1. Case Number: G.R. No. 235878. February 26, 2020
Case Title: BUSAN UNIVERSAL RAIL, INC., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION-METRO
RAIL TRANSIT 3, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent and the Joint Venture composed of Busan Transportation Corporation, Edison
Development and Construction, TMICorp, Inc., and Castan Corporation entered into a contract
for the (DOTC)-MRT3 System Maintenance Provider. The total amount of the MRT3 Contract
is P3,809,128,888.00 broken down into four package. Billing 1-8 has been paid but when
petitioner sent to respondent Billing No.9, DOTr Usec. Chavez required petitioner to submit
additional supporting documents and directed the withholding of certain amounts. Petitioner
replied through a letter and gave its explanation, but Billing No. 9 was still not settled. In a letter
dated April 19, 2017, Usec. Chavez directed petitioner to explain why the MRT3 Contract
should not be terminated with the happening of a series of serious incidents.
As of the date of the petition, Billing Nos. 9 to 18 remained unpaid. After several returns of
letters, petitioner responded, and again invoked Subsection No. 20 under Section III of the GCC,
requesting for a mutual consultation.Petitioner instituted before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of Interim Measures of Protection, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Order
of Protection under the Special ADR Rules, essentially seeking to maintain the status quo and
enjoin respondent from terminating the MRT3 Contract. RTC denied the petition. It noted the
manifestation of petitioner's lawyer that the case had already been referred to the Philippine
Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. for arbitration.Subsequently, respondent issued a Notice to
Terminate the MRT3 Contract. Meanwhile, respondent issued a Decision dated November 3,
2017 terminating the MRT3 Contract between respondent and petitioner.
On December 11, 2017, the RTC denied petitioner's omnibus motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to issue the protection and restraining order sought by
petitioner against respondent.
RULING:
Under Section 28 of RA 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, as referred to
in the above Section 59, the grant of an interim measure of protection by the proper court before
the constitution of an arbitral tribunal is allowed.
However, Section 3 of RA 8975 prohibits the issuance of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions against national government projects.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order
is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may,
if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or
order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur
under existing laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2. Case Number: A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578. January 28, 2020 Case Title: OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSELITO C.
VILLAROSA, formerly of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, respondent.
FACTS:
On July 7, 2015, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published an article written by Tulfo, "What's
Happening to Makati Judges?" Allegedly, three Makati judges committed certain irregularities in
the discharge of their judicial functions. Among the three judges is Judge Villarosa of Branch 66,
RTC, Makati City. According to the said article, Judge Villarosa favored moneyed litigants in
commerCial cases, even if their cases are unmeritorious. Tulfo further claimed that Judge
Villarosa is part of a syndicate composed of Makati judges who decide big commercial cases
based on money and not on the merits.Hence, an investigation was conducted. Atty. Villarosa
submitted his explanation.
One of them the explanation as to the transfer of cases for judicial dispute resolution (JDR) to
Branch 149 - Judge Villarosa averred that the transfer of cases to Branch 149 was brought about
because Branch 149 was the lone commercial court that has jurisdiction over the said cases and
that it has been a practice to refer commercial cases to Branch 149 whenever JDR failed.
Because of this, it was not entirely his fault to follow such practice.
Another one is as to the issuance of an order restraining the DOTC for a period of 20 days from.
performing any and all acts related in any manner to its procurement of additional light rail
vehicles for the MRT-3, in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8975—
Judge Villarosa averred that he issued a protection order which is akin to a restraining order. He
insisted that the issuance of an ex parte protection order was in accord with the Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) Rules as, based on the pleadings, there were allegations which
warranted the issuance of a protection order. This was an available remedy under the ADR
Rules, which was a necessary relief to those who are entitled thereto.
