Energy 205 (2020) 118025 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/energy Review Challenges in the decarbonization of the energy sector Elisa Papadis*, George Tsatsaronis €t Berlin, Marchstr. 18, 10587, Berlin, Germany Chair of Energy Engineering and Environmental Protection, Technische Universita a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Received 26 December 2019 Received in revised form 27 April 2020 Accepted 31 May 2020 Available online 6 June 2020 In order to limit the effects of climate change, the carbon dioxide emissions associated with the energy sector need to be reduced. Significant reductions can be achieved by using appropriate technologies and policies. In the context of recent discussions about climate change and energy transition, this article critically reviews some technologies, policies and frequently discussed solutions. The options for carbon emission reductions are grouped into (1) generation of secondary energy carriers, (2) end-use energy sectors and (3) sector interdependencies. The challenges on the way to a decarbonized energy sector are identified with respect to environmental sustainability, security of energy supply, economic stability and social aspects. A global carbon tax is the most promising instrument to accelerate the process of decarbonization. Nevertheless, this process will be very challenging for humanity due to high capital requirements, the competition among energy sectors for decarbonization options, inconsistent environmental policies and public acceptance of changes in energy use. © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Keywords: Decarbonization Energy sector CO2 emissions Carbon tax Renewable energy sources Contents 1. 2. 3. 4. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Energy transition towards decarbonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1. Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.2. Current status in global CO2 emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Options for decarbonization in each sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Generation of secondary energy carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1.1. Electricity generation sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1.2. Heat supply sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3. Petroleum products and synthetic fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. End-use energy sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.1. Households and public buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2. Trade and commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.3. Transportation sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.4. Industry sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Interdependencies of the sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.1. Process integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.2. Water-energy nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Challenges to overcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.1. Investments in energy conversion systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.2. Investment needs in developing economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Security of electricity supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Economic stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: elisa.papadis@tu-berlin.de (E. Papadis), georgios.tsatsaronis@ tu-berlin.de (G. Tsatsaronis). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118025 0360-5442/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 2 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 5. 6. 4.4. Social aspects of transition and dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Solutions and policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Emission trading scheme requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2. Carbon pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3. Further measures and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Declaration of competing interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1. Introduction Recent developments in climate change and increasing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions worldwide show that, although the share of renewable energy (RE) in the primary energy supply is growing, all countries have to significantly increase their efforts in order to decarbonize the energy sector in the future. The last two decades contain the warmest years on record [1e3]. Weather phenomena are becoming extremer. Surveys [4e8] show that people are worried about climate change as they face an increased number and intensity of phenomena such as floods, droughts, fires, storms or sea-level rise. In addition, climate change is expected to worsen many kinds of diseases. Climate change is anthropogenic and the main cause is the increasing combustion of fossil fuels to cover the growing need for energy [1,9e13]. The decarbonization of the energy sector has been the subject of research for several years, gaining increased attention recently. It is commonly acknowledged that the most obvious way to achieve decarbonization is the use of RE. Therefore, many countries already use a continuously increasing share of their renewable resources, such as wind, solar, geothermal or hydro energy to generate electricity. For example, some countries have already achieved very high shares of RE for electricity generation due to hydropower, such as Paraguay (99%), Norway (97%) and Costa Rica (93%) [14]. China and the USA had the highest installed wind energy and solar photovoltaics capacity worldwide in 2019 [15]. However, the decarbonization of the energy sector entails several challenges and the interdependencies between the secondary energy carriers and end-use energy sectors should not be underestimated. With this paper we aim to contribute to the decarbonization efforts by providing a basis for a better understanding of the challenges associated with it. In literature, challengesdincluding those of the integration of REdare usually categorized into technological, economic, and social issues. The most important issue is to ensure that technology options are available at the required scale and at an acceptable cost, particularly for sectors which are more difficult to decarbonize, such as industry or transport [16,17]. The main challenge is to reduce fossil fuel use in the end-use sectors [18]. Brown et al. [19] introduce and distinguish viability criteria for the transition to REbased electricity systems. They emphasize the importance of proven technologies and resource availability. The challenges of the integration of high RE shares in the electricity sector are stated and analyzed in several publications (e.g. Ref. [17,20]). Complexity increases with increasing RE shares while in parallel phasing out fossil fuels [20]. Loftus et al. [21] review existing decarbonization scenarios and assess the potential contributions of each primary energy carrier to decarbonization. According to their analysis, most of the studies treat economic issues and only few discuss technological readiness. The system integration is treated superficially or not at all, and social and non-cost aspects are also given minor attention. In general, decarbonization of industry and transport is not discussed in detail. With respect to economic issues, the need for substantial low-carbon investments in the energy sector is seen as the major challenge, both in industrialized and emerging economies [16,18,20]. Long-term financing and policies to ensure decarbonization while contributing to economic development are required [16]. Barido et al. [22] point out the necessity of support mechanisms that include multiple country-specific factors. A further major challenge is associated with socially viable mitigation strategies. Public acceptance of technology options, acceptable energy prices and benefits to the communities are addressed in this context [16]. Heard et al. [23], state that no carbon-free technology can be limited a priori. This statement overlooks the fact that some carbon-free technologies are simply not viable because of economic, political or social considerations. Psychological and cultural aspects can be both drivers and barriers in the process. In the political dimension, country and regional policies need to be consistent with international decarbonization strategies and enable economic growth [16]. € m et al. [24] mention the lack of national commitments Rockstro to following decarbonization pathways. Energy system models are valuable planning instruments for estimating possible decarbonization pathways. There are several publications dealing with modeling the electricity sector (e.g. Ref. [25e32]) as well as the entire energy sector (e.g. Refs. [31e35]) in Europe and worldwide. Despite many high-quality publications addressing the urge for decarbonization and the challenges associated with it, national and international politics are far behind in achieving the target. Many researchers and scientists (e.g. Ref. [13,16,24,36,37]) call for the introduction of stricter controls on carbon emissions, in the form of an appropriate carbon tax, in order to encourage fast action in the short term. There is an immense need for early action now, since significant time is required for innovations and for the deployment of globally applicable strategies. In this article we review the historical development of the global decarbonization process and assess the technology options for decarbonization in each sector. We evaluate whether the technology options are proven and viable for the future energy sector design, analyze the challenges from environmental, technical, economic and social perspectives, and discuss some solutions and policies. 