We humbly ask for peace
in our hearts, our bodies, our minds, and our souls,
as we wait patiently and confidently.
Not once did you leave us despite our failures and sins.
We recognize and accept the death of your Son, Jesus on the
cross, as a symbol of your unconditional love for us. We thank
you for the assurance of eternal life upon acceptance of Jesus as
our Savior.
Father, we humbly come before you as one family to ask that for
your Divine providence we implore the help of the Holy Spirit to
work in the hearts of those who are preparing for the 2021 Bar
Examination, especially members of our Bedan family.
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY
College of Law
The RGCT – Bar Operations Center is a recognized organization of the San Beda
University College of Law dedicated to assisting our Bedan brothers and sisters in their pre and postpreparations in taking the Philippine Bar Examinations administered by the Supreme Court. The Bar
Operations Group formerly known as the Centralized Bar Operations was renamed as the RGCT –
Bar Operations Center in honor of our beloved Mother of Lions, Atty. Risel G. Castillo-Taleon for her
life dedication in teaching and for caring and taking the Organization under her wings. Working on
continuing her legacy, the RGCT – Bar Operations Center continues to innovate and improve its
services for our Bedan Brethren amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
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I.
REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK I ........................................................................................... 02
A. General Principles ................................................................................................................. 02
B. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability ............................................................................ 07
C. Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) ........................................... 13
D. Service of Sentence .............................................................................................................. 14
E. Effect of Death of Accused ................................................................................................... 15
II. REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK II .......................................................................................... 15
A. Crimes Against Persons........................................................................................................ 15
B. Crimes Against Property ....................................................................................................... 19
C. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security ..................................................................... 23
D. Crimes Against Public Interest .............................................................................................. 25
III. SPECIAL PENAL LAW ............................................................................................................... 27
A. Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. NO. 9262)................... 27
B. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act
(R.A. No. 7610) ..................................................................................................................... 29
C. Safe Spaces Act (R.A. No. 11313) ....................................................................................... 30
D. Data Privacy Act (R.A. No. 10173) ....................................................................................... 32
(1)
GENERAL RULE: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 14).
EXCEPTIONS: (1) principles of public international law, (2) treaty stipulations, and (3) laws of preferential
application (CIVIL CODE, Art. 14; RPC, Art. 2).
The following persons are not subject to the operation of our criminal laws: (SCAMR)
1. Sovereigns and other heads of state;
2. Charges d’affaires;
3. Ambassadors;
4. Ministers plenipotentiary; and
5. Other Representatives accredited to the host heads of the State Ministers resident
(2)
GENERAL RULE: Penal laws of the Philippines are enforceable only within its territory ((REYES, The Revised
Penal Code, Book One, (2021), p. 19 [hereinafter REYES, Book One]).
EXCEPTIONS: Article 2 of the R.P.C. provides that its provisions shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of
the Philippines against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine Ship or airship;
2. Should forge or Counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and
securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the Introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being Public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
or
5. Should commit any of the crimes Against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One
of Book Two of this Code (RPC, Art. 2).
(3)
While on board a Malaysian-owned, MARINA-registered merchant vessel, I, an Indonesian crew, stabbed
U, a Ukrainian crew. U died. If the stabbing incident occurred beyond 200 nautical miles from the
Philippine baselines and outside the territorial waters of other states, may I be prosecuted before a
Philippine court?
Yes. Under Art. 3 of the UNCLOS, the territorial sea extends up to twelve (12) nautical miles from the
baseline, within which all penal laws apply (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011). Under the
Principle of Extraterritoriality, the provisions of the RPC shall be enforced outside the jurisdiction of the
Philippines against those who should commit an offense while on board a Philippine ship or aircraft (RPC, Art.
2, par. 1). It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of
her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship (U.S. v. Fowler, G.R. No. L- 496, December 31, 1902). Here, the
stabbing incident occurred outside of the Philippine territory. However, since the vessel is registered with the
MARINA, It was considered to be on board a Philippine ship at the time of the commission of the offense. Hence,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction.
(4)
GENERAL RULE: Penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex
post facto law (Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February, 22, 2008).
EXCEPTIONS (has retroactive effect):
1. When the law is favorable to the accused; and
2. When the law decriminalizes an act.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCEPTIONS (no retroactive effect):
1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action
(Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. 922, November 8, 1902); and
2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal (RPC, Art. 22).
(5)
May the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 (An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code) be given retroactive
effect?
The answer must be qualified. As a rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous
to the accused (Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008). The amendatory effects of R.A. No.
10951 are either favorable or prejudicial to the accused. If a provision of said Act is favorable to the accused, it
shall be given a retroactive effect. If a provision of said Act is prejudicial to the accused, it shall be given a
prospective effect. R.A. No. 10951 expressly provides that said Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that
it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence by final judgment (R.A. No. 10951, Sec. 100).
NOTE: An example of a provision which is prejudicial to the accused is the imposition of a minimum
penalty of prision mayor for estafa by postdating check punished under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC (R.A. No.
10951, Sec. 85). Prior to R.A. No. 10951, estafa by postdating a check was punishable by a minimum penalty of
arresto mayor, which is a penalty lower than prision mayor.
(6)
The bench and bar must rid themselves of the common misconception that all mala in se crimes are found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special laws. The better approach
to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act (Cardona v. People, G.R. No. 244544.July 6, 2020). When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished under a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006).
(7)
Pro Reo Doctrine
In dubio pro reo means “when in doubt, for the accused.” (People v. Ong, G.R. No. 175940, February 6,
2008). It is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions (People v.
Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004).
(8)
Rule of Lenity
The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.
(9)
Equipoise Rule
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application
if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not suffice
to produce a conviction. The equipoise rule has been generally applied when the parties have already concluded
the presentation of their respective evidence (People v. Gabo, G.R. No. 161083. August 3, 2010).
(10)
Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege — There is no crime when there is no law that punishes it.
(11)
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — The act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal.
The maxim "Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea," expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime
is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a
crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent
(Manzanaris v. People, G.R. No. L-64750. January 30, 1984).
(12)
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus — An act done by me against my will is not my act.
(13)
El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado —He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused.
(14)
What is mens rea?
Mens rea is defined as the non-physical element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up
the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind (ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R.
No. 195956, March 11, 2015).
(15)
Mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a defense in a crime committed by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005).
(16)
Mistake of Fact as a defense
A person by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal
liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime if the actor had known
the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
If such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged “cancels the presumption of intent,” and works an acquittal; except
in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the penal code one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit. (U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910).
(17)
Requisites of a Mistake of Fact:
1.
2.
3.
That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been what the accused believed them to be;
That the intention of the accused in doing the act was lawful; and
That the act done was not attended by fault nor carelessness on the part of the accused.
FACTOR
EFFECT ON INTENT
EFFECT ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Mistake of Fact
Negative criminal intent
Negative criminal liability
Aberratio Ictus
Intent is against unintended victim or The act may result in a complex crime (Art. 48,
the effect is in addition to injury on RPC) or in two felonies, although there is just
intended victim.
one intent. Thus, may result to a greater criminal
liability.
FACTOR
Error in Personae
Praeter Intentionem
(18)
EFFECT ON INTENT
EFFECT ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Intended result falls on another due to Depends upon intended crime and actual crime
error in the identity of the victim.
committed:
a. If these are of different gravity – Article 49
shall apply. In effect it is an extenuating
circumstance. If the resulting crime is
greater than intended, e.g., parricide when
what is intended is homicide (Art. 49)
b. If the actual and intended crimes are the
same – no mitigation of penalty.
Actual crime is greater than intended Mitigating under Article 13
An impossible crime is attendant when the act performed would be an (1) offense against persons or property,
(2) that the act was done with evil intent, and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible under the third element, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either: (1) legal impossibility,
or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime” (People vs. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018).
(19)
What is the doctrine of absorption and when is it applicable?
The doctrine of absorption, or the Hernandez Doctrine, is a rule that provides that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (Enrile v. Hon. Amin, G.R. No.
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990, citing People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 [1956]). The doctrine of absorption
of crimes generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, and only if the trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006).
NOTE: Even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the conceptual definition of a complex
crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes a single definite penalty therefor it cannot also be punished as a
complex crime, much less as separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by law (People v.
Circulado, G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996).
(20)
Attempted felony
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance (RPC, Art. 6, Par. 3).
(21)
Frustrated felony
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator (RPC, Art. 6, Par. 2).
(22)
Consummated felony
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present (RPC, Art. 6, Par. 2).
(23)
Indeterminate Offense
It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous. The accused may be convicted of a felony defined by the acts performed by him up to
the time of desistance (REYES, Book One, supra at 107).
(24)
Give examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage.
The examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage are as follows:
1. Rape, since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, no matter how slight the
penetration, the felony is consummated (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990);
2. Indirect Bribery, because it is committed by accepting gifts offered to the public officer by reason of
his office. If he does not accept, he does not commit the crime. If he accepts, it is consummated;
3. Direct Bribery;
4. Corruption of Public Officers, because the offense requires the concurrence of the will of both
parties, such as that when the offer is accepted, the offense is consummated. But when the offer is
rejected, the offense is merely attempted;
5. Adultery, because the essence of the crime is sexual congress;
6. Physical Injury, since it cannot be determined whether the injury will be slight, less serious, or serious
unless and until consummated; and
7. Theft, because the unlawful taking immediately consummates the offense and the disposition of the
thing is not an element thereof (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).
