citizen was their religious practices. This new model of religious
Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie was one that enjoyed the fruits of economic and social life
without sacrificing their Islamic practices. They had a high level of self-confidence,
which was far from the characteristics of self-orientalization that might have been
successfully anticipated by the secular critics.
The JDP leadership took advantage of the opportunities for “reconfiguring
alliances” and “redistributing political power,” tried to build institutions and values, and
attempted to eventually “overthrow the ingrained Kemalist mode or patterns of
‘progressive’ and elitist thinking.”1000 They asserted that they wanted the needs, demands
and the identity of the civil society to shape politics in a bottom up manner, by placing
the state power in the hands of the people,1001 through democratic consolidation. Yavuz
finds it contradictory that the JDP sought to reform the existing political system and
transform the relations between the state and the society, while simultaneously defining
1000
1001
Ibid.
Ibid.
251
itself as a conservative democracy.1002 He also argues that the JDP lacked democracy in
its internal mechanisms while promoting pluralism and political participation at the
national level.1003 According to some observers, the characteristics and exact definition of
the conservative democratic identity is rather vague and this leaves room for the JDP to
attempt to end the tensions within Turkish identity politics,1004 between secular and
Islamic, Turkish and Kurdish and local and global.1005
When the party was established, Erdogan repeatedly stated that the party would
not be a one based on centralization of power at the leadership and it would be based on a
democratic system. However, some observers argue that it had become more and more
leader-centric over the years. This is a problem that was seen in almost all major the
political parties in Turkey. There are many incidents that demonstrate the differences
between the JDP and other parties. In the one case, during the first JDP government,
Abdullah Gul gave up the position of the prime minister to Erdogan after his ban on
politics was lifted, choosing to become the minister of foreign affairs. This was an
interesting situation as Gul took a regular ministerial position after prime ministry. Later
on Gul was elected as president rather than Erdogan. This was a reflection of the power
dynamics within the party, as Gul was rewarded with the presidency for having
previously given up his seat as the prime minister to Erdogan. Aside from the underlying
strategic reasoning, the case of a political leader giving the highest position to another
member of his team is not one seen often. A third example is the case of Bulent Arinc
1002
Ibid, pp. 9-10.
Ibid, p. 10.
1004
Ibid, p. 14.
1005
Burhanettin Duran, “JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation,” inThe
Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 286.
1003
252
who went back to being an ordinary parliamentarian after having served as the speaker of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly for five years. These examples were supported by
the rhetoric that the JDP was a party aimed at serving the people.
The JDP initiated a transformation in both “the parameters of Turkish politics and
Islamist politics through ‘Europeanization’ and ‘internalization’ of the internal
issues,”1006 through a meticulous process of balancing the expectations of Islamists and
secularists in domestic politics and the relations with Europe and the United States in
foreign policy.1007 In addition to the transformation in domestic and foreign policy, the
more critical transformation took place in the Islamic political discourse and identity in
Turkey.1008 As the new policies of JDP initiated a change in the political system as well
as the representations related to the identity definitions and power relations in the
republic, the JDP was going through a process of transformation and self-definition. It
was trying to accommodate the demands and needs of the society, aware of its pluralistic
nature. JDP transformed from “an Islamist to a conservative democratic party.”1009
Burhanettin Duran argued that one of the incentives in the JDP’s taking a proWestern and pro-European stance was its expectation that EU membership would enable
Turkey to “further a process of promoting its relations with the Middle East and the
Muslim World.”1010 The JDP wanted to utilize its close relations with Europe to act as a
1006
Yavuz, “The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish
Islamic Movement,” p. 14.
1007
Ibid.
1008
Ibid.
1009
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the
European Union, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 112.
1010
Yavuz, “The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish
Islamic Movement,” p. 14.
253
spokesperson for the Muslim states,1011 which it believed would increase its influence
among the Muslim states as well as in the EU. He added that during this process they
overlooked the challenges of following a multidimensional foreign policy approach as a
part of the European Union,1012 which could lead to a conflict of Turkish interests with
those of the EU. He concludes that the primary foreign policy challenge of JDP in the
context of EU accession and globalization processes would be the redefining Turkish
national identity, which needs to start with a proper theorization of the “conservative
democratic” identity.1013 Duran argued that to enrich “its political discourse of
conservative democracy,” the JDP would need to accommodate the demands of Turkish
and Kurdish identities within Turkish nationalist identity.1014 The strenuous nature of this
process of transformation sometimes caused slowing down in the relations with the EU
due to the challenges, which needed to be dealt with at the domestic level.
Commencement of the Accession Negotiations
After Turkey was given the date of October 3, 2005 for the initiation of the
accession negotiations, the relations with the European Union started to decelerate. There
was a slowing down of the introduction of new harmonization laws as well as the
implementation of the reforms that had been passed.1015 The main obstacle remained to
be Turkey’s continuing refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriots. Ali
Babacan was appointed as the Chief Negotiator at the beginning of the accession
1011
Duran, p. 294.
Yavuz, “The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish
Islamic Movement,” p. 14.
1013
Ibid.
1014
Duran, p, 300.
1015
Jenkins, pp. 178-179.
1012
254
negotiations in 2005. He was simultaneously holding the position of Minister of
Economy until Egemen Bagis took over the position of Chief Negotiator in 2009.
The official “Negotiating Framework” set out the principles, the substance, the
technical details of the negotiating process, and listed the preliminary headings of the
thirty-five chapters to go into effect in October 3, 2005. The framework stated that upon
the 2004 agreement of the European Council,
The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an
open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.
While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption
capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the
obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the
European structures through the strongest possible bond.1016
It is important to note that the term “negotiation” used here does not carry a
connotation related to the original meaning of the term. In case of the EU accession
process, it refers to the process of benchmarking the candidate nation’s harmonization
laws against the acquis communautaire, the growing collection of laws and regulations of
the European Union.
The above statement by the European Union received severe criticism from the
Turkish side at the official and societal levels. There was a great feeling of
disappointment in the EU’s declaration that the opening of the accession negotiations did
not necessarily mean that it would lead to membership. Even if Turkey were to satisfy all
the political, economic and legal requirements, EU could clearly deny Turkey
membership on the basis of its absorption capacity. This disappointment led to a decline
in the Turkish popular support for the EU membership prospect.
1016
European Commission, “Negotiating Framework,” Luxembourg, October 3, 2005.
255
In July 2004, almost eighty percent of JDP supporters supported EU membership,
which was higher than the national average of seventy three percent.1017 Similarly, their
support for international organizations such as NATO was also above the national
average. They were also pro-westernization and preferred aligning with the West rather
than the East in case of having to make a choice.1018 This reflected that the JDP had a
pro-globalization stand rather than one that prioritized national standing1019 where it
faced stronger enemies. It is important to highlight that JDP’s pro-globalization position
emerged in a background of the peripheral social and economic forces it represented and
JDP actually advanced “Turkey’s integration to global structures,” to “eliminate the
bureaucratic and Kemalist ideological center.”1020 Most of JDP’s support base was from
the periphery and they were supportive of the globalization process.1021 JDP realized that
the only way to establish democratic stability would be through breaking the powerful
influence of the Kemalists and the military, and this was a task that needed to be
supported at the international context to be successful. Therefore the JDP was eager to
welcome globalization. Integration in the global system strengthened the internal
legitimacy of the JDP government. The Kemalist establishment displayed an antiglobalization stance in order to prevent the JDP from deepening its international support.
1017
Ihsan Dagi, “ The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human
Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in The Emergence of a New
Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 2006), p. 92.
1018
“NATO ve Turk Dis Politikasi Kamuoyu Arastirmasi,” Pollmark, July 2004.
[Referenced by Ihsan Dagi, “ The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and
Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” p.93.]
1019
Dagi, “ The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights
Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” p. 93.
1020
Ibid.
1021
Ibid.
256
The accession negotiations were inaugurated on October 3, 2005. The
negotiations for each candidate country consisted of the “screening” (evaluation) of
whether the related national laws and institutions were brought up to the European
standards in each area of acquis. There were thirty-five chapters of acquis against which
Turkish harmonization process would be evaluated. In the meanwhile, the 2006 Progress
Report of the Commission was announced and it was one of the most critical reports that
Turkey received, expressing concern for the slowing down in the reform process.1022 It
highlighted the issues of fundamental human rights and minority rights that needed a lot
more work.1023
The European Union then decided to suspend the negotiations on eight chapters in
December of 2006 mainly because Turkey failed to open its borders to Cyprus and pass
the reforms required for membership.1024 Although earlier that year the government
attempted to resolve the issue by offering to open its airports and sea ports to Cypriot
vessels in return for EU recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the EU
Commission was unable to convince Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos to accept this
bargain.1025 While the British and Italian governments were in favor of the Turkish offer,
the Cypriots wanted the accession process to be totally broken off, however, the
Commission decided that suspension of the negotiations on some of the chapters was
1022
Yildiz and Muller, p. 37.
Ibid.
1024
Jenkins, p. 178.
1025
William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey:
The Case of the AKP, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 127.
1023
257
sufficient.1026 This suspension meant that full implementation of the Customs Union
would be pending together with the negotiations on these chapters.
The accession negotiations were reopened on March 29, 2007, even though there
was no change on the Cyprus issue, and the accession process was “back on track,”
despite the lack of any change in relation to the Cyprus issue.1027 This was done during
the German Presidency, on the basis that Turkey was getting ready to carry out some
reforms needed for alignment with the EU.1028
At the time of the announcement of the suspension of the negotiations, the
popularity of EU among the Turkish public, especially the supporters of the JDP was
already declining. They lost trust in the EU membership process out of nationalist pride,
overlooking the fact that the 1963 Ankara Agreement required that they open borders to
all the member states, which now included the Greek Cyprus, as well.
Among the many reasons that contributed to the decrease in the popularity of the
European Union among the conservative population was the continuous anti-headscarf
stance of the European Court of Human Rights. Although not an institution of the
European Union per se, its decisions were upheld by the European Union. The court’s
decision on the Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey case sided with the implementation of the
headscarf ban, utilizing a similar language with the Kemalist secularist elite’s argument
related to the impact of the headscarf on women who do not wear it.1029 Sahin had
1026
Ibid, p. 127.
“EU resumes Turkey accession talks,” EurActiv.com, March 30, 2007, accessed on
April 17, 2013, available at http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-resumes-turkeyaccession-talk-news-217906
1028
“EU Resumes Turkey Accession Talks,” BBC News, March 29, 2007, accessed on
June 8, 2013, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6503869.stm
1029
Jenkins, p. 178.
1027
258
applied to the court in July of 1998 and the Court passed a ruling in October of 2005
asserting that in the Turkish context
where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular,
equality before the law of men and women are being taught and applied in
practice, it is understandable that the relevant authorities should wish to preserve
the secular nature of the institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such
values to allow religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic
headscarf, to be worn.1030
The Court’s arguments demonstrated that they held the same views as the
Kemalists. The Kemalists’ secularist anti-headscarf narrative argued that women who
wear the headscarf as a visible symbol of Islamic obligation create a form of peer
pressure on the women who choose not to wear it. This logic of fear politics has been an
important factor in supporting the restriction of the basic religious right of the
headscarved women who constitute 64.2 percent of the female population in Turkey,1031
to dress according to their beliefs. The “possible” pressure that women who do not wear
headscarves may feel around the women who do has been a prominent argument that
legitimized the headscarf ban. This argument also ignored the political inequality
between the headscarved women who were devalued by the secular republican discourse
and the power it gave to those who did not wear it over the majority that did. Erdogan’s
reaction to the court’s decree challenged the authority of the court in deciding a religious
matter. The court’s ruling and Erdogan’s reaction to it revived the image of Europe
prejudiced against Muslims, selecting the most potent symbol of women’s dress as a
point of reference.
1030
European Court of Human Rights Court, “Judgment,” Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey,
Strasbourg, November 10, 2005.
1031
Jenkins, p. 178.
259
In the meanwhile, although Erdogan’ reaction to the court’s decision was seized
by the secularist adversaries as an indicator of JDP’s “hidden agenda” of aspiring to
establish an Islamist state in Turkey, the JDP government “made no significant attempt to
Islamicize the Turkish state” with the exception of cases such as the earlier attempt to
criminalize adultery,1032 in 2004 which it withdrew upon European reactions. The JDP
seemed to concentrate on attempting to lift restrictions on religious freedom rather than
using the powers of the state to promote Islam.1033 This has been their argument ever
since they party was established. In addition, although many of the members of the party
at the highest level had to suffer with the consequences of the headscarf ban through the
women in their family, they had made no attempt to bring the issue to the national
platform due to its sensitive nature. When asked about this, the response given in the
inner circles was that the headscarved women needed to be more patient until societal
consensus was established. “Societal consensus” translated into “convincing the
secularists” or being able to overcome the political uses of this issue nationally and
internationally, neither of which were to happen in the near future.
By 2006, the public opinion regarding the Turkish people’s support for
membership had already declined to 32.5 percent, which was more than a fifty percent
decrease since 2004.1034 As the EU decided to suspend the accession negotiations and the
Turkish public had lost support for membership, provided the backdrop for the JDP and
Erdogan’s development of the “Ankara Criteria” argument.
1032
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 179.
1034
Ibid, p. 178.
1033
260
Erdogan had initially made this statement shortly after his visits to some EU
member states in 2002, during the first days of the JDP. He stated that JDP’s future
policy perspective would be based on “making the Copenhagen Criteria the Ankara
Criteria,”1035 highlighting the determination of the JDP in achieving progress in the EU
membership track. Later, in July 2005, three months before the accession negotiations
started, during his address to the Azerbaijani Parliament, Erdogan made the following
statements to highlight that the JDP insisted on its position:
Turkey should be accepted into the European Union. If not, we'll change the name
of the Copenhagen criteria to the Ankara criteria and continue with the reforms…
There’s no turning back on the road that Turkey’s been taking to integrate with
Europe, and there are no other alternatives.1036
Erdogan’s statement indicates that Turkey “chooses” European democracy for
itself even if it is not accepted in the European Union. It also shows that the JDP
ambitiously wants Turkey to continue to be a part of the EU project.
The concept of “Ankara Criteria” coined by Erdogan was repeated to national and
international audiences especially at times of tension or gridlock in the relations with the
European Union. Erdogan’s comments meant that Turkey, under the JDP, managed to
internalize the European Union project, determined to continue embracing it even if
membership were no longer an option.1037 This was a reflection of how JDP policies
challenged the existing orientalist representations of Turkey’s relationship to Europe.1038
The JDP, as a representative of the political Islamic movement, was ready to adopt the
1035
“Erdogan: Kopenhag Kriterleri Ankara Kriterleri Olacak,” Hurriyet, December 17,
2002.