OCA found Judge Villarosa guilty of violation of a SC directive and four counts of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and recommended the forfeiture of all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives, and circulars.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA. The Supreme Court
furthered that as to the transfer of cases for JDR to Branch 149, the Consolidated and Revised
Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and JDR
provides that the judge to whom the case has been originally raffled, or the JDR Judge, shall
preside over the first stage of the judicial proceedings, i.e., from the filing of a complaint to the
conduct of CAM and JDR during the pre-trial stage. Furthermore, in a multiple sala court, "if the
case is not resolved during JDR, it shall be raffled to another branch for the pre-trial proper up to
judgment." Thus, the court to which the case was originally raffled is mandated to preside over
the first stage of the proceedings, including the JDR, and it is only upon the failure o£ the JDR
that the said C'}e should be raffled to another branch. Here, Judge: Villarosa hastily transferred
the cases to Branch 149 without the first stage· of the proceedings, which includes JDR, in clear
violation of the abovementioned guidelines.
Secondly, regarding the issuance of a TRO which remained effective "until further notice" in
violation of the 20-day period prescribed in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and
Administrative Circular No. 20-95, Judge Villarosa did not offer any valid explanation, as he
merely said that the parties, at that time, were in the process of amicably settling the case.
As to his issuance of a TRO against the DOTC in violation of R.A. No. 8975, he claimed that he
issued a "protection order akin to a restraining' order" in accordance with the ADR Rules. The
Court finds Judge Villarosa liable for: (1) violation of A.M. No. 03-3-03-SC dated July 8, 2014
when he deliberately failed to transfer eight commercial cases to Branch 137; and (2) four counts
of gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he (a) transferred cases for JDR to Branch 149
without conducting the first stage of judicial proceedings, including JDR, in violation of the
Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of CAM and JDR;
(b) ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 09-524 pending in his court with Civil Case No.
CEB-34790 pending in Branch 10, RTC, Cebu City, in violation of Section 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court; (c) issued a TRO that was effective beyond the 20-day period prescribed in
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in Civil Case
No. 11-1059; and (d) issued a TRO against the DOTC in SP M-7574, in violation of Section 3 of
R.A. No. 8975.
WHEREFORE, former Judge Joselito C. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of four (4) counts
of Gross Ignorance of the Law, as well as of violation of A.M. No. 03-3-03-SC.
3. Case Number: G.R. No. 217151. February 12, 2020
Case Title: DRS. REYNALDO ANG and SUSAN CUCIO-ANG, petitioners, vs. ROSITA DE
VENECIA, ANGEL
MARGARITO D. CARAMAT, JR., EMMA TRINIDAD CARAMAT, JOSE MARI B. SOTO,
JEN LEE G. VILVAR, and
THE CITY ENGINEER'S OFFICE OF THE CITY OF MAKATI, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Ang own a two-storey residential house and lot. When respondent Caramat started
construction on a five-storey commercial building on the adjoining lot, spouses Ang notice
cracks in their walls misalignment of their gate and several doors in their house. The architect
they hired reported that the foundation of their house was exposed and moved, as the foundation
of the five-storey building being constructed by Angel. Before the barangay officialsAngel
agreed to make all necessary repairs in the spouses Ang's property and to provide preventive
measure. But spouses Ang was not satisfied with the work and sought barangay mediation again.
But respondent refused to conduct additional repair. This prompt spouses Ang to refer the
complain to respondent City Engineer of Makati. But still no action from Angel and.
A formal complaint was instituted against respondents. However, during the pendency of the
case, OCA Circular No. 111-2014 was promulgated, which reiterated an earlier directive for all
trial courts to dismiss all pending cases involving construction disputes for referral to the
CIAC.Hence the proceeding was suspended. The case was dismissed and referred to CIAC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over an ordinary civil case for damages filed by a
non-party to a construction contract.
RULING:
It is clear from the foregoing that OCA Circular No. 111-2014 does not operate to ipso facto
dismiss all construction disputes pending before the regional trial courts; but instead directs all
presiding judges to issue orders dismissing such suits.
The trial court's issuance of the aforequoted order reveals two facts: 1) the trial court's receipt of
the spouses Ang's Manifestation and Motion; and 2) its intention to rule upon the merits thereof.
It likewise evinces the trial court's continued exercise of jurisdiction over the case and its intent
to hear the parties on the issue of whether or not the case should be dismissed. That this was the
intention of the trial court is further made evident in the assailed February 20, 2015 Order.