(25)
Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Its existence may be inferred and proved through acts that show a common purpose, a
concert of action, and a community of interest (People v. Orozco, et.al., G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017,
Leonen Case).
(26)
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the 2002 case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes
were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,
G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
(27)
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan involves individuals linked together in a vertical
chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy usually involves the distribution of narcotics
or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
COMPLEX CRIME
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OR COMPOSITE CRIME
As to Concept
It is made up of two or more crimes being punished in It is made up of two or more crimes which are considered
distinct provisions of the Revised Penal Code but alleged only as components of a single indivisible offense being
in one information either because they were brought about punished in one provision of the Revised Penal Code.
by a single felonious act or because one offense is a
necessary means for committing the other offense or
offenses.
As to Penalty
Penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed and Penalty specifically provided for the special complex crime
in its maximum period.
that shall be applied according to the rules on imposition
of the penalty.
(28)
REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE: (URL)
1. Unlawful aggression (condition sine qua non);
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it (if by a peace officer, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to overcome opponent); and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People v. Siega, G.R. No.
213273, June 27, 2018).
(29)
Explain the concept of unlawful aggression.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (Sombilon vs.
People, G.R. No. 177246, September 25, 2017). Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the condition
sine qua non of the justifying circumstances of self-defense, defense of relative and defense of stranger, whether
complete or incomplete. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether
the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself (or his
relative or a stranger); the peril must not be imagined or an imaginary threat (People vs. Cosgafa, G.R. No.
218250, July 10, 2017).
(30)
When is the means employed in the act of self-defense considered reasonable?
Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon;
the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the
person who invokes self-defense, and also the place and the occasion of the assault. Perfect balance between
the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required, because the person
assaulted loses sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate or to choose which weapon to use (Remegio
vs. People, G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017). What the law requires is rational equivalence and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury (People v. Encomienda, G.R. No. L-26750, August 18, 1972).
NOTE: Unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it are
common requisites of self-defense, defense of relative and defense of a stranger. These three justifying
circumstances differ as to their third element. In defense of relative, the third element is that in case provocation
was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein. In defense of a stranger, the
third element is that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive (RPC, Art.
11, pars. 2 and 3).
(31)
Fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right
In the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his
duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the
exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if
the officer had used necessary force (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
TIME WHEN ACCUSED SUFFERS
INSANITY
Immediately before or at the precise moment
commission of the crime
EFFECT ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Exempt from liability (BOADO, Notes and Cases on the
Revised Penal Code, Books 1 and 2 and Special Penal Laws,
(2018), p. 123 [hereinafter BOADO]).
TIME WHEN ACCUSED SUFFERS
INSANITY
After commission of crime or during trial
EFFECT ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Proceedings will be suspended and accused is committed to a
hospital for mandatory treatment until he could understand the
proceedings (CAMPANILLA, Criminal Law Reviewer, Volume
I, (2020), p. 226 [hereinafter I CAMPANILLA, Reviewer]).
After judgment or while serving sentence
Execution of judgment is suspended with regard only to
personal penalty; the accused is committed to a hospital. The
NOTE: If at any time the convict shall recover period of confinement in the hospital is counted for the purpose
his reason, his sentence shall be executed, of the prescription of the penalty (Id.).
unless the penalty shall have prescribed under
the RPC (BOADO, supra at 124).
NOTE: Not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. For the defense of
insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence, which must relate
to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged.
The prevalent meaning of the word ‘crazy’ is not synonymous with the legal terms ‘insane’, ‘non compos mentis,’
‘unsound mind,’ ‘idiot,’ or ‘lunatic.’ The popular conception of the word ‘crazy’ is being used to describe a person
or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner, but it does not necessarily and
conclusively mean prove that he is legally so. In order to be exempt from criminal liability, the accused must be
so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent (People v. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25. 2018).
(32)
In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 as amended
by R.A. No. 10630 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the
mental age (People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014).
AGE AND DISCERNMENT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
15 or under, regardless of discernment
Exempt but shall undergo intervention program
Above 15 but below 18, without discernment
Exempt but shall undergo intervention program
Above 15 but below 18, with discernment
Subject to criminal liability but shall undergo diversion
program
At least 18
Subject to criminal liability
(R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 6, as amended by Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10630).
(33)
AAA, 15 years old, testified that her classmates Jojo, Coco and Toto (aged 15, 16 and 17, respectively)
convinced her to go with them at the apartment of Jojo’s aunt, where they handed her a shot of liquor.
After five to ten minutes from drinking the liquor, AAA started feeling dizzy. As she was closing her eyes,
AAA felt that she was being carried by Jojo. Then, Jojo proceeded to lower her shorts while Coco and
Toto were guarding the door. After successfully lowering AAA's shorts, Jojo went on top of her and
raped her. After performing the deed, Jojo invited Coco and Toto to take their turns. When AAA regained
her consciousness, she tried to escape but her ravishers blocked her way. Jojo told AAA not to report
them and threatened to hurt AAA’s brother if she did. Suddenly, AAA’s brother knocked on the door of
the apartment causing Jojo, Coco and Toto to run away. Jojo, Coco and Toto were later convicted of
rape. On appeal, as a group of 15-17-year olds, they interposed exemption from criminal liability claiming
to not have acted with discernment in the commission of the crime.
(a)
(b)
Is their appeal meritorious?
Should their claim for exemption fail, are appellants entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority?
(a)
No, as minors who have acted with discernment, Jojo, Coco and Toto are not exempt from criminal liability.
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344, the minor appellants herein, all above 15 years of age but under 18,
shall only be exempt from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment. Discernment is the mental
capacity of a minor to understand between right and wrong. Such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case. Here, the acts of the appellants of intoxicating their victim, guarding the door, blocking her escape,
threatening her and running away upon confrontation prove the presence of discernment. Thus, despite
being minors above 15 but under 18 years old, they are not exempt from criminal liability for having acted
with discernment (People vs. Sisracon, et al., G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018).
(b)
(34)
Yes, they are so entitled. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is over
fifteen (15) and under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period (RPC, Art. 68, par. 2).
Cee was terminated from her job as the Vice President for Finance of UMC. The termination from
employment was allegedly caused by a private document falsified by Maysala to make it appear that Cee
was using office funds for personal use. As a result, Maysala was criminally charged with Falsification
of Private Documents. In her defense, Maysala maintained that she was merely acting upon Finance
Manager Linao’s instructions and that she only performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her
job if she defied her superior’s order. She was apprehensive to follow because she suspected something,
but nevertheless acquiesced to such instruction. May the exempting circumstance of acting under an
impulse of uncontrollable fear be appreciated in favor of Maysala?
No, it may not be appreciated because there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation
or coercion that would have compelled her to do what she did. For the appreciation of such circumstance to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as
to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. Here, there is no showing that Maysala was threatened with loss of employment by her
superior should she fail to do the instruction, thereby negating her claim of having acted under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear (Manansala vs. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015).
(35)
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
This mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is obtaining when there is a
notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim (People v. Gonzales, Jr., G.R. No.
139542, June 21, 2001).
(36)
Sufficient provocation
"As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim
adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity." The victim
must have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused. Likewise, in order to be mitigating, the
provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act (Miranda v. People, G.R. No. 234528,
January 23, 2019).
(37)
Passion or obfuscation
The mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation cannot be considered in favor of an accused when
the relationship between him and the deceased is illicit, because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility
for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arises from
vicious, unworthy and immoral passions (People v. Visagar, G.R. No. L-5384, June 12, 1953).
(38)
Voluntary surrender
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has
not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture (People
v. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011). The mere issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically
make the surrender involuntary. Notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still
be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the
very act of himself giving up (People v. Lozano, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003).
(39)
Inherent aggravating
Those that must necessarily accompany the commission of the crime. Thus, they are not appreciated as
aggravating circumstances within the contemplation of Art. 14 and are treated as essential elements of the
offense to which they form an integral part. Thus, they generally do not serve to increase the penalty (RPC, Art.
62(2)).
Some inherent aggravating circumstances are: (IFBAD)
1. Fraud in estafa (RPC, Art. 315);
2. Breaking of a wall or unlawful entry into a house in robbery with the use of force upon things (RPC,
Art. 299);
3. Abuse of public position in malversation of public funds and property (RPC, Art. 217); and
4. Deceit in simple seduction (RPC, Art. 338; ESTRADA, Book One, supra at 135).
(40)
Nighttime
Nighttime by and of itself is not aggravating. It becomes so only when it is especially sought by the offender
or taken advantage by him to facilitate the commission of the crime (objective test) or to ensure his immunity
from capture (subjective test) (People v. Pasiliao, G.R. Nos. 98152-53, October 26, 1992).
(41)
Abuse of superiority
Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative
strength of the aggressor vis-a-vis the victim. There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one
malefactor and one victim (People v. Maron G.R. No. 232339, November 20, 2019).
(42)
Evident premeditation
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment (People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007).
(43)
Treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. (Art. 14, par. 16, RPC) Treachery
attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter is asleep and unable to defend himself.
Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a position to defend himself, take flight or otherwise avoid the assault, thus
ensuring that the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the attacker (People vs. Dela Pena G.R. No.
238120, February 12, 2020).
(44)
Unlawful entry
Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as the accused entered
the room of the victim through the window, which is not the proper place for entrance into the house (RPC, Art.
14. par. 18; People v. Barruga, G.R. No. 42744, March 27, 1935).
