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HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL
Volume 7, Summer 2008
Reconciling the Debate on Universal
Human Rights
Reframing the Notion of Identity
Lida Bteddini
It is often argued that securing universal human rights is a means to
achieving human security. However, universal human rights have long been
contested by cultural relativists who argue that such universality undermines
cultural differences. This article aims to reconcile universalists’ and cultural
relativists’ arguments by demonstrating that universal human rights can
exist within a culturally-sensitive universal framework.
T
Preamble of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights advocates
the fundamental importance of the
establishment of universal human
rights," to reaffirm faith…in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small."1 The
underlying foundation of human rights lies in the
implicit acknowledgement the importance such
rights have for human security. After all, human
rights abuses represent a breach of such security
and an infringement on the dignity and worth of
the individual self. For this reason, the notion of
universal human rights must be understood as an
extension of the human security paradigm.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was established over a half a century ago, and yet
the notion of universal human rights is still highly
contested. Cultural relativists argue that rights and
moral values cannot be universally established
he
because no universal culture exists, and therefore,
universal human rights are implausible, while
proponents of universal human rights argue that
universality does not presuppose uniformity. In
other words, the principle of universal human
rights implies that such rights would be based on
universally recognized and accepted principles
which transcend cultural or religious diversity.
Perceptions of individual identity play a
crucial role in shaping a person’s perception
of human commonality. This article aims to
illustrate the reconcilability of cultural relativist
and universalistic arguments regarding universal
human rights by proposing an alternative
conception of identity as presented through George
Herbert Mead’s "Theory of the Social Self."
Mead’s theoretical framework will provide a new
lens by which the debate surrounding universal
human rights may be analyzed and resolved.
The first segment of this article will provide a
Lida Bteddini has a dual-Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Philosophy as well as a Master’s degree in
Ethics, Peace, and Global Affairs, from the American University of Washington D.C. She also studied political science at
the American University of Beirut in Lebanon for one year. She is currently working in international development.
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brief summary of the theoretical arguments made
by cultural relativists and universalists regarding
the notions of identity and universal human
rights. Understanding the foundation of these
theories allows for a better recognition of how
notions of identity contribute to a conflict over the
universality of human rights, and helps to better
define the way in which universal human rights
are conceptualized. Next follows an extensive
theoretical analysis of George Herbert Mead’s
"Theory of the Social Self."Mead’s analysis
of identity provides an innovative framework
by which relativist and universalistic notions
of human rights may be understood, as will be
discussed in detail within this section. Finally, a
comprehensive assessment of the philosophical
claims of Mead will be applied to the debate
surrounding universal human rights. This section
of the article will help to illustrate the possibility
of reconciliation between the two theories of the
human rights debate through analyzing Mead’s
theory regarding identity and its role in shaping
moral action.
Cultural Relativism
the Debate
and
Universalism:
Cultural Relativism
In rejection of the notion of objective truth, the
ancient Greek sophist Protagoras is quoted as
having described truth as "the way things appear
to me, in that way they exist for me and the way
things appear to you, in that way they exist for
you."2 While not explicitly linked to culture,
Protagoras’ theories on relativism have played
a crucial role in establishing the theoretical
argument against objective truth and in support of
relativistic concepts of morality.
The crux of the argument posed by cultural
relativists regarding universal human rights is
whether it is possible to successfully conceive of
culturally sensitive universals. Since according
to this theoretical perspective, culture is the
underlying foundation of an individual’s identity,
universal human rights seems problematic due to
the absence of a universal culture. The absence
of a "universal culture" would imply that moral
values could only be derived specific to particular
communities. In other words, though all cultures
may subscribe to human rights, the definition of
such rights would differ from one culture to the
next, and would not be universally applied.
In "Universalism and Relativism in Human
Rights," David Duquette argues that the core of a
person’s identity is comprised mainly by the social
network within which one is assimilated, relying
heavily on "the hypothesis of enculturation" and
the role that culture plays in forming an individual’s
"ethical self-perception and perception of others."3
In other words, the values and judgments of an
individual are ultimately the product of that
person’s cultural affiliation and social patterns of
life.4 Melville Herskovitz, one of history’s leading
exponents of ethical relativism, states that cultural
relativism is a philosophy that stresses the dignity
inherent in every body of custom, and "the need
for tolerance of conventions though they may
differ from one’s own."5
The implication of this worldview is that
moral evaluations are ultimately relative to an
individual’s cultural identity, and therefore, no
universal moral claims exist. It is through this
theoretical framework that cultural relativists
regard the notion of universal human rights.
