TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC INSURGENCY, BOKO HARAM AS A
CASE STUDY
ABSTRACT
This study analyses the distinction between terrorism and Domestic
insurgency by drawing upon the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. It provides
a conceptual discussion through multi-dimensional analyses from the actororiented, the action oriented, the purpose-oriented, and the ontologyoriented perspectives. In so doing, in addition to the organizational
characteristics, it critically identifies Boko Haram varying strategies of
terrorist and insurgent violence, and their temporality and reasoning as the
conflict unfolded to make conceptual inferences. This study found, first, that
while Boko Haram as an actor indicates an insurgent character, Boko Haram
use of violence reflects intense terrorism action. Second, the use of terrorism
by Boko Haram reflects an inextricable overlap in temporality and a direct
link with guerrilla methods. Despite Boko Haram terrorist and insurgent
violence resulted from different factors and reasoning at the intermediate
level; they are designed to converge at the overall aim of Islamization
campaign. Third, Boko Haram violence reflects varying purposes of
terrorism, e.g., intimidation, attrition, survival and group solidarity. Fourth,
Boko Haram resorted to more indirect and asymmetrical violence in an
increasing tendency to deflect state power and, thus, to coerce Nigeria North
Eastern and North Western State into a political compromise, i.e., a
negotiated settlement.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
It should be noted from this introductory remark that combining
terrorism and insurgency in the paper is deliberately applied because of the
inseparable interconnectedness between the two terms (as clarified in the
next section). In other words, insurgency cannot be separated entirely from
terrorism- because the former can either take place within the context of the
latter or (sometimes) as its synonym and vice versa. According to Schaefer
(n.d) insurgency is often linked inextricably with terrorism. This fact has also
been recognised by Merari (2003); that is, terrorism is a tool that many
insurgent groups use to further their agendas.
For many centuries back, violent groups were formed and they engage
in open/hidden struggles with authority. For instance, Jewish “zealots” used
to attack Roman authorities and Ashashins (assassins) members of Shiite
sect used to attack Sunnis between 11th and 13thcenturies. The periods that
follow, such as the West phaliantreaty of 17th century and the French
Revolution of the 18th century up to the 21stcentury have all witness an
upsurge of terrorism and insurgency world over (White, 2002; Muhammed,
Ishaq & Mukhtar, 2018;). These struggles are turning out to become
terrorist-like activities because of the way and manner the violent groups are
reveling in the launch of terrorist attacks on innocent populations in order to
exert fear and to further their course.
Today, even countries that have never witnessed violent activities of
terrorists and ideological insurgents are bedeviled with it. For example, after
the Federal Government of Nigeria's amnesty to the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) insurgents, Boko Haram came to
be the most dreadful insurgent movement Nigeria ever had (Muhammed et
al. 2018). The Boko Haram insurgents, for instance, are said to be connected
to international terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab of Somalia, Isil of Syria
and Iraq. It has also a known link with Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP) which is part of the bigger terrorist radical groups in the Sahel, very
prominent in many parts of Africa.
Terrorism, insurgency and guerilla warfare have been the predominant
types of political violence on the global earth from the end of 1940s to 1970s.
The incidence of the insurgency has been prevalent particularly among
developing countries of the world (Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan,
2013;Mukhtar, 2017). On the growing numbers of insurgent groups
worldwide, attention has become more intense on the causes and
consequences of the problem. These groups have attracted more attention
because of the level of terrorist and insurgent activities that have been on
increase world over, which usually culminate in loss of many lives and
properties as a consequence (Mukhtar, 2017); yet, identifying the underlying
factors for the emergence and perpetuation of the twin evils of terrorism and
insurgency is necessary in order to effectively fight them.
The factors responsible for terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria are
many as they can be attributed to a number of factors. Thus, Robert-okah
(2014) identified some sources of security threats, in a generic manner,
which in Nigeria is said to have emanated from military experiences,
ethnic/religious
pluralism,
unemployment,
poverty
and
failure
of
governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small
arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and indigene question in Nigeria.
The consequences of terrorism and insurgency are always devastating.
They threaten security and well-being of a society or nation. Specifically,
terrorism and insurgency affect human lives, people’s properties, their
economic activities, and educational system, among others. For instance, as
evident in the activities of many terrorists and insurgents in Nigeria, terrorists
and insurgents adopt such tactics as kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, arson,
taking hostages, and assault and they can disrupt services, such as
telecommunication masts to distort or delay any linkages with the area of
their campaign (Lutz & Lutz, 2013).
In view of this background, this chapter is set to investigate the causes,
consequences, and remedies of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. The
paper is structurally divided into seven sections, with this introductory
section being the first. The second section deals with conceptual
clarifications; the third section is on the theoretical framework; the forth
section discusses the causes of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria; the fifth
section examines the consequences of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria;
the sixth section recommends some remedies of terrorism and insurgency in
Nigeria; and the seventh section concludes the paper.
Distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence,
particularly from insurgency, has raised questions about how to
conceptualize terrorism. The different character and types of terrorism and
other forms of political violence, along with the underlying reasons for an
intrastate conflict, are the centrepieces of the discussion. Analysing varying
types of political violence together rather than separately to identify how
they relate to one another has been considered important lately in the
literature. It is particularly crucial to analyse why and when these types of
violence coexist, complement, substitute one another, and overlap during
different phases of conflicts.
Boko Haram sect, a violent uprising of dissident Islams in North Nigeria
with a deep-rooted historical background and more than a decade struggle
against the Nigerian State, offers a significant case to analyse in terms of the
diverse and varying characteristics of violence that occurred over the span
of the conflict. In this regard, by drawing upon the literature, this study
provides a multi-perspective analysis from various angles related to actorbased, action-based, ontology-based, and purpose-based approaches, with
particular focus on the characteristics of violence in order to analyse different
types of terrorism and insurgent methods.
The Boko Haram terrorist group is one of the longest-lasting and still
active intrastate conflicts with significant regional impact in the recent history
of Nigeria and the neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad, Cameroon etc). The
United Nations Develop Programme (UNDP) said insurgency directly resulted
to the death of 35,000 people in three states in the region, while an
estimated 314,000 people died “from indirect causes” in the entire Northeast region. Since 2009, the North-east has been the theatre of the violent
campaigns of the Islamic extremist group, Boko Haram, its breakaway group,
the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), and counter-insurgency
forces. PREMIUM TIMES had reported that the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in an August 2019 report, said
insurgency activities of extremist Islamic groups had led to the death of an
estimated 35,000 persons in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. The UNDP
confirmed, in its latest report released on June 24, 2021, that “national data”
showed that “conflict has directly resulted in the deaths of 35,000 people in
the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe as a result of battle or one-sided
violence since 2009″.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
In its prolonged struggle, the Boko Haram evolved in different phases,
each reflecting varying characteristics of violence based on internal (tit for
tat against the Nigerian State) and external political dynamics. Nigeria, by
presenting the issue solely as a terrorism problem, implemented intense
securitization policies for many years. Only after in-recent times did Nigeria
adopt certain social and political reforms to accommodate certain Boko
Haram grievances.
Therefore, this study seeks to find out when and why violent movements
like Boko Haram resort to different forms of terrorism; and how the changing
character of violence relates to certain strategies that makes them insurgent.
1.3 Objective of the Study
Such heterogeneity in defining Boko Haram issue resulted in use of different
concepts
each
of
which
would
imply
a
distinctive
approach
of
countermeasures. This raises some significant questions which the
researcher adopts as it researches objectives.
Hence the objectives of this study are to;
i.
