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UNIT 1
MEANING OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
What Is Industrial Organization
What Is Industrial Organization: An Example
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Summary Of the Example
Central Question in Industrial Organization (Market Power)
Is There Market Power
Is There Market Power
Central Question in Industrial Organization
How Do Firms Acquire Market Power (An Example)?
How Do Firms Maintain Market Power?
How Do Firms Maintain Market Power? (An Example)
What Are the Implications of Market Power? (Transfer Effect)
Productive Inefficiency, Rent Seeking, An Opposite View: Austrian School
Is There a Role for Public Policy?
Chicago School View
BASIC MICROECONOMICS
Demand (Example)
Demand
Consumer Demand for Pizza Slices
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Consumer Surplus
Market Demand
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Demand Elasticity
Costs
Cost Concepts
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Marginal Cost & Average Cost
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Opportunity Cost and Sunk Cost
Sunk Cost
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Economics Of Scale and Economics of Slope
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Profit Maximization
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Efficiency
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Allocative Efficiency
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Efficiency In Production
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Dynamic Efficiency
THE FIRM
The Firm
Internal Discipline
Labour Market Discipline
Product Market Discipline
Capital Market Discipline
In Summary
What Determines the Firm’s Boundaries?
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Why Are Firms Different
Strategy, Culture
GAMES AND STRATEGY
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
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Dominant Strategies, Dominated Strategies, And Nash Equilibrium
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Dominant Strategy
Dominated Strategy
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Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
Dubious Application of Dominated Strategies
Nash Equilibrium
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Nash Equilibrium
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Multiple Nash Equilibria
Sequential Games: Commitment and Backward Induction
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Modelling Sequential Games: Extensive Form Representation
Modelling Sequential Games: Extensive Form Representation
Backward Induction
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The Value of Commitment
Repeated Games
Deriving Equilibrium of The Repeated Game
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UNIT 2
Monopoly And Regulation
Monopoly
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Price Discrimination
Demand Elasticity and Optimal Monopoly Margin
97. Dominant Firms
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99. Dominant Firm Optimal Price
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Monopoly And Monopoly Power
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Regulation
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Marginal Cost Pricing
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Average Cost Pricing
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Low Power Incentive, High Power Incentive, Price Cap Regulation
108.
Price Cap Regulation
109.
Price Cap Regulation
110.
Access Pricing
111.
Efficient Component Pricing Rule
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PERFECT COMPETITION
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Assumptions
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From Theory to Stylized Fact
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Monopolistic Competition
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Assumptions
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Short Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
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Long Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
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UNIT 3
129.
OLIGOPOLY
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Oligopoly Competition
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Bertrand Model
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Bertrand Model
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Bertrand Model: Reaction Curve and Equilibrium
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Pricing With Capacity Constraints
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Firm 2’S Optimum
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The Cournot Model
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Firm 1’S Optimum, Two Extreme Cases
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Deriving Reaction Function
Cournot Equilibrium
Cournot Equilibrium
Adjustment To Equilibrium: A Dynamic Interpretation of The Cournot Equilibrium
Adjustment To Equilibrium
Algebraic Derivation of Equilibrium
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Monopoly, Duopoly, And Perfect Competition
Comparing The Cournot Equilibrium with Monopoly and Perfect Competition
Bertrand Versus Cournot
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