The implication of this theory is that morality is
essentially culture-specific and even more so, that
each culture differs in terms of its moral values and
judgments. Ann Mayer’s cross-cultural analysis
of Islamic notions of human rights adequately
illustrates this point. According to Mayer, if
human rights are not derived locally from a
specific culture, the validity and applicability of
such rights becomes questioned.6
According to such theorists, a universal notion
of human rights is problematic in that it is an
attempt to impose an absolute moral valuation
among a world divided culturally and socially,
thus comprised of various identities, each
holding a different conception of human rights.
The cultural relativist framework emphasizes
the role of social patterns in establishing an
individual’s conception of morality. In response
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
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Herskovitz declared that the underlying concern
of cultural relativism is the potential imposition
of a single culture over the moral values and
rights of others.7 The inability of universal human
rights to incorporate the particularities of specific
cultures and communities is the most problematic
aspect of its application, thus making such rights
seem impossible.
Universalism
Universalism is effectively represented through
John Locke’s "natural rights theory," which views
human rights as universal insofar as the rights
or entitlements proposed are those applicable to
all persons simply by virtue of their existence
as human beings.8 The underlying claim of
universalism is that human rights are universal
because they address the absolute needs for
securing the life of any individual regardless of
cultural affiliation.9 According to universalism,
human nature is the level of identity emphasized
through the establishment of human rights and
therefore, such rights are "ascribable to people
simply as human beings."10 This theoretical lens
frames the issue of human rights as universally
applicable since such rights aim to secure
common physiological necessities attributable
to all human beings regardless of cultural and
societal particularities. The implication of such a
theory is that individuals are entitled to be treated
in certain ways solely by virtue of their common
existence as human beings, and therefore, human
rights work towards protecting the basic essentials
of human life. The notion of human commonality
was the basis for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which declares human rights as
inherent to all human beings and therefore, not
a social production. Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that "all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights," while Article 2 further stresses the
entitlement of all human beings to "all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political, or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other
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Volume 7, Summer 2008
status."11 Because the universalistic framework
views human rights as dealing with the rights of
all human beings on the basis of physiological
needs and commonalities, the notion of universal
human rights seems natural and cultural relativist
claims against the universality of such rights are
deemed unfounded.
The preceding sections offer a brief overview
of the debate surrounding universal human
rights. While cultural relativism emphasizes the
constitutive role that culture and societal practices
have on the defining of an individual’s view of
morality, universalism considers the common
physiological essence of all human beings as
the basis for human rights. The way in which a
problem is framed determines its resolution. In
other words, the irreconcilability of the arguments
presented by universalism and cultural relativism
is due to the way in which the problem of universal
human rights is framed. Cultural relativists
consider identity as shaped entirely by a person’s
cultural tradition and therefore, since no universal
culture exists, universal human rights cannot exist
either. The universalistic approach to human rights
considers human nature as the building block of
identity. All human beings are physiologically
equal through their common human nature,
regardless of their cultural or societal differences.
Therefore human rights can be universally applied
because such rights secure the basic necessities
for the preservation of human life.
The two theories seem to be irreconcilable
and preclude agreement about human rights.
However, George Herbert Mead’s "Theory of the
Social Self" offers an alternative framing of the
notion of identity that can resolve this seeming
impasse. His pragmatist approach to the notion
of the social self provides a new lens by which
the universal human rights problematic may be
understood. Though Mead’s "Theory of the Social
Self" may not provide a complete resolution to
the debate on universal human rights, Mead’s
ideas prove useful in reframing the notion of
identity on which the debate currently founders.
The following section will provide an extensive
overview of Mead’s "Theory of the Social Self"
to show that Mead’s model is an effective strategy
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to resolve the theoretical divide between cultural development of the social group in which human
relativism and universalism.
beings exist.17 Becoming an object to oneself
refers to the ability of an individual to distinguish
Mead's Theory of the Social Self: the between an experience that immediately takes
Origin of the Mind
place and "our own organization of it into the
experience of the self."18 As Mead stresses, the
The first step to gaining an understanding of self and the organism are not one and the same,
Mead’s "Theory of the Social Self" is illustrating since the self is "entirely distinguishable from an
"the structures upon which the self is constructed," organism that is surrounded by things and acts
and the framework by which Mead defines with reference to things, including parts of its own
personal identity.12 The overarching principle of body."19 The ability of an individual to experience
Mead’s theory is the emphasis on the role that itself indirectly through the particular standpoints
society plays in defining the notion of the "self." of other members of a social group allows an
According to Mead, the mind and the self are individual to become a subject to oneself.20 This
essentially social products, and therefore, the is an important aspect of Mead’s theory because it
individual self is constructed entirely out of the provides the basis by which human existence can
social process.13 The self, according to Mead, has be understood in relation to its social community.