Find out the strategies dominantly used by Boko Haram as it relates to
Terrorism and Domestic Insurgency.
ii.
The relationships between the different strategies of terrorism and
domestic insurgent and the over all goal of Boko Haram.
iii.
Find out the distinction between Terrorism and Domestic Violence
using Boko Haram as a case study.
1.4 Research Questions
The following made up the research questions for this study. They are;
i.
what strategy of terrorism and insurgency are used by Boko Haram?
ii.
what are they relationships between the different strategies of
terrorism and domestic insurgency and the over all goal of Boko
Haram?
iii.
Are there distinctions that exist between terrorism and domestic
violence?
1.5 Significance of the Study
This study will be of great significance to the various institutions of
International Relations, mass media practitioners, the political class,
scholars, researchers, security agencies etc. as it will make recommendations
on how to improve and enhance security awareness, sensitization and
education using the available tools for that purpose.
For the sake of similar reoccurrence in the future and also to prospective
researchers, this study will serve as a point reference or criticism to them
and to others who may wish to carryout research of this nature and also
expand the knowledge of International Relations Students on Terrorism and
Domestic Insurgency with Boko Haram as a case study.
1.6 Delimitation of the Study
This study limits itself to how Boko Haram as operated for more than
a decade first as an insurgency and later evolved into terrorist activities. It
will have nothing to do with other security issues and challenging and posing
as threat to the existence of Nigeria as an entity.
1.7 Limitations of the Study
In the course of undertaking the study, against this background, this
article analyses terrorism versus Domestic insurgency, different types of
terrorism, and the myriad of factors leading to different types of violence,
using Boko Haram as a case study.
The existing literature, however, lacks a comprehensive analysis of the
varying characteristics of violence that have occurred in the more than 10
years Boko Haram conflict in terms of the typology of political violence and
the relationship of the characteristics to one another.
1.8 Definition of Terms
To aid understanding of this study, the following terms will be
operationally defined;
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Several works have been done that borders on Terrorism and
Domestic Insurgency being that they are both popular and attested global
issues and more specifically national issue in Nigeria. Therefore, this work
is entirely not ground breaking as it merely differs in the context of Boko
Haram as a case study.
This chapter basically reviews related research and concepts to this
subject matter with a view of ascertaining the state of knowledge in the
area and sharpening the focus of this research. This chapter also takes into
consideration a theoretical framework to serve as a support.
2.2 Review of Concept
In other to achieve the purpose of this chapter, certain concept
associated to this research will be harnessed and reviewed in consent to how
they relate to this research.
2.2.1 History of Boko Haram
This section, after discussing and applying the aforementioned criteria
to the Boko Haram case, focuses on the characteristics of Boko Haram
violence. In that, it employs multiple analyses that include and incorporate
action-based, actor-based, purpose-based and ontology-based approaches
along with the analysis of the directness of the challenge i.e., linking the
nature of the violence to Boko Haram declared cause, grievance and the
overarching goal. Such an approach discusses the nature of the violence from
jus in bello perspective, that is, illegitimacy versus legitimacy in how the fight
is carried out. By relying on these perspectives, this section discusses Boko
Haram violence in the context of terrorism and insurgency, and questions its
linkages and relations to one another. It portrays the structures and changing
character of Boko Haram violence as the conflict unfolds by thoroughly
analysing Boko Haram violence and its organizational characteristics.
Boko Haram’s origins lie in a group of radical Islamist youth who
worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a decade
ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram)
declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and
irredeemable. The group declared it was embarking on hijra (a withdrawal
along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to
Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state,
near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hardline Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused antistate
ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life
under “true” Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away
from the corrupt establishment. In December 2003, following a community
dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond, the group got into a conflict
with the police. Group members overpowered a squad of officers and took
their weapons. This confrontation led to a siege of its mosque by the army
that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shootout in which most
of the group’s seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali.
The group had gained press attention in Nigeria, and interest from the
U.S. Embassy, because of the catchy name locals had given it: the Nigerian
Taliban. It also caught the attention of the Nigerian media because many of
the group’s members were the sons of wealthy and influential people in
Nigeria’s northern establishment. They were perhaps not all from the very
highest circle of Nigerian society, but one was alleged to have been the son
of then Yobe governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim. In a 2004 U.S. State Department
cable, revealed by Wikileaks, the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded the group
did not present an international threat and likely had no links to international
jihadist organizations.
The few survivors of the “Nigerian Taliban” returned to Maiduguri,
where they settled back with others from the youth group that had originated
at the Ndimi mosque. The leader of this Maiduguri group, Mohammed Yusuf,
then embarked on the process of establishing the group’s own mosque in
Maiduguri. This new mosque, named the Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid, was built on
land to the north of the centre of town, near the railway station, owned by
Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. The group was apparently left
alone by the authorities, and it expanded into other states, including Bauchi,
Yobe, and Niger state. The group’s neighbours in Maiduguri dubbed the
group Boko Haram, which roughly translates as “Western education is
forbidden” in Hausa.
Observers say the group constructed a “state within a state,” with a
cabinet, its own religious police, and a large farm. It attracted more and
more people under its roof by offering welfare handouts, food, and shelter.
Many of the people the group attracted were refugees from the wars over
the border in Chad and jobless Nigerian youths. The source of the group’s
money at this stage of its existence is not clear. Members of the Borno
religious establishment say that Yusuf received funds from Salafist contacts
in Saudi Arabia following two hajj trips that Yusuf made during this time.
Another possible source of funding during this period was donations from
wealthy northern Nigerians.
In 2006, a wealthy northern businessman was arrested by the State
Security Services after a group of children alleged that they had been sent
by the group to an al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania. The businessman
says 4 his donations to the group were an innocent attempt to contribute
zakat, an obligation of wealthy Muslims to give charitably.
On the eve of the 2007 presidential elections, Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud
Adam, a prominent, popular cleric and regular preacher at the Ndimi mosque
in Maiduguri, was assassinated as he was praying at the mosque he
administered in Kano. The killing was a mystery for some time, but it is now
acknowledged that it was carried out on the orders of Mohammed Yusuf.
Sheikh Ja’afar had begun to criticize the group for its hard-line ideology,
predicting a clash with the state. The killing is now seen by some as a key
point in the development of Boko Haram, because there was no longer the
possibility of turning Yusuf and his followers back to the mainstream of the
northern Islamic establishment. Much bloodier events soon followed. In July
2009 the group came into conflict with the authorities in a strikingly similar
way to the events of six years before. Traveling en masse to the funeral of
a fellow member, the group was stopped by police traffic officers, who were
enforcing a tightened restriction on motorcycle helmets, and an argument
ensued. The circumstances are unclear, but a member of the group is
reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers. The group then
attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe, killing scores of police officers.
Yusuf released several video sermons in which he explicitly threatened the
state and the police with violence. They were circulated on DVD and gained
a widespread audience. These events led the Bauchi government to crack
down on the group, arresting more than seven hundred members. In
Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group’s mosque, but members of the
sect managed to break out and for three days they had the run of the town.
They roamed the city acting independently, fighting police when they came
across them and killing Muslim and Christian civilians indiscriminately. The
police eventually regained control of Maiduguri, and then embarked on a
bloody purge of the group’s members and anyone they suspected of being
a Boko Haram supporter or sympathizer. Dozens of people were rounded up
and executed without trial, including Yusuf’s father-in-law. Mohammed Yusuf
was arrested by the army and handed over to the police, who killed him
within hours. Police officials denied that he had been executed, saying he
had been shot while trying to escape. Videos clearly showing the execution
of young boys and other alleged Boko Haram members by the police,
including Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in the state
government, have been posted on YouTube. Those members of the group
who were not killed or arrested fled, some say out of Nigeria.
