See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359400877
Make It Great Again: The Relationship Between Populist Attitudes and
Nostalgia
Article in Political Psychology · March 2022
DOI: 10.1111/pops.12825
CITATIONS
READS
0
148
5 authors, including:
Jan Willem van Prooijen
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
157 PUBLICATIONS 4,401 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Europe Continent of Conspiracies: Conspiracy Theories in and about Europe View project
Power instability and the conspiracy beliefs of narcissistic leaders. View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Jan Willem van Prooijen on 22 March 2022.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
1
Make it Great Again:
The Relationship Between Populist Attitudes and Nostalgia
Jan-Willem van Prooijen1,2,3, Sabine Rosema1, Axel Chemke-Dreyfus1, Konstantina Trikaliti1,
and Rita Hormigo1
1
VU Amsterdam, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology
2
The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR)
3
Maastricht University, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology
In Press
Political Psychology
Correspondence to Jan-Willem van Prooijen, VU Amsterdam, Department of Experimental
and Applied Psychology, van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Email: j.w.van.prooijen@vu.nl
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
2
Abstract
Populist movements typically endorse a pessimistic view that blames the “elites” for societal
problems. Why is this populist worldview so appealing to many citizens? We propose that
populism is associated with nostalgia: A bittersweet feeling defined as a sentimental longing
for a better past. We tested this idea in three preregistered studies. Study 1 revealed that both
personal and collective nostalgia (i.e., referring to either personal memories, or a shared
national history) were associated with populist attitudes. Moreover, the nostalgia measures
mediated a link between collective angst and populist attitudes. Studies 2 and 3, then, were
experiments designed to investigate the causal order between nostalgia and populist attitudes.
In Study 2, a manipulation of nostalgia could not establish a causal effect on populist
attitudes; however, a measure of nostalgia was again correlated with populist attitudes. In
Study 3, we tested the reverse causal order by exposing participants to either a populist or
pluralist speech. Results revealed that exposure to the populist speech increased both personal
and collective nostalgia. In all studies, these effects emerged independent of political
orientation. Apparently, feelings of nostalgia are closely associated with populist attitudes,
and may help explain why citizens find a populist worldview appealing.
Keywords: Populism; Personal nostalgia; Collective nostalgia; Political ideology; Collective
angst
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
3
Make it Great Again:
The Relationship Between Populist Attitudes and Nostalgia
Populist movements around the world have had remarkable electoral success in the
past decade. This includes the Trump presidency in the US, the election of Bolsonaro in
Brazil, the “leave”-vote in the Brexit referendum, and the widespread national support for
various EU populist movements (e.g., Italy’s Five-star movement; Hungary’s Fidesz;
Greece’s Syriza). These societal developments have placed the question of what drives
citizens’ populist attitudes high on the agenda of political psychologists. A common definition
is that populism is a worldview (Müller, 2016) or communication style (Jagers & Walgrave,
2007) that portrays society as a continuous struggle between the “corrupt elites” versus the
“noble people” (Mudde, 2004). As such, two key elements of populist attitudes are antielitism (i.e., a deep-rooted distrust towards powerful elites in society) and people-centrism
(i.e., a focus on ordinary, hard-working citizens, who are conceived of as a homogeneous
group that is represented by populist leaders). The current research was designed to make a
novel contribution by investigating a psychological factor that may be part of the appeal of a
populist worldview: Feelings of nostalgia.
Populism has been described as a “thin-layered” or “hollow” ideology that can be
applied to both left- and right-wing political beliefs, and indeed, populist movements exist
across the political spectrum (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2017). Nevertheless, populism may manifest itself differently depending on the ideology to
which it is attached. For instance, right-wing populist movements are characterized by
stronger nationalist and xenophobic sentiments, and emphasize strict anti-immigration
policies (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019), while left-wing populist movements place a relatively
heavy premium on income equality (Akkerman, Zaslove, & Spruyt, 2017). Moreover,
“authoritarian populism” is more common at the political right than at the left, and refers to
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
4
enforcing populist goals – that is, opposing the “elites” and increasing homogeneity among
“the people” – through coercion (Morelock, 2018). These important differences
notwithstanding, the broad and overarching construct populism is defined by anti-elitism and
people-centrism, which may occur across the political spectrum (see also Mudde, 2004).
Previous research has established that populist attitudes are intimately related with
negative feelings and emotions. For instance, there is a bidirectional link between
political discontent and populist attitudes, such that political discontent increases populist
attitudes, but also, populist rhetoric fuels feelings of political discontent (Rooduijn, van der
Brug, & De Lange, 2016). Moreover, support for populist movements is associated with
conspiracy beliefs (Erisen, Guidi, Martini, Toprakkiran, Isernia, & Littvay, 2021; Blinded),
protest attitudes (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013), disagreeableness (Bakker, Schumacher, &
Rooduijn, 2021), and ontological insecurity, that is, feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, and fear
(Kinnvall, 2018). Such emphasis on the negative feelings associated with populist attitudes
does not address an important question, however: What makes the bleak rhetoric of populist
movements so attractive among citizens? Part of the answer may be that populist rhetoric –
using emotional language – often draws a comparison between a currently corrupt political
system with a much better, glorious past. Indeed, populist leaders often promise a return to
that glorious past as a solution for the societal problems that they observe (e.g., Trump’s
“Make America great again”; Farage’s “We want our country back”). Such idealizations of
history may increase the appeal of populist movements through feelings of nostalgia, defined
as a sentimental longing for a better past (Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008;
Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). In the current contribution, we examine the
relationship between feelings of nostalgia and populist attitudes.
Nostalgia and Populist Attitudes
Nostalgia is a bittersweet feeling that includes both negative and positive emotions.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
5
While early conceptualizations mainly emphasized the negative aspects of nostalgia and
equated it with for instance depression, homesickness, or feelings of loss, more recent
research underscores that the psychological benefits of nostalgia outweigh its drawbacks. In
particular, nostalgia is associated with increased positive affect, self-esteem, feelings of
belonging, and a sense of meaning in life (for overviews, see Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut
et al., 2006). Accordingly, nostalgia buffers against a range of threats to psychological
functioning. For instance, feelings of nostalgia protect people’s well-being following meaning
threats (Routledge et al., 2011), and help people cope with loneliness by increasing the social
support that they perceive (Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao, 2008). Also, nostalgia
alleviates feelings of collective guilt for the historical wrongdoings that one’s nation has
committed (Baldwin, White, & Sullivan, 2018).