a "character different from that of a physiological
As Mead explains, because the social network
14
organism proper." It is not an inherently of selves is intertwined with the creation of the
existing entity, but is instead developed over self, the unity and structure of the complete
time and through a process of social experiential self reflects the unity and structure of the social
activity.15 This theory is often challenged by such process as a whole.21 Therefore, the organization
essentialists as S. A Gelman, who view certain and unification of a larger social group will in turn
aspects of personal identity as being inherent and define the structure of the complete and unified
unalterable.16
self.22 The implication of this statement is that
It is necessary to illustrate Mead’s conception of a "unified self" is determined on the basis of an
the self in order to examine the implications such individual’s capacity to internalize the attitudes and
a theory has for the debate surrounding universal roles of others within a particular social network
human rights. The next few sections will examine of selves.23 The "generalized other" is, therefore, a
Mead’s notion on the distinction between the term that refers to the ability of one to perceive an
"self and the organism," "the generalized other," experience on the basis of the attitudes and roles
"consciousness vs. self-consciousness," and the of others apart from itself. This notion marks
"'I' vs. 'me' distinction," all of which are pertinent the basis for an individual’s capacity to make
concepts for a successful reframing of the debate decisions and develop moral and value-based
on universal human rights.
judgments. This next section will further clarify
Mead’s theory of the "generalized other," and
The Self and the Organism
provide a more comprehensive illustration of the
relationship of the self to the social community.
Mead begins with an analysis of the distinction
between the self and the organism. "Reflexiveness," The "Generalized Other" and the Self-Conscious
according to Mead, is the "essential condition…for Self
the development of the mind," and which allows
an individual to distinguish definitively between Though Mead’s model forcefully stresses that
the self and the body. The main differentiation the self is not inherent at one’s birth but, rather,
between an individual person and a "lower is completely defined within a social network,
animal" is that individual’s ability to become an it is important to note that Mead’s account of
‘object to itself’, possible through the evolutionary identity does not preclude the existence of moral
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The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was established
over half a century ago, and yet
the notion of universal human
rights is still highly contested.
autonomy—something that is important when
considering a person’s capacity to think.24 Mead
states that "the organized community or social
group which gives to the individual his unity of
self may be called ‘the generalized other,'" which
represents the attitude of the whole community.25
Nonetheless, the internalization of the "generalized
other" provides a means by which an individual
can develop a thought process and "think." A
personality is created through an individual’s
membership within a community, because that
individual incorporates the "institutions" of
that community into one’s own conduct.26 This
implication of this argument is that a person’s selfrealization is dependent on his or her participation
within a social community. The self, apart from
this participation, is unidentifiable.27
The community, according to Mead, is
comprised of a "structure of attitudes" instead
of a "group of habits."This is important, since
as Mead stresses, a social community is not
based on traditional habits formed as a result of
one’s membership in a group. Such habits are,
instead, insignificant in the defining of the selfconsciousness, but merely comprise that which
Mead terms the "unconscious self."28 He furthers
this point by asserting that while consciousness
merely refers to a "field of experience," selfconsciousness is a term which signifies the "ability
to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses
which belong to the others of the group."29
Therefore, these two terms must be understood
separately, since the self-conscious self is of a
different level of awareness not characteristic of
a merely conscious being.
The most significant aspect of this analysis
is Mead’s assertion that "each one of the selves
is different from everyone else; but there has
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Volume 7, Summer 2008
to be a common structure (…) in order that we
may be members of a community at all."30 The
"common structure" is the backbone of particular
social groups and subsequently, individual selves,
which comprises the notion of ‘overarching unity’
characteristic of the social community.31 In other
words, social structures and societal norms play a
crucial role in defining self-identity because they
provide the foundation upon which the individual
and unique self may develop.
The full development of the self is described
in two stages. In the first stage, the individual
self is conceived of as constituted "simply by an
organization of the particular attitudes of other
individuals toward [themselves] and toward one
another in the specific social acts in which he
participates with them."32 During the second stage,
"the organization of the social attitudes of the
generalized other or the social group as a whole to
which [one] belongs" completes the development
of the self so that it is an individual reflection of
a general systematic pattern of socialization in
which the self and other selves are involved.33
More clearly, the first stage of development
signifies one’s ability to generalize the "other."
This generalization leads into the second stage of
development which is the thought process and the
notion of the "I."