Sometime in mid-2010 Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri and started
a campaign of assassinations. This campaign began with hit-and-run attacks
against police checkpoints in Borno and Yobe. The group’s favoured method
was to do so on a motorcycle, whereby the pillion rider would kill the police
officers and seize their weapons. Gunmen also forced their way into the
homes of local leaders who had cooperated with the police by naming Boko
Haram members. The people who had taken over houses formerly belonging
to escaped Boko Haram members were also killed if they refused to leave.
On Christmas Eve 2010 as many as half a dozen bombs were detonated
near churches and a market in two districts of Jos, Plateau state, killing
scores of people. At the time it was not assumed to be a Boko Haram attack;
it was thought to be a nasty twist to the long-standing ethno-political conflict
there. Then, on New Year’s Eve 2010 a bomb was detonated in a popular
open-air fish restaurant and market inside the grounds of the Mogadishu
barracks, just outside Abuja, killing ten. While it sits very close to a military
barracks, the market was frequented mostly by civilians and was relatively
loosely protected. Initially it was not certain that either bombing had been
carried out by Boko Haram. There had been a bombing three months before
at a ceremony in Abuja marking the fiftieth anniversary of the country’s
independence for which Boko Haram was not implicated. (A leader of the
Niger Delta militant organization the Movement for the emancipation of the
Niger Delta [MEND], in custody in South Africa, faces charges of planning
that attack.) But in early 2011 an FBI investigation concluded that the
Mogadishu barracks bomb was constructed using the same techniques as
devices in Jos, and suspicion fell on Boko Haram. These attacks showed the
group was prepared to strike vulnerable spots and cause civilian casualties.
It launched its bombing campaign in the already tense city of Jos, and
it showed the authorities it was able to reach them in Abuja. During the first
few months of 2011, the group’s targets for assassination operations in
Maiduguri widened beyond the original focus of police and other authorities.
In February 2011, for example, a pharmacist in Maiduguri—not believed to
have had any previous connection to the group’s treatment by the police—
was murdered in a robbery neighbours attributed to Boko Haram. Cash and
a large amount of medical supplies were taken from his shop. A senior
member of the group who identified himself as “Abu Dujana” told this author
in an interview that anyone whom the group declared an “enemy” would be
killed, though he could not say what the pharmacist had done. Abu Dujana
also reported that the group had not ruled out the use of suicide bombers in
its attacks. The group began to rob banks, cash-in-transit convoys, and
successful businesses, not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi, where the
group remains strong. The group claims it is permitted to do this by the
Quran, as the money it takes is considered to be the “spoils of war.” A source
who has followed the group closely states that the group is thought to have
made approximately 500 million naira (about $3 million, or £2 million) from
such robberies, but such claims are unverifiable.
In June 2011 Boko Haram bombed the national police headquarters in
Abuja. A car laden with explosives drove into the compound of Louis Edet
House, a block of offices previously thought secure in Abuja’s government
zone, by following a convoy of senior officers through the gates. It is believed
the driver aimed to put the car near the entrance stairway as the senior
officers entered, but he was directed around the back of the building by
guards, where the bomb detonated in the car park. At the time it was
questioned whether the bombing was meant to be a suicide attack, because
it was possible that the bomber had been delayed in Abuja traffic, but in
August 2011 remaining doubts were removed when a man drove a car into
the UN compound in 6 Abuja and detonated a massive bomb, killing twentythree people and wounding scores more. The attack launched Boko Haram
onto world news and established it as a militant group with the technical,
and doctrinal, capacity to produce suicide bombs. The organization released
a martyrdom video made by the driver of the car. Security intelligence
analysts at Stratfor say building successful suicide weapons, like the ones
used at the United Nations and at police headquarters, is very difficult. To
perform two successful detonations is good evidence that there is a foreign
hand involved in training Boko Haram, they say. The type of explosives the
group uses are common in mining and construction, according to Reuters.
There are plenty of sources of such explosives in northern Nigeria. The way
the group contacted the outside world also changed about this time. A
journalist colleague in Nigeria says the group tightened its telephone
discipline, collecting the numbers of journalists it wanted to contact, rather
than having journalists call contacts they had made in the organization. A
Boko Haram spokesman with the nom de guerre of “Abu Qaqa” began
contacting journalists to claim attacks. The government later claimed that it
had captured him, but Boko Haram says that another member had been
captured and that Qaqa is still active. The purported leader of the group,
Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s former right-hand man, also began to post videos
to YouTube at this time.
Since August 2011 there have been almost weekly attacks by militants
planting bombs in public or in churches in Nigeria’s northeast. The group has
also broadened its targets, away from direct revenge attacks on the state to
include other representations of authority. This expansion includes setting
fire to schools and attacking newspaper offices. In March 2012, some twelve
public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, with as many
as 10,000 pupils forced out of education. Three alleged members of Boko
Haram were killed while trying to set light to a school, reports say. The group
has told journalists that these attacks are in retaliation for the arrests of a
number of Islamic teachers from traditional “Tsangaya” Quranic schools in
Maiduguri. In the Tsangaya system of schools, clerics teach children to
memorize the Quran. These schools, some with only a few children, some
very large, operate not only in Nigeria but also across the whole of the Sahel.
The children, known as Almajiris, come to the city from the countryside.
Many beg during the day and give their money to the teacher, or mallam,
who runs the school. The group also says that it is attacking the government
school system in retaliation for what it says is the government’s attack on
the Tsangaya system as a whole. There has also been an increase in reports
of people being beheaded in public by Boko Haram. It is believed that these
might be internal purges of moderate members, or members in the group
who have been arrested and can therefore no longer be trusted. Big attacks
have included bombings on Christmas Day 2011, when bombs were
detonated in three states, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe, killing forty-five people.
In January 2012 three groups of gunmen and suicide bombers
coordinated attacks on three government buildings in Kano—the police
headquarters, the office of the immigration service, and the State Security
Service. More than two hundred people were killed. The group has also
continued its involvement in the long-standing conflict between indigenous
groups and Hausa/Fulani “settlers” in Plateau state. Most of the violence in
the area has not had a connection to Boko Haram, but in February 2012 a
suicide car bomb was detonated at a Jos church. Days later, in March,
another suicide bomb was detonated outside St. Finbar’s church in Rayfield,
Jos, near the government house. Nineteen people have been killed so far in
retaliatory tit-for-tat attacks immediately following those bombings. More
recently, there have been deadly bomb and gun attacks on the offices of
This Day newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, the Catholic chapel in Bayero
University Kano, and a cattle market in Yobe. Dozens were killed in each
attack.
2.2.2 The Challenge of Defining Boko Haram
In interviews before his death, Mohammed Yusuf told the BBC Hausa
Service he believed the earth was flat and that rain was not caused by
evaporation from the ground. Such statements have led to widespread
derision of the group and a resistance to taking it seriously enough to
examine its aims. The name Boko Haram has also become a barrier to
people’s understandings of the group’s motives (it is used throughout this
report only because it is shorter and better known than its proper name). In
fact, the name was really a succinct critique and implied rejection of Yusuf’s
teachings. “Boko Haram,” rather than a distillation of the group’s core beliefs,
was a name given to the group by dismissive neighbours who had not joined
the sect and had no time for it. It was as if they were saying “those people
who go on and on about Western education being a sin.” Boko Haram, as a
group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The
group’s use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical
explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to
use the fruits of Western education when it suits them. Boko Haram is,
however, against those in northern Nigeria known as “yan boko.” Yan boko
is literally translated as “child of the book.” It refers to the elite created by
the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonize Nigeria—the people
who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and
corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally
corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself
rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim umma (community).