1036
“Erdogan: Copenhagen Criteria Would Become Ankara Criteria,” The Journal of
Turkish Weekly, July 1, 2005, accessed on April 10, 2013, available at
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/14088/erdogan-copenhagen-criteria-would-become1037
Kavakci Kan, “ Turkish Challenge to the Orientalist Narrative of the European
Union,” p. 87.
1038
Ibid.
261
European values of democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law with or
without the support of the European Union. This was a demonstration of the fundamental
orientalist argument regarding the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, with a
government that was labeled as “Islamist” demonstrating its willingness and capability to
accept and internalize Western values.
At the internal level, many of the changes demanded especially by the
marginalized groups of the society as extremely important steps in the path of
Europeanization, modernization, development and democracy were initiated by a team
other than the Kemalist elite, who had historically claimed monopoly over the
Westernization process. The success of the JDP as a representative of the religious,
backward, subordinate ‘other’ in the embrace of the European process was a reflection of
the transformation in the internal power relations between these forces in Turkey and
their commitment to Turkey’s role model status. The JDP government, managed to bring
democratic reforms and take important steps in enhancing the human rights record of
Turkey in a peaceful manner. They also involved civil society organizations that
represent many different factions in the population in the reform process. From this
perspective, the JDP set a good example to not only the other Muslim nations in the
region, but also many other struggling democracies in the international arena.
These national policy changes associated with Turkish desire for EU membership
also served JDP’s political interest. The JDP was aware that the EU harmonization
process was a valuable asset in consolidating Turkish democracy, which was the sine qua
non of maintaining its legitimacy and existence. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis argued “the value
of liberal reform should not be instrumentally measured against the successful flow of
262
accession negotiations but against the completion of Turkey’s democratic consolidation
process.”1039 The JDP’s approach to the EU accession process was not just a foreign
policy project but also the major incentive to fuel the internal process of consummating
democracy reflecting how the national and foreign policy practices were at so many
different levels. In the process, it also redefined the balance of forces in Turkish society.
One of the reasons behind the success of the JDP is its “widespread appeal to the
periphery of Turkish society in popularizing the liberal reform discourse initiated by the
European Union.”1040 By bringing those groups that had been marginalized by the
previous Kemalist governments, it deepened the success of the democratization process.
It also expanded its base of political support and legitimacy.
Erdogan’s and JDP officials’ repeated statements that the Turkish democratization
process was independent from the EU harmonization process1041 and the use of the
“Ankara Criteria” captured the national dynamics of the democratization process that
needed to continue even if the EU accession did not take place. Earlier, in 2005, in
response to suggestions that Turkey should become an associate partner rather than an
actual member to the European Union, Erdogan stated that EU membership was not a
pure necessity for Turkey and it would not be the end of the world if the accession did not
take place adding that if the EU failed to keep its promises and did not start the accession
negotiations, Turkey would rename the Copenhagen Criteria as Ankara Criteria and
continue its way.1042 Abdullah Gul, who was the Foreign Minister at the time, also argued
1039
Grigoriadis, p. 179.
Ibid.
1041
Ibid.
1042
Erdal Sen, “AB Olmazsa Turkiyede Kiyamet Kopmaz; Yolumuza Devam Ederiz,”
Zaman, September 4, 2005.
1040
263
that Turkey would turn its back and leave if EU were to introduce new requirements for
membership.1043
Viewing Turkey’s political liberalization as beneficial per se for Turkey, rather
than merely a concession to the European Union, shows that the AKP would be
willing to rise to the circumstances and support Turkey’s democratization process,
regardless of the outcome of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. This policy will
also facilitate the rise of a participant political culture.1044
The JDP’s embrace and internalization of political liberalization as beneficial to
the national interests of Turkey, led to the development of a new political culture that
offered its own rewards. As the gradual process of lifting the limitations on the rights and
freedoms of citizens began together with the economic improvement, the support for the
JDP also increased with every election.
Through the uncertainty of membership in the negotiation framework, EU was
reminding Turkey that it rightfully still held the power to approve or reject Turkish
membership. While traditional official Turkish reaction would have emphasized
European betrayal, the JDP’s reaction was a defensive but constructive one. The JDP
recognized EU’s position holding the authority to allow or disallow accession, however,
it also deemed itself, the JDP as the winner of the democratization process. JDP’s
attitude, unlike previous reactions in similar situations, was that changes gave it and
Turkey an equally powerful position as the EU in consolidating Turkish democracy.
2007 General Elections and Gul Presidency
2006 and 2007 were challenging years for the JDP with respect to maintaining
internal stability. An increase in the number of attacks towards the non-Muslim
population by ultra-nationalists, news of which were framed by the Kemalist media in a
1043
1044
Ibid.
Grigoriadis, p. 180.
264
manner that blamed terrorist organizations with Islamist inclinations, led to internal
tension as well as in the international arena. A deadly attack on the Council of State, one
of the significant citadels of secularism and Kemalism, by a so-called “Islamist” lawyer,
was another incident that led to internal uproar. The Kemalist elite, and the military, with
the unconditional voluntary support of the media, created an atmosphere of “fear politics”
in which many conspiracy theories ciculated with substantial evidence, that was later
found to be untrue. The attack was later linked to Ergenekon, a deep state organization
that carried out many terrorist attacks and blamed it on various groups, especially
Islamists.
In the meanwhile there was a change in the military command due to the
military’s own retirement policies and May 2007 marked the end of the presidential term
of Sezer. The issue of who the next president would be became the hot topic of
discussion that polarized the nation for months. Since the JDP had the majority of the
seats in the parliament, they would be the ones to determine the next president. The
Kemalists, assuming that Erdogan would naturally not let anyone else to take this
powerful position, started a campaign against Erdogan, fearing that his becoming the
president would mean a total loss of control for the Kemalist establishment. Over the next
few months as Erdogan took the heat of the media attacks, the long-awaited
announcement came as Abdullah Gul, not Ergogan that was the JDP’s presidential
candidate. Gul eventually became the president after heated debates, the opposing
Republican People’s Party’s boycott that the extended voting procedure as well as their
attempt to have the election result revoked by the constitutional court, on technical
grounds.
265
On April 27, as the debates on the presidency were ongoing, the web site of the
Chief of General Staff published a declaration expressing the military’s concern for the
ongoing debates related to the presidency, also reminding and reassuring the Turkish
public of the military’s determination in upholding the secular characteristic of the state
at all cost.1045 The army’s memorandum, also known as “the internet memorandum or ememorandum of April 27th,” was accompanied by a series of mass meetings that
protested the JDP government.1046 For the Kemalist establishment and its supporters the
position of the presidency was the last and most powerful of battlefronts that needed to be
defended. Abdullah Gul was a practicing Muslim, who had entered active politics as a
member of the Welfare Party, which was closed on the basis that it constituted a threat to
secularism. He was also married to a headscarved woman. The possibility of having a
president with these political credentials in office was seen as representing a defeat for
the military and the Kemalist-secularist establishment.
On the issue of presidency, the Constitutional Court ruled that the required
quorum of two thirds had not been satisfied and the election was invalid.1047 Interestingly
amidst this political turmoil, the Turkish economy remained stable and continued to
grow, albeit at a slow rate.1048 The JDP called for early parliamentary elections in July
from which it came out with a landslide victory, winning 46.58 percent of the votes and
341 parliamentary seats. The Republican People’s Party came in second with 20.88
percent of the votes, winning 112 seats, followed by the 17.27 percent votes of
Nationalist Movement Party. 5.24 percent of the votes, which corresponded to 26
1045
Hale and Ozbudun, pp. 39-40.
Ibid, p. 40.
1047
Grigoriadis, p. 181.
1048
Jenkins, p. 182.
1046
266
parliamentary seats, were won by members of the Kurdish Nationalist Democratic
Society Party members who had to run as independents to overcome the 10 percent
national threshold required for political parties to enter the parliament.1049 The new JDP
majority in the parliament consisted of many new members from a variety of walks of
life, moving the JDP more towards the center of the political spectrum.1050 The election
victory was followed by the re-election of Abdullah Gul to presidency in August despite
the opposition of the Republican People’s Party.
Gul’s election was perceived as a turning point for Turkey with aspirations that
the JDP “could further democratize the country, bringing about economic liberalization
and international integration,” provided that it was “allowed to carry the mandate of the
46.5 percent” public support.1051 By increasing their support for the JDP, which led to
Gul’s election, the Turkish public showed their support for the JDP’s “liberalinternationalist outlook and rejected isolationist tendencies.”1052 They supported the
JDP’s rejection of the authoritarian secularist legacy and resistance to the extreme
pressures from the military.1053 This also reflected the Turkish public’s support for the
EU membership process.
Although Gul’s election represented a great victory for the JDP and its support
base, the Kemalists were not ready to give up. In January of 2008, the Nationalist
Movement Party proposed to resolve the headscarf issue through making an amendment
to the Constitution. Based on its confidence of having gained a sweeping majority in the
1049
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 40.
Ibid, p. 43.
1051
Hasan Kosebalaban, “Party With Islamist Roots Set to Modernize Turkey,”
YaleGlobal, August 28, 2007.
1052
Ibid.
1053
Ibid.
1050
267
parliament and the support of the presidency, the JDP attempted to take this opportunity
to put an end to the headscarf ban at the universities. They were aware that the patience
of the people who suffered the consequences of the headscarf discrimination was running
out. Many of these people were among the most dedicated supporters of the JDP,
however, their demands had been constantly postponed. Their level of anxiety increased
as reforms in many other areas related to human rights issues were passed one by one.
This is why this belated attempt was a welcome step.
The constitutional amendments related to lifting the ban on the headscarf passed
with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party early in February of 2008, however,
it was immediately taken to the Constitutional Court by the Republican People’s Party. In
a matter of three months, the court annulled the amendments, decreeing that they were
incompatible with the principle of secularism and therefore unconstitutional.
Closure Case Against the JDP
The Constitutional Court’s decision was perceived as a partial victory for the
Kemalists. This unsuccessful attempt of the JDP led the Chief Prosecutor to immediately
file a closure case against the JDP, requesting that the leaders be banned from politics on
the basis that their actions constituted a threat to secularism.1054 This was the perfect
opportunity for the Kemalists system to dissolve the JDP and wipe its effects on the
Turkish political landscape. Based on the history of the Constitutional Court’s decisions
in similar cases, the situation did not seem very bright for the JDP. However, all the
reforms, the democratization process supported at the national and international levels led
1054
Grigoriadis, p. 182.
268
to an overall societal transformation, which had drastic effects on the existing balances
and the power relations.
The opening of a closure case against the JDP in March 2007 caused mixed
reactions in the various EU institutions. The anti-Turkish membership camp interpreted
the case as a sign of the insufficiency of democratic development and maintaining
political stability in Turkey.1055 The relations with the EU had taken a turn for the worse
upon the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to French presidency. Sarkozy was known for his
anti-Islam position and his clear opposition to Turkish membership, suggesting
“privileged partnership” instead of actual membership. This was a suggestion, which got
voiced at various times through out Turkish EU membership journey by other prominent
officials from the EU or member states, such as German Chancellor Merkel. Sarkozy
blocked discussion of two of the chapters related to economic and monetary policy in
June 2007, but later was convinced by the Commission to change his position.1056
The EU held an anti-closure position despite the European Court of Human
Rights Court’s arguments supporting the constitutionality of the decisions in the previous
closure cases in Turkey. The EU always encouraged increasing political participation at
all levels of the society together with establishing the basic freedoms. Some members of
the European Parliament suggested that negotiations would need to be suspended in case
of closure, arguing that the process itself would cause a setback for Turkey since the
reform process would be put on hold until the Court passed a decision.1057 They
1055
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 128.
Ibid, p. 127.
1057
Selcuk Gultasli, “EU: Talks Must Be Suspended If AK Party Closed Down,” Todays
Zaman, April 2, 2008, accessed on April 19, 2013, available at
1056
269
perceived party closures to be an “open assault” on democracy. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis,
member of the European Parliament from Germany said, “Turkey’s Kemalists must adapt
to the circumstances of the 21st century.”1058 He highlighted that Turkey is the only
democracy in the Muslim World and the closure of the JDP would be perceived as the
victory of “a deep state” against democracy.
The European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey expressed her surprise to see the
Turkish judiciary acting “as if it is the owner of the secular state.”1059 Cem Ozdemir,
member of the European Parliament of Turkish origin from Germany, expressed concern
that the EU would not have a counterpart to negotiate with if the party was closed, since
neither the military, the judiciary nor the bureaucracy could negotiate on behalf of
Turkey.1060 Another member of the parliament of Turkish descent, Emine Bozkurt, from
the Netherlands argued that the case ignored the “conviction of the 47 percent of citizens
of Turkey.”1061 Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner of Enlargement, asserted, “in a
normal European democracy, political issues are debated in parliament and decided in the
ballot box, not in the courtroom,” adding that according to the fundamental principle of
respect for separation of powers “the executive shouldn’t meddle in the court’s work,
while the legal system shouldn’t meddle in democratic politics.”1062 Jose Manuel
Barroso, the President of the European Commission, during his visit to Turkey stated that
it is “something not normal in a stable democratic country that the party that was chosen
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-137898-eu-talks-must-be-suspended-if-ak-partyclosed-down.html
1058
ibid.
1059
ibid.
1060
ibid.
1061
ibid.
1062
“EU Warns Turkey: Political Issues Should Be Decided Through Ballot Box, Not in
Courtroom,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, March 18, 2008.
270
by the majority of the Turkish people is now under this kind of investigation,” adding that
the European Union is “looking for a secular, democratic Turkey. You cannot impose
religion by force you cannot impose secularism by force.”1063 He concluded by stating
that EU could not be impartial to this development due to the candidate status of
Turkey.1064
These remarks reflect that the European Union had to take a position against the
secularist camp, which led to their de facto positioning themselves on the side of the JDP
government. It served the EU interest to deal with the JDP as the interlocutor within the
accession process, rather than the Kemalist elite or the military. The Commission also
showed its position against the closure of the JDP by deciding to open negotiations on
two more chapters in June of 2008.1065 The JDP responded by passing three significant
reforms that EU had been requesting: one related to the penal code, the other enabling the
establishing of a Kurdish channel on state television,1066 and the other related to the
property rights of non-Muslims.1067
The European reaction to the closure case served for strengthening the legitimacy
of the JDP. Paradoxically, the Kemalists who perceived themselves as the sole authority
on Westernization were put in a position of castigation by a very important European
authority, while the JDP seemed like it was receiving their full support. The messages of
the various officials of the European Union were aimed at “educating” the so-called “pro-
1063
“Barroso Pushes Turkey on Reforms,” EurActiv.com, April 11, 2008, accessed on
April 21, 2013, available at http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/barroso-pushes-turkeyreforms/article-171567
1064
Ibid.
1065
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 128.
1066
Ibid.
1067
Ibid, p. 184, footnote 46.
