A Geopolitical Union: Bound and Divided by Geography Pre-Master Human Geography Academic Skills II 2021 Arjan van Tongerlo (s1065697) 08-06-2021 1 Abstract The EU Global Strategy in June 2016 reintroduced the concept of European strategic autonomy (ESA) to European foreign and security policy. ESA aims to position the EU as a strong independent actor to adequately deal with the geopolitical competition of the 21st century. In the current multipolar world order the EU and its member states can no longer neglect their security and require an appropriate collective strategy in order to protect their interests. To achieve this, however, one has to consider the geographical and geopolitical challenges that the EU faces. This paper assesses the effect of the EU’s geopolitical environment on its strategic autonomy ambitions, namely: How does the EU’s geopolitical environment affect its ambitions of becoming strategically autonomous in foreign and security policy? An empirical analysis will be conducted based upon EU foreign and security policy documents to assess the EU’s ambitions and geopolitical environment. Additionally, this essay uses theories of liberalism and realism to further analyze the political dynamics affecting EU foreign and security policy. The use of such theories in combination with the empirical analysis of EU policy can establish an understanding pertaining to the geopolitical confinement of the EU in their strategic autonomy ambitions. While the EU requires a unified strategy in order to achieve strategic autonomy, this essay suggests that the EU will have to overcome institutional roadblocks imposed by different threat perspectives and priorities due to different geographical positionings in order to achieve a cohesive strategically autonomous Union. Keywords: Strategic autonomy, geopolitics, European Union, foreign policy, security policy 2 Introduction In June 2016 the European Union’s High Representative Federica Mogherini delivered the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) 2016. A long overdue revision of its predecessor, the 2003 European Security Strategy, the document focused on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, pleading for a stronger and more united Europe regarding military cooperation and foreign policy in order to deal with the changing international environment (EUGS, 2016). In the current international order, the EU has to deal with a variety of challenges in order to maintain its security and stability. Over the past number of decades, what scholars have called a ‘ring of instability’ has formed around the territory of EU states (Robinson, 2020; Iklody, 2016). From the East beginning with Russian, gradually going south towards Northern-Africa an ‘arc’ or ‘ring’ of uncertainty and instability is surrounding the EU. In addition, the previous United States (US) administration under president Trump laid bare how fragile the transatlantic alliance can be further stimulating the narrative that the EU needs to be able to provide in its own foreign and security policy. Combined with the fall of the liberal international order and the rise of new global powers such as China and to a lesser extend Russia, Europe can no longer depend on the US for its security and defense (Torreblanca, 2019). In its current position, no European state is able to establish a power position in the changing political environment (Messenger, 2017). A collective European security and defense policy, in which Europe is able to act autonomously, is required in order to ensure the security and power position of the European states. However, in achieving such a collective position the EU is a ‘prisoner of geography’. The diverse nature of the 27 EU states due to differing geopolitical ambitions and risk assessment in combination with the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy complicates the EU’s potential in achieving its ambitions laid out in the EUGS. Therefore, the following paper seeks to assess the effect of the EU’s geopolitical environment on its strategic autonomy ambitions. Thus, the research question for the following analysis is: How does the EU’s geopolitical environment affect its ambitions of becoming strategically autonomous in foreign and security policy? Relevance The scientific relevance of this research paper lies in the increased understanding of the complicated geopolitical environment the EU and its member states have to deal with in relation to their strategic autonomy ambitions. Much of the academic work on the EU’s strategic autonomy since the publication of the EUGS has focused on either internal aspects like the potential military capabilities and political will of the EU, such as Fiott’s work on European capability development, or on the external aspects such as the potential of the EU to autonomously maintain stability in its neighborhood, with Makarychev 3 & Devyatkov work on EU’s eastern neighborhood being a prime example (Fiott, 2018; Makarychev & Devyatkov, 2014). Therefore, it can be said that most debates so far have focused either on internal or external aspects of strategic autonomy from a political science perspective. This paper aims to look at the dynamics between the internal and external from a geographical perspective in order to establish a framework of how this geographical dynamic affects the EU’s strategic autonomy ambitions. The societal relevance of this research paper lies in the added value to the EU’s current attempts to increase its strategic autonomy. While in this sense, the direct implementation primarily relates to EU policy makers and politicians, the long-term effects will affect EU citizens as well. This paper aims to establish a framework in which the possibilities to establish a strategically autonomous Union set clearly defined lines for potential obstacles in providing a collective foreign and security strategy. Currently, the EU is aiming to establish a so-called Strategic Compass which is aimed at establishing a collective framework for member states to work within (European External Action Service, 2021). This paper should therefore be seen as a potential addition