Mead’s account of the social self is important
since it provides reconciliation between the
notion of the socially determined self (me) and
the self, which is autonomous and unique (I). The
differentiation between these two self-concepts is
illustrated more clearly in the next section, which
discusses their distinctions in detail. This divide
will help to conceptualize the aspect of identity,
which plays a role in decision making, especially in
regards to moral action within Mead’s theoretical
framework.
The "I" Vs. "Me" Distinction
Mead’s model divides the self into two specific
entities: the socially determined and concrete
"me" and the unique and unfixed "I."34 Therefore,
a person’s identity is a mixture of both social
determinacy and autonomous individuality. This
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intertwining of self-concepts is important since
it provides a forceful resolve to the paradox of
determinacy vs. free will. Though an aspect of
personal identity may be socially determined on
the basis of one’s membership within a particular
community, the self is nonetheless capable of
individuality and self-deliberation. Membership
within a social community is dependent on the
existence of a common social structure, and the
existence of a community of attitudes that controls
the attitudes of all.35
The implication of Mead’s theory is that
personal identity is a mixture of both socially
determined characteristics in addition to the unique
and autonomously defined entity which is the "I."
Without the foundation of the "me," the "I" cannot
exist. At the same time, the give-and-take nature
of the relationship between these two phases
implies that the "I" is also a necessary response
to the existence of the "me." 36 In other words,
while the "me" is representative of the socially
defined and limited aspect of identity, the "I" is a
representation of autonomy and spontaneity which
allows for individual thought and expression. This
point is important in illustrating the potentiality
for the existence of social distinction even within
a homogenous social group. The metaphysical
question of the "I" vs. "me" distinction is not the
main concern for Mead. Instead, he illustrates
these self-concepts in terms of their functionality
as well as the nature of conduct between them.
The conduct of the "me" compared to the "I" is
quite different. While the "I" provides the self with
a component of individuality, the "me" refers to
the aspect of the self which represents "a definite
organization of the community."37 Mead adds that
for the "me," "there is no certainty in regard to
it. There is a moral necessity but no mechanical
regard to it."38 The importance of this statement is
that individual identity cannot be fully understood
unless it is recognized as a collaboration of "I"
vs. "me" distinction. Contrary to essentialist
perspectives which view components of
identity as inherent and static, the defining of an
individual, for Mead, is a continuous process of
adjustment and reaction, something which allows
for personality and distinctiveness.
The relationship between the "me" and the
"I" is further discussed in relation to the social
community within which one exists. Though
an individual cannot control the environment
he or she is born in, the country of his or her
origin, or the culture and traditions of his or her
ancestry, Mead emphasizes that these aspects of a
particular identity comprise the "me," which does
not constitute the complete self. The continuous
process of the defining of the social self
necessitates change. Therefore, the self is never
static and unchanging. The self is "an eddy in the
social current and so still a part of the current."39
Unfortunately, Mead does not provide a
extensive analysis on the limits of the individual’s
control over his or her development and autonomy
and, in turn, the extent of the influence of the
community or social group on the shaping of self
identity. Therefore, it is questionable whether
Mead considers the self capable of willingly
choosing or rejecting certain personal affiliations,
or being bound by the components of the socially
determined "me."
Furthermore, it is not clear what Mead
specifies as constituting a "shared environment"
or a "common context," thus leaving these terms
ambiguous. Nonetheless, what Mead provides
is a pervasive account on the individualistic and
autonomous nature of the social self, a notion
which is crucial to understanding the extent of
diversity and distinction that can exist within a
social group or community.
Mead's Theory of Universals
The "I" vs. "me" distinction is similar to Mead’s
theory of "universals," which proves significant
to the application of Mead’s Theory of the Social
Self and the debate on universal human rights.
A "universal" is described as belonging to "the
experience of all of us," the "us" referring to
all human beings.40 An effective illustration of
the notion of universals is in the scenario Mead
provides to express the difference between the
individual and the community. He explains
that during a concert, for example, what each
individual gets out of the experience is very
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different from the next. Nonetheless, the
physical objects of that concert are universal
and common to the whole audience.41 In other
words, a particular experience is derived from
a common quality by which all individuals can
relate. The concept of the universal and particular
is not meant to be understood as the difference
between objective and subjective. In other words,
the particular experience of an individual should
not be understood as something that is based on
individual perception, but rather, that everything
in the social community takes place as a process.
This process begins with the existence of a social
organization. Therefore, the community within
which the organism or individual exists "acts
in such a co-operative fashion that the action
of one is the stimulus to the other to respond,
and so on…"More importantly, Mead asserts
that the "universe of discourse" within which
people are able to communicate, allows for the
collaboration of various social groups into a higher
organizational relationship. Such a relationship is
representative of the commonality necessary for
social development, and is the foundation of the
mind, or the self.42
Establishing the foundation of the self is
important since it provides a base by which the
development of the individual can be better
analyzed. Furthermore, the recognition of the
role of the individual within the larger social
community, and the interrelatedness of the
relationship between society and the self, is a
crucial aspect of Mead’s theoretical framework.