271
Europeanization” Kemalists about what real democracy required. The Turkish military
was also openly critical of EU’s encouragement of the JDP government “to curb the
military’s political and societal influence,” accusing Brussels of campaigning against
it.1068 It was a great disappointment for the Kemalists to see that the Europeans sided with
the JDP, lecturing them on the requirements of democracy. Needless to say, the JDP
welcomed EU’s support in form of its taking a position against the authoritarian elements
in Turkish state tradition.
The case also marked a major turning point in the balances of power between the
major actors, redefining who they were. The EU’s reaction undermined the power of the
secularist establishment. Secularism, supported by the military and the Kemalist elite no
longer held a privileged position and secularists could not claim to speak for all. This
demonstrated the dramatic change in the Turkish political system. While the court’s
decision confirmed that the JDP was an Islamist party, it also showed that the military
was no longer in charge of safeguarding secularism. The court was aware that a decision
for closure would reflect on the authoritarian nature of the state, therefore had to pass the
decision which reflected how divided the members of the court were on the issue.
Four months after the filing of the case, the Constitutional Court decided in July
2008, that the JDP had become a focus of anti-secular activities and penalized it by
partially withholding state funding.1069 The decision was a close call for the JDP.
Although 6 out of the 11 judges voted in support of closure, the result was one vote short
1068
“Bush says Turkish EU Membership in US ‘interest’,” EUObserver.com, November
10, 2006, accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://euobserver.com/enlargement/22551
1069
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 75.
272
of the constitutional majority required for closure.1070 In addition, 10 out of the 11 judges
decided that the party had become a place of convergence for anti-secularist activities,
leading to interpretation that this was a “politically motivated compromise, a sword of
Damocles hanging over the head”1071 of the party.
The decision brought relief to both the Europeans and the JDP. Most interesting
and simultaneously confusing part of the decision was that the court found that the JDP
had in fact become “a center of anti-secular activity,” yet it did not decree for closure.
This was the first time in history of Kemalism that “anti-secular activity” got away with
almost no punishment. While it was interpreted as a sweet and sour victory by the JDP,
the Kemalists concentrated on the verification of the argument that the JDP was a threat
to secularism.
Aside from the reactions, an analysis of the decision yields the possibility that
although the Constitutional Court intended to decree for the closure of the party, it had to
take a step back due to the international pressure. Until this decision, it was beyond
comprehension that the court would not rule for closure of a party that it found to be a
home for anti-secularist activities. Obviously the external pressures, especially the
position of the European Union, were extremely effective. The internal pressures such as
the public’s support for the JDP and the general population’s demand on maintaining
social stability in the nation may have had some effect as well. The history of the court’s
rulings on similar cases did not generally end in the favor of the popular support. For
instance, the case on the constitutional amendment on lifting the headscarf ban, the ruling
1070
1071
Ibid, p. 156.
Ibid.
273
was one that was taken against the public’s long-lasting support for the issue.1072
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that it was mainly the external pressure that led to the
court to pass a decision that was radically different from those in previous similar cases.
This result can be interpreted as a demonstration of the fact that that the court, as the
representative of the Kemalist establishment was, for the first time, faced with a worthy
opponent that challenged its superficial claims locally and internationally. The court, as
one of the important prongs of Kemalist establishment that had traditionally carried the
torch of Europeanization since the establishment of the republic, could still pass a hostile
decision but not one as coercive as before.
This case also demonstrated the paradoxical swap of positions between the
Kemalists and the representatives of Islamic political movement. While the Kemalist elite
still held onto their claims to being the standard bearer of progress, they no longer
represented modernity1073 and they “seemed to have abandoned westernization” while
Islamists were “advocating further westernization that meant democracy, closer
integration with the EU and a lesser Kemalist state.”1074 This was another indicator that is
aligned with Ihsan Dagi’s argument that “the Kemalists have gone away from the EU (the
west) and the very objective of westernization.”1075
The changing discourse of Turkish Islamists presents an important move not only
for the spread of modern political values among the Islamic groups in Turkey but
also for a possibility of rapprochement between Islam and the West. Furthermore
1072
Metin Toprak and Nasuh Uslu, “Headscarf Controversy in Turkey,” Journal of
Economic and Social Research, 2009, Vol. 11, no1, p. 48-49. (p. 43-67), and Kavakci
Islam, p. 138.
1073
Ihsan Dagi, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and
Westernization, Report, Central European University Center for Policy Studies,
2001/2002, p. 46.
1074
Ibid, p. 52.
1075
Ibid.
274
the changes seem not confined to the discourse of the Islamists but the Islamic
self (identity) is being transformed at least among some Islamic sectors.1076
This case carried traces of the possibility between Islamic elements and the
Western values as in the quoted argument of Dagi. The authoritarian policies of the
Kemalist establishment had come to such a point that the Europeans were left with no
choice but to side with the JDP, consolidating and solidifying the change in position of
the Islamic political discourse in relation to the west.
The court case also reinforced the role model status of Turkey, albeit under the
leadership of an “Islamist” government. The Kemalists had to come to terms with the
transformation in the political landscape, which further complicated the Turkish narrative
regarding its role model status argument. They also had to face that the distinction they
introduced between secularization and democratization. The transformation due to the
democratization process initiated by the EU reforms was making it impossible to hold on
to the Kemalists of putting secularist practices above democratic ones. One of the
Kemalists’ most fundamental claims had been based on associating secularism with
“modernity” and progressiveness and Islam with “backwardness,” and the JDP, just like
the previous Islamic political movements was “neither antimodern, nor backward.”1077
More significantly, the JDP became identified with democratic process, which the
secularists often sacrificed in favor of their political dominance. However, the Kemalists
were not ready to accept defeat and they were determined to hold on to their claims and
arguments as long as possible. The issue of the headscarf ban remained to be one of the
few areas where the secularist policies were in place.
1076
1077
Ibid, p. 51.
M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p. 265-266.
275
EU’s position in the closure case reflects their acceptance of the fact that the
secularists no longer have the power to represent the Turkish majority. Therefore they
had to take a position against secularism, which was now competing against democracy,
since the closure of the JDP would reflect the undermining of democracy. The European
attitude towards the JDP in the closure case was also a clear reflection of European
realpolitik, i.e. acknowledgment of the JDP’s destabilization of the classic Orientalist
assumptions that argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The EU officials
were aware the shortcomings of the JDP government in bringing the Turkish human
rights standards to the EU level, however, their credibility and potential reflected through
the reforms deserved recognition.
The case and its results worked to the advantage of JDP in a number of ways.
First and foremost, it strengthened the party’s legitimacy at the domestic level. The fact
that the Constitutional Court did not decide for closure was considered as a victory for
the JDP as well as a sign of the success of the democratization reforms that had been
passed. The European Union’s taking of a less critical stance towards the JDP within the
framework of the closure case was another factor that strengthened its legitimacy at the
local, regional and international levels. The European Union was openly declaring that it
was willing to have the JDP represent Turkey in the accession process.
Another very important development that was also highlighted by the case was
the JDP’s putting an end to the historical role of the military in Turkish politics. Two of
the most important actors that prevented Turkey from developing democratically were
the military coupled up with the Kemalist elites. The democratization process fuelled by
the EU alignment of Turkish political discourse led to the successful marginalization of
276
the military by the JDP. The military was no longer welcome in the capacity to guard
secularism, which always came at the cost of major setbacks in the democratic process.
This marked a major turning point in the Turkish political discourse during which the
balance of power between major powers, especially the definition of key actors was
changing. The military’s struggle to maintain control of the state through determining the
political agenda was rebuffed by the JDP’s quest for democratization.
One of the indirect but significant outcomes of the closure case that worked to the
advantage of the JDP was in relation to the issue of resolving the headscarf ban. The case
gave the JDP an excuse to legitimize the delay of the future attempts to resolve the
headscarf issue, which remained to be a highly sensitive issue for the Kemalist
establishment as well as the EU. The EU continued to share the view that the headscarf
was an impediment to the implementation of secularism.
Although resolving the headscarf ban had never been an official stance or
uppermost item on the JDP agenda, it ranked high on the list of issues deemed important
for its loyal supporters. The pressure from the supporters was bound to increase after the
Gul Presidency, since they no longer had the excuse of a potential presidential veto.
Therefore the attempt to make a constitutional amendment, which was initiated by the
nationalists, relieved the pressure. Taking this opportunity was a win-win situation for the
JDP. If the Constitutional Court had decided for the amendment, the support for the JDP
would have increased further with the added support of the non-JDP voters who wanted
the ban lifted. JDP would be credited for resolving a decades long problem that had
negatively affected the lives of a significant part of the population. The annulment
277
decision of the Court enabled the JDP to justify its lack of action on the issue. But more
importantly, it justified the postponement of it to an undetermined date.
From the perspective of the women who were affected by the ban, the power
relations and the representations remained the same. The headscarved women remained
at their subordinate positions, while their non-headscarved female and male counterparts
with whom they shared the same beliefs and therefore similar position of subordination,
now held higher positions of power. For instance, although there were a few headscarved
women in the committees of the party organization, there were no headscarved female
parliamentarians. The headscarved women were marginalized through exclusion or
through having to take low profile positions, while non-headscarved women and men
who were also observant Muslims had the opportunity to be politically and socially active
under the JDP government.
Once the closure case was settled, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn ,
argued that the JDP government should “pursue reforms with renewed vigor.”1078 He
emphasized that it was necessary for Turkey to make the necessary changes to the
constitution that reflect the societal transformation and consolidate the freedoms and
rights of the citizens, hoping that it would also serve as a solution to the annual political
crises,1079 referring to the closure case and possibly the challenging presidential election
process that led to the election of Abdullah Gul. In response, Chief Negotiator Babacan
emphasized that the government was determined to continue the reform process not just
1078
“EU Urges Turkey to Overhaul Constitution,” Today’s Zaman, September 17, 2008,
accessed on April 23, 2013, available at
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=15338
5
1079
ibid.
278
for the sake for the EU membership process, but also because of their belief that Turkish
people deserve higher standards of living.1080 In this response, he was again emphasizing
Turkish rather than European standards and expectations.
Re-introduction of the Role Model Argument in Relation with the Middle Eastern
(Islamic) States
Bringing economic and political reform to the Middle East had been among the
major Western concerns for the region, especially after the events of September 11, 2001.
The United States led the way in this process and re-initiated the presentation of Turkey
as a “model” of democratization to the Muslim World,1081 especially as part of the
“Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” in 2004.1082 Turkey was presented as a
country with a historical experience of “democratic and social reform” that “stands as a
model for others” during the Bush Presidency,1083 as well as “a role model for the large
swath of the world” due to its being a majority Muslim nation and its secular, democratic
and modernized characteristics during the Clinton Presidency.1084 This discourse was
more ideological than the European one, which recognized the real problems Turkey had
with the authoritarian republican legacy of its secular governments. In the post
September 11th period, President George W. Bush praised Turkey for being a Muslim
country that upholds democracy, rule of law and freedoms, presenting it again, as a
model for the Muslim nations.1085
1080
Ibid.
Meliha Benli Altunisik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle
East,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, Nos. 1-2, Spring 2005, p. 45. (p. 45-63).
1082
Ibid, 45, and Hale and Ozbudun, p. 144.
1083
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 144.
1084
Altunisik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” p. 45.
1085
Ibid, p. 46.
1081
279
During this period, even though Turkey had already initiated the reform process
by harmonizing its laws with those of the European Union, there was still a long way to
go before Turkey could truly be considered as a democratic country. The United States
really did not consider the level of democratization or the need for further
democratization when presenting Turkey as a role model. In fact, the United States had a
tradition of harshly criticizing Turkey for its poor human rights record in the Human
Rights Reports annually published by the State Department. These reports even made
repeated reference to the headscarf ban as a human rights violation, a topic that was
ignored by the Europeans for decades. The United States’ re-presentation of Turkey as a
role model was obviously not based on its democratic transformation. It was based on its
historical ties as a “good ally” since the beginning of the Cold War era.
The United States also supported Turkish EU membership based on the same
reason. Some in the European Union were skeptical of this unconditional support of
Turkey by the United States, and perceived Turkey to be a Trojan horse, that would bring
the US interests into the European Union. There were a number of incidents when the
European Union expressed disappointment with the US enthusiasm for Turkish
membership, which took the form of an ultimatum or were seen as interference in the
internal affairs of the European Union.
President Bush, during Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Washington DC in
October 2006, stated, “it is in the United States’ interest that Turkey join the European
Union.”1086 This was among the many incidents that clearly indicated the frequent
1086
“Bush says Turkish EU Membership in US ‘interest’,” EUObserver.com, November
10, 2006, accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://euobserver.com/enlargement/22551
280
diplomatic interventions of Washington in the relations between the EU and Turkey. The
United States also gave full support to Turkey in trying to find a solution to the Cyprus
problem that constituted the major impediment for Turkish membership. The US support
for Turkey continued even after the Turkish disagreement over the United States policies
towards the Middle East. In fact, the re-introduction of the role model argument was
fuelled by Turkey’s increasing role as an international actor as well as a mediator in the
region. This explained that it was in the interest of the US to continue supporting Turkey
in its EU membership journey, in exchange for its service in the region of US interests.
Up to this point, as far as the United States was concerned Turkey continued to be a good
ally that had active relations both with the Europeans and the Muslims, which made it a
valuable asset, especially at a time when the popularity of the United States was on the
decline.
The JDP government, in its first days in office, had stated that Turkey did not
have any aspirations to be a model to any other nation.1087 However, both Erdogan and
Gul have presented the Turkish experience as a valuable asset to the region as well as the
Western nations.1088 The JDP took every opportunity to express Turkey’s willingness to
act as a mediator between Europe and the Middle East.1089 Erdogan co-sponsored the
Alliance of Civilizations project initiated by the United Nations together with the Spanish
Prime Minister in 2005.1090 Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero argued
that the alliance aimed to “avoid widening the gap between the Eastern and Western
worlds” and was perceived as a means to transform the “‘historic rivalry between the
1087
Altunisik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” p. 57.
Ibid.
1089
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 144.
1090
Ibid.
1088
281
Christian and Turkish empires… into a positive association.”1091 This was a symbolic
project proposed against the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis of Samuel Huntington.1092
Erdogan argued that Turkey’s connections with both the West and the Muslims could be
utilized to enhance its international image and disprove Huntington’s argument.1093
Huntington argued that western and non-western civilizations will be in constant conflict
with each other and the “paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between
‘the West and the Rest’…a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be
between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.”1094 Both Zapatero and Erdogan
were presenting Turkey as a role model, which could play a role in containing the
widening gap between the West and the Muslim world. Zapatero’s reference to the
representation of Turkey as a historic rival of Christian empire and his presentation of
modern Turkey as a representative of the Muslim world and Erdogan’s response
emphasizing the potential of Turkey in playing an important role in the fight against
extremism contributed to the role model argument. Hale and Ozbudun argue that
“stressing Turkey’s role as a mediator between Europe and the Middle East also
strengthened its claim for membership of the EU, according with the liberal notion of an
open, multi-cultural future for Europe.”1095 The arguments within the discourse of
alliance of civilization presented representations of Turkey as a model state with an
1091
“Erdogan, Zapatero Launch Alliance of Civilizations Initiative,” SETimes.com,
November 28, 2005. Accessed on May 30, 2013, available at
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/11/
28/feature-01
1092
Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993,
Vol. 72, No: 3, pp. 22-49.