There are many barriers to understanding the group. So little
information about the organization can be verified, and solid, dependable
information in general is hard to come by in Nigeria. Naturally, questions
have been raised about what it has and has not done. Many possible sources
of information are unreliable.
The Nigerian police are often led by corrupt or incompetent officers who
fight for their own fiefdom rather than work together. Because of this the
police rarely provide useful information to the public. Boko Haram too does
not have an incentive to give reliable or accurate information on attacks it
has carried out, or about the group more generally. Boko Haram has denied
shootings and bombings that fit its pattern of activity. There are some
attacks ascribed to Boko Haram that could easily be the work of armed
robbers operating under the mask of the group. Political rivals could also be
using the cover of Boko Haram to settle scores and carry out assassinations.
In one example, a failed bombing in March 2012 of a church in Bauchi was
said by the police to have been plotted by a rival Christian organization. Had
the bombing gone to plan, it is easy to see how the attack would have been
blamed on Boko Haram.
The security services’ inability to deal with Boko Haram in any
meaningful way has highlighted the extreme weakness in its capacity to carry
out investigations. This weakness is undoubtedly open for exploitation by
criminals and criminal politicians alike. Any attack that happens within this
state of institutional weakness could be ascribed to “Boko Haram.”
Understanding of the group has not been helped by the nature of
Nigerian politics. For example, in January 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan
announced that Boko Haram had infiltrated the highest levels of politics and
the military. The president painted a picture of a puppet group that was
being used by aggrieved northern politicians to bring down his southern
government. A serving senator accused of having connections with the group
was arrested. But President Jonathan’s remarks have been condemned by
some observers as political opportunism. In Nigerian politics it is a standard
manoeuvre to blame problems on one’s political enemies, even if the
situation has nothing to do with them. The president’s announcement may
have had more to do with distracting Nigerians away from painful increases
he was about to make in the price of fuel than to actual truth, observers say.
In reality, connections between the core group of Yusuf’s followers and
established northern elites or politicians today are unlikely. A local journalist
who has followed the group for years says attempts to present Boko Haram
as a puppet organization of the northern elite are “absurd.” It is certainly
difficult to see how any northern politician, or his or her representatives,
could interact with Boko Haram at this stage. It is as likely that the group
would kill them—as yan boko—as do their bidding. Of course, there are those
individuals within the northern elite who will certainly seek to exploit the
actions of Boko Haram for their own purposes. But opportunistically using
events as they happen is not the same as directing them.
Following the failed rescue of hostages Chris McManus and Franco
Lamolinara in March 2012, President Jonathan shifted his analysis of the
group, playing up the connections between the group and international
terrorism. He reportedly wrote to the British and Italian governments: “The
Nigerian Government remains resolutely committed to facing up squarely to
the challenge of terrorism on our shores and in the international community.”
His language was carefully chosen to downplay the local politics and to not
contradict any possible connection between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. In
this letter, he reportedly also suggested the “ties between our three nations
[should] grow deeper.” Observers believe this to be a thinly veiled request
for money from the Europeans. Richard Dowden, head of the Royal Africa
Society, has suggested the failed raid on the Sokoto kidnappers is a good
opportunity for Jonathan to bring on new streams of finance for his very
costly security plans at a time when his own budget is under severe
constraint.
All this uncertainty cannot be taken to mean that a violent group made
up of followers and sympathizers of Mohammed Yusuf, calling itself Jama’atu
Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, does not exist. A source who has
followed the group in Maiduguri since 2007 told this author that the core
group has evolved into a cell-like organization, run by a thirty-member Shura
Council. He could not say where the council members were located but
suggested that they were not all in one place. Council members are able to
travel into and around Nigeria, and they use mobile phones to communicate,
meeting face-to-face less often. Each member of the council is responsible
for a cell, and each cell is focused on a different task or geographical area.
Someone on the lowest level of the cell might not know another member of
similar rank in the organization. This source says that most of the group’s
actions are agreed at the council level but that leader Abubakar Shekau also
takes decisions without referring them to the council.
Raufu Mustapha of Oxford University’s Department for International
Development is working to clarify the situation surrounding Boko Haram. He
says that anyone who doubts that a single group is operating in northern
Nigeria is “in denial.” He points out that throughout its existence, the
organization has constantly morphed and changed its nature as it has gone
through various incarnations. This evolution has made it difficult for
observers to pin the organization down and define it. Clarity has been
obscured because contact with the organization is difficult. When there has
been contact with the outside world, the organization has proved elliptical.
It has made announcements about its goals that are contradictory, not really
achievable, or unrealistic. The water has been muddied further by the
number of interpretations of motive and causation that observers attribute
to anything that happens in Nigeria, and the conspiracy theories that flow
from them.
In interviews before his death, Mohammed Yusuf said the purpose of
the organization was to withdraw from a society that had become corrupt
and beyond help. His group would then set up a new society whose sole
purpose was to be close to Allah. From that purpose prosperity and success
would naturally flow, and his righteous group would eventually take over
mainstream society. Where “Western” society had gone wrong, Yusuf said,
was in deviating from the principles of sharia. For this vision of the world
Yusuf drew on his 9 interpretation of thirteenth-century scholar Ibn
Taymiyyah. Taymiyyah, much cited by Salafist radicals, advocated that in the
face of leadership by Muslims who did not behave in a benevolent way and
used their leadership to oppress, it was acceptable to Allah for individuals to
withdraw from that corrupt system and fight it with violence.
Like Mohammed Yusuf, the current leaders of the sect want to set up a
state-like organization, operating initially on a small scale, parallel to the
federal government. They believe this organization would inevitably grow
and grow until it would replace the actual state. Where its members operated
unchallenged between 2002 and 2003, the group aimed in that direction.
They built on this in the years in Maiduguri, with the group growing to
the point where it had many “state-like” functions, such as providing welfare
handouts, job training, jobs in mini-industries, resources for the rest of the
community, and “moral police” along the same lines as the Hisbah religious
police in Kano. These functions have continued in the period of conflict since
2009.
Mustapha says, “When al-Qaeda talks about the advances their allies
have made in Africa, they mostly talk about al Shabab, not Boko Haram.”
Branding Boko Haram as an international terrorist group with the same antiWest aims as al-Qaeda will not solve the problem, Campbell believes. He
says the narrative being built up around the group, especially by the British
government in the aftermath of the failed rescue attempt of hostages Chris
McManus and Franco Lamolinara in March 2012—that the group is a radical
terrorist organization with links to the outside bent on the overthrow of a
friendly government and hostile to Western interests—is unhelpful. “The
facts don’t support this assertion,” he says. This is especially true if the policy
recommendations that flow from this view include aid to the Nigerian security
services to wipe out the followers of Mohammed Yusuf. Campbell says such
assistance will not deal with the grassroots anger, and may cause the Boko
Haram . . . could also be seen as a kind of personality cult, an Islamic
millenarianism sect, inspired by a heretical but charismatic preacher.
2.2.3 Conceptual discussion of the definitions of Terrorism and
Domestic Insurgency
This study is structured in three parts. First, there is a conceptual
discussion of the definitions of terrorism and Domestic insurgency in the
broad context of an intrastate war from action and actor-oriented
perspectives and ontological factors. Second, after briefly discussing the
ontological perspective of social construction and causes of Boko Haram rise
in Nigeria, the study reviews the organizational characteristics of Boko Haram
and applies actor-oriented approaches to Boko Haram case. In that it
analyses Boko Haram organizational structure, its management body, level
of popular support devoted to Boko Haram, and Boko Haram declared goals.
