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Establishing the Structure of Reality for an Industry: Model and Anti-Model
Arguments as Advocacy in Nike's Crisis Communication
Article in Journal of Applied Communication Research · August 2001
DOI: 10.1080/00909880128109
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Journal of Applied Communication Research
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Establishing the structure of reality for an
industry: model and anti-model arguments as
advocacy in Nike's crisis communication
Timothy Sellnow & Jeffrey Brand
To cite this article: Timothy Sellnow & Jeffrey Brand (2001) Establishing the structure of reality
for an industry: model and anti-model arguments as advocacy in Nike's crisis communication,
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 29:3, 278-295, DOI: 10.1080/00909880128109
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Journal of Applied Communication Research
Vol. 29, No. 3, August 2001, pp. 278 –295
Establishing the Structure of
Reality for an Industry: Model and
Anti-Model Arguments as
Advocacy in Nike’s Crisis
Communication
Timothy L. Sellnow and Jeffrey D. Brand
ABSTRACT This study illustrates the potential role of model and anti-model arguments
in organizational crisis communication. Specifically, model and anti-model arguments are
described as a strategy for moving the focus of a crisis from an organization to its industry.
Model arguments enable organizations to establish their corrective action as industry
standards that merit imitation. Conversely, organizations can set minimum standards for
their industries with anti-model arguments. Phil Knight’s May 12, 1998, speech announcing Nike’s new initiatives in global manufacturing is analyzed as a case study. The essay
concludes that model and anti-model arguments can suspend criticism of the organization,
create the foundation for a return to industry prominence by the organization, and establish proposed new industry standards that are favorable to the organization.
KEY WORDS: Nike, Phil Knight, anti-model argument, Perelman, crisis communication.
I
In the 1990s, Nike emerged as “a favorite target for sweatshop allegations” after
the corporation “followed the course of many other U.S. footwear and sportswear firms that have built manufacturing bases in low-wage Southeast Asia”
(Ramey, 1998b, p. 11). As a result, Nike engaged in “ongoing damage control”
related to its global manufacturing (Stabile, 2000, p. 200). On May 12, 1998, Phil
Knight, Nike cofounder and C.E.O., chose to personally outline the most dramatic
steps Nike had taken thus far in its effort to diminish criticism for its global
manufacturing policies. At the time of Knight’s speech to the National Press Club
Conference in Washington, D.C., Nike employed slightly over 500,000 workers at
350 contractors in 35 countries (Ramey, 1998a). Criticism of Nike had intensified
considerably in the two years prior to Knight’s speech. By Knight’s own admis-
Timothy Sellnow (Ph.D., Wayne State University, 1987) is a Professor of Communication and Jeffrey
D. Brand (Ph.D., Indiana University, 1995) is an Assistant Professor of Communication in the Department of Communication at North Dakota State University. This paper was presented at the 2000
National Communication Association Convention, Seattle, Washington. All correspondence can be
sent to the first author at: North Dakota State University, Communication Department, P.O. Box 5075,
Fargo, ND 58105-5075.
Copyright 2001, National Communication Association
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AUGUST 2001
sion, the company had become synonymous with “slave wages, forced overtime
and arbitrary abuse” (Blackistone, 1998, p. 16). The comic strip Doonesbury and
Michael Moore’s 1998 film The Big One satirized Nike for its seeming disregard
for the welfare of its Asian workers. Ultimately, the mounting criticism against
Nike’s global manufacturing policies made wearing the company’s products “increasingly uncomfortable” for American consumers (Blackistone, 1998, p. 16).
Knight’s 1998 speech in response to sweatshop allegations, however, was
prompted by more than a guilty conscience. Two months prior to Knight’s speech,
Nike “announced that its quarterly profits fell 70 percent” (Dunphy, 1998, AP
Online). Nike’s official stance on the decline was that trouble in the Asian
economy was primarily responsible for the decrease in profits (Ramey, 1998b).
Nevertheless, the timing of the speech suggests that Nike felt a sense of urgency
to resolve the “incessant criticism over working conditions at its Asian plants”
(Baum, 1998, AP Online).
Nike’s situation can be described as a crisis of social responsibility. For organizations to maintain social legitimacy, they must function as more than economic institutions (Hearit, 1997; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). Specifically,
organizations must also support “important social goals and values” and help to
solve “social problems that affect both society and the organization” (Seeger,
1997, p. 119). Issues of social responsibility include responsible treatment of
workers, customers, and the environment, and because social goals and values are
complex and dynamic, organizations must engage in an ongoing process of
monitoring and responding to relevant issues if they are to maintain a socially
acceptable position (Heath, 1997). An issue related to social responsibility can
reach crisis proportions for an organization, as it did for Nike, if the issue peaks
in the public interest and the organization is seen as unwilling to respond to the
issue in a socially acceptable manner (Marconi, 1992; Coombs, 1999). By crisis,
we mean “low probability/high consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization” (Weick, 1988, p. 305).
In some cases, crises of social responsibility can have implications for an entire
industry. For example, the residence hall fire at Seton Hall University that killed
three students in January 2000 heightened scrutiny of residence hall safety for
higher education in general (“School works to save image,” 2000). Similarly,
Exxon’s delayed and, at times, ineffective cleanup operation in Valdez, Alaska,
created industry-wide criticism of oil transportation procedures (Johnson & Sellnow, 1995). In Nike’s case, the company’s global manufacturing procedures were
not unique. Other major sportswear companies such as Reebok and Adidas
engaged in similar practices (Ramey, 1998b). In part because of its size, Nike had
drawn the most notice (Baum, 1998). Thus, Nike’s crisis had implications for the
entire industry.