1093
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 144.
1094
Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993,
Vol. 72, No: 3, p. 48.
1095
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 144.
282
observant Muslim government, which was capable of communicating with the West and
the Muslims. This was another demonstration of the argument that role model status of
Turkey was dependent on Western recognition- Spain and the United Nations in this
case- and it involved an intrinsic declaration of Turkish “difference” from other Muslim
states.
Many actions and ventures of the JDP reflected the desire to make Turkey a highprofile nation1096 in the region and in the wider international arena. Getting Turkey
elected to the U.N. Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2009-2010 term
was among the other steps taken in this direction.1097 It was a great success, considering
the fact that the last time Turkey sat in the Security Council was in 1961.1098 Erdogan
interpreted the election as an indicator of Turkey’s growing role in the international
arena, stating that the election “is a reflection of our increasing weight in the international
politics and the confidence that the international community has in us.”1099 President Gul
also welcomed the development explaining, “Turkey will continue assuming an
influential role in the solution of the problems to restore peace, stability and tranquility in
our region and in the world and will continue to contribute to endeavors to establish
dialogue between the cultures and religions.”1100 Both statements reflected Turkey’s
desire to become an active actor in the international arena.
1096
Ibid.
Ibid.
1098
“Turkish Officials Hail Turkey’s Security Council Seat,” Hurriyet DailyNews.com,
October 22, 2008, accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/10150122.asp?scr=1
1099
Ibid.
1100
Ibid.
1097
283
By May of 2008 Turkey had assumed the role of meditating peace talks between
Syria and Israel. It made attempts to act as a mediator in the disputes between Russia and
Georgia, and between Pakistan and Afghanistan.1101 Turkey was also trying to keep its
relations with Iran stable, hoping to get their cooperation in fighting against PKK
violence. This was important since Iran was a Muslim neighboring country that also had
a large Kurdish population. However, pressure from the United States and Israel weighed
heavily on the progress of the relations between the two states. One of these incidents
took place in August 2008, when Turkey withdrew from a lucrative agreement to buy
Iranian natural gas, at the last minute after the harsh American and Israeli reaction to the
visit of President Ahmedinejad.1102 EU studies professor Cengiz Aktar commented that
Turkey could not treat Iran like the Western nations since it was a neighbor with whom it
had complex relations.1103 The concerns and suspicions of the United Nations Security
Council members such as United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany
regarding Iran’s nuclear program1104 as well as the ongoing pressures from United States
and Israel caused constant strain in Turkish-Iranian relations. After this incident, Turkey
continued to maintain good relations with Iran while simultaneously the keeping the
relations with its allies stable. Turkey attempted at some point to take on the role of the
mediator between Iran and the Western nations.
1101
Ibid.
Robert Trait, “Turkey Pulls Out of Deal to Buy Iranian Natural Gas Under Pressure
From the US,” The Guardian, August 14, 2008, accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/15/turkey.iran
1103
Ibid.
1104
Ibid.
1102
284
The rise of the JDP had opened a new era in the Turkish-Iranian relations,1105 as
Iran had welcomed the first electoral victory of the JDP as a victory for Islamists in
Turkey, expressing willingness to improve economic and political relations.1106 The JDP
responded emphasizing common Islamic values, as well as common economic and
security interests. Iran perceived this change as a possibility to end the history of
ideological tensions in the relations with Turkey under the Kemalist rule and the JDP did
not have the Kemalists paranoia that building good relations with Iran would lead to the
spread of extremism in Turkey. The course relations between the two states were
extremely important for the Western and Middle Eastern states due to their possible
impact on the Western sanctions against Iran.1107 Both Iran and Turkey considered the
western orientation in constructing their relations with each other, which reflected on the
role model status. Turkey’s increasing role as a mediator and a buffer between the West
and Iran was a valuable resource for all parties involved.
The subsequent presentation of Turkey as a model country to towards the Arab
countries in the region can be compared to the AKP’s alignment with the US with
regards to the Greater Middle East Project and the uneasiness it created for
bureaucratic policy makers in both instances, since Turkey’s policy to become a
leader amongst Arab neighbors led to the deterioration of relations with Israel as
was the case after 2003.1108
The tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations reduced the tensions between Turkey and
the Muslim states that were critical of what seemed like an unconditional Turkish support
1105
Nader Habibi, “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western
Sanctions,” Middle East Brief, May 2012, No. 62, p. 2.
1106
“Iran Welcomes AKP Government,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 7, 2002.
Accessed on May 30, 2013, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=iran-welcomes-akpgovernment-2002-11-07
1107
Habibi, “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions,”
p. 1.
1108
Terzi, p. 108.
285
of Israel. The JDP, especially with support of the presidency, was trying to push Turkey
to emerge as a regional actor, which could act unilaterally on implementing its foreign
policy initiative based on “zero-problems with neighbors.” This policy developed by
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davudoglu, focused on improving political, economic and social
relations with all neighbors, especially the Middle-Eastern states.
The JDP government, in a way, was struggling in transforming its hard-power
based foreign policy perspective supported by the US and Israel into a more soft-power
oriented foreign policy relatively closer to the EU model. It was a challenge for the JDP
to find the balance between maintaining good relations with the Western nations, its
neighbors while pursuing and protecting Turkish interests. It was harder with respect to
the relations with the Middle East. This new presentation of the role model status created
problems by representing Turkey at a higher level than the Muslim states because of its
ties with the West, undermining the common bonds of religion.
JDP, despite its popularity among the Muslim nations and in Muslim
organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Countries, and despite its links to
previous Islamic political movements, did not base its foreign policy strategies on
“Islamic basis.”1109 JDP’s foreign policy outlook was multi-dimensional. While trying to
maintain stable relations with Muslim nations especially its neighbors including Iran, Iraq
and Syria and enhance relations with African nations, Turkey was simultaneously trying
to improve its relations with states like Greece, Russia, Azerbaijan and even Armenia.
Turkey and Armenia did not recognize each other and therefore had not diplomatic
relations until October of 2008, when Abdullah Gul became the first Turkish president to
1109
Hale and Ozbudun, p. 145.
286
visit Armenia. Turkey also tried very hard to maintain stable relations with Israel albeit
all the challenges.
Although Turkey was trying to reorient itself in the international arena, it was
aware of its limitations in acting independent of its western allies, especially the United
States.1110 While Hale and Ozbudun argue that conformity with the European Union
remained a priority for the JDP who had displayed its categorical rejection of “the ‘us
versus them’ mentality” that was widespread in the Muslim World,1111 the role model
status required that Turkey side with the West in the “us versus them” dichotomy, when
dealing with the Muslim world. The most important argument of Turkey in its EU
membership bid still continued to be the fact that it was a secular democracy with a
Muslim population.1112 As Turkey was trying to execute its multi-dimensional foreign
policy, the EU reform process had visibly slowed down by 2008.1113
Relations with Israel Vis-à-vis the Gaza Blockade
Israel and Turkey both had a history of being presented as role models for the
region. Israel, which was praised as “the only democracy in the Middle East,” for many
years, was recently updated to “the only real democracy in the Middle East,”1114 and also
categorized as “the region’s only free country,” by Freedom Houses 2013 survey.1115 The
relations between these two states that shared their respective role model statuses began
1110
Ibid.
Ibid.
1112
Ibid.
1113
Ibid.
1114
Mark Perry, “Israel’s Democracy Myth,” Al Jazeera.com, February 13, 2013.
Accessed on June 1, 2013, available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/2013210102718996794.html
1115
Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the
Balance,” Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House, p. 5.
1111
287
to diminish in mid 2000s for a number of reasons. JDP’s prioritization of strengthening
relations with the neighbors, the increasing popular support for Palestinians because of
strict policies of the Israeli state, emergence of intelligence information regarding
incrementing influence of Israel in northern Iraq, as well as Turkey’s assuming a
leadership role amongst its Muslim neighbors were among the reasons that led to the
deterioration of relations with Israel.1116
An incident that caused a significant impact on Turkish Israeli relations took place
at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in 2009. During a panel discussion on
Israeli-Palestinian relations, Prime Minister Erdogan stormed off the stage in protest of
how the moderator refused to give him enough time to respond to the comments of
President Peres. Before he was cut off, the prime minister criticized the mistreatment of
Palestinians, especially in Gaza, by Israel, pointing out that it was “killing people” and
this was wrong.1117
Erdogan was welcome back in Turkey by crowds of people in a strong show of
support. While there were many local and international critics of Erdogan’s reaction who
blamed him for not acting diplomatically and behaving in a way that jeopardized
Turkish-Israeli relations, the incident contributed to his popularity, in the region, and
among the Muslim nations at other parts of the world. Erdogan was perceived by many as
a hero who stood up for the oppressed. Although the incident did not have any substantial
effect on the Turkish-Israeli relations, which continued in their regular track, Erdogan
began to be perceived differently in the Muslim world. Some argued that Turkey which
1116
Terzi, p. 108, footnote 1.
“Turkish PM Storms off in Gaza Row,” BBC News, January 29, 2009, accessed on
April 25, 2013, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/davos/7859417.stm.
1117
288
was perceived as a role model for the Islamic movements1118 was now challenging
Israel’s status in the region.1119
The long history of strategic, military, economic, and political partnership with
Israel, another role model country presented as the only democratic state in the Middle
East,1120 no longer meant that Turkey would keep its silence sensitive issues. A blockade
was imposed on Gaza was by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations
in 2006, after Hamas came out as the winner of the elections.1121 This blockade, which
was interpreted as a means of implementing collective punishment on the people of Gaza
who elected Hamas to govern them,1122 had been a concern for Turkey and an issue that
periodically caused tension in the relations with Israel.
JDP government showed more concern and was more involved in the Palestinian
issue than the previous parties, and this sensitivity towards finding a solution to the
increasing suffering in Palestine was supported by the broader Turkish population.1123
Hamas’ experience was similar to JDP in a number of ways. Hamas, like the JDP won the
general elections after its performance at the local government level. It had done very
1118
Shlomo Hasson, Israel’s Geopolitical Dilemma and the Upheaval in the Middle East,
(College Park, MD: The Joseph and Alma Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies), p. 43.
1119
Ibid, pp. 80-81.
1120
Josh Ruebner, “The ‘Only Democracy in the Middle East?’ Hardly.,” Huffingtonpost,
March 9, 2011, accessed on June 1, 2013, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-ruebner/the-only-democracy-in-the_b_833379.html
1121
Jonathan Steele and Jonathan Freeland, “Carter urges ‘supine’ Europe to Break with
US over Gaza Blockade,” The Guardian, May 25, 2008, accessed on April 25, 2013,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/26/israelandthepalestinians.usa1
1122
Esra Bulut and Carolin Goerzig, “The EU and the Gaza Blockade: Dismantling
Collective Punishment; Reviving Representative Peacemaking,” European Institute for
Security Studies, June 2010, p. 2. Accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU_and_the_Gaza_blockade.pdf
1123
Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the
Muslim World, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 75.
289
well in the 2005 municipal elections and won the large majority of the parliamentary
seats (76 out 132) in the 2006 general elections.1124 Hamas, like JDP was also perceived
and feared as a representative of religious fundamentalism that would impede democracy.
The connection between the two is also evident in the fact that Hamas, like the JDP was
the beneficiary of electoral politics for the Muslim “other,” but denied its right to govern,
which the JDP feared it would happen to it one day.
It is important to note that the Palestinians in Gaza exercised their rights to vote at
free and fair elections, which was a perfect example of electoral practice in a democratic
system. However, the Western nations and their prominent organizations were not happy
with the results of the election and therefore took action by putting an embargo in place
which was so strict that it even limited entry of humanitarian aid to the region. It is ironic
that the Western nations that are supposed to be the cradle of democracy could not handle
the electoral outcomes won by the “others,” who performed a democratic exercise which
happened to produce an outcome that was not favored by them.
Turkey went through a similar experience after the Turkish Parliament’s vote
against the Turkish support for American troops in Iraq. The results of the Muslim
others’ practice of democracy did not necessarily make the Western nations that promote
democracy very happy. It reflected the artificial nature of the role model argument. While
the United States promoted Turkey as a good democratic and secular model for the
Muslim nations to follow, the outcome of their democratic process was not respected
when it clashed with the United States’ pursuit of its self-interests.
1124
Scott Wilson, “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in
Mideast,” Washington Post, January 27, 2006, accessed on April 25, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html
290
In case of the Gaza blockade, the European Union, which sometimes
distinguished itself from the United States’ hard-nosed real politik had no problem
punishing the Palestinians for practicing democracy which the EU upholds. According to
some peace activists like former president Jimmy Carter, by supporting the blockade, the
European Union was “colluding in a human rights crime.”1125 JDP considered the
European nations as well as others involved in the blockade, of violating the very
principles they upheld and imposed on other nations to follow. In this case, the EU’s
position on the blockade reflected a failure when benchmarked against the political
Copenhagen Criteria.
The Gaza blockade was among the foreign policy issues which the JDP struck a
chord with both Turkish officials and affected relations with Israel. The next one took
place in May of 2010, when an internationally organized civilian flotilla carrying
humanitarian aid attempted to break the blockade and was attacked by the Israeli army
while still in international waters. As a result of the attacks, nine Turkish citizens, one of
whom was also a United States citizen were killed. The ships were taken to Israel, and the
people on board were taken into custody. This caused a great uproar in Turkey where the
flotilla had started. After continuous pressure from Turkey and reactions from the
international community, Israel ended up having to release all the Turkish and foreign
nationals who were brought back to Turkey by the Turkish government.
1125
Jonathan Steele and Jonathan Freeland, “Carter urges ‘supine’ Europe to Break with
US over Gaza Blockade,” The Guardian, May 25, 2008.
291
United Nations Human Rights Council found that the Israeli military broke
international law by using “an unacceptable level of brutality,”1126 and the international
community condemned the violence. However, the final report of the United Nations
panel investigating the issue found that Israeli army was trying to protect itself and
argued that the Gaza blockade was “a legitimate security measure” to keep weapons from
being smuggled into Gaza.1127 A case was filed in Turkish courts against the commanding
officers in charge of the attack on the charges of instigating premeditated murder.1128 The
victims also filed individual cases in the International Criminal Court. The Turkish
government withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv, expelling the Israeli ambassador
from Ankara, cancelled the joint military exercises, called for punishment for the “bloody
massacre” and asked for an official apology to Turkey and compensation of the victims.