(45)
Dwelling
Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode. One's dwelling place is a 'sanctuary worthy of respect' and that one who slanders
another in the latter's house is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. He who goes to another's house
to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty that he who offends him elsewhere (People v. Belo, G.R. No. 109148,
December 4, 1998).
RECIDIVISM (Art. 14, par. 9)
REITERACION (Art. 14, par. 10)
Where a person, on separate occasions, is Where the offender has been previously punished for an
convicted of two offenses embraced in the same offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
title in the RPC.
penalty or for two crimes to which it attaches a lighter
penalty
When a person, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by
When the offender has been previously punished (has
final judgment of another crime embraced in the
served sentence). The first offense was punished with
same title of the RPC.
an equal or greater penalty; or he committed two or
more crimes previously where he was meted lighter
penalty.
(46)
The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery and the means adopted must
have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime (Cirera y Ustelo v. People, G.R.
No. 181843, July 14, 2014, Leonen Case).
(47)
May treachery be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide?
Yes, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime.
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty
for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which
in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime
and prescribing a penalty therefore shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. xxx
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide, and it is not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide;
neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of
robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefore. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty. The high court of
Spain declared that it would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery with homicide,
treachery would have no application, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons,
the crime is not only an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende).
Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide (People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003).
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of
homicide is killed by treachery.
NOTE: The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or
as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
(48)
Matibay confronted Duhat, and asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?" Duhat replied "wala," and without
warning, Matibay delivered a fist blow hitting Duhat on the left cheek and causing him to teeter
backwards. Matibay then pulled out his gun and frontally shot Duhat, who fell face-first on the pavement.
While Duhat remained in that position, Matibay shot him several more times leading to his death. Matibay
was prosecuted for murder since it was alleged that treachery attended the killing of Duhat. Matibay
contends that there was no treachery because he shot Duhat during their face-to-face confrontation. Do
you agree with Matibay?
I disagree with Matibay. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it
was made rendered it impossible for Duhat to defend himself. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Matibay, who was armed with a gun, confronted Duhat, and without any provocation, punched and
shot him. The heated exchange of words that preceded the incident was insufficient to forewarn Duhat against
any impending attack from his assailant. Thus, the frontal attack made by Matibay does not negate the presence
of treachery (People v. Matibag, G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015).
(49)
The alternative circumstances are: (RID)
1. Relationship;
Relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the :
a. Spouse;
b. Ascendant;
c. Descendant;
d. Legitimate, natural, or adopted Brother or Sister;
e. Relative by Affinity in the same degree of the offender
2.
Intoxication; and
Mitigating
If intoxication is not habitual
Aggravating
If intoxication is habitual
If intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to If it is intentional (subsequent to the plan to commit
commit a felony
a felony) - drinks fully, knowing its effects, to find a
stimulant to commit a crime or a means to
suffocate any remorse
3.
Degree of instruction and education of the offender
As a general rule, lack of sufficient education is a mitigating circumstance in almost all crimes (U.S. v.
Reguera, G.R. No. L-16639, March 22, 1921). However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule
which, although not making it mitigating, it also does not make it aggravating, to wit:
a. Crimes against Property such as arson, estafa, theft, or robbery;
b. Crimes against Chastity;
c. Treason, because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citizen however
unaltered or uncultured he may be;
d. Rape; and
e. Murder or homicide; to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed
to know and feel (People v. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, October 23, 1979).
NOTE: For violations of R.A. No. 9262, being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other
mind-altering substance shall not be a defense (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 27).
(50)
For purposes of Article 332, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood
relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by
the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the
beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa through falsification?
No, the relationship by affinity is not dissolved by death of one spouse. In the case of Intestate Estate of
Manolita Gonzales v. People (G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010) the Court held that for purposes of Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the
affinity. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
No, the beneficial application of Article 332 does not cover the complex crime of estafa through
falsification. The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose
of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to
apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly
treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation
(Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010)
NOTE: The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article
11(2) of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one’s relatives under Article 13(5) of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship
in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code (Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People,
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
(51)
When is the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable?
Its application shall be mandatory except in the following cases:
1. Those persons convicted of offenses punished with life imprisonment;
2. Those persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua (People v. Rocha, G.R. No.
173797, August 31, 2007; People v. Asturias, G.R. No. 61126, January 31, 1985);
3. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
4. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
5. Those convicted of piracy;
6. Those who are habitual delinquents;
7. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
8. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof; and
9. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year (not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of the Act, except as provided in Sec. 5 thereof);
NOTE: If the maximum term of imprisonment is less than one (1) year, the trial court may not impose
an indeterminate sentence but straight penalty of one year or less instead (Guinhawa v. People, GR
No. 162822, August 25, 2005).
10. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of this Act; and
11. Those, whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro (R.A. No.
4103, Sec. 2).
(52)
Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by the RPC?
It is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum term which the court is mandated to impose for the
benefit of a guilty person who is not disqualified therefore; provided that the maximum imprisonment exceeds 1
year. It applies to both violations of Revised Penal Code and special laws.
If the offense is punished under the RPC, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said code. It is noteworthy that the mitigating or
aggravating is only to be considered in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In
contrast, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code
(RPC) for the offense. The basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not the imposable
penalty (People v. Yco, G.R. No. 6545, July 27, 1954; ISLAW, Sec. 1).
(53)
Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by special laws. (2017 Bar)
If the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall
not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (ISLAW, Sec. 1).
(54)
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what should be the penalty for homicide if there are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances?
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. Since there are no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, each of the accused-appellants should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of
which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is
that properly imposable under the RPC, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period (People v. Villanueva, G.R.
No. 226475, March 13, 2017).
(55)
What are the requisites of the three-fold rule?
The following are the requisites of the three-fold rule:
a. The maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than 3 times the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him;
b. But in no case to exceed 40 years;
c. This rule shall apply only when the convict is to serve 4 or more sentences successively (RPC, Art.
70).
The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve continuous imprisonment for several
offenses. If the convict already served sentence for one offense, that imprisonment will not be considered
(Alejandro v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3215, October 6, 1949).
(56)
In 1995, Mayor Anton and his six (6) cohorts were convicted for seven (7) counts of rape with homicide
of two college students. Each one was sentenced to suffer a total of seven (7) reclusion perpetua. Mayor
Anton has been in the Bilibid prison for twenty-five (25) years. Due to the recent SC decision which
declared that the GCTA law may be applied retroactively, there is a possibility that Mayor Anton and his
co-principals may be eligible for an early release, assuming that they meet the qualifications under the
GCTA law. The families of the victims are opposing such possibility, contending that each of the accused
must not be released as they must serve the total of seven (7) reclusion perpetuas each, when in fact
they have only served around 25 years. Is the contention correct?
No, the contention of the families is incorrect. The three-fold rule applies in this case. Under Article 70 of
the RPC, the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum of those imposed equals the said maximum period. Further, such maximum period
shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. In the case of People v. Mendoza, it was held that the accused were
guilty of five counts of murders and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count. In this case, it was
held that the duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed 40 years (RPC, Art. 70; People v. Mendoza,
G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950).
(57)
A sentence may be suspended in the following cases:
1. In case of insanity (Article 79, RPC); and
2. Minority (Sec. 31-35 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC and RA 9344).
(58)
A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with the crime 3
months later. He was 23 when he was finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to serve a
jail term, he sought a suspension of the sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile offender. Should
he be entitled to a suspension of sentence? If not, what provision of R.A. No. 9344 may he avail of? (2003
Bar)
No. Although A was below 18 years old when he committed the crime, he was already 23 years old when
he was finally convicted and sentenced. The provisions of Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 allow suspension of sentence
only until the offender reaches 21 years of age. Thus, A is no longer eligible for suspension of sentence (Sec 38,
R.A. 9344). Even if the offender may no longer avail of suspension of sentence, he may still avail of Sec. 51,
which is confinement in agricultural camps or other training places.
NOTE: Section 46 of the 2019 Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law provides that “If the child
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the judgment of conviction, shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of sentence
can be availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21)
years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt, without prejudice to the child’s availing of other benefits such
as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in the interest of justice. The benefits of suspended sentence
shall not apply to a child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall
nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and in lieu
thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
(59)
Before finality of judgment
Criminal liability as well as both personal and pecuniary penalties are extinguished under Art. 89 (People
v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994).
(60)
After finality of judgment
Only his criminal liability is extinguished. His civil liability is not affected by his death (I CAMPANILLA,
Reviewer, supra at 458).
(61)
Pending appeal of his conviction
The death of the accused pending the appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
his civil liability based solely on the offense committed, as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused
(People v. Antido, G.R. No. 208651, March 14, 2018).
NOTE: The death of the accused prior to the issuance of entry of judgment extinguishes only his criminal
liability ex delicto and not civil liability arising from sources other than delicts (People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166;
June 5, 2017).
(62)
The RTC found Ruel guilty for Violation of Section 11(3), Article II of R.A. 9165, which was affirmed by
the CA. On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction of accused, thus affirming the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, through an unsigned Resolution. On August 7, 2014, accused moved for
reconsideration, questioning this Court's June 23, 2014 unsigned Resolution and praying for his
acquittal. On July 22, 2016, this Court received from the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections a
letter20 dated July 15, 2016 informing this Court that accused died on March 1, 2015, prior to the issuance
of this Court's June 27, 2016 Resolution. What is the effect of the death of the accused?