2. Energy transition towards decarbonization 2.1. Historical background The first worldwide common efforts to control and stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere took place at the Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro in 1992, where many countries agreed on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) [38]. The ultimate objective of this E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 convention is to “achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” [39]. Such a level should be achieved within “a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” [39]. The UNFCCC was followed by an agreement for setting internationally binding emission reduction targets that is commonly known as the Kyoto Protocol. It states “common but differentiated responsibilities” of the parties [40]. The United Nations defined three mechanisms which support the countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol in reaching their emission reduction targets cost-effectively [41,42]: 1. Emission trading (ET). The parties have emission limitations, which are expressed as emissions allowances. The emission allowances can be traded between parties that are over or below their targets. 2. Joint Implementation (JI). This mechanism allows a party to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission reduction or removal project with another party. 3. Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). Parties can implement emission reduction projects in developing countries and earn saleable certified emission reduction credits (CER). In another annual Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC in Paris in 2015, the succession of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which is commonly known as the Paris Agreement. The key resolution was the commitment to “limit the temperature increase to well below 2 C compared to pre-industrial levels, with efforts to limit it to 1.5 C” [44]. It came into force in November 2016 [44]. In parallel to the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, the UN developed 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), agreed to by 193 countries in 2015 [45]. In particular, Sustainable Development Goal 7 has the scope to “ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy services by 2030” [45]. Specified indicators for success are the proportion of population with access to electricity and primary reliance on clean fuels and technologies, the RE share in the total final energy use, and the energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and gross domestic product (GDP). 2.2. Current status in global CO2 emissions Although the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol have been ratified by industrialized countries and economies in transition, the total global CO2 emissions have been increasing continuously (Fig. 1). Carbon pricing (carbon tax and ET) covered only about 15% of the GHG emissions worldwide in the year 2018 [46]. The main reason for the mechanisms associated with the Kyoto Protocol not achieving higher emission reductions is the very low price of emission allowances, which resulted in a surplus of certificates in the market [47,48]. The abundance of certificates made climate friendly investments not attractive economically. The profit generated through emission trading schemes (ETSs) was not reinvested into low-carbon technologies or research, which resulted in a lack of effort to achieve decarbonization. Neither the transport nor the buildings and agriculture sectors are included in the ETSs, even though high emissions occur in them. As for the CDM and JI, there was no incentive for investment due to low certified emission reductions. In general, there was a lack of control and no sustainability assessment in place for either mechanism, which made it hard to monitor the progress. 3 Drastic global measures to cut emissions are not part of the Paris Agreement, since each country is left to put national measures into action. The SDGs, and particularly Goal 7, are necessary to globally reduce the differences in the living standards among countries. Although the characterization of energy services in the SDG 7 is promising, it is also somewhat contradictory. Reliable, sustainable and modern energy services are definitely desirable, yet they entail high investments, which in turn affect the affordability. From 1990 to today, the world’s population has been steadily increasing, reaching 7.4 billion people in 2016. It is expected to reach 10 billion people by 2060. In addition, the share of people without access to electricity has been decreasing since 1990 and fell below one billion for the first time in 2015, a number that is expected to further decline. These developments imply that the demand for energy will continue to grow. Refs. [46,49e51] foresee an increase in the efficiency of providing and using “end-use” energy, which would counteract the increasing demand from the growing population. In order to identify the highest potential for decreasing CO2 emissions, the emissions from the secondary and end-use energy sectors are examined. The highest emissions are associated with electricity and heat generation, and with industry, in all regions of the world, see Fig. 2, [52]. The per sector emissions of world regions show that Asia’s CO2 emissions from electricity and heat generation are very high. Asia’s emissions from the buildings and industry sectors are also the highest, compared to the other regions. It must be noted that transport does not include international marine and aviation. 3. Options for decarbonization in each sector In the following subsections some options for the decarbonization of the energy sector are analyzed. The discussion addresses secondary energy carriers and end-use energy sectors, see Table 1. 3.1. Generation of secondary energy carriers The generation of secondary energy carriers such as electricity, heat, petroleum products and synthetic fuels is dominated worldwide by chemical reactions, mainly the combustion of fossil fuels. Only in electricity generation is the share of renewable primary energy substantially increasing. In the past years, with the energy transition and the liberalization of the energy markets implying many regulatory changes, the secondary energy sector has undergone major transformations and more are expected to come. 3.1.1. Electricity generation sector In the electricity sector, an amount of RE (photovoltaics, onshore and offshore wind) and hydropower have already been integrated, with South and Central America and Europe reaching the highest shares (Fig. 3). The share of RE sources in the electricity generation mix of the regions can be attributed to efforts to increase the installed RE capacity (as in Europe) or to the occurrence of favorable environmental conditions, for example, the existence of potentials to use hydropower or geothermal energy (as in South and Central America). Nevertheless, coal, nuclear energy and natural gas still dominate the electricity generation globally. The use of primary energy sources in the electricity generation depends on the natural resources, the economic state and the historical development of each region. Revenues generated from the exploitation and export of the fuels are an essential contributor to the economy and employment of some regions. For this reason, it is very challenging to convince policy makers in these regions to halt coal and oil expansion. The electricity sector is regarded as the one where 4 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 Fig. 1. CO2 emissions per region based on data from Ref. [43]. Transport includes international aviation and maritime transport. Fig. 2. CO2 emissions per sector and region of the world in 2016. Own representation based on data from Ref. [52]. E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 5 Table 1 Energy carriers and sectors. Primary energy Secondary energy End-use energy Non-renewable: fossil fuels, nuclear energy Renewable: solar (wind, hydropower, solar irradiation, biomass), geothermal, gravitational Electricity Heat Petroleum products Synthetic fuels Households Trade and commerce (incl. agriculture) Transport Industry decarbonization will be achieved first, compared to the other sectors. Sector coupling options, in which a future