Uploaded by Nassim Boukhriss


See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260203620
Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Article in Journal of Civil Society · August 2013
DOI: 10.1080/17448689.2013.816541
1 author:
Dilshod Achilov
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Political Islam and Contentious Politics View project
Cyber Social Threats View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Dilshod Achilov on 17 January 2016.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
Journal of Civil Society, 2013
Vol. 9, No. 3, 268 –286, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.816541
Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab
Spring in the Middle East
Department of Political Science, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN, USA
ABSTRACT To what extent do participatory civil society dynamics, rooted in self-assertive social
capital, help explain the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011? How do pro-democratic Arab attitudes
matter in promoting elite-challenging collective actions? Does Islam support or hinder elitechallenging, self-assertive social capital? To answer these questions, this study systematically
examines the variation in self-assertive (emancipative) social capital in Egypt and Jordan from a
comparative perspective. By using emancipative social capital theory, this article embarks on an
individual-level quantitative analysis derived from the World Values Survey database to explore
the empirical nexus between pro-democratic attitudes, elite-challenging actions, and Islamic
values in order to partly explain comparatively high-intensive and persistent uprisings in Egypt
and relatively low-intensive and less persistent demonstrations in Jordan. The findings offer
critical insights in understanding the social capital dimension of the Arab Spring uprisings in
2011 and contribute new clues about empirical interactions between Islamic resurgence and civil
society dynamics in the Muslim world.
Arab Spring, Islam, social capital, collective action, Egypt, Jordan, Middle East
The Arab uprisings of 2011, known as the Arab Spring, have dramatically changed the
social and political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. The protests were
sparked by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, which led to the
ousting of the Tunisian President, Zinel Abidine Ben Ali, on 14 January 2011. On 11 February 2011, the world watched how Egypt’s long-term dictator—Hosni Mubarak—fell
from power. Indeed, Mubarak’s fall was a critical juncture in the Arab uprising that
substantially empowered ordinary citizens to boldly continue pressuring other incumbent
dictators in the region. In this way, the Arab Spring challenged the predominant assumption of Arab exceptionalism in the democratization literature (Stepan & Robertson, 2004)
and set a new stage for studying the rapidly evolving patterns of Middle East politics.
Correspondence Address: Dilshod Achilov, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, East Tennessee
State University, 100 CR Drive, Johnson City, TN 37614, USA. Email: achilov@etsu.edu
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
While some Arab nations celebrated seminal victories that toppled long-term autocratic
regimes such as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, others only saw a limited change (e.g.
Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan). In other words, while some Arab states achieved comparatively high political gains (e.g. regime changes) from mass demonstrations, some states
only attained limited gains (e.g. limited constitutional reforms) from mass protests
against incumbent authoritarian leaders.
One of the defining features of the Arab uprising was the elite-challenging actions of
people that swept through the entire region. Even though ‘collective actions by specific
actors are at the heart of revolutionary struggles’, they are often overlooked in empirical
research to explain rare, but major, social, and political shifts (Parsa, 2000, p. 5). Collective action is a distinct and perhaps most influential form of political participation. In this
respect, social capital is often cited to have a dominant influence on political participation
(Krishna, 2002). For instance, Putnam writes that ‘politics without social capital is politics
at a distance’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 341). Whether or not citizens are actively involved in politics or ‘whether they are alienated and cynical nonparticipants, depends entirely, in this
view, on the available level of social capital’ (Krishna, 2002, p. 439). Social capital is
not only important for providing social bonding (which connects individuals to pursue collective goals), but it is also regarded as an instrumental tool to direct communities towards
active (or perhaps, more pro-active) participation in democracy building (Krishna, 2002;
Putnam, 1995). Regardless of how the social capital has been defined or measured in the
literature, scholars concur that social capital has emerged as an inseparable component of
democratization (Fukuyama, 2001).
In measuring people’s involvement and active participation in society, virtually all previous empirical studies have focused on memberships in voluntary associations or interpersonal trust as key defining features of social capital. Challenging this tradition for the first
time, Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) have convincingly demonstrated that elite-challenging actions or emancipative social capital is a distinct type of social capital that is linked
with greater civic benefits compared to a more generic concept of social capital.1 They show
that self-expression values nurture emancipative social capital, which in turn promotes elitechallenging actions (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005).
In this study, by building on the previous work of Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch’s
(2005) emancipative social capital theory, I examine the extent to which the dynamics
of self-assertive publics, or emancipative social capital, may explain the degree of commitment, persistence and associated payoff (political gains) in the wake of the protests
in Egypt and Jordan from a comparative perspective. The following three questions are
examined: To what extent does self-assertive social capital help explain the Arab
Spring uprisings in 2011? How do pro-democratic Arab attitudes matter in promoting
elite-challenging collective actions? Does Islam support elite-challenging, self-assertive
social capital? To tackle these questions, this study embarks on a quantitative analysis
of emancipative social capital measured by elite-challenging actions derived from the
World Values Survey (WVS).
Conceptual Framework: Emancipative Social Capital
The studies of social capital, in its various forms, have attracted a great deal of empirical
scrutiny in the social sciences (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Lin, 2001; Putnam,
2002; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993). Scholars have extensively explored the
D. Achilov
variation of social capital to explain a myriad of social and political puzzles (Casanova,
2001; Fukuyama, 2001; Radnitz, Wheatley & Zurcher, 2009). As it is one of the widely
studied concepts in democratization literature (Ciftci, 2010; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993), social capital largely still remains a slippery concept. As Onyx and
Bullen (2000) point out, it is slippery ‘because it has been poorly defined, important
because it refers to the basic raw material of civil society’ (p. 24). In general terms,
social capital’s popularity in empirical research is often linked to its insightful explanatory
power in answering the most basic and universal question in social and political research:
‘what keeps societies together and leads individuals to act for collective goals’(Welzel,
Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005, p. 122).