The criminal liability is extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment (Art. 89 (1) RPC). Likewise, the civil liability of the accused arising
from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death. Considering accused's death pending appeal
extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, the criminal action must be dismissed since there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. Therefore, when accused died on March 1, 2015 during the
pendency of his appeal and prior to this Court's Resolution dated June 27, 2016, his criminal liability has already
been extinguished (Tuano y Hernandez v. People, G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), September 28, 2016, Leonen
Case).
(63)
Definition
Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
PARRICIDE (Art. 246)
As to Basis
of the Crime
As to the
Victim
Relationship of the offender and the victim
INFANTICIDE (Art. 255)
The age of the child. He/she must be less than
three (3) days old. Otherwise, the crime is
parricide.
May be committed not only against a child Only against a child less than three (3) days old
three days old or over but also against other
relatives
PARRICIDE (Art. 246)
As to the
Offender
As to
Application
of the Rule
on
Conspiracy
Committed only by the relatives enumerated
INFANTICIDE (Art. 255)
Committed by any person
Does not apply as the basis is the relationship Applicable. Only one Information is filed against
of the offender and the victim. Separate all offenders.
Information must be filed for the murder or
homicide committed by the non-relative
conspirator.
As to the
Concealment of dishonor of the mother is not Concealment of dishonor of the mother (and
Mitigating
mitigating.
maternal grandparents) is mitigating.
Circumstance
of
Concealment
of Dishonor
(64)
When invoking Art. 247 of the Revised Penal Code as defense, the accused must prove the following:
a. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of
age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
b. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury
in the act or immediately thereafter.
c. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
To satisfy this burden, the accused must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the other person in
flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. However, as with self-defense, the
exceptional circumstance provided under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code may not prevail if the accused
fled from the crime scene and failed to inform the authorities about the incident (People v. Puedan, G.R. No.
139576, September 2, 2002).
(65)
Murder is committed if the following elements are present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide.
The killing of or assault against a child by an adult assailant is always treated as treacherous, even if the
treacherous manner of the assault is not shown. Indeed, the weakness of the minor victim because of his tender
years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant. The minor victim cannot be expected to
put up any form of effective resistance because of his tender age, relatively small frame, and inexperience in
combat. Moreover, a deadly attack against a minor is easier to execute inasmuch as the minor can offer little, if
any, resistance, thereby posing no peril to the attacker (People v. Haloc, G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018).
(66)
One day, while Y’s wife was quietly minding her own business, X suddenly barged into their house
looking for Y. X ran into Y’s room. Y’s wife shouted at X to close his room However, X immediately
stabbed Y with a bladed weapon while uttering the words “Papatayin kita”, in which he eventually
succeeded. Z, Y’s friend, was able to pull him out of the room. Not contented, X went back and stabbed
Y again. X was charged and convicted of the crime of murder. X insisted on appeal that treachery cannot
be appreciated since Y’s wife was able to warn her husband that he was approaching their room with a
bladed weapon. Is X liable for murder?
Yes, he is liable for murder. The fact that Y’s wife was able to shout at the former to close his room does
not rule out the presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible
danger to his person, there is treachery nonetheless when the attack was executed in such a manner as to make
it impossible for the victim to retaliate. The present case typifies this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to
defend himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right inside his own
abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a defense (People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 216063, June
5, 2017).
(67)
Two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously
adopted. The fact that a gun was fired does not mean that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately
employed. The use of a gun, by itself, does not necessarily imply treachery. (People v. Belludo, G.R. No. 219884,
October 17, 2018).
(68)
ELEMENTS OF INFANTICIDE
To convict an accused charged with infanticide, the following elements must be proved:
a. A child was killed;
b. The deceased child was less than three days old; and
c. The accused killed the child.(Peope v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, January 22, 2020).
(69)
REQUISITES TO MAKE KILLING AS INFANTICIDE
There are three requisites to make killing as infanticide, to wit:
a. The infant must be killed outside the maternal womb — killing an unborn fetus regardless of its
viability or intrauterine life is not infanticide, but abortion;
b. The infant must be viable — killing a non-viable fetus outside the womb is still abortion; and
c. The infant must be less than three days old — a child with a life of three (3) days or more is not an
infant; hence killing a child, who is not an infant, is not infanticide but parricide or murder
(CAMPANILLA, Criminal Law Reviewer, Volume II, (2020), p. 375 [hereinafter II CAMPANILLA,
Reviewer]).
(70)
X, accused, allegedly attacked and assaulted A. A sustained physical injuries in the different parts of his
body which required medical attendance for the period of 25 days, and caused him to be incapacitated
to perform his customary labor for the same period of time. A, as alleged in the complaint, also lost the
power to hear of his right ear. What crime(s) did X commit? Explain.
X is guilty of serious physical injuries under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
the Revised Penal Code, it should be considered serious physical injuries when the injured person becomes ill
or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days (but must not be more than 90 days), as a result of the physical
injuries inflicted. Here, A required medical attendance for only 25 days. However, he lost the power to hear of
his right ear. Article 263, paragraph 3 applies when the person injured shall have lost "the use of any other part
of his body." Since A in this case was deprived of the use of his right ear, a part of his body, such offense
accurately falls under such aforementioned provision. Therefore, X is liable for serious physical injuries (People
v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-4213, November 28, 1953).
GRAVITY
DAYS
Incapacity from habitual work
Permanent
Illness/incapacity from habitual work
Over 90 days
Illness/incapacity from labor
31 - 90 days
Less Serious
(Art. 265)
Incapacity from labor/medical attendance required
10 - 30 days
Slight
(Art. 266)
Incapacity from labor/medical attendance required
1 - 9 days
Serious
(Art. 263)
(71)
INJURY
A jeep recklessly driven by A went out of control and hit the wall of a house and a bystander, wrecking
the wall and injuring the person hit. In two separate informations, the driver was charged with damage
to property thru reckless imprudence and slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Were the
charges proper? If you were the Prosecutor, for what crime/s would you charge A? Explain.
The charge is not proper. If I were the Prosecutor, I will charge A in a single information for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight physical injuries. The essence of the quasioffense of criminal negligence or imprudence lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that if
intentionally done would be punishable as a felony – for the law punishes the negligent or imprudent act and not
the result thereof. In other words, negligence or imprudence is the crime itself.
NOTE: If two informations are filed, one for damage to property thru reckless imprudence and the other
for slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, and the offender is acquitted or convicted of the crime of
slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, such conviction or acquittal will constitute double jeopardy in
the prosecution for damage to property thru reckless imprudence as such refers to the same act of reckless
imprudence (Buerano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-30269, July 19, 1982).
(72)
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, and (2) the accused
had carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim
was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Carnal
knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is below 12 years old should be designated as statutory
rape. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only pertinent
concern is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge indeed took place. Hence, a person's capacity
to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her
chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years
of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of
the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established (People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020).
(73)
The elements of special complex crime of rape with homicide are the following:
a. The appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman;
b. Carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and
c. By reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the
appellant killed a woman (People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019, Leonen Case).
(74)
Article 266- A 1 (d) provides that rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman when
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the other circumstances
in this article be present. If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused
remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A
(1) is carnal knowledge of "a woman against her will or without her consent." Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse
with an intellectually disabled person is rape since proof of force or intimidation becomes needless as the victim
is incapable of giving consent to the act (People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017, Leonen Case).
(75)
The elements of rape with homicide are present. In rape with homicide, “homicide” is to be understood in its
generic sense and includes murder committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Thus, even if any qualifying
circumstance is proved, it would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime is still rape with homicide. The
aggravating circumstance is to be considered as generic aggravating only (People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321,
October 5, 2011).
(76)
XXX, then 10 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of Y, then 31 years old. XXX’s mother told Y to
spend the night at their house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room
floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus." He saw that Y "fondled his penis." When Y returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward
his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Y played with his sexual organ.
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident,
but he remained silent. She asked him to leave.
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident
to the Sta. Rosa police station. The police referred them to the municipal health center for medical
examination where the examination revealed that there were no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice
that was also "negative for spermatozoa." A criminal complaint was filed against R. The RTC found Y
guilty of rape through sexual assault. The CA affirmed the conviction. Are the RTC and CA correct?
Yes, the RTC and CA are correct. Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as
"instrument or object rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice." In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify
what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed.
In this case, the absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection
and penetration. The medico-legal explained that the negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not
remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter The gravamen of the crime is the
violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."
Hence, the RTC and CA are correct in ruling that Y is guilty of the crime of rape through sexual assault (Ricalde
v. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, Leonen Case).
(77)
X, a police officer, was assigned to investigate a vehicular collision between a jeepney and a taxi. X
confiscated the license of TD, the driver of the taxi, and demanded from the latter the amount of 5,000 in
exchange for his license. The thought of not having his driver's license back and the possibility that he
might not be able to earn a living for his family prompted him to give the amount demanded. Feeling
aggrieved, TD instituted an action against X allegedly for the crime of simple robbery. During the trial, it
is established by the prosecution that whenever a license was confiscated due to a traffic violation, the
same must be claimed from the office of the MMDA or City Hall, and not from the officer who confiscated
his license as the case may be. What crime did X commit?
Yes, X is liable for committing simple robbery against the taxi driver. Simple robbery is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, but the extent of the violation or intimidation does not fall
under paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the RPC. The following elements must be established: 1) that there is
personal property belonging to another; 2) that there is unlawful taking of that property; 3) that the taking is with
intent to gain; and 4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. TD’s money
was unlawfully taken by the petitioner with intent to gain and through intimidation. X is not authorized to keep an
offender's license and receive any payment for its return. Likewise, intense fear produced in the mind of TD that
restricted or hindered him to exercise his will as X succeeded in forcing TD to choose between parting with his
money or have his driver's license completely confiscated or cancelled (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April
23, 2018).