The peculiarity of Mead’s theory is that it
views the social process as existing prior to the
existence of individuals or selves. Therefore,
unlike an individualistic theoretical framework,
which considers the individual as a precondition
to the appearance of the social community, the
social theory places the social community as the
foundation for the genesis and development of the
mind, and in turn, the self.
Whereas the preceding sections focused on
illustrating the development of selves on the basis
of "the human organism," the next section of this
article will examine the application of Mead’s
Theory of the Social Self to the social community.
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Volume 7, Summer 2008
This section will prove helpful in illustrating the
nature of human societies and the role of individual
selves within such communities.
Mead's Theory of the Social Self - The Self
the "Social Context"
in
The basis of human society, according to Mead,
begins with understanding the difference between
man and the most basic of societies, the society of
insects. The fundamental difference, stresses Mead,
is that while the society of insects is constructed
around the physiological differentiation between
its group members, human society is founded
upon the development of language. Therefore,
the "system of organization" of human society is
built upon a level of communication distinct from
that of physiologically-dependent insect societies.
Mead states that human society finds "unity into
the varied structures of the human form by means
of an additional organ, the brain and the cortex."44
It is insufficient to evaluate human society on the
basis of physiological differentiation, according
to Mead, since human beings are minimally
different on this level. Analyzing human society
on such a basis would be similar to analyzing the
physiological differentiation existing within a
"nest of ants."45
The implication of such a statement is that while
insect societies are differentiated physiologically,
the level of response possible by its members is
limited intellectually. Human society, on the other
hand, is dependent on intellectual and languagebased differentiation for the functioning of its
"system of organization." Because of this, "there
thus arises the almost indefinite multiplicity of
the responses of the human organism."46 A human
being is socially defined in large part by his or
her ability and response within an environment
instead of mere physiologically or biologically
determined characteristics.
In describing the relationship between human
society and the vertebrates, Mead states that the
process of communication is "nothing but an
elaboration of the peculiar intelligence with which
the vertebrate form is endowed."47 It is through
communication that the individual can define his
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or herself, and human free will and self-realization
can occur. Nonetheless, Mead stresses that a
human being’s capacity for self-determination is
wholly dependent on their membership within a
social community of selves. The implication of
this theory is that communication cannot take
place without an individual’s social involvement.48
The social process is, therefore, the key to
differentiation among human beings. Language
provides human beings with the capacity for "an
entirely different principle of organization which
produces not only a different type of individual
but also a different society."49 Thus, this theory
maintains that since human beings are minimally
diverse physiologically, universal human rights
working to secure the common physiological
needs of human beings do not threaten cultural or
societal particularities.
Self-realization is achieved in acknowledging
the consciousness of both oneself and other
individuals. The process of co-operative activity
which can take place within a human society is
distinctly higher than that which takes place among
insects, or within a herd, for example.50 While it
is the physiological characteristic of the central
nervous system of human beings which allows
them "to take the attitudes of other individuals, and
the attitudes of the organized social group, toward
[oneself]," the capacity for self-determination is
entirely dependent on how an individual utilizes
such a capacity for self-consciousness.51 Principles
such as "kindliness, helpfulness, and assistance,"
comprise
the essential
Culture is depicted as
characteristics
of individuals a changing process
in a human instead of a static
c o m m u n i t y, entity.
according to
Mead.52 The
concept of such a society depicted in Mead’s
theory is highly abstract, but nonetheless
important in helping one realize the possibility by
which the limits of various social groups may be
transcended.53
Mead furthers his emphasis of the significance
of communication by arguing that an individual’s
consciousness of both oneself and other individuals
is "equally important for…self-development and
for the development of the organized society
or social group."54 Therefore, communication
necessitates participation with another, which in
turn "requires the appearance of the other in the
self, the identification of the other with the self,
the reaching of self-consciousness through the
other."55 A society is thus built up out of elements
formed through human to human contact,
which Mead argues is identifiable through such
universal forms as "universal religions and…
universal economic processes.56 The fundamental
attitudes of human beings toward one another, as
Mead argues, can be seen through such attributes
as "kindliness, helpfulness, and assistance,"
which he refers to as a "universal religion."57 In
regards to universal economic processes, Mead
argues that there exists a "fundamental process of
exchange on the part of individuals arising from
the goods for which they have no immediate need
themselves but which can be utilized for obtaining
that which they do need."58 Mead highlights both
the attitudes of ‘neighborliness’ and ‘the process
of exchange,’ which constitute the "most highly
universal" and "most highly abstract society."59
He unfortunately does not write extensively
on the topic of religion or economics, leaving
this assertion quite vague and underdeveloped.