to establishing a collective EU framework by providing a realistic geopolitical analysis of the EU’s and member states’ ambitions. Methodology In order to provide an answer to the research question, an empirical analysis will be provided. Considering the qualitative nature of this research, the empirical analysis will be used in order to ‘’find meanings, opinions, or the underlying reasons from its subjects’’ (Bouchrika, 2021). Specifically, this research will use textual analysis involving the process of describing, interpreting and understanding textual content. As defined by Fairclough, its aim is to connect broader cultural, political or social context (Fairclough, 2003). For this research, a textual analysis of key policy documents pertaining to European strategic autonomy will be conducted. First, the EU Global Strategy 2016 will be analyzed in order to acquire a better understanding of the EU’s aims and ambitions. Second, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, the follow up document of the EUGS will be looked at. The analysis of these documents will be supplemented be a further review of the EU’s geopolitical environment. In order to do so, key literature on the EU’s neighborhood and EU states’ foreign and security policy documents will be analyzed. This analysis will be further supplemented by the use of the theories of liberalism and realism. These political theories will be supplemental to the research in order to provide a scientific explanation of the political dynamics at play. 4 Theoretical Framework In order to comprehend the full scope of the issues at hand it is important to first look at relevant theories. Through the theoretical framework, a number of theories regarding European strategic autonomy and its topics will be explained. Realism The concept of realism is viewed as one of the core theories within political science. It has, however, been used in a variety of ways and a variety of concepts within academic literature. In its most basic form, realism can be defined as a theory which assumes that the international environment is anarchic, meaning there is no international authority to enforce universal law and agreements or prevent the use of force by nations (Doyle, 1997). Due to the uncertainty in states’ behavior and the inability of the international system to control states’ behavior, realists believe that states try to become as powerful as they can to ensure their own security and survival (Waltz, 1959). Inherently, this definition of realism shows its geographical nature. A realist consider the power of state in relation to other states and with it in relation to its geographical situation (Carmichael, 2013). While governments and international institutions themselves do not use terms such as realism in the formulation of their policy, the use of realist thought is often noticeable. For the purpose of this paper, realism will be used in order to explain the behavior of (European) states in the post-World War II era as well as in the modern day. It is often argued that it was the weakness of post-war European states that forced these states to cooperate in the face of potential Soviet threat. As Waltz would argue, when there is a lack of internal balancing capabilities in order to protect oneself against others, one needs to balance externally in the form of alliances (Waltz, 1979). Based on this reasoning, it is realist thought that led to the creation of the liberal EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The pressure of external forces in the form of the Soviet Union determined internal politics. Liberalism While often seen as the counterpart of realism, liberalism can also be viewed as re-examining realism. Similar to realism, liberalists agree that there is a natural state of anarchy in the international environment in which the state has to protect its sovereignty and national interest. Unlike realism, however, liberalism argues that democracy and international cooperation in areas such as trade are the answer for the prevention of conflict (Morgan, 2013). In this paper, liberalism will be used in order to explain the post-World War II developments within Europe and how liberalist strategies were employed for the protection of European states. While liberalism does not inherently perceive geography as a core factor for security in the same way as realism, this paper will argue that the EU has geopoliticized liberalism in such a way that its underlying assumption are geographical. 5 Liberalist ideas and expansion in post-war Europe can broadly be characterized in two distinct ways. The first of these is the liberalization process that began in the immediate after of the second World War, which can be seen as an internal liberal strategy. As liberalists will argue, the development of strong economic ties between states will significantly decrease the chances of interstate conflict due to interdependencies (McGlinchey, 2017). Within Europe, this led to the creation of economic liberal institutions such as the EU. The second liberalization process has occurred in the post-Cold War era. While through its expansionist behavior the internal liberal strategy continued through the inclusion of post-Soviet states in the EU, an external liberalization policy took place in order to deal with the European periphery. Through concepts such as the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU attempted to use liberalization as a controlling mechanism in order to keep its neighboring states ‘in check’. The provision of economic incentives was meant to promote liberal-democratic ideals in Europe’s periphery and with it lead to further European stabilization. Liberal Intergovernmentalism The final relevant theory for this paper is liberal intergovernmentalism. One could argue that liberal intergovernmentalism lies at the crossroads between realism and liberalism, in that it uses liberal institutions through a realist lens. Liberal intergovernmentalism is founded on two basic assumption about international politics. First, there is an internal competition within states between different interest groups in order to formulate