On 3 January, the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
(China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA, the P5) jointly stated that a nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought.
This echoed the declaration by President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at their Geneva summit meeting in 1985, which was
followed by historic talks on nuclear disarmament. The same principle has featured
in joint statements by US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin,
and by Putin and Chinese Premier Xi Jinping in 2021. But it had never been affirmed
simultaneously by all five.
Beyond being positively surprised by the P5’s consensus and willingness to commit
themselves publicly on the fundamental importance of avoiding nuclear war,
observers’ reactions were mixed. Welcomed by many as a worthwhile recognition of
reality in this tense and troubled time, the move was also greeted with a fair degree of
scepticism, mostly focused on the contrast between words and deeds. Nobody wants
a nuclear war, to be sure, but China is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal and the
other four are all modernizing their nuclear forces.
The statement was timed for what would have been the eve of the four-timespostponed 10th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which is the cornerstone of international efforts to regulate nuclear
weapons by preventing further states from getting them and by advancing
disarmament. The P5 owned nuclear weapons at the time the NPT was opened for
signature (as did Israel, although it did not join the treaty) and are recognized in the
treaty as nuclear weapon states. At successive RevCons, the P5’s collective failure to
take practical steps for further nuclear disarmament has been a source of growing
frustration among the other parties. Placating their critics, amid worries that this
frustration could lead to a weakening of global support for the NPT, was one motive
for the P5’s statement. In the event, the RevCon was once again postponed because of
Covid-19.
More than rhetoric?
The apparent unity of the five is positive, especially given current tensions and the
absence of cooperation on arms control and other strategic issues. However, over the
years, the P5 have shown very limited willingness to work together on substantive
questions.
We should not expect this statement to have as much impact as when the Soviet and
US leaders recognized the impossibility of winning a nuclear war in 1985. The
Gorbachev-Reagan statement came when they had just launched nuclear
negotiations. At their next summit in Reykjavik, they discussed complete elimination
of nuclear weapons. Although this idea never materialized, much good still came out
of the process, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the
start of steep reductions in the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals.
There are no indications of a similar process happening today. The 2022 joint
statement was noticeably free of any concrete commitments or practical proposals,
while the 1985 statement was full of them. The scepticism that greeted the P5
statement is therefore understandable.
However, there are inescapable logical implications of recognizing that nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought. It is therefore worth taking the statement
at face value and focusing the argument now on what the statement necessarily
entails.
Implications for policy and action
The P5 statement asserted that ‘nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to
exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war’. It
pledged that the five would ‘consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon
States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities’.
These goals have clear practical implications for the five’s nuclear doctrines, force
postures and behaviour.
First, in the area of nuclear doctrine there is an evident contradiction between
forswearing nuclear war and reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in a
conflict. Yet only one of the P5 countries, China, has a ‘no-first-use’ (NFU) policy.
One logical way to build on the P5 statement would be for France, Russia, the UK
and the USA to also adopt NFU policies, as several civil society groups are currently
urging.
An NFU policy is essentially a declaration of intent. But it can be made more credible
by being reflected in nuclear posture and force structure. Basically, NFU logically
points to a limited nuclear capability serving the purpose of retaliation rather than
war-fighting and involving less escalatory risk than huge arsenals. This would mean
ending the development or deployment of weapons that blur the distinction between
nuclear and conventional forces and could increase the risk of nuclear weapon use,
such as tactical nuclear weapons, and eliminating war fighting from nuclear doctrine.
Biden has previously expressed support for the principle that the ‘sole purpose’ of
nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapon use against the USA or its allies. Sole
purpose is a close relation of NFU. Depending on how it is defined, it does not
necessarily rule out first use of nuclear weapons, but it does emphasize the
retaliatory function. This logic is challenging for US allies in Europe and Asia who
have been urging the USA not to adopt sole purpose or NFU in the soon-to-bepublished US Nuclear Posture Review. In Europe in particular, the allies’ resistance
to such changes reflects consistent policy and strategy: NATO has maintained the
option for first use of nuclear weapons for 70 years.
The second part of the logic is about the arms race. The P5 statement implicitly
recognizes this, saying, ‘We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic approaches to … prevent an arms race that would benefit none and
endanger all.’
The P5 are already in an arms race so it is rather late for prevention, but they can
certainly restrain it. Their anti-ballistic missile defence systems, anti-satellite
weapons and hypersonic missiles are all destabilizing in different ways. The
development and deployment of these systems fuel the other side’s threat
perceptions, and therefore constitute steps in the action-reaction process of a classic
arms race. Arguably one effective way to address the key drivers of hypersonic and
anti-satellite weapon development in China and Russia would be for the USA to
include its missile defence system in arms control negotiations. This could also
enable discussions with Russia to limit its large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
Third, the P5 should live up to their responsibility to avoid war among themselves.