(78)
.
(79)
Under the Revised Penal Code, to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery
(People v. Dillatan Sr., G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018).
Component crimes in a special complex crime have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of
the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime,
another crime is committed. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide (People v. Dillatan Sr., G.R. No. 212191,
September 5, 2018).
(80)
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide,
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless one of them clearly endeavored to prevent the same
in which case he is liable only for Robbery (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
(81)
X and Y were playing a game of poker with their friend, A. After 3 deals, X and Y went home with their
total winnings of 12,000php. On their way home, they were suddenly ambushed by accused A by
indiscriminately firing against them. Y was shot, which led to his death, but X was able to evade the
shooting by jumping into a canal. A then took the money and fled the crime scene. Is A liable for the
separate crime of attempted murder/homicide with respect to X?
No, A committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of attempted murder with
respect to X is not a separate crime but is absorbed in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is
absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally
the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery (People v.
Cabbab Jr., G.R. No. 173479, July 12, 2007).
(82)
While outside her house, Lalaine saw Aurora and 3 other men. Aurora introduced herself as an employee
of the POEA and upon such pretension, Lalaine offered Aurora to talk to her inside her house. At this
juncture, one of the men suddenly declared a hold-up, poked a gun at Lalaine’s neck, slapped her, and
tied her hands. The men then proceeded to rob the house taking with them valuables and a vault
containing dollar currencies, and thereafter left the crime scene. What crime/s is/are committed?
The crime committed is the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of robbery with force upon things under Subdivision A applicable in the case are:(1) the
offender entered an inhabited place; (2) the entrance was effected by using any fictitious name or pretending the
exercise of public authority; (3) once inside the building, the offender took personal property belonging to another
with intent to gain. One the other hand, robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Art. 294
has the elements applicable in the case which are: (1) any of the physical injuries defined in pars. 3 and 4 of Art.
263 was inflicted in the course of robbery; (2) any of them was inflicted upon any person not responsible for the
commission of the robbery.
The accused, after entering the residential house of Lalaine took away valuables, including the vault
containing US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of
persons during the robbery by slapping, threatening and tying the victim. Furthermore, Aurora pretended to be
from the POEA (paragraph a(4) of Art. 299) and also took the vault (paragraph b(2) of Art. 299). Hence, they are
liable for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under Article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code and robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015).
(83)
AAA rode a jeepney from Siniguelas, Sta. Mesa in Manila to go to work in Recto. She was the lone
passenger in that jeepney driven by X. While driving, X told AAA that he would pass by Quiapo to buy
something. AAA assumed that she would be dropped off in Recto, but X kept driving. Terrified, AAA
implored X to stop the jeepney, but he ignored her; the jeepney only pulled to a stop when it reached a
grassy place. There, X pointed a screwdriver at AAA as he ordered her to have sex with him. AAA
struggled as Salen undressed her. He stabbed her and slapped her face, breaking her nose and bruising
her eye. He then repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina.
Once his lust was sated, X stabbed and beat her up again. He took all her belongings, including her wallet
containing cash, her Samsung cellphone worth P7,000.00, her TIN/BIR ID, PhilHealth ID, and even her
empty Metrobank ATM card, along with various other identification cards. What crime/s did X commit?
X is liable for robbery with rape. The elements of robbery with rape are the following: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied
by rape. In the case at bar, X took all of AAA’s belongings. For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not
distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery
that was accompanied by rape. The facts do not bear out that the robbery was a mere afterthought, considering
that AAA testified that accused-appellant took time to disable her and then got away with her personal belongings
(People v. Salen, Jr., G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020, Leonen Case).
(84)
AAA and BBB took 15 boxes of detergent soap without paying for their price and loaded them on a
pushcart. They were apprehended by the security guard hauling the pushcart at the parking lot and
loading the boxes in a taxi. AAA and BBB were convicted of consummated theft. On appeal, AAA and
BBB argued that they should only be held liable for frustrated theft since at the time they were
apprehended, they were never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. Is their
contention correct?
The contention of AAA and BBB is wrong because there is no crime of frustrated theft. The ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. Here, with
intent to gain, AAA and BBB acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable
period of time that they were able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these
onto a taxicab. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No.
160188, June 21, 2007).
(85)
ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT: (TAI-WAG)
1. There is Taking of personal property;
2. Said property belongs to Another;
3. Said taking be done with Intent to gain;
4. It be done Without the owner’s consent;
5. It be Accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or force upon things;
and
6. It be done with Grave abuse of confidence (People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28,
2008).
(86)
Jema was a loan bookkeeper of CCS Bank, thus, she is authorized to collect and accept loan payments
of the bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts therefor. Likewise, she is also authorized to
accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she
has received, and remit such payments to her supervisor. However, CCS Bank discovered the nonremittance of some loan payments received from its clients. Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts
amounting to 500,000 were issued by Jema but were unreported and the corresponding payements were
unremitted. Dissatisfied with her explanation about the unremitted payments, an Information for estafa
through misappropriation was filed against her. Will the case prosper? Discuss.
No, the case will not prosper. One of the elements of Estafa through misappropriation is that the offender's
receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same. Under this, the offender acquires both
material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a
possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner. Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of
the said property constitutes theft. Jema was merely a collector of loan payments from CCS Bank's clients, and
just being a mere custodian of the missing funds, she had only acquired material and not juridical possession of
such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged (Benabaye v. People, G.R.
No. 203466, February 25, 2015).
(87)
What are the differences between Theft and Estafa with abuse of confidence?
THEFT (Article 308)
ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
(Article 315[1])
As to Acquisition The offender takes the thing without the
of Property
owner’s consent.
The offender receives the thing from the
offended party.
As to Possession The offender only acquires the material
or physical possession of the thing.
The offender also acquires the juridical
possession of the thing and the offender
misappropriates it.
(88)
There can be no complex crime of falsification of private documents and estafa because the element of damage
essential in both is the same (People v. Co, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019).
(89)
Estafa through falsification of a commercial document is a complex crime because while two crimes were
committed, namely estafa and falsification of a commercial document, the estafa would not have been
consummated without the falsification of a commercial document (De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672,
February 02, 2015).
(90)
Chris, Paula, Arthur, Sissy, Theo, Chelca and Matt established the HRem Network Corporation, an
association operating on funds solicited from the public. They made representations having the
business, property and power to solicit and accept investments and deposits from the general public
and capacity to pay guaranteed monthly interest on investment from 5% to 6% and commissions. Upon
hearing these, Mariel, Hannah, Margaret, Carla and their other 7 friends decided to become investors
thus giving several amount of cash to the corporation as payment. After several months, no money was
given to the investors despite repeated demands. Then, they found out that HRem Network used their
money to their own personal benefits. What is the crime committed? Discuss.
Chris, Paula, Arthur, Sissy, Theo, Chelca and Matt committed the crime of syndicated estafa. The
elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the
RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahangnayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. They used deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority
to solicit investments from the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. Investors were
induced to invest because of the representations and promise of lucrative income. Their false pretenses and
representations made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud and reliance thereon by aggrieved
parties constitute the element of defraudation in the crime of syndicated estafa (People v. Baladjay, G.R. No.
220458, July 26, 2017).
(91)
Alicia went to Peter persuading the latter to buy her 10 checks at a rediscounted rate of 10% of the total
aggregate amount. She, likewise, assured Peter that the checks were hers and duly funded. However,
unknown to Peter, Alicia actually knew that she had no sufficient funds to cover the amount of the
checks. After Peter agreed to buy the checks, Alicia affixed her signature on the face of the checks. When
the checks become due, Peter tried to deposit the checks to his bank account but the drawee bank
refused payment because the account was already closed thus the bank returned the said checks to
Peter. He immediately demanded from Alicia the equivalent amount of said checks giving her 5 days to
comply. However, Alicia still failed to pay Peter. An Information for estafa was filed against Alicia. Will
the case prosper? Explain.
Yes, Alicia is liable for the crime of estafa by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation. Such estafa consists of the following elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. It is necessary the check should have been
issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of
a preexisting obligation. It is established that Alicia induced Peter to buy her checks after she mispresented that
she had enough funds in her account. Moreover, when informed by Peter of the dishonor of the checks, Alicia
still failed to pay within period given to her (Batac v. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018).
(92)
AAA introduced herself as the head of a company, MMG, to private complainant to solicit investments.
The Articles of partnership showed AAA as its general partner. The other 4 accused were shown to be
limited partners. The complainants, after investing, received several post-dated checks supposedly
covering their investments with interest. However, when they tried to deposit the checks, their banks
informed them that these were dishonored because MMG’s accounts were already closed. AAA insists
that he may not be found guilty of violating PD 1689 in relation to estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC
as the element of fraud or deceit is absent. Is AAA correct?
No, AAA’s contention is untenable. One of the elements of estafa by means of deceit is that there must
be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his business. In the case at hand, such element of fraud
or deceit is apparent because the incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people, including
herein accused, made false pretenses and representations to private complainant regarding a supposed lucrative
investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them. Furthermore, the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and the incorporators/directors of MMG ended up
running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice (People v. Mateo et
al. G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017).