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that the dismissal was indeed formalized in open court
during the November 12, 2014 hearing, the Manifestation with Motion to Retain Jurisdiction and
to Proceed with Tria filed by the spouses Ang on November 17, 2014 should be considered a
Motion for Reconsideration. The November 12, 2014 Order of the court a quo curtly states the
following:
In view thereof, this case is hereby ordered Dismissed and Jet the records of the same be referred
to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) for proper disposition.
Said Manifestation with Motion directly addresses the statements made in the aforequoted Order
and sets forth arguments against the dismissal of the case for referral to the CIAC.
The present petition does not raise any factual question. The petition poses a sole question:
Which tribunal has jurisdiction over the suit for damages filed by the spouses Ang? This
question does not involve any determination or finding of truth or falsehood of the factual
allegations raised by the spouses Ang; but instead concerns the applicability of the construction
arbitration laws to the suit filed by the spouses. Direct resort to this Court is therefore justified.
The jurisdiction of the CIAC is provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1008, or the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law.The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not
limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of
agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and
defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost.Excluded from
the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall
continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Both the court a quo and the respondents rely on Rule 2.1.1 of the CIAC Rules, which states that:
At any rate, the termination of the contract prior to a demand for arbitration will generally have
no effect on such demand, provided that the dispute in question either arose out of the terms of
the contract or arose when a broad contractual arbitration clause was still in effect. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that there must be a subsisting contract before the jurisdiction
of the CIAC may properly be invoked. The jurisdiction of the CIAC is not over the contract but
the disputes which arose therefrom, or are connected thereto, whether such disputes arose before
or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
4. Case Number: G.R. No. 244590. November 13, 2019.
Case Title: VALENZUELA TERESA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [VALTEHA]
REPRESENTED HEREIN
BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT, LAURA R. HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. CELSO UMALI,
REPRESENTED BY
MIRAFLOR UMALI, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER,
respondents.
FACTS:
VALTEHA is the registered owner of a parcel of land measuring 1,202.04 square meters
situated in Sta. Mesa, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 278096.
portion of this property is a road lot. Celso and his wife, member of VALTEHA owned a lot
adjacent to the road lot. VALTEHA noticed an encroachment upom the portion of the road lot
caused by the construction by respondents on their property. VALTEHA then objected,
nonetheless respondents continued to occupy the disputed area and even initially rented out the
structure and thereafter used the the structure for the business. After several demand remained
unheeded VALTEHA filed with the RTA Mania a complaint for accion publiciana against
respondents for the recovery of the subject portion. RTC rendered decision ordering respondents
to vacate the disputed area. However, on appeal CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
referred the parties to VALTEHA's Grievance and Adjudication Committee (Committee).
VALTEHA complied with the said CA decision and filed complaint with the Committee.
Committee ruled in favor of VALTEHA and ordered respondents to remove their structure on
the disputed area. Decision was affirmed by the boards of VALTEHA. VALTEHA instituted a
similar complaint for accio publiciana but was denied.
It explained that the decision of the Committee, as an arbitral body, operated a a bar to the case
for accion publiciana because such ruling had the effect an authority of res judicata.The issue of
whether respondents lawfulloccupied and built structures on the disputed area had already been
passed upon by the Committee in favor of VALTEHA
The CA clarified that while the decision of the Committee cannot be considered as one rendered
by a court of justice, this should not bar the application of the principle of res judicata. By its
very nature, arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution system used to resolve a controversy
other than by adjudication of a presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MeTC has exclusive and original jurisdiction to try the complaint for accion
publiciana.
RULING:
The Supreme Court remand the case t the RTC of Manila, subject to compliance with the
requirement under the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (SADR) The
RTC is directed to resolve the case on the merits.
