Cases 13-22:
13. G.R. No. 109149 December 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
(right to be represented by a counsel who is a lawyer) (due process of law) (indirect
contempt) (RAPE)
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who
misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape 1 of a girl less than nine (9)
years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented
as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer
who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied committing
the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from
quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision 2 finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together
its accessory penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to
the complainant and another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of
failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as
amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full duration of his preventive
imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 In his brief, 4 appellant made the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF
HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW
AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue
of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong,
who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination
and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of
a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is
actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant
confirmed this fact. 5 Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel
should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that
appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process
since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said person
"presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled
the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner."
However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes
much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system
of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual may collide with the awesome
forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the law as well as ethically committed
to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a
similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 In Delgado, petitioner and two others were
convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents.
One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of
judgment, petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside
the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court for a new trial, explaining that —
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial
Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any
defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be
a denial of due process. 7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was
represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorney's Office, the Court has
ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively
accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420,
April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for
failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where
the accused was not even duly represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no
matter how zealous his representation might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly. 8 Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 9 The
right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
State. 10 Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement
is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily. 11
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of
the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial to be
present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to
the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests
the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to the Supreme Court.
Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in the
Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 13 a
Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet
taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the unauthorized
practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in
connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is
DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report its
recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this, order. Let all concerned
parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their
appropriate action.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.
(a person who is not a lawyer or member of the bar should not and cannot recover attorney’s
fees, which is granted only to certified members of the bar) (contempt) (canon 34 legal ethics)
(atty. – client relationship is a condition for the recovery of atty’s fees)
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al.
vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a
decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final.
On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963,
Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and
Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of
attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition
for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was
opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of the Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation
for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing
but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering
that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner
for review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing
for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share
in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence
of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties
shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same
section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine
and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the
orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said
court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation
for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be
a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as
well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and
the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting
persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practicing law, and under
statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law
unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good
standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as
an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
act or an act done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees
by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal,
by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before
the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court
of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and
cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union
PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and
Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved
party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any
order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court
of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo,
it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
15. G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
(atty- client relationship as a condition for the recovery of atty’s fee, thus the person representing
should be a lawyer) (a non-lawyer cannot claim atty’s fees)
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul
the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and
car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment
to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved
should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues
the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have
heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with
their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the
daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they
were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer
for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed
to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of
Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September
6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him.
He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and
conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative
basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for
work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed
that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits
for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these
were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents
two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction
of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to
controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from
February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1,
1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It,
accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not
illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before
us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be
struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of
discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code
against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of
Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made
were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to
make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of
or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when
the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined
by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to
tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or
permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for
which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance
due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of
P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even
in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount
of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent
the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry,
after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean
condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the
amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in
this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments
they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the
taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly
noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair
play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if
they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof.
While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories.
Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and
attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and
payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits,
plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR.,
EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA,
RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO
CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE
ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA,
DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO
BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and
REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.
(3 exceptions where a non-lawyer can represent a labor dispute)
(amicable settlement not complied, due process must be observed the court should require the
parties to file their position papers)
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the
decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases
to the Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal
office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by
the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown,
Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and
worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project
neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its
other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid
them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenthmonth pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while the others were assigned
to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were
issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The preliminary
conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private
respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted
petitioner's liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenthmonth pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner's right to file its position paper.1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were
dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.2
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week to settle the claims.
Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the
complaint and directing petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao held:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed, and what the
complainants might think as to how this branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as
they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to order the
respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the
Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The
Supreme Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties." (Lao Sok v.
Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court cannot decide a case without
facts either admitted or agreed upon by the parties or proved by evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v.
Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual
claims of the above-named complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10)
days from receipt of this order.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute the individual
claims of the herein complainants.
SO ORDERED.3
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m.
respondent thru their representative manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the
complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise of the
respondent, the latter failed to appear without any valid reason.
Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the
complainants, we believe that the issues raised herein have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed
and Terminated, however, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their
differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof
based on the employment record on file with the respondent.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was
denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind
petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent Commission was rendered
without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that:
I
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A
NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND BUT ON
SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law
when it was adjudged by the NLRC liable without trial on the merits and
without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the
principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by
the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that petitioner is
already in estoppel to disclaim the authority of its alleged representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private,
respondents' unsubstantiated complaints to hold petitioner liable for
damages.5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and respondent Commission are
void for the following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio
and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the
arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and
were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or summons and copies of
orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized
representative; provided further that in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof
shall be served on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the
parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of
complainants as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with
Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or
his agent. . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by
registered mail on the party himself. If the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized
representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in
Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor
served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City.
The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of
petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or "agent" of parties
on whom summons may be served, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted
to.6
Under the Revised Rules of Court,7 service upon a private domestic corporation or
partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the
corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them.8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised
the construction project.9 According to the Solicitor General and private respondents,
Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the
employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the
importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other
responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.
(IMPORTANTE NGA RULING)
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims
of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and
respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to
present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
thereto by the latter. . . .10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents
himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with written
authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred to by the latter.11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members
of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to
the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on
behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters
to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the
cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations
Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to respondent Commission
did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no
authority to appear before the respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was
verified by him, not by petitioner.12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into the
merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio was duly
authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the ground that notices were
served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to
appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters
before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer
Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and
requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner. The authority to
compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by evidence.13 This is explicit
from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall
have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot,
without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise
agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the preliminary conference
and constituted an offer to settle the case amicably. The promise to pay could not be presumed to
be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General.14 A defendant's promise to
pay and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation from the plaintiff to
withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant from liability.15 In effect, the offer to pay was an
offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.16 If this rule were otherwise, no attempt to settle
litigation could safely be made.17 Settlement of disputes by way of compromise is an accepted and
desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals.18 In fact, the Labor Code mandates
the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the
dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing.19
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decisions of
the labor arbiters which were not only based on unauthorized representations, but were also
made in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree
upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter
shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position
papers
xxx
xxx
xxx
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as promised, Labor
Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers.
The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private
respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file
position papers but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner
shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This
should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and respondent
Commission, they "shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by
technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the
fundamental and essential right of due process.20 And this right is satisfied, at the very least, 'when
the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.21 Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan
erred in dispensing with this requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first
to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist
the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the
Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
17. A.C. No. 8096
July 5, 2010
REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY. RODOLFO U. VIAJAR,
JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
(respondents appeared as counsel without authority for a party without approval from the
OGCC and COA) (3 indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private lawyers) (no
authority to represent kay na expire na ang ijang appointment as counsel)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-3351 passed on July 17, 2008
by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-1953.
The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case filed by the complainants against the
respondents.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hired
respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April 17,
2006.2 The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission on Audit
(COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes.3 However, controversy later erupted
when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Peña board and Yaphockun board, laid
claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.