Simply put, the notoriety of a crisis may allow the spokesperson for an organization to act as, in Crable and Vibbert’s (1985) terms, “a catalyst for affirmative
change” (p. 13). For example, Exxon’s CEO, W. D. Stevens, not only offered a
defense of Exxon in his speeches following the Valdez crisis, he also provided
extensive deliberative messages related to spill prevention and cleanup policies
for the oil industry as a whole (Johnson & Sellnow, 1995). Similarly, in responding to his company’s E. coli outbreak that killed several children, Robert Nugent,
president of Jack in the Box, U.S.A., called for higher industry standards in meat
inspection and pledged to adopt unprecedented testing procedures for all beef
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products served by his organization (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). In both cases, the
afflicted organizations advocated improved standards for their industries as well
as actions related to their specific crises.
In short, consumers and other stakeholders expect organizations to maintain an
image of social responsibility (Heath, 1997; Seeger, 1997). When organizations fail
to do so, they are likely to face a crisis situation (Hearit, 1995). In responding to
such crises, organizations are placed in a position of high visibility where they
can make recommendations regarding their entire industry. Such recommendations receive extensive attention due to the increased media coverage associated
with crisis events (Dionisopoulos & Crable, 1988). In this essay, we use Phil
Knight’s speech as a case study to further explore the means by which organizations in crisis situations serve as catalysts for changing the standards of their
industry. Specifically, we focus our attention on an organization’s potential to
position its crisis response as a call to enhance the social responsibility of its
industry. To do so, first, we review the pertinent literature on crisis communication. Second, we introduce the concept of model and anti-model argument as a
form of corrective action. We explain the means by which model and anti-model
argument can enable organizations to defend themselves while strategically selecting and endorsing an agenda of socially responsible behaviors for their entire
industry. Next, we apply this framework to Knight’s speech that outlined Nike’s
six new anti-sweatshop initiatives. Finally, we offer implications regarding the
use of industry-oriented model and anti-model arguments in organizational crisis
communication.
Organizational Crisis Communication
Ware and Linkugel (1973) introduced a series of strategies for apologetic discourse and applied them to texts of political apologia. Schultz and Seeger (1991)
contend that Ware and Linkugel’s genre of apologetic discourse “may be expanded” from its typical focus on single speaker situations to be applied to
“rhetoric which is corporate rather than individual centered” (p. 51). Several
authors have adapted Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) work to organizational crisis
communication (Benoit & Lindsey, 1987; Ice, 1991; Schultz & Seeger, 1991;
Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995). Benoit (1995a) offers the most comprehensive and
widely applied typology that extends the work of Ware and Linkugel. While
Benoit’s typology is fitting for both individuals and organizations, his development of image restoration strategies for organizational crisis communication is
most relevant to this study.
Benoit (1995a) identifies five image restoration strategies: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification. Denial may involve simply denying responsibility for an event or shifting
the blame from the organization to individuals or agencies outside the boundaries
of the organization. Organizations can evade responsibility for a crisis by claiming
that they were provoked, lacked sufficient information (defeasibility), had an
accident, or that, despite the crisis, they were acting with good intentions. Corporate advocates can reduce the perceived offensiveness of the crisis event with
six variants. Three of these variants, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence, come from Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) work. To these, Benoit (1995a) adds
minimizing the crisis, attacking the accuser, and compensating the victims of the
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crisis. In taking corrective action, the accused has two options: “restoring the
situation to the state of affairs before the objectionable action and/or promising to
⬘mend one’s ways’ and make changes to prevent the recurrence of the undesirable
act” (p. 79). Mortification occurs when the accused accepts responsibility for its
wrongdoing and asks to be forgiven.
Throughout the protracted debate involving Nike’s global manufacturing practices, it is likely that the company enacted many of the strategies described by
Benoit (1995a). In Knight’s 1998 speech, however, the primary focus was clearly
on correction. A Nike press release on the day of the speech described Knight’s
presentation as “a watershed speech for Nike” (Ramey, 1998a, p. 2). Knight’s
speech featured six new initiatives that focused precisely on correcting previous
problems. Although, in his speech, Knight continued to minimize the severity of
the problem and to emphasize the good intentions of his company as he had done
in the past, the speech was newsworthy because Nike was taking unprecedented
steps to avoid abusive working conditions in the future.
Benoit’s (1995a) concept of corrective action has received extensive attention in
the organizational crisis communication literature (Benoit, 1995b; Benoit, 1997;
Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996;
Hearit, 1995; Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998). Benoit and Czerwinski (1997)
explain that, “unlike compensation, which seeks to pay for a problem, corrective
action seeks to prevent or correct it” (p. 45). It is important to note here that
corrective action can be taken by an organization even in cases where the organization is not viewed as responsible for the crisis. For example, Johnson and
Johnson denied responsibility for the Tylenol poisoning, but the company voluntarily took corrective action by changing the way its product was presented and
packaged. Benoit and Lindsay (1987) contend that these actions, along with
“breaking the link of Tylenol and death,” combined to “cleanse Tylenol’s tainted
image” (p. 143). We do not contend that corrective action is essential in all crises,
nor do we assume that corrective action should be taken without consideration of
legal consequences. Rather, corrective action is a viable means for an organization
to regain a public image of social responsibility in crisis situations.
Previous studies indicate that corrective action that seeks to prevent similar
crises in the future tends to be more effective in the image restoration process than
routine solutions (Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Hearit,
1995; Sellnow, 1993). Routine solutions, such as a single organization’s blaming
and firing responsible individuals, may address the crisis of the moment but do
little to increase consumer confidence that similar crises won’t occur in the future
(Sellnow, 1993). Conversely, original solutions that signal change within an
organization can often “enhance a perception of preventive, long-term change and
renewed social legitimacy” (Sellnow & Seeger, 1989, p. 17).