increased share of the heat and buildings, transportation and industry sectors will be electrified, make the decarbonization of the electricity sector more urgent. Yet how can this transition be achieved? From the generation side, the deployment of renewables needs to be promoted further worldwide. In all the following discussions, it is implied that RE sources will continuously be exploited worldwide. Conventional power plants will still be necessary to cover the remaining residual load, due to the fluctuation of power generation from renewables. The efficiency increase in these plants is often presented as an attractive option contributing to decarbonization. However, we must realize that (a) in some plants (e.g., combinedcycle power plants), regardless of the contribution of innovation, we are slowly approaching thermodynamic limits which, after a point, will make further efficiency improvements impossible, and (b) in all thermal power plants, further efficiency improvements can be obtained only by significantly increasing the capital cost, a fact which makes these plants less economically attractive. Nevertheless, a fuel switch from coal to natural gas needs to be achieved as a mid-term solution, leading to a gradual coal phase- out, as it is already being discussed or agreed upon in several countries [54]. After a transition period, during which natural gas will be combusted, a fuel switch to green fuels will likely occur. This creates further challenges, since for instance, hydrogen generation from RE sources is not yet economically feasible (section 3.1.3). An increased share of RE demands higher flexibility of thermal power plants, leading to challenges in obtaining system security (section 4.2). An option which is often referred to as the major technology for decarbonization of the power sector and energy intensive industry is Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The technical feasibility of CCS is established, since it is based on conventional technology (pre- or post-combustion, oxyfuel process, see, e.g., Refs. [55]). Nevertheless, only very few plants for CCS in electricity generation have been implemented (out of 32 CCS projects in the gas processing, industry and electricity sector globally, only 3 are in operation in the electricity sector [56]). An assessment of whether CCS from power plants can reduce the overall environmental impact of electricity generation led to the result that, depending on the energy penalty associated with CO2 capture, CCS does not necessarily result in a reduction of the overall environmental impact [57], because CO2 Fig. 3. Share of fuel in electricity generation of each region in 2018, based on data from Refs. [53] (CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States). 6 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 capture requires additional energy input and results in significant efficiency reductions. In the study “Integrated Energy Transition” [58] CCS is excluded as an option for decarbonization in the short term. Additional concerns regarding possible environmental damage during the storage, low economic viability and problems with the public acceptance of the CO2 transportation resulted in the CCS technology not reaching the status of commercialization. In connection with CCS, the technologies Carbon Capture and Usage (CCU) and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) need to be mentioned. According to Quarton et al. [59], an emission reduction can be achieved with CCU, whilst delivering useful products. However, the contribution of CCU to the global CO2 reduction is found to be negligible or even a costly distraction, if the chemicals created with the captured CO2 are used and the CO2 is released to the atmosphere again [59,60]. As for CCUS, the weaknesses of both previously mentioned options (CCS and CCU) apply combined. In our opinion CCS, CCU and CCUS are no realistic options for decarbonization and are, therefore, not further considered in this paper. Another theoretical technology option are nuclear fusion reactors, once they have reached commercial status. The electricity generated would be safe, carbon free and adequately available. However, given the long period of time during which nuclear fusion has already been the subject of research, with not very encouraging results, this technology is not considered for decarbonization. Nuclear fission is indeed an option for decarbonization, however, as long as the questions of safety and of the treatment and disposal of nuclear waste have not been answered satisfactorily, it does not represent a truly sustainable solution. Nuclear fission is associated with significant public opposition in several countries and is considered highly risky due to societal risk and unresolved economic issues in many recent publications [61e63]. Further publications show model-based results, where a transition to a low-carbon economy is possible without nuclear power [26,30,62,64]. In addition, nuclear generation is not well aligned with RE electricity generation, because its ramp rates are slow and, therefore, this less flexible operation would lead to a relatively low number of full-load hours, resulting in no economic viability due to high capital costs [19,20,26,65]. Even though often discussed as a broadly applicable option for decarbonization, the very high capital cost of nuclear power makes it an unachievable option for emerging economies [62]. Because of all these reasons, the expected real contribution of nuclear fission to decarbonization will probably remain relatively low. 3.1.2. Heat supply sector Since process heat is discussed in section 3.2.4, in this section we mainly refer to heat used for space heating and hot water supply in residential and commercial buildings. The heating sector in rural areas is dominated by decentralized heating systems mainly based on oil or gas. In contrast, district heating networks (DHN) supply a high share of thermal energy to consumers in many large cities. District heating systems are usually supplied by combined heat and power (CHP) plants or heat only plants based on fossil fuels. Low-carbon energy sources can currently not compete with fossil fuels, particularly when the latter are subsidized and legally favored by governments. In the short term, the expansion of DHN supplied by CHP plants should be favored, since they have a higher degree of fuel utilization compared to the separate generation of heat and electricity and thus contribute to primary energy savings. Waste-to-energy is expected to play an increasing role in the CHP sector [66,67]. Excess heat from industrial and municipal waste incineration can be efficiently integrated into DHN. An environmentally friendly operation must be ensured by commercially available technologies for flue- gas cleaning. The transition should move towards DHN using RE as a primary energy source. Alternative low-carbon heating sources, e.g. solar thermal energy and the use of waste heat can supply DHN as well as individual households with decentralized heating systems. Lowering supply temperatures can enable the integration of various alternative heating sources. Thermal storage for seasonal and daily storage of heat can provide the needed flexibility to CHP plants and enable an efficient operation [68]. Power-to-heat technologies (e.g., heat pumps and electric boilers) powered by “green electricity” can provide flexibility on the generation side while using low electricity prices under suitable regulatory frameworks [69]. 3.1.3. Petroleum products and synthetic fuels Liquid and gaseous energy carriers are used extensively now and will still be indispensable in the future. Petroleum has the highest share in the global primary energy demand [49]. Since it is used in almost all sectors, it contributes to the emissions of all enduse energy sectors. Especially in the transport sector, liquid fuels dominate. Liquid biofuels can substitute liquid fuels derived from petroleum with minor adaptations to the existing infrastructure. Synthetic fuels and hydrogen are attributed great importance for decarbonization in the future [70]. Hydrogen could in the long term substitute natural gas in power and heat generation, but also in sectors which are harder to decarbonize, such as the chemical and metallurgical industries, or the transportation sector, since its combustion has no environmental impact. Relatively small adaptations of technical equipment would be necessary for a retrofit from natural gas to hydrogen and the existing gas distribution pipelines or an infrastructure similar to these could be used. However, the generation of hydrogen has several drawbacks. Hydrogen can be generated from synthesis gas (a mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen) out of methane, heavy fuel oil, biomass or coal. In some refinery processes, hydrogen is generated as a byproduct (e.g., in catalytic naphtha reforming). Currently, more than 70% of the commercially available hydrogen is generated through steam reforming of methane, an endothermic chemical catalytic reaction that