There are numerous definitions of social capital in the literature that capture different
dimensions of social relations (e.g. trust, networking, bonding, bridging, collective
action, and more). Generally, in defining social capital, a heavy emphasis has been
placed on ‘why’ and ‘how’ social relations matter and on structures in which individuals
work together for a common purpose.2 Although many comparative studies have operationalized social capital in terms of memberships in voluntary organizations, such as
churches, educational organizations, environmental groups, professional organizations,
or other civil associations (Diamond, 1994; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti,
1993), some have focused on civic attitudes, such as interpersonal trust, as key indicators
of social capital (Ciftci, 2010; Norris, 2002). Unpacking this concept, Onyx and Bullen
(2000) distinguish five key elements of social capital derived from intensive literature
review: community participation, reciprocity, shared values, trust, and social agency.
Through hierarchical factor analysis, they identify three specific factors that appear to
strongly define social capital: participation in a network/community, agency, and trust
(Onyx & Bullen, 2000).
Collective agency is also theorized as an important driving social force in social capital
research (Leonard, 1997). In Putnam’s terms, for instance, social capital is referred to as
‘features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Similarly, hightrust social relations tend to promote mutual learning experiences as a result of ‘thicker
and richer information flows’ (Cooke & Morgan, 2000, p. 31), and reinforce collective
actions (van Staveren & Knorringa, 2007).
It is widely held that social capital cannot be generated by individuals acting only by
themselves in isolation from others (Leonard & Onyx, 2003). The development of
social capital requires active engagement of citizens working collectively within a participative community (Leonard & Onyx, 2003). For instance, Leonard (1997) argues that
social capital should be analysed through a model of a complex and multiplex interrelationship between agency and social connections. On the same grounds, drawing
from collective efficacy theory, Williams and Guerra (2011) independently note the
importance of collective efficacy and posit that:
Collective efficacy rests on the assumption that social networks are a necessary starting point, but it adds the action-oriented component of mutual trust and support as a
required precursor for collective mobilization for the common good. To this extent,
collective efficacy has an agentic quality missing from conventional thinking about
social capital. (p. 128)
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Social capital is also defined as the aggregate of resources that are connected to the ownership of a membership within a group or a network that provides its members with collectively owned capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Said differently, social capital is the result of
individuals intentionally building their networks and social relations for mutual benefit
(Portes, 2000).
I draw from Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch’s (2005) formulation of emancipative social
capital, which highlight that these networks and social relations, when activated, may
empower people to pursue elite-challenging collective actions. The focus of this study
is on emancipative social capital—an important dimension of agentic social capital,
which should not be understood in exclusive terms. In other words, a network or community may have a certain amount of social capital that it uses for a variety of purposes—one
of which can be emancipative political actions. To define emancipative (or self-assertive)
social capital, I rely on Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch’s (2005) definition of citizens’ elitechallenging actions as a key determinant of self-assertive (emancipative) social capital
that produces collective actions through which individuals pursue their goals in society.
Until now, an empirical operationalization of social capital was predominantly based on
institutional memberships. To challenge this conception, Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch
(2005) argue that:
The emphasis placed on membership in voluntary associations shows a fixation on
institutionalized forms of community involvement. Participation in non-institutionalized forms of community involvement, such as boycotts, strikes, demonstrations
and petitions, plays a minor role. To be sure, non-institutionalized actions are distinct from institutionalized ones by their ‘challenging’ nature, as they confront
decision-makers with demands from ‘below’. But their elite-challenging thrust
does not disqualify non-institutionalized actions as a form of community involvement. They are a form of community involvement. Yet, studies to date have been
reluctant in examining elite-challenging actions as a manifestation of social
capital. (p. 122)
One important contribution that Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) make to social
capital literature, going beyond a fixed institutional conceptualization, is the introduction
of a previously neglected empirical operationalization of self-assertive, emancipative
social capital, measured by individual elite-challenging actions. Following in the footsteps
of Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005), I conceptualize social capital within the framework of emancipative social capital theory.3
Analysing Protests in Egypt and Jordan
Analysing the Guardian’s daily news publications of the Arab Spring events in Egypt and
Jordan (Table 1), we can observe that Egyptians staged 22 major mass elite-challenging
demonstrations in Tahrir Square from 7 December 2010 to 11 February 2011.4 The
level of commitment and persistence of Egyptian protests were remarkably high, which
managed to endure the hurdles of Mubarak’s security forces and pro-regime provocateurs
in Tahrir Square. According to the Guardian, there were 15 confirmed cases of civilian
deaths from the time the uprisings erupted in Cairo until the day Mubarak fell from
power (Table 1). The bloodiest day was 17 December, when nine civilians died after
D. Achilov
Table 1.
Frequency of major elite-challenging protests in Egypt and Jordan in 2011
Date range
1 December 2010–11 February 2011a
12 February 2011–31 May 2011
1 June 2011–31 December 2011
Civilian deaths
Civilian deaths
Note: aMubarak’s fall.
Source: Only major demonstrations as defined and coded by the Guardian newspaper (The Arab Spring 2011
timeline) (URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/-world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactivetimeline).
clashing with Egyptian security forces. To appease the demonstrators, Mubarak appointed
his intelligence chief as a first-ever Vice President on 25 January and formed a new government. The protesters were unmoved. On 1 February, Mubarak announced that he would
step down and pave a way for a new leader in September. This also did not satisfy the
crowds of thousands who kept chanting the slogan ‘Go away now!’. 4 February witnessed
the biggest demonstration yet, called the ‘Day of Departure’, with hundreds of thousands
gathered in Tahrir Square demanding freedom and calling on Hosni Mubarak to step down
immediately.5 Mubarak’s concessions did not help stop the uprisings; rather, the level of
commitment and persistence of protesters only intensified. It was not until the 22nd demonstration on 11 February that the Egyptians finally celebrated the departure of the dictator
who ruled Egypt for more than 30 years.