(93)
AAA was alleged to have recruited and promised employment or job placement to and collected fees
from 16 contract workers, without first obtaining any license/authority from the POEA or by the DOLE to
recruit workers for overseas employment. AAA denied the charges against her and argued that she was
an auditor of PET Plans, Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it highly unlikely for her to
have engaged in the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad. What crime/s did AAA
commit? Explain.
AAA is liable for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa. Illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.
In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements concur:
(a) the accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits; (b) he used such deceitful
means prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on such deceitful
means to part with his money or property; and (d) the offended party suffered damage(People v. Racho G.R. No.
227505, October 2, 2017).
(94)
Jake is a businessman and wanted to buy dollar checks that he will use to buy the machines for his
business. Then, he was able to meet Amy representing herself having fully funded dollar checks. Then,
upon agreement to buy the checks, Amy issued Check No. 9999 drawn by and against Brooklyn Bank in
New York. As payment, Jake gave a cashier’s check in favor of Amy. Amy was able to encash the
cashier’s check, however, when Jake deposited the dollar check he was notified that the dollar check
was spurious.
(a)
(b)
What is the crime committed by Amy?
Assuming Amy argued that Jake accepted her promise to novate the transaction into ordinary
creditor-debtor relationship, thus, extinguishing her criminal liability. Is her defense proper?
Explain.
(a)
She is liable of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
The essential
elements of estafa Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC are: a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; c) the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; d) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage. Amy falsifying the dollar check and misrepresenting to Jake that it was
genuine and sufficiently funded in exchange therefor the cashier's checks constitute the fraud.
Furthermore, Amy encashing the check and appropriated the proceeds thereof to the damage and
prejudice of Jake seals her liability (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003).
(b)
No. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. Criminal offense is
committed against the People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that
the law imposes for the commission of the offense (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June
25, 2003 citing People v. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964).
(95)
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons (People v. Cacho y Songco, G.R. No. 218425,
September 27, 2017).
(96)
There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide. The crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or
is a separate crime altogether. Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated — whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur
to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed (People v. Abayon, G.R. No. 20489, September 14, 2016).
(97)
Under the Revised Penal Code, If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if
the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention
becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present (People v.
Mamantak, G.R. No. 174659, July 28, 2008).
(98)
The rule now is where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570,
October 12, 1998).
(99)
P went to a 7/11 convenience store. He boarded his Tamaraw FX and as he drove, he noticed a gray Isuzu
Crosswind tailing him. Thus, he decided to head to the nearest police precinct on Evangelista Street.
Upon alighting from his vehicle, a man, whom he later identified as X, alighted from the Crosswind across
the street. P recognized him because they lived in the same barangay. X told P that one of his
companions noticed that P received illegal drugs. P denied Z's accusations. P was later handcuffed and
brought to the PDEA parking lot. X's group told P that they would release him if his father would pay
them ₱150,000.00.
On X's instruction P called his father, Q, and told him to come over to the PDEA since there were people
demanding money for his release. After Q arrived and talked to the group, one member of the group took
off P's handcuffs. Q gave X the amount of P5,000.00, telling him to just call for the remaining balance
later. P drove home with his Q following him.
What crime/s did X and his group commit?
X and his group are liable for kidnapping for ransom and robbery. In kidnapping for ransom, the
prosecution must be able to establish the following elements: (1) the accused was a private person; (2) he or
she is kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (3) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (4) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. In order to prove kidnapping, the
prosecution must establish that the victim was forcefully transported, locked up or restrained. It must be proven
that the accused intended to deprive the victim of his liberty. In this case, the act of handcuffing P and physically
harming him to prevent escape falls under this definition. The fact that P voluntarily went with the accused does
not remove the element of deprivation of liberty because P would not have gone with X's group had they not
misrepresented themselves as PDEA agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs. Moreover, X and his
group also told P that he would only be released if Q paid them ₱150,000.00.
The elements of simple robbery are (1) that there is personal property belonging to another; b) that there
is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. In this case, there was a taking of personal property, the P5,000.00
belonging to Q by means of intimidation. (People v. Avancena, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017, Leonen Case).
(100) X and her friend, Y, were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was
later identified as PO3 Z, grabbed X by her right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where
three (3) other men were waiting. Both X and Y shouted for help but no one came to their rescue. Y
managed to escape and immediately reported the incident to X's mother, A.
Meanwhile, PO3 Z and his companions drove the van around Quezon City. One (1) of X's abductors, a
certain Major C, asked for her relatives' contact numbers. X gave the number of her brother, E.
A received a phone call from one (1) of the kidnappers, who demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for X's
liberty. A informed him that their family could not afford to pay the ransom due to their financial
condition. Suddenly, the caller hung up. E thereafter arrived and negotiated for a reduced ransom when
one (1) of the kidnappers called again. The kidnappers acceded and lowered their demand to
P100,000.00. What crime(s) did the Z and his companions commit? Explain.
Z and his companions are liable for kidnapping for ransom. Under the Revised Penal Code, a conviction
for the crime requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) that
individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by one who simulates public
authority. (c) any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill
that person is made. (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.
In this case, (1) a public official may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is
shown that he committed acts unrelated to the functions of his office. (2) the accused kidnapped X as stated in
the facts. (3) the accused deprived the victim of her liberty to extort money, and therefore illegal. (4) the victim X
is a woman. Hence, the accused are liable for kidnapping for ransom (People v. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August
2, 2017, Leonen Case).
(101) Public documents:
a. Public documents proper – _documents created, executed, or issued by a public official in response
to the exigencies of the public service, or in the execution of which a public official intervened (U.S. v.
Asensi, G.R. No. L-11159, August 7, 1916)
b. Official documents– _documents in the execution of which public officers take part virtue office or
any document which has become part of the public records (U.S. v. Asensi, G.R. No. L-11159, August
7, 1916)
c. Private documents punished as falsification of public documents:
i. When acknowledged before a notary public (People v. Tan, G.R. No. 24187, March 15, 1926);
ii. When intended to be a part of the public or official record (Monteverde v. People, G.R. No.
139610, August 12, 2002).
(102) Private documents
Private documents are deeds or instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a
notary public or other person legally authorized, by which a document some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth (U.S. v. Orera, G.R. No. 3810, October 18, 1907);
(103) Commercial documents
Commercial documents are those used by merchants or businesspersons to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions (Malabanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186329, August 2, 2017).
(104) ELEMENTS: (NAF)
1. The offender is a public officer, employee or Notary public or ecclesiastical minister;
NOTE: The same is not applicable when the purpose is merely to correct clerical errors in unessential
details (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-26057, April 25, 1968).
2.
He takes Advantage of his official position when:
a. He has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or
b. He has the official custody of the document which he falsifies; and
NOTE: If he did not take advantage of his official position, he would be guilty of falsification of public
document by a private individual under Art. 172.
3.
The offender Falsifies a document.
(105) EIGHT (8) MODES OF FALSIFYING A DOCUMENT: (IPA-UTAIN)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Counterfeiting or Imitating (feigning) any handwriting, signature or rubric;
Causing it to appear that persons have Participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;
Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;
Making Untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
Altering True dates;
Making Alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists or including in such a copy a statement contrary to or different from that of the
genuine original; and
Intercalating any instrument or Note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official
book (RPC, Art. 171).
(106) PUNISHABLE ACTS:
1.
2.
3.
Falsification of public, official or commercial document by a private individual;
Falsification of private document by any person; and
Use of falsified documents.
a. Introducing in a judicial proceeding
b. Use in any other transaction
(107) Damaso applied for a salary loan from XYZ Cooperative by misrepresenting himself to be an employee
of the City’s Engineer’s Office by using the name “TulfoCordura” to the loan clerk of said cooperative.
Likewise, he presented his employee’s I.D. from the City Engineer’s Office bearing the name of
TulfoCordura. He also gave supporting documents which are the certification from the City Human
Resource, Certificate of Employment, service record and promissory note. All such documents reflected
the name of “TulfoCordura” as the loan applicant and debtor. Through his misrepresentation, the loan
clerk gave him the cash advances. However, the real TulfoCordura was informed that his name was used
to applied for a salary loan. If you were the lawyer of the real TulfoCordura, what crime will you file
againstDamaso? Explain.
Damaso is liable for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The elements of
the crime of falsification of commercial documents under Article 172(1) are: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and, (3) the act
of falsification is committed in a commercial document. Damaso’s, a private individual, act of causing it to appear
that Cordura had participated in the act of applying for a loan, in fact, he did not do so in a loan application and
a promissory note which are all commercial documents satisfies the elements. It must be emphasized anew that
when the offender commits on a public, official, or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes
form a complex crime (Desmoparan v. People, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019 citing De Castro v. People,
G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015).
(108) Differentiate Article 171 from Article 172.
If the person committing any of the acts enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is a public officer, employee, or notary who took advantage of his or her official position, or an eccleciastical
minister which may affect civil status of persons, then the higher penalty of prision mayor is imposed. However,
if the person committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 is a private individual, then Article 172 of the
RPC applies, and the private individual is punished with the lesser penalty of prision correccional.
(109) Definition — It is the willful and corrupt assertion of falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority
of law on a material matter (Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005).
(110) Elements of Perjury: (SCAR)
1. The accused made a Statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a Competent officer authorized to receive and administer
oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate Assertion of a falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is Required by law or made for a legal purpose
(Union Bank of the Phils. v. People, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012).