uses additional gas to provide the required heat. Furthermore, hydrogen can be generated via electrolysis of water. For hydrogen generation, however, to be declared as “green” and minimize CO2 emissions, it must be produced solely through power generated from RE sources. In this way, hydrogen electrolysis can provide flexibility to the energy system through conversion of power to gas and back to power, for instance using gas turbines or fuel cells. The main challenge of H2 electrolysis are the high production costs of hydrogen. Additionally, from the thermodynamic viewpoint it is not meaningful to invest money to convert electricity (having the highest thermodynamic quality) into an inferior energy carrier (hydrogen) with significant thermodynamic inefficiencies. Another challenge is the storage of hydrogen. Liquefying hydrogen is highly energy intensive, and is, therefore, only justified in specific cases. Establishing a hydrogen economy has been a topic of research for over 40 years now. We must be careful about how we evaluate solutions in which hydrogen is generated through electrolysis and how we place the boundaries of the system we evaluate: for example, hydrogen generation that appears to be a meaningful decarbonization solution at the local level because here the electricity used in the electrolyzer is generated from renewable resources (“green” hydrogen), becomes a dissatisfactory solution, if this electricity could have been transported to another region and used there to reduce the amount of fossil fuels combusted there for electricity generation. In this example it would have been more E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 appropriate to use the electricity in the second region and to consume a fossil fuel (instead of hydrogen) in the first one, because in this way the inefficiencies and costs associated with the conversion of electricity to hydrogen would have been avoided and the overall emissions would be lower. With respect to setting boundaries for decarbonization evaluations we must always consider the largest possible meaningful geographical area. If we establish a hydrogen economy, the decarbonization requirement dictates that we must effectively distinguish between “green” hydrogen on one side and “grey” or “black” hydrogen (hydrogen generated through steam reforming of natural gas or through synthesis gas generated by coal gasification) on the other side. Thus, we can conclude for the hydrogen economy that the very large quantities of hydrogen that would be required for an almost complete decarbonization in this century probably cannot be provided without a significant increase of electricity generated by nuclear energy. The hydrogen economy could be meaningfully implemented at a time point characterized by a worldwide shortage of fossil fuels and, in parallel, large quantities of excess “green” electricity. It is possible that the current situation with respect to hydrogen production will change through innovative concepts. For example the HECAP (Hydrogen and Electricity generation from CArbonaceous materials and Process heat) process [71,72] that was developed by the second author in 1981 is a truly zero-emission process and has an unusually high overall thermodynamic efficiency. This process uses any carbonaceous material (e.g., bad-quality coal) and process heat (which nowadays could be provided by solar energy) to generate electricity and hydrogen, the most important energy carriers of the future. The CO2, which is generated in the combustion of the carbonaceous material with sulfuric acid (H2SO4), leaves the process at high pressure in a liquid state and could be directly stored or used in another chemical process. Furthermore, the sulfur dioxide (SO2) is removed from the HECAP process as a liquid, whereas no nitrogen oxides can be formed in the process because the combustion is not conducted with air as an oxygen carrier, but with sulfuric acid. On the downside, some equipment of the HECAP process (high-temperature filters for the removal of particulate matter after combustion, gas turbines using a mixture of CO2, SO2 and H2O as working fluid, as well as the electrolytic step in the generation of hydrogen in the so-called Westinghouse thermochemical process) are not yet commercially available. It should be noted, however, that without the development of new innovative concepts for hydrogen production, hydrogen will probably remain throughout the current century an “energy carrier of the future”. 3.2. End-use energy sectors In the group of the end-use energy sectors, households and public buildings are treated in the same section, as they have a high demand for secondary energy (electricity and heat). Agriculture is considered together with trade and commerce. Further end-use sectors are transport and industry. 3.2.1. Households and public buildings The buildings sector is mainly shaped by the living standards. In industrialized countries, the future demand for energy will most probably be flattened as a result of the higher efficiency of appliances. In developing countries, however, an increase is predicted for the future, mostly due to improving standards of living [50]. The bottlenecks in this sector are the required high investments and the lack of financial incentives for the use of more efficient and renewable-based energy systems. Many countries do not have mandatory building codes despite the high rate of construction of new buildings [73]. Developing countries face a completely 7 different situation, with a share of the population lacking access to modern housing. The energy demand for heating and cooking purposes is primarily covered by burning biomass or coal in stoves. Energy efficiency needs to increase through better insulation of buildings, more efficient heat-supply (cold-supply) systems and usage of highly efficient appliances. Lastly, the behavior changes of people living in the buildings can also be a major driver in reducing the energy demand in households and buildings. 3.2.2. Trade and commerce Referring to trade and commerce, we focus on the sector of agriculture and the supply of goods, because more than 25% of GHG are emitted from agriculture, forestry and land use [13]. The coexistence of a surplus society that discards food and a society with insufficient food supply reveals major opportunities for change, which will affect the natural resources. The report on “Climate Change and Land” [74] addresses several issues which are directly related to the living standards of the industrialized countries. The high demand for meat, short product life cycles and the consumerist behavior amplify climate change and affect land use. The need for more land area, decrease in soil fertility and forested area, and increase in desert area are already visible consequences of this lifestyle. The relatively high energy demand for fertilizers and transportation increases the emissions of the agriculture sector [75]. The challenge remains to feed a growing population. Combined global efforts towards an increase in the forested area and a termination of deforestation are necessary measures. With respect to the increasing population of the world, humans, especially in industrialized countries, need to accept changes in their behavior. Reducing the demand for meat by consuming less, wasting less food, increasing product utilization and reducing waste can contribute to lessening CO2 emissions and protecting the environment. This implies a huge challenge for developing economies, which need to avoid the “mistakes” made in industrialized societies and directly adapt to new lifestyles following a more sustainable way of living. Considering the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries and the fact that elements of the way of life in these countries are often adopted by developing countries, the efforts to change the way of life in the industrialized countries should be even greater. 