Following the Tunisian and Egyptian massive uprisings, Jordanian oppositional forces
seized the moment to take their grievances to the streets of Amman. The ruling monarch of
Jordan, King Abdullah II, quickly realized the gravity of a growing tsunami of Arab uprisings in the region, which could soon claim his throne as well. Comparatively, however,
Jordanian demonstrations were fewer, calmer, and more stable.
There was only one major mass elite-challenging demonstration from 1 December 2010
to 11 February 2011. From the time of Mubarak’s fall through the end of 31 May, Jordanians staged three mass demonstrations. The major Jordanian uprising against the regime
of King Abdullah II took place on Friday, 25 February, two weeks after Mubarak’s departure.6 This was the bloodiest day of the Jordanian uprising. Thereafter, there were five
demonstrations; one elite-challenging mass protest occurring each month in March,
April, June, October, and November. In sum, only seven major Jordanian demonstrations
were held in 2011 (Table 1).
Remarkably perhaps, the Jordanian King has managed to stay in power and has avoided a
possible regime collapse that happened in other Arab states by granting limited concessions
in order to appease the public. He quickly discharged government ministers, extended
popular financial subsidies, offered new economic incentives, and promised major political
reforms. Like other Arab leaders, he employed his security forces to monitor all demonstrations and track protesters. These tactics largely proved effective in suppressing and containing the protests at manageable levels. When King Abdullah II promised new democratic
reforms in June, the protesters generally appeared pleased and seemingly agreed to wait for
the monarch to deliver his promises. Unlike Egyptian protesters, Jordanians did not insist on
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
demanding ‘immediate’ results; rather, the majority seemed content with this ‘anticipation’
for greater democratic reforms to be delivered in the near future. The level of commitment,
persistence, and demand for ‘immediate’ change was substantially lower in Jordan and distinctly incomparable to that of the Egyptian uprisings.
Emancipative Social Capital, Islam, and Political Change
Social revolutions are commonly defined as rapid, fundamental, basic transformations of
society’s state and class structures driven by class-based uprisings from below (Skocpol,
1979). This is a rather narrow and strict definition. Even though it is premature to predict
the long-term consequences of the 2011 Egyptian uprisings, the majority of analysts and
scholars define Egypt’s case as a ‘social revolution’, which led to major societal transformations from below. Jordan, however, would not qualify to fit this definition.
Leading explanations by several influential works on social revolutions have used structural analyses that focus on variables such as economy, class structures, international conditions, and nature of the state (Goldstone, 1991; Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979). While
structural models have made major advances in explaining the causes of revolutions
that set the stage for mass mobilizations, they fail to explain the ‘complexity of social
revolutions in developing countries’ and particularly come up short in determining ‘the
revolutionary process or outcome’ (Parsa, 2000, p. 7). In the case of both Egypt and
Jordan, the uprisings did not originate entirely from structural class-based antagonism;
rather, multiple classes were united to shake the long-enduring autocratic status quo.
Yet, it is important to highlight that mainly lower and middle classes were united
against the ruling elite in Tahrir Square in Egypt. Similar socio-economic classes,
though largely dominated by a lower class, made up the majority of protesters in
Jordan. Although class-based explanations should not be dismissed entirely, the models
that predominantly use class-based conflicts are insufficient to fully explain the
complex extent of the Arab uprising (Parsa, 2000).
The critics of structural models, on the other hand, have argued that structural explanations fail to account for the role of ideology, which is central to understanding
various social mobilizations (Sewell, 1985; Zald, 2000). The theorists who viewed ideology at the forefront of social revolutions claimed that ideas play powerful roles in mass
mobilizations. For instance, Skocpol (1982) writes that Shi’a teachings of martyrdom
inspired religiously devout Iranians to oppose the Shah Pahlavi of Iran at all costs. At
first, the ideological theory may resonate with the Arab Spring uprisings given that a
single Tunisian merchant (who set himself on fire) helped inspire the entire Arab world
to mobilize against autocratic regimes. Nevertheless, the Egyptian protesters did not represent a single or unified ideology; rather, the masses comprise ideologically distinct
groups, such as moderate Islamists, hardliner conservatives, secular liberals, minorities,
and other groups with divergent ideological views. While Egyptian protesters appeared
to be united under the auspice of ‘freedom’ in principle, their perceptions varied in
terms of specific ideas about the future path of the Republic. These ideological differences
still continue today in post-Mubarak Egypt. Unlike in Egypt, the protesters in Jordan did
not demand ‘immediate’ results from the state authorities. Though the ideas of freedom
and democracy appeared to have played a central role in inspiring Egyptian protesters
in Tahrir Square, by contrast, these powerful ideas were insufficient to mobilize Jordanians
to the same intensity and persistence against the regime.
D. Achilov
Emancipative Social Capital and Political Payoffs
Democracy without citizen participation, faith in democratic institutions, and active civil
society is more of an empty concept without substance that largely characterizes authoritarian regimes (Dahl, 1971). On the premise that only ‘societies can be rich in social
capital but individuals cannot’, some theorists emphasized that social capital is a collective
resource, with no room for individual involvement (Norris, 2002, p. 139). In contrast,
some scholars stressed the connections (as central features of social capital) that individuals use to pursue their personal goals in society (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). As most
theories link social capital’s central function to produce collective action in order to
contest state policies and thereby to keep state structures accountable to the public,
‘there is no conceptual justification to exclude elite-challenging action from the study
of social capital’ (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005, p. 124). In this respect, Welzel,
Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) convincingly argue and empirically demonstrate that the frequency of elite-challenging actions effectively measure social capital’s productivity in
terms of its capacity to produce collective actions that are associated with higher
payoffs. Accordingly, if the level of elite-challenging actions is high, then it is theoretically plausible to expect to see a high level of public commitment and persistence to
produce and maintain collective actions, which can subsequently yield higher political
gains (payoff). With this in mind, I introduce first two hypotheses:
H1: A higher level of emancipative social capital is associated with higher levels of
commitment and persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and, thereby, is
associated with a higher payoff.