Recent months have been marked by rising tensions between China and the USA
over the fate of Taiwan and between NATO and Russia over Ukraine, raising
concerns about the potential outbreak of war and the role of nuclear weapons were
those conflicts to escalate.
If the P5 do indeed consider ‘the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States’
and the reduction of strategic risks as among their ‘foremost responsibilities’, there
has to be a radical change of tone, a readiness to seek compromise, and serious
efforts to de-escalate these crises. This is even more important given the everincreasing risk of unintended escalation related to linkages between nuclear weapons
and emerging technologies in fields such as cyber and artificial intelligence.
Dialogue as key to moving forward
At the close of the joint statement, the five states write that they are ‘resolved to
pursue constructive dialogue’. This would be very welcome and is urgently needed in
2022.
It was encouraging that the P5 statement was negotiated during a period of high
tensions between major nuclear weapon states. Dialogue—such as the ongoing
Russian-US strategic stability talks and plans for similar discussions between China
and the USA—could also help to address those tensions and to pave the way for more
concrete risk-reduction steps.
The channels of communication should not be limited to policymakers and
diplomats, but also involve direct contact between militaries. Dialogue is the only
way to make progress in realizing the objectives of the P5 statement and it would be
welcome if a commitment to dialogue were a more front-and-centre component of
each government’s international policy.
The rescheduled RevCon, now due to be held in August, would be a good place for
the P5 to demonstrate progress that constructive dialogue is making towards
following through on the logic of their joint statement. That leaves about six months
to put in some more hard work.
Pada tanggal 3 Januari, para pemimpin lima anggota tetap Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan BangsaBangsa (Cina, Prancis, Rusia, Inggris dan AS, P5) bersama-sama menyatakan bahwa perang nuklir
tidak dapat dimenangkan dan tidak dapat diperjuangkan. Ini menggemakan pernyataan yang dibuat
oleh Presiden Ronald Reagan dan Sekretaris Jenderal Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev pada KTT Jenewa
1985, yang diikuti oleh negosiasi bersejarah tentang perlucutan senjata nuklir. Prinsip yang sama
disampaikan dalam pernyataan bersama Presiden AS Joe Biden dan Presiden Rusia Vladimir Putin,
serta Putin dan Perdana Menteri China Xi Jinping pada tahun 2021. Namun prinsip itu tidak pernah
dilakukan sepanjang tahun yang ditegaskan pada saat yang bersamaan. Selain dikejutkan secara
positif oleh konsensus P5 dan kesediaan publik untuk berkomitmen pada pentingnya menghindari
perang nuklir, reaksi para pengamat beragam. Dipuji oleh banyak orang sebagai pengakuan berharga
atas realitas di masa-masa tegang dan bermasalah ini, langkah itu juga disambut dengan
skeptisisme, sebagian besar berpusat pada kontras antara kata-kata dan perbuatan. Tentu saja, tidak
ada yang menginginkan perang nuklir, tetapi China sedang memperluas persenjataan nuklirnya dan
empat lainnya semuanya memodernisasi kekuatan nuklir mereka.
Pernyataan tersebut bertepatan dengan 10th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), yang selama ini menjadi landasan upaya internasional untuk mengatur
senjata nuklir, memperbanyak diri dengan menghalangi negara lain. untuk mendapatkannya dan
dengan bergerak menuju perlucutan senjata. P5 memiliki senjata nuklir pada saat NPT dibuka untuk
ditandatangani (seperti yang dilakukan Israel, meskipun bukan pihak dalam perjanjian) dan diakui
dalam perjanjian sebagai negara senjata nuklir. Pada Revolusi berturut-turut, kegagalan kolektif P5
untuk mengambil langkah-langkah praktis untuk perlucutan senjata nuklir lebih lanjut telah menjadi
sumber frustrasi yang berkembang, antara lain. Curahnya kritik mereka, di tengah kekhawatiran
kekecewaan ini bisa berujung pada melemahnya dukungan global terhadap NPT, menjadi salah satu
alasan pernyataan P5. Dalam acara ini, RevCon sekali lagi ditunda karena Covid19. Lebih dari
retorika? Penyatuan tahun ini tampak positif, terutama mengingat ketegangan saat ini dan
kurangnya kerja sama dalam pengendalian senjata dan isu-isu strategis lainnya. Namun, selama
bertahun-tahun, P5 telah menunjukkan kesediaan yang sangat terbatas untuk bekerja sama dalam
isu-isu substantif. Kita seharusnya tidak mengharapkan deklarasi ini memiliki dampak seperti itu
ketika para pemimpin Uni Soviet dan Amerika Serikat menyadari bahwa kemenangan dalam perang
nuklir pada tahun 1985 tidak mungkin. Pernyataan Gorbachev Reagan datang saat mereka baru saja
memulai negosiasi nuklir. Pada pertemuan puncak berikutnya di Reykjavik, mereka membahas
penghapusan total senjata nuklir. Meskipun gagasan itu tidak pernah terwujud, banyak hal baik
telah datang dari proses tersebut, termasuk Perjanjian Kekuatan Nuklir Jarak Menengah 1987 dan
awal dari pengurangan besar-besaran dalam persenjataan nuklir negara-negara adidaya.
