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YUN KWAN BYUNG
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163553
vs.
PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT
AND
GAMING
December 11, 2009
FACTS
PAGCOR launched its Foreign Highroller Marketing Program that aims to
invite patrons from foreign countries to play at the dollar pit of designated
PAGCOR-operated casinos under specified terms and conditions and in
accordance with industry practice.
Petitioner, a Korean national, alleges that he came to the Philippines four
times to play for high stakes at the Casino Filipino; that in the course of the
games, he was able to accumulate gambling chips worth US$2.1
million. Petitioner contends that when he presented the gambling chips for
encashment with PAGCORs employees or agents, PAGCOR refused to redeem
them. PAGCOR claims that petitioner, who was brought into the Philippines by
ABS Corporation, is a junket player who played in the dollar pit exclusively
leased by ABS Corporation for its junket players. PAGCOR alleges that it
provided ABS Corporation with distinct junket chips and ABS Corporation
distributed these chips to its junket players.
At the end of each playing period, the junket players would surrender the
chips to ABS Corporation and only ABS Corporation would make an accounting
of these chips to PAGCORs casino treasury.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in holding that PAGCOR is not liable to petitioner,
disregarding the doctrine of implied agency, or agency by estoppels
RULING
Article 1869 of the Civil Code states that implied agency is derived from
the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without
authority. Implied agency, being an actual agency, is a fact to be proved by
deductions or inferences from other facts. On the other hand, apparent authority
is based on estoppel and can arise from two instances. First, the principal may
knowingly permit the agent to hold himself out as having such authority, and the
principal becomes estopped to claim that the agent does not have such authority.
Second, the principal may clothe the agent with the indicia of authority as to lead
a reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent actually has such
authority. In an agency by estoppel, there is no agency at all, but the one
assuming to act as agent has apparent or ostensible, although not real, authority
to represent another.
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