Erdogan stated “Israel will no longer be able to do what it wants in the Mediterranean”
and that Turkish warships would be in patrol, adding that “relations with Israel cannot
normalize if Israel does not apologize for the flotilla raid, compensate the martyrs’
families and lift the blockade on Gaza.”1129
The “Flotilla Incident,” which is also known as the “Mavi Marmara incident”
named after the Mavi Marmara ship that was leading the flotilla and the one that was
1126
“Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla,” BBC News, March 22, 2013, accessed
on April 30, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10203726
1127
Ibid (“Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla,” BBC News, March 22, 2013).
1128
“Second Hearing of Mavi Marmara Trial Held,” Ihh.org.tr, February 21, 2013.
Accessed on June 1, 2013, available at http://mavimarmara.ihh.org.tr/en/main/news/0/second-hearing-of-mavi-marmara-trial-held/1593
1129
“Erdogan Offers ‘Arab Spring’ neo-laicism,” Hurriyet Daily News, September 15,
2011. Accessed on May 2, 2013, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-offers-arab-spring-neolaicism.aspx?pageID=438&n=erdogan-offers-8216arab-spring8217-neo-laicism-201109-15
292
attacked became an important incident that further strengthened Turkey’s image amongst
the Arab and Muslim nations. It contributed to the popularity of Erdogan and the JDP
government in the region due to their firm stance against the Israeli officials and their
continuing persistence afterwards, producing an atmosphere of solidarity with other
Muslim and non-Muslim nations. The incident served Turkish self-interest and influence
in the region but also caused complications in its relations with the West.
From a perspective of power relations, the Turkish rebuke of Israel, one of the
strongest nations that sits at the peak of power in the region allowed Turkey to reclaim
power it had abandoned. It strengthened the JDP government’s position internationally
and nationally. Even the military, which historically had strong relations with the Israeli
counterparts, went along with the reaction of the JDP government. Although there were
still those who were critical of the government and even the military for protesting Israel,
they were little in numbers.
The United States was the third most concerned nation about the future of the
relations between Turkey and Israel. Obama presidency had improved the declining
Turkish American relations. He chose Turkey as the first Muslim country he would visit
in his first international trip after he took office, 2009. While some interpreted the visit as
an attempt for the United States to re-build the deteriorating relations, others emphasized
that it confirmed the American plans to “build up Turkey as a regional outpost, to play
the role of policeman to secure US interests in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central
Asia.”1130 It highlighted Turkey’s strategic importance for the United States with its
1130
Kerem Kaya, “Obama Visit Signals Increased Role For Turkey and Greater
Tensions,” April 17, 2009, World Socialist Web Site. Accessed on May 1, 2013, available
at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/04/turk-a17.html
293
influence in Afghanistan, the role it had played in establishing peace between Syria and
Israel, the border region of Iraq and Iran.1131 Obama also re-expressed support for
Turkish membership to the European Union during this visit, as well as emphasizing
Turkey’s success in having established a secular democracy in a country with a majority
Muslim population.
It was a little more than two months after President Obama’s emphasis on his
hope that Turkey and United States could persuade their ally Israel and Palestine to live
peacefully under a two-state system that the Mavi Marmara incident occurred. After the
incident, Turkey waited for an apology while Israel insisted on its original position, until
March 22, 2013. On this date, President Obama, used his visit to Israel to convince
Benjamin Netenyahu to issue an apology. Netenyahu called Erdogan, explaining that the
Mavi Marmara tragedy was not intentional and that Israel regretted over it. Netenyahu
“apologized to the Turkish people for any errors that could have led to loss of life and
agreed to complete the agreement on compensation,” and Erdogan accepted the apology
on behalf of the Turkish people.1132 This apology provided an indicator that the JDP had
transformed the power relations between it, Israel and the United States.
The Arab Spring and the Role Model Argument
By 2010, the foreign policy practices based on “zero-problems with neighbors”
approach aimed at stabilization of its relations with the states of the Middle East was
perceived by some in the West as detaching itself from Europe and the United States,
while others argued that Turkey’s increased role in the Middle East was in fact
1131
Helene Cooper, ”America Seeks Bonds to Islam, Obama Insists,” The New York
Times, April 6, 2009. Accessed on May 1, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/europe/07prexy.html?_r=0
1132
“Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla,” BBC News, March 22, 2013.
294
complemented and dependent on its relations with the Western nations.1133 This argument
asserts that Turkey was utilizing its good relations with the West to promote itself in the
Middle East while at the same time it strengthened its relations with the Western nations
using its newly acquired influence in the region. The role model argument was an
important asset utilized by Turkey in this regard. The nations of the Middle East
displayed caution when dealing with Turkey due to their concern that it gave a higher
priority to the its relations with the West.1134 The Turkish officials’ or media’s references
to the Ottoman past did not help the situation, either1135 to the resentment of the Empire
among the Arabs. However, the Middle Eastern states were still supportive of Turkey’s
connections with the West, as they perceived it as “a voice for the Muslim or Middle
Eastern countries to raise their concerns in Western fora.”1136
Turkey’s various attempts to mediate in conflicts between some states led to
mixed outcomes, as well. The skeptics argued that in most cases the attempts did not lead
to any solution. There were also some who argued that Turkey’s main purpose was to
impress the west. 1137 The level of skepticism seemed to decline after the incident at
Davos and the flotilla crisis.
Ahmet Davudoglu became foreign minister in May 2009 and continued to
rigorously implement the “zero-problems with neighbors” policies. However, the
unexpected change in the political landscape in the Middle East began to produce
1133
Terzi, p. 110. [Reference to International Crisis Group, Turkey and the Middle East:
Ambitions and Constraints, Europe Report 203, April 7, 2010.]
1134
Terzi, p. 110.
1135
Ibid.
1136
Ibid, p. 110. [Reference to International Crisis Group, Turkey and the Middle East:
Ambitions and Constraints, Europe Report 203, April 7, 2010.]
1137
Ibid, pp. 110-111.
295
“neighbors with problems” starting with Tunisia in December 2010. The uprisings
against the poor economic and social conditions of dictatorial regimes spread from
Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and then to Syria. The revolutionary
transformation in the political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa that led to
the rise of Islamist governments contributed to discussions of the utility of the Turkish
model. The JDP was extremely enthusiastic to engage in that discussion, especially since
it had won a clear victory, winning more than 49.8 percent of the votes in the June 2011
general elections.
Many believed that Turkish democracy constituted a good example for the former
dictatorships in the Arab nations, arguing that “despite all its shortcomings, Turkish
democracy is a unique inspiration for the Middle East,” especially considering that
“Turkey has been able to maintain its religious and secular identity within a pluralist
democracy.”1138 This was the general atmosphere in September 2011 as Prime Minister
Erdogan began his tour to the Arab Spring countries with Egypt, where he was greeted
enthusiastically.1139 During his visit Erdogan promoted Turkish secularism as a good
example for the Egyptians and other Muslim nations. Erdogan explained that Turkish
secularism was defined as “the principle that the state is equidistant from all religions,”
highlighting that secularism did not mean atheism, requesting the Egyptian people not to
1138
Pelin Turgut, “A Model of Middle East Democracy, Turkey Calls for Change in
Egypt,” Time, February 2, 2011. Accessed on May 1, 2013, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045723,00.html
1139
Rania Abouzeid, “Why Turkey’s Erdogan is Greeted Like a Rock Star in Egypt,”
Time, September 13, 2011. Accessed on May 1, 2013, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2093090,00.html
296
“be afraid of secularism.”1140 Erdogan’s statements got a lot of negative reaction from the
conservatives in both Egypt as well as the religious Turkish citizens who had suffered
under the oppressive secularist policies of the Turkish state.
Following the criticisms, Erdogan repeated his suggestion that the Arab states
adopt the Turkish secular model in Tunisia, but this time he elucidated that the definition
of secularism was different from the “Anglo-Saxon or Western perception,” arguing that
secularism was a characteristic of the state, not individuals, therefore a Muslim individual
could “govern a secular state in a successful way.”1141 He added that “in Turkey, 99
percent of the population is Muslim, and it did not pose any problem. You can do the
same here” after emphasizing the success of Turkey as a democratic and secular state.1142
He highlighted that his administration was perceived as a model by the Arab nations in
the post-revolution period, assuring that “Tunisia will prove to the whole world that Islam
and democracy can co-exist,” just like Turkey did.1143
These statements contributed to the increasing criticism by practicing Muslims in
both Arab countries and at home. First of all, the argument that secularism “did not pose
any problem” was not accurate and Erdogan, was one of the people who personally
suffered through the consequences of the extremist policies of Turkish laiklik. The
researcher of this dissertation had the opportunity to ask the Prime Minister, why he
1140
Umit Cetin, “’Don’t Be Afraid of Secularism…’ How Erdogan’s Egypt Tour Looks
in Turkey,” Hurriyet/Worldcrunch, September 15, 2011. Accessed on May 2, 2013,
available at http://www.worldcrunch.com/don-t-be-afraid-secularism-how-erdogan-segypt-tour-looks-turkey/world-affairs/-don-t-be-afraid-of-secularism...-how-erdogan-segypt-tour-looks-in-turkey/c1s3757/#.UYIovL_U5SV
1141
“Erdogan Offers ‘Arab Spring’ neo-laicism,” Hurriyet Daily News, September 15,
2011. Accessed on May 2, 2013.
1142
Ibid.
1143
Ibid.
297
suggested the Turkish model to the Arab nations, while aware of the negative
implications, and was told that he referred to the definition of secularism included in the
Justice and Development Program.1144 The party program expresses that while religion is
one of the most important institutions for mankind, secularism is a prerequisite for a
democracy as well as the guarantor of freedom of religion and conscience.1145 It also
explains that the JDP opposes the interpretation of secularism as hostility against
religion.1146 According to the program, secularism enables people of all faith and belief to
practice their beliefs freely, express their views and live accordingly, while at the same
time securing the rights of the people who do not adhere to any faith, making secularism
a basic principle of freedom and societal peace.1147
Secondly, although Erdogan emphasized that the Arabs and Turks are brothers,
the presentation of Turkish model of secularism and democracy despite all of its many
deficiencies, suggests that Turkey sees itself as an emerging power in the region.
Promoting a model that clearly is problematic at a number of levels to the emerging Arab
democracies is a means of “othering” them and seeing them as followers rather than
equals. Turkey is treating the Arab nations in a way very much similar to the way it was
treated by Western nations, especially within the perspective of its presentation as a role
model. This is coupled with the attempt to reclaim the connections based on common
grounds with them. While the Western nations were fully aware of the plethora of
deficiencies that the Turkish model had, they still argued that it was “good enough” for
1144
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, SETA DC Conference, September 24, 2011, New York.
Justice and Development Party, “Party Program,” Accessed on June 1, 2013,
available at http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi#bolum_
1146
Ibid.
1147
Ibid.
1145
298
the Muslim world. Now, Turkey, having overcome many obstacles and after having
achieved a significant level of progress in the democratization process under the
leadership of JDP, is presenting the Turkish model to the Arab nations, as if it had
something to offer. From this perspective, the promotion of the Turkish secular model to
the Arab world could be perceived to be not much different from the various programs
imposed by the western nations on the developing world. Assuming that Turkey has good
intentions, they need to realize that the Arab nations may benefit from shared
experiences, however, they need to produce a model that might work best for them and
should not be offered one that has oppressed a majority of its population.
From another perspective, by presenting the current transformed perception of
Turkish secularism as a good model to the Arab world, Erdogan is trying to change the
classical discourse of secularism together with all the representations and power relations
it entails. Through this presentation Erdogan is increasing the value and validity of the
JDP-model of secularism internally as well as at the international level. He is
strengthening his confidence in the JDP model as well as increasing its legitimacy. By
overlooking the painful transformation process, especially the oppressive measures that
came at a very high cost to the Turkish society for many years, Erdogan is creating a
different history and understanding of secularism that does not contradict Islamic values.
He is trying to develop an Islamic history to secularism, and supporting his arguments by
giving example of the overall success of the JDP government from transforming the
nation from a weak power, a follower into a major actor that plays leadership roles in the
international arena. More importantly the JDP, managed to do this while struggling
299
against the powerful Kemalist elite and the military as well as all the negative
representations of its “Islamist” roots in the national and international levels.
By promoting this final product to the Arab world as a good model, Erdogan is
encouraging them to embrace a new perception of secularism that accommodates
religious freedoms rather than controlling them. The Turkish support for democratization
during the painful transitional period in the post-Arab Spring Middle East continued.
While nations like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have overthrown their dictators and continue
to work on their respective transitional structures, the opponents of the dictatorship in
Syria have been faced with violence under the Assad regime and therefore so far have
been unable to establish a regime change for the better.
The history of Turkish relations with Syria had been far from tension-free until
the JDP took office. The JDP, under its new foreign policy, established economic and
political relations with Syria, acted as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli conflict, as well as
convinced Syria to cooperate with Turkey in their fight against the PKK. Syrian support
for the PKK had caused a major strain on the relations since 1970s, and it was a welcome
change for both Turkey and Syria to improve their relations with each other after 2002.
However, Assad’s violent reaction against the uprising caused Turkey to abruptly end the
relations with the Syrian government. However, Turkey opened its borders to the
refugees who managed to survive whose number has reached 400,000 as of May
2013.1148
1148
Huseyin Aydin, “Turkiye’deki Suriyeli Multeci Sayisi 400 bine Ulasti,” Zaman, May
2, 2013. Accessed on May 4, 2013, available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_turkiyedeki-suriyeli-multeci-sayisi-400-bineulasti_2085100.html
300
Change in Civilian-Military Discourse and the Role Model Status
One of the most important changes that took place under the JDP government was
initiating the gradual decrease in the role of the military in politics. The Turkish military
had enjoyed “the privilege of an autonomous position because of its role as the guardian
of Kemalism, secularism and national unity,”1149 since the first days of the republic, and
held the power to interfere in the political system, which led to interruptions in the
Turkish democracy. The military could never be held accountable for its actions during
these interruptions. The military’s role as the guardian of secularism and Kemalism had
“restricted Turkey’s foreign policy options and weakened Turkey’s bargaining position in
the EU bid.”1150 Two factors related to securitization that were the main foci of the
military’s involvement in politics were Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.1151 The
process of putting an end to the role of the military was one of the biggest challenges
faced by the JDP upon the initiation of the EU harmonization process.
The reforms introduced by the JDP government:
challenged the status quo under which the military had occupied a privileged
position and consolidated its hegemony over Turkey’s civilian governments.
Turkey’s EU candidacy and the subsequent emphasis on enhancing democracy
paved the way for putting pressure on the military to become more transparent
and accountable to the public.1152
The resurfacing of the military’s self-claimed role as the guard of secularism and
the other Kemalist principles, during the debates on the 2007 presidential elections led to
1149
Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, “The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, the JDP Rule and the
EU Reform Process in the 200s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DECAF),” Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2010, p.
387.