The term "universal religion," for example, is
problematic because of its oversimplification of
the complexity of existing religious traditions. In
leaving this notion vague, Mead seems to disregard
fundamental differences that exist among and
within certain religions, which sometimes leads
to unavoidable conflict. Further development of
this concept would help to address such critical
points of contention.
Nonetheless, the most important point to
consider is that while these two processes
represent a universal human society, the process
of communication is still the vehicle by which
"neighborliness" and "a process of exchange"
can take place. Communication represents
the utmost universal process available to selfconscious human society. It is also a process
that is distinctive to human beings, and which
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allows for a complex and highly organized social
community unattainable in other societies such
as that of insects or vertebrates.60 While not
entirely similar, Mead’s theory of the significance
of communication can be compared the work of
modern behaviorists such as B.F Skinner, who
recognized the importance language plays in the
process of socialization.61
The next section of this article will provide
an application of Mead’s theoretical framework
to the debate surrounding the establishment of
universal human rights. It will aim to highlight the
theories of the "mind" and the "self," and further
discuss Mead’s alternative understanding of
identity presented within the preceding pages. In
addition, the next section will aim to illustrate the
potential for reconciliation between universalistic
and cultural relativistic arguments regarding a
universal implementation of human rights.
Application of Mead's
Universal Human Rights
Theory
to
Mead’s "Theory of the Social Self" is an
innovative approach to the debate surrounding
universal human rights: it allows for a reframing
of the human rights problematic by redefining
the meaning behind "identity" and the "self."
Furthermore, Mead’s notion of ‘community’proves
helpful in comprehending both universalistic and
cultural relativistic arguments, regardless of their
stance on the debate surrounding universal human
rights. Though Mead did not specifically address
the issue of universal human rights, his ‘theory of
the social self’ will prove helpful in reshaping the
lens by which identity and, in turn, the ‘self’, are
perceived.
The strength of Mead’s theory is his framing of
the "self" as dynamic and complex. As previously
discussed, Mead’s notion of identity considers the
"self" to be neither completely determined, nor
completely free and autonomous.62 The result is
a "self" which is best defined as an ever-changing
process instead of something that is static and
unchanging.63 The implication of this statement
is that it is neither culture nor human nature that
completely defines an individual. One’s identity is
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intricately bound to the social process and consists
of the interconnectedness of both a socially
determined "me" and a largely autonomous "I."
The presence of both the "me" and the ‘I’ help
to shape what Mead terms as the "self-conscious
self."64
Moral judgment or action on the part of an
individual within a social community can be
based on the membership of an individual within
that particular society. Nevertheless, Mead
stresses that an individual’s identification with
a specific community, whether it be religious,
political, or cultural, does not dictate that person’s
moral action. Instead, selves are wholly capable
of acting aside from such affiliations. Decisions
of individual moral selves will not necessarily be
determined on the basis of social communities.65
The implication of this theory is important
for understanding the polar dichotomization
of universal and cultural relativist arguments
regarding universal human rights. Both
universalist and cultural relativist understandings
of the "self" are insufficient in effectively
recognizing the dynamics of identity as well as an
individuals’ capacity for moral judgment. Human
nature or culture alone cannot fully explain the
nature of an individual’s identity and the role
of the "self" in the social community. From the
perspective of Mead’s theory, both universalist
and cultural relativist theories on universal human
rights represent incomplete theorizations of what
comprises an individual’s identity.
While cultural relativist notions of identity
consider culture to be the essence of all moral
judgment, Mead emphasizes the relational nature
of an individual’s existence to that of another.
Social interactions are what define a rational
actor, and therefore, the existence of the self of
one person is wholly dependent on its relation
to others in a community of selves. Nonetheless,
the theory that an individual is constituted by
the social process, and that all selves exist as
"individual reflections" of it, does not mean that
each individual does not have its own "peculiar
identity."66 As Mead argues, while the "I" exists in
spontaneity and autonomy, this does not preclude
the existence of a socially defined and concrete
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"me" by which the "I" is molded and shaped.
Such a theory poses an innovative perspective on
the nature of identity in forming moral agency
within society. Though the existence of one self
is dependent on the existence of a community of
selves, each particular self also has independent
agency as well as individual identity.