3.2.3. Transportation sector The transportation sector is split into road and rail transport, as well as maritime traffic and aviation. The possibility to move worldwide at comparably low cost has an impact on the increases in land, sea and air traffic. Light-duty vehicles, such as cars, are the most common means of transport worldwide. Freight transport on land is mainly carried out with trucks. Cars and trucks are further responsible for non-CO2 pollutants like nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, solid particles and more [76]. Future climate friendly transportation should be more efficient. Electromobility can be applied to cars and trucks and is included as an option in most future scenarios. To reduce the overall CO2 emissions, however, the electricity used in electromobility should be generated by RE sources and definitely not by using coal. Fuel-cell vehicles are considered to take longer to reach commercial status using “green” hydrogen. Improved public transport, consisting of high frequented routes and attractive pricing schemes, as well as car-sharing offers can contribute to decreasing CO2 emissions. An extended rail network with fast connections between cities can enable consumers to shift to low carbon transport. Sharing, route optimization, relaxing of delivery windows and higher operational efficiency can hold future CO2 emissions from trucks at low levels [77]. Aviation is used for freight and passenger transport. It accounts 8 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 for 2.1% of global CO2 emissions [78] and is the most challenging sector to decarbonize [79]. Reductions in CO2 emissions in this sector include efficiency and operational improvements, fuel switching and regulatory measures. Improved air traffic management can reduce CO2 emissions through more direct routing and flying at optimum altitudes and speeds [76]. In the very long term, switching to power-to-gas and alternative fuel solutions (i.e. biofuels and green hydrogen) can be an option. In this case, however, aviation would compete directly with other sectors for the use of the limited quantities of these “green” fuels. The above mentioned measures require high investments. Therefore, no substantial efforts towards emission reduction are expected from that sector without policy incentives, regulations on national and international level or a significant fossil-fuel price increase. Currently, emissions from international aviation are not being fully charged in the existing ETSs. A new resolution to address CO2 emissions from international aviation as of 2021 was agreed upon by the International Civil Aviation Organization [78]. The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) aims to stabilize CO2 emissions at 2020 levels by requiring airlines to offset the growth of their emissions after 2020. The participation is voluntary from 2021 and mandatory after 2026 [78]. CORSIA is not satisfactory because the participation should be mandatory from the very beginning and because the ways for achieving decarbonization are not convincing. Maritime transport is based on heavy fuel oil and accounts for 2.5% of global CO2 emissions [80]. It is a comparatively efficient mode of freight and passenger transport [76]. Maritime transport emissions could increase in the future, in light of the increasing demand for transported goods. Monitoring emissions, introducing efficiency improvements to reduce emissions as well as global strategies to include them in ETSs are necessary. The efficiency of newly built vessels could be improved by applying the fuel price increases and technical changes, such as waste heat recovery, auxiliary power systems and operational measures [76]. Fuel switching in maritime transport systems is quite unlikely in the short term, because the fuel cost is currently low and alternatives are still very expensive [76]. Transportation should be shifted from road and air to railway and water wherever possible. Besides technical, operational and market-regulated aspects, the shift also requires a behavior change in the population. 3.2.4. Industry sector The industry sector includes many highly energy-intensive processes which are difficult to decarbonize [81e86]. High emissions occur in the following industries: metallurgical (iron and steel making, aluminum, copper), chemical (refineries, plastic, fertilizers), non-metallic minerals (cement and lime, ceramics, glass), pulp and paper, textiles and leather, food processing and mining. Iron and steel making require high-temperature process heat which is usually supplied through fossil fuels, but can be efficiently provided by (green gas-fired) CHP processes [82e84,87,88]. Industrial products are used internationally and therefore the allocation of emissions is challenging. In order to head towards decarbonization of industry, energy efficiency must be increased in all industrial sectors [82,88], for example through process integration. Utilization of waste heat in conjunction with heat pumps can decrease the primary energy demand [84,88]. Wherever possible, fuel switching, deployment of “green” hydrogen and electrification of processes can decrease the CO2 emissions [82,83,85,87]. With respect to behavior change, a reduction in product demand will also contribute. Furthermore, a reduction of plastic production and use, can decrease the primary energy demand for oil or gas. New user habits and supply chain models are necessary to achieve this. Nevertheless, without efficient policy measures, decarbonization is very unlikely to happen in this sector [85]. 3.3. Interdependencies of the sectors Process integration and energy-water nexus are not associated with only one of the above-mentioned sectors. Therefore, they are discussed in the following sections. 3.3.1. Process integration Increased efficiency is an option for lowering overall emissions which is often praised (and sometimes overemphasized). Especially in processes which are characterized by high primary energy demand and/or high fuel prices, process integration is a way to increase overall efficiency while decreasing resource consumption and waste of manufacturing procedures. Synergies can be obtained by further utilizing energy (heat or electricity) and material (water, solvents) flows, leading to technically, environmentally and economically viable solutions [89]. Heat integration is a wellknown form of process integration and can be applied through pinch analyses in heat exchanger networks [90]. Industrial power plant synergies can be obtained when the plants are clustered at a site [91]. Mathematical optimization methods can be applied for designing resource and cost optimal plants (e.g., by using superstructures) or for identifying optimal operation strategies. Nevertheless, solving these problems robustly and in acceptable time frames can be challenging. 3.3.2. Water-energy nexus Water and energy use are interdependent. A large part of global electricity consumption is used for the supply of drinking water and for wastewater treatment [49,92]. This share is expected to increase in the future, due to an increased need for desalinated water, wastewater treatment and transfer of water over long distances. The CO2 emissions can be decreased through efficiency improvements or by using alternative energy sources, such as solarpowered desalination plants. Vice versa, water is used in power generation and fuel production [49,92]. Conventional thermal power plants depend on the availability of water (used as working fluid, cooling fluid, etc.). Furthermore, some technologies discussed for decarbonization can also be water-intensive [93]. Therefore, water scarcity in certain regions should be considered in the design of the future energy sector [94]. Strategies for recycling water need to be further deployed and the use of water-intensive technologies avoided when possible. 4. Challenges to overcome All the aforementioned options for the decarbonization of the sectors are subject to restrictions on the energy sector, which result from environmental and economic aspects as well as human rights. Sustainable development is often referred to as consisting of three pillars: the social, ecological and economic. Yet instead of looking at them as having comparable importance as has been the case before, they are viewed as a series of embedded systems, as suggested by and discussed in Refs. [95,96]. In embedded systems, the main energy sector requirements are closely related and influence each other. These are: (1) environmental sustainability (climate protection), (2) the security of energy (electricity) supply and (3) economic stability. Any transitions in the energy sector should be compatible with social needs while protecting the climate. E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 9 4.1. Environmental sustainability electricity can be steps in that direction [47]. In order to reach environmental sustainability, it is imperative to reduce CO2 emissions. Looking at the current energy sector environmental protection and sustainability are only pursued as long as environmental restrictions are in place, and only up to the mandatory level. There has been no incentive to develop a sustainable energy sector, since there is no monetary reward. Yet the stressed environmental boundaries necessitate a shift towards sustainability [97]. For a decarbonized energy sector, new investments are necessary to drive the shift from CO2 intensive technologies to sustainable technologies. However, it is not easy for investors to choose such options. Investments in the energy sector are long-term decisions for technology options to be used for several decades. Inconsistent and not elaborated climate policies in most countries have created uncertainty and, as a result, investors are concerned about the increasing regulatory risk [16,98]. Future energy demand forecasts rely on models that contain uncertainties about forthcoming needs for installed capacity. The model results vary broadly depending on the institution and the considered scenarios. Improvements in efficiency would decrease the final energy demand [17,49,99,100]; the electrification of other sectors, however, will increase the electricity demand and, therefore, the total energy demand. This reveals a lack of a guided lead for the design of the future overall energy sector. To obtain environmental sustainability, the following challenges must be addressed: 4.1.2. Investment needs in developing economies A high willingness to invest in RE technologies is seen in industrialized countries. With low interest rates, robust credit markets and very little currency risk, the conditions for investments are favorable. In contrast, developing countries have to deal with high interest rates, less robust credit markets and high currency risk, which make the conditions for investment less favorable [47]. A comparison of interest rates in different countries reveals a broad range with interest rates, starting close to zero (in countries like Switzerland, Germany and Japan) and ranging up to 25% in countries like Yemen, Venezuela and Haiti [102]. The need for large investments in developing countries is high and will continue to increase with the growing demand for energy. The main challenge is to overcome the capital scarcity in those markets. 