On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Peña board filed Civil Case No. 17934 for
Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes
and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose hostility to the
"present" Board of Directors, the Dela Peña board, is supposedly of public knowledge.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Peña board also adopted Resolution No. 0095 appointing
respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private collaborating
counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct supervision and control of
Atty. Ignes.
Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24 for
Indirect Contempt of Court6 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its
General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On February 19, 2007, they
also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages7 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD),
represented herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey J. Vargas. On March
9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental complaint8 in Civil Case No. 1799.
Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 0799 dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the
retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007.
In its letter10 dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that the
retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated,
the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s
grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable circumstances; and
that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s contract was justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities
Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that
said board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and requested to hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed
a disbarment complaint11 against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA Case
No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They likewise stated
in their position paper12 that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after the OGCC had
confirmed the expiration of Atty. Ignes’s contract in its April 4, 2007 manifestation/motion13 in Civil
Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by its General
Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme Investigative and Security Agency, represented by
its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.
In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent KWD
until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contract’s pre-termination. Atty. Mann
also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in deference to the OGCC’s
stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Mann’s defense.15
On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation16 before the IBP with the following
attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No.
1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008 Order dismissing
Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as counsel of KWD and
Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.
In his report and recommendation,17 the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held that
Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and
he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in SCA Case No. 5024 and Civil Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.
As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that they be
fined ₱5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per Santayana v.
Alampay.18 The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to secure the conformity of the
OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.
As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Complainants contend that the (won) IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case
because respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels
of KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants
point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the
"Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al." in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated April
8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) "for being filed by one not duly authorized by law;" and that
the authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm since Resolution No.
009 of the Dela Peña board lacks the conformity of the OGCC. As a consequence, according to
complainants, (won) respondents are liable for willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April 17,
2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He submits that
they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In their comment, Attys. Viajar, Jr. and
Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid from private funds of the
members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel who might need legal representation, not
from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann submits similar arguments.
After a careful study of the case and the parties’ submissions, we find respondents
administratively liable.
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity
if a GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule.
Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the
OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum
Circular No. 9,19 issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from
hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same
Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written
concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private
lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,20 we listed three (3)
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can
only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may
be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD? NO.
We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as
collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the
records shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the 4th
Whereas Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes "presently stand as
KWD legal counsels," there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Nadua’s
engagement as legal counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann
are concerned, their appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No.
009 has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec
Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec
Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in Phividec’s behalf
considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied
with.21 Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann
to act as collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pretermination of his own retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys.
Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his
authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he was
not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he
stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP
on March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic notes22 in Civil Case
No. 1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely urgent motion for the
immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was compelled
to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as counsel of Ms.
Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the motion, Atty.
Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case. Atty. Ignes also
manifested that they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders dismissing Civil Case No.
1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept any motion for
reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty. Ignes later
filed a notice of appeal23 dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the notice of
appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC, in its
Order24 dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.
As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as
counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba
represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of
the facilities of KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with
the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that
Atty. Ignes still appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This
fact was not lost on the RTC in denying due course to the notice of appeal.
Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority? YES.
The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately
appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have admitted the
existence of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling in
Phividec.25 Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that
there are indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for noncompliance with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel
would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC.
Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without complying with what the rule requires.
They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves voluntarily, on their
own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents’ authority as counsels of KWD which question was
actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify
KWD’s counsels26 dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23,
200727 respondents still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And
despite the pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC
that he needs OGCC authority to file an intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of
KWD.
With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the
charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as
collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts
were clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as
counsels of the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel in their private suits.
Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to
do so, there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for
the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired.28 In Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of
₱5,000 on the respondent for willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The respondent therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification
Administration, a GOCC, without any approval from the OGCC and COA.
Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of ₱5,000 on each respondent.
On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened
after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No.
1799.30 As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified by the Court of
Appeals.31 We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.32
1awphi 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on
July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and
John Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a
case without authority to do so and FINED ₱5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents’ personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 176530
June 16, 2009
SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G. GARCIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
(Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal) (even without
the knowledge or consent of the client as long as the atty-client relationship has not yet been
terminated, the act of the counsel for the client is commendable)
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated February 6, 2007 in CA–G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for
declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and
Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos
and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance
and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez,
an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and
deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on
July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the
notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and
Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the
Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith,
and that the action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents’ (plaintiffs’) evidence, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not
the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been
awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed
beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no
tenancy relationship.
In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject
property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there
was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the
motion.4
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC, which gave due course to the same.6 The
records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge
Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to
receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for
disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty.
Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the
plaintiffs was still in America.7
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated
October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated and the records of the
case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
1avv phi 1
SO ORDERED.8
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in
nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought
was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject property. It also
noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed
fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents’ knowledge
and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty.
Magbitang’s appellants’ brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants’ brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB
(Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over
respondents’ complaint.9
1st issue: IMPORTANTE
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client
before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually
withdraw Atty. Magbitang’s authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely
stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.10 Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing
therefrom.11 Respondents’ silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated
to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and
diligence."12 Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him; otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.13 In light of
such mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her
clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.
2nd issue: The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, not the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.14
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.15 Respondents’ complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the
slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in
full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by
plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the
issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and
not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties
herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA
awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latter’s entitlement thereto questioned.
Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian
in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.
On the alleged deficiency of the appellants’ brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice
it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants’ brief
sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have
repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be
allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the
core reason for the existence of courts.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, respondent.
(imposter) (contempt of court)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan
when his real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for contempt.
The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter alia, that
respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly
tried and convicted when the contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly
issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed
jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case
considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had
supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different
cases filed by petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of
the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres
Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with "Execution of
Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short).
Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent
Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First
Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try the criminal
case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May
1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and,
in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p.
61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon
Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal
Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March
1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant
that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was
denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya."
The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27 March 1980, finding
petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal
from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639
pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court
dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that
"the non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by
mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner,
ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on
the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such that respondent Court
had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of
conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to
produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9 July
1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court
through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F,
Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner,
this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground that the
accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The
pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court
through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982, Certiorari was denied for
being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been
sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment
has been rendered by respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February
1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the
Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed
and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond
(citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the Court on July 19,
1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No.
SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The
Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the closure and
termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral
Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or
not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was already
passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res
adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with
Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the
same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the accused is brought
to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1)
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense
charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the
present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit.
Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and should have
awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded
arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the
records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on
the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant,
which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid
until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with
grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising from
the Kapunan Decision, that was timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made
it appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried, let alone convicted. No
jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds water
considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands,
Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on 27 March
1980 by the Director of Lands, who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural
Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p.
2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the
present petition for being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for
contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused from filing a
Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows
that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged
in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on
September 29, 1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on
the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the
latter's death, assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of
Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer
and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine
Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6,
1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal
Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the
lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient
basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also
disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed
Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for
the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he
claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name
as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his
real name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's Manifestation,
dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused
had died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of
the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty.
Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed
imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this
Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those cases,
we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;"
dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a
poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the
same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his
explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule
71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6)
months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres
Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs.
Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner be
subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting
that petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat
petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still
has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand,
without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes
that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent
misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct,
degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon
Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements
actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long
since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts
continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are
hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court,
severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the
subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No.
639 from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all
Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing himself as Filemon Manangan,
Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is
declared to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
20. A.C. No. 5829
October 28, 2003
DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.
DECISION
(KAWATAN NGA ABOGADO) (estafa, gross misconduct, deceit, fraud, violations of the code of
professional ethics especially canon 16, falsification of commercial document, Malpractice)
(disbarred)
PER CURIAM:
On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified
complaint1 against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred
by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company
(Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered
problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected,2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia
(Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondent’s services.
By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine,"
under whose care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had
not before met, that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being
recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery;" an advance payment of P50,000.00 "to be
charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully collected;"
P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearings, conferences
outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be
also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee,
messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be
charged to complainant’s account which would be reimbursed upon presentation of statement of
account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney’s fees does not bear complainant’s conformity,
he not having agreed therewith.
It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant’s claim, for by
letter4 of December 9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to
settle the claim of complainant "in an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage which is therefore
FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P525,000.00) PESOS."
A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France,5 he, on the advice
of respondent, signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney6 authorizing
respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of
complainant’s claim as well as to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and receive payment" from
it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date
Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No. 841172 payable to complainant in the
amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim.7 The check was received by respondent.
In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the
24th of the same month.8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant
what respondent had written him (Garcia) in respondent’s letter9 of March 26, 1999 that the claim
was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and that it was still subject of negotiations in which
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. In the
same letter to Garcia, respondent suggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid
a protracted litigation.
On December 6, 1999, on complainant’s personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he
was informed that his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to
respondent the year before.10 Complainant lost no time in going to the law office of respondent who
was not around, however, but whom he was able to talk by telephone during which he demanded
that he turn over the proceeds of his claim.11
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter12 wherein he acknowledged
having in his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as
attorney’s lien pending complainant’s payment of his attorney’s fee, equivalent to fifty percent
(50%) of entire amount collected. In the same letter, respondent protested what he branded
as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior" complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at
respondent’s office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows, quoted verbatim:
We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless our
attorney’s fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be barbaric and
uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper representation with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa, Department of Labor and
Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for your taxation compliance and
the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good network...
While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a case
against you. We will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us for the
peaceful settlement of this matter. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
As despite written demands,13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance
claim and to acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney’s fees he was demanding,
complainant instituted the administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t appears that there was ‘irregularity’
with the check," it having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was
therein intercalated after his (complainant’s) name.14
1awphi 1.nét
Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees,15 complainant
decried respondent’s continued possession of the proceeds of his claim16 and his
misrepresentations that the recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties.17
In his Counter-Affidavit18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of
the proceeds of complainant’s claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorney’s fees. He
expressed readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once he got paid fifty percent
(50%) thereof, he citing the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by
practicing lawyers in the insurance industry as the basis of the amount of his attorney’s fees,19 which
to him was justified in the absence of an attorney-client contract between him and complainant, the
latter having rejected respondent’s letter-proposal of October 21, 1998.20
Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainant’s
claim and the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to
contact complainant whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to encash the check and
keep the proceeds thereof in conformity with the Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor.21
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in
his Complaint-Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent’s proposal in
his October 21, 1998 letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected for his legal
services.22 And he presented documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999 letter of
respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and
suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainant’s claim
at P350,000.00.
Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent
declared that it was made upon Garcia’s request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal)
who was said to be Garcia’s business partner.23
Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating
his explanation that it was on Garcia’s express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter,
which was directed to the fax number of Ramiscal.
1ªvvphi1.nét
Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia
that he had talked to complainant about respondent’s retention of fifty percent (50%) of the
insurance proceeds for professional fees less expenses,25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the
total amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim
complainant is entitled to receive less attorney’s fees and expenses.26 Thus, respondent claimed that
he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt,
Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 on different occasions at his
(respondent’s) former address through his executive secretary Sally I. Leonardo; the amount of
P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondent’s) former employer Commonwealth Insurance Company
through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and at Manila
Intercontinental Hotel’s coffee shop sometime in October 1999.27 Respondent submitted the separate
sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas.28
Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was
made, respondent alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia
who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding
complainant’s claim.29
Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainant’s offer to pay him P50,000.00
for his services, insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his
professional fees and it was through him that Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered
its initial rejection of complainant’s claim, he is entitled to a contingent fee of 50% of the net
proceeds thereof.30
Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim,
incurred representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation
expenses on various occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline expenses and
parking fees of P5,000.00;31 and that his retention of complainant’s money was justified in
light of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien without a valid working permit in
the Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his professional fees.32
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation33 of October 26, 2001, found
respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to
immediately turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount of the
P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondent’s professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed
by complainant.
The Board of Govenors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigator’s
Report, issued Resolution No. XV-2002-40134 on August 3,2002, reading:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondent’s dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession to which
he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand
(P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant without prejudice to respondent’s right to claim
attorney’s fees which he may collect in the proper forum. (Underscoring supplied)
The records of the case are before this Court for final action.
Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. He prays for the reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator
so that Garcia can personally appear for his (respondent’s) confrontation.
WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and fraud
There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted
or documented.
This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
RULE 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.
xxx
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
RULE 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
xxx
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence in him.
xxx
RULE 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
xxx
RULE 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Filipino lawyer’s principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears
on the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain
specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or
property received for or from the client36 as well as delivery of the funds or property to the
client when due or upon demand.37
Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant’s
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to
his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by
his letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still
pending and recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His
explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcia’s express request is nauseating. A
lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication, documented at that,
on the mere request of a friend.
By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit
of his client, he committed professional misconduct.38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a
greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to
the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he
himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds
thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his
duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.39
That respondent had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him
of his duty to account for it.40 The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien
presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case
of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however,
the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his
fees.41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of such fees.42
In respondent’s case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his
compensation for judicial determination so that his and complainant’s sharp disagreement
thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held
on to complainant’s funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to the
amount of attorney’s fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of
an attorney’s retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify
inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon
demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney’s fees. After he
received the check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already
asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had to
doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been in custody
of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say
the least.
As for respondent’s claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had
on several occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00
out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for
it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof.
It is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount
of money to Garcia without documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged,
he and Garcia were not in good terms.43 Not only that. As stated earlier, respondent’s CounterAffidavit of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant unequivocally
contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody.
Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct.
Respondent’s claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly
for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus
highly suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct.
The intercalation of respondent’s name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable
solely in favor of complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance44 is clearly a brazen
act of falsification of a commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to
encash the check.