Culture is a particular characteristic of the
larger whole of an individual’s identity. It is one
aspect of the self and does not completely define a
human being. What Mead proposes is not merely
an understanding of the individual self but, more
importantly, the relationship of the particular self
to society, and consequently, the realization of the
self as a part of the larger whole.67 He contends
that "the organized structure of every individual
self within the human social process of experience
and behavior reflects, and is constituted by, the
organized relational pattern of that process as a
whole."68 In other words, what each individual
reflects is a different perspective of a relational
pattern, existing out of a common social origin,
shaped and molded according to individual
particularities.69 In this sense, rationality and
morality can be understood as neither wholly
universal nor wholly subjective, but as existing in a
social interchange among a community of selves.70
In turn, human rights should not be perceived as a
force of identity change but, rather, as a result of
the particularistic yet universal framework which
is characteristic of human society.
Cultural relativists hold that the establishment
of universal human rights would disregard
cultural differences, and therefore, prove to be
problematic and insensitive to such concerns.
If one applies Mead’s theory to the debate on
universal human rights, however, it follows that
cultural groups represent a particular community
which derives from a larger and all-encompassing
common social origin. The implication is that
universal human rights are plausible insofar
as they are constituted by the generalized and
common origin of the rights of all human beings.
Thus, they transcend the particularities of culture
and specific social communities and work towards
securing the individual interests of all human
beings, which live in partial independence from
their cultural contexts and social limitations.
A crucial component of Mead’s Theory of
the Social Self is the notion of a "common
structure."Universalism argues that human
nature comprises an all-encompassing level of
identification among human beings that should be
the core of universal human rights. While it is true
that different social communities are comprised of
different social habits and values, Mead’s theory
asserts that there exists a "common structure"
which is necessary in order for any community
to exist at all. This "common structure" acts as
a backbone to social communities, and provides
a sense of "overarching unity" necessary for
the sustenance of social groups. Therefore,
the existence of social groups validates the
notion of a ‘common structure.’ The process of
communication which exists within such social
communities is a characteristic of all human
social networks, whether it is through language,
social habits, or even physical gestures.
As long as there is a level of communication
among human beings within or among different
social groups, there must exist an ‘overarching
unity’ which allows for successful communication
to take place. In other words, culture exists as a
particular experience of a larger all-encompassing
human social origin. Mead’s depiction of an
audience at a concert, mentioned earlier, is an
effective illustration of this point. Though the
physical environment and set-up of the concert
will be the same for all individuals who attend the
performance, it is nonetheless true that different
people will leave the concert with a different
overall experience, with particular incidents acting
as the differentiating factor. In this way, culture
can be understood as a particular reflection or
derivative of a universal common social origin. In
other words, specific local communities or groups
are similar to mirror reflections of a different
aspect of that same social origin of which all
human beings are a part.
Mead’s theory offers an alternative way of
understanding the relationship of the individual
to culture, which circumvents the irreconcilability
of the debate between cultural relativist and
universalists and reframes the debate on the
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establishment of universal human rights. As
Mead effectively portrays, the self is dynamic. It
is a complex entity which cannot be adequately
expressed or understood through static,
unchanging, and concrete definitions. In viewing
identity as multifaceted, it becomes evident that
the approaches of both universalism and cultural
relativism regarding identity are both crucial
yet incomplete understandings on the nature of
identity. In other words, while identity is shaped
forcefully by culture, the "common social origin"
of human beings also plays a large role in the
shaping of an individual’s propensity for moral
action. At the same time, this common origin
alone is not the deciding factor of a person’s moral
judgment. It only helps to define the "me," and
provides minimal influence on the individual’s
autonomy or individuality. According to this
theory, the self is both culture-specific as well as
universally derived. In turn, an individual can be
both a member of a certain local community or
social group, but also has the capacity to associate
oneself as a member of a civilization, or even an
entire race. Universal human rights are derived
from and should work to secure the "common
social origin" of all human beings, regardless of,
but not insensitive to, cultural affiliation.
The application of Mead’s Theory of the
Social Self presents an alternative approach to
the universal human rights paradigm. Culture is
depicted as a changing process instead of a static
entity. Over time, humans evolve and so does
culture. At the same time, an individual born into
a specific culture has the propensity to travel, and
thus integrate into other cultures across the world.
That individual is able to communicate and relate
to other human beings across-cultures, not merely
because of culture similarities, but rather, because
of a common social origin which is derived
from human nature. Without the existence of an
"overarching unity," particular derivations would
not exist. In other words, culture is originated
through the process of human social development
of which all human beings are a part.
Through the Meadian lens, universal human
rights are rights based on that which is applicable
to all human beings. Such rights work to secure
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the universal so that the particular may exist.