domestic preferences. Second, states will push this domestic agenda within international institutions such as the EU while bargaining common European interests (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2018). Due to certain states having a better bargaining position, in the case of Europe the more powerful states such as Germany and France, EU-level policy is often influenced by the preferences of such states. In relation of this paper, this theory will be used in order to exemplify how external factors effectively impact internal EU-level politics. States try to use liberal organizations such as the EU to advance their own national realist imperative which, as has been previously stated, is in part determined by the uncertainty of potential insecurity of its own geographical environment. Therefore, the acknowledgement of this process is essential in order to further develop a framework to explain the internal constraints caused by the external environment. 6 The Strategic Autonomy Ambitions of the EU ‘’The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned.’’ These are the opening words of the EU Global Strategy by Federica Mogherini (EUGS, 2016). The crisis Europe is currently going through regarding its international identity is at the foundation of the EUGS. Throughout this section, the ambitions of the EU regarding its strategic autonomy will be looked at. In order to effectively analyze European strategic autonomy (ESA), one needs to know the political environment within which it operates. Therefore, this chapter will begin with a brief overview of the development of European foreign and security policy after which the relevant policy documents pertaining to ESA will be analyzed. The Origins of EU Cooperation The origins of modern European cooperation can be traced back to the post-World War II period. In the aftermath of two world wars within a matter of decades, European states were weakened. The era of European great powers had faded and many European states came under influence of either the US or the Soviet Union. This in turn led to the bipolar international order between 1945 and 1991 (Messenger, 2017). As an effect of the instability in the first half of the 20th century, which culminated in both world wars, European states had lost their status as great powers. On the one hand, European states were in a state of internal disarray due to their war-torn economies and societies. On the other hand, the effect of this decreased power position subsequently resulted in decolonization, with European states no longer able to control their foreign territories. European states were no longer the great powers themselves, but were influenced by great powers. The ‘outside forces’ effectively resulted in European states having to adapt their own national discourse in order to not simply function as a satellite state between the new great powers. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United States (US) and Soviet Union began to show a realist foreign policy with Europe being the main playing field. It can be said that both the US and Soviets followed the logic of the Rimland theory, which argues that whoever controls the ‘Rimland’, an area which stretches from West-Europe almost entirely around the Soviet Union to East-Asia, had the power to control the world (Mishra, n.d.). Since neither super power could allow the other to be in control, Europe became the prime chessboard for the geopolitical power struggle. While both powers tried to ensure their own security through an arms race, both the United States and the Soviet Union also implemented what Waltz would dub external balancing strategies through their European allies (Waltz, 1979) in order to prevent European states from switching sides. 7 Being in a weakened state, European states had little choice but to be influenced by either of the powers. Whereas the east of Europe came under Soviet influence, the western part of the continent heavily relied on the US for support. Following realist reasoning, the US knew that weakened West-European states would be vulnerable to Soviet communist influences. Therefore, the US decided to revive WestEuropean economies through the Marshall Plan while simultaneously providing a collective security force through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the case of a Soviet attack (Messenger, 2017). While these realist external balancing strategies were aimed at maintaining the US power position through the prevention of Soviet influences, the US knew internal West-European change was also required in order to provide stability. Besides external pressures from the Soviet Union, another potential risk for European destabilization was falling in the old trap of interstate European conflict. With both the US and European states themselves willing to prevent future intra-European conflict, the external realist policies were supplemented with internal liberal strategies. Based on the liberal thought that economic interdependencies prevent the potential of interstate conflict, West-European states under US influence decided to move towards economic integration in order to not only strengthen the collective position, but also prevent conflict amongst each other (Messenger, 2017). This aim was further underlined by the form of cooperation that was established, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a collective control over coal and steel, two vital war resources, chances of interstate conflict significantly decreased (Carmichael, 2013). Based upon the abovementioned, it can be stated that the European cooperation originated due to external influences. There may be no greater way to exemplify this than the famous words of first NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay, who said NATO was created to ‘’keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’’ (NATO, n.d.). The foreign and to a certain extent domestic policies of West-European states were influenced by American realist thinking and the geopolitical reality of Cold War Europe. In this, collective foreign and security strategies were often left to NATO with the European