Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
Definition of Statutory Construction
“Statutory construction” is the art or process
of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
The absence of a statutory definition of a
term used in a statute will not render the law
void for vagueness, if the meaning can be
determined through the judicial function of
construction. Elementary is the principle that
words should be construed in their ordinary
and usual meaning. (Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan)1
This conclusion firms up in the light of the
mischief sought to be remedied by the law,
resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. (Caltex Inc. v. Palomar)2
Nature of the
Construction
Rules
of
Statutory
The basic canon of statutory interpretation is
that the word used in the law must be given
its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent
is manifest from the law itself. (PCFI v. NTC)3
Judiciary’s
Construction
Role
in
Statutory
END Law Notes
The Court should not assume the role of
legislator. (Floresca v. Philex – dissenting
opinion of Justice Gutierrez)4
Strict v. Liberal Construction
The liberal construction of a law should not
be countenanced if it is clear and
unambiguous.
In the case of Fetalino v. COMELEC,5 the
Court denied the petitioners’ appeal to liberal
construction of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is
misplaced since the law is clear and
unambiguous. We emphasize that the
primary modality of addressing the present
case is to look into the provisions of the
retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of
statutory construction in this consideration,
we find that the language of the retirement
law is clear and unequivocal; no room for
construction or interpretation exists, only the
application of the letter of the law.
Also, in the case of Legaspi v. Creative Play,6
the Court denied the invocation of liberal
application of the rules of court when the
petitioner transgressed procedural rules due
to belated filing of a petition.
Lastly, in the case of People v. Veneracion,7
the Court denied the liberal interpretation of
criminal law because it is clear under the law,
that the penalty imposable for the crime of
Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion
Perpetua but Death.
The duty of the court is to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on any part or branch
of the government.
The provision leaves no room for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the trial
judge to impose a penalty under the
circumstances described, other than a
sentence of death. Hence, the petition was
granted and the Court remanded the case to
the trial court for proper imposition of the
penalty.
1
5
2
6
G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004
G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966
3 G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984
4 G.R. No. L-30642, April 30, 1985
G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012
G.R. No. 169942, January 24, 2011
7 G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
What is Judicial Legislation?
The Court should give Congress a chance to
perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The
Court should not pre-empt Congress and
usurp its inherent powers of making and
enacting laws. While it may be the most
expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial
fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court
dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation. (Corpuz v. People)8
In the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining,9 the
Court ruled that there is no judicial legislation
because it only applied and gave effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and
Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution when it ruled that awarding
compensation
under
the Workmen's
Compensation Act differs from that in giving
damages under the Civil Code.
In case of any doubt which may be
engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil
Code direct that the doubts should be
resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code,
otherwise known as Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, promulgated on May 1,
1974, but which took effect six months
thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor
Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In
case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail."
8
9
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
G.R. No. L-30642, April 30, 1985
END Law Notes
Also, it was held in the case of Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation v. CIR,10 that as
mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an
administrative rule or regulation cannot
contravene the law on which it is based. RR
7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar
as the definition of the term "goods" is
concerned. This is a legislative act beyond
the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of
Finance. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which
are the product of a delegated legislative
power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should
be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the objects and
purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or
regulation must conform, not contradict, the
provisions of the enabling law. An
implementing rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and
void.
While administrative agencies, such as the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are
without authority to limit the scope of the
statute to less than what it provides, or
extend or expand the statute beyond its
terms, or in any way modify explicit
provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative agency for that
matter cannot amend an act of Congress.
Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it
restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of
transitional input tax credit under Section 105
is a nullity.
10
G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
Lastly, in the case of Corpuz v. People,11 the
Court ruled that with regard to the necessity
of demand, it agreed with the CA that
demand under this kind of estafa need not be
formal or written.
legis in all that time and that no bond shall be
admitted for the release of it.
When the law does not qualify, We should
not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so.
Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a
written demand as evidence is not fatal.
It has been repeated time and time again that
where
the
statutory
norm
speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts
to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no
doubt as to the scope of its operation, must
be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
born to that effect. (Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company
Credit Union, Inc. v. Manila Railroad
Company)13
Fundamental Rule in the Construction of
Statutes
A statute must be read according to its spirit
or intent, for what is within the spirit is within
the statute although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a
bit differently, that which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as
if within the letter, and that which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and
should not accept an interpretation that
would defeat the intent of the law and its
legislators.
In the case of PDEA v. Brodett,12 the Court
ruled that the ordering the release of the car
at that point of the proceedings was
premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer
of any property, or income derived therefrom,
that has been confiscated from the accused
charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the
pendency of the proceedings in the Regional
Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly
requires that such property or income
derived therefrom should remain in custodia
When Does Statutory Construction Come
In?
In the case of National Federation of Labor v.
Eisma,14 the Court ruled that Article 217 is to
be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor
arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It
means, it can only mean, that a court of first
instance judge then, a regional trial court
judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope
of the authority conferred on him by law when
he entertained the suit for damages, arising
from picketing that accompanied a strike.
That was squarely within the express terms
of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be
tolerated.