1150
Ibid, p. 388.
1151
Ibid.
1152
Ibid, p. 392.
301
the direct harsh criticism of the European Union, at a time that the Turkish-EU relations
had lost its momentum. In 2008 a case was filed against a deep state organization named
Ergenekon, which included some high-ranking military officials and had plans to
overthrow the government through a series of violent acts. This was the first time in the
history of the republic when such a clear confrontation between the government and the
military took place. The historical inability of civilian actors, especially elected officials
to “question outright the existing power structure in civil-military relations”1153 made it
almost impossible to establish civilian control over the military. The external stimulus of
the EU was utilized by the JDP government to legitimize the steps required to initiate the
transformation in the discourse of civil-military discourse in Turkey.1154
This eventual success of the JDP in gradually decreasing the role of the military in
the national politics became a major factor authenticating the role model status among the
Muslim nations, especially the Arab states in the Middle East, most of which had
authoritarian regimes or were struggling or transitional democracies. The JDP’s success
as a government with Islamist roots, in putting an end to the privileged status of the
military, which was the prerequisite for the advancement of democracy was presented as
best practice to the Muslim states.
1153
1154
Ibid, p. 400.
Ibid.
302
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: TO BE OR NOT TO BE AN EU MEMBER: THAT
IS THE RHETORICAL QUESTION
Figure 2. Map of Member States of the European Union1155
Transformation of Turkish National Identity: From Mimicking the West to Identity
Searching
The construction Turkish Republican identity was based on the mimicry of the
European identity in every aspect of social and political life. It was associated with
reforms aimed at a break with all links to the Ottoman past. The three prongs of this
process were intertwined with discourses of secularism, westernization and
modernization as the means of saving the new republic from the darkness of
1155
“Map of Members States of the European Union” accessed on July 18, 2013,
available at http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/europe_map.htm
303
underdevelopment, poverty and defeat and raising it to the level of development that the
Western states had achieved.
This dissertation offered a postcolonial critique of this new republican identity
and its discourses. It suggested that the process of Orientalist knowledge production and
the representations that emerged created a hierarchy of power relations, which stayed in
place for decades with the support of the Kemalist elite, the military and some exogenous
factors, including the contribution of the Western states.
Turkish sui generis perception of secularism constituted the most important prong
of the process of producing the new national identity and its hierarchy of power relations.
The Kemalist elites assumed power over its largely religious through extreme secularist
policies. All characteristics that mimicked Western life styles were promoted and
encouraged while the religious and traditional characteristics were disparaged. The
constructed model of ideal republican citizen was defined to be modern and all other
forms of behavior especially those that carried Islamic characteristics were disdained.
The new republican identity based on the principle of secularism became engaged
in the systematic process of Orientalization in which the conservative Muslims were
deemed as “bad citizens,” for their resistance of the Kemalist model of secular proWestern citizenship geared at raising Turkey to the level of Western states. Initially, the
development of this identity in the international arena combined elements of subliminal
resentment and admiration of the West. The resentment of having lost their imperial
status, a loss that the republic never addressed, was mixed with a deep admiration for and
hope for recognition by the Europe, as well as a desire to catch up.
304
Secularism emerged as the paramount principle of state formation. Although the
new republic defined itself to be secular and democratic, maintaining secularism held a
privileged position in relation to democratic development. The defense of secularism by
the Turkish military against popularly elected governments contributed to major setbacks
to the democratization process. The republic built a controversial legacy of practicing
authoritative secularism that was simultaneously modestly democratic if not
authoritarian.
Postcolonial Reading of the Turkish Role Model Status
Meliha Benli Altunisik, lists the arguments against the possibility of Turkey to be
considered as a model in four categories: The first is based on the premise that the
Turkish experience is unique and cannot be adapted to other cases, mainly due to its
embrace of secularism.1156 The second refers to the shortcomings of the Turkish
democracy especially with respect to the rights of the practicing Muslims and the Kurdish
population, and the third argues that Turkey’s long history of problematic relations with
the Middle East, especially the Arab world (mainly due to the its pro-western orientation)
constituted an obstacle to the acceptance of the Turkish model.1157 Finally, Turkey’s
historical ties with the West as a member of many Western international organizations as
well as its commitment to westernization make it too different than other Muslim
nations.1158 Contrary to the many who uphold the representation of Turkey as a model to
other Muslim states, like Antunisik few critics argue that this model cannot be
1156
Altunisik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” p. 46.
Ibid.
1158
Ibid.
1157
305
reproduced.1159 Despite the importance of some of her criticisms regarding the fictional
nature of and the inherent contradictions within its articulation regarding the role model
argument is still utilized by the Western states, the Kemalists and by the JDP.
The early chapters showed that the attempts by the founders of the republic to
define themselves as progressively Western were eventually used by Western states and
powers as a model for others. Turkey’s role model status argument has been utilized by
the Western states in differentiating it from the rest of the Muslim world, which would
serve the purpose of maintaining it as an ally and attempting to mold other Muslim states
into similar models that would serve the Western interests. This research has found that
the Western promoters of the Turkish model have utilized it to define their relations with
the Muslim world to a certain degree. Through their support of the Turkish Republic as a
secular democratic Muslim state, they simultaneously endorsed and authenticated it. In
this process the Western states chose to intentionally overlook the deficiencies and the
illiberal1160 nature of the Turkish democratic model.
This dissertation has argued that the presentation of Turkey as a secular and
democratic Muslim state and the overlooking all of its authoritarian tendencies shows that
the Western states had power and authority to categorize Turkey as they wish, even in the
face of conflicting evidence.
One of the underlying reasons behind the disregard for the authoritarian secularist
policies that subordinated and oppressed its Muslim characteristics was that they were
aimed at reproducing the European experience. Holding the position of defining and
1159
Ibid, p. 47.
Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1997,
Vol. 76. No. 6, p.22-43.
1160
306
categorizing their “others” enabled the Western states to promote Muslim self-definitions
that reproduced the Western experience. This position allowed them to overlook the
marginalization of Islam since they have historically believed that this marginalization
could potentially bring these societies to welcome Western values. This system of
thought is based on the Orientalist assumptions regarding the incompatibility of Islam
with Western values such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.
This Western power of representation contributed a form of control over Turkey
and the rest of the Muslim world. The categorization of Turkey as a good democratic
secular model despite all its shortcomings produced a hierarchy of power relations that
rewarded Turkey’s quest for Westernization by placing it over and above the other
Muslim nations. Turkey welcomed and benefited from this position and reproduced and
the representations that maintained it.
By claiming and accepting its role model status, Turkey agreed (until recently) to
divorce itself from the other Muslim states assuming a powerful position over them and
also bringing itself closer to the Western nations it admired and hoped to join through EU
membership. The continued sustenance of the role model status was dependent upon
Turkey’s good relations with the West, the Kemalist elites and the legitimacy of their
secularist policies that continued to subordinate its conservative Muslim population.
There was an underlying paradox in the republican embrace of its role model
status vis-à-vis other Muslim states. While the very foundation of this self-definition was
based on the obliteration of its Islamic characteristics, the republic was ironically
reinforced the very category that it sought to escape, i.e. Turkey as a “good Muslim” state
307
amongst the others.
The analysis of the republican discourse of secularism, highlighted by the military
coup d’états reflects on the fictional characteristic of the role model status. It also reflects
that both the Western states which have labeled the republic as a role model and Turkey
in its self-promotion as a good model have utilized this status to serve their own interests
and also in defining their relations with each other and the Muslim states. The role model
status has been a valuable asset in Turkey’s demands for privileged treatment by the
European Union as well as the United States. Turkey has also legitimized its secularist
policies despite the retrogression in democratic process.
The analysis of the EU membership discourse demonstrated that while Turkey
insisted on its determination to “become” European by achieving membership status, it
was also repeatedly proving the limits of Turkish secularism as the route to European
status. While Europe presented Turkish secularism as role model to the other nations in
the region, Turkey’s political system was declared to be democratically deficient by
European standards. Europe gave Turkey mixed signals by endorsing and promoting it as
a model while simultaneously criticizing its human rights record, which especially
increased after the 1980s. This showed that Europe ignored Turkish illiberalism when it
suited its own interests, reserving the right to highlight Turkish inadequacies when it
applied for EU membership.
Turkey, on the other hand, while hoped that in exchange for being a secular
Western model it would receive “special treatment” by being granted membership status,
without having to put any effort into improving its democratic credentials or bad human
308
rights record. It treated its role model status as a basis for being European enough. In this
case, Turkey is faced with criticism for its democratic deficiencies, especially its poor
human rights record, which constitutes the main political reason that prevents Turkish
membership to the European Union. This created dissonance within Turkey, which
believed the representations attached with the role model status while being trapped in
the candidacy status, unable to see the future of its membership journey. The mixed
representational message of the EU by presenting Turkey as a good model for other
Muslims to follow despite its policies that restrict human rights, while simultaneously
presenting its inadequacies as a basis for not being European enough needing to wait at
the gates of Europe, offered a good measure on the powerful position of EU in its
relations with Turkey.
The EU’s selective neglect of extremely apparent human rights violations towards
the observant Muslims, such as the headscarf ban has also added to the record of
European inconsistencies in their discussion of its relations with Turkey. The EU’s
complete silence towards the “Kavakci Ordeal” is a perfect example for this. It reflects
EU’s disregard for practices that affect Muslims, but do not reproduce European forms of
behavior. It also reemphasizes EU’s powerful position in picking and choosing the
practices that it condones or approves in the Turkish Republic.
Turkey’s application to EU membership has dealt with a serious blow to the
prominent republican perception of secularization as an equivalent of Westernization,
pressuring Turkey to come to terms with its difference from the west. Turkey’s
economic, political, and social characteristics as well as its history of authoritarianism are
factors that differentiated the Turkish Republic from EU.
309
The Dramatic Change in the Turkish National Discourse with the JDP
From the first days in office, the JDP was very vocal of their support for the EU
membership process. Unlike previous political parties that were a part of the Islamic
political discourse, the JDP took a pro-western and pro-EU membership stance. Setting
EU membership as a foreign policy priority enabled the JDP to initiate the transformation
of the existing state structure and their compatibility with the EU standards. In the
Turkish context, they were expected to lead to a dramatic progress in democratization.
The JDP used EU membership process to redefine the political system in Turkey,
particularly in the area of democratization, enabling minority representation as well as
marginalization of the political role of the military and its authoritarian legacy. One of
the most drastic changes related to the human rights issue was the initiation of the “peace
process” with Kurdish separatists. This was something unimaginable in Turkey, as the
Kurdish identity had been subordinated and marginalized from the Turkish national
identity since the first days of the republic. This lead to the PKK violence, which began
in the 1980s. Putting an end to the historical role of the military as a dominating force in
the political arena was a major accomplishment of the JDP putting an end to coup d’états
that overruled the electoral will of the public.
The long-standing political alliance between the Turkish military and the
Kemalist elites had been the major obstacles that prevented the republic from developing
its democracy. The JDP’s success in implementing the legal and social changes that were
a part of the EU harmonization process shows how this foreign policy focus had national
implications. The embrace of the EU membership process not only as a foreign policy
concern but also a national policy priority eliminated many structures and laws that short310
circuited the democratization. The changes included abolishing death penalty, increasing
safe guards against torture and mistreatment, lifting limitations to the freedom of
association, improvements in code of criminal procedure and civil code.
These changes challenged the assumption that Islam and democracy are
inherently incompatible. The underlying paradoxes and the anomalies within the
discourses of secularism and republicanism which have opened the political arena for
new groups that had been excluded like the Kurds and conservative Muslim political
actors.
As a result the Kemalists who had dominated politics and “ruled” the republic
became defenders of an authoritarian status quo while the “Islamists” became identified
with improved democratic conditions that brought the country closer to EU membership.
The fact that the economy kept on growing even during the various political crises with
the military or the global economic crisis made their success more substantial. JDP’s
increased popular support with each election reaching more than fifty percent reflected
their success in addressing the needs and demands of the society at a level higher than
any other party before them.
All of these different factors led to the destabilization of many of the Orientalist
assumptions and representations that JDP and its supporters especially the practicing and
conservative Muslims had been associated with. All of a sudden, the Orientalized others
assumed a powerful position vis-à-vis the Kemalist elite and the military with strong
popular base of support as well as direct or indirect international support in the
international arena.
311
One of the major accomplishments of the JDP was their acknowledgement of the
existence of a “Kurdish problem” and their continuing efforts to find a solution that
would terminate the state’s discriminatory policies and the violence inflicted by Kurdish
separatists. By March 2013 Abdullah Ocalan, their captured leader agreed on a cease-fire
and put an end to the violence. 1161 Even the fact that the JDP “considered” negotiating
with Ocalan, who had been labeled as a “baby-killer,” “head of terrorists,” and perceived
as the source of evil by previous secular governments for decades, in the name of putting
an end to the violence was a radical step that could not have even been imagined a decade
ago. Erdogan and the JDP approached the issue very carefully, getting civil society
involved by appointing a “committee of wise men,” representing a variety or sociopolitical, economic and religious segments of the society. This group travelled all over
Turkey to listen to, address the concerns of the people regarding the peace process, and to
present their findings to the government in a final report. This move, despite the various
criticisms (towards the people selected for the committee, the lack of a structured process
in their interactions with the people, etc.), reflected some progress achieved in the
democratization process.
Even though there are still those who strictly oppose Turkish membership in
general and those who continue to have concerns regarding the existence of a hidden
Islamist agenda, the EU officials had no choice but to deal with the democratically
elected JDP that had an interest in rejecting the anti-democratic measures favored by the
Kemalists and the military. This came as a shock to the Kemalist establishment including
the military, the media and some institutions (the Council of State and the Constitutional
1161
Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey Gives Politics a Chance,” The National Interest, April 4,
2013.
312
Court). The JDP utilized the EU membership process to initiate a democratic
transformation process in Turkey, which they put in the service of their expanded
political interest. The internalization of the EU process as a national priority, led to a
major turning point in the balance of power between major powers including the
Kemalists, the military and the Islamists and their relations with regional and
international actors.
Transformation of the Turkish Foreign Policy
The Turkish Republic had followed a Western-oriented foreign policy for the first
eighty years of its existence. The relations with its neighbors in the Middle East were
defined through their primary relations with Europe and the United States. As a result
Turkey was not very actively involved in the region except to serve the interests of its
western allies.
Following the initial rise of the JDP to power, both national and foreign policy
priorities were geared towards the EU membership process. Unlike its predecessors, JDP
was keen to simultaneously maintain good relations with the West and the East, which it
did not see to be mutually exclusive. The JDP introduced a “zero-problems with
neighbors” in its foreign policy system strengthening the existing relations as well as
building new relations with states like Armenia with which it had no diplomatic relations.
It even attempted to negotiate the future of Cyprus with the Greek Cypriot government,
through the United Nations’ Annan Plan. The JDP also took some initiatives to play an
active role in the Organization of Islamic Conference, increasing its effectiveness in the
international arena.