People can experience nostalgia at various levels of analysis, notably personal and
collective nostalgia (Wildschut, Bruder, Robertson, Tilburg, & Sedikides, 2014; see also
Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015). Personal nostalgia refers to people’s individual
past, and may include memories pertaining to for instance family, friends, music, school, and
TV programs. Collective nostalgia, in contrast, refers to the shared past of a group that people
connect their identity to (e.g., one’s country), and may include memories of glorious moments
in a group’s history, or a generalized feeling that the group was better in the past. Personal
nostalgia is tied mostly to individual-level emotions and outcomes, and collective nostalgia is
tied mostly to group-level emotions and outcomes. Particularly collective nostalgia therefore
has been associated with political attitudes. For instance, feelings of collective angst – a
collective emotion in response to the perception that one’s ingroup is under threat – is
associated with increased collective nostalgia. Such collective nostalgia, in turn, predicts
rejection of immigrants, as people’s sentimental longing for a glorious national history
emphasizes differences with immigrants who were not part of this history (Smeekes et al.,
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
6
2018). Qualitative studies further support the link between collective nostalgia and rejection
of immigrants (Mols & Jetten, 2014).
More generally, nostalgia has been associated with support for right-wing political
movements. For instance, it has been noted that conservatives have a stronger emphasis on
tradition (Jost, 2017), and focus more on the past (Baldwin & Lammers, 2016), than liberals.
Moreover, writing about one’s autobiographical memories makes people more politically
conservative (Lammers & Proulx, 2013), and collective nostalgia is associated with support
for right-wing populist movements (although the shape of this relationship depends on how
the collective past is described; Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). While we do not dispute a link
between right-wing political orientation and nostalgia, recall that the key features of populism
– anti-elitism and people-centrism – occur across the political spectrum, as evidenced by
many left- and right-wing populist movements (Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde & Zaslove,
2017). An exclusive focus on the link between nostalgia and right-wing political movements
therefore leaves the question whether or not nostalgia is associated with populist attitudes
unanswered. After all, establishing a relationship between nostalgia and support for rightwing populist movements does not clarify whether this relationship is attributable to the rightwing ideology of these movements, their populist worldview, or both.
In the present research, we propose that nostalgia is uniquely associated with populist
attitudes above and beyond the effects of right-wing political orientation. Populist movements
across the spectrum blame societal elites for the wrongs that they perceive in current society
(e.g., Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016), implying an assumption that elites have ruined the present
as compared with a better past. As a case in point, a content analysis of the speeches of the
Spanish left-wing populist party Podemos revealed highly nationalistic rhetoric that
frequently appealed to a glorious past, which supposedly has been lost due to the actions of
political elites (Custodi, 2021). Accordingly, societal pessimism is strongest among right-
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
7
wing populist movements, but closely followed by left-wing populist movements
(Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). Other studies reveal that as compared with moderates,
people at both the radical right and left are more anxious about the future of their society
(BLINDED) and express more anger due to feelings of threat (Frimer, Brandt, Melton, &
Motyl, 2019). Given the potential of nostalgia to help people cope with such perceived threats
(Routledge et al., 2011; Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006), it stands to reason that
across the political spectrum, populist attitudes are associated with nostalgia.
Research overview
In three studies, we assessed the relationship between nostalgia and populist attitudes.
The studies examined both personal and collective nostalgia. Study 1 had a cross-sectional
design to provide first evidence for a relationship between populist attitudes and nostalgia.
Studies 2 and 3, then, were experiments to test the causal relationship between populism and
nostalgia. Study 2 manipulated personal and collective nostalgia using a procedure validated
in previous research (Wildschut et al., 2006, 2014) and tested its effect on populist attitudes.
Study 3, then, manipulated whether participants were exposed to a populist or a pluralist
speech, and tested its effect on personal and collective nostalgia. To test the unique
relationship of populist attitudes with nostalgia, all studies statistically controlled for political
orientation, along with three other control variables (i.e., gender, age, and education level).
Open Practices Statement
All three studies were preregistered prior to collecting the data. We report all
conditions, measures, and data exclusions, and have conducted no further studies on the
relationship between populist attitudes and nostalgia beyond those reported here.
Preregistrations, data, stimulus materials, and Online Supplemental Materials (OSM) are all
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
8
available on the Open Science Framework.1 The studies have ethical approval as part of an
institutional cluster application by the first author.
Study 1
The present study tested the prediction that both personal and collective nostalgia are
related with populist attitudes (Hypothesis 1a). Assuming that populist attitudes mainly
concern collective (i.e., nation-level) issues, and based on the insight that particularly
collective nostalgia is associated with how people appraise collective outcomes (Wildschut et
al., 2014; see also Lammers & Baldwin, 2020; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Smeekes et al., 2018), we
predicted that the link with populist attitudes would be stronger for collective than personal
nostalgia (Hypothesis 1b).
Given the assumed role of perceived threat in the relationship between nostalgia and
populist attitudes, Study 1 also contained measures of threat experiences at two levels of
analysis, namely existential anxiety (i.e., a personal form of anxiety about the future that
involves fears about death, meaninglessness, and guilt; Weems, Costa, Dehon, & Berman,
2004) and collective angst (Smeekes et al., 2018). We predicted that feelings of existential
anxiety and collective angst are positively associated with populist attitudes (Hypothesis 2).
Also, based on the notion that nostalgia helps to psychologically buffer against such
threatening experiences (Sedikides et al., 2008) we predicted that nostalgia is a mediator of
the relationships between collective angst, existential anxiety, and populist attitudes. As
existential anxiety emerges from individual-level threats, we predicted that individual
nostalgia mediates the relationship between existential anxiety and populist attitudes;
likewise, as collective angst emerges from threats to the collective, we predicted that
collective nostalgia mediates the relationship between collective angst and populist attitudes
1
Study 1 preregistration: https://osf.io/ay5sq/?view_only=cbdafa32aa854d1dbc8fbb7391ac9838; Study 2
preregistration: https://osf.io/u94gh/?view_only=5abdfde39f11487387699734c6a4995c; Study 3 preregistration:
https://osf.io/bd6tx/?view_only=ee8035b5f05e4993870a609ef63388f5. Data, materials, and Online
Supplementary Materials: https://osf.io/jm6we/files/?view_only=12f82a03d31549cab55c0c4adf9f4e7f
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
9
(Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants. We conducted the study online through TurkPrime in February 2019. An
a-priori power analysis revealed that 312 participants are required for 95% power to detect a
small-to-medium effect size (f2 = .05); to be on the safe side, we aimed for 350 participants.