The study further analyses action-based criteria of the nature
(directness), form (target status, location, incident type), and purpose of
violence. In that, it analyses how different characteristics of terrorist and
insurgent violence relate to Boko Haram periodic objectives as well as its
overarching goal. The analysis of the form and nature of Boko Haram
violence uses incident-level quantitative data from four different institutional
and governmental databases; and identifies the purpose of Boko Haram
violence through qualitative data from original pro- Boko Haram sources such
as resolutions and bulletins from Boko Haram released visuals. The final
section offers concluding remarks.
2.2.4 Consequences of Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria
Generally speaking, insurgency has a suppressive effect on social and
economic aspects of a nation and insurgent terrorism has never recorded
any good outcome in any part of the world. In Nigeria for instance, it is
inadequate to mention insurgency in the country without reference to the
activities of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants. The government of
Nigeria is currently battling with the terrorism and insurgency and these
groups are accused of committing several human rights abuses against
civilians (Mukhtar, 2017). In line with the above, Odo (2015) also noted that
the Boko Haram violent activities have become even more violent and
culminated in a lot of destruction when the deputy leader of the group,
Abubakar Shekau, assumed the mantle of leadership of the group. During
Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram organised deadly attacks on the civilian
population, government establishments, military and police installations,
schools, churches and mosques, offices, including United Nations
Headquarters in Abuja. These operations expanded Boko Haram’s theatre of
activities from the north-eastern states to other parts of the north such as
Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa and Abuja (Odo,
2015). They also engage in kidnapping people especially women and school
girls for ransom which they often use to buy more weapons and supplies for
further terrorist attacks.
The violence unleashed by Boko Haram insurgent is not confined to
Borno State, where the group has stronghold, it also spread to neighbouring
states of Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe and even beyond. Boko Haram attacks in
the Kano Metropolis started in 2012 in Police Headquarter, Bompai with
multiple losses of lives and properties and continued since. Many attacks
took place such as those in Emir Mosque, Federal College of Education,
School of Hygiene, etc. Towards the end of 2015, three female suicide
bombers exploded themselves in Farm Center, Kano state’s largest market
of telecommunication commodities, such as recharge cards, computer,
handsets, and other telecommunication accessories. Each attack is usually
accompanied with multiple casualties, which makes the group a threat to
national security (Mukhtar, 2017). Insurgency is still ongoing in many parts
of Nigeria today, particularly in Borno and Yobe states.
In a nutshell, terrorism and insurgency are often thought up to involve
political violence (Merari, 2003), in sociological sense, the political violence
will not leave other socio-economic structures unaffected. From the
functionalist point of view, as argued by Mukhtar (2017), when one social
institution is disrupted, other structures will directly or indirectly be affected
by the suffering of that particular social institution. Thus, religious bigotry
may be a recipe for socio-economic crises in country. This is why the Boko
Haram activities, and other dissidents or insurgent groups, for example
Maitatsine, Odua People Congress (OPC), MEND, and Movement for the
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB) were accompanied
with not only widespread fear and mutual suspicion among citizens, but also
with loss of lives and properties.
Boko Haram members usually working in groups of hundreds, indulges
in attacks on village people and at times daringly take over military bases
and barracks, taking away weapons and other supplies which they use to
attack other places. The current trend of Herders attack banditry and
kidnapping is said to be connected with terrorist elements who often move
in packs of hundreds brandishing high calibre weapons which they use to
take over places and over-power victims into submission. As a result, many
lives and property are lost and many people taken hostage for ransom.
Terrorism and insurgency have led to the displacement of millions of people
all over Nigeria, thereby stimulating IDP crisis in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa,
Taraba, Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi
states whereby hundred of thousand people in camps. This has led to Billions
of Naira worth of resources wasted and economic activities like farming and
trading being halted depressing the national economic growth. Thus, the
crises of IDP is has continued unabated in Nigeria despite claim of Boko
Haram being technically defeated.
2.2.5 Analysis of Boko Haram violence—action-based approach
This section focuses on the action-based perspective and discusses the
character/nature, form and purpose of Boko Haram violence in the context
of directness of challenge to illustrate how Boko Haram conducted its fight.
Due to their interrelated natures, target status, directness of the challenge,
and the methods used by Boko Haram are simultaneously analysed through
the scope of Boko Haram’s chronological evolution. As the core piece of the
study, the linkage of Boko Haram violence—whether direct or indirect—
related to its ontological factors, is incorporated into the analysis to explain
the Boko Haram’s characteristics and changing character in the context of
terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. In that,
the use of violence that is indirectly linked to the ontological factors of a
violent movement is considered to have low legitimacy, as in the notion of
terrorism in which violence is directed against indirect or symbolic targets.
Rather than solely looking at the overall counts of violent incidents and
related target status, this section focuses also on the form, purpose, and
location of violence to make inferences on the character and characteristics
of violence. In so doing, it first presents figures and trends of civilian and
combatant casualties; then it analyses these characteristics in the Boko
Haram’s evolution for the entire span of the conflict (2007 till dates), and
relates them to the Boko Haram’s original causes, grievances and goals, as
well as to the contextual political and strategic dynamics of the Nigerian State
and Boko Haram. This approach identifies the Boko Haram’s resort to
terrorism in terms of different strategies, i.e., attrition, provocation,
intimidation, outbidding, and spoiling, as categorized by Kydd and Walter.
2.2.6 Conceptual Clarifications: Terrorism and Insurgency
The concepts of terrorism and insurgency have not been given
intellectual devotion by academics and ardent attention by national and
international authorities until recently (Duyvesteyn, 2012). Despite the
plethora of efforts at providing a clear definition of the concept of terrorism,
more controversies have been the outcome of such intellectual devotion
because terrorism has never been clearly and exactly defined (White, 2002;
Herman, 2009; Gibbs, 2012; Hassan & Mukhtar, 2016; Ibrahim & Mukhtar,
2017a). Perhaps, the above notion is closely tied with the Chomsky’s (as
cited in Ibrahim & Mukhtar, 2017b: 140) argument that, “we have to qualify
the definition of ‘terrorism’ given official sources: the term applies only to
terrorism against us, not the terrorism we carry out against them.” However,
Hermon (2009:7) defined the concept as “the deliberate and systematic
murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political
ends”. Gibbs (2012:64) defined terrorism as illegal violence or threatened
violence directed against human or nonhuman objects”.
Insurgency, on the other hand, has to do with battle between state
and non-state actors, whereby the latter is challenging the former and even
trying to weaken the authority through series of subversive tactics. In
Schaefer’s view, the term insurgency is often used to cover a wider scope of
low-intensity conflicts. Insurgent groups, according to USG COIN Guide
(2009), fund their activities through multiple illegal means, such as:
An illicit economy, sometimes of international scope,
eluding government monitoring, taxation and
interdiction. Such illicit financial activities diminish
government revenues, increase corruption among
local officials, and weaken the control and legitimacy
of the government. Criminal activities may include
theft, extortion, trafficking (of narcotics, arms and
people), money laundering, piracy, document fraud,
bribery, kidnapping and black market activity. These
funding streams will often drive insurgents into
alliances of convenience with organized crime. In
some cases, long-standing insurgencies morph into
gangs or organized criminal networks that are
motivated by profit and economic self-interest, rather
than ideology (p.8).