Respondent’s threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible
sanctions from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good
network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of
complainant’s funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that
he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the
funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his lack of
good moral character. Worse, by respondent’s turnaround in his Supplement to his CounterAffidavit that he already delivered to complainant’s friend Garcia the amount of P233,000.00
which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared
that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount
to a refusal to remit complainant’s funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that he has
misappropriated them.45
In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a
member of the noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit
and gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to
recover his attorney’s fees and purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from
Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.
21. G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR. complainant,
vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review by
the court, is a complaint1 filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.,
a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively,
of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in
his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of
general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.
The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced, with the
alleged contemptuous statements italicized for ready identification as the particulars
equivalent to the innuendo in a libel charge:
Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death
Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang
ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na lamang sila sa
magiging resulta ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang
interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon
marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya
kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station
manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot
na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.
Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa
kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia
Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding "balita" ewan kung totoo,
na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At
kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan
kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National
Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa.
xxx xxx xxx
Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan,
mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw
kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang
Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski
sa kapitolyo." Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa
pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng
double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and
laban diyan.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty
of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an
imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub
judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment2 that his article does not intend to
impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after complainant
had promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or influence the review
by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in
the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the comments made therein were made
in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article
may contain unfavorable comments about complainant, it cannot be considered as having the
tendency to degrade or impede the administration of justice; and that the complaint, which is for
contempt of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court contrary
to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment3 and Supplemental Comment,4 asserts that the
article is merely in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show, "Magandang
Gabi Bayan," last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
11640-41, entitled "People vs. Godoy;" that the article is no longer sub judice as the same was
published only after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the
case; that the article cannot be considered contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear
and present danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the
administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of the press; that a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does
not constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which did not intend to malign nor
place him in disrepute in the performance of his functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon
cannot be held liable for contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or Personal
connection with, the authorship or publication of the allegedly contemptuous article, since she had
just returned from the United States when the same was published.
On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature,
we are inclined, based on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in
the negative. We have read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced
that what is involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have
been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with
contextual care, there would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding.
In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to favorably consider the following
explanation of respondent Ponce de Leon in her Supplemental Comment:
On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that
the same does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair
criticism.
The first portion of the article reads:
"Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban
kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang
sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy
sa DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at
hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang
interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy.
Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear.
Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang
katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR.
O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na
takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa."
The foregoing does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the public
accusations being made by complainant that he is being given death threats by the
family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The article only makes a justifiable query as
to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his accusations
are true.
"Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book
maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si
Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang
ugnayan. Meron ding ‘balita’ ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy
daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At
kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin
ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala
kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na
ang kaso ay naka-apela pa." (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused Danny
Godoy. They are not presented as facts by respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.
In fact, he even goes to the extent of acknowledging that he himself does not
know if the rumors are true or not.
The subject article then offers the following analysis:
"Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa dalawang tao,
kay Danny Godoy at Judge Gacott. Kung babaliktarin ng Supreme
Court and decision ni Gacott, lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott naman ang
masisira, ang kanyang aspirations na maitaas sa Court of Appeals at
eventually makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte suprema ng bansa.
Kung papaboran naman Gacott ay sigurado na ang kamatayan ni
Godoy, at double pa pero si Gacott maitataas pa ang puwesto. Tayo
naman, hintay lamang tayo ng ano mang magiging developments ng
kaso."
The foregoing is nothing more than a fair analysis. For indeed, if the Honorable
Court affirms the Decision of Complainant, the accused Danny Godoy would
be meted the death sentence. On the other hand, if the decision is reversed,
this may adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be promoted to the
Court of Appeals, and eventually to the Honorable Court.
Finally, the subject article reads:
"Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga
mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka
kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay
Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi
Bayan, 'Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw
dito, maski sa kapitolyo.' Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may
mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil
baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty,
lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban
diyan."
Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr.
allegedly said. But more importantly, the foregoing is merely a reaction not so
much to Complainant's Decision, but to the public statements made by
Complainant in the national television show "Magandang Gabi Bayan."
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely
which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the
publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be
capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment
and criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is
extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant
punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free
speech and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will generally and wisely pass
unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with
simply a reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides
against another; and oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine.
The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be
other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed
wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but
the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party
ashamed of such, outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in
silence.5
Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that there are two primary issues
presented in this incident which deserve a more extended disquisition, firstly, because of their
importance and frequent involvement in contempt proceedings filed in the courts, and,
secondly, by reason of the fact that there are numerous and variant pronouncements on the
subject of contempt which need to be clarified.
(PINAKA IMPORTANTE NGA ISSUE SA TANAN)
The principal issues are (1) whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of postlitigation statements or publications; and (2) which court has jurisdiction over a contempt
committed against the trial court while the case is pending on appeal. Other cognate and
related issues must also be discussed so as to provide judicial guidance on the present state of our
statutory and case laws thereon.
Before we go into a more intensive analysis of said issues, however, it may be beneficial for
purposes thereof to preliminarily revisit and expound on the nature and implications of a special civil
action for contempt or of any initiatory pleading therefor filed as an incident in the main case. That
exercise will further explain and justify our disposition of the contempt charge herein.
I
Prefatorial Considerations
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper
punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform. Due
perhaps to this two fold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are
classified as civil or criminal.6 However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal
contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite indistinct. The confusion in attempts to
classify civil and criminal contempts is due to the fact that there are contempts in which both
elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal, but
partake of the characteristics of both; or it is also possible that the same act may constitute both a
civil and criminal contempt.
A. As to the Nature of the Offense - (criminal contempt vs civil contempt)
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect.7 On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein
and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.8
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an
offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against
public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings
to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are
remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that
civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.9
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one
can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt
proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence,
good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. 10
B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised
A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the
power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court’s authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a
remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal
contempt involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power and dignity of the
court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the
contempt consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the
benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court, and the contemnor is
committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an execution to
enforce the judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real
party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings look only to the future. And it is said
that in civil contempt proceedings, the contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. 11
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief
sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the
purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial. 12
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal
actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested
in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of
the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not
criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime.
The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a
civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt
proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal
cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings.
So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for
criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular
criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved. 13
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they
are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to
do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to
preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a
judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil
contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit,
of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and
the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure
governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil
contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil
action is a proceeding in that action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court order in
a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in contempt or proceed in an
independent prosecution to enforce the order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding
is auxiliary to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is essentially a new and
independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and
service of new process. 14
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor,
or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt
proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. 15
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed
innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In
proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the
complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than
a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair
preponderance" burden. 16
On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well settled, it can be safely concluded
that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.
(PINAKA IMPORTANTE SA TANAN TANAN)
II
Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt
Proceedings
A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties
In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the courts
and the press, quoting there in the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, 18 thus:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press
and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate uphold the
principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative
and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case
where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed
with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon
as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right
of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing
writings which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely
invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and
the press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the
spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an
abuse of the liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for
contempt of court.
Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently
couched so as to impute responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes
recognized that with respect to whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is
to be treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn between those speeches or writings which
are protected by the privilege of free speech and a free press and those which constitute an
abuse of it.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of
speech; persons engaged in the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right
than that possessed by persons not in that business. 19
B. Different Doctrines or Schools of Thought- (TWO DOCTIRNES)
In the case of In re Francisco Brillantes, 20 Justice Perfecto explained in his dissenting opinion that
"as to whether contempt may be committed for criticizing a tribunal after the same has
rendered decision or taken final action on a matter which is the subject of criticism, there are
two schools of thought represented, respectively, by what we may call the English doctrine
and the American doctrine, the first for the affirmative and the last one for the negative. The
question now is to determine which of the two doctrines is more conformable to reason and justice
and, therefore, should be, adopted and applied by our tribunals."
1. The English Doctrine
According to Justice Perfecto, the rule in England is that there can be contempt of court even
after the case has been terminated. He then proceeded to ramify:
In England comments upon the court's action in a concluded case, where libelous or
calculated to bring the court into disrepute, were freely punishable as contempt under
the early common law. Distinction between pending and concluded matters does not
seem to have been made. Any comment impairing the dignity of the court was
punishable as contempt regardless of the time at which made.
xxx xxx xxx
The whole theory of the early common law of contempt is admirably delivered by
Wilmot, J., in King vs. Almon, . . . . The publication there complained of was a volume
containing a diatribe against Lord Mansfield for allowing an amendment of pleading
as of course, and apparently from corrupt motives, in a concluded case, and further
charging him with having introduced a practice to defeat the efficacy of the writ
of habeas corpus. It is there said: "The arraignment of the justice of the judges is
arraigning the King's justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the
choice of his judges, and excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction
with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them; and,
whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the
most fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls
for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatever — not
for the sake of the judges as private individuals, but because they are the channels
by which the Kings' justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be
universally thought so, are both absolutely necessary for giving justice that free,
open, and uninterrupted current which it has for many ages found all over this
Kingdom, and which so eminently distinguishes and exalts it above all nations upon
the earth . . . . The constitution has provided very apt and proper remedies for
correcting and rectifying the involuntary mistakes of judges, and for punishing and
removing them for any voluntary perversions of justice. But, if their authority is to be
trampled upon by pamphleteers and newswriters, and the people are to be told that
the power given to the judges for their protection is prostituted to their destruction,
the court may retain its power some little time; but I am sure it will instantly lose all its
authority, and the power of the court will not long survive the authority of it: Is it
possible to stab that authority more fatally than by charging the court, and more
particularly the chief justice, with having introduced a rule to subvert the
constitutional liberty of the people? A greater scandal could not be published . . . . It
is conceded that an act of violence upon his person when he was making such an
order would be contempt punishable by attachment. Upon what principle? For
striking a judge in walking along the streets would not be a contempt of the court.
The reason, therefore, must be, that he is in the exercise of his office, and
discharging the function of a judge of this court; and, if his person is under this
protection, why should not his character be under the same protection? It is not for
the sake of the individual, but for the sake of the public, that his person is under such
protection; and, in respect of the public, the imputing of corruption and the perversion
of justice to him, in an order made by him at his chambers, is attended with much
more mischievous consequences than a blow; and therefore the reason of
proceeding in this summary manner applies with equal, if not superior, force, to one
case as well as the other. There is no greater obstruction to the execution of justice
from the striking a judge than from the abusing him, because his order lies open to
be enforced or discharged, whether the judge is struck or abused for making it.
2. The American Doctrine
In American jurisprudence, the general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a
judge with respect to past cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt,
even though libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court. 21 It has been
said that the power to punish as a contempt a criticism concerning a case made after its
termination is denied under the theory that such a power is not necessary as a safeguard to
the proper functioning of the court as a judicial tribunal.
And it has been said that comments, however stringent, relating to judicial proceedings which
are past and ended are not contempt of court even though they may be a libel against the
judge or some other officer of the court.
There is even the view that when a case is finished, the courts and judges are subject to the
same criticisms as other people and that no comment published in connection with a
completed case, however libelous or unjust, is punishable as contempt of court.
Thus it is said that the remedies of a judge who suffers abuse at the hands of the press, not
amounting to contempt, are the same as those available to persons outside the judiciary. 22
To the same effect was the holding in People ex rel. Supreme Court vs. Albertson, 23 where it was
declared that —
The great weight of authority is to the effect that — in so far as proceedings to punish
for contempt are concerned — comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully
determined in the particular court criticized is unrestricted under our constitutional
guaranty of liberty of the press and free speech, especially in the absence of a
statute of direct application to the contrary. This view in brief is based upon the
theory
that — keeping our constitutional guaranties in mind — libelous publications which
bear upon the proceedings of a court while they are pending may in some way affect
their correct determination, and are properly the subject of contempt proceedings. On
the other hand, such publications or oral utterances of entirely retrospective bearing
come within the sphere of authorized comment unless they affect a judge personally,
when he has his remedy in an action of libel or slander, as does any other individual
thus offended. He has the right to bring an action at law before a jury of his peers.
Along similar lines, in Ex Parte Mcleod, 24 the court ruled that:
The right of a court to punish, as for contempts, criticisms of its acts, or even libels
upon its officers, not going to the extent, by improper publications, of influencing a
pending trial, . . . would not only be dangerous to the rights of the people, but its
exercise would drag down the dignity and moral influence of these tribunals. Such
criticism is the right of the citizen, and essential not only to the proper administration
of justice, but to the public tranquility and contentment. Withdrawing power from
courts to summarily interfere with such exercise of the right of the press and freedom
of speech deprives them of no useful power.
Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Montana in State ex rel. Metcalf vs. District Court, 25 pointed
out that the legal proceeding involved therein was not pending when the alleged libelous article was
published, then referred to the guaranty of freedom of speech and the press, and eventually held
that the publication involved was not punishable as contempt. It declared that so long as the
published criticism does not impede the due administration of the law, it is better to maintain the
guaranty of the Constitution than to undertake to compel respect or punish libel by the summary
process of contempt.
Finally, in holding that persons who had published newspaper articles alleging that a
designated judge had been intentionally partial and corrupt in the trial of certain causes
which had been decided and were not pending when the publication occurred could not be
punished as for contempt the court, in State ex rel. Attorney General vs. Circuit Court, 26 cited a
number of cases supporting the view that libelous newspaper comments upon the acts of a
court in actions past and ended do not constitute contempt. It pointed out that some of such
decisions took the position that to punish such publications would constitute a serious
invasion of constitutional guaranties of free speech and a free press.
It ratiocinated in this manner: "Important as it is that courts should perform their grave public
duties unimpeded and unprejudiced by illegitimate influences, there are other rights
guaranteed to all citizens by our Constitution and form of government, either expressly or
impliedly, which are fully as important, and which must be guarded with an equally zealous
care. These rights are the rights of free speech and of free publication of the citizens'
sentiments on all subjects. It seems clear to us that so extreme a power as to punish for
contempt because of libelous publications as to past litigation, is inconsistent with, and
would materially impair, the constitutional rights of free speech and free press."