To ensure that participants had lived long enough in the US to enable feelings of collective
nostalgia, we preset a minimum age of 25 years old in TurkPrime. Also, we had the
preregistered inclusion criterion that participants had been living in the US for more than 20
years. The sample contained a total of 360 participants; however, 5 participants did not meet
our inclusion criterion and were excluded, leaving 355 participants for the analyses (183 men,
172 women; Mage = 40.94 years, SD=12.24).
Measures
Demographics. Participants first provided basic demographics, including gender, age,
education level, and political orientation (1= Very left-wing, 7= Very right-wing).
Existential anxiety. We assessed a modified version of the Existential Anxiety
Questionnaire (EAQ). This scale consisted of 13 items on a 7-point scale (1 = Almost never
true, 7 = Almost always true; Weems et al., 2004). Example items are “I often think about
death as this causes me anxiety” and “I am not anxious about fate because I am resigned to it”
(recoded; α = .86).
Collective angst. Participants indicated their collective angst through the Collective
Angst Scale (Smeekes et al., 2018) consisting of 4 items scored on a 7-point scale (1 =
Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Two example items are: “I have the impression that
things in the United States are taking a turn for the worse”, and “I am worried about the future
vitality of the United States” (α = .90).
Personal and collective nostalgia. We then measured personal nostalgia with the
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
10
Individual Nostalgia Scale (Batcho, 1995). Participants answered on a 7-point scale how
much they miss 20 stimuli about when they were younger (e.g., family; music; places; friends;
1 = Do not miss at all, 7 = Miss it very much; α = .91).
We measured collective nostalgia using the 4-item Collective Nostalgia Scale (“I get
nostalgic when I think back to the United States in past times”; Smeekes et al., 2018)
combined with 3 additional collective nostalgia items from The Index of Nostalgia Proneness
(“The society in which I live used to be better than it is now”; Holak, Havlena, & Matveev,
2005). The resulting 7-item scale was scored on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree), and had good reliability (α = .90).
An exploratory factor analysis (Principal Axis Factoring with Oblimin rotation)
showed a two-factor solution that largely corresponded with the personal and collective
nostalgia scales (Eigenvalues > 1; see Table S1 in the OSM). There were three items (out of
20) for the personal nostalgia scale, and one item (out of seven) for the collective nostalgia
scale, that turned out psychometrically problematic. As we had not preregistered to drop
items, in the results section below we analyze the results for the full scales. In the OSM we
report the main analyses when these items are dropped, which yielded similar results.
Populist attitudes. We assessed the 8-item populist attitudes scale (1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; Akkerman et al., 2014). Example items are: “The politicians in
The United States Congress need to follow the will of the people”, and “The people, and not
politicians, should make our most important policy decisions”. The scale had satisfactory
reliability (α = .72).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the measured variables are in
Table 1. Consistent with previous research, both forms of nostalgia were associated with
right-wing political orientation (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020); moreover, political orientation
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
11
was uncorrelated with populist attitudes, underscoring that populism is a distinct political
dimension that occurs at both the left and right (Akkerman et al., 2014).
Nostalgia and Populist attitudes. As preregistered, we analyzed the results through a
hierarchical linear regression that included populist attitudes as dependent variable, the
control variables (gender, age, education, and political orientation) as predictors in Step 1, and
personal and collective nostalgia as predictors in Step 2. Degrees of freedom deviate from the
total sample due to attrition and missing values. Step 1 was significant (R2 = .04), F(4, 345) =
3.41, p = .009, which was due to a significant effect of education: Lower education levels
predicted higher populist attitudes, B = -0.19, SE = .056; CI95%[-0.303; -0.082]; p < .001. The
other control variables were not significant (ps > .338). More importantly, Step 2 added
significantly to the regression model (DR2 = .10), F(2, 343) = 19.23, p < .001. As
hypothesized (1a), personal nostalgia, B = 0.16, SE = .045; CI95%[0.070; 0.249]; p < .001, and
collective nostalgia, B = 0.10, SE = .038; CI95%[0.028; 0.177]; p = .007, both significantly
predicted populist attitudes. Contrary to Hypothesis 1b, however, collective nostalgia was not
a stronger predictor of populist attitudes than personal nostalgia.
Existential anxiety and collective angst. To test Hypothesis 2, we conducted a
hierarchical linear regression analysis with the control variables entered in Step 1 (age,
gender, education, political ideology), existential anxiety and collective angst in Step 2, and
populist attitudes as dependent variable. Results for Step 1 were similar as for nostalgia
reported above. Step 2 was also significant, (DR2 = .04), F(2, 344) = 8.10, p < .001. Collective
angst significantly predicted populist attitudes, B = 0.123, SE = .031; CI95%[0.062; 0.184]; p <
.001; the relationship between existential anxiety and populist attitudes was not significant,
however, B = -0.063, SE = .042; CI95%[-0.146; 0.020]; p = .135. These findings provide mixed
support for Hypothesis 2: Only collective angst, and not existential anxiety, is associated with
populist attitudes.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
12
To test Hypothesis 3, we conducted two mediation models with either existential
anxiety or collective angst as independent variable, the two nostalgia measures as parallel
mediators, and populist attitudes as dependent variable, while again controlling for age,
gender, education, and political orientation (Process Model 4; 1000 bootstrap samples, biascorrected; Hayes, 2013). For existential anxiety, the indirect effect through personal nostalgia
was significant, B = 0.037, SE = .015; CI95%[0.014; 0.073], while the indirect effect through
collective nostalgia was not significant, B = 0.006, SE = .008; CI95%[-0.005; 0.272]. For
collective angst, the indirect effect through collective nostalgia was significant, B = 0.022, SE
= .012; CI95%[0.002; 0.049], although unexpectedly, the indirect effect through personal
nostalgia was also significant, B = 0.026, SE = .011; CI95%[0.010; 0.053]. These findings
support Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
The results provide first evidence that, above and beyond a link with right-wing
political ideology, feelings of nostalgia are associated with populist attitudes. This supports
our theoretical assumption that people find a populist worldview appealing due to its promise
to return to a better past. Moreover, the results largely supported the hypothesized
relationships between perceived threat (particularly collective angst), nostalgia, and populist
attitudes. These findings are consistent with earlier work indicating that threat experiences are
associated with nostalgia (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008; Smeekes et al., 2018) and support for
populist movements (e.g., Kinvall, 2018; Rooduijn et al., 2016; Steenvoorden & Harteveld,
2018).