project primarily focusing on economic affairs (Messenger, 2017). It wasn’t until the end of the Cold War that the EU moved into the foreign and security policy domain through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (European Commission, 2019). EU Global Strategy The end of the Cold War marked the biggest geopolitical shift since the end of the second World War. The fall of the Soviet Union opened the door for the US to become the sole superpower and with it a liberal hegemonic order. This dynamic shift significantly affected the geopolitical reality of the EU. Without a significant threat rivaling the US power position, the US no longer needed to invest as heavily European security nor did it need to dictate European foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2018). Therefore, the European states gained a new level of independence in setting its own foreign and security policy 8 ambitions. Considering that NATO, primarily through American personnel and material, had been the hard power during the Cold War, the EU had to rely on its soft power and normative instruments in this new world order. Therefore, the EU’s methods to ensure the peace and security of its member states centered around a geography-based liberal strategy. In the two decades following the Cold War the EU expanded into Central- and East-Europe by integrating a multitude of former Soviet states into the organization. Through a process of liberal-democratization in its eastern periphery the original WestEuropean EU states intended to stabilize their geographical environment (Messenger, 2017). A second foreign and security policy strategy subsequently took place. This strategy, which has been criticized for being a neo-colonial policy, took shape in the form of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Hoh, 2012). The ENP has been an attempt to exert influence over states in Europe’s eastern and southern periphery that are unable to integrate into the EU. To this end, the EU attempts to stimulate states into a process of liberal-democratization in exchange for economic benefits. In essence, post-Cold War Europe displayed a positivistic outlook onto the world in which the fundament was based around the liberal idea that the promotion of liberal-democratic ideals would prevent interstate conflict. This vision was further underlined in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the predecessor of the EUGS. While acknowledging potential threats such as the EU borders growing closer to conflict areas, the EU set out a clear preference for soft power tools through multilateralism and the promotion of liberal values (CVCE, 2013). By 2016, this positively outlook had changed. The claim by Fukuyama that simple democratic promotion would not result in the hoped for liberalization came to be true (Fukuyama, 1995). For this reason, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini was ordered to establish a new strategy paper, the EU Global Strategy. The document titled Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe marked the beginning of a new era of EU foreign and security policy. Through this document, the EU acknowledged that the persistence of ‘forever wars’ in the Middle-East, a significant increase in migration streams towards the EU, terrorists attacks in EU states and the Russian annexation of the Crimea signaled an end to the prosperous liberal hegemony that Europe had envisioned after the Cold War (EUGS, 2016). With this, the EU underlines that its external environment has begun threatening the internal stability and security of the EU. The EUGS, as opposed to its predecessor, poses a more realistic outlook of the world with the acknowledgement of threats facing the Union, going as far as stating that the Union is under threat and that the European project is being questioned (EUGS, 2016). While the document still supports the promotion of liberal-democratic values throughout the world, it recognizes that the EU will have to deal with a variety of threats in order to maintain its own peace and security. This new outlook gets underlined by the introduction of the term ‘principled pragmatism’, meaning that the EU will view the world in the 9 way that it is, not in the way the EU wants it to be, while simultaneously upholding its norms and universal law (Kaldor, 2017). In order to ensure the aforementioned goals of promoting liberal-democratic values while maintaining a realistic outlook of current-day geopolitical competition, the EUGS goes on to emphasize the importance of unity and united action. Acknowledging the fact that no single EU member states has a significant power position in the current geopolitical environment, the EUGS states the a collective Union will be able to achieve more than uncoordinated unilateral actions by member states (EUGS, 2016). This sentiment gets further underlined through the statement that ‘’Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world’’ (EUGS, 2016). Markedly, however, one also has to take note of the statement there is no clash between national and European interests, a statement which will be further examined in a later section of this paper. Continuing on the need to act as a collective unit, the importance of EU engagement in the wider world is marked as vital for European peace and security. Acknowledging the importance of actively engaging in the global marketplace in order to obtain a power position within the current world order, the EU knows that maintaining peace and security requires the use of its economic power. Through the creation and maintenance of strong ties within areas such as global value chains, collective climate actions and transnational crime the EU hopes to establish interdependence, meaning that the parties involved cannot afford to act hostile without it threatening their own peace and security (EUGS, 2016). Based upon this one can say that the EU still underpins the importance of liberal ideals such as economic interdependence. Through the maintenance of economic ties, the EU hopes to prevent further destabilization. On the other hand, this liberal principle simultaneously displays