However, even under American jurisprudence, as shall hereafter be demonstrated, the aforesaid
rulings are not without exceptions. There is ample authority that, under proper circumstances,
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and liberty of the press do not protect
contemptuous publications relating to court proceedings even though such publications are
not made until after the pendency of the litigation in question.27
3. The Philippine Doctrine
In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views on this issue which have to be
analyzed and, if possible, reconciled. On that exordial indication, we have digressed into these
aspects of the law on contempt and seized upon this incident in the criminal cases at bar in order to
essay a rapprochement of such views into what we may call the Philippine doctrine.
In the early cases decided by this Court involving contempts through newspaper
publications, the rule was that contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed
with respect to pending suits. Apparently, the weight of authority then was to the effect that
criticism of the conduct of a judge or a court with regard to matters finally disposed of does
not constitute contempt, even though it may be libelous.
That rule first found application in the case of In re Lozano, et al. 28 and was reiterated in the
subsequent cases of In re Abistado, 29 and People vs. Alarcon, et al, 30 where this Court, speaking
through Justice Malcolm, tersely stated:
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. . . . (6
R.C.L., pp. 508-515).
It will be noted that the aforequoted conclusion was arrived at after a short discourse presented by
the ponente on the existing divergence of opinions on the matter between the English and American
courts. But the learned justice, notwithstanding his preference for and application of the
American doctrine, nonetheless thereafter made the recommendatory observation that
"(w)ith reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked first of all
that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly. What is best
for the maintenance of the judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion."
It seems that this view was shared by then Associate Justice Moran when he dissented from the
majority opinion in the aforecited case of People vs. Alarcon, et al., which upheld the doctrine
enunciated in Lozano and Abistado, in this wise: "I know that in the United States, publications about
courts, after the conclusion of a pending case, no matter how perverse or scandalous, are in many
instances brought within the constitutional protection of the liberty of the press. But while this rule
may find justification in that country, considering the American temper and psychology and the
stability of its political institutions, it is doubtful whether here a similar toleration of gross misuse of
liberty of the press would, under our circumstances, result in no untoward consequences to our
structure of democracy yet in the process of healthful development and growth."
Such perception could have probably impelled Justice Moran to deviate from the then accepted
doctrine, with this rationalization:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to courts and to court proceedings, are
of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule
announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the
language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influenced of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
That dissenting opinion was impliedly adopted in the subsequent case of In re Brillantes, 31 where the
editor of the Manila Guardian was declared in contempt of court for publishing an editorial, stating
that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner, even after the case involving
the validity of said examinations had been terminated. This was followed by In re Almacen 32 where
the Court stated categorically that the rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has
terminated had lost much of its validity, invoking therein the ruling in Brillantes and quoting with
approval the dissenting opinion in Alarcon.
(RULING)
It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court, the general rule that there
can be no contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under
certain situations. From the shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position announced
in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded that the termination of the case is not a guaranty
of immunity from a contempt charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or
libelous, depending on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words, one may still be cited
for contempt of court even after a case has ended, where such punitive action is necessary to
protect the court and its dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or
calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy
public confidence in that court.
This qualified distinction is not without justification and, in fact, was also foreshadowed by the
concurring opinion of Justice Briones in Brillantes wherein, after noting the conflicting views on the
amenability of the contemnor during the pendency or after the termination of the judicial proceeding
in the court involved as illustrated by the English and American doctrines thereon, he advanced the
proposition that —
. . . esta distincion no tiene mucha importancia. Lo importante para mi es ver si la
critica lanzada por el recurrido es falsa y esta concebida en terminos tales que
"tiende directamente a degradar la administracion de justicia," . . . es indiferente si
versa sobre un asunto o negociacion totalmente terminada o no; el desacato existe
entonces y debe ser castigado.
. . . Se trata simplemente de la facultad inherente en los tribunales de reprimir y
castigar todo acto que tiende a ambarazarles y obstruirles en su funcion de
administrar justicia, . . . .
The rationale for making a qualification to the rule generally considered as the American doctrine,
which rule as herein qualified we now adopt and refer to as the Philippine doctrine on this issue, is
profoundly and eloquently explicated by Justice Moran in Alarcon, to wit:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the
press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not be confused with
freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing
vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the
fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As important as is the
maintenance of a free press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is
the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice and
secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. "The administration
of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and distinct are equally
sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts
have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
principles of the Constitution and the laws, from which the former receives its
prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." (U.S. vs. Su liens, 38 Fed., 2d., 230.)
Democracy cannot long endure in a country where liberty is grossly misused any
more than where liberty is illegitimately abridged.
xxx xxx xxx
If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were directed
to this Court in connection with a case already decided, the effect of the rule
laid down by the majority is to deny this court the power to vindicate its
dignity. The mischievous consequences that will follow from the situation thus
sought to be permitted, are both too obvious and odious to be stated. The
administration of Justice, no matter how righteous, may be identified with all
sorts of fancied scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost
their cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect and
obedience to Law will ultimately be shattered, and, as a consequence, the
utility of the courts will completely disappear.
It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public confidence
should be a tribute to judicial worth, virtue and intelligence. But compelling respect to
courts is one thing and denying the courts the power to vindicate themselves when
outraged is another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes with impunity a
discontented citizen to unleash, by newspaper publications, the avalanche of his
wrath and venom upon courts and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and
that justice has somewhere been perverted, law and order require that he follow the
processes provided by the Constitution and the statutes by instituting the
corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. As Mr. Justice Palmer, in
speaking of the duty of courts and court officers, has wisely said:
Would it be just to the persons who are called upon to exercise these
powers to compel them to do so, and at the same time allow them to
be maltreated or libeled because they did so? How would a suitor like
a juryman trying his case who might expect he would be assaulted,
beaten, his property destroyed, or his reputation blasted, in case he
decided against his opponent? Apply the same thing to judges, or the
sheriff, and how long could organized society hold together? With
reference to a judge, if he has acted corruptly, it is worse than a mere
contempt. But it is apparent it would not be right that the court of
which he is a member should determine this, and consequently the
law has provided a plain and easy method of bringing him to justice
by a petition to Parliament; but, while the law authorizes this, it does
not allow infamous charges to be made against him by persons,
either in the newspapers or otherwise, with reference to how he has
or shall discharge the duties of his office. It must be apparent to all
right thinking men that, if such were allowed to be indulged in, it must
end in the usefulness of the court itself being destroyed, however
righteous its judges may act. From what I have said it must not be
supposed that I think that the decisions of the court, or the actions of
the judges, or other persons composing the court, are not to be
discussed; on the contrary, I would allow the freest criticism of all
such acts if done in a fair spirit, only stopping at what must injure or
destroy the court itself and bring the administration of the law into
disrepute, or be an outrage on the persons whose acts are
discussed, or when such discussion would interfere with the right
decision of the cause before the court.