Contrary to predictions, there were no differences between personal and collective
nostalgia in their relationship with populist attitudes. Furthermore, both personal and
collective nostalgia mediated the link between collective angst and populist attitudes. This
suggests that the pessimistic view of society implied by populist attitudes is also associated
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
13
with people’s nostalgic memories of their own personal past. Presumably, populist attitudes
often involve a critical view of policy that has influenced not only a nation as a whole, but
also citizens’ personal lives (e.g., opportunities, income, and so on). In Studies 2 and 3, we
further investigate these issues by including both personal and collective nostalgia.
The Study 1 findings are limited by their cross-sectional design, raising questions
about causality. As the primary focus of the current investigation was the link between
nostalgia and populist attitudes, the next two studies are experiments that focused exclusively
on establishing the possible causal relationships between these variables. To avoid
overcomplicating our experimental designs – and given that the links of threat experiences
with the variables of interest already have been examined in previous research – Studies 2 and
3 did not investigate the roles of existential anxiety and collective angst further.
Study 2
When people feel nostalgic, they may be drawn to populist narratives that reinforce
these sentiments by highlighting the problems of the present, or by glorifying the past. Study
2 therefore tested the hypothesis that inducing personal and collective nostalgia would
increase populist attitudes as compared to a neutral control condition (Hypothesis 4), while
again statistically controlling for political ideology, gender, age, and education. In a more
exploratory fashion, we also exposed participants to two speeches of politicians (one populist
and one pluralist speech), and tested what politician they would vote for.
Method
Participants and design. We conducted the study online in the US through
TurkPrime during the spring of 2019. The study had a three-cell experimental design
(personal nostalgia vs. collective nostalgia vs. control). As in Study 1, we recruited
participants with a minimum of 25 years old, and had the inclusion criterion of living for more
than 20 years in the US. Although the sample contained 846 participants, attrition was
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
14
relatively high and only 603 participants completed all the measures. After also excluding
participants who did not meet the inclusion criterion, we retained a a sample of 589
participants (241 men, 345 women, 3 other; Mage = 42.13, SD = 12.66) yielding 95% power to
detect a small-to-medium effect (f = .16).
Procedure. We first measured the same demographics as in Study 1. Participants then
were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. We manipulated nostalgia based on
the procedure by Wildschut and colleagues (2006; 2014): Participants in the personal
nostalgia condition read a definition of personal nostalgia and were instructed to recall and
describe a nostalgic event from their personal past. In the collective nostalgia condition the
procedure was the same, except that participants were instructed to recall and describe a
nostalgic event from their country’s past. In the control condition, participants were instructed
to recall and describe an ordinary event in their life. After the manipulation participants
completed, as a manipulation check, a nostalgia measure of three items (e.g., “right now, I am
feeling quite nostalgic”; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; α = .99). Participants then
completed the same populist attitudes measure as Study 1 (α = .76).
We also implemented a mock voting procedure in which participants read two
speeches of political leaders (presented as being from a different country) in counterbalanced
order, one endorsing populist values (“Allan”) and one endorsing pluralist values (“Smith”).
The two speeches did not explicitly refer to left- or right-wing topics, and are adaptations
from existing speeches by Donald Trump (populist) and Barack Obama (pluralist). Key
elements (such as emotionality, anti-establishment rhetoric, blaming an outgroup, and so on)
were selected based on comparative discourse analyses of populist and non-populist leaders
(Mols & Jetten, 2014, Hawkins, 2009; Reineman, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & De Vreese,
2016; for details, see the OSM). Both speeches had approximately the same length and the
same general message (“It is time to take action for change”). After reading both texts,
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
15
participants indicated what leader they would vote for. Participants were then debriefed, and
received a code through which they could collect a small fee.
Results
Manipulation check. An ANOVA on the manipulation check revealed a significant
effect of the nostalgia manipulation, F(2, 586) = 128.01, p < .001; h2 = .30. Tukey’s HSD test
revealed that participants in both the personal (M = 6.19, SD = 0.89) and collective nostalgia
conditions (M = 5.72, SD = 1.11) felt more nostalgic than participants in the control condition
(M = 4.15, SD = 1.82; ps < .001). Also, participants in the personal nostalgia condition felt
more nostalgic than participants in the collective nostalgia condition (p = .003). These results
suggest that the manipulation was successful in inducing feelings of nostalgia in participants.
Populist attitudes. We then proceeded with a confirmatory test of our hypothesis
using an ANOVA with populist attitudes as dependent variable. As preregistered, we
empirically controlled for gender, age, education, and political orientation in the analysis.
Education was the only significant covariate, F(1, 577) = 5.28, p = .022; h2 = .01 (other
covariates ps > .13). Of importance, the effect of the nostalgia manipulation was
nonsignificant, F(2, 577) = 1.72, p = .18; h2 = .006 (personal nostalgia condition, M = 5.19,
SD = 0.87; collective nostalgia condition, M = 5.32, SD = 0.85; control condition, M = 5.15,
SD = 0.92). This finding does not support our hypothesis: Although the manipulation
successfully varied levels of (personal and collective) nostalgia in participants, it did not
causally influence participants’ populist attitudes.
Exploratory analyses. The nostalgia measure (i.e., manipulation check) was
positively correlated with populist attitudes (r = .11, p = .010). We then conducted a
hierarchical linear regression with the control variables entered in Step 1, the nostalgia
measure in Step 2, and populist attitudes as dependent variable. Step 1 was significant (R2 =
.02), F(4, 579) = 2.71, p = .029, which again was due to lower education levels predicting
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
16
increased populist attitudes, B = -0.102, SE = .044; CI95%[-0.188; -0.016]; p = .020 (other
control variables ps > .11). More importantly, Step 2 was significant (DR2 = .011), F(1, 578) =
6.417, p = .012, revealing that feelings of nostalgia predicted increased populist attitudes, B =
0.057, SE = .023; CI95%[0.013; 0.102]; p = .012. Thus, while the present experiment did not
detect a causal effect of the nostalgia manipulation on populist attitudes, it did replicate the
correlational relationship between feelings of nostalgia and populist attitudes.
We also analyzed the results of the mock voting procedure. First, we examined the
effect of the manipulation on voting (which we had preregistered as exploratory analysis).