More clearly, while cultural relativists consider
values and judgments of an individual to be
ultimately a product of that person’s cultural
affiliation and social pattern of life, Mead’s theory
identifies a person’s cultural affiliation and social
pattern of life as being derived from a larger and
all-encompassing human social origin. Just as
individuals are members or reflections of their
cultural group, so are cultural groups members or
reflections of the "universal society of selves."
Conclusion
As has been discussed, Mead’s Theory of the Social
Self provides a new approach to universal human
rights. It provides a theoretical framework by
which the notion of the universality of such rights
may exist in accordance with cultural sensitivities
and peculiarities. A universal application of human
rights does not necessarily negate the values
and judgments of particular cultures, as is often
argued by cultural relativists. At the same time,
culture comprises a significant and influential
aspect of an individual’s identity. What Mead’s
account suggests is that a successful reframing
of universal human rights would provide due
recognition to the cultural sources of individual
identity while recognizing the universality of the
applicability of human rights.
Universal human rights would thus work
towards securing the basis for the sustenance of
cultures and traditions, all of which are dependent
and derived from a larger collective society of
selves. Universal concepts such as that of universal
human rights arise out of collective social awareness
of the interdependence of human beings on one
another.71 Mead’s understanding of the social self
helps one recognize the inadequacies of cultural
relativism and universalism in conceptualizing
identity and, in turn, human rights. The preceding
assertions made within this article suggest that
cultural relativist and universalist arguments on
universal human rights are reconcilable and, more
importantly, that human rights can exist within a
culturally-sensitive universal framework.
The actualization of this reconciliation would
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require a reframing of the current human rights
dialogue. In other words, the notion of identity
presented within any universal human rights
framework must represent that of a complete self,
thus incorporating both cultural relativist and
universalist notions of what constitutes identity and
recognizing the dynamic and ever-changing nature
of the social self. In this way, both the peculiarities
and commonalities that can be observed among
individuals within a social community can be
understood as constitutive of individual selves
within a larger human society of which all
human beings are members. Just as autonomy
and diversity can exist within a homogenous and
close-knit social community, so can commonality
and universality exist among a world of diversity
and distinction. Mead’s Theory of the Social Self
is a valuable account of the relationship of the
individual to a larger community of selves. With
the proper acknowledgment, Mead’s theory will
provide the human rights debate with a useful
outlook on the nature of individual identity and
its role in shaping the debate on universal human
rights.
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Volume 7, Summer 2008
Notes
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948). http://www.unhchr.ch/
udhr/lang/eng.htm (accessed August 8, 2007).
2
Edward Schiappa. Protagoras and Logos. (Columbia SC: University. of South Carolina Press, 1991).
3
David Duquette. "Universalism and Relativism in Human Rights." Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 63.
4
Melville Herskovitz. Man and His Works, (New York: Knopf, 1950).
5
Ibid.
6
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Current Islamic Thinking on Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa’im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990), 137.
7
“Statement on Human Rights,” American Anthropologist, (American Anthropological Association, 1947). 539-543.
8
John Locke. The Second Treaties on Civil Government, (1690). http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr00.txt (accessed 14 July 2007).
9
Ibid.
10
Alistair MacLeod, “The Structure of Arguments for Human Rights,” Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World (2005), 24.
11
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 10 Dec. 1948). http://www.unhchr.ch/
udhr/lang/eng.htm (accessed August 8, 2007).
12
George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, & Society. (Chicago: The University of Chicago P, 1934). 116.
13
Ibid, 163.
14
Ibid.,135.
15
Ibid.
16
S. A. Gelman and L. A. Hirschfeld, “How Biological is Essentialism?” in Folkbiology, ed. D.L Medin & S. Atran (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
17
Ibid.,136-137.
18
Ibid., 135.
19
Ibid., 137.
20
Ibid., 138.
21
Ibid.,144.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 147.
25
Ibid.,154.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 162.
28
Ibid., 163.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 163 (emphasis added)
31
Ibid., 146.
32
Ibid., 158.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., 173-174.
35
Ibid., 164.
36
Ibid., 182.
37
Ibid., 176.
38
Ibid., 178.
39
Ibid., 182.
40
Ibid., 185.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 284.
43
Ibid., 235.
44
Ibid., 236.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., 243.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid., 244.
50
Ibid., 255.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid., 258.
53
Ibid., 259.
54
Ibid., 253.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., 258.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid., 259.
1
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Ibid.
Skinner, B.F. About Behaviorism (New York: Knopf, 1974), 104.
62
Ibid., 174.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid., 209.
67
Ibid., 200-201.
68
Ibid., 201.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid., 320.
60
61
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