As is indicated above, the majority of foregoing work on corrective action has
developed generalizations for image restoration in distinct organizations. We
expand this focus to include the capacity for a single organization to enact
corrective action that, in Crable and Vibbert’s (1985) terms, is designed to have a
catalyst effect for the standards and policies of social responsibility for an entire
industry. In cases involving social responsibility, Heath (1997) explains that
“through their comments—as well as actions that reveal their commitment to
mutual interests— companies help shape the standards by which they are judged”
(p. 133). As such, we contend that, when facing crises of social responsibility,
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organizations can enhance their public image by enacting and promoting improved standards of corporate responsibility for their industry. Specifically, we
describe how these outcomes may be complementary to one another when organizations structure the reality of the crisis using model and anti-model arguments.
To clarify our position, we next offer a discussion of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s (1969) model and anti-model framework.
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Structuring Reality with Model and Anti-Model Arguments
Heath (1997) explains that “standards of corporate responsibility are the product of advocacy, a debate that addresses the standards by which key organizations
are judged” (p. 127). Ultimately, organizations have aspirations of “structuring the
information environment in ways that privilege certain resolutions of policy
debates” (Gandy, 1992, p. 135). As is discussed above, a single organization’s
crisis can trigger such debate for an industry. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1969) categorize discourse that resorts “to the particular case” as arguments that
establish the structure of reality (p. 350). If, during the debate regarding a particular crisis, an organization engages in conduct it hopes will “incite” or “inspire”
comparable activities by similar organizations, it is seeking to establish the
structure of reality through the use of model and anti-model argument (p. 362).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that, in model and anti-model arguments,
the speaker “strives to emulate the one or to shun the other” (p. 368). The
relevance of this form of argument to Nike’s global manufacturing crisis is evident
in the way Knight (1998) confronted his industry during his speech. Knight
openly challenged the members of his industry and related industries to embrace
the initiatives he proposed as new standards for social responsibility. In reference
to his six initiatives, Knight said:
. . . this sets a standard for our industry and related industries to follow. We believe
that these are practices which the conscientious good companies will follow in the
21st century. These moves do more than just set industry standards. They reflect who
we are as a company. I don’t necessarily expect you to believe that. But, I will tell you
this: it makes us feel better about ourselves. (p. 640)
Formal appeals such as this are fitting with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s
notion of model and anti-model argument. They explain that “imitation of behavior is not always spontaneous. One person may seek to induce it in another.
Argument can be based either on the rule of justice or on a model that one will be
asked to follow” (p. 363). By challenging the sportswear industry to follow Nike’s
six initiatives for social responsibility, Knight offered a model of progress and
justifiable minimum standards that raised the threshold for acceptable business
practices in the global economy.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) notion of model and anti-model argument has received limited attention in the communication literature. Warnick and
Kline (1992) elucidate Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definition as follows:
Argument from model and anti-model presents a person or group as a model to be
imitated or avoided. Attraction for the model (antipathy for the anti-model) is
converted into favorable or unfavorable orientation towards the model’s behavior.
The argument’s aim is to encourage imitation. (p. 9)
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Measell (1985) offers several considerations for identifying and analyzing
model and anti-model arguments. He indicates that model and anti-model arguments, as well as all argument forms that establish the structure of reality, are
characterized by three tenets:
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First, they begin with a known case; second they reveal, implicitly, the existence of
a general rule or principle of regularity; third, the natural ambiguity of language make
these arguments especially fragile, for their efforts are somewhat unpredictable
despite the intention of the speaker and his ability to adapt to the audience. (p. 66)
In crises of social responsibility, then, organizations that structure reality with
model and anti-model arguments seek imitation. In constructing such arguments,
a crisis provides the known case, and the expectations of social responsibility
infer a principle of regularity. Further, the ambiguity inherent in such arguments
makes it difficult to predict their ultimate success or failure.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain that “one does not imitate just
anybody; the person chosen as model must enjoy some measure of prestige” (p.
363). One indication of such prestige is the degree of imitation fostered by the
model. An entity cannot serve as a model without imitation. Ordinarily a model
“shows what behavior to follow, and also serves as a guarantee for an adopted
behavior” (p. 364). That is why models “must keep careful watch on [their]
behavior” (p. 365). Ironically, nonconformists can also be models if the individualism they advocate is seen as a “capacity to avoid temptations of imitation” (p.