Following our protocol, the four control variables were included in Step 1 of a binary logistic
regression analysis (populist speech coded as 1, pluralist speech as 0). In Step 2 we included
two orthogonal contrasts, the first comparing the nostalgia conditions with the control
condition (personal nostalgia -1; collective nostalgia -1; control condition 2), and the second
comparing the two nostalgia conditions (personal nostalgia -1; collective nostalgia 1; control
condition 0). Step 1 was significant, c2(4) = 36.49, p < .001 (Nagelkerke R2 = .082), as rightwing orientation predicted an increased likelihood of voting for the populist candidate, B =
0.281, SE = .053, Wald = 1.022, p < .001; Exp(B) = 1.324, CI95%[1.194; 1.470] (other control
variables ps > .06). Step 2 was not significant, however, c2(2) = 0.166, p = .920. Thus, the
nostalgia manipulation did not predict an increased likelihood of voting for the populist
candidate, which is consistent with the findings of our main confirmatory analysis.
We then tested whether populist attitudes would predict an increased likelihood of
voting for the populist candidate, to validate these speeches as possible manipulation of
populist rhetoric in Study 3. Results of Step 1 containing the control variables was identical to
the previous analysis. Step 2 containing the populist attitudes measure, then, was significant,
c2(1) = 5.570, p = .018 (Nagelkerke R2 = .094). Also after statistically controlling for rightwing political orientation, populist attitudes predicted an increased likelihood of voting for the
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
17
populist candidate, B = 0.234, SE = .100, Wald = 5.474, p = .019; Exp(B) = 1.264,
CI95%[1.039; 1.538]. This validates the notion that the populist speech indeed is more
appealing than the pluralist speech to people high in populist attitudes.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 did not support a causal effect of (personal and collective)
nostalgia on populist attitudes; however, it did replicate the correlation between nostalgia and
populist attitudes. There are at least two possible (and not mutually exclusive) reasons why
the causal effect did not emerge. One interpretation is that populist attitudes (and preference
for the rhetoric of populist politicians) represents a relatively stable political worldview that is
difficult to influence with subtle experimental manipulations. While it would be premature to
exclude the possibility that there may be a causal effect of nostalgia on populist attitudes over
a longer period of time, Study 2 did not provide evidence for this causal effect in the short
run. A second interpretation, however, is that the association between populist attitudes and
nostalgia emerges (at least partly) because of a reverse causal order: Populist rhetoric may
increase feelings of nostalgia. Study 3 was designed to test this possibility.
Study 3
Populist rhetoric contains various elements that may increase feelings of nostalgia. For
instance, populist rhetoric tends to be highly emotional, critical of present-day society, and it
tends to (implicitly or explicitly) argue that the past was better than the present (e.g., Custodi,
2021; Mudde, 2004; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). In Study 3 we therefore tested
whether exposing people to populist rhetoric would increase feelings of nostalgia. In the
exploratory analysis of the mock voting procedure, Study 2 indicated that populist attitudes
(above and beyond right-wing orientation) predicted a vote for the populist instead of the
pluralist politician. This suggests that these speeches are valid operationalizations of a
populist versus pluralist speech, and therefore we used these speeches as manipulation of
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
18
populist rhetoric in Study 3. We predicted that as compared with a pluralist speech, exposure
to a populist speech increases feelings of personal and collective nostalgia (Hypothesis 5). As
participants read either a populist or pluralist speech based on random assignment, we
expected substantial variation in how much they would agree to the speech they were exposed
to. We therefore also predicted that agreement with a populist speech (but not necessarily with
a pluralist speech) would be positively associated with personal and collective nostalgia
(Hypothesis 6).
Method
Participants and design. We aimed for 400 participants in a two-cell design (populist
versus pluralist speech), yielding more than 95% power to detect a small effect size (f2 = .03).
The total sample contained 480 US citizens (188 women, 291 men, 1 other; Mage = 36.79, SD
= 11.01) who completed the online study via TurkPrime; due to attrition, however, the actual
sample varied across dependent variables. We did not set a-priori inclusion criteria in this
study, and hence, there were no data exclusions. The study lasted about 10 minutes.
Procedure. Participants first provided the same demographic information as in the
previous studies. To manipulate exposure to populist rhetoric, participants were randomly
assigned to a populist or pluralist (i.e., control) speech condition. Participants were informed
that this was a speech by a US politician; for the rest, the text was the same as validated in
Study 2 (i.e., the mock vote procedure). To reinforce the manipulation, after reading the
speech participants completed two comprehension checks and briefly summarized the speech.
Participants then indicated to what extent they agreed with the speech (1= Strongly disagree,
7 = Strongly agree).
After this, participants responded to the same measures of collective nostalgia (a =
.92) and personal nostalgia (a = .93) as in Study 1. An exploratory factor analysis again
supported a two-factor solution, although some of the items again were psychometrically
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
19
problematic (see Table S1 in the OSM). If these items were dropped, the analyses yielded
similar results as reported below (statistical details in the OSM).
Also, participants responded to the same populist attitudes scale which in Study 3 we
included for exploratory purposes (a = .74). At the end of the study participants were
debriefed, and given a code to collect their payment.
Results
Confirmatory analyses. Following our preregistered protocol, we performed a
hierarchical linear regression for each of the nostalgia types (collective and personal) with
age, gender, education level and political orientation as control variables in Step 1, the
populist rhetoric manipulation and agreement in Step 2, and their interaction effect in Step 3.
We effect-coded the conditions (-1 populist speech, 1 pluralist speech) and mean-centered the
agreement measure. The main effect of populist rhetoric in Step 2 was the test of Hypothesis
5; the interaction effect in Step 3 was the test of Hypothesis 6. Results of the regression
analyses are displayed in Table 2.
For collective nostalgia, Step 1 was significant (R2 = .263), F(4, 398) = 35.56, p <
.001, which was due to significant effects of age and political orientation. Step 2 also was
significant (DR2 = .084), F(2, 396) = 25.594, p < .001. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the main
effect of populist rhetoric was significant (b = -.094, p = .024). People experienced more
collective nostalgia after reading the populist as opposed to the pluralist speech, although this
difference was pronounced more for the means adjusted for the control variables and
agreement (Madj-populist = 4.16, SE = .090; Madj-pluralist = 3.87, SE = .089), than for the raw
means (Mpopulist = 4.06, SD = 1.53; Mpluralist = 3.96, SD = 1.56). Also the agreement effect was
significant (b = .307, p < .001), suggesting that agreeing with the speeches in general was
associated with collective nostalgia. Step 3 provided only marginal support for Hypothesis 6,
(DR2 = .006), F(1, 395) = 3.416, p = .065, although consistent with our underlying line of
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
20
reasoning, a (not preregistered) Fisher r-to-z test revealed that the correlation between
agreement and collective nostalgia was stronger in the populist condition (r = .55, p < .001)
than in the pluralist condition (r = .21, p = .002), z = -4.02, p < .001 (two-tailed).