an underlying realist, and therefore geopolitical, motive. The strengthening of economic ties should result in an increased power position. In addition to underpinning the importance of internal cohesion, the EUGS also established five priorities for external action: the security of the union, state and societal resilience to the east and south, an integrated approach to conflict, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21 st century (EUGS, 2016). What all these priorities have in common is that the EU seemingly has to ambition to step up its involvement on the international theatre in security and defense. The EU realizes that, while still acknowledging NATO as an important security actor, its member states can no longer solely rely on NATO for the protection of Europe and its neighborhood. The EU and its member states have to be able to respond to the security challenges of the 21 st century ranging from military threat, terrorism, hybrid threats to climate change and energy security. Therefore, the EU requires to capacities and capabilities to defend its own territory while also being able to exert influence outside of its territory 10 in order to ensure stability in its neighborhood and maintain peace throughout the world. In order to do so, the EU and its member states have to step up in its foreign and security policy. One of the core principles in achieving a safe and secure Union is through strategic autonomy. The EUGS states that ‘’An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders’’ (EUGS, 2016). The document goes on to mention that ‘’Europeans, working with partners must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the treaties’’ (EUGS, 2016). Based upon this, one can derive a general meaning of strategic autonomy as the ability of Europe to set its own priorities and make its own decisions regarding its foreign policy and security (Fiott, 2018). The EUGS does, however, lack a definition of European strategic autonomy which leaves member states the opportunity to assign their own meaning to the concept. Altogether, one can infer that the EUGS has a more realistic outlook on the security of Europe. Through the EUGS, the EU has shown its ambition to create a stronger foreign and security policy. The external environment has deteriorated to such an extent that it has begun to threaten the EU and its member states. The liberal-democratic strategies of the post-Cold War era have not succeeded in their aim of ensuring the peace and security of Europe and need therefore be replaced. Similar to the post-World War II era, the European states are not in a proportionate power position to individually challenge the threats. Unlike this period, however, the US has no strategic interest in being the sole protector of Europe. Due to its historic reliance on NATO and its legacy of being a liberal soft power organization, the EU now lacks the necessary capabilities to act as a more realist actor. The EU needs to present itself as a strong unified actor in the current multipolar order and in the global market. Only through direct involvement can the EU establish itself as a strong and leading geopolitical actor. Besides promotion of liberal-democratic values and the flexing of the Union’s economic muscles this also means that the EU has to be capable of protecting its own territory and intervening abroad in order to end conflicts and maintain stability in its wider region. Under the banner of European strategic autonomy, the EU aims to achieve these goals by becoming a Union that is capable of setting and acting upon its own strategic ambitions without being influenced or needing help of outside actors. However, this does require the EU to become a credible actor in foreign policy matters. Currently, the EU has a severe gap between its strategic autonomy ambitions and its security and defense capabilities. The intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy accompanied by a negligence of military investments throughout much of the 21st century has left the EU in a weakened state. Collective security and defense build-up in accordance with collective strategic ambitions are required in order to ensure the security of both the Union as a whole as well as the individual member states. 11 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence As mentioned above, the EU currently lacks the security and defense capabilities necessary to be a credible security block in the current geopolitical order. Therefore, as a follow-up to the EUGS Mogherini put forward the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) in November 2016. Building upon the ambitions laid out in the EUGS, the IPSD puts forth a renewed level of ambition for EU security and defense policy (Council of the European Union, 2016). The new level of ambition is based around three strategic priorities from the EUGS: responding to external conflicts and crises when they arise, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens through external action (European External Action Service, 2018). Notably, all three of those priorities are focused on ensuring the internal peace and security of the EU through external action outside of EU territory. Similar to the EUGS, the IPSD notes that the member states need to increase cooperation in order to acquire the necessary defense capabilities while the EU simultaneously requires to become a more active partner in stimulating cooperation with organizations such as NATO. In order to ensure the success of both the EUGS and IPSD a number of actions were proposed in the document. The first of these is deepening defense cooperation. In order to deepen defense cooperation the EU established the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). The aim of CARD is to develop a more systematic way to provide more transparency and identify shortcomings from EU member states. CARD provides an intermediate step in the development of EU capabilities (EDA, n.d.). Through CARD the EU can establish an overview of the capability landscape and deeper cooperation and synchronization regarding defense. A second action for implementation