364). In general,
the attribution of good qualities to superior beings makes it possible, if it is accepted,
to argue from the model, and, if it is challenged, to enhance the value of the quality
as being at least worthy of the attribution to the model. (p. 365)
Namely, an organization that enacts socially responsible standards can serve as
a model for both its members and its industry. When an organization, such as
Nike, experiences a crisis that hampers its image, the organization can regain its
model status by shunning unacceptable practices. As such, an organization can
reemerge as a model by stressing its unwillingness to conform to standards that
are not acceptable. In short, even when challenged for its failings, the fact that an
organization upholds the high value of social responsibility can serve as an
attribute of model behavior.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) describe anti-model arguments as the
inverse of model arguments. They explain, “whereas reference to a model makes
it possible to encourage a particular kind of behavior, reference to an anti-model
or foil serves to deter people from it” (p. 366). Because anti-model arguments seek
to influence others to “be different from someone,” it is not always possible to
“infer precise positive behavior” (p. 367). Positive behavior is advanced through
“an implicit reference to a model” (p. 367). Anti-model arguments can reach the
level of propaganda when they are “presented in a conventional and deliberately
false manner so as to bring about the revulsion desired” (p. 368). On a more
reasonable level, “anti-model arguments may be introduced, not for the purpose
of bringing about revulsion, but as the starting point of an argument a fortiori, in
which case the anti-model represents a minimum below which it is improper to
go” (p. 369). This is typical when individuals or, in this case, organizations are in
competition with one another. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that com-
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petition “develops resemblances between opponents, as over a period of time they
borrow each others’ effective devices: certain techniques can be recommended for
use just because they are those used by the opponent” (p. 368). In organizations,
these resemblances can take the form of standard industry practices. In other
words, an entire industry could regularly engage in profitable practices that key
publics see as socially irresponsible. When such resemblances take the form of
irresponsible behavior, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that anti-model
arguments demarcate the “permissible from the unlawful” (p. 368). For an industry, then, standards or regulations can serve as a “minimum below which it is
improper to go” (p. 369). Thus, anti-model arguments can be used to develop
minimum standards. Anti-model arguments infer that violating these standards is
unacceptable.
To summarize, model and anti-model arguments in organizational crisis communication can serve as an appeal for the correction of an entire industry.
Organizations structure the reality of the industry when using arguments based on
a particular crisis. Organizations can portray themselves as models if they assert
that they have engaged in admirable behavior or that they have avoided conforming to the negative pressures of their industry. Anti-model arguments serve to set
the standards below which it is improper for organizations to act. Finally, model
and anti-model arguments imply general rules through language. Thus, the natural ambiguity of language makes it difficult to predict the precise outcome of
model and anti-model arguments. With these principles established, we turn to
our analysis of Phil Knight’s (1998) speech.
Model and Anti-Model Arguments in Knight’s Speech
A news release from Nike on the day of Knight’s speech stated, “We want to be
more than just a sportswear company. We want to be a socially responsible
company, which we’ve been addressing and now we’re going to do more” (Ramey,
1998a, p. 2). Knight’s speech was broadcast live on the ESPN 2 television network.
Video and print content of the speech was placed on the Nike website as well. The
speech also received widespread media coverage. For example, a review of the
speech, including mention of Nike’s initiatives, appeared in such newspapers as
the New York Times, USA Today, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dallas Morning News,
Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco Examiner. Thus, the speech reached an
audience far beyond the members of the National Press Club. Knight’s speech
served to launch a new era for Nike during which the corporation would attempt
to rebuild consumer confidence in its ability to maintain a value of social responsibility for all of its workers.
Knight (1998) began his speech with a healthy dose of self-deprecating humor
that summarized the recent criticism against Nike. Referring to criticism of the
corporation’s global manufacturing policies as “the cloud that has been over
Nike’s head for the past couple of years,” Knight explained that he had been
characterized as “a corporate crook” and as the “perfect corporate villain for these
times” (p. 637). Knight announced to the audience that he had come before them
to “let you journalists have a look at the great Satan, up close and personal” (p.
637). Accompanying Knight to the speaking engagement were six owners and
managers of Nike foreign factories. Knight referred to his entourage as “satanettes”
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(p. 637). Knight explained at the outset that his purpose for speaking to the Press
Club extended beyond simply defending Nike’s actions:
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If I accomplish my objective today, it’s not to change the dynamics of the debate, but
rather for those who are truly interested, those that want to look beyond the sound
byte, to give you a base of facts for context on an issue that I believe will be with us
for the better part of the next decade. (p. 637)
Knight proceeded to deliver a 20-minute address that provided an explanation
of Nike’s six new initiatives. Through these initiatives, Knight attempted to
restructure the reality of the global manufacturing crisis for Nike and the sporting
goods industry. Specifically, four of Knight’s initiatives used model arguments to
portray Nike as a model worthy of industry-wide imitation. Conversely, two
initiatives used anti-model arguments to established minimum standards for the
sportswear industry. Each initiative is discussed below.
Initiative One: Air Quality
Knight (1998) established Nike as a model for other members of the sportswear
industry by announcing, in his first initiative, that his company would move from
“harmful chemicals” used to bond the soles of its shoes to water-based chemicals
(p. 639). Nike was accused by its critics of using “poorly ventilated factories” in
its global manufacturing (Blackistone, 1998, p. 16). The primary source of the
problem was the potentially harmful vapors emitted by the chemical toluene.
Knight admitted that concentrations of toluene found in Nike’s Asian factories
exceeded the limits established by OSHA for American factories. Knight explained that toluene had always been used to manufacture rubber-soled athletic
shoes. He said “every Olympic marathon champion in this century but one has
run the 26 miles, 286 yards in shoes made with potentially harmful chemicals,
including the much-publicized toluene” (p. 639). The only exception said Knight
was “Abebe Bikila, who won the 1960 marathon in Tokyo running bare foot” (p.
639). He insisted there had simply been no alternative to toluene.
Rather than addressing the ventilation problems related to toluene in Nike
factories, Knight (1998) emphasized a corrective action, developed by his company, that had the potential to revolutionize the sportswear industry. Knight
contended that “marathoners and most other athletes for the first time have a
choice” to purchase shoes that are not made with chemicals that are potentially
harmful to workers who make them (p. 639). Knight said:
After four years of extensive research and hard work with our partners in Asia, we
have developed and put into practice water-based cements, which allow shoes to be
cemented without the use of the most potentially harmful solvents, including toluene. (p. 639)
As a result of this “breakthrough” Knight pledged that “by the end of this
calendar year [1998], all Nike shoe factories will meet OSHA standards in indoor
air quality” (p. 639).