Another area of contention that attracted recent terrorism literatures
is the tendency for foreign countries to sponsor terrorist activities. In many
cases foreign governments have been accused for sponsoring violence,
including bombings, hijackings, and assassinations to disturb the peace of
another country for some political ends. For example, Hungary and Italy
supported and assisted dissidents Yugoslavia to destabilize the country and
make it vulnerable (Kilcullen, 2004).
In a nutshell, terrorism is a deliberate violent attack on non-combatant
groups or valuable objects, as a reaction to government policy or certain
social situations, religious sentiment or political ideology, while insurgency is
a subversive movement against government by non-state actors. The two
can be defined differently, but cannot be practically separated in a variety of
situations. For example, Boko Haram and Niger Delta Avengers are insurgent
groups, but they perpetrate terrorist attacks on government’s establishments
and innocent populations.
2.2.7 Causes of Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria
There are various views on the causal factors of terrorism and
insurgency. In Nigeria in particular, Innocent & Ibeatan (2010) and
contended that, terrorism and insurgency are associated to Nigeria’s extreme
inequality, a youth bulge, crumbling infrastructure, and high unemployment.
In line with the above, Mukhtar, Mukhtar, & Mukhtar (2015) mentioned that
statistical figures put Nigeria unemployment rate at about 50 percent of the
country’s population and youth’s unemployment rate in the same country is
also over 50 percent. Millions of Nigerian youth are frustrated because many
of them went to various schools-colleges and universities-and they strive to
finish despite the poverty challenging majority of them at face. Yet, upon
graduation getting a job turn out to be their hardest job. In line with this
argument, Adebayo (2013) observes that, unemployment rate in Nigeria has
continued to be on the increase despite the abundant human and natural
resources available in the country. Chronic youth’s unemployment is evident
in Nigeria. Every year, thousands of graduates are produced but there are
no jobs for majority of them. Nigerian streets are replete with youth hawkers
and those who are redundant.
Innocent & Ibeatan (2010) further suggested that attacks by terrorist
and insurgent groups in the country has highlighted the challenges faced by
Nigeria's government and an indication that the leadership class has to
improve governance in order to reduce conflict, and promote economic
development. In his own view, Adenrele (2012) said, insurgency is a sheer
symptom of poverty and political alienation, while Edobor (2014) perceives
terrorism in Nigeria as caused by the combination of political, economic and
institutional factors. Nwaze (2004, cited in Mukhtar, 2017) identified sources
of security threats in Nigeria to have emanated from militarism, and military
experiences, ethnic/religious pluralism, unemployment, poverty and failure
of governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small
arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and the indigene question in
Nigeria, Nigeria’s socio-economic status in Africa and the illegal alien issues,
globalization, porous security heritage and external influence. It is necessary
to distinguish between different causes as each may require different
remedy.
Like in other countries, the sources of insecurity in Nigeria can be
traced to a number of factors. Beyond the external-internal dichotomy,
sources of insecurity can equally be classified as either remote or proximate
and immediate. In Nigeria, the challenge is not so much about external
sources but rather that of internal sources, especially economic.
Consequently, terrorism and insurgency are influenced by many factors, but
poverty and unemployment are the major reasons for the two problems in
developing countries, such as Nigeria. Therefore, when a country’s economy
improves and government is committed to reduction in income inequality,
the rate of poverty alleviation will improve and crime will by extension be
reduced.
For example, the former leader of Boko Haram group believed the
western education (Boko) is deemed forbidden (Haram) in the region and
among other reasons, he argued that, this type of education had brought
nothing good to the people but poverty and misery and he succeeded in
brain-washing his already disenchanted and disgruntled adherents that
western education was the cause of their plight (Ovaga, as cited in
Muhammed et al. 2018). From the foregoing, it could be discerned that social
and economic inequalities, poverty and unemployment, as well as illiteracy
are some of the major factors that motivated the formation of the Boko
Haram insurgency.
2.2.8 Remedies of Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria
The government of Nigeria is currently battling with the Boko Haram
and the group is accused of committing several human rights abuses against
civilians. It is thus of greatest concern to international actors to engage in
concerted effort to tackle the scourge associated with the activities of this
group in order to pave way for peace and development of Nigeria (Persson,
2014). As suggested by Ibrahim & Mukhtar (2017b), journalists and citizens
should become more daring and vocal in expressing their views and
collaborating with the security agents. Information technology (IT) will
therefore play a critical role in strengthening Nigeria’s national security
against potential attacks by terrorists and insurgents in Nigeria. In specific
terms, IT will help enable the Nigeria to identify potential threats, share
information more readily, provide mechanisms to protect the nation, and
develop response capabilities. Propaganda could be as effective as armies in
defeating insurgency; the people had to be persuaded that their interests lie
with the government.
But Ibrahim & Mukhtar (2017b) also recognized that, success of the
above efforts lies in good governance by the Nigerian leadership classes. The
effective way of winning the hearts, minds and support of subjects, including
terrorists or dissidents is ensure transparent, accountable, credible, or just
and selfless leadership. One of the strategies used by the leaders of terrorists
and insurgents in Nigeria, such as the leader of Independent People of Biafra
(IPOB), Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram,is pointing out the selfish
leadership style of the Nigerian leaders as their reason for dissidence. late
Boko Haram leader, Yusuf, was the justification of boycotting the Nigerian
secular government since it failed to improve the living conditions of the
majority of the citizens. This argument convinced many youth and led them
to join the Boko Haram movement without hesitation.
The social structure and anomie made it clear that youths are involving
in unlawful behaviours because of perceived frustration by the way the social
system operates, especially due to inequality, unnecessary joblessness, and
poverty, while others are given offer hand to enjoy a better life. It is
therefore argued that terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria are somehow
products of joblessness among youths, and social inequality.
On this basis, Nigerian government shall make jobs available for
youths, males and females, and other categories of the Nigerian population
in order to have them engaged or committed to something doing for making
a living. This will go a long a way fighting the insurgency in the entire
country.
To remedy the incidences of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, the
government shall also motivate the security forces through incentives and
modern sophisticated weapons of attacking and counterattacking the
insurgents and promotion of intelligence. In previous times, there were many
reports of Nigerian armies (soldiers) and police men running away from the
battle field because the insurgents and the terrorists were equipped with
sophisticated weapons than the security men.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
For the purpose of this study, two theories namely: Social Structure
and Anomie theory were considered acceptable because they met the
required aspects of the subject matter.
2.3.1 Social Structure and Anomie Theory. Durkheim’s (1893, as cited
in Abdullahi, Saleh & Mukhtar, 2016)
Social Structure and Anomie theory will be used to explain the factors
underlying terrorism and insurgency. The theory is the outcome of
Durkheim’s (1893, as cited in Abdullahi, Saleh & Mukhtar, 2016) research on
anomie. Anomie theory asserts that when social regulations are weak or
broken, the controlling influence of society on the individual to conform to
rules and regulations equally becomes weak or ineffective (Iwariemie-Jaja,
2003). The theory tries to establish relationship between structural
bottleneck and anomie, as well as criminal tendency. For Durkheim (1897,
as cited in Abdullahi et al. 2016), anomie is a morally deregulated condition,
that is, a breakdown in either the rules of society or the amoral norms. As
such, when there are no clear rules to guide members of the society,
individuals find it difficult to adjust to the changing conditions of life. This in
turn, leads to frustration, conflict, dissatisfaction and deviance. Durkheim
concludes that, crime or deviance is inevitable in a period of rapid
socioeconomic change.