For personal nostalgia, Step 1 was significant (R2 = .094), F(4, 398) = 10.358, p <
.001, which was attributable to significant effects of gender and political orientation (see
Table 2). Step 2 also was significant (DR2 = .131), F(2, 396) = 33.453, p < .001. The main
effect of the populist rhetoric manipulation was significant (b = -.194, p < .001). Supporting
Hypothesis 5, participants reported more personal nostalgia following the populist speech
(Madj = 4.576, SE = .079; M = 4.48, SD = 1.23) than following the pluralist speech (Madj =
4.096, SE = .078; M = 4.19, SD = 1.23). Consistent with the findings on collective nostalgia,
the main effect of agreement was also significant (b = .363, p < .001). Step 3 was not
significant, however (DR2 = .001), F(1, 395) = 0.296, p = .587. Hence, our preregistered
analysis did not support Hypothesis 6 for personal nostalgia, although it is worth noting that
(consistent with the findings on collective nostalgia) a Fisher r-to-z test indicated a slightly
stronger correlation between agreement and personal nostalgia in the populist condition (r =
.480, p < .001) than in the pluralist condition (r = .315, p < .001), z = -1.97, p = .049 (twotailed).
Exploratory analyses. We first tested whether the manipulation of populist rhetoric
influenced populist attitudes, using the same hierarchical regression analysis with populist
attitudes as dependent variable (an analysis explicitly preregistered as exploratory). Step 1
was significant (R2 = .030), F(4, 397) = 3.120, p = .015, which was attributable to a
significant effect of political orientation, B = 0.060, SE = .024; CI95%[0.013; 0.107]; p = .013
(other control variables ps > .77). Step 2 was also significant (DR2 = .031), F(2, 395) = 6.503,
p = .002, however, this was due to a significant agreement main effect, B = 0.104, SE = .029;
CI95%[0.046; 0.161]; p < .001. The effect of the populist rhetoric manipulation was not
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
21
significant (p = .162), as was Step 3 including the interaction, (DR2 = .000), F(1, 394) = 0.185,
p = .668.
These exploratory results have two implications. First, although populist attitudes do
predict voting for a populist candidate (Study 2), populist rhetoric does not directly shape
populist attitudes. This may suggest that a populist worldview develops gradually over time,
and is not easily changed through exposure to a single populist speech. Second, agreement to
either speech (i.e., both populist and pluralist) predicts populist attitudes. While this finding
may appear counterintuitive, it is consistent with recent findings that populist attitudes are
associated with gullibility, as reflected in acceptance of a broad range of epistemic claims
independent of its source (BLINDED). The current findings hence further suggest that
populist attitudes predict less critical consumption of (in this case, political) information.
Moreover, both speeches emphasize a need for change, which may appeal to populists’
feelings of societal discontent (Rooduijn et al., 2016).
We then examined whether the populist rhetoric manipulation would shape populist
attitudes indirectly through feelings of nostalgia. Consistent with the previous studies,
populist attitudes were positively correlated with both collective nostalgia (r = .360, p < .001)
and personal nostalgia (r = .419, p < .001). We subsequently tested a model with personal
and collective nostalgia as parallel mediators of the link between populist rhetoric and
populist attitudes, while statistically controlling for agreement and the four control variables
(Process Model 4; 1000 bootstrap samples, bias-corrected; Hayes, 2013). The indirect effects
were significant for both collective nostalgia, B = -0.012, SE = .008; CI95%[-0.035; -0.002],
and personal nostalgia, B = -0.057, SE = .017; CI95%[-0.102; -0.032]. These findings suggest
that the effects of populist rhetoric on nostalgia may have indirect, downstream implications
for populist attitudes.
Discussion
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
22
Study 3 reveals that exposure to populist rhetoric increases feelings of both personal
and collective nostalgia. Also, these effects emerged independent of how much participants
agreed with the (populist or pluralist) speech. Finally, an exploratory mediation analysis
suggests that exposure to a populist speech indirectly shapes populist attitudes through
feelings of nostalgia. Apparently, populist rhetoric makes people feel nostalgic, which in turn
is associated with increased populist attitudes.
General Discussion
The present studies examined the link between populist attitudes and feelings of
nostalgia, while statistically controlling for political orientation. Study 1 showed that both
personal and collective nostalgia were associated with populist attitudes. Moreover, these
effects were related with collective angst, which is consistent with the notion that nostalgia
helps people cope with threatening experiences (e.g., Routledge et al., 2011; Sedikides et al.,
2008; Zhou et al., 2008). Studies 2 and 3, then, focused on establishing the causal order of the
relationship between nostalgia and populist attitudes. Study 2 found no evidence that nostalgia
causally shapes populist attitudes, yet replicated the correlation between nostalgia and
populist attitudes. Study 3 found that as compared with a pluralist speech, exposure to a
populist speech increased personal and collective nostalgia. These three studies support the
idea that populist attitudes are related with feelings of nostalgia.
These findings make two broader contributions to the emerging research literature on
populism. First, previous research on the link between nostalgia and populist attitudes has
focused largely on right-wing political orientation. This has manifested itself in establishing
relationships between nostalgia and support for right-wing policy issues (i.e., rejection of
immigrants; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Smeekes et al., 2018), or support for right-wing political
movements more generally (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). The present studies expand on these
insights by illuminating that populist attitudes are uniquely associated with nostalgia, also
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
23
after controlling for political orientation. This finding dovetails with qualitative research
observing substantial nostalgic sentiments also among left-wing populist movements
(Custodi, 2021). Second, the current research contributes to the question what the appeal is of
populist movements among citizens. Populism is associated with for instance political
discontent (Rooduijn et al., 2016) and societal pessimism (Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018).
Why would citizens be drawn to political movements espousing such a dark view of society?
The findings presented here illuminate that populist movements not only emphasize a range of
societal threats, but also provide citizens with a psychological buffer against these threats, by
increasing feelings of nostalgia and promising a return to a glorious past.
Contrary to our initial expectations, across studies the results did not suggest
differences between personal and collective nostalgia in their relationship with populist
attitudes. Although personal and collective nostalgia are closely related constructs, they are
empirically distinct as underscored by the factor analyses reported in the OSM. At first blush,
these findings appear inconsistent with earlier research showing that collective nostalgia is
uniquely associated with positive feelings towards people’s ingroup (Wildschut et al., 2014),
and support for specific policy issues, notably rejection of immigrants (Mols & Jetten, 2014;
Smeekes et al., 2015). Populist attitudes reflect a rather broad view of how society is
governed, however, which also has relevance for the perceived quality of people’s own
personal lives. As such, personal nostalgia may be associated with support for (or rejection of)
political movements, to the extent that such movements provide solutions (or are held
accountable) for societal problems that also affect people’s personal lives and well-being (see
also Lammers & Proulx, 2013). While speculative at this point, we suspect that people’s
opinion on some specific policy issues (e.g., immigration) may be uniquely associated with
collective nostalgia, but their support for political parties more generally – which also make
decisions directly relevant for citizens’ own income, job opportunities, safety, health, and so
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
24
on – is associated with both personal and collective nostalgia.