H2: Citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian regime.
Islam and Democratic Civil Society
Social capital is also often cited as an important by-product of religion, tradition, shared
historical experience, and other social ‘factors that lie outside the control of any government’ (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 17).
In the last two decades, the studies analysing Islam, civil society, democratization, and
the interactions thereof have received a great deal of scholarly attention. Particularly,
studying the patterns of coexistence between Islam and democracy has been at the
centre of comparative political research of the Muslim world. In this respect, employing
individual-level survey data on Muslim attitudes has become a leading empirical tool
for understanding the highly complex composition of Muslim politics, which ‘offer
strong evidence that judgments pertaining to political circumstances and performance
do make a difference’ (Jamal & Tessler, 2008, p. 108).
The findings from survey data analyses have consistently illustrated that popular support
for democracy is remarkably high in the Muslim world. For instance, the studies on
Muslim attitudes in the Arab world (Jamal & Tessler, 2008), Africa (Bratton, 2003),
Central Asia (Rose, 2002), and non-Arab Muslim states (Hofmann, 2004) have yielded
decidedly similar results that Islam and democracy are not inherently incompatible but
that Islam neither fosters antidemocratic attitudes nor diminishes support for democracy
(Norris & Inglehart, 2004).
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Some scholars, by contrast, have argued that Islam is ‘exceptional’ in a sense that
Muslim societies are ‘uniquely resistant’ to liberal democracy by defending a Neo-Orientalist argument that questions Islam’s compatibility with liberal democratic norms (Fish,
2002; Huntington, 1996).
Despite the claims of Islam’s inherent incompatibility with democracy and a possible
clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world, the evidence from empirical analyses has revealed that democracy has an overwhelming positive image in the
Islamic world (Inglehart, 2007; Norris & Inglehart, 2003). For instance, according to
Inglehart (2007):
In response to the item ‘Democracy may have many problems but it is better than
any other form of government,’ 61 per cent of the publics of the five Arab countries
agreed strongly—a figure higher than 52 per cent registered in 16 Western European
countries or the 38 per cent strong agreement in the United States, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand. . .. Clearly, the publics of Arab countries (and Islamic societies in
general) do not reject democracy: overwhelmingly majorities want it. (p. 42)
This finding resonates with Esposito and Mogahed’s (2008) large-N study, which claims to
have surveyed a representative sample of over a billion Muslims; this study asserts that
‘Muslims see no contradiction between democratic values and religious principles’ (Esposito & Mogahed, 2008, p. 63).
Yet, how does a civil society argument apply to the context of the Islamic world? In this
respect, Cavatorta (2006) cites three reasons for Islamist associations to be a potential
force, not an obstacle, for democratization: (1) Islamic civil society movements are
capable of political learning; (2) they generate secular civil society activism as a response
to their activities, increasing the number of actors in the political and social system; and
finally (3), they can cooperate with other civil society groups on a variety of issues, provided that they are all subject to the same autocratic rule (Cavatorta, 2006).
Given this propensity for Islamic actors to support democratic civil society and in the
light of the recent overwhelming political victories of moderate Islamic political parties
in Tunisia (An-Nahda), Morocco (Justice and Development), and Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), it is theoretically plausible to expect that Islam may be positively disposed to
encourage citizens to participate in elite-challenging actions which promote emancipative
social capital. To this end, I introduce my third hypothesis:
H3: A higher level of religiosity (Islam) is positively associated with higher levels of
elite-challenging actions that promote emancipative social capital.
Social, Political, and Economic Contexts
Egypt is the biggest Arab nation in the Middle East with over 80 million citizens while
Jordan’s population is only about 6 million. Yet, there are many similarities both countries
share. Table 2 compares key social, economic, and political indicators that capture preuprising contexts for each state.
The indicators of economic well-being were highly similar in Egypt and Jordan. For
instance, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and Human Development Index
(HDI) were hardly distinct, implying that the standards of living were almost alike.
D. Achilov
Table 2. Key social, political, and economic indicators for Egypt and Jordan
Civil society dynamicsa
Percent Involved in elite-challenging actions (emancipative social
Public disapproval of authoritarian rule
Uprising payoff (2011)
Regime change
Political reforms
Freedom and economic development
Freedom house score (2010) (2–14 scale)b
GDP per capita (2010)c
Corruption Index (2010) (0–10 scale)d
Financial satisfaction (1– 10 scale)a
Social indicators
Religiosity level—Islamic values (0– 100)a
Percent ‘Highly Religious’ (2007–2008)
Educational attainment (scale 1–8)a
Internet users as percent of population in 2010 (average for MENA
region was 21%)e
Facebook users as percent of population in 2010e
Mobile cellular subscription (per 100 people)—2010c
International relations
US aid (2009) in millionsf
Diplomatic relations with Israel
11 (Not
11 (Not
WVS database (2000–2008).
Freedom House ‘2010 Freedom in the World’ database (www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world).
World Bank Open Data indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator).
Transparency International ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ database, 2010 (www.transparency.org/research/cpi/
Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats.com).
US Dept. of State’s Congressional Research Service on the Middle East (2010, 2011) (www.loc.gov/crsinfo/
Individual assessments of satisfaction with household finances were virtually the same: an
average score of 5.1 and 5.7 out of 10 (1-dissatisfied to 10-satisfied) in Egypt and Jordan,
The level of political rights and civil liberties, as evaluated by Freedom House, was nearly
indistinguishable; both countries were classified as ‘not free’ in 2010. While Mubarak
managed to maintain his regime for over 30 years by suppressing civil and political liberties,
Jordan has been a limited constitutional monarchy since 1951. According to the Jordanian
constitution of 1951, the executive power was vested in the king with the power to appoint
prime ministers and other key executive (e.g. governors) and judicial posts.