We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted opinion which, we fully
believe, conforms to basic dogmatic teachings on judicial and professional conduct requiring
respect for and the giving of due deference to the judicial system and its members — ethical
standards which this Court has, time and again, been trying to inculcate in the minds of every
member of the Bar and the public in general.
4. Cautela on the Balancing of Interests
On the bases of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that a line has to be drawn between those
utterances or writings which are protected by the privileges of free speech and a free press and
those which constitute an abuse thereof, in determining whether an allegedly scurrilous publication
or statement is to be treated as contempt of court. But to find the line where the permissible right of
free speech ends and its reprehensible abuse begins is not always an easy task. In contempt
proceedings, it was held that this line must usually be defined by the courts themselves, and in such
cases its location is to be established with special care and caution. 33
In so doing, it becomes necessary to give the subject that careful examination commensurate with
its importance, mindful that, on the one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be
maintained, while, on the other, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the citizen must be
preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. If the court is shorn of its power to punish for contempt
in all proper cases, it cannot preserve its authority, so that even without any constitutional or
statutory guaranty this power is inherent in the court. But the Constitution itself, in the Bill of Rights,
guarantees free speech and liberty of the press. Of course, it was never intended, under the guise of
these constitutional guaranties, that the power of the court should be trenched upon. 34
How to determine whether an act or utterance is covered by the protective mantle of the
constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press or whether it is already outside or an abuse thereof, is
an altogether different matter. We have perforce to draw from tenets in American jurisprudence,
although with discriminating choice, since after all our present doctrines on contempt vis-avis constitutional limitations trace their roots in the main to the lessons laid down and born of the
social and judicial experience in that jurisdiction.
The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the truth, with good motives and
for justifiable ends, whether it respects governments individuals; the right freely to publish whatever
the citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except in so far as
such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public
offense, are as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or
pecuniary interests of individuals. The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every
man to publish his opinion; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society to inquire into the motives
of such publications, and to distinguish between those which are meant for use and reformation, and
with an eye solely to the public good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame.
To the latter description, it is impossible that any good government should afford protection and
impunity.
The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he pleases, but he is liable for the
abuse of this liberty. If he does this by scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be
punished for contempt. In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists principally in not telling the
truth. There is a right to publish the truth, but no right to publish falsehood to the injury of others with
impunity. It, therefore, does not include the right to malign the courts, to libel and slander and utter
the most flagrant and indecent calumnies about the court and its officers, nor to invade the
sanctuaries of the temples. Such practices and such miscreants ought to be condemned, and the
courts would deserve condemnation and abolition if they did not vigorously and fearlessly punish
such offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the liberty of the press, and if the slander relates to
the courts, it concerns the whole public and is consequently punishable summarily as a criminal
contempt. It is therefore the liberty of the press that is guaranteed, not the licentiousness. It is the
right to speak the truth, not the right to bear false witness against your neighbor. 35
This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision
after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and
scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. 36
It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a vast difference between
criticism or fair comment on the one side and defamation on the other. Where defamation
commences, true criticism ends. True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars; (1)
Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call for public comment. (2) Criticism
never attacks the individual but only his work. In every case the attack is on a man's acts, or on
some thing, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in personalities. (3) True
criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable motives, unless justice absolutely requires it, and
then only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic never takes advantage of the occasion to gratify
private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of matters of public interest,
and the judicious guidance of the public taste. 37
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted after a
case has been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their
criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no matter
how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial
conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected
by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the
people in their courts. 38
Moreover, it has been held that criticism of courts after a case is finally disposed of, does not
constitute contempt and, to this effect, a case may be said to be pending so long as there is still
something for the court to do therein. But criticism should be distinguished from insult. A criticism
after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the court, and on that ground it does not
constitute contempt. On the other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case is decided,
can under no circumstance be justified. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; but to hurl the false charge that the Supreme Court has been committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of
justice, and it constitutes contempt. 39
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism
of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of
court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize
the court; 40 or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would
be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to
as a defense in contempt proceedings.
On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution
and must be sacredly guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that instrument
and must not be permitted to destroy or impair the efficiency of the courts or the public respect
therefor and the confidence therein. 41
Thus, in State vs. Morril, 42 the court said that any citizen has the right to publish the proceedings and
decisions of the court, and if he deems it necessary for the public good, to comment upon them
freely, discuss their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the
fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them; but he has no right to
attempt, by defamatory publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it, and
dispose the community to disregard and set at naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such
publications are an abuse of the liberty of the press; and tend to sap the very foundation of good
order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice. Courts possess the power to
punish for contempt libelous publications regarding their proceedings, present or past, upon the
ground that they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public confidence and respect for their
judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to the good order and well-being of society, and
most effectually obstruct the free course of justice.
Then, in In re Hayes, 43 it was said that publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right
than others, to bring to public notice the conduct of the courts, provided the publications are true and
fair in spirit. The liberty of the press secures the privilege of discussing in a decent and temperate
manner the decisions and judgments of a court of justice; but the language should be that of fair and
honorable criticism, and should not go to the extent of assigning to any party or the court false or
dishonest motives. There is no law to restrain or punish the freest expressions of disapprobation that
any person may entertain of what is done in or by the courts. Under the right of freedom of speech
and of the press the public has a right to know and discuss all judicial proceedings, but this does not
include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation, groundless charges of unfairness and stubborn
partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency.
Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, 44 it was ruled that the freedom of speech may not be exercise
in such a manner as to destroy respect for the courts, the very institution which is the guardian of
that right. The dignity of the courts and the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary
adjuncts to the administration of justice. Denigrating the court by libelous attacks upon judicial
conduct in an ended case, as well as one which is pending before it, may seriously interfere with the
administration of justice. While such an attack may not affect the particular litigation which has been
terminated, it may very well affect the course of justice in future litigation and impair, if not destroy,
the judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected to the attack.
Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that false and libelous utterances
present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 45 To constitute contempt,
criticism of a past action of the court must pose a clear and present danger to a fair administration of
justice, that is, the publication must have an inherent tendency to influence, intimidate, impede,
embarrass, or obstruct the court's administration of justice. 46 It is not merely a private wrong against
the rights of litigants and judges, but a public wrong, a crime against the State, to undertake by libel
or slander to impair confidence in the judicial functions. 47
Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez,
et al., 48 held as follows:
. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence
of the comment or utterance must be ''extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is
primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged
unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the
administration of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme
Court of the United States said: "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a
result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils
are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . The
possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published
criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and press." . . .
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in
relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote: "Freedom of speech and
press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may not hold in
contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or
to belittle him. The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications
concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for
contempt . The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat to the administration of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper
criticism against the free speech to determine whether such may constitutionally be
punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public comment should in
borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending
cases." . . .
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. . . .
Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the pendency of a case, no compelling
reason exists why the doctrines enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative
publications made after the termination of the case. Whether a case is pending or not, there is the
constant and ever growing need to protect the courts from a substantive evil, such as invective
conduct or utterances which tend to impede or degrade the administration of justice, or which
calumniate the courts and their judges. At any rate, in the case of In re Bozorth, 49 it was there
expressly and categorically ruled that the clear and present danger rule equally applies to
publications made after the determination of a case, with the court declaring that a curtailment of
criticism of the conduct of finally concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of some
serious substantive evil which it is designed to avert.
Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra, let it here be emphasized that
the protection and safety of life, liberty, property and character, the peace of society, the proper
administration of justice and even the perpetuity of our institutions and form of government,
imperatively demand that everyone — lawyer, layman, citizen, stranger, newspaperman, friend or
foe — shall treat the courts with proper respect and shall not attempt to degrade them, or impair the
respect of the people, or destroy the faith of the people in them. When the temples of justice become
polluted or are not kept pure and clean, the foundations of free government are undermined, and the
institution itself threatened.
III
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is Committed
Against a Lower Court while the Case is Pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do
an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in
only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative
considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule
has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. 50
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt
rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by
the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; 51 the power to punish for contempt
exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and
due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes: 52 and in order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience
thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency. 53
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general
rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial
court, regardless of the imposable penalty. 54
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting
officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be
referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact. 55
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts
forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and
may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and decorum which are not
its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes
thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the
appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt
would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges.
Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of justice, and the offense of
violating a judicial order is punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless
of the court which may have made the order. 56 However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer
of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate
to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court. 57
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or
agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 58
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given
matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court. One of the most common
reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases involving venue
deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding
has been begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some
jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances. 59
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered
by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which does not
extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt
occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act. 60
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt
against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate
courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is taken is particularly
contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status
quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 61
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case,
which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the
main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular
judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or
otherwise unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper
court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered. 62
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other. 63
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt,
the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts
and the people from improper professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action
remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one contemned
furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court. 64
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in
other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done. 65
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis
that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried
before the court actually contemned. 66
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire
case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect
the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this
Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.
IV
Appropriate Remedies where the Alleged Contemptuous Statement is also Claimed to
be Libelous
Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority is that in so far as proceedings
to punish for contempt are concerned, critical comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully
determined by it is unrestricted, under the constitutional guaranties of the liberty of the press and
freedom of speech. Thus, comments, however stringent, which have relation to judicial proceedings
which are past and ended, are not contemptuous of the authority of the court to which reference is
made. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in
contempt of the court's authority.
On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate and effective
remedy. 67 The force of American public opinion has greatly restrained the courts in the exercise of
the power to punish one as in contempt for making disrespectful or injurious remarks, and it has
been said that the remedy of a judge is the same as that given to a private citizen. 68 In such a case,
therefore. the remedy of a criminal action for libel is available to a judge who has been
derogated in a newspaper publication made after the termination aid a case tried by him,
since such publication can no longer be made subject of contempt proceedings.
The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine doctrine earlier discussed
wherein there may still be a contempt of court even after a case has been decided and
terminated. In such case, the offender may be cited for contempt for uttering libelous remarks
against the court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power to punish for contempt does
not and will not prevent a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after the institution of
contempt proceedings. In other words, the fact that certain contemptuous conduct likewise
constitutes an indictable libel against the judge of the court contemned does not necessarily require
him to bring a libel action, rather than relying on contempt Proceedings. 69
The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and punishable by indictment. or
other method of criminal prosecution does not prevent the outraged Court from punishing
the contempt. 70 This principle stems from the fundamental doctrine that an act may be
punished as a contempt even though it has been punished as a criminal offense. 71 The
defense of having once been in jeopardy, based on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not
lie in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the proposition that a contempt may be an offense against
the dignity of a court and, at the same time, an offense against the peace and dignity of the people
of the State. 72 But more importantly. adherence to the American doctrine by insisting that a judge
should instead file an action fur libel will definitely give rise to an absurd situation and may even
cause more harm than good.
Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to descend from the plane of his
judicial office to the level of the contemnor, pass over the matter of contempt, and instead attack him
by a civil action to satisfy the judge in damages for a libel, would be a still greater humiliation of a
court. That conduct would be personal; the court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the judicial status
is fixed to such a point that our courts and the judges thereof should be protected from the improper
consequences of their discharge of duties so much so that judicial officers have always been
shielded, on the highest considerations of the public good, from being called for questioning in civil
actions for things done in their judicial capacity.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the and to the degradation of private prosecution, we
subdue their independence, and destroy their authority. instead of being venerable before the public,
they become contemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything
sacred in society, and to overturn those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best
guardians of civil liberty. 73
Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for
libel, has been assailed as being without rational basis in principle. In the first place, the
outrage is not directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the
court as an organ of the administration of justice. In the second place, public interests will
gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed
of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his
behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from
civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy
to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if
not superior, force. 74
(ANOTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE)
V
Whether or not the Same Contemptuous Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be the
Subject of both a Contempt Proceeding and an Administrative Disciplinary Action
With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge, we feel that this
issue with respect to proper remedies against an erring member or the Bar should consequentially
be addressed, by way of reiteration, since conflicting and erroneous remedies are sometimes
resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.
The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are
separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the
other. 75 A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the
authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal
with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the
court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office. 76 The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to
safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and
not, on the vindictive principle. 77 The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary
authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys
who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. 78
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is
not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. 79 In the same
manner an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the
same facts leading to conviction. 80 It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to
show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they
have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of
court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. 81
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to
discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the
court's basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge
of judicial functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.: 82
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here: the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and
the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the
Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently,
where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's
disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power
to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of
the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the
Bar is but corollary to the court's exclusive power of admission to the bar. A lawyer
is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is
called upon to share in the task and responsibilities of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
With this rounding out of the subordinate and principal issues in resolving the incident, we feel that
the guidelines we have laid down will provide assertive references for the lower courts in disciplinary
matters arising before them. Coming back to the incident fore resolution, arising as a spin-off
from the criminal cases at bar, we reiterate what we have declared at the outset, absolving
judge for the reasons therein stated.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
22. G.R. No. 146783
July 29, 2002
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MAXIMINO GAMIDO;
MAXIMINO B. GAMIDO, petitioner,
vs.
NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416
William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as "counsel" for petitioner Maximino B.
Gamido. Two issues were tendered during the hearing of said motion today, attended by Dela Cruz
and the counsels for respondent led by the Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo Urbiztondo, OSG, to
wit:
1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against forum-shopping; and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel for petitioner in this
case, considering allegations that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of February 12, 2001, personally his
Motion to Withdraw Petition, and that the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the
withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for
Relief, which was filed without authority of the petitioner and clearly without merit, should be and is
hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for petitioner that he, Espiridion J.
Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and indicated in his pleadings filed
before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been shown and
admitted by him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, after he was made to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
appearing as counsel in this case without license to practice law, and although he asked the Court
for forgiveness for the wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA
CRUZ GUILTY of indirect contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE, he is hereby sentenced to pay
a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days from notice
hereof, OR suffer IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue, Manila, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.