Because Nike had developed the water-based alternative to toluene and became
the first company to adopt it, Nike acquired a degree of the prestige Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) claim is needed to inspire imitation. Nike has been
outspoken in its effort to serve as a model for the sportswear industry regarding
the shift from toluene. An April 3, 1998, Nike press release, alluding to Knight’s
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(1998) upcoming speech, stated, “Our goal is to lead the industry by eliminating
solvent-based adhesives and potentially harmful substances such as toluene, the
current standard in all other buyers’ contract footwear factories, by June 1999” (p.
1). Nike continued to appeal to the sportswear industry to adopt its water-based
cements after Knight’s speech. Maria Eitel, Vice President of Social Responsibility
for Nike, said, in a speech to shareholders at Nike’s annual meeting on September
23, 1998. “We encourage other companies to switch to water-based solvents as
well. The technology exists. It takes the commitment to make it a reality in
factories to protect workers from harmful substances” (p. 3).
Initiative Two: Minimum Age of Workers
To counter accusations that Nike used child labor, Knight (1998) announced, in
his second initiative, that Nike had “raised the minimum age of all footwear
factories to 18. And at all apparel and equipment factories, the minimum age is
16 —the same as in the United States” (p. 639). In Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s (1969) terms, Knight’s endorsement of American age standards for global
manufacturing in the sportswear industry created an anti-model argument that
established “a minimum below which it is improper to go” (p. 639). Knight was
particularly critical of European athletic firms. Knight explained that Nike had
been accused of using sweatshop labor to stitch its soccer balls. He admitted that
some of Nike’s first orders were sewn by “children, old people, blind people,
under all kinds of bad conditions” (p. 639). He explained that the corporation
used employees in these conditions because “essentially for 50 years the Pakistan
soccer ball industry had been made up of a process in which the ball uppers were
sent out into a cottage industry with very little control on who the uppers were
sewn by” (p. 639).
In providing the context of the soccer ball industry, Knight (1998) insisted Nike
responded to the “unacceptable conditions” they found by enacting model behavior (p. 639). Knight claimed that, when the investigation of the situation found
that conditions were unacceptable, Nike established “the first controlled soccer
ball stitching centers” where minimum ages and wages are enforced (p. 639).
Knight expressed frustration that other manufacturers of soccer balls in Pakistan
had not followed Nike’s example:
But the European athletic firms who make by far the greatest number of soccer balls
in Pakistan—as much as 70% of the total export of soccer balls— have not changed
the way they do business at all. And I point this out to show that the often-used
phrasing of Nike critics, that they pick on Nike because as an industry leader, if Nike
changes their manufacturing process, the others will follow, is simply not true. (p.
639)
The fact that other members of the industry had not imitated Nike’s soccer ball
stitching centers is not surprising. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain
that, to garner imitation, a model’s behavior must confer “added value on their
acts” (p. 363). This value provides the motivation for imitation. Until Knight’s
speech, Nike had done little to emphasize the controls it initiated in the soccer
ball industry. In fact, much of the debate surrounding Nike’s minimum age labor
practices at the time of the speech was focused on Nike’s apparel (Clark, 1998).
Because Nike’s soccer ball stitching centers had not captured the attention of key
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publics, Nike’s competitors had little incentive or perceived value to follow
Nike’s lead.
Despite the controversy, Knight was true to his word. By September of 1998,
Nike’s Vice President of Social Responsibility boasted that the company had
successfully raised the age of “workers in our factories to 18 in the footwear
factories and 16 in our apparel, equipment and accessory factories” (Eitel, 1998,
p. 3).
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Initiative Three: Independent Monitoring
In his third initiative, Knight (1998) said Nike “publicly recognized the need for
expanded monitoring to include NGOs [non-government organizations] and the
need for a summary statement about this monitoring” (p. 640). This pledge was
the most ambiguous and controversial of Knight’s six initiatives. To provide
context for this initiative, Knight offered a review of Nike’s previous monitoring
system:
Back in 1992, before anybody else in the athletic footwear industry—and I believe
that only Levi-Strauss had one—Nike instituted a code of conduct for use in factories
throughout Asia. In 1994, we became the first in any industry to have that code of
conduct audited by the international accounting firm of Ernst & Young. We’ve been
criticized for using a firm we are paying for this review, and I think this is really
pretty funny. The only reason that a CPA firm has for its very existence is its
independence. (p. 639)
Despite having this program in place, Nike had been severely criticized for
activities in its Asian factories (Schmit, 1999). Knight placed his discussion of
monitoring in the context of this criticism. Consequently, Knight’s third initiative
served not as a model argument, but as an anti-model argument to establish
monitoring as a minimum standard.
Nike had received considerable criticism for manufacturing shoes in Vietnam
using Korean and Taiwanese-owned plants. Vietnamese workers making Nike
shoes had been cruelly punished for poor performance. For example, a year prior
to Knight’s speech, 12 Vietnamese employees fainted while being forced to run
around the factory in extreme heat. The workers were among 56 employees who
were punished for failing to wear regulation shoes. In other incidents at Korean
and Taiwanese owned factories, workers making Nike shoes had been required to
kneel, had been slapped with shoes, and had been forced to lick the floor as
punishment for poor performance (Schmit, 1999).