313
The relations with Israel is the one area in which the most dramatic changes took
place. Given its Western oriented foreign policy, Turkish relations with the Israeli state
had been on good terms and at the cost of deterioration of the relations with the Muslim
states in the Middle East. Turkey had economic and military cooperation agreements with
Israel of which the United States was highly supportive.
The case of Israel is one of the many examples that reflect the magnitude of the
transformations in Turkish foreign policy. From an international relations perspective,
Israel traditionally held a position of power in the world system as an ally of the United
States. The representations of Israel as the only democratic state in the Middle East made
it a role model for all states in that region, including Turkey, allowing it to exist at the
highest levels of power relations hierarchy. The process that was initiated by Prime
Minister Erdogan’s Davos rebuke and continued with the determination of JDP
government’s demand for an official apology from the Israeli state regarding the Mavi
Marmara flotilla incident, ended with Israel’s apology. This was a first for the Israeli state
as well as within the discourse of international relations. Turkey had the support of the
Muslim states of the Middle East in contrast to the support given to Israel by international
organizations such as the United Nations, the EU, as well as the United States. However,
the United States changed its position, and the apology was issued with President Obama
acting as a mediator.
This recent incident reflects arguments that challenge and contradict the existing
representations of Israel, and Turkey as well as their positions within the power hierarchy
of international relations. It is an extremely important step for Turkey as it breaks free
from the historic representation of subordinate, incapacitated, backward Muslim “other”
314
through its resistance of the pressures of the international community led by the United
States to contain this issue. While there are those who argue that Turkey must have
agreed to some concessions to get Israel to issue an apology, Israel’s eventual giving in to
the Turkish pressures has equalized the power relations between Turkey and Israel. It is
also important to note that during the last three-year period, both states avoided acts that
might escalate the tension to higher levels.1162 Through out the process, Turkey has
followed a diplomatic strategy balancing soft and hard power based approaches. The
successful restoration of relations will be put to test upon Erdogan’s visit to Gaza and the
West bank that is planned to take place in the second half of 2013.
Kilic Kanat summarized the characteristics of the dramatic transformation of
Turkish foreign policy in three sections: First, there is the placement of the Middle East
back on the Turkish foreign policy agenda through a policy of engagement and deepening
economic partnerships.1163 Second is the initiation of the new projects in previously
overlooked regions including Africa and Latin America and finally the dramatic change
in the decision making process due to the increased public interest in foreign policy
issues as well as an overall civilianization of Turkish foreign policy1164 through the
elimination of military influence on politics. Based on these changes Kanat concludes
“these developments have redefined Turkish foreign policy and positioned Turkey as a
major player in regional and global affairs.”1165 While the arguments regarding the
possibility of a shift of axis from west-oriented foreign policy towards an east/Muslim1162
Kirisci, “Turkey Gives Politics a Chance.”
Kilic Kanat, “Drivers of Foreign Policy Change in the AK Party Decade,” SETA DC
Perspective, Kadir Ustun, ed., May 2013, p. 4.
1164
Ibid.
1165
Ibid.
1163
315
oriented foreign policy still exist, these arguments demonstrate that JDP has introduced a
foreign policy perspective focused on Turkish interests.
Revisiting the Turkish Model in the post-Arab Awakening Period
In the West, the classic image of Turkey has long been misleading: a secular
country, a democracy, an unshakeable friend of the United States, a nation whose
strategic outlook conforms with U.S. interests in the region ... a model to all
Muslims. During the past 50 years, most of these descriptions have not
corresponded to reality, presenting mainly a comforting but unexamined myth. If
the Western version of Turkey’s past is a myth, however, the good news is that
today’s Turkey, based on the remarkable realities of its evolution during recent
years, is in fact now becoming a genuine model that finally offers a degree of
genuine appeal to the region. 1166
Graham Fuller, in his 2004 article discussing the myths and realities of Turkey’s
strategic model,1167 states that the classical image of Turkey as a secular and democratic
ally of the United States and a model to Muslims which has been prevalent over the last
50 years in the West, were a myth. He also argues that the transformation of the Turkish
Republic over the last few years has brought it closer to becoming a real “good model”
for the region.1168 The new model was based on substantial democratization and
willingness to simultaneously act as a Western and Eastern power.1169 Arguments similar
to Fuller’s have become more prevalent after the period of Arab uprising. Erdogan took
advantage of these arguments as well as his increasing popularity in the region especially
after the “One Minute” incident and his response to the flotilla incident, to promote
Turkey as a model for the region and to transform the entrenched perception of extreme
secularism in Turkey.
1166
Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,” p. 51.
Ibid.
1168
Ibid.
1169
Ibid.
1167
316
Once the JDP put the EU harmonization process on track, it began to focus on the
Middle East, presenting itself as a role model for Muslims to follow. The initial plans to
establish a policy of “zero problems with neighbors” needed to be revised after the period
of Arab revolutions erupted in the Middle East. As some of the dictatorships were being
dissolved one after another and the process of establishing transitional democracies
began, the JDP reintroduced the role model argument.
Erdogan promoted the Turkish model as a secular democratic state with a Muslim
population during his visits to Egypt and Tunisia, where he was received with a fanfare.
It was interesting that Erdogan was promoting secularism during an international visit.
When asked about the negative effects of the extreme secularist practices of previous
administrations in the light of the promotion of secularism to the new Arab democracies,
Erdogan said that he referred to a more liberal form of secularism as defined in the
official JDP Party Program. This was a part of Erdogan’s attempt to redefine secularism
in a way that distanced Turkey from the French model and was closer to the American
model. His promotion of this new representation of secularism while in the Middle East
was giving a message to the West, who had originated and buttressed the role model
argument, to support this new definition of secularism, which would enable him to
legitimize his regime against an inevitable Kemalist backlash. This was another example
of the practice of utilization of foreign policy issues to initiate internal transformations.
The post-Arab spring presentation of Turkey as a model was much different than
the historical model that had been previously promoted. The JDP promoted itself as a
model of what Islamists can do when they assume power, especially how they can pave
the way for democratization. Unlike the previous model, which was full of contradictions
317
that oscillated between westernization, democratization, modernization and secular
extremism, the redefined model was about the process of an Islamist government coming
to power through free elections and the extent to which they could be trusted to deliver
democracy.
The Turkish experience under the JDP went “beyond demonstrating the
compatibility of Islam and democracy,”1170 demonstrating how “Islamist movements can
be moderated through democracy.”1171 This reflected the transformations of the Islamic
political discourse and how it led to the significant changes in the Turkish society as well
as the international arena. The discourses of modernization, secularization, westernization
and democratization have been greatly changed. Many of their entrenched Orientalist
assumptions were weakened or replaced with ones that questioned their binary
oppositions, such that the Oriental “other” had initiated a process of self-transformation,
which led to changes in the internal and international political discourse. The “other” was
able to improve its economy, push for democracy and adopt the western values, without
sacrificing the basic elements of its Muslim identity.
In addition to the democratic piece, this model had an important economic
component of a development model in which people were interested. During the time
period that started with the JDP’s taking office in 2002, it managed to navigate through
the various interval economic crises and those erupting all over the world. JDP was
successful in maintaining economic stability during the global financial crisis of 2008
which hit the United States very hard as well as the EU. As of April 2013, many EU
members such as France, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus have needed financial
1170
1171
Altunisik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,” p. 56.
Ibid.
318
bailouts and continue to deal with record high unemployment rates, which worsen the
already deteriorating economic conditions in the region.1172 In the meanwhile, the
Turkish economy became the seventeenth largest in the world,1173 and Turkey managed
to pay off the debt it owed to IMF, which had accumulated over the last five decades. The
EU standards require the maintenance of public debt below sixty percent of the GDP, to
which most of the members have not adhered. In contrast, Turkey has managed to lower
its own to thirty six percent as of May 2013.1174
Setting the economic piece aside, this new version of the role model status
remains problematic, especially with respect to its reflections on the power relations. The
validity of the role model status is dependent on maintaining good relations with the
west, which in return provides privileged access. A state that is considered as a role
model by default cannot be considered as an equal to the ones to whom it is supposed to
constitute a model. Turkey’s taking on of the position of leadership requires its isolation
from the rest of the Muslim states. In other words, both the role model and leadership
statuses are based on the assumption that the followers of the model are not equals. Prime
Minister Erdogan’s claim that Turkey can be a role model for the new democracies in the
Middle East, because they share similar values ignores the inequalities suggested by the
role model status, which may contribute to different interests.
1172
Alex Lantier, “Europe’s Economic Crisis: Unemployment Hits Record Highs in
Spain, France,” Global Research, April 26, 2013. Accessed o May 21, 2013, available at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/europes-economic-crisis-unemployment-hits-record-highsin-spain-france/5333053
1173
Turan Kayaoglu, “Turkey: Not a Leader for Democracy in the Middle East,”
Brookings Institute, May 19, 2012. Accessed on May 21, 2013, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/19-turkey-democracy-kayaoglu
1174
“Turkey Terminates Decades of IMF debt,” Herald Sun, May 15, 2013, accessed on
May 21, 2013, available at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/turkeyterminates-decades-of-imf-debt/story-e6frf7k6-1226642595394
319
Having said that, the change in the Turkish foreign policy discourse that involves
being more active in the region and continuing efforts to “lead by example,”1175 provide a
“source of inspiration.”1176 Turkey had not played such an active role in the Middle East
since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.1177 A 2011 survey on the “Perception of Turkey in
the Middle East” found that 78 percent of the respondents found Turkey to be the most
favorable country in the world, 77 percent picked Turkey to be the country that
contributed most to the peace process, 71 percent wanted Turkey to play a bigger role in
the Middle East, 61 percent agreed that Turkey is a model for the region and finally
Turkey was expected to become the regions strongest economy in the next ten years.1178
When asked why Turkey can be perceived a model, democracy came out as the first
choice, followed by economy, Muslim background, secular political system and its
strategic value.1179 The 2012 version of the same survey came out with similar findings,
however with slightly lower percentages.1180 In the 2012 survey, the reasons for the
respondents’ choice of Turkey as a model was slightly different with economy in the first
place, followed by democracy, secular political system, Muslim background and its
strategic value. This could be interpreted as a demonstration of the presence of skepticism
1175
Nilgun Arisan Eralp, “The Possibility of a Transformational Partnership Between
Turkey and the EU: Will the “Opportunity” Become Reality?” in Europe, Turkey and the
Mediterranean: Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening Relations, Armando Garcia
Schmidt and Joachim Frits-Vannahme, eds, (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012), p.
16.
1176
Sinan Ulgen, “A Faster, Better Route to Economic Integration Across The
Mediterranean,” Brussels: Carnegie International Economic Bulletin, October 13, 2011,
p. 1.
1177
Daniel Dombey, “Turkish Diplomacy: An Attentive Neighbor,” Financial Times,
February 26, 2012.
1178
Mansur Akgun and Sabiha Senyucel Gundogar, “The Perceptions of Turkey in the
Middle East 2011,” (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2011), p. 6.
1179
Ibid, p. 21.
1180
Ibid, p. 6.
320
about Turkish democracy after the Arab spring.
Mustafa Akyol asserts that Turkey had been perceived as a “lost cause” by Arab
states for decades, for having abandoned its faith and civilization and therefore did not
constitute a good example of the “compatibility of Islam and modernity.”1181 Based on
the survey results and articles on the subject it is safe to state that Turkish popularity in
the region has increased and that the JDP model has been taken into consideration as a
good example by some groups in the region. Fuat Keyman suggests that “Turkey’s
dynamic economy, deepening entrepreneurial culture and secular democracy can indeed
serve as a model or ‘locus of aspiration’ for the Arab Spring” and adds that in case
Turkey and EU cooperate in their approach to the region “Turkey’s ability and capacity
to play its expected roles would be immensely increased.”1182
Future of the Role Model Status
The fictive nature of the role model status of Turkey and its utilization to serve
the respective interests of different parties involved in the debate was one finding that
was not hypothesized at the beginning of this dissertation. The various arguments related
to the possibility of the role model myth of becoming reality is a finding that is worth
debating. Whether Turkey truly can serve as a model or has the potential to serve as a
good example for other Muslim countries is, in my opinion, a rhetorical question. The
more important issue is how Turkey, under the JDP had managed to use the role model
1181
Mustafa Akyol, “Turkey’s Liberal Islam and How It Came to Be,” Turkish Policy
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2008, p. 86.
1182
Fuat Keyman, “Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Concflicts,” in
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean: Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening
Relations, Armando Garcia Schmidt and Joachim Frits-Vannahme, eds, (Gutersloh:
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012), p. 49.
321
status discourse as a means to change and alter the global discourse of Orientalism.
The JDP’s success in utilization of the EU process to initiate internal
transformation in Turkey is clear. The termination of decades long authoritarian
mindsets, the political marginalization of the military in politics, putting an end Kemalist
domination of political and social life, managing to steer the country through regional and
global financial crisis, transforming it into one of the important players in the global
economic stage as well as showing that values such as democracy, rule of law and respect
for human rights can be integrated into the Muslim identity are among the
accomplishments that can be mentioned. The JDP’s self-confidence against the many
challenges that were faced in the early days in office could be traced to the support it
received from the Turkish population and explains its economic and political success.
As part of the postcolonial analysis of the various actors involved in the Turkish
EU membership debate, in contrast to the Orientalized Muslim, the charismatic
leadership of Erdogan offered an alternative understanding of Muslim leaders. Erdogan
was a self-confident consrvative and strong leader who did not internalize the
representations related to the inferiority of the religion and the culture. For his supporters
he was a good example of a conservative practicing Muslim who had been represented as
backward and incapable of being successful or being prime minister. While many of his
critics were concerned about the hidden agenda of Islamism, which he was assumed to
share as well as being compared to various dictators in the region, the role he played in
the Turkish democratic transition cannot be denied.
Mustafa Akyol agrees with the liberal criticism of the JDP for becoming
322
increasingly authoritarian and adds:
The real problem lies in not the “Islamism” of the AKP, but its “Turkishness” –
i.e., the problems that it inherited from Turkey’s political culture: an overpowerful leader, a love affair with conspiracy theories, an obsession with “honor”
that limits freedom of speech and a concept of “terrorism” that criminalizes even
ideas. These are the standard troubles that Turkish governments, let them be
Kemalist or center-right, have displayed for many decades. The AKP is only
proving that it too is not free from these negative Ankara traditions.1183
If the JDP is not much different from other political parties in Turkey, then the
discussion of its limitations is no longer hostage of the Orientalist disourse. Like other
parties, the JDP reflects the traces of the Turkish patriarchic tradition in the low rates of
female representation in the parliament as well as within the party administration.