is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) through which capable and willing member states can collectively develop defense capabilities. Currently, there are 47 active PESCO projects related to training, land formation systems, maritime, air systems, cyber and joint multiple services (European Council, 2020). Additionally, the IPSD proposed actions to improve the possibilities of the EU to conduct mission and operations. Under the IPSD proposal, the EU should improve the flexibility of the EU Battlegroups in order to better rapid response when necessary alongside establishing a joint planning and conduct for civilians missions (Council of the European Union, 2016). In essence, the IPSD continues upon the conclusions of the EUGS and sets forth a number of goals and strategies in order to obtain the security and defense capacities and capabilities required in order to become a strategically autonomous actor. Within the IPSD it becomes clear that most of these actions are aimed at increasing internal aspects such as increased integration and coordination between member states in order to better deal with the external environment. 12 Unifying a Union It may be clear by now that the EU’s ambitions to become a strategically autonomous actor cannot be achieved without further coordination and integration between EU member states. Due to the intergovernmental structure of EU foreign and security policy the EU is dependent upon the willingness of its member states who are responsible for setting their own national foreign and security policy. Therefore, one has to consider the geopolitical circumstances affecting the foreign and security policy of EU member states before one can consider the possibilities for a collective EU strategy. Prior to looking at the foreign and security ambitions of individual states, one has to consider the wider geopolitical context affecting not only the EU as a whole but also the member states individually. European Neighborhood Europe is in the unique position of being directly connected to its bordering continent without natural separation by an ocean. Often referred to as ‘Eurasia’, the European and Asian continents, while consisting of different cultures, are geographically linked (Makarychev & Devyatkov, 2014). Historically, Central- and East-European states have provided a buffer zone between West-Europe and Russia and vice versa. However, since the end of the Cold War, the West has expanded its influence towards East-European states through EU and NATO expansion, causing a dynamic shift in the way Europe has to deal with its eastern borders. Even though the East-West dynamic has improved since the end of the Cold War, conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 showed the unstable relationship Europe has with its eastern partners such as Russia. Furthermore, both the Fragile State Index and Corruption Percentage Index show medium to low scores in East-European states such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine with a decline in their 2019 scores meaning the region has become less stable in 2019 (Fund For Peace, 2019). Even though many former Soviet states have integrated into the EU, there is still a clear difference between these Central- and Eastern-European states compared to the West-European states. Many EastEuropean states are wary of the concept of strategic autonomy since they fear this will provoke the US and could lead to a decreasing US commitment in Europe (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). Developments such as the sudden emergence of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 only underlined the concerns of European states about the threat Russia poses. The positive EU outlook of the post-Cold War which saw the extension of liberal-democracy into previous Soviet states as the solution to create stability in Europe did not properly consider the Russian foreign policy marked by realism. Russia sees the expansion of both the EU and NATO towards its border as a threat to its security which has led to the current state of affairs in which both the EU and Russia have to be wary of the other in East-Europe (Russian Federation, 2014). In its southern neighborhood, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the EU also faces several challenges. The political instability and military interventions that have occurred in the MENA13 region over the past number of decades have directly affected the threat perception the EU has to assign to the region. Only separated by the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa’s instability could spill over into Europe. Between 2011 and 2019, protests and riots have risen in countries such as Libya, Algeria and Morocco (Munich Security Conference, 2020). As the last decade has shown, disruption accompanied by migration flows can cause tensions within and amongst European countries. The development of further civil unrest in states such as Algeria could potentially lead to a disruption in gas export to EU member states, which could lead to a greater European reliance on either Israel or Russia for its natural gas (Munich Security Conference, 2020). Furthermore, the European limitations in its ability to provide stabilization in North African states has opened the door for other states such as Russia to push its agenda in the region. Similarly, the volatile developments in the Middle-East influences the geopolitical context of the EU and Europe as a whole. The persisting instability in the region continues the cycle of conflict, terrorism and migration flows which could affect Europe. The spill-over effect of the instability in the MiddleEast and increasing presence of actors such as Russia remains a key point of contention for numerous south-European states (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). The Affair of States The geopolitical environment of the EU member states has a considerable amount of influence on the possibilities of the EU to become a strategically autonomous actor. Most notably, one can look at the differing national foreign and security policies in order to see how geography affects the geopolitical