The Struggle for Autonomy: Establishing the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
A CASE STUDY
In Partial Fulfilment of the Course
Public International Law
Prepared by:
Jesmar C. Delima
III-A
Presented to:
Atty. Analissa Padon
Professor
Establishing an Autonomous Region as an International Concern
Via a modern lens, we view the employ of autonomy as a device to enable ethnic
or other groups claiming distinct identity in order to exercise direct control over affairs of
special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers that cover
common interests. It is also regarded as a strategy of averting and settling selfdetermination conflicts is based on the recognition of group-specific concerns alongside
and on par with concerns of individuals apropos their ethnic identities and the state. It is
likewise premised on the acceptance that in endowing an ethnic group the necessary
legislative, executive, and judicial powers to address their concerns effectively will
contribute to individual, group, and state security, and thus to preventing the disruption of
the territorial and/or social integrity of a given country. Now, fundamentally, there exists
no uniform use of terms for the different kinds of arrangements for autonomy, in traversing
the entire globe. Nonetheless, the most widely reputed is federalism. In such, all regions
enjoy equal powers and have an identical relationship to the central government. The
federal prototype may be regarded inconsequential and moot, should the intent be only
mere accommodation of one or two minority groups. In such situations, special powers
may be devolved only to a part of the country where the minority constitutes a majority-these powers being exercised only by regional institutions. Normally, very significant
powers are devolved and the region, unlike in a federation, plays relatively little role in
national government and institutions. This kind of autonomy is referred to as regional
autonomy or federacy. By the nature of this kind of regional autonomy which is deemed
asymmetrical, we see fine examples in the now-extant autonomous regions like the South
Tyrol of Italy, Puerto Rico of the United States, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s
Republic of China, Greenland and Faroes of Denmark, and Scotland of the United
Kingdom, inter alia.
Now, what primarily sets the disparity between unitary and federal systems is the
existence in the latter of an intermediate government level often referred to as states. In
unitary systems, there exists two main government levels – the central and the local.
Federal systems, on the other hand contain three distinct government levels (federal, states,
and local). The states in federal systems share sovereignty with the federal government in
that remote from fiscal autonomy, they possess full complements of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, and have final jurisdiction over a broad range of policy areas that are
defined in the constitution. Furthermore, in federal systems, the states are also instrumental
towards the exercise of self-rule and shared-rule that is the hallmark of federal system.
States in federations are autonomous units that exercise self-rule or decision-making
powers within the limits set by the constitution. Concurrently, they have vested rights
towards shared rule. The practice of self-rule and shared rule provides stability to
federations and that it allows unity notwithstanding diversity and encourages coordination
and cooperation among the constituent states and the federation.
Proceeding to the claim that establishing autonomous regions are indeed of
international concern, an array of opinions from sociological luminaries regards the
establishment of such in a positive light. They posit that arrangements involving the grant
of autonomy to regions are likely to be established if the international community becomes
involved in conflict resolution. At both the international and the regional levels there
existed a considerable multitude of support for autonomy, as reflected in emerging
international norms. The increasing involvement of the international community in
national conflicts has facilitated the application of these norms to the settlement of
conflicts. The League of Nations even showed a particular preference for autonomy, and a
number of treaties for minority protection were based on autonomy, of which many of the
current autonomous regions survive to this day. However, in exact same latitude that the
establishment of autonomous regions invites positive views, opposers to such contention
maintain that such grant of autonomy would, on the contrary, yield to even bigger
problems, national or international in scope. Scholars who hold a contrary position argue
that the prospect of obtaining an autonomy status may even be conducive to groups
engaging in ethnic warfare. Further, according to such interpretation, autonomy is not the
solution to ethnic conflict but rather instead its adverse cause. These views generate
different predictions as to how the profile of violence should look like in the run up to and
after autonomy is granted. If autonomy is utilized by central governments to avail bolstered
solutions to ethnic violence, then one can glean that the risk of civil wars will start
decreasing once autonomy becomes anticipated and even more so when the negotiations
formally commence. If autonomy is successful at mitigating conflict, then the risk of civil
wars will sharply reduce after autonomy is obtained. Contrarily, if autonomy fuels conflict
through legitimizing and strengthening separatists, then the risk of civil wars should remain
high or even increase in the years following the policy change. Finally, if ethnic wars are
strategically engineered to obtain autonomy, then risks of civil wars may actually increase
in the years leading up to the granting of autonomy status but sharply spelunking
afterwards.