(111) To be liable for the crime of perjury, mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused. A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the
accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be
false by other evidence than the contradicting statement. Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony
under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this
would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony
charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each
other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be
furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the
accused.
The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that
fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of
the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified (Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 162187, 18 November 2005).
(112) R.A. No. 9262 includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: (PSPE)
1. “Physical violence” refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
2.
“Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:
a. Rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b. Acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c. Prostituting the woman or child.
3.
“Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family
to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets
or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
4.
“Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
a. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
b. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment
of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
c. Destroying household property;
d. Controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
(113) Boy left his wife, Girl, and their children in their home in Quezon City to work abroad. A few years later,
Boy acquired a permanent resident status. One day, Girl received an e-mail from Boy’s mother showing
pre-nuptial photos of Boy and his live-in partner abroad. Aggrieved, Girl filed a complaint before the RTC
of Quezon City against Boy for violation of R.A. No. 9262. Girl claims that Boy’s marital infidelity
constitutes psychological violence and have caused her mental and emotional anguish. When Boy came
home to the Philippines to buy wedding souvenirs, he was arrested. For his defense, Boy claims that the
local courts do not have jurisdiction over the case because the acts complained of transpired abroad.
(a)
(b)
Is Boy’s defense tenable?
Assuming instead that the case filed against Boy was for the crime of bigamy, does RTC Quezon
City have jurisdiction?
(a)
No. While it is true that penal laws only apply within the Philippine territory, R.A. No. 9262 contemplates
that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes.
Under Sec. 7, cases may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Psychological violence is an
indispensable element of the offense but equally essential is the element of mental and emotional anguish
which is personal to the complainant. Here, the marital infidelity was committed by Boy abroad while its
effects of mental and emotional anguish to Girl occurred here in the Philippines. Thus, Boy may be validly
tried before the RTC of Quezon City where Girl and their children reside (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448,
January 11, 2018).
(b)
No, Boy cannot be prosecuted for bigamy before the local court because the bigamous marriage was
contracted abroad. Following the Principle of Territoriality, penal laws are only enforceable within the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulation (CIVIL
CODE, Art. 14). The Principle of Extra-Territoriality does not find application in this case because the act
complained of is not one of the instances under which Philippine penal laws may apply to crimes committed
outside of its territorial boundaries (RPC, Art. 2).
(114) Discuss what happens at each stage of the so-called “cycle of violence” involved in the claim of Battered
Woman Syndrome.
The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence”, which has three
phases:
a. During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs. It could be verbal or slight physical abuse
or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of
kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
b. During the acute battering phase, brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death occurs. The
battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has
no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
c. During the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase, the couple experience profound relief.
On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and
promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince
herself that the battery will never happen again (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15,
2004).
(115) Misis had been married to Mister for 10 years. Since their marriage, Mister had been jobless and a
drunkard, preferring to stay with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. Misis was the
breadwinner and attended to the needs of their three (3) growing children. Many times, when Mister was
drunk, he would beat Misis and their three (3) children, and shout invectives against them. In fact, in one
of the beating incidents, Misis suffered a deep stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged stay
in the hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal abuses committed against her, she consulted a
psychologist several times, as she was slowly beginning to lose her mind. One night, when Mister arrived
dead drunk, he suddenly slapped Misis several times while shouting invectives against her. Mister then
went to sleep and left Misis crying. While Mister was sound asleep, Misis stabbed Mister several times
causing his instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed that the husband suffered three (3) stab
wounds. Can Misis validly put up a defense? Explain. (2014 Bar)
Yes. Misis can put up the defense of battered woman syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from
physical and psychological or emotional distress resulting from cumulative abuse by her husband. Under Section
26 of R.A. No. 9262, “victim survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome
do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.” As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased, stabbing the
victim further is not self-defense. However, even if the element of unlawful aggression in self-defense is lacking,
Misis, who is suffering for battered woman syndrome, will not incur criminal and civil liability (R.A. No. 9262, Sec.
26).
(116) A was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 9262 after B, his former girlfriend accused him
of pulling her hair, punching her back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading her
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. In his defense, A averred that at the time of the alleged
incident, he was no longer in a dating relationship with B; hence, R.A 9262 was inapplicable.
(a)
(b)
Will the defense prosper?
Is it required that the complainant bore a child with the accused to be able to charge him with
violation of R.A. No. 9262?
(a)
No, the defense was not valid. Dating relationship contemplates a situation wherein the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship (R.A. No.
9262, Sec. 3, par. e). For R.A. No. 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be
a consequence of such a relationship. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed (Dabalos v. RTC Angeles City G.R. No.
193960, January 07, 2013). In the given case, even if A and B were no longer romantically involved when
the incident happened, the fact that B was his former girlfriend and that he inflicted physical suffering which
demeans and degrades the latter’s intrinsic worth and dignity, is constitutive of the crime.
(b)
No, as long as the woman had sexual relations with the accused, which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3, par. f). Thus, B was not excluded from the coverage of
the law even if she did not bear any child from A.
(117) X married Y in 2006. Thereafter, Y started to work in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in 2008. X claimed that Y stopped supporting their children, compelling her to take
additional jobs to augment her income. X also alleged of Y’s virtual abandonment, mistreatment, and
physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, Y has been allegedly living with a Singaporean
woman. The alleged marital infidelity caused X mental and emotional anguish, prompting her to file a
case against Y for violation of Sec. 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 before the Family Court of Pasig. The Family
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because the alleged illicit relationship occurred
outside the country. Is the ruling of the court correct?
No, the ruling of the Family Court is incorrect. Contrary to the interpretation of the court, what R.A. No.
9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional
suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks
to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may
be committed. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense. And Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the
means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also
is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No.
212448, January 11, 2018).
(118) H and W were married with two kids. Barely six years into the marriage, W filed a Petition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against H and her parents-in-law, Spouses A and B,
before the RTC. W alleged that H, in conspiracy with her parents-in-law, was causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of R.A. No. 9262. Spouses A and B filed a
Motion to Dismiss contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since as parents-inlaw of W, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. On the contrary, W contends that R.A. No. 9262 must
be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of the same Act which explicitly provides for
the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletory applied. May the parents-in-law of W be
included in the Petition for the Issuance of a TPO in accordance with R.A. No. 9262?
Yes, the parents-in-law may be included in the petition. While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an offender through another. In addition, the protection order
that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may
include individuals other than the offending husband. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the
law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women
and children. Hence, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262 and consequently, parents-inlaw may be included in a Petition for the Issuance of a TPO (Go-Tan vs. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852,
September 30, 2008).
(119) Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused
primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed
on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but
also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children
(Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017).
(120) Jayson and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño.
When the procession passed in front of the Bongalon’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also
a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy". Bongalon confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and "animals". He also struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and
slapped Jayson on the face. Bongalon then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando, their
father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house. Bongalon explained that he only talked with
Jayson and Roldan after his minor daughters told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at
them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
Bongalon was charged with the crime of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. Does Bongalon’s acts
constitute child abuse under R.A. 7610?
No, the acts of Bongalon does not constitute child abuse. Child Abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes xxx physical abuse xxx and any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being xxx.
There is no showing that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth
and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The
laying of hands on Jayson has been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered
harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime
of child abuse (Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013)
(121) On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ric, who was then 31 years old, and a distant
relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. XXX’s mother told Ric to spend the night at their house
as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. XXX awoke as "he felt pain
in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus. He saw that Ric "fondled his penis." XXX
told his mother about what happened. For what crime should Ric be prosecuted?
Ric should prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which
is prision mayor, considering that XXX was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Ric’s act
undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section
5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period (Ricalde v. People, G.R. No.
211002, January 21, 2015, Leonen Case).
NOTE: When the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 266-A and Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be.
Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period (Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, Leonen Case).
(122) Marley, a 16-year old barrio lass, was invited by Charlie, a 60-year old man, to keep him company in
Lights On Lights Off, a beerhouse in the red light district of Malate. May Charlie be charged for a violation
of R.A. No. 7610? Explain.
Yes, Charlie may be charged for violation of Sec. 10 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The said provision punishes
other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
committed by any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in
ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places. It further provides
that this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal
duty. Here, Marley is a minor and is also ten years younger than Charlie. They are strangers to each other and
Charlie is not performing any moral duty when they hang out together in a public beerhouse. Thus, Charlie
committed other acts of neglect and exploitation punished under Sec. 10 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610,
Sec. 10 (b)).
(123) What acts does the Safe Spaces Act (R.A. No. 11313) penalize? (SOQWE)
1. Gender-Based Streets and Public Spaces Sexual Harassment (R.A. No. 11313, Art. I);
a. Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in Restaurants and Cafes, Bars and Clubs, Resorts and Water
Parks, Hotels and Casinos, Cinemas, Malls, Buildings and- Other Privately-Owned Places Open
to the Public (R.A. No. 13313, Sec. 5); and
2.
3.
4.
b. Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in Public Utility Vehicles (R.A. No. 13313, Sec. 6);
Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment (R.A. No. 11313, Art. II);
Qualified Gender-Based Streets, Public Spaces and Online Sexual Harassment (R.A. No. 11313, Art.
III);
Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (R.A. No. 11313, Art. IV); and 5. Gender-Based
Sexual Harassment in Educational and Training Institutions (R.A. No. 11313, Art. V).
(124) How is Safe Spaces Act different from Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995?