Neither induced nostalgia (Study 2) nor populist rhetoric (Study 3) directly influenced
respondents’ populist attitudes. This suggests that populist attitudes reflect a relatively stable
worldview that is not easily changed through a single, ad-hoc experimental manipulation.
These findings do not exclude the possibility, however, that populist attitudes are malleable in
the long run, for instance through frequent feelings of nostalgia, or repeated exposure to
populist rhetoric. While the null-effect observed in Study 2 does not support a causal effect of
nostalgia on populist attitudes in the short run, more research is necessary that takes the
relatively stable quality of populist attitudes into account. Future longitudinal studies may test
the idea that feelings of nostalgia, and frequent exposure to populist rhetoric (e.g., during an
election campaign) gradually increases populist attitudes among citizens. Such a longitudinal
design would also allow to expand upon the preliminary finding observed in Study 3, that
populist rhetoric shapes populist attitudes indirectly through personal and collective nostalgia.
These considerations suggest that establishing the long-term relationships between populist
attitudes and nostalgia is a fruitful direction for further research.
Strengths, limitations, and future research
The current research has a number of noteworthy strengths and limitations. Among the
strengths are the fact that all studies were preregistered, and all studies were well-powered.
This methodological approach suggests that the findings reported here are robust, and likely
to replicate in follow-up studies. Furthermore, we report three studies that include both crosssectional (Study 1) and experimental designs (Studies 2 and 3). Across these designs the
results paint a fairly consistent picture, suggesting that the findings observed here are not an
artefact of one type of research method. Moreover, the findings provide information not only
about the association between populist attitudes and nostalgia, but also provide evidence that
populist rhetoric causally increases feelings of nostalgia.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
25
A limitation is that all samples were drawn from the US through crowdsourcing
websites. The samples that we investigated hence were not representative for the larger US
population, and moreover, populism may take different forms in different countries (e.g.,
Müller, 2016). Furthermore, the present research was restricted by examining attitudes only.
A more powerful indicator of populist support is voting behavior in elections. Indeed,
research suggests that psychological variables assessed during an election campaign can
meaningfully predict whether or not citizens subsequently vote against the political
establishment (BLINDED). Altogether, these issues point at the overarching limitation that
there is a gap between the psychological methodology used in present studies, versus the
macro-level political processes that the current project seeks to inform. The present findings
therefore may be expanded by a large-scale, multination investigation using nationally
representative samples, to assess if nostalgia contributes to voting for populist movements
across countries.
Study 3 examined the effects of populist versus pluralist rhetoric. Although an
experimental manipulation of populist rhetoric is a relatively novel approach in this research
domain, it necessarily varied a range of underlying psychological variables. As listed in Table
S2 (OSM), the populist text was more emotional, placed more blame on an outgroup, used
more first-person plural pronouns (we, us), was more anti-establishment, and so on. Indeed,
these are all elements of populist speech as indicated by previous discourse analyses (e.g.,
Mols & Jetten, 2014, Hawkins, 2009; Reineman, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & De Vreese,
2016). While including all of these elements increases ecological validity, it is also difficult to
establish what specific underlying variables drive the effects of the manipulation. For
instance, it is possible that populist rhetoric increases (personal or collective) nostalgia merely
due to its emotional content. Future research may therefore more carefully unpack what
specific elements of populist speech drives people’s nostalgic sentiments.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
26
By focusing on populist attitudes independent of political orientation, the present
research sought to expand on previous research that has focused on the link between nostalgia
and support for right-wing political movements (e.g., Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). Study 1
found no linear relationship between populist attitudes and right-wing political orientation,
which is consistent with previous research (Akkerman et al., 2014). The populist (versus
pluralist) speech to operationalize populist rhetoric in Study 3, however, was associated with
right-wing orientation, as people at the political right were more likely to vote for the
politician articulating the populist speech (see exploratory findings Study 2). In the current
research, we could mitigate this concern by statistically controlling for political orientation in
the analyses. Still, future research examining the causal effects of populist rhetoric may
develop stimulus materials that are equally appealing to people at the political left versus
right.
Related to these issues, it is important to note that the current contribution does not
imply that left- and right-wing populist movements are equivalent; indeed, research indicates
substantial differences between left- versus right-wing populist movements (Akkerman et al.,
2017; Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019). Future research may expand on the studies reported here by
testing what specific role nostalgia plays among various ideologically different populist
movements.
Integrating the current findings with prior research suggests a broader theoretical
model about the relationships between threat, populist rhetoric, nostalgia, and populist
attitudes. We specifically suspect that when experiencing feelings of threat (e.g., collective
angst) people become more susceptible to populist rhetoric, as such rhetoric helps to mitigate
threat experiences through feelings of nostalgia. Due to this underlying process, threat
experiences may increase populist attitudes and support for populist movements (cf. Kinvall,
2018; Rooduijn et al., 2016; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018). The studies presented here are
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
not suited to test this model directly, given that threat experiences were measured only in
(cross-sectional) Study 1, and populist rhetoric was manipulated only in Study 3. Future
research may hence more directly test this hypothesized theoretical model in studies that
examine the joint causal effects of threat experiences and populist rhetoric on feelings of
nostalgia, populist attitudes, and support for populist movements.
Concluding remarks
Many populist movements have enjoyed remarkable electoral successes in the past
decade. Explaining what makes such movements appealing to citizens is not an easy task,
however, as many psychological, economic, cultural, and historical variables are likely to
contribute to populist sentiments and voting. The present research sought to illuminate a
psychological factor that helps to explain the appeal of a populist worldview. The current
findings suggest that feelings of nostalgia are closely associated with populist attitudes,
presumably as this bittersweet feeling helps people cope with the dark view of society that
populist movements often promulgate. Through a sentimental longing for a better past,
populist attitudes may increase people’s hope for a better future.
27
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
28
References
Akkermans, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). How populist are the people? Measuring
populist attitudes in voters. Comparative Political Studies, 47, 1324-1353.