By his own admission, Knight (1998) could not offer a detailed proposal
regarding independent monitoring. With regard to his independent monitoring
initiative, Knight said, “the specifics of this will come some time down the road,
but we are working hard to put this into effect” (p. 640). Thus, Knight could not
offer a definitive model for imitation. In fact, he admitted that Nike’s monitoring
procedures were flawed. Consequently, at the time of the speech, he could only
claim that all companies should have a monitoring program in place. In other
words, Knight was arguing that no monitoring system was worse than having an
incomplete or controversial monitoring system. In this manner, Knight’s third
initiative served as an anti-model by proposing that sportswear manufacturers
should, as a minimum standard, have in place some form of factory monitoring
that could allow for public accountability.
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Nike’s difficulty in developing its independent monitoring program continued
after Knight’s speech. Four months later, Maria Eitel (1998) admitted that Nike
had not yet achieved the form of independent monitoring Knight (1998) had
pledged to undertake. Eitel said that Nike’s efforts to develop the independent
monitoring program had been “a difficult and fascinating process” and that “you
will soon see monitoring teams at work that include auditors and NGOs” (p. 3).
Eitel also emphasized the fact that Nike’s independent monitoring efforts were
“charting new territory” because “no company that manufactures globally is
doing comprehensive, independent monitoring” (p. 3). Following Knight’s
speech, Nike experimented with a variety of independent monitors. This experimentation received favorable responses from some Nike critics. For example,
Medea Benjamin, codirector of the San Francisco-based human rights group
Global Exchange complimented Nike for allowing an independent environmental
researcher to monitor one of its plants in Vietnam. Benjamin called this action “an
astounding transformation for a company that once . . . limited factory access to
people they thought would write favorable reports” (Schmit, 1999, p. 2).
Initiatives Four and Five: Making a Positive Contribution to Workers
With his fourth and fifth initiatives, Knight (1998) announced two employee
benefit programs for Nike’s Asian factory workers. In his fourth initiative, Knight
announced that Nike was “expanding our education program in our footwear
factories” (p. 640). Knight said Nike’s education program, which began in Vietnam, would include “middle and high school equivalency course availability for
all workers in Nike footwear factories” (p. 640). With his fifth initiative, Knight
described Nike’s plans to increase support for its “current micro-enterprise loan
program to a thousand families each in the countries of Vietnam, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Thailand” (p. 640). Knight explained that the loans were designed
for “small businesses such as pig farming and the making of rice paper” (p. 640).
He claimed that the education and loan programs had already been successful on
a trial basis in Vietnam. In offering a background for these initiatives, Knight
provided an appealing description of the contribution Nike had already made to
the Vietnamese economy. He explained, “Nike shoes make up 5% of the total
export of the whole nation of Vietnam” (p. 639). Knight insisted Nike contributes
“on two counts: we provide jobs and we generate a significant amount of foreign
currency” (p. 639).
Clearly, Nike’s commitment to educating and providing entrepreneurial opportunities for employees and their families is socially responsible. By challenging
the sportswear industry to follow Nike’s precedence of employee programs,
Knight (1998) established Nike as a model. Moreover, the positive reaction by
Nike’s critics to the company’s new employee programs established an element of
prestige for the company. For example, Simon Billenness, senior analyst for a
Boston-based mutual fund specializing in companies “it deems to be socially
responsible,” described Nike as a “bellwether” for human rights (Ramey, 1998b,
p. 11). The favorable reaction to Nike’s employee education and loan programs
was tempered somewhat by criticism that Knight said nothing in his speech about
providing reasonable wages to Nike’s Asian employees (Blackistone, 1998;
Ramey, 1998b; Adame, 1998). Despite this criticism, Nike’s new programs offered
benefits to its global employees that were unprecedented in the sportswear in-
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dustry. These programs, then, served as a model for the rest of the sportswear
industry.
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Initiative Six: Independent Research
In his final initiative, Knight (1998) pledged to remain open to further research
and discussion of the complexities involved with global manufacturing. Specifically, he pledged to “fund university research and open forums to explore issues
related to global manufacturing and responsible business practices” (p. 640). He
admitted that, regardless of the efforts made by Nike and the shoe industry,
“opponents will certainly be able to find incidents and anecdotes of exception” (p.
640). As such, he insisted that the form of research and discussion he proposed
was needed to allow “those who are truly interested” to “set the standard for our
industry and related industries to follow” (p. 640). In this case, Knight confirms
the ability of independent agencies, universities in particular, to evaluate and
make recommendations regarding global manufacturing. Conversely, he chastises
critics whose bias and limited perspective mislead the public regarding Nike and
other industry members.
Knight’s (1998) support for independent research to establish standards for
“responsible business practices” in the sportswear industry established Nike as a
model (p. 640). In this case, Nike’s model status was based on its willingness to
embrace the recommendations of a highly credible source. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain that “the person following the model enjoys an enhanced value, and can thus, in turn, serve as model” (p. 364). Knight’s (1998) sixth
initiative, in essence, establishes independent experts on social responsibility in
global manufacturing as model figures whose recommendations should be enacted in the sportswear industry. In this case, the knowledge and objectivity
provided by independent experts gives their recommendations added credibility.
As is discussed above, Nike had been harshly criticized for the potential bias
created when it hired its own monitors and consultants to observe its factories
(Schmit, 1999). Critics saw Nike and its accounting firms as too biased to be
effective. Antithetically, independent experts had the potential to generate objective standards that would be seen as trustworthy in the eyes of Nike’s key publics.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that, by following a credible model, one
can gain the value of that model and eventually serve as a model. Knight’s sixth
initiative established Nike’s willingness to adopt the standards of social responsibility created by credible experts. In this manner, Knight created the opportunity for Nike to share model status with a group that held the credibility Nike
lacked.
Implications
Previous research indicates that Nike was wise to engage in corrective action.