The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law of 1995. The gravamen of the offenses punished under the Safe Spaces Act is the act of
sexually harassing a person on the basis of the his/her sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression,
while that of the offense punished under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is abuse of one's authority,
influence or moral ascendancy so as to enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate. (Escandor v. People,
G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020, Leonen Case).
(125) How is Gender-Based Streets and Public Spaces Sexual Harassment committed?
The crimes of gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment are committed through any
unwanted and uninvited sexual actions or remarks against any person regardless of the motive for committing
such action or remarks (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.4, par. 1).
(126) What acts are included as Gender-Based Streets and Public Spaces Sexual Harassment?
Gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment includes catcalling, wolf-whistling, unwanted
invitations, misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist slurs, persistent uninvited comments or gestures
on a person’s appearance, relentless requests for personal details, statement of sexual comments and
suggestions, public masturbation or flashing of private parts, groping, or any advances, whether verbal or
physical, that is unwanted and has threatened one’s sense of personal space and physical safety, and committed
in public spaces such as alleys, roads, sidewalks and parks (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.4, par. 2).
(127) How is Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment committed?
Gender-based online sexual harassment includes acts that use information and communications
technology in terrorizing and intimidating victims through physical, psychological, and emotional threats,
unwanted sexual misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist remarks and comments online whether
publicly or through direct and private messages, invasion of victim’s privacy through cyberstalking and incessant
messaging, uploading and sharing without the consent of the victim, any form of media that contains photos,
voice, or video with sexual content, any unauthorized recording and sharing of any of the victim’s photos, videos,
or any information online, impersonating identities of victims online or posting lies about victims to harm their
reputation, or filing, false abuse reports to online platforms to silence victims (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.12).
NOTE: Any record, photo or video, or copy thereof of any person that is in violation of the preceding
sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.14).
(128) When can Gender-Based Streets, Public Spaces and Online Sexual Harassment be qualified?
The penalty next higher in degree will be applied in the following cases:
1. If the act takes place in a common carrier or PUV, including, but not limited to, jeepneys, taxis,
tricycles, or app-based transport network vehicle services, where the perpetrator is the driver of the
vehicle and the offended party is a passenger;
2. If the offended party is a minor, a senior citizen, or a person with disability (PWD), or a breastfeeding
mother nursing her child;
3. If the offended party is diagnosed with a mental problem tending to impair consent;
4. If the perpetrator is a member of the uniformed services, such as the PNP and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), and the act was perpetrated while the perpetrator was in uniform; and
5. If the act takes place in the premises of a government agency offering frontline services to the public
and the perpetrator is a government employee (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.15).
(129) What acts are included as Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace? (EDE)
The crime of gender-based sexual harassment in the workplace includes the following:
1. An act or series of acts involving any unwelcome sexual advances, requests or demand for sexual
favors or any act of sexual nature, whether done verbally, physically or through the use of technology
2.
3.
such as text messaging or electronic mail or through any other forms of information and
communication systems, that has or could have a detrimental effect on the conditions of an individual’s
Employment or education, job performance or opportunities;
A conduct of sexual nature and other conduct-based on sex affecting the Dignity of a person, which
is unwelcome, unreasonable, and offensive to the recipient, whether done verbally, physically or
through the use of technology such as text messaging or electronic mail or through any other forms
of information and communication systems; and
A conduct that is unwelcome and pervasive and creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating
Environment for the recipient: Provided, That the crime of gender-based sexual harassment may also
be committed between peers and those committed to a superior officer by a subordinate, or to a
teacher by a student, or to a trainer by a trainee (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.16).
(130) Is the school prohibited from investigating an act of gender-based sexual harassment or sexual violence
if the individual involved does not want to file a complaint?
No, the school may proceed with the investigation. The Safe Spaces Act provides that even if an individual
does not want to file a complaint or does not request that the school take any action on behalf of a student or
faculty member and school authorities have knowledge or reasonably know about a possible or impending act
of gender-based sexual harassment or sexual violence, the school should promptly investigate to determine the
veracity of such information or knowledge and the circumstances under which the act of gender-based sexual
harassment or sexual violence were committed, and take appropriate steps to resolve the situation. If a school
knows or reasonably should know about acts of gender-based sexual harassment or sexual violence being
committed that creates a hostile environment, the school must take immediate action to eliminate the same acts,
prevent their recurrence, and address their effects. Once a perpetrator is found guilty, the educational institution
may reserve the right to strip the diploma from the perpetrator or issue an expulsion order (R.A. No. 11313, Sec.
21).
(131) What are the prohibited acts under the Data Privacy Act (R.A. No. 10173)?
The following are prohibited acts under the Data Privacy Act:
1. Unauthorized processing of personal information and sensitive personal information
It is committed when the processing of the said information was done without the required consent of
the data subject or the person whose personal information is being processed, or without being
authorized under the Data Privacy Act or any existing law (Sec. 25).
2.
Accessing personal information and sensitive personal information due to negligence
It is committed when a person provides access to personal information of the data subject due to his
or her negligence (Sec. 26).
3.
Improper disposal of personal information and sensitive personal information
It is committed when a person knowingly or negligently disposes, discards, or abandons the personal
information of an individual in an area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the personal
information of an individual in its container for trash collection (Sec. 27).
4.
Processing of personal information and sensitive personal information for unauthorized
purposes
It is committed when a person processed personal information for purposes not authorized by the data
subject, or otherwise authorized under the Data Privacy Act or under existing laws (Sec. 28).
5.
Unauthorized access or intentional breach
It is committed when a person knowingly and unlawfully violates data confidentiality and security data
systems, breaks in any way into any system where personal and sensitive personal information is
stored (Sec. 29).
6.
Concealment of security breaches involving sensitive personal information
It is committed when a person, after having knowledge of a security breach and of the obligation to
notify the National Privacy Commission, intentionally or by omission conceals the fact of such security
breach (Sec. 30).
7.
Malicious Disclosure
It is committed when a person, with malice or in bad faith, discloses unwarranted or false information
relative to personal information or personal sensitive information obtained by him (Sec. 31).
8.
Unauthorized Disclosure
It is committed when a person discloses to a third person personal information without the consent of
the data subject. In this mere disclosure without the consent of the data subject is prohibited (Sec.
32).
(132) What is the scope of application of the Data Privacy Act?
The Data Privacy Act applies to the processing of all types of personal information and to any natural and
juridical person involved in personal information processing including those personal information controllers and
processors who, although not found or established in the Philippines, use equipment that are located in the
Philippines, or those who maintain an office, branch or agency in the Philippines subject to the immediately
succeeding paragraph: Provided, That the requirements of Section 5 are complied with (R.A. No. 10173, Sec. 4,
Par. 1).
(133) What are the instances where the Data Privacy Act may be applied extraterritorially?
This Act applies to an act done or practice engaged in and outside of the Philippines by an entity if:
1. The act, practice or processing relates to personal information about a Philippine citizen or a resident;
2. The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the entity is processing personal information in the
Philippines or even if the processing is outside the Philippines as long as it is about Philippine citizens
or residents such as, but not limited to, the following:
a. A contract is entered in the Philippines;
b. A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines but has central management and control in the
country; and
c. An entity that has a branch, agency, office or subsidiary in the Philippines and the parent or affiliate
of the Philippine entity has access to personal information; and
3. The entity has other links in the Philippines such as, but not limited to:
a. The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and
b. The personal information was collected or held by an entity in the Philippines (R.A. No. 10173,
Sec. 6).
(134) What are the instances where the provisions of the Data Privacy Act do NOT apply?
1. Information about any individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution that
relates to the position or functions of the individual, including:
a. The fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution;
b. The title, business address and office telephone number of the individual;
c. The classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual; and
d. The name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of employment
with the government;
2. Information about an individual who is or was performing service under contract for a government
institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, and the name of
the individual given in the course of the performance of those services;
3. Information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature such as the granting of a license
or permit given by the government to an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact
nature of the benefit;
4. Personal information processed for journalistic, artistic, literary or research purposes;
5. Information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority which includes the
processing of personal data for the performance by the independent, central monetary authority and
law enforcement and regulatory agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated functions;
6. Information necessary for banks and other financial institutions under the jurisdiction of the
independent, central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to comply with Republic Act
No. 9510, and Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering
Act and other applicable laws; and
7. Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign jurisdictions in accordance with the
laws of those foreign jurisdictions, including any applicable data privacy laws, which is being
processed in the Philippines (R.A. No. 10173, Sec. 4).
(135) Who is a “Data Subject”?
“Data subject” refers to an individual whose personal information is processed (R.A. No. 10173, Sec.
3[d]).
(136) What is “Processing”?
“Processing” refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon personal information
including, but not limited to, the collection, recording, organization, storage, updating or modification, retrieval,
consultation, use, consolidation, blocking, erasure or destruction of data (R.A. No. 10173, Sec. 3[j]).
(137) What is “Privileged Information”?
“Privileged information” refers to any and all forms of data which under the Rules of Court and other
pertinent laws constitute privileged communication(R.A. No. 10173, Sec. 3[k]).
(138) What is “Sensitive Personal Information”?
Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:
1. About an individual’s race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color, and religious, philosophical or
political affiliations;
2. About an individual’s health, education, genetic or sexual life of a person, or to any proceeding for any
offense committed or alleged to have been committed by such person, the disposal of such
proceedings, or the sentence of any court in such proceedings;
3. Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not limited to, social
security numbers, previous or cm-rent health records, licenses or its denials, suspension or
revocation, and tax returns; and
4. Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept classified (R.A. No.
10173, Sec. 3[l]).
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