Attachments to Islamic values (religiosity levels) show that Jordanians are comparatively more religiously devout (more likely to attend mosques) than Egyptians. Remarkably, close to half of the population in Egypt (46%) and the majority of Jordanians
(68%) indicated that they attend mosques at least once a week. On the other hand,
general secular educational attainment in Jordan was slightly higher than that of Egypt.
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
It has been argued that technology (e.g. cell phones, Internet, and social networking
sites) played a pivotal role in organizing and accelerating demonstrations across the
region at early stages of the Arab uprising (Lotan et al., 2011). On the other hand,
some have argued that the Internet factor should not be exaggerated nor isolated from
other media outlets when analysing political change (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011).
Notably, access to the Internet, mobile cellular phones (e.g. SMS text messaging), and
social networking was remarkably different in each country. For instance, the percentage
of Internet users was 27% in Egypt and 39% in Jordan. Facebook user penetration was
only 13% in Egypt and about 30% in Jordan in 2011. This means that the proportion of
Jordanian Facebook users was at least twice as big as their Egyptian counterparts. Furthermore, there were more cell phone subscribers than the entire population of Jordan (109
accounts per 100 people). Comparatively, only 87 out of 100 Egyptians had access to
mobile phones. Indeed, technology was a main vehicle for communication, organization,
and coordination for protesters. Nevertheless, this disparity of technological infrastructure
raises an important question: why did the Internet (e.g. social networking) and texting only
play a limited role in galvanizing Jordanian demonstrations, despite Jordan’s greater technological advantage, whereas Facebook, Tweeter, and SMS-messaging played a central
role in accelerating and, perhaps, sustaining the Egyptian uprising? This question challenges the argument that the Internet was a leading cause for the 2011 Arab uprisings.
Notably, the variation in the level of emancipative social capital was high. While 1 out
of every 4 Egyptians participated in 1 of 3 elite-challenging actions (25%), only 1 out of 12
Jordanians engaged in such protests (8%). Attitudes of disapproval towards having one
strong, authoritarian ruler were 88% in Egypt and approximately 70% in Jordan,
suggesting that a level of pro-democratic public opinion was comparatively higher in
Egypt (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Percentage of elite-challenging actions in Egypt and Jordan.
Source: WVS data for Egypt (2001, 2008) and Jordan (2000, 2007).
D. Achilov
Data and Methods
This study utilizes individual-level survey data from the WVS for Egypt and Jordan.
Jordan’s sample size is n ¼ 2423 (n ¼ 1223 for 2001; n ¼ 1200 for 2007). Egypt’s
total sample is 6050 (n ¼ 3000 for 2000; n ¼ 3050 for 2008). The total sample size for
both countries is n ¼ 8473. For descriptive statistics, see the appendix.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is emancipative social capital, which is measured by an index of
three elite-challenging actions. I follow Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch’s (2005) conceptualization of emancipative social capital on the basis of three questions from the WVS
regarding elite-challenging actions: whether the respondent had (1) ever signed a petition,
(2) joined in boycotts, or (3) attended peaceful demonstrations. For each question, survey
respondents could answer either ‘have done’, ‘might do’, or ‘will never do’. All ‘have
done’ answers were coded as ‘2’, ‘might do’ answers were coded as ‘1’, and the remaining
‘will never do’ responses were coded ‘0’ resulting in a three 0 – 2 scale transformed variable (for each elite-challenging survey question). Next, an additive index scale of 0 – 6 was
generated. For instance, a score of 6 indicates that a survey respondent had participated in
all three types of elite-challenging actions, whereas 0 refers to willingness to never participate in any of these three actions.
To verify internal consistency and reliability of this new index, a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.747 was obtained.8 Next, a maximum likelihood factor analysis, with varimax
rotation and with Kaiser normalization was estimated. While ‘signing petitions’ and
‘joining in boycotts’ loaded at 0.791 and 0.835, respectively, ‘attending lawful demonstrations’ loaded at 0.527 (all loaded above 0.4 threshold).
Independent Variables
Disapproval of authoritarian rule measures individual perceptions towards having a single
authoritarian ruler who disregards democratic elections. This variable is measured by a
scale of 1 – 4 derived from WVS’s following survey question: ‘Would you say it is
a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country with a
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?’ Variable
coding: 1—‘very good’, 2— ‘fairly good’, 3— ‘bad’, and 4— ‘very bad’.
Religiosity (Islam) is a 0 –3 scale of survey respondents’ religious values derived from
individual responses on how often they attended mosques. The respondents who attended a
mosque once a week or more were assigned a score of ‘3’ (High religiosity). Those who
attended mosques ‘once a month’ or ‘only on specific holy days’ were assigned a score of
‘2’ (Moderate religiosity). Those who attended Mosques less often were assigned a score
of ‘1’ (Low religiosity). If a respondent did not claim, in a separate survey question, that
he/she was a ‘convinced atheist’, the minimum score of ‘1’ was retained, since coding
individuals who do not attend Mosques as ‘not religious’ (‘0’ score) would have been inaccurate. People who do not attend mosques at all cannot be assumed as ‘not religious’.
Therefore, only those respondents who stated that they (1) ‘did not attend mosques’ at
all and stated (2) that they were ‘atheist’ received a score of zero (No religiosity).
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Control Variables
. Female is a dummy variable that controls for gender (0—male; 1—female).
. Age is a numerical value of each respondent’s age.