The Supreme Court further held that Alternative dispute resolution is not merely a precondition for filing complaint in court but is also a recognized means of ending litigation through
"any process or procedure used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other th by adjudication of a
presiding judge of a court or an officer of a governmen agency" A critical feature of arbitration
as an alternative mode of disput, resolution is party autonomy or "the freedom of the parties to
make their o arrangements in the resolution of disputes with the greatest cooperation of an the
least intervention from the courts. "The parties who have agreed to settle their dispute through
arbitration must accept the consequences of the arbitral proceeding. As a policy, the court must
not interfere in the merits of an arbitral award and, in the process, bail out parties who are not
satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, or offer them a second chance to plead the merits
of their respective cases. The court has a limited role in arbitral proceedings and the grounds for
judicial intervention are narrowly circumscribed in the SADR and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004.
In the interest of expediency and in keeping with the policy of the State to promote speedy and
impartial justice and declog court dockets, the complaint for recovery of possession filed by
VALTEHA with the intention of enforcing the arbitral award issued in its favor shall be
considered a Petition for Confirmation of Domestic Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11 of the
SADR and Section 40 of R.A. 9285. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the RTC of Manila,
Branch 42 subject to compliance with the requirements under the SADR.
5. Case Number: G.R. No. 230645. July 1, 2019.
Case Title: TONDO MEDICAL CENTER, represented by DR. MARIA ISABELITA M.
ESTRELLA,petitioner,vs.
ROLANDO RANTE, doing business under the name and style of JADEROCK
BUILDERS,respondent.
FACTS:
On August 27, 2013, petitioner Tondo Medical Center (TMC), entered into a Contract
Agreement with Jaderock Builders, for the construction project The project was funded by the
Department of Health (DOH). Project should be completed within240 days.TMC claims that
respondent incurred delays in the project. Petitioner was then prompted to write respondent a
letter informing the latter of the delays and directed him to deploy sufficient work force to cover
the delays incurred.On June 27, 2014, the project was still unfinished. TMC sent respondent
another letter informing him that no further extensions would be given to him. Respondent took
exception to the action undertaken by TMC. In reply, TMC informed respondent that there was
nothing to terminate because the contract automatically ceased to exist after June 27, 2014.Dr.
Estrella created the Contract Termination Review Committee (CTRC) to assist her in the
disposition of the case. After review it was decided that the contract with respondent is
terminated due to the contractor’s unjustified delay. Respondent was also blacklisted in
participating in he bidding of all government projects.MR was denied. Aggrieved, respondent
filed an appeal before the DOH, but appeal was not heeded.Respondent then filed a Request for
Arbitration with the CIAC for the resolution of his claim against TMC for unpaid fees. CIAC
upheld the validity of TCM's termination of the contract, but ruled that respondent is still entitled
to monetary claims. Aggrieved by the findings of CIAC, TMC filed a petition for review with the
CA. Hence, CA ruled on the finality of the award.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the CIAC.
RULING
No. 'Construction Industry Arbitration Law (EO 1008) provided for an arbitration mechanism for
the speedy resolution of construction disputes other than by court litigation." Executive Order
No. 1008 created the CIAC and vests upon it original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by the parties involved in construction in
the Philippines.
The competence of the CIAC to handle construction disputes was expressly recognized by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, specifically Section
5912 of the said law and was formally incorporated into the general statutory framework on
alternative dispute resolution through R.A. No. 9285, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004 (ADR Law), specifically Chapter 6, Section 34 and 35.
The CIAC has a two-pronged purpose: (a) to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of
settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation
which commonly accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes through the
entire hierarchy of courts, and, (b) to provide authoritative dispute resolution which emanates
from its technical expertise.
It is clear from the foregoing that questions of fact cannot be raised in proceedings before the
Supreme Court — which is not a trier of facts - in respect of an arbitral award rendered under the
CIAC.The Court explained the rationale for limiting appeal to legal questions in construction
cases resolved through arbitration, thus: Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in the
labor field, in the construction industry, and in any other area for that matter, the Court will not
assist one or the other or even both parties in any effort to subvert or defeat that objective for
their private purposes. The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon
the artful allegation that such body had "misapprehended facts" and will not pass upon issues
which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as "legal
questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they
must have had confidence in such arbitrators.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.