Benoit (1995b) concludes that “when a wrong is committed, one should admit,
apologize, and take corrective action” (p. 102). Failure to accept justified responsibility for a crisis and to move toward corrective action will typically intensify
rather than mitigate the crisis (Benoit, 1995b; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Sellnow et
al., 1998). Knight’s (1998) willingness to admit that there had been problems in
Nike factories and to offer original solutions to them was appropriate. Had his
speech emphasized such strategies as denial or differentiation, Knight would
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likely have only further aggravated the situation (Benoit, 1995b). In addition to
offering added support for these guidelines of effective crisis communication, the
Nike case allows for consideration of corrective action that is directed toward an
industry as well as an organization.
Ultimately, the Nike example suggests that the value of model and anti-model
arguments that propose industry-wide corrective action is based on their capacity
to enable an organization to frame the debate surrounding a crisis. Nike faced
harsh criticism in the two years prior to Knight’s (1998) call to the sportswear
industry to adopt Nike’s six new initiatives. It was not until public sentiment and
the market turned against Nike that the company chose to respond to its image
crisis by proposing and publicizing these corrective actions. As we have argued
above, Nike’s original solutions were framed as improved standards, not just for
Nike, but for the sportswear industry as a whole. The Nike case suggests that this
form of model and anti-model argument can shift the debate from the previous
failures of the organization in question to the standards of an industry. In Nike’s
case, the new initiatives and their feasibility attracted the attention of its critics.
Some of Nike’s harshest critics responded to the speech with a guarded optimism
and an unexampled sense of patience. Medea Benjamin, codirector of the human
rights group Global Exchange, “badly hurt Nike’s image when he exposed unsafe
conditions at one of its factories in Vietnam in 1997” (Greenhouse, 1999, p. 3C).
A day after Knight’s speech, Benjamin said Nike’s initiatives were “extremely
positive” (Ramey, 1998a, p. 11). Seven months after Knight’s speech, the Far
Eastern Economic Review commented that Nike’s initiatives “could spur a
clean-up of its rivals’ factories as well” (Gilley, 1998, p. 66). At a minimum, Nike’s
model and anti-model arguments created a focus on the impending initiatives and
their potential for improving working conditions. This focus contrasted sharply
with what Nike had faced prior to the speech—an ongoing retrospective analysis
of wrongs previously committed in Nike factories.
It is also interesting to note that Knight (1998) was able to publicize Nike’s
initiatives for the sportswear industry without creating a swell of criticism from
its industry competitors. The model and anti-model format made this possible for
two reasons. First, the value of social responsibility was the paramount feature in
all of Nike’s model arguments. This focus on social responsibility made it difficult
for opponents to reject Knight’s proposals without appearing that they were
rejecting the value of social responsibility as well. Second, Knight’s model and
anti-model arguments sought to establish the structure of reality for the industry.
Consequently, his initiatives were all future-oriented with a focus on the collective whole, rather than any specific organization.
This focus on the industry rather than any specific competitor is fitting with
previous research on the decentered nature of organizations (Cheney, 1991; Ice,
1991; Schultz & Seeger, 1991; Sellnow, 1993). Cheney explains that organizations
“tend to ⬘decenter’ the self, the individual the acting subject” (p. 5). He asserts that
statements such as “Ma Bell decided” leave observers to wonder, “Decided by
whom?” (p. 5). Seeger and Schultz contend that the decentered nature of organizations creates an opportunity to deny and diffuse responsibility in crisis situations that is not possible in cases of individual apologia. We contend that this
decentered quality exists to an even greater degree when reference is made to an
entire industry. For example, when Knight assigns responsibility to the sportswear industry, he is referring to the collective acts of many independent organi-
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zations, each with numerous employees. These agencies are united only in the
fact that they make similar products. By calling for corrective action in the
industry, then, Knight diffuses guilt for Nike and makes his recommendations to
an abstract entity. Ironically, Knight moves from a debate with his critics over
global manufacturing to a new debate with an unnamed and imprecise foe.
The initial impact Nike had in structuring the reality of the global manufacturing debate invites speculation as to the potential success of model and anti-model
arguments in other organizational crises. As such, we propose several implications related to the relevance this case may have for other industries and other
types of crises. We also briefly consider the ethical ramifications of model and
anti-model arguments.
Several characteristics of the sportswear industry contributed to Nike’s ability
to engage in model and anti-model arguments. Namely, the sportswear industry
does a large volume of business, has viable competition among companies, has
public visibility, and produces a product or service that is acquired directly by the
public. Model and anti-model arguments related to norms and standards are most
likely to function effectively in industries with similar characteristics.
Without a large volume of business, a crisis is not likely to acquire the level of
media attention needed for a single company to influence an industry via a public
forum. Such crises simply do not have the status needed to influence policies
(Crable & Vibbert, 1985). Similarly, if an industry lacks viable competition among
its members, there would be little merit in arguments directed toward the industry. When an industry is dominated by a single organization, arguments regarding
the industry have the potential to appear self-serving. For example, in some
regions, a single energy supplier or cable television operator is dominant. For
such dominant organizations, addressing a crisis with arguments directed toward
the industry is not likely to be compelling for their customers. In these cases, a
prevailing organization would be better served by simply announcing its corrective action and restoring its images on an individual basis.
Nike was also influenced by public attitudes that affected consumer behavior.
The prestige of wearing the Nike logo was compromised by the growing intensity
of sweatshop allegations. In Nike’s case, diminished prestige meant diminished
sales. The declining support of its consumers was motivation to offer corrective
action (Blackistone, 1998). As Heath (1997) explains, maintaining “harmony with
stakeholders” regarding key issues is essential to “lessen unwanted intrusion” (p.