The Dilemma in the South
Panning forward to the extant conflicts in the strife-laden south of the Philippines,
such presage the recurring call for the fulfillment of the right to self-determination of the
Muslim population in the Philippines in order to obtain sustainable peace. With almost
forty years of recursive fighting between Muslim armed opposition groups and the
Philippine military forces, and the resulting high toll on human lives, the search for
sustainable peace and full respect for human rights remains a colossal challenge that the
country faces. The current armed conflict began in late 1960s, when a Muslim armed group
identified as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) started to advocate for a Moro
homeland. A rich lore tainted with blood and swords and guns are however of no shallow
reasons, as one can associate with their cry for a homeland. The far reaches of their
advocacy stems and spans a good hundreds of years ago when the Spaniards, upon conquest
were surprised to find people adhering to the religion of the Moors, their rulers and
adversary since time immemorial. After the Spaniards’ success in colonizing and
converting the natives to Christianity in Luzon and Visayas, they trained their guns on the
Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. For more than three centuries, the Moros have passionately
defended their community, their freedom and their faith against the conquistadors. The
Moros, therefore, developed a distinct identity intensified by Islam and self-preservation,
which was far different from the Christianized natives. The gap between the two groups
have intensified and in fact did not stop with the differences in both history and culture. It
was made worse by the fact that Spain used the Indios in their war against Moros.
Going back to the dates ensuing the armed conflicts that have commenced in the
60s, The Philippine government responded via heavy military means, yielding to serious
numerous deaths among, and displacement of, the civilian population (Muslims and
Christians alike). In the 1970s, the Philippine government made efforts in bringing forward
peace talks and has thus obtained a peace agreement with the then main Muslim armed
opposition group (MNLF) to stop the conflict and address the problems. Only however for
armed confrontations breaking out every now and then, between the Philippine military
and the MNLF, and also with another Muslim armed opposition group (Moro Islamic
Liberation Front or MILF, a sub-faction). For every break out of armed hostilities,
thousands of non- combatants are caught in the crossfire, and suffer displacement and other
human rights violations.
Efforts in Bringing Forward Peace and Concessions
In December 1976, the Philippine government commenced and signed an
agreement with the MNLF through the intercession of the Organization of Islamic
Conference. This agreement, known as the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, provided for the
creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao and Palawan, and the establishment of an
autonomous government, judicial system, and special security forces. In 1977, President
Marcos and the Batasang Pambansa came out with a series of laws to implement the 1976
Tripoli Agreement that resulted in the creation of Regional Councils in each of Regions IX
and XII in Mindanao. Only for such solution to be widely repudiated by the MNLF.
In the years that fell after 1993 and until 1996, peace negotiations were brought
forward and accordingly birthed a comprehensive peace agreement that managed both to
weave closely to the Tripoli Agreement signed 20 years earlier and to stay within the formal
bounds of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional bill establishing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. The hereon agreement furnished the implementation of the
Tripoli agreement in two phases. First, it radically conceived a transitional administrative
structure known as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development. Such
body substituted for the provisional government that was called for in the Tripoli agreement
but was not allowed under the 1987 Constitution. The role of the Southern Philippines
Council for Peace and Development was to supervise the implementation of the agreement
during a three-year trial period. Nur Misuari, the founder and chairman of the MNLF, was
made chairman of the SPCPD and won election as governor of the ARMM. The agreement
also provided for thousands of MNLF fighters to be integrated into the Philippine armed
forces and national police. The development component of the Southern Philippines
Council for Peace and Development was viewed as key to the agreement. During the threeyear trial period, such body was to demonstrate both to Muslim supporters and suspicious
Christian residents the economic benefits of peace under an autonomous region by
channeling national and international development funds into the region as well as by
attracting foreign investment. The 1996 Peace Agreement’s second phase then called for
the establishment of a new Regional Autonomous Government with its own executive
council, a legislative assembly, and representation in the national government. It would
also be vested with tax raising powers, a regional security force, an educational system that
would incorporate Islamic pedagogy and pragmatics, and a system of Shariah courts. The
boundaries of this new Regional Autonomous Government were to be determined by a
