Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. - 248 N.Y. 339
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial
Department (New York) affirmed the trial court’s holding that the Long Island R. Co. (Defendant)
was responsible for injuries to Plaintiff resulting from an explosion. The Defendant appealed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must establish each of the
following elements: duty, standard of care, breach of duty, cause-in-fact, proximate cause (scope
of
liability)
and
damages.
Facts. The Plaintiff was standing on a railroad platform purchasing a ticket, when a train stopped
and two men ran forward to catch it. One of the men nearly fell, and two railroad employees
attempted to help him. In the process, a package containing fireworks fell and the contents
exploded. As a result of the explosion some scales at the other end of the platform fell and struck
the Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued and a jury found in her favor. The Appellate Division affirmed this
decision, but the Court of Appeals of New York reversed.
Issue. What constitutes negligence?
Held. The court reversed the appellate court judgment and dismissed the complaint.
Dissent. The dissent takes the view that, as a matter of law, it could not be determined that the
Defendant’s actions were not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries. Justice Andrews
concluded
that
the
judgment
should
have
been
affirmed.
* In perhaps one of the most significant dissents in modern tort law, Justice Andrews in Palsgraf
expresses what has become the matrix for measuring the scope of one’s duty and its relationship
to causation in connection with negligence claims. Essentially, Justice Andrews’ formulation is a
consideration of the appropriate tests for proximate (or legal) cause – the third element in the
formula
for
tort
law
(duty,
breach,
causation
and
harm).
* Concerning negligence, Andrews first asks “[i]s it a relative concept – the breach of some duty
owing to a particular person or to particular persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably
threatens the safety of others, is the doer liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they
result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger?” The
latter is often characterized as the “zone of danger” or “zone of impact” i.e., the area in which the
plaintiff is at risk of physical impact resulting from the alleged wrongdoer’s negligent behavior.
As Justice Andrews notes, “[n]egligence may be defined roughly as an act or omission which
unreasonably does or may affect the rights of others, or which unreasonably fails to protect oneself
from
the
dangers
resulting
from
such
acts.”
* He offers the concise maxim, “[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others,” and further notes, “[w]hen injuries
do result from our unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are
unusual, unexpected, unforeseen and unforseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must
be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the
former.”
Discussion. Plaintiff must show that some wrong was done to herself, i.e., that there was a
violation of her own rights, not merely a wrong done to someone else. In this case, there was
nothing to indicate that the package contained fireworks, and if dropped, would cause an explosion.
The guards, who were assisting the passenger on the train, were negligent in doing so, and caused
the package to be dislodged, which fell causing an explosion. The explosion caused some scales
at the other end of the platform to fall, striking Plaintiff. The guards were not negligent in relation
to the Plaintiff, who was standing far away when the package was dropped. If the court had decided
that Defendant was negligent in respect to the Plaintiff, then the majority concludes that a
defendant would be liable for any and all consequences of its negligence, “however novel or
extraordinary.”
TORTS:





Duty
A. Standard of care:
-Did the D owe the P a standard of care? Yes or no answer?
-What standard of care did the D owe?
Palgraf v Long Island Railroad: Majority rule-no, because she was outside the zone
of danger. Minority rule-yes,
B. Negligence Per Se
Breach
A. Industry customs:
B. Res ipsa laquatur:
Causation
Damages
Defenses
INTENTIONAL TORTS:
A. Voluntary act by D:
For a prima facie case, one must show that the D had a voluntary act by the D that gave
rise to the liability, liability is based on volitional bodily movement. (reflexes are
considered a voluntary act) (a seizure is not considered a volitional act)
B. Intent: AND
Subjective-what the persons mind was doing to give rise to the act.
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, under 8A, “requires the actor desires
consequences of the act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it”.

Intent as “Desire” (Specific Intent): Intent is satisfied if the defendant desires to
cause consequences of his act and the desired consequences constitute an
intentional tort.

Intent as “Substantial Certainty” (General Intent): Intent is satisfied if the
defendant is substantially certain that his acts will cause the elements of the
intentional tort to occur.
C. Causation.
The defendant’s act (or something set in motion by the defendant’s act) must be the legal
cause of the result giving rise to liability. This is generally satisfied when the conduct of
the defendant is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
D. Transferred Intent Doctrine: If the defendant intends to commit the intentional tort of
battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, or trespass to chattels, but his act,
instead or in addition, result in any of the other five intentional torts, the defendant is
liable, even though he did not intend to commit the other tort.
A defendant is liable under the transferred intent doctrine if the defendant intends to
commit a battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, or trespass to chattels
against one person but instead:
commits a different intentional tort (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land,
or trespass to chattels) against that person;
B. commits the same intentional tort against a different person; OR
C. commits a different intentional tort (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land,
or trespass to chattels) against a different person.
A.
Mistake Doctrine: If the defendant intends to do acts which would constitute a tort, it is
no defense that the defendant mistakes, even reasonably, the identity of the property or
person he acts upon or believes incorrectly there is a privilege.
Insanity and Infancy: Neither insanity nor infancy are defenses for intentional torts.
However, mental competence and age could be relevant factors in determining the
subjective intent of the defendant.
E. Battery: The intentional tort of battery occurs when the defendant:
1. Causes or is a substantial factor in bringing about;
2. Harmful or offensive contact;
o Contact is “harmful” if it causes pain, disfigurement, or injury.
o Contact is “offensive” if it violates the plaintiff’s reasonable sense of personal
dignity. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 103.
o The plaintiff need not be aware or conscious of either the contact or its harmful or
offensive nature at the time of the intrusion.
3. To the plaintiff’s person;
o The “plaintiff’s person” includes anything connected to the plaintiff (e.g., a cane,
clothing, etc.).
4. With the intent to bring about harmful or offensive contact to another.
o The majority of courts only require intent to cause contact that society defines as
harmful or offensive (i.e., there is no requirement that the defendant intends to
cause harm or cause offense.).
F. Assault: The intentional tort of assault occurs when the defendant:


Causes or is a substantial factor in bringing about;
Reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff;





The plaintiff must perceive that harmful or offensive contact is about to happen to
him.
 Bodily contact is not required (the intentional tort of assault compensates
pure psychological injury).
 Fear or intimidation in the plaintiff is not required (only the awareness in
the plaintiff that harmful or offensive contact is imminent unless the
plaintiff takes immediate evasive action).
While the Second Restatement permits unreasonable apprehension in the plaintiff,
the majority of courts require that the apprehension is reasonable.
Of imminent harmful or offensive contact;
Words alone are generally insufficient.
Threats of future harm are insufficient.
With specific or general intent.

G.
The defendant must desire or be substantially certain that his actions will cause
the apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.