Manifesto 1985, sebaliknya, penuh dengan mereka. Dengan demikian, skeptisisme yang menyambut
pernyataan P5 dapat dipahami. Namun, ada konsekuensi logis yang tak terhindarkan untuk
mengakui bahwa perang nuklir tidak dapat dan tidak dapat dimenangkan. Oleh karena itu, adalah
tepat untuk menerima pernyataan ini begitu saja dan fokus pada argumen untuk apa yang
terkandung di dalamnya. Implikasi bagi kebijakan dan tindakan
"Senjata nuklir, selama masih ada, harus digunakan untuk tujuan defensif, mencegah agresi dan
mencegah perang," kata pernyataan P5. Dia berjanji bahwa lima negara "akan menganggap
pencegahan perang antara kekuatan nuklir dan pengurangan risiko strategis sebagai tanggung jawab
utama kami." Tujuan-tujuan ini memiliki implikasi praktis yang jelas untuk Lima Prinsip, Disposisi,
dan Tindakan Nuklir. Pertama, di bidang doktrin nuklir, terdapat kontradiksi yang jelas antara
menghentikan perang nuklir dan menegaskan hak pertama untuk menggunakan senjata nuklir
dalam konflik. Namun, hanya China, salah satu negara P5, yang memiliki kebijakan No First Use
(NFU). Salah satu cara logis untuk memajukan pernyataan A-5 adalah agar Prancis, Rusia, Inggris,
dan Amerika Serikat mengadopsi kebijakan NFU, yang kini dituntut oleh beberapa kelompok
masyarakat sipil. Kebijakan NFU pada dasarnya adalah deklarasi niat. Tapi itu bisa dibuat lebih
kredibel dengan tercermin dalam postur nuklir dan struktur kekuatan. Pada dasarnya, NFU secara
logis menunjuk pada kemampuan nuklir terbatas yang melayani tujuan pembalasan daripada
pertempuran perang dan melibatkan lebih sedikit risiko eskalasi daripada persenjataan besar. Ini
berarti mengakhiri pengembangan atau penyebaran senjata yang mengaburkan perbedaan antara
kekuatan nuklir dan konvensional dan dapat meningkatkan risiko penggunaan senjata nuklir, seperti
senjata nuklir taktis, dan menghilangkan pertempuran perang dari doktrin nuklir. Biden sebelumnya
telah menyatakan dukungan untuk prinsip bahwa 'satusatunya tujuan' senjata nuklir adalah untuk
mencegah penggunaan senjata nuklir terhadap AS atau sekutunya. Satusatunya tujuan adalah
hubungan dekat dari NFU. Bergantung pada bagaimana hal itu didefinisikan, itu tidak selalu
mengesampingkan penggunaan pertama senjata nuklir, tetapi itu menekankan fungsi pembalasan.
Logika ini menantang bagi sekutu AS di Eropa dan Asia yang telah mendesak AS untuk tidak
mengadopsi tujuan tunggal atau NFU dalam Tinjauan Postur Nuklir AS yang akan segera diterbitkan.
Di Eropa khususnya, perlawanan sekutu terhadap perubahan semacam itu mencerminkan kebijakan
dan strategi yang konsisten: NATO telah mempertahankan opsi untuk penggunaan pertama senjata
nuklir selama 70 tahun.
Bagian kedua dari Logika berkisar pada perlombaan senjata. Pernyataan P5 secara implisit
menegaskan hal ini: “Kami akan terus mencari pendekatan diplomatik bilateral dan multilateral
untuk mencegah perlombaan senjata yang tidak menguntungkan siapa pun dan merugikan
segalanya. Itu saja.”