plebiscite. However, the agreement allowed for the redrawing of provincial boundaries to
cluster predominately Muslim municipalities, thus making it likely that the new Regional
Autonomous Government would be significantly larger than the current ARMM and would
include most Muslim communities in Mindanao. Now, despite the initial promise of the
1996 Peace Agreement, it too has slowed down badly in its implementation and is in
imminent danger of unraveling altogether. The September 1999 deadline for initiating the
second phase of the agreement has come and gone. The autonomy agreement is stuck in its
initial transition phase and has made very little progress in achieving either peace or
development in the Muslim South. The headmost problem that the implementation of the
1996 Peace Agreement is entwined with is that it has practically failed to bring peace to
Muslim Mindanao. As with the 1989 negotiations, the Philippine government decided to
negotiate only with the main Muslim separatist faction led by Nur Misuari, a signatory to
the original Tripoli Agreement. In the years since the 1996 agreement, two other armed
separatist factions (the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf) have clashed militarily with the
Philippine army and those clashes have recently escalated tremendously. Although the
Philippine government tends to promote the view that these two factions are
interchangeable, they are in fact quite distinct geographically and politically. While the
Abu Sayyaf faction has garnered more headlines with its killings and kidnappings, the
MILF is the only rebel group with sufficient military might and civilian support to wage a
protracted war once again against the government. After some initial armed encounters
with government troops shortly after the 1996 agreement was signed, the MILF signed a
cease-fire agreement with the government in 1997 and entered into peace talks.
Negotiations proceeded slowly and were punctuated by occasional skirmishes. Since late
1999, however, fighting has intensified and in early 2000 the MILF withdrew from peace
talks. From the point thereon, the discord between the MILF and government troops has
only exacerbated and became more widespread than at any time since the signing of the
Tripoli Agreement.
Ensuing such esteemed non-fruition of the supposed goals set forth in the 1996
Peace Agreements, the Philippine government, on October 15, 2012, signed a document
touted as the figurehead or the framework agreement on the Bangsamoro, which
commenced the Aquino Administration's effort to end the deadlock in the peace process.
Such document, while merely providing for a general framework for the actual peace
negotiations, heralded that the status quo is unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro shall be
established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The
Bangsamoro was the new autonomous political entity referred to in the subsequent points
of decision-making. According to the thereon President Aquino, such agreement will serve
as the one which will finally seal genuine, lasting peace in Mindanao. This went on with
the Bangsamoro entity replacing ARMM which was dubbed by the sitting president as a
failed experiment.
Fast forward, under the current presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, a new draft for the
Bangsamoro Basic Law was fashioned into existence and became legislated into law as the
Bangsamoro Organic Law (Republic Act No. 11054) or more popularly known as BOL in
2018. A plebiscite transpired on January 21, 2019, to ratify the such statute with a majority
of ARMM's voters deciding in favor of the ratification of the law which prompted the
needed abolition of the ARMM, thus setting the establishment of the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in motion. Achieving the required amount of votes, the Commission
on Elections thereon proclaimed the BOL as deemed ratified on the 25th of the same month
in 2019. Now, entailing the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the abolition
process of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has been slowly dissipating as a
necessary consequence of paving the way for the settling of the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region. Under the law a transition body, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), is
to be devised pending the election of the new region's government officials in 2022. The
members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority took their oaths on February 22, 2019,
alongside the ceremonial confirmation of the affirmative plebiscite results. As per the
current situation of the supposed transitioning period of the BARMM, the signing of the
President of Republic Act No. 11593 (An Act Resetting the First Regular Elections In the
BARMM) prompted the rescheduling of the supposed first regular parliamentary elections
on 2022 to 2025. This likewise called for the extension of the said transitioning.
Online Sources:
1.
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-local-democracy
autonomous-region-muslim-mindanao.pdf
2. https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/06/challenges-facing-philippines-bangsamoroautonomous-region-one-year
3.
https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Briefing-Paper-
Philippines-Mindanao-Chronology.pdf
4. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/301-philippines-militancyand-new-bangsamoro