55% of the globally estimated required investment will be in developing countries in the next 15 years [47]. 4.1.1. Investments in energy conversion systems The investment in fossil fuels and consequently their exploitation and combustiondespecially of coaldshould be decreased and, if possible, eliminated. Permits for the construction of new coaland oil-fired power plants should not be issued in the future, if the generated CO2 would be released to the atmosphere. The electricity and heat generation from fossil-fired power plants should be reduced. This requirement contradicts the economic planning of many countries, which are highly dependent on the exploitation of their natural resources, such as oil, gas, coal and on the exploration of new reservoirs. Their incentives for leaving these resources in the ground are low. Changes in the market structure could lead to a situation in which technical units are unable to earn money before the end of their lifetime and thus become stranded assets [16,30]. This situation can be market-related or politically induced, for example in the event of a phase-out of certain technologies. Stranded assets can also occur in the renewable sector when, for instance, supporting schemes expire. The concern over making (the right) investments in the energy sector during an uncertain period can result in a reduction of electricity or heat generation capacity and, in the worst case, incapability to cover the demand. Conventional fossil-fuel power generation entails a large amount of running costs, such as fuel and maintenance costs, while the capital cost usually has a lower share in the overall cost structure. In contrast, low-carbon power generation technologies have a high initial capital cost and low operating costs. This leads to an increased importance of capital expenditures. Since renewable technologies have zero marginal cost, they reduce the average electricity prices. Renewables can, however, amplify market design flaws, leading to negatively priced periods at times [101]. This calls for well-designed and flexible electricity markets. To attract investments in low-carbon generation, a consensus on the framework of the transition towards sustainable investments is necessary [47]. Policies which increase the predictability of longterm cash flows as well as policies and components which provide a higher certainty about future prices for low-carbon 4.2. Security of electricity supply The changing requirements on thermal power plants, the lack of investment incentives and technical feasibility are seen as obstacles that make it difficult to achieve a fast decarbonization while ensuring electricity supply. Power delivery is necessary on demand. Thermal power plants based on fossil fuels are flexible and can easily adapt to demand. They are, therefore, called load-following units. In an electricity system the units are dispatched and operated in order to exactly meet the demand. In present and future electricity systems, covering the demand becomes more challenging than it has been in the past, as the share of RE increases. Electricity generation from RE is intermittent and cannot easily adapt to demand fluctuations, which often results in a mismatch between generation and demand [103]. In times of growing numbers of extreme weather phenomena and more importantly longer cold periods with no solar/wind power generation, only flexible thermal power plants and (seasonal) energy storage can bridge longer supply gaps resulting from intermittent RE sources. A fast reaction to weather changes in order to balance renewable generation calls for very accurate weather forecasts, as well as highly flexible thermal power plants and necessitates frequent start-ups and shut-downs, faster ramp rates and lower minimum load [103]. Increased thermal material stress due to these factors calls for more robust, advanced materials, which are still in early pilot-project stages or not cost effective yet. In the case of fossil-fueled CHP plants, the heat demand must be covered, even if there is no need for power. The necessary phaseout of coal-fired power plants calls for alternative methods to cover heat demand and for flexibility options like thermal storages [68,103]. In Germany, with an expected phase-out of coal power plants until 2038 [104,105], the gas-fired power plants will constitute a bridging technology for the decarbonization of the energy sector. They will probably undergo changes in their operation in the medium term, which will result in a broader capacity utilization. The coal phase-out plans of individual countries are not sufficient; a global coal phase-out is necessary in order to reduce the carbon intensity in the energy sector and to increase environmental sustainability. The coal power plants could be replaced by naturalgas-fired power plants with green gas substituting the fuel in the long run. From an economic perspective, the phase-out could be implemented via a forced phase-out or a market-driven phase-out, through increasing CO2 prices or other incentives. The phase-out should be accompanied by a deletion of the released CO2 10 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 certificates from the ETS. Otherwise this measure will contribute little to decreasing emissions. In order to avoid a negative spill-over effect from carbon leakage, the measures must be applied globally. For a smooth transition, the system’s stability during integration of large amounts of RE should be ensured, which can be accomplished through electricity or thermal (seasonal) storage, power-toX approaches, price responsive consumers and increased demand side management measures in the long term [103,106]. For the interim time, investments in gas distribution systems and liquefied natural gas terminals can contribute. Besides sufficient electricity and heat generating capacity, conventional power plants are necessary to provide a certain amount of spinning mass (inertia) [79]. Alternative systems need to be developed that can take over the part of the conventional must-run capacities. Storage technologies can provide multiple ancillary services, such as electric energy time shift, supply capacity, black start, frequency regulation, and spinning reserve. The technologies range from pumped hydro storage, mechanical energy storage (compressed air, flywheel energy, cryogenic energy storage), to electrochemical (batteries) and thermal storage (hot water or molten salt) [107]. Some storage systems are still in the R&D phase, for example, adiabatic cryogenic-based energy storage systems [108]. The drawback here is the relatively low round trip efficiency [109]. Power-to-heat-topower concepts [110], where heat is stored in order to be used in a thermal power plant, are also being investigated. However, they are not very promising in part because of the low round trip efficiency when a thermodynamically inferior energy carrier (heat) is initially produced and then used to generate electricity. Although standardized components are used in many cases, these systems are not profitable under today’s conditions. Since decarbonization is a global issue, the coupling of markets to enable and simplify cross border trade of electricity will be indispensable [106]. Steps in that direction are taken already, for example with the Clean Energy Package of the European Union [111]. Nevertheless, more efforts on a global basis need to be set into action. Grid expansion and investments in transmission and distribution networks are also crucial [106,112]. Whichever way the decarbonization is structured and implemented, major new investments will be required to meet global and regional energy needs and secure the energy supply [47]. The lack of investment incentives for flexible generation capacity is a great challenge to securing electricity supply at all times, especially when considering the simultaneous phase-out of certain technologies. For an increased flexibility in the market structure, investments need to be secured and economic viability ensured. Finally, climate-friendly operation must become more economical than climate-damaging operation through rewarding reduction of CO2 emissions rather than subsidizing specific technologies. New energy sector requirements raise issues regarding the technical feasibility of the suggested options. The existence and availability of materials determines which technologies can be deployed in future energy systems. For example, rare earths are used for digitalization applications, catalysts, and batteries, whereas high-temperature materials are needed for combustion chambers, heat exchangers and turbines. The technological readiness of solutions needs to be given or be economically attractive, for example for large-scale energy storage, hybrid vehicles, next generation biofuels, and finally, hydrogen technology. The long duration of planning and construction of energy conversion systemsdwith a time horizon of 5e10 years from the start of planning to the start of operationdis often a high barrier for such investments. It shows the need for an early transformation of the energy sector, to prepare it for future requirements. 