. Education is an 8-point scale of the survey respondent’s education level. (Ranging from
‘1—Inadequately completed elementary education’ to ‘8—Completed college
. Income is a 5-point scale of the survey respondent’s income level (1—lowest; 5—
Mode of Analysis
I began with a descriptive analysis by systematically comparing and contrasting associational patterns displayed by variables under investigation. In doing so, I examined the variation in self-assertive, emancipative social capital in Egypt and Jordan with respect to
associated political gains. Next, I employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analysis to explore the empirical relationship between attitudes towards authoritarianism,
Islam (religiosity levels of individuals), and emancipative social capital.
From 2001 to 2008, approximately 25% of Egyptians participated in elite-challenging
actions. This rate was 8% for Jordan from 2000 to 2007. Figure 1 illustrates this comparison. While the probability for participation in elite-challenging actions was about 0.25 in
Egypt, it was 0.08 in Jordan. That is, Egyptians were almost four times more likely to
engage in an elite-challenging action compared with Jordanians, suggesting that the
level of emancipative social capitals was almost four times higher in Egypt (revolution)
than it was in Jordan (no revolution).10 This finding lends support for H1 that a higher
level of emancipative social capital is associated with higher levels of commitment and
persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and, thereby, is associated with a higher
Figure 2 illustrates the association patterns of individual attitudes towards having a
strong leader (a proxy for pro-democratic attitudes) and the levels of elite-challenging
actions in Egypt and Jordan. The disapproval attitudes towards ‘having a strong leader
who does not have to bother with parliament and elections’ appear to be highly associated
with higher rates of elite-challenging actions in Egypt. This association is supported by a
positive, statistically significant Pearson correlation between the two variables (r ¼ 0.066;
p , 0.000). This pattern offers initial evidence supporting the second hypothesis (H2) that
citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in
elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian regime.
In Jordan, on the other hand, associational trends between disapproval of autocracy and
emancipative social capital reveal inconsistent patterns. No clear associational trend can
be observed. The Pearson correlation between the two variables yields a negative, statistically insignificant coefficient (r ¼ 20.006; p , 0.786).
Figure 3 shows a graphical illustration of the association between Islamic values and
elite-challenging emancipative social capital distilled by four categories of individual attitudes towards having a strong leader.
D. Achilov
Figure 2. Associational trends between levels of elite-challenging actions (emancipative social
capital) and disapproval rates toward having a strong authoritarian leader in Egypt (2008)
and Jordan (2007).
Notes: Line of best fit: Cubic. Egypt: Pearson r ¼ 0.066, p , 0.000; Jordan: Pearson r ¼ 0.005,
p , 0.786. Emancipative social capital rescaled into a dichotomous measure: at least one ‘fulfilled’
collective action ¼ 1, else ¼ 0.
The associational plot between Islam and emancipative social capital per each level of
individual support for authoritarianism suggests that more religious Egyptians (Figure
3(a)), who view authoritarianism negatively, manifest a higher level of emancipative
social capital. In Jordan, no systematic trend can be distinguished (Figure 3(b)). In a
bivariate association between support for authoritarianism and emancipative social
capital (Figure 3(c)), as well as relationship between Islam and emancipative social
capital (Figure 3(d)), Egypt clearly stands out with its positive trend in contrast to Jordan.
While correlational and trend analyses provide important insights, a further analysis of the
net-effects of the independent variables is necessary. In this respect, to better understand the
effects of citizens’ attitudes towards authoritarianism, religiosity (Islam), and control variables on emancipative social capital, I estimate the following OLS model (Table 3)
Y = a + b1 x1 + b2 x2... bk xk + 1,
Emancipative Social Capital = a+b1 (Disapproval of authoritarian rule) + b2 (Religiosity)
+b2 (Age) + b2 (Education) + b2 (Female)
+b2 (Income) + 1.
All else being equal, the effects of pro-democratic attitudes (discontent towards having
a strong leader) on participating in elite-challenging actions are positive and statistically
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Figure 3. Associational patterns between emancipative social capital, support for strong leader, and
religiosity levels (Islam).
Notes: Line of best fit: Cubic. Emancipative social capital rescaled into a dichotomy: at least one
‘fulfilled’ collective action ¼ 1, else ¼ 0.
Source: WVS.
Table 3. OLS regression estimates of emancipative social capital
Disapproval of authoritarian rule
Adjusted R2
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
p , 0.10.
p , 0.05.
p , 0.01.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.169∗∗∗ (0.019)
0.167∗∗∗ (0.019)
20.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
20.007 (0.008)
0.048∗∗∗ (0.019)
20.233∗∗∗ (0.036)
0.362∗∗∗ (0.106)
0.126∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.335∗∗∗ (0.024)
20.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
20.031∗∗∗ (0.009)
0.127∗∗∗ (0.022)
20.171∗∗∗ (0.044)
0.354 (0.133)
20.001 (0.026)
20.048∗ (0.011)
20.001 (0.002)
0.087∗∗∗ (0.012)
0.009 (0.031)
20.474∗∗∗ (0.053)
0.457∗∗ (0.149)
D. Achilov
significant (Model 1), which suggests that citizens who disapprove of authoritarian styles
of leadership are more likely to engage in collective actions against incumbent regimes.
This evidence lends support for H2 that citizens with higher levels of pro-democratic attitudes are more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions against an authoritarian
The combined model (1) also suggests that religiosity levels are positively related to
emancipative social capital. That is, holding other variables constant, citizens with
higher levels of attachments to the Islamic way of life are more likely to participate in
elite-challenging actions. The age, gender, and income factors are also statistically significant; older citizens, people with lower income, and females appear less likely to partake in
self-assertive collective actions.
Model 2 reports the findings for Egypt. Accordingly, the disapproval attitudes towards
having a single authoritarian ruler in Egypt are positively and statistically related to emancipative social capital, suggesting that Egyptian citizens with more negative views towards
having a strong, autocratic leader were more likely to participate in elite-challenging actions.
This finding is consistent with H2. Next, attachment to the Islamic way of life, or the level of
religiosity, is also statistically significant to understanding emancipative social capital. This
means that, holding everything equal, individuals who frequently attended mosques were
more likely to engage in elite-challenging demonstrations in Egypt.