Akkerman, A., Zaslove, A., & Spruyt, B. (2017). ‘We the People’ or ‘We the Peoples’? A
comparison of support for the populist radical right and populist radical left in the
Netherlands. Swiss Political Science Review, 23, 377-403.
Bakker, B. N., Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2021). The populist appeal: Personality and
antiestablishment communication. The Journal of Politics, 83, 589-601.
Baldwin, M., & Lammers, J. (2016). Past-focused environmental comparisons promote
proenvironmental outcomes for conservatives. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 113, 14953-14957.
Baldwin, M., White, M. H., & Sullivan, D. (2018). Nostalgia for America’s past can buffer
collective guilt. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48, 433-446.
Batcho, K. I. (1995). Nostalgia: A psychological perspective. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 80,
131-143.
Bernhard, L., & Kriesi, H. (2019). Populism in election times: A comparative analysis of 11
countries in Western Europe. West European Politics, 42, 1188-1208.
Custodi, J. (2021). Nationalism and populism on the left: The case of Podemos. Nations and
Nationalism, 27, 705-720.
Erisen, C., Guidi, M., Martini, M., Toprakkiran, S., Isernia, P., & Littvay, L. (2021).
Psychological correlates of populist attitudes. Advances in Political Psychology.
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12768
Frimer, J. A., Brandt, M. J., Melton, Z., & Motyl, M. (2018). Extremists on the Left and Right
Use Angry, Negative Language. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 45, 1216123, doi: 10.1177/0146167218809705
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
29
Hawkins, K. (2009). Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative
perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 1040–1067.
Hayes, A.F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis:
A regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Holak, S., Havlena, W., & Matveev, A. (2005). Exploring nostalgia in Russia: Testing the
index of nostalgia-proneness. European Advances in Consumer Research, 7, 33-40.
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical
study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political
Research, 46, 319-345.
Jost, J. J. (2017). Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology. Political
Psychology, 38, 167-208.
Kinvall, C. (2018). Ontological insecurities and postcolonial imaginaries: The emotional
appeal of populism. Humanity & Society, 42, 523-543.
Lammers, J., & Baldwin, M. (2020). Make America gracious again: Collective nostalgia can
increase and decrease support for right-wing populist rhetoric. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 50, 943-954.
Lammers, J., & Proulx, T. (2013). Writing autobiographical narratives increases political
conservatism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 684-691.
Mols, F., & Jetten, J. (2014). No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the
way for anti-immigrant sentiments. International Journal of Intercultural Relations,
43, 74-86.
Morelock, J. (2018). Critical theory and authoritarian populism. London, UK: University of
Westminster Press.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39, 541-563.
Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. New York, NY:
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
30
Oxford University Press.
Müller, J.-W. (2016). What is populism? Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömbäck, J., & De Vreese, C. H. (2016). Populist
political communication: Toward a model of its causes, forms, and effects. In T.
Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. De Vreese (Eds.). Populist
political communication in Europe (pp. 12-28). New York, NY: Routledge.
Rooduijn, M., Van der Brug, W., & De Lange, S. L. (2016). Expressing or fueling
discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent.
Electoral Studies, 43, 32-40.
Routledge, C., Arndt, J., Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Hart, C. M., Juhl, J., Vingerhoets, A. J.
J. M., & Schlotz, W. (2011). The past makes the present meaningful: Nostalgia as an
existential resource. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 638-652.
Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2013). Sympathy for the ‘devil’? Voting for populists in
the 2006 and 2010 Dutch general elections. Electoral Studies, 32, 124-133.
Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2008). Nostalgia: Past, present,
future. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 304-307.
Smeekes, A., Jetten, J., Verkuyten, M., Wohl, M. J., Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Ariyanto, A., ... &
Butera, F. (2018). Regaining In-Group Continuity in Times of Anxiety About the
Group’s Future. Social Psychology, 49, 311–329.
Smeekes, A., Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2015). Longing for the country’s good old
days: National nostalgia, autochtony beliefs, and opposition to Muslim expressive
rights. British Journal of Social Psychology, 54, 561-580.
Steenvoorden, E., & Harteveld, E. (2018). The appeal of nostalgia: The influence of societal
pessimism on support for populist radical right parties. West European Politics, 41,
28-52.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
31
Weems, C. F., Costa, N. M., Dehon, C., & Berman, S. L. (2004). Paul Tillich's theory of
existential anxiety: A preliminary conceptual and empirical examination. Anxiety,
Stress & Coping, 17, 383-399.
Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C. (2006). Nostalgia: content, trigger,
functions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 9, 975–993.
Wildschut, T., Bruder, M., Robertson, S., van Tilburg, W. A. P., & Sedikides, C. (2014).
Collective nostalgia: A group-level emotion that confers unique benefits on the group.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107, 844-863.
Zhou, X., Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., & Gao, D.-G. (2008). Counteracting loneliness: On
the restorative function of nostalgia. Psychological Science, 19, 1023-1029.
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
32
Table 1.
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the measured variables – Study 1
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Age
40.94 12.24
-
2. Education
2.65
0.79
-.06
3. Political orientation
3.77
1.85
.18*** -.08
-
4. Existential anxiety
3.03
1.07
-.21*** -.02
-.03
-
5. Collective angst
4.85
1.44
.02
-.12*
-.05
.18*** -
6. Personal nostalgia
4.41
1.11
-.05
-.13*
.25*** .21*** .23*** -
7. Collective nostalgia
4.32
1.43
.18*** -.17** .41*** .01
8. Populist attitudes
5.23
0.83
.03
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
7
8
-
-.19*** -.002 -.04
.26*** .53*** .22*** .29*** .26*** -
POPULISM AND NOSTALGIA
33
Table 2.
Hierarchical Regression Results Study 3.
Collective nostalgia
Personal Nostalgia
B(SE)
B(SE)
CI95%
-0.003; 0.019
CI95%
Step 1
Age
0.020(.006)** 0.008; 0.032
0.008(.006)
Gender
0.157(.136)
0.259(.121)* 0.020; 0.497
Education
-0.055(.084) -0.220; 0.110
-0.110; 0.425
Political orientation 0.384(.036)*** 0.313; 0.454
0.014(.075)
-0.133; 0.161
0.175(.032)*** 0.113; 0.238
Step 2
Populist rhetoric
-0.145(.064)* -0.271; -0.019
-0.24(.056)*** -0.350; -0.130
Agreement
0.298(.042)*** 0.216; 0.381
0.283(.037)*** 0.211; 0.355
-0.076†(.041) -0.158; 0.005
-0.020(.036) -0.091; 0.052
Step 3
Interaction
Note. † p = .065; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
View publication stats