Karena P5 sudah ikut lomba senjata, agak terlambat untuk pencegahan, tapi pasti bisa
dipertahankan. Rudal balistik, senjata anti-satelit, dan sistem pertahanan rudal hipersonik mereka
semuanya menjadi tidak stabil dalam banyak hal. Pengembangan dan penggunaan sistem ini
meningkatkan kesadaran akan ancaman musuh dan oleh karena itu merupakan langkah dalam
proses aksi-reaksi perlombaan senjata klasik. Tidak diragukan lagi, cara yang efektif untuk mengatasi
dorongan utama untuk pengembangan senjata supersonik dan anti-satelit di China dan Rusia adalah
bagi Amerika Serikat untuk memasukkan sistem pertahanan rudal dalam negosiasi pengendalian
senjatanya. Ini juga memungkinkan negosiasi dengan Rusia untuk membatasi persenjataan besar
senjata nuklir taktisnya. Ketiga, P5 harus memenuhi tanggung jawab mereka untuk menghindari
perang di antara mereka. Beberapa bulan terakhir telah ditandai dengan meningkatnya ketegangan
antara China dan Amerika Serikat atas nasib Taiwan, dan antara NATO dan Rusia atas Ukraina, dan
peran senjata nuklir dalam potensi pecahnya perang dan konflik yang semakin intensif.
kekhawatiran tentang. Jika P5 benar-benar melihat "penghindaran perang antara negara-negara
bersenjata nuklir" dan pengurangan risiko strategis sebagai salah satu "misi utamanya", diperlukan
perubahan mendasar dalam sikap, kompromi, dan upaya serius. .. Untuk mengatasi krisis ini. Ini
bahkan lebih penting mengingat peningkatan risiko eskalasi yang tidak disengaja terkait dengan
hubungan antara senjata nuklir dan teknologi yang muncul di berbagai bidang seperti dunia maya
dan kecerdasan buatan.
Dialog adalah kunci kemajuan
Di akhir pernyataan bersama, kelima negara bagian "memutuskan untuk terlibat dalam dialog
konstruktif." Ini sangat disambut baik dan akan sangat dibutuhkan pada tahun 2022. Hal ini
mendorong bahwa Deklarasi P5 dinegosiasikan pada saat ketegangan meningkat antara negaranegara senjata nuklir utama. Dialog seperti negosiasi stabilitas strategis Rusia-AS yang sedang
berlangsung dan rencana untuk negosiasi AS-China yang serupa juga dapat membantu meredakan
ketegangan ini dan membuka jalan bagi langkah-langkah mitigasi risiko yang lebih spesifik. ... Saluran
komunikasi tidak boleh terbatas pada pembuat kebijakan dan diplomat, tetapi juga harus mencakup
kontak langsung antara personel militer. Dialog adalah satu-satunya cara untuk bergerak menuju
tujuan Deklarasi P5, dan akan baik jika komitmen untuk dialog menjadi bagian penting dari
kebijakan internasional semua pemerintah. RevCon mendatang, yang sekarang dijadwalkan untuk
Agustus, adalah tempat yang baik bagi P5 untuk menunjukkan kemajuan yang dicapai melalui dialog
konstruktif untuk lebih mengikuti logika Pernyataan Bersama. .. Ini menyisakan sekitar 6 bulan untuk
bekerja lebih keras.
Ringkasan asli
On 3 January, the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France,
Russia, the UK and the USA, the P5) jointly stated that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought. Beyond being positively surprised by the P5`s consensus and willingness to commit
themselves publicly on the fundamental importance of avoiding nuclear war, observers` reactions
were mixed. Nobody wants a nuclear war, to be sure, but China is currently expanding its nuclear
arsenal and the other four are all modernizing their nuclear forces. The statement was timed for
what would have been the eve of the four-times-postponed 10th Review Conference (RevCon) of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the cornerstone of international efforts to
regulate nuclear weapons by preventing further states from getting them and by advancing
disarmament.
We should not expect this statement to have as much impact as when the Soviet and US leaders
recognized the impossibility of winning a nuclear war in 1985. However, there are inescapable
logical implications of recognizing that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The
P5 statement asserted that `nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve
defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war`. It pledged that the five would `consider the
avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our
foremost responsibilities`.
These goals have clear practical implications for the five`s nuclear doctrines, force postures and
behaviour. First, in the area of nuclear doctrine there is an evident contradiction between
forswearing nuclear war and reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. One
logical way to build on the P5 statement would be for France, Russia, the UK and the USA to also
adopt NFU policies, as several civil society groups are currently urging. Basically, NFU logically points
to a limited nuclear capability serving the purpose of retaliation rather than war-fighting and
involving less escalatory risk than huge arsenals.