The effects of control variables, such as age, gender, income, and educational attainment, also appear to be statistically relevant to emancipative social capital. As evidence
suggests, older citizens, people with higher educational credentials and females appear
less likely to engage in self-assertive collective actions. Income levels, on the other
hand, are positively related to participation in collective protests. This finding suggests
that citizens with higher incomes are more likely to get involved in demonstrations, implying that economic conditions may not be the single source of grievances that prompt individuals to challenge the authoritarian status quo.
In Jordan, the effects of the two key independent variables are starkly different from
Egypt (Model 3). While there is no evidence for the effects of disapproval attitudes
towards having a single authoritarian ruler, the religiosity level is negatively related to
understanding emancipative social capital. Model 3 estimates that individuals’ religious
values are negatively related to participation in elite-challenging protests in Jordan.
This finding is a direct contradiction to the Egyptian case. Considering the control variables, male citizens and those with higher educational degrees appear to be more likely
to engage in elite-challenging actions.
Holding everything constant, while Islamic values seem to promote emancipative
social capital in Egypt, they appear to negatively affect the participation in elite-challenging actions in Jordan. Even though the combined model (for both countries) yields
positive and statistically significant coefficient for Islamic values, given the stark difference in the two cases, it is unclear whether or not Islam can promote emancipative
social capital.
This study has attempted to (1) analyse the dynamics of emancipative social capital and
associated political gains as a result of mass elite-challenging actions, (2) explain the
effects of pro-democratic attitudes on propensity to partake in collective actions, and
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
(3) examine the extent of Islam’s role in shaping emancipative social capital in the context
of Egypt and Jordan.
In the light of early Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Jordan, the level of commitment
and persistence of Egyptian demonstrations was substantially higher than the uprisings in
Jordan. In terms of emancipative social capital, measured by the dynamics of elite-challenging actions, Egyptians were almost four times more likely to participate in democratic
demonstrations than Jordanians. Consequently, the political gains of Egyptian protests
were substantial (complete regime change), while the payoffs of Jordanian demonstrations
were limited to political reforms proposed by King Abdullah II.
In line with H1, the evidence suggests that a higher level of emancipative social capital
is associated with higher levels of commitment and persistence to democratic demonstrations and is, thereby, associated with higher payoffs, as the Egyptian case attests. In
contrast, a lower level of elite-challenging social capital is associated with lower levels
of commitment and persistence to democratic mass demonstrations and is, thereby, associated with lower gains, as the Jordanian case suggests. In the light of these findings, emancipative social capital theory helps explain the dynamics of collective actions and
associated payoffs.
The role of Islam reveals inconsistent results. There is insufficient evidence to support
the proposition that a higher level of religiosity (Islam) is positively associated with higher
levels of elite-challenging actions that promote emancipative social capital. In other
words, the findings are inconclusive with regard to Islam’s capacity to stimulate the development of emancipative social capital in Islamic societies. Whereas the degrees of religiosity seem to encourage citizens to challenge elites in Egypt, less religious citizens appear
to be more likely to engage in elite-challenging actions in Jordan. For Egypt, one can
speculate that the Muslim Brotherhood is a highly organized and fairly powerful social
and political movement, which is not the case in Jordan and which could be driving the
effects of Islam in the Egyptian context. Traditionally, Islamic leadership has been far
more outspoken against the Mubarak regime in Egypt as opposed to Jordan. In this
respect, religious individuals may be more prone to pursue elite-challenging actions
when their religious leaders (e.g. imams) actively take a firm stance to challenge state policies. By contrast, the Islamic leaders who do not take a decisive stand may leave their
highly religious followers unsure and, thus, less committed to their actions. Additionally,
it is also important to highlight that the level of state repression of Islamic actors has been
significantly higher in Egypt than Jordan. Nonetheless, in order to further distinguish the
effects of Islamic values, more future research is necessary.
The degree of high commitment and persistence of Egyptian protests with associated
high political gains in the end (e.g. the Mubarak regime’s fall) and the relatively low commitment and persistence in Jordanian demonstrations with associated low political gains
(e.g. limited reforms) lend support for emancipative social capital’s explanatory strength,
highlighting the importance of participatory civil society dynamics in understanding the
evolving patterns of democratization in the Middle East in general, and the Arab awakening in particular. Although the findings offer compelling evidence of a relationship
between emancipative social capital and political gains as a result of mass elite-challenging actions, more research to further scrutinize the effects of elite-challenging actions
is necessary.
In sum, this study extends the debate on the empirical nexus between social capital and
democratization, while contributing answers to explain the social capital dimension of the
D. Achilov
Arab uprisings in 2011. All at once, by providing a fresh analysis of Islam and its increasing role on shaping the rapidly changing social and political landscape of the Muslimmajority states, this study offers new clues on the empirical interactions between
Islamic resurgence and civil society dynamics in the Muslim world.
1. Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) demonstrate that emancipative social capital, measured by elitechallenging actions, has comparably higher civic payoffs than traditional social capital measured by
voluntary associations, at both societal and individual levels.
2. The structure in social capital can be in the form of groups, organizations or networks: see Coleman
(1990) for a detailed discussion.
3. By drawing from Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch’s (2005) conceptualization of emancipative social
capital measured by three elite-challenging actions asked by the WVS project.
4. On 11 February 2011, a long-term dictator—Hosni Mubarak—fell from power.
5. The Guardian, ‘Cairo’s biggest protest yet demands Mubarak’s immediate departure,’ accessed February
10, 2012 (URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/day-of-departure-hosni-mubarak).
6. The Guardian, ‘Thousands join ’day of rage’ across the Middle East’, February 25, 2011, accessed on
February 10, 2012 (URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/thousands-join-day-of-rageacross-middle-east).