The theory of anomie is taken further by Merton (1938). Though
Merton’s (1938) anomie theory did not focus on criminality, it emphasizes
the fact that the existence of inequality, due to the way society is structured,
may make it anomic. Merton begins by saying that society defines being
successful in terms of certain goals (such as financial security) but does not
always provide the means (including schooling and good jobs) to reach these
cultural expectations. Bell (2010) clarifies from sociological mirror. Merton
locates two structurally inherent factors that occupy central importance for
the sociological analysis of the relativity of deviant behavior: (1) “culturally
defined goals,” which are deemed by all and sundry, irrespective of status
and position, as legitimate and highly desirable goals to pursue; and (2) the
means the social structure condones as legitimate avenues for the pursuit of
culturally prescribed ends (Bell, 2010).
Therefore, patterns of rule breaking depend on whether or not people
accept society’s goals and whether or not they have the opportunity to reach
them. To this extent, five adaptations are bound to emerge (Iwarimie-Jaja,
2003). The modes of adaptations include: conformity, innovation, retreatism,
ritualism, and rebellion. The first mode of adaptation, conformity, is nondeviant because the people that fell under its category accept both the
culturally defined goals and the structurally condoned means of achieving
the goals. All the other four are deviance or crimes. Innovation involves those
individuals, who accept goals but reject the means, retreatism represents
people who reject both goals and means, ritualism is for those who reject
the goals but accept the means, and rebellion is the act of those who try to
change the entire system.
The theory made a significant contribution towards understanding the
reason why terrorism and insurgency are becoming inevitable under social
arrangements that design hard-earned values, a situation that drift some
people to violence in many societies, Nigeria inclusive. In addition, using the
Merton’s mode of adaptation, the insurgency is neatly classified under
rebellion because terrorist and insurgent groups seek to revolutionize the
system to suit their ideal political arrangements.
The theory is however criticized for many shortcomings. Among these
critiques is that, the theory also assumes that all people share the same goals
and values, which might not always be true. As Siegel (2010) notes, people
pursue a number of different goals, including educational, athletic, and social
success. Juveniles may be more interested in immediate goals, such as
having an active social life or being a good athlete, than in long-term “ideal”
achievements, such as monetary success. Achieving these goals is not a
matter of social class alone; other factors, including athletic ability,
intelligence, personality, and family life, can either hinder or assist goal
attainment.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is focused on assessing and evaluating using definite
patterns the Terrorism and Domestic Violence with Boko Haram as a case
study. The work plan of this research, the population of the study with the
sample size, sampling technique, method/instrument of data collection and
validity/reliability of the research instruments will be discussed in this
chapter.
3.2 Research Design
In carrying out this research systematically and considering the
objectives of the study, the researcher used the qualitative research
methodology in this study. Also, the focus group was used and adopted as
the research method considering that it aligned with the research intent,
purpose and the nature of the topic.
Generally, qualitative study is subjective and at the same time
inductive, which focuses on individual meaning, interpretation, and
understanding of issues based on the views of the participants, in their own
natural settings and environment.
These documents (transcribed from interviews, and document review)
became the working transcripts for analysis and coding purposes. Content
analysis was used to analyse data collected in this study. This methodology
comprised strategic and inductive evaluation of the raw data collected.
3.3 Population of the Study
The population of the study comprised of the 65 persons that made up
the focus group.
3.4 Sample Size
Considering that the population of study was relatively small to manage
by the researcher, the population of study was adopted as the sample size.
3.5 Sampling Procedure
The purposive sampling method was used to selecting members of the
focus group. By doing so, the researcher considered people who were willing,
enthusiastic and motivated participants that will provide the quality data and
information required to respond to the research questions, an environment
of trust and transparent relationship was also my focus.
The plan was to select the participants from a pool of potential 64
participants who had the experience, emotions, and mental capacity to
provide credible information relating to their personal experience,
perspective and opinion/fact on Boko Haram insurgency. The informed
consent protocol was utilized to establish mutual respect and transparency
with the participants in the study. It was required of me by the informed
consent that I discussed the purpose of the study with the participants and
what was expected of them in their roles as voluntary participant, as required
by the informed consent. Also, I explained the potential benefits of the study
to the security and development of affected states and Nigeria in general.
Transparency and honesty were always maintained with the
participants and they were assured of their maximum confidentiality and
privacy during the duration of the study and that their identity was not
revealed to a third party absent their explicit consent. The participants were
assured that the study and its outcome will be based solely on the
information, data, and perspective of the participants and the meanings they
ascribed to them. This process was achieved by making it possible that the
interpretations and conclusion was subjected to member cross- checking and
peer review. Member checking was utilized to establish validity, accuracy,
and credibility of the study as the true meaning and valid interpretation of
participants’ story to the phenomenon under study.
Open ended questions were asked in order to refrain from leading
questions. Sampling in a qualitative study is an act of conscious and
deliberate selection of participants that are most suitable for the study which
will be 65 in sync with the purpose and need of the study. It can be assumed
that the above premise supports the fact that the unique characteristics of
the participants will meet the needs of the study.
3.6 Instrument for Data Collection
The data used for this study were obtained from the primary sources
(this refers to data expressly collected for a specific process) for the purpose
of this study, the primary data were sourced through the following means;
i.
Interview Questions: The structure of interview questions in a
study determines the quality of the data and information that the
participants in an interview session provide.
3.7 Method of Data Collection
To avoid any ambiguity, I used singular, clear and 68 open-ended
questions, and a concerted effort was made in the choice of words used in
structuring the questions to avoid any leading questions that will prompt a
preconceived response. In-depth interview technique will be the primary
data collection strategy that will be utilized in this study.
The “data collection circle” will be used to collect high-quality data and
information needed to answer the research questions. The in-depth face-toface interview discussion technique was suitable for this study because direct
observation technique would not have been possible, trying to understand
how a group of people lived and organized their lives and the meanings they
attached to their experiences in their world would be impossible through
direct observation.
The face-to-face 69 interviews were conducted at the convenience of
the participants and as a result, yielded the participant pool.
In-depth interviews were the primary data collection strategy that was
used in this study also data were collected from the review of available and
relevant documents. The additional data were collected for triangulation
purposes to validate or repudiate data collected using the primary strategy
and the output of data analysis.
3.8 Validity and reliability of Instrument
To ensure validity and to verify the validity of the research instrument,
the instrument (questionnaire) was face validated by my supervisor. It was
tested if the questionnaire is related to the research topic and also whether
they actually addressed the research questions raised in the study. Clarity
and ambiguity were also tested.
The researcher in ensuring in ensuring reliability and authenticity of the
research instrument and the entire work in general, the researcher
conducted a pilot study or a pre-test.
3.9 Method of Data Analysis and Presentation
The data analysis was manually done and handled by the researcher.
Tables were used to present the data in order of relevance to the research
questions while the findings were expressed in simple percentages to show
the strength of answers from the respondents. The researcher used the
method because it is simple and adequate in terms of data analysis and
accuracy.
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
The study was mainly designed to determined or to know the
distinction or similarity that exist between Terrorism and Domestic
Insurgency using Boko Haram as a case study. This study involved the
analysis of the data obtained from the focus group through interviews. This
chapter therefore presents and discusses the findings from the study.
Presentation of data was done using the tables and simple percentages used
for analysis.
4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis
I collected the data analysed in this study through face-to-face
interviews with 10 people who met the demographic requirements outlined
in Chapter 3. I used two questions to gain an understanding of the
participants’ lived experience as a result of their exposure to Boko Haram
insurgency in Borno and to drive data collection.
The questions were as follows:
RQ1: what strategy of terrorism and insurgency are used by Boko Haram?
RQ2: what are they relationships between the different strategies of
terrorism and domestic insurgency and the overall goal of Boko Haram?