4.3. Economic stability Next to environmental sustainability and security of energy supply, the third dimension of the energy sector is economic stability. Economic systems need to serve human needs within the boundaries of available resources [97]. Besides other needs, such as water, food, income, education and safety, the need for energy is fundamental for the well-being of humans. Energy is supplied within the framework of current economic conditions. However, focusing more on serving the socio-ecological system and less on private profit can increase the sustainability of the energy sector and drive decarbonization forward. The impact of global economic activities needs to be determined also on the basis of environmental repercussions and not only growth in GDP. Perhaps the Human Development Index, which includes education, life expectancy and per capita income [96,113], expanded to include ecological factors would be a better metric of the wealth of a nation. Economic activities within environmental limits must be rewarded, while activities which stress the boundaries should face penalties. When talking about economic stability we must also consider political barriers that may exist during the deployment of innovative technology options. This applies especially for options such as transportation of electricity or fuels between regions with different political systems. Guaranteeing the safety of energy supply is a crucial issue for future energy systems and it can be more easily achieved under stable political conditions. The transition to a decarbonized energy sector will be very costly. To satisfy the SDG Goal 7 of “affordable and clean energy”, measures to compensate the investment intensive transition need to be elaborated. Otherwise, consumers will bear a significant cost burden on the way to reaching a sustainable, decarbonized energy sector. It should be noted that high energy costs to consumers are a trigger for dissatisfaction and political instability as well as an opportunity for populistic parties in a democratic system to increase their power and through their policies and actions to cause a regression in the decarbonization progress. Therefore, all price increases that will be unavoidable in the future in order to meet decarbonization targets must be accompanied by measures to lighten the economic burden on the population, particularly on socially disadvantaged consumers. 4.4. Social aspects of transition and dilemmas One crucial aspect of the decarbonization of the energy sector is the socially compatible design of the process. A fair transition must consider the changes in the economic structure of the affected regions and ensure social and economic justice. The real cost for the end user is, in that perspective, the most important aspect. Psychological and cultural aspects can also represent challenges for the transition [114]. Changes in energy use need a long time to be accepted and require a major shift in mindset and culture. Citizens must be directly involved in the processes and decisions. In this way, aversion towards changes and the unknown can be minimized. Strengthening education on technological and economic aspects as well as increasing awareness for climate issues need to become priorities. Aversion to certain technology types for instance due to landscape interference (i.e. wind turbines), fear of an increasing amount of blackouts and the concern of having to pay for the transition are important issues which need to be addressed. Public acceptance of various solutions must increase. This can be achieved through the direct involvement of citizens, understanding of the alternatives, campaigns and education. Decentralization can also empower communities, as shown in projects where the E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 11 municipal utilities repurchased the local (electricity and/or heating) grid from private operators. More economically developed countries with stable and wellfunctioning governments in place will provide technical solutions and infrastructures in the coming years and in that way pave the way for other regions. Communities in the global South, especially in Africa, cannot assume leadership in these efforts. Yet their direct dependency on agriculture and land use makes them severely affected by climate change. This discrepancy needs to be addressed by industrialized countries, keeping the historical responsibility in mind. Otherwise, the migration of large population groups will intensify. taxes and levies on energy sources). In order to consider learning effects and technological evolution it should be adjustable and increase gradually [100]. Taxing emission-intensive imports should establish internationally fair competitive conditions. In order to ensure broad public acceptance and to contribute to a fair society, the carbon price should be socially viable. The income from the carbon tax needs to be redistributed in the population, support poverty reduction and education, foster development and reduce other taxes [100]. It can also be directly used to support further CO2 reduction measures, like investments in renewables, and in emission friendly means of transport, renovation and refurbishment of buildings, and public infrastructure. 5. Solutions and policies 5.3. Further measures and future work Until now we see a failure to incorporate the cost of environmental damage from GHG emissions in current regulations. The application of existing mechanisms has proved to be insufficient, which led to the redesign and reformation of some instruments after the Paris Agreement (see Refs. [115,116]). Controlling the emissions and surpluses on the market while setting and adapting targets is definitely one step in the right direction. The price for CO2 emissions has been very low for many successive years in the past, resulting in a lack of effort and insufficient pace towards decarbonization. This leads us to the question of whether ETSs alone are enough to achieve the decarbonization of the energy sector. Though carbon pricing is perhaps the most important option, it is not the only solution. Effective planning ahead, by defining longterm targets and short-term sector specific plans, can also contribute to reaching the targets [16]. Individual countries and cities need to develop decarbonization strategies. Well-designed policy packages that will trigger the required changes are indispensable, with measures such as carefully introduced targeted investment subsidies, performance standards and mandates, communication and education campaigns and a CO2 tax for global aviation and shipping [16]. Research on the socio-economic dimension is necessary to provide further options on viable ways of imposing a global CO2 tax. Each country’s share in the total global CO2 emissions should be considered to distribute the efforts among them in an equitable manner. This is already stated in the Kyoto Protocol as “common but differentiated” responsibilities of each party. The share of each country’s historical emissions and the global use of products produced in China, India and the USA have to be considered for the allocation. An exergoenvironmental analysis can assist in assessing the environmental responsibility of each country [122]. From a historical perspective, however, the industrialized countries have emitted the largest part of CO2 and, therefore, have the obligation to compensate. Following this, international policies and laws need to be developed and implemented, which will bind the countries to decrease the emissions and report their progress to the international community. More efforts in research and innovation are necessary. For example, technologies and materials need to be developed further. The broadness of the energy sector worldwide poses challenges towards choosing the right methodology to evaluate decarbonization effects. Mathematical modeling can be applied to holistically evaluate (a) the impact of different technology options, (b) the appropriate magnitude of a CO2 tax on the global energy sector and (c) the contribution of this tax to decarbonization. Finally, the necessity and benefits of energy system (and especially open-source) modeling need to be highlighted. With the aid of these models, the most economically viable solutions, considering the technical constraints, can be determined and evaluated [19,123]. Robust models with fast solving times, that are able to consider countryspecific market structures and social effects, are necessary. Fast actions are needed to ensure these models are developed further and support decision making. 