121). By emphasizing its concern for social responsibility, Nike was, in essence,
attempting to rebuild a harmony with its consumers and to diminish criticism
regarding its global manufacturing policies. Organizations that frequently and
directly come into contact with consumers have ample opportunities to emphasize their model behavior. Ironically, the same consumer attention that resulted in
Nike’s diminished sales gave it the audience needed to influence industry standards.
Organizations from industries similar to the sportswear industry might also
benefit from the use of model and anti-model arguments. The automobile, apparel,
hospitality, furniture, food, financial services, communications, and health-care
industries are a few examples of industries where a crisis has the greatest potential to support industry-oriented model and anti-model arguments. Each of these
industries provides a tremendous volume of sales and services directly to consumers in a competitive environment.
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More specifically, several aspects of the global manufacturing crisis enabled
Nike to address its industry with model and anti-model arguments. First, the
crisis was fostered by Nike’s implementation of policies that were generally
accepted by the sportswear industry. Aside from having the greatest volume of
sales, Nike’s global manufacturing procedures were not extraordinary. Second,
Nike had the resources available to support the changes it proposed. For example,
Nike could sustain the cost of switching to water-based cements, hiring mature
workers, funding research, and establishing employee programs. Smaller organizations or industries without a large volume of business would be much less
capable of enduring the expense of major changes. Third, Nike’s crisis evolved
slowly. There was sufficient time available for Nike to apply its new initiatives
and for key publics to determine their ultimate effectiveness. Finally, Nike’s crisis
generated considerable public attention. Nike was able to capitalize on the same
attention that had created consumer concern to publicize its arguments to resolve
the crisis for itself and its industry.
At a minimum, Knight’s strategy of moving the debate away from Nike and
toward the industry as a whole enabled him to take an active role in managing
relevant issues. As we discussed at the outset of this essay, organizations can
and should capitalize on the heightened media coverage and public awareness
associated with crises if they want to be proactive in molding future policy
(Crable & Vibbert, 1985; Johnson & Sellnow, 1995). Nike’s initiatives meet this
recommendation by addressing the relevant issues and forming initiatives that
are clearly within Nike’s capability to consummate. As such, model and
anti-model arguments enable organizations to publicly critique their relevant
industries. Such criticism can serve as a means for managing issues in a way
that can, ultimately, result in public policies that are favorable to the organization. Ideally, the organization emerges from a crisis as a model for innovation in its relevant industry.
This point calls forth consideration of the ethics surrounding the use of
model and anti-model arguments during crises that are designed to structure
the reality of an industry. Although the intent of this study is not to generate
an exhaustive analysis of Nike’s ethics, several observations can be made.
First, Nike’s initiatives were within its capacity to act. Nike was able to enact
all but one of its initiatives within weeks of the speech. The only initiative that
took more time was Knight’s (1998) call for independent monitoring. If an
organization expects to maintain the public’s trust, it must be willing and able
to follow through on standards it proposes for its industry. Second, Nike’s
crisis was relevant to the industry. As is discussed above, Nike’s global
manufacturing policies were similar to those of its competitors. Attempts by an
organization to obscure its exceptional internal failings by directing attention
to the industry would be ethically suspect. Third, Nike’s proposals were
designed to correct problems in the industry. With the exception of worker
pay, Knight’s initiatives addressed the key complaints regarding its global
manufacturing. Moreover, the initiatives were fitting for Nike’s competitors. In
other words, the initiatives appeared to be designed to improve the industry,
rather than to give Nike a competitive advantage. Thus, there was an essence
of sincerity in Knight’s speech. Ideally, then, ethical organizations responding
to crises would restructure the reality of their industry with the primary intent
to correct its flaws.
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Conclusion
Social responsibility is an essential element for organizations seeking long-term
success (Heath, 1997; Seeger, 1997). When Nike’s credibility was shaken by
accusations of mistreating its international employees, the corporation was threatened with a substantial contraction of profits and credibility. Nike’s strategy of
focusing its response on problems related to its industry appears to have afforded
Nike the time needed to improve working conditions in the international factories
that manufacture its products. Since Knight’s speech, Nike’s defense has focused
on the innovative programs and procedures adopted. Nike’s website includes
many testimonials of the improved conditions in the factories it uses. Maria Eitel,
Nike’s Vice President for Corporate Responsibility, argues that Nike’s initiatives
represent a change throughout the corporation. Several months after Knight’s
speech, she told Nike shareholders that corporate responsibility is “integrated
into everything we do at the company” and that Nike is “a company of honest,
caring people who want to learn from the past, and make the company the best it
can be” (McCall, 1998, AP Online). Although the ultimate success or failure of
Knight’s speech and the initiatives contained within will not be known for several
years, his anti-model arguments have given Nike the opportunity to refocus the
debate and the time needed to regain credibility.
Future research should consider, in further detail, the ethical ramifications of
using anti-model arguments to refocus debate on an industry rather than an
organization. Such research might more clearly explicate the thresholds where
this approach becomes unethical. Future studies should also investigate how
model and anti-model arguments are used in risk communication. How do these
arguments function when dealing with threats of harm rather than responding to
known crises? Future studies could also consider the viability of model and
anti-model arguments to influence the prevailing standards for the behavior of
professionals in such areas as politics, law, and health-care. For example, under
what circumstances can an individual use his or her personal crisis to initiate
change in the standards of his or her profession?
The Nike case serves as evidence that social responsibility is an important value
among American consumers. Simply put, many American consumers expect and
demand that organizations maintain safe and fair working conditions for all of
their employees.
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Received February 24, 2000
Accepted January 16, 2001
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