RQ3: Are there distinctions that exist between terrorism and domestic
violence?
In this chapter, I present the results of the data collection and analysis
process and describe the demographics of participants, as well as provide
evidence of trustworthiness as it related to my research. Then I present the
study’s results.
4.3 Discussion of Findings
The purpose of this qualitative study was to determine and examine
the distinction and similarities that exist between Terrorism and Domestic
Insurgency using Boko Haram as a Case Study. The results presented in this
chapter is a detailed interpretation of the analysis of the data collected from
the ten participants whose age range between 25 and 65 years and had
suffered from exposures to Boko Haram insurgency.
The study premise was that there were sufficient proves that showed the
activities of Boko Haram insurgency were similar to that of known Terrorist
sect. The study was also interested in examining the strategies of Boko
Haram that classifies them Terrorist group and Insurgency. This led to the
formulation of the following study’s research questions: RQ1: what strategy
of terrorism and insurgency are used by Boko Haram? RQ2: what are they
relationships between the different strategies of terrorism and domestic
insurgency and the overall goal of Boko Haram? RQ3: Are there distinctions
that exist between terrorism and domestic violence?
To provide answers to these research questions, 11 open-ended
interview and focus group questions were presented to the study
participants. The survey questions were designed to encourage study
participants to supply the information required to answer the research
questions. The interview questions were deliberately formulated to elicit the
information and data needed to answer the research questions from the
participants. After a thorough examination and analysis of the transcribed
interviews, my memo and syncopation with research questions and
literature, the following three themes emerged: 1. actor-sense, 2. actionsense (i.e., directness), 3. and ontology-sense Below is a detailed discussion
of each of the identified theme concerning the interview questions.
The focus is on the action sense, with the entire span of Boko Haram
conflict broken down to five different periods. The study then reviewed the
form, nature and purpose of violence in terms of their linkage with Boko
Haram ontological factors. Based on the dynamics of the conflict, as well as
the national and international context, this analysis found that Boko Haram
shifted focus and direction to reach its overarching goal (over its periodic
objectives) and periodically modified its goals and strategies. This is clearly
reflected in Boko Haram’s use of violence. Boko Haram employed different
types of terrorism over different periods that are defined as conflict-related
terrorism. With the inception of the fight in 2009, Boko Haram, in addition
to typical guerrilla warfare, they use terrorism for intimidation to maintain
compliance.
After a thorough examination and analysis of the transcribed
interviews, my memo and syncopation with research questions and
literature, the following three themes emerged: 1. actor-sense, 2. actionsense (i.e., directness), 3. and ontology-sense Below is a detailed discussion
of each of the identified theme concerning the interview questions.
The focus is on the action sense, with the entire span of Boko Haram
conflict broken down to five different periods. The study then reviewed the
form, nature and purpose of violence in terms of their linkage with Boko
Haram ontological factors. Based on the dynamics of the conflict, as well as
the national and international context, this analysis found that Boko Haram
shifted focus and direction to reach its overarching goal (over its periodic
objectives) and periodically modified its goals and strategies. This is clearly
reflected in Boko Haram’s use of violence. Boko Haram employed different
types of terrorism over different periods that are defined as conflict-related
terrorism. With the inception of the fight in 2009, Boko Haram, in addition
to typical guerrilla warfare, they use terrorism for intimidation to maintain
compliance.
Terrorism versus insurgency:
Findings also showed that Boko Haram used terrorism as a part of its
attrition strategy and for survival, employing suicide attacks, explosive
devices, etc. in western metropolitan cities. The group ceased the violence
strategically until 2004 and shifted toward becoming an internationally
recognized legitimate entity. However, these failed to gain legitimate status,
and Boko Haram was officially listed as a terrorist organization by certain
countries.
Also from creation, they employed violence in a reactionary manner to
gain popular support and regroup. They further switched to a bottom-up
approach in which political activities took the lead. They also started to use
more strategic violence in both terror and guerrilla methods to maintain its
place in the government’s political agenda. They also conducted terror
attacks on civilians and security forces in non-Boko Haram areas.
Some available documents that were content analyzed showed that
Boko Haram has a highly insurgent character given its actor-based attributes
that include organizational structure with recognizable management body,
its direct military ways to challenge state authority, its specific goal(s),
considerable level of popular support, and its recent use of non-violent
activities in political, social, and economic realms.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Summary of Findings
After a careful analysis of data, the researcher found that;
I.
Boko Haram shifted focus and direction to reach its overarching goal
(over its periodic objectives) and periodically modified its goals and
strategies. This is clearly reflected in Boko Haram’s use of violence,
particularly after their military defeat in the early years of it formation.
II.
Boko Haram employed different types of terrorism over different
periods, as identified by Kydd and Walter’s five categories, as well as
additional types outlined by Lyall and Wilson and Stepanova, that are
defined as conflict-related terrorism.
III.
Boko Haram, in addition to typical guerrilla warfare, used terrorism for
intimidation to maintain the compliance of sharia laws and Islamic
teachings and targeted it neigbourhood.
IV.
Boko Haram used terrorism as a part of its attrition strategy and for
survival employing suicide attacks, explosive devices, etc. in
metropolitan cities.
V.
Boko Haram in addition to sensational attacks on army outposts they
conducted terror attacks on civilians and security forces in non- Boko
Haram areas.
VI.
Boko Haram has a highly insurgent character given its actor-based
attributes that include organizational structure with recognizable
management body, its direct military ways to challenge state authority.
Nevertheless, violence employed by Boko Haram mostly reflects
conflict-related/ revolutionary terrorism in addition to its insurgent
attacks.
5.2 Conclusion
This study, by adopting a technical rather than a moralistic approach,
analysed the concepts of terrorism and insurgency by revisiting the
discussions in the literature through the analysis and illustration of Boko
Haram case. Analyses are based on multiple perspectives of actor-sense,
action-sense (i.e., directness), and ontology-sense. The focus is on the action
sense, with the entire span of Boko Haram conflict broken down to five
different periods. The study then reviewed the form, nature and purpose of
violence in terms of their linkage with Boko Haram ontological factors.
In conclusion, terrorism and insurgency have been part of human
social and political experiences for long in the history of the world. However,
the problems have been changing over time. This is conditioned by the
increase in their frequency and the fact that they are taking novel dimensions
as international and transnational violent activities. Yet, the two inter-related
problems are attributed to multiple socio-economic and political factors,
including; poverty, unemployment, injustice, globalization, political struggle
and ethno-religious sentiments, among others. Like the causes, the
consequences of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria are many. These
consequences are: organised deadly attacks on the civilian population,
destruction of government’s establishments, military and police installations,
schools, churches and mosques in many parts of the country.
5.3 Recommendation
This study recommends the following;
I.
that states, in their countermeasures, give particular attention to the
actor-oriented characteristics when determining the overall state
strategy to control the problem.
II.
Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaigns should be designed more
broadly rather than securitization efforts focusing only on actionoriented characteristics.
III.
More specifically, as opposed to Counter Terrorism (CT), which is
broadly categorized as deterrence, use of civilian law, enhanced
defences and negotiation policies. Counter Insurgency (COIN),
however, includes political, military and paramilitary, economic,
psychological and civic actions in addition to those Counter Terrorism
(CT) categories. While Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency
(COIN) overlap, what critically differs the two is that the Counter
Insurgency (COIN)campaigns cover more of the political and social
spheres. Despite the changing and evolving doctrines, Counter
Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) are in essence two
fundamentally different but interrelated concepts, each having strengths
and weaknesses on different levels.
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