Although 45 of the 78 female parliamentarians in the 550-seat parliament elected in 2011
are from the JDP, which won a total of 327 seats, this low percentage is in conformity
with the patriarchal political tradition of the republic. In addition, the constant
postponement of and the delayed partial resolution to the headscarf issue, is also
consistent with the same patriarchal tradition.
On the other hand, Erdogan’s Western educated headscarved daughter Sumeyye
Erdogan, accompanies him (as the Advisor to the General Secretary to the Justice and
Development Party) in most of his international visits which might be considered as a
means of making the headscarf more visibly acceptable in this rarified public arena. In
his May 2013 visit to Washington DC, both of Erdogan’s daughters accompanied their
parents during the meetings with President Obama and Mrs. Obama. They were also with
1183
Mustafa Akyol, “AKP Is Too Turkish- Not Too Islamic,” Hurriyet Daily News,
February 1, 2012. Accessed on May 22, 2013, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-is-too-turkish--not-too-islamic.aspx?pageID=449&nID=12724&NewsCatID=411
323
him during his public address at Brookings Institute. This was a symbolic inroad within
the classical republican representations of Islamist governments. During the 90-year
history of the republic, it was only until a few years ago that a spouse wearing a headscarf
could be accepted at the Turkish presidential palace. In 2013 they were welcome at the
presidential residences both in Turkey and the United States.
Figure 3. “We have increased Turkey’s prestige in 10 years”
Bilboard posted by JDP Office, Elmali District, Antalya 1184
A billboard displayed by one of the JDP offices in Antalya displays two very
famous pictures of Turkish prime minister and the president of the United States at two
different times. The first photograph is from the 2000 visit of Prime Minister Ecevit with
1184
“Mahkeme AK Parti Afisi Icin Kararini Verdi,” Yurt Haber, May 26, 2011, accessed
on May 22, 2013, available at http://yurthaber.mynet.com/detay/antalyahaberleri/mahkeme-ak-parti-afisi-icin-kararini-verdi/7386
324
President Clinton, in which Clinton looks very relaxed, leaning on the back of the couch,
while Ecevit looks as if he is distressed and assuming a respectful posture. The second
photograph is one with Prime Minister Erdogan and President Obama, in which Erdogan
looks as if he is being emphatic in a serious exchange with President Obama. The
romanticized image of Erdogan as a man of courage who can stand up against the super
powers of the West and will not allow his country to be pushed around was among the
factors that increased level of public confidence in the JDP. Erdogan, who had grown up
in a middle-income family in one of the poorer districts in Istanbul, sold simit, played
professional soccer, attended a religious high school was an overall ordinary man who
was also a devout conservative Muslim. His success in rising up the ladder of politics,
becoming mayor of Istanbul and then prime minister was an inspirational example for
many other Muslims who were not used to witnessing the success stories of people who
shared similar values and positions in life. Erdogan seemed like a person of the people
whose increasing self-confidence allowed him and his supporters to overcome the
devaluing effects of Orientalization.
Future of Relations with the EU
The JDP government utilized the EU process as a means for addressing the issue
of balancing relations between (1) the East and the West and (2) the national and the
international. While the EU deals with its own set of crises related to its finances and its
future, the uncertainty of the future of Turkish-EU relations has increased.
The JDP has made it clear that they have internalized the European standards as
their own and will continue to implement them whether it eventually leads to
325
membership or not. Erdogan’s analogy of renaming the Copenhagen Criteria as Ankara
Criteria fits perfectly with this argument. In a recent interview Deputy Prime Minister Ali
Babacan who formerly held the position of EU negotiator, stated that when he first
assumed the position of chief negotiator, the question was “When Turkey will be ready
for Europe,” and in the present the question is “When will Europe be ready for
Turkey.”1185 He added that EU which stands out as a European peace project would
become a global peace project when Turkey joins as a member.1186
As Europe tries to make decisions about its own future, there are a number of
scenarios that have been suggested regarding the future of Turkish membership issue.
While some argue that it would be very challenging for Turkey to overcome its “bad luck
in the EU membership process,”1187 Minister of Economy Zafer Caglayan suggested that
Turkey might consider withdrawing from the customs union because of the agreement
conditions that come at a high cost for Turkey (Based on the customs union agreement,
the non-EU member states with which EU has a free trade agreement are exempt from
customs taxes when selling goods to Turkey, while Turkey has to pay excessive taxes and
fees while trading with these third parties).1188 Former Turkish Economy Minister Kemal
Dervis, argued that Turkey could adopt a model similar to the British model and become
an EU member while opting out of the Eurozone,1189 giving it greater financial
1185
Ali Babacan, Interview, Charlie Rose, April 29, 2013.
Ibid.
1187
Bulent Keles, “Can Turkey Overcome Bad Luck in EU Membership Process?”
Todays Zaman, April 23, 2013, accessed on May 22, 2013, available at
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-313495-can-turkey-overcome-its-bad-luck-ineu-membership-process.html
1188
Sefer Levent, “Turkiye Gumruk Birligi’nden Cikacak mi,” Hurriyet, March 28, 2013.
1189
“EU to Have Two Types of Memberships: Scholar,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 6,
2013, accessed on May 22, 2013, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-to1186
326
maneuverability. The EU Minister Egemen Bagis suggested that Turkey perceived EU
like a dietician and followed its prescription to become more healthy, despite the fact that
the dietician was also overweight, adding that Turkey would continue to adopt new EU
standards whether it is admitted or not.1190
Throughout the EU Turkish membership journey, the latter was perceived as a
definite financial burden on the EU in addition to concerns regarding its “cultural”
difference, which was based on its representation as the Muslim “other.” Because of the
ongoing economic crisis in the EU, Turkey has begun to perceive its relations with the
EU vis-à-vis the customs union as a financial burden. The representation of the EU as
well as many of the European states as stable and strong economies has lost its validity,
just like the representation of Turkey, as a poor and unstable economy is no longer true
now.
The EU discourse on Turkey resembled an unequal struggle between a cat and
mouse over the JDP decade. The change in the representations within the discourse will
lead to a dramatic transformation in the power relations between the parties involved. The
JDP’s perception of the EU membership process not as an end but as a means for making
Turkish democracy stronger has had important effects. Minister Bagis’ presentation of
the Norwegian example,1191 which adopts EU’s new regulations even though it is not an
have-two-types-of-membershipsscholar.aspx?pageID=238&nID=40637&NewsCatID=344
1190
“Bagis, SETA-DC ve GMF Panelinde Konustu,” Zaman, April 25, 2013, accessed on
May 22, 2013, available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_bagis-seta-dc-ve-gmfpanelinde-konustu_2082442.html
1191
Egemen Bagis, “Turkey and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance,” Conference,
SETA Foundation and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, April 24, 2013,
Washington, DC.
327
EU member, suggests that Turkey might also consider using the EU as a free consultant
without having to deal with the economic burdens of membership as well as the
Orientalist baggage. One might argue that this might invite attacks from the Turkish
secularists as endangering the Western identity of Turkey. However, considering the
increasing economic problems in the EU and increasing nationalist and anti-EU approach
amongst the Kemalist elite they are not likely to gain public support regarding this
argument. In the meanwhile, both the JDP and the EU will continue to be critical of each
other and continue to utilize their bickering for their own political gains.
Contribution to the Postcolonial Enterprise
Postcolonial theory has contributed significantly to the examination of the
dominant representations as the source of hierarchies of power relations both internal and
external to the Turkish Republic, its dominant culture and history. This dissertation
offered a postcolonial reading of the “role model status” as an orientalist construction.
The fictional character of this representation of secular Turkey as a model defined its
relations with both the East and the West. It was used both by Turkey and the EU in ways
that were old as well as new.
The authoritarian history and legacy of this concept was central to the Turkish
process of EU membership application. At the same time, membership in the EU was
used by the JDP to disprove claims about its anti-democratic credentials creating a
political space for itself and deepening Turkish democracy. It helped the JDP maintain its
legitimacy, gradually allowing it to assume a powerful position in Turkish national
politics. Conversely, the EU used Turkish membership to emphasize the shortcomings of
328
this role model state as a Muslim country. The democratic shortcomings of secular
Turkey showed once again how the Orient and the Occident were essentially different
because even their most progressive of the former was nevertheless anti-democratic.
The JDP addressed the authoritarian legacy of the Kemalist establishment and the
military, and pushed for democracy in a way no other government before it did. Its
utilization of the EU membership process as a tool in pushing for this democratization
and its success in transforming Turkish economy into one of the most stable in the region
have to be recognized and credited. However, Turkey still has a long way to go in the
democratization process as the Turkish society is still learning to deal with the electoral
majority minority divide.
Future of the Role Model Status (Post-Gezi Parki Protests)
At the end of May 2013, a protest that started out as an environmental rally turned
into a days-long demonstration against Erdogan and some of the JDP’s new policies such
as the restriction of the sale of alcohol after 10 pm as well as the ongoing Ergenekon case
under which many journalists were also imprisoned. The use of excessive force by the
police caused the demonstrations to spread all over the country with the increase in the
number of people who demanded Erdogan to resign on the basis of his authoritarian
tendencies. While Erdogan insisted that a government that was elected by the majority of
the people could not be called “authoritarian,” he argued that except for the few people
with true environmental concerns, the protest was a production of the local and global
interest lobbyists who were not happy with the economic progress in Turkey. He
emphasized that the protest was also supported by people who were not happy with the
overall democratic progress and the fact that issues as challenging as lifting the
329
discriminatory policies towards the Kurdish population were actually being resolved.
The western reactions to the incident were mostly in support of the protesters,
highlighting the deficiencies of the Turkish democratic model. The international media,
from the outset immediately conceptualized the protests within a framework of
“secularists versus Islamists,” even though the protesters included people from both
sides.1192 An article in the Foreign Policy served as a basis for the argument that Turkey
had become “the textbook case of a hollow democracy”1193 under the JDP. It stated that
while Turkey was presented as an “excellent model”1194 and “model partner,”1195 the JDP
was ironically “building an illiberal system just as Washington was holding up Turkey as
a model for the post-uprising states of the Arab world.”1196 The United States had
continued to utilize the role model status and the possibility of partnering up with Turkey
in accordance with the US interests in states like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.1197
Accordingly, although Turkey had become the 17th-largest economy in the world, an
influential actor in the Middle East, and a trusted interlocutor, it did not have much to
offer the Arab world due to its increasingly “authoritarian” government.1198 It was
suggested that the United States to urge the JDP to listen to the demands of the citizens,
1192
Nilufer Gole, “Gezi: Anatomy of Public Square Movement,” Todays Zaman, June7,
2013.
1193
Steven A. Cook and Michael Koplow, “How Democratic is Turkey,” Foreign Policy,
June 2, 2013.
1194
Laura Peterson, “The Pentagon Talks Turkey,” The American Prospect, September 5,
2002 [Referenced by Cook and Koplow, “How Democratic is Turkey.”]
1195
Pelin Turgut, “Can Obama Keep Eastward-Looking Turkey On Side?,” Time,
December 7, 2009. [referenced by Cook and Koplow, “How Democratic is Turkey.”]
1196
Cook and Koplow, “How Democratic is Turkey.”
1197
Ibid.
1198
Ibid.
330
as it does to the Arab governments.1199
Mark LeVine argued that if issues that were protested were not resolved, this
could lead to “the complete discrediting of the ‘Turkish model’” for the Islamist parties in
the post-revolution Arab world.1200 In addition, even though the Turkish case cold not be
a model because of its shortcomings, in the first place, it had been recognized as such and
could be saved if the JDP government listened to the demands of the protesters.1201
Another article in the Economist compared Erdogan to a sultan, highlighting his
religiosity, arguing that his party was “far from being a model of Islamic democracy…”
and “might expose the concept as oxymoron.”1202 Erdogan was portrayed as a potential
authoritarian leader, while describing President Abdullah Gul as a good democratic
leader, with the emphasis that “the problem is not Islam it is Mr. Erdogan.” 1203
These articles and numerous similar ones, which were published in national and
international media as well as the messages that were disseminated throughout the
various social media outlets offered representations that adhered to clear orientalist
assumptions about Erdogan, JDP and the Turkish society in general. While presenting the
issue as a polarization between the Islamists and secularists, which is far from the truth,
the articles presented Erdogan as the “bad Islamist” and in addition some presented Gul
1199
Ibid.
Mark Levine, “So Much For the Turkish Model?,” AlJazeera.com, June 3, 2013,
accessed on June 4, 2013, available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136318303398554.html
1201
Ibid.
1202
“Turkey’s Troubles: Democrat or Sultan?” The Economist, June 8, 2013, accessed on
June 9, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-receptayyip-erdogan-should-heed-turkeys-street-protesters-not-dismiss-them-democrat-orsultan?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/democrat_or_sultan_
1203
Ibid.
1200
331
as the “good Islamist” who can be tolerated by the secularists because he was willing to
go along with them.
The very charismatic leadership and tough style of Erdogan, which caused his
party to win greater victories with each election, were now presented as signs of his
authoritarian attitude, which Turkey should not tolerate . Although Mr. Erdogan offered
to meet with the representatives of the protestors after the weeklong protests, which got
violent at times, his search for reconciliation did not receive much attention from the
international media. In the meanwhile the United States and the European Union
repeatedly expressed concern for the rights and demands of the protestors and the
demands of the JDP supporters for reestablishing social and political stability did not
receive much recognition.
Turkish secularists have been discussing the concepts of “tyranny of the majority”
and “civilian dictatorship” ever since the JDP emerged as a major political power and
achieved parliamentary majority. Before the JDP came into power, and the Islamist
political parties were in the minority, the rhetoric regarding them was based on the
argument that they were a minority and their demands for religious freedoms like lifting
the headscarf ban were not put on the political agenda since they did not represent the
majority. Furthermore, it was argued that issues as such required societal consensus.
Upon the growing popularity of the JDP, the rhetoric changed in a way that
prioritized the rights and demands of the minority while simultaneously introducing the
rhetoric of “civilian dictatorship.” With the Taksim protests the representation of Erdogan
as the man who took Turkey furthest in the EU membership process, drastically improved
332
Turkish democracy, came closest to resolving the decades long Kurdish problem, paid off
the debt to the IMF, and managed to steer the Turkish economy through the global crises
with almost no damage, all of a sudden were replaced by representations of him as a
fascist dictator who wanted to bring Islamic rule to Turkey. The international medias’
self-conflicting claims that Erdogan wanted to Islamize the country and their promoting
of Abdullah Gul as the more moderate Islamist and therefore the lesser evil, demonstrates
the Orientalist character of these arguments. One cannot help but wonder whether similar
attention and sympathy would emerge if the protest had been on an issue related to
religious rights against a secularist majority government. The continued valuation of the
West and what it stands for and the devaluation of what Islam stands for suggests that
despite the many changes that had taken place in Turkey in the last decade, the
intellectual and political hierarchies of power associated with the main contenders for
power (secular and Islamists) has not. This, in turn, has implications for Turkey’s
application to EU membership.
333
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