ambitions of states. Since an analysis of all 27 member states would be excessive, a selection of the five most powerful EU states has been made. The criteria for determining the most powerful European states is based upon the population size and defense budgets of the states (Nováky, 2019). The reason for this selection can be found in liberal intergovernmentalist thinking. As this theory explains, more powerful states will often use their stronger position in order to establish policies more beneficial for their national interests (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2018). Therefore, the views of the largest EU states will presumably be most significant for the strategic autonomy discourse of the EU. The first state one can look at when considering European foreign and security policy is France. Ever since the inauguration of president Macron France has been the main driver of European strategic autonomy. Reflective of its geographical environment as a West-European state, the French vision entails a level of independence from other powers such as the US, while remaining compatible with NATO (La Délégation à l'information et à la communication de la défense, 2017). Due to its relative distance from Russia, France does not depend on NATO and US protection and is therefore capable of promoting a significant level of autonomy for Europe. In light of events in recent years, France sees terrorism as the biggest threat facing Europe. Therefore, the stability of the MENA-region is a top 14 priority for France. Furthermore, both the French national foreign and security policy as well as its ambitions for strategic autonomy put a bigger focus Africa. While not wishing to return to the age of being a colonial empire, France does believe that strong ties with African states will benefit Europe (Powell, 2017). Germany, on the other hand, has a more modest stance when it comes to strategic autonomy. A state still reluctant to become a powerful military force due to its past while simultaneously being more wary of Russia due to its location, Germany refers to the use of strategic autonomy in relation to Europe’s historical normative character and Europe’s economic structure. Being located more centrally in Europe, Germany perceives Russia as a more imminent threat than France (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). In regard to security and defense, Germany outlines Europe’s dependency on NATO and the US due to capability gaps. Unlike the French vision of autonomy of action, Germany relates strategic autonomy to the decision-making abilities, which implies reluctance in vouching for autonomy of action considering Germany’s positive stance on NATO (Lippert, von Ondarza & Perthes, 2019). When looking at Italy’s views regarding strategic autonomy, one should note that Italy’s White Paper for International Security and Defense was published in 2015, one year prior to the EUGS. Therefore, the white paper has no mention of the term strategic autonomy (Ministero Della Difesa, 2015). However, it still provides Italy’s views regarding European cooperation in the security and defense dimension. Unsurprisingly, due to its geographical location, Italy assign more attention to the Mediterranean region. Similar to France, Italy does not view Russia as its biggest threat, but is more focused on matters such as transnational terrorism and the instability in the southern periphery (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). Regarding the Spanish view of strategic autonomy, one can look at the Spanish National Security Strategy 2017. Spain refers to the EU’s normative power by stating that the EU should have a positive influence in transforming its neighboring states and potential EU-member states, which will stabilize the region (Presidencia Del Gobierno, 2017). In March 2021, Spain put forth a non-paper in cooperation with the Netherlands pertaining to strategic autonomy. Considering the Spanish history with financial struggles, it should come as no surprise that there is an emphasis on the collective economy in this document (Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European Union, 2021). Furthermore, due to its geographical location Spain, like Italy, assigns significant attention to the Mediterranean region (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). Poland is the biggest European actor in Central- and East-Europe based on its population size, defense expenditure and GDP (Nováky, 2019). Poland is one of the main supporters regarding transatlantic cooperation. Due to its location and history, Russia is viewed as the dominant threat (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). Therefore, Poland supports strategic autonomy in a way that is beneficial to NATO. According 15 to the Polish vision, European strategic autonomy must be in line with the European availability and capability to be a partner within NATO (Zaborowski, 2018). A Clash of Visions Based upon the analysis of the five states one can infer that there is a lack of a cohesive strategic mindset within the EU. While each member state, through the EU, agrees upon the protection of liberaldemocratic principles and core values, the geographies and histories of the member states lead to diverging threat assessments. When one goes towards the east of Europe, one will find that states assign a larger amount of attention to the threat posed by Russia, while going towards the Mediterranean results in a more vocal stance against terrorism and potential spill-over effects from the MENA-region. While geography is one of the main factors for this cacophony of visions, another important factor can be found in the nature of the EU itself. The EU is an organization based upon the principles of liberalism. Both economic liberalism, based upon the logic that economic interdependence will prevent conflict, and democratic liberalism, the belief that democratic states do not go to war with one another, are ideas that can be found at the core of the EU. As has been argued in this paper, the ECSC was not only meant for the collective strengthening of (West-)Europe, but also to establish interdependencies in order to decrease the likelihood of further conflict. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union the liberalistic positivist outlook gained momentum without any severe threat or opposing force. Due to the lack of opposition, liberalism was perceived by many as the answer to the prevention of conflict and the EU managed to not only expand geographically, but also across the political spectrum by entering the realm of foreign and security policy through the CFSP and CSDP. As the age of liberal hegemony fell, however, realism once again became more prominent in international politics. As per (neo)realist thinking, the state is the only reliable actor in protecting its own interests and assuring its own security. While cooperation with other states, or as Waltz coins it external balancing, is a potentially strategy in doing so, cooperation is not seen as the sole solution. Within the EU this entails that while the CFSP and CSDP can be beneficial for EU member states, states can and often do decide to make unilateral decisions if their national interests diverge from EU policy. While economic cooperation within the EU is supranational, the intergovernmental nature of foreign and security policy can be seen the last stronghold of the sovereignty European states possess (Howorth, 2017). Effectively, while the EU, based upon liberal principles, tries to become a geopolitical power in order to deal with current-day challenges, the member states’ priority is to protect its own interests first. Such a clash of visions was once again underlined during a defense ministerial meeting in November 2020, where it was noted that national and NATO ambitions are often prioritized over EU ambitions (EDA, 2020). 16 Conclusion This paper has sought to examine how the EU’s geopolitical environment affects its foreign and security policy ambitions of becoming strategically autonomous. The first section of this paper established how external influences and internal instability in a post-World War II era led to interstate cooperation in order to collectively strengthen (West-)Europe and prevent future interstate conflict amongst European states. It wasn’t, however, until the end of the Cold War that the EU began expanding into the realm of foreign and security policy. Even when it eventually did expand into this realm, the EU itself was primarily a liberal-democratic soft power organization, leaving the hard security aspects to NATO and the security umbrella of the US. As a result, the EU and its member states have not sufficiently prepared themselves for the changing geopolitical environment. The ring of instability in the EU’s eastern and southern periphery and the originating of a multipolar world order have pushed the EU to adapt its outlook onto the world and its foreign and security policy ambitions. The publication of the EUGS marked the changing perspective of the EU. Through the EUGS and the subsequent IPSD the EU acknowledges its weakened position and capability gaps. Through the concept of European strategic autonomy the EU is attempting to position itself as a unified geopolitical block with the capabilities to deal with the new geopolitical environment. Due to the intergovernmental nature of European foreign and security policy the EU is dependent upon the willingness of its member states in achieving strategic autonomy. The statement made in the EUGS that there is no clash between European and national interests has proven to be a simplified statement that does not capture the full geopolitical scope of the EU. At its core, EU member states share the same liberal-democratic principles. Furthermore, an EU able to impose itself as a unified geopolitical Union is able to position itself as a superpower whereas no singular EU member state has the power to effectively deal with its neighborhood or the Sino-American geopolitical rivalry. However, it has proven to be rather difficult to achieve a convergence of strategic interests. In order to achieve a strategically autonomous Union, a common strategic vision has to be established. Due to differing geographical contexts, resulting in diverging threat assessments, a common European strategy will be difficult to establish. EU member states have diverging histories and geographical positionings, therefore they perceive different threats as more imminent than others. As the analysis has shown, states towards the east of Europe such as Poland will assign a higher priority to threats pertaining to Russia, while states such as Spain and Italy, in addition to France due to its history in the region, look towards the Mediterranean area first when considering their threat assessments. Because EU foreign and security policy is intergovernmental, states will look to their own interests first. While member states largely share the same norms and values they want to protect, common strategic interests have to be based on common threat assessments which is being hampered by historical and geographical differences. 17 The EU’s changing external environment has caused the need for greater internal cohesion and capabilities in foreign and security policy. However, this same external environment is affecting the possibilities of achieving the level of required cohesion and capabilities as laid out in the EUGS and IPSD. While the EU as a collective faces the same threats, individual member states will assign different priorities based upon their own histories and geographies. If the EU wants to achieve strategic autonomy it needs to first address nationalistic diverging attitudes of its member states. The lack of a comprehensive definition of strategic autonomy within the EUGS has enabled member states to assign its own definitions. Therefore, the geopolitical differences between member states cannot be overlooked. In order to become strategically autonomous, the EU and its member states will first need to find come to a comprehensive consensus on its strategic vision. 18 References Bouchrika, I. (2021, 11 May). What Is Empirical Research? Definition, Types & Samples. 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