This would mean ending the development or deployment of weapons that blur the distinction
between nuclear and conventional forces and could increase the risk of nuclear weapon use, such as
tactical nuclear weapons, and eliminating war fighting from nuclear doctrine. Biden has previously
expressed support for the principle that the `sole purpose` of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear
weapon use against the USA or its allies. This logic is challenging for US allies in Europe and Asia who
have been urging the USA not to adopt sole purpose or NFU in the soon-to-be-published US Nuclear
Posture Review. In Europe in particular, the allies` resistance to such changes reflects consistent
policy and strategy: NATO has maintained the option for first use of nuclear weapons for 70 years.
The P5 statement implicitly recognizes this, saying, `We intend to continue seeking bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic approaches to … prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger
all. ` The development and deployment of these systems fuel the other side`s threat perceptions,
and therefore constitute steps in the action-reaction process of a classic arms race.
.
Arguably one effective way to address the key drivers of hypersonic and anti-satellite weapon
development in China and Russia would be for the USA to include its missile defence system in arms
control negotiations. Recent months have been marked by rising tensions between China and the
USA over the fate of Taiwan and between NATO and Russia over Ukraine, raising concerns about the
potential outbreak of war and the role of nuclear weapons were those conflicts to escalate. If the P5
do indeed consider `the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States` and the reduction of
strategic risks as among their `foremost responsibilities`, there has to be a radical change of tone, a
readiness to seek compromise, and serious efforts to de-escalate these crises. At the close of the
joint statement, the five states write that they are `resolved to pursue constructive dialogue`.
It was encouraging that the P5 statement was negotiated during a period of high tensions between
major nuclear weapon states. Dialogue—such as the ongoing Russian-US strategic stability talks and
plans for similar discussions between China and the USA—could also help to address those tensions
and to pave the way for more concrete risk-reduction steps.
.
Ringkasan
On three January, the leaders of the 5 everlasting contributors of the UN Security Council (China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the united states, the P5) jointly stated that a nuclear
strugglefare can not be gained and ought to by no means be fought.
Beyond being undoubtedly amazed via way of means of the P5`s consensus and willingness to
dedicate themselves publicly at the essential significance of warding off nuclear strugglefare,
observers` reactions had been mixed.
Nobody desires a nuclear strugglefare, to be sure, however China is presently increasing its nuclear
arsenal and the alternative 4 are all modernizing their nuclear forces.
The announcement became timed for what might had been the eve of the 4-times-postponed tenth
Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that's the cornerstone of
global efforts to adjust nuclear guns via way of means of stopping similarly states from getting them
and via way of means of advancing disarmament.
We need to now no longer count on this announcement to have as a whole lot effect as whilst the
Soviet and US leaders identified the impossibility of triumphing a nuclear strugglefare in 1985.
Although this concept by no means materialized, a whole lot desirable nonetheless got here out of
the process, which includes the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the begin of
steep discounts withinside the superpowers` nuclear arsenals.
However, there are inescapable logical implications of spotting that nuclear strugglefare can not be
gained and ought to by no means be fought.
Implications for coverage and movement The P5 announcement asserted that `nuclear guns—for so
long as they maintain to exist—need to serve protective purposes, deter aggression, and save you
strugglefare`.
It pledged that the 5 might `recollect the avoidance of strugglefare among Nuclear-Weapon States
and the discount of strategic dangers as our predominant responsibilities`.
These goals have clean sensible implications for the 5`s nuclear doctrines, pressure postures and
behaviour.
First, withinside the place of nuclear doctrine there's an obtrusive contradiction among forswearing
nuclear strugglefare and booking the proper to apply nuclear guns first in a conflict.
One logical manner to construct at the P5 announcement might be for France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the united states to additionally undertake NFU policies, as numerous civil society
groups are presently urging.
Basically, NFU logically factors to a confined nuclear functionality serving the cause of retaliation in
place of strugglefare-combating and related to much less escalatory danger than big arsenals.
This might suggest finishing the improvement or deployment of guns that blur the difference among
nuclear and traditional forces and will growth the danger of nuclear weapon use, including tactical
nuclear guns, and getting rid of strugglefare combating from nuclear doctrine.
Biden has formerly expressed assist for the precept that the `sole cause` of nuclear guns is to
discourage nuclear weapon use towards the united states or its allies.
This good judgment is tough for US allies in Europe and Asia who've been urging the united states
now no longer to undertake sole cause or NFU withinside the soon-to-be-posted US Nuclear Posture
Review.
In Europe in particular, the allies` resistance to such adjustments displays steady coverage and
strategy: NATO has maintained the choice for first use of nuclear guns for 70 years.
.