7. Derived from the WVS (2000–2008) question: ‘How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your
household? If 1 means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale and 10 means you are completely
satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household’s financial situation?’
8. A Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (0.747) is statistically acceptable for the internal reliability and consistency of emancipative social capital’s additive index. No inter-item correlation fell below .30—a
minimum necessary threshhold (de Vaus, 2002, p. 184).
9. For missing values in the income variable, data imputation from the values derived from a variable indicating economic social class was used.
10. The odds ratio, however, does not prove that elite-challenging actions increase the chances for revolutions; rather, they manifest a strong association (at this stage) between the variables under analyses.
Aouragh, M. & Alexander, A. (2011) The Egyptian experience: Sense and nonsense of the Internet revolution,
International Journal of Communications, 5, pp. 1344–1358.
Bourdieu, P. (1986) The forms of capital, in: J.G. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the
Sociology of Education, pp. 241–258 (New York, NY: Greenwood Press).
Bratton, M. (2003) Briefing: Islam, democracy and public opinion in Africa, African Affairs, 102(408),
pp. 493–501.
Burt, R. (1992) Structural Holes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Casanova, J. (2001) Civil society and religion: Retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective reflections on Islam, Social Research, 68(4), pp. 1041–1080.
Cavatorta, F. (2006) Civil society, Islamism and democratization: The Case of Morocco, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 44(2), pp. 203–222.
Ciftci, S. (2010) Modernization, Islam, or social capital: What explains attitudes toward democracy in the Muslim
World? Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), pp. 1442–1470.
Coleman, J. (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of Sociology, 94,
pp. s95–s210.
Coleman, J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Cooke, P. & Morgan, K. (2000) The Associational Economy. Firms, Regions, and Innovation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Dahl, R. A. (1971) Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
de Vaus, D. (2002) Surveys in Social Research (London: Routledge).
Diamond, L. (1994) Toward democratic consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 5(3), pp. 4–17.
Social capital, Islam and the Arab Spring in the Middle East
Esposito, J. & Mogahed, D. (2008) Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York, NY:
Gallup Press).
Fish, S. (2002) Islam and authoritarianism, World Politics, 55(1), pp. 4–37.
Fukuyama, F. (2001) Social capital, civil society and development, Third World Quarterly, 22(1), pp. 7–20.
Goldstone, J. (1991) Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press).
Hofmann, S. R. (2004) Islam and democracy: Micro-level indications of compatibility, Comparative Political
Studies, 37, pp. 652–676.
Huntington, S. P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon &
Inglehart, R. (2007) The worldviews of Islamic publics in global perspective, in: M. Moaddel (Ed.) Values and
Perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern Publics, pp. 25–46 (New York, NY: Palgrave).
Jamal, A. & Tessler, M. (2008) Attitudes in the Arab World, Journal of Democracy, 19(1), pp. 97–110.
Krishna, A. (2002) Enhancing political participation in democracies, Comparative Political Studies, 35(4),
pp. 437–460.
Leonard, R. (1997) Theorizing the relationship between agency and communion, Theory & Psychology, 7(6),
pp. 823–835.
Leonard, R. & Onyx, J. (2003) Networking through loose and strong ties: An Australian qualitative study, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14(2), pp. 189–203.
Lin, N. (2001) Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (London: Cambridge University Press).
Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D., Pearce, I. & Boyd, D. (2011) The revolutions were tweeted: Information flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, International Journal of Communications,
5, pp. 1375–1405.
Moore, B. (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern
World (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
Norris, P. (2002) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2003) Muslims and the West: Testing the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, Comparative
Sociology, 1(3), pp. 235–265.
Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2004) Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Onyx, J. & Bullen, P. (2000) Measuring social capital in five communities, The Journal of Applied Behavioral
Science, 36(1), pp. 23–42.
Parsa, M. (2000) States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Portes, A. (2000) The two meanings of social capital, Sociological Forum, 15(1), pp. 1–12.
Putnam, R. D. (1995) Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital, Journal of Democracy, 6, pp. 65–78.
Putnam, R. D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon &
Putnam, R. D. (2002) Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R. & Nanetti, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Radnitz, S., Wheatley, J. & Zurcher, C. (2009) The origins of social capital: Evidence from a survey of postSoviet Central Asia, Comparative Political Studies, 42(6), pp. 707–732.
Rose, R. (2002) How Muslims view democracy: Evidence from Central Asia, Journal of Democracy, 13(4),
pp. 102–111.
Sewell, W. H. (1985) Ideologies and social revolutions: Reflections on the French case, The Journal of Modern
History, 57, pp. 57–85.
Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Skocpol, T. (1982) Rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution, Theory and Society, 11(3),
pp. 265–283.
van Staveren, I. & Knorringa, P. (2007) Unpacking social capital in economic development: How social relations
matter, Review of Social Economy, 65(1), pp. 107–135.
Stepan, A. & Robertson, G. B. (2004) Arab, not Muslim exceptionalism, Journal of Democracy, 15(4),
pp. 140–146.
D. Achilov
Welzel, C., Inglehart, R. & Deutsch, F. (2005) Social capital, voluntary associations and collective action: Which
aspects of social capital have the greatest ‘civic’ payoff? Journal of Civil Society, 1(2), pp. 121–146.
Williams, K. R. & Guerra, N. G. (2011) Perceptions of collective efficacy and bullying perpetration in schools,
Social Problems, 58(1), pp. 126–143.
Zald, M. N. (2000) Ideologically structured action: An enlarged agenda for social movement research, Mobilization, 5, pp. 1–16.
Table A1. Variable coding and descriptive statistics
Emancipative social capital (latent variable)
Disapproval of authoritarian rule
Scale (0– 6)
Scale (0– 3)
Scale (1– 4)
Scale (1– 8)
Scale (1– 5)
Copyright of Journal of Civil Society is the property of Routledge and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
View publication stats