5.1. Emission trading scheme requirements Today’s ETSs need to be adapted to flexible ones, but still they cannot alone ensure the decrease of CO2 emissions. The quantity of certificates in ETSs must be continuously re-discussed, excess certificates deleted and free certificates cut. Carbon leakage needs to be monitored more tightly and, if possible, prevented. Further sectors, like buildings, transport and agriculture, need to be included in existing ETSs and combined with additional policy packages. Finally, a minimum price for CO2 emissions should be introduced. 5.2. Carbon pricing An effective carbon pricing scheme could contribute to lessening CO2 emissions and thereby limiting the effects of climate change while simultaneously fostering economic growth and development according to the SDGs. It can trigger changes in investment patterns and technologies and drive the shift from coal to gas within the constraints of existing capacity. A carbon tax can be such an efficient way to raise revenues while encouraging lower emissions [16]. There are several publications which give the magnitude of the cost of the carbon tax. Back in the year 2008 Stern demanded a carbon tax that could start in the range of around 20 to 40V/t CO2 for the year 2020 [36,117]. In order to continuously intensify the efforts for decarbonization, the tax should increase, reaching values around 120V/t CO2 in the year 2030 [118]. To achieve significant CO2 emission reductions, further model-based analyses propose significantly higher CO2 prices in the range of 330e380V/t CO2 [119,120]. In order to promote investment and innovation, Edenhofer et al. [118] state the importance of setting the price in advance. The German Environmental Agency states that the environmental damage of 1t CO2 was 180V/t CO2 in 2016, increasing to 205 and 240V/t CO2 in 2030 and 2050, respectively [121]. The design of a carbon tax should be administratively simple. It can be implemented using existing energy policy instruments (like 6. Conclusions In this paper we show that the decarbonization of the energy sector is a very complex issue where many environmental, economic, technical, social and political aspects need to be considered simultaneously. The current situation with respect to the decarbonization of the 12 E. Papadis, G. Tsatsaronis / Energy 205 (2020) 118025 energy sector is far from being satisfactory. We see the necessity of a turn away from an economy in which the energy sector provides inexpensive and very large amounts of energy and a society with increasing inequality and towards an environmentally sustainable and socially viable system. From the energy crises of the last century we learned that when the energy prices increase the per capita use of energy decreases, while the efficiency of energy systems and the creativity of scientists increase. Since we need these three effects (among others) to decarbonize the energy sector, we conclude that energy must become more expensive in the future without causing political instability in the world. A carbon tax is one of the most effective measures for moving in the desired direction. In the interest of a socially fair global transition, the affordability of energy prices for the society must consequently be guaranteed through the redistribution of the largest part of the tax in the society. Providing both “clean and affordable” energy for all compels us to unite environmental sustainability and social justice, while staying inside the social and planetary boundaries as defined by Ref. [97]. There have been several studies that predict future developments in the energy sectors. Some of these studies “demonstrate” how we can reach a complete decarbonization in some years by making rough assumptions and ignoring (a) the technical difficulties of decarbonizing aviation and certain industrial sectors (e.g., concrete and steel production), and (b) the fact that to house a continuously increasing population on earth more concrete and steel will be required. The danger is that decision makers decide to delay action that is required today with the justification that, even if we start later, we can still achieve complete decarbonization in, for example, 50 years. We do not believe that a complete global decarbonization can be realistically achieved in the 21st century, although a plethora of theoretical solutions is available today. The reasons for the authors’ assessment include the following: 1. The capital required for investment and for establishing new infrastructures is very large. Besides climate change, governments must solve various issues associated with health insurance, payment of pensions in future, education improvements, etc. The profitability of the required investments in the energy area will not be very high at least in the beginning. This article was written before the corona crisis. The current pandemic and the associated indebtedness of almost all countries clearly demonstrate the importance of this point. 2. The energy sectors discussed above will compete for the decarbonization options that are available today and priorities need to be formulated. 3. The environmental policies are often inconsistent. 4. Political calculation, lobbying efforts, populism and corruption often make the implementation of required policies impossible or cause a regression in the decarbonization progress. 5. The world population is not yet ready for the changes in energy use and lifestyle that are absolutely necessary. For the largest part of the population it is very difficult indeed to change the current lifestyle and give up certain comfort that they enjoy due to low energy prices. This might represent the most difficult process of decarbonization. However, the lessons learned from the corona crisis might assist the world population to more easily accept some of the required changes after the pandemic is over. Nevertheless, the above points are not reasons for resignation. People are the driving force to implement the necessary changes. We need to continue and intensify all related efforts at the teaching, research and political level. Furthermore, we need to make use of our right to vote and find and elect politicians who will act according to the long-term interest of humankind. Finally, we have to become more sensitized, attentive and thoughtful when it comes to the consumption of food and products and to the use of resources such as energy (electricity and heat) at home and in the office, as well as of means of transportation. We must change our behavior and our habits. The sooner this happens, the better it will be for the climate. Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. Acknowledgments Parts of this work have been presented as keynote lectures at the 32nd International Conference on Efficiency, Costs, Optimization, Simulation and Environmental Impact of Energy Systems (ECOS 2019) in Wroclaw, Poland (June 23e28, 2019) and at the Qatar Sustainability Summit in Doha, Qatar (October 27e28, 2019). Financial support from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), Germany, within the scope of the research project “DEKADE-F-W€ arme” with the project reference number 03ET4071A is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, the authors would like to thank the three reviewers of this paper and Chrissa Tsatsaronis for their constructive comments that helped improve the quality of the paper. Nomenclature Abbreviations CCU Carbon Capture and Usage CCUS Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage CCS Carbon Capture and Storage CDM Clean Development Mechanism CHP Combined Heat and Power CORSIA Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation DHN District Heating Network ET Emission Trading ETS Emission Trading Scheme GDP Gross Domestic Product GHG Greenhouse Gas Emissions JI Joint Implementation RE Renewable Energy UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change References [1] Nasa Goddard Media Studios. Was the fourth hottest year on record. 2019. 2018. https://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/13142. [2] Sanchez-Lugo A. Global climate report - annual 2018. State of the climate. 2018. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201813. [3] Us Global Change Research Program. Climate science special report: fourth national climate assessment. In: Fourth national climate assessment, vol. I. 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