Also in the case of Daoang v. Mun. Judge of
San Nicolas,15 the Court held that the words
used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil
Code, in enumerating the persons who
cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
The children mentioned therein have a
clearly defined meaning in law and, as
pointed out by the respondent judge, do not
include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
11
14
12
15
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011
13 G.R. No. L-25316, February 28, 1979
G.R. No. L-61236, January 31, 1984
G.R. No. L-34568, March 28, 1988
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.
election only, and not to motions for
interventions.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the
adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the
consolation of having one, by creating
through legal fiction, the relation of paternity
and filiation where none exists by blood
relationship.
The
present
tendency,
however, is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life, and every intendment is
sustained to promote that objective. Under
the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or children by legal fiction, is no longer a
ground for disqualification to adopt.
Also, in the case of San Miguel Corporation
v. Inciong,19 the Court ruled that under
Presidential
Decree
851
and
its
implementing rules, the basic salary of an
employee is used as the basis in the
determination of his 13th-month pay. Any
compensations or remunerations which are
deemed not part of the basic pay is excluded
as basis in the computation of the mandatory
bonus.
Lastly, in the case of People v. Mapa,16 the
Court ruled that the law, regarding illegal
possession of fire arms, cannot be any
clearer. No provision is made for a secret
agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is
equally clear. The first and fundamental duty
of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them." Hence, the
conviction of the accused must stand. It
cannot be set aside.
Rule on Executive Construction
It is elementary in the rules of statutory
construction that when the language of the
law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. (Insular
Bank of Asia and America Employees Union
v. Inciong)17
In the case of Insular Bank of Asia and
America Employees Union v. Inciong,20 the
Court held that the provisions of the Labor
Code on the entitlement to the benefits of
holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides
for both the coverage of and exclusion from
the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the
then Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is
principally intended for daily paid employees,
when the law clearly states that every worker
shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is
a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive
of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states
that "All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor." Moreover, it shall always be
presumed that the legislature intended to
enact a valid and permanent statute which
would have the most beneficial effect that its
language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155
A. 112.)
In the case of PAFLU v. BLR,18 the Court
dismissed the petition of PAFLU on the
ground that it is crystal clear from the
provisions that written consent of the
employees only applies to certification
Lastly, in the case of Navarro v. Executive
Secretary,21 the Court held that State policies
are the very reason for the enactment of the
Local Government Code (LGC), with the
view to attain decentralization and
countryside development. Congress saw
that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang
337, had to be replaced with a new law, now
16
19
17
20
G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967
G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984
18 G.R. No. 79347, January 26, 1989
G.R. No. L-49774, February 24, 1981
G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984
21 G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and
cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as
an archipelagic country. This accounts for
the exemption from the land area
requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as
expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450
of the LGC, with respect to the creation of
municipalities and cities, but inadvertently
omitted from Section 461 with respect to the
creation of provinces. Hence, the void or
missing detail was filled in by the Oversight
Committee in the LGC-IRR.
How to Ascertain Legislative Intent?
Intention of the legislator must be
ascertained, not from the consideration of a
single word or a particular phrase of the law,
but from the context of the whole law or from
a portion thereof as compared with the
whole. (Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino)22
END Law Notes
Sociis) provides that where a particular word
or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its true meaning may be made
clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it
is associated. (Aisporna v. CA)24
It is a rule of statutory construction that "when
the language of a particular section of a
statute admits of more than one construction,
that construction which gives effect to the
evident purpose and object sought to be
attained by the enactment of the statute as a
whole, must be followed." A statute's clauses
and phrases should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts. (Sanciangco v. Rono)25
Legislative intent regarding certain laws:
The rule is that all the provisions of the law
even if apparently contradictory, should be
allowed to stand and given effect by
reconciling them if necessary. Consequently,
each part of section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so
as to produce a harmonious whole. (Araneta
v. Conception)23
1. Veteran Pension Law
Veteran pension law which must be
accorded a liberal construction and
interpretation in order to favor those
entitled to the rights, privileges and
benefits granted thereunder, among
which are the right to resume old
positions
in
the
government,
educational benefits, the privilege to
take promotional examinations, a life
pension for the incapacitated,
pensions for widow and children,
hospitalization and medical care
benefits.
A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible. The meaning of the law,
it must be borne in mind, is not to be
extracted from any single part, portion or
section or from isolated words and phrases,
clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole.
Every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context. This means
that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment, not separately and
independently. More importantly, the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
22
23
G.R. No. L-22678, January 12, 1925
G.R. No. L-9667, July 31, 1956
The purpose of Congress in granting
veteran pensions is to compensate,
as far as may be, a class of men who
suffered in the service for the
hardships they endured and the
dangers they encountered, and more
particularly, those who have become
incapacitated for work owing to
sickness,
disease
or
injuries
24
25
G.R. No. L-39419, April 12, 1982
G.R. No. L-68709, July 19, 1985
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
sustained while in line of duty. A
veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude
to and recognition of those who
rendered service for the country,
especially during times of war or
revolution, by extending to them
regular monetary aid. For this reason,
it is the general rule that a liberal
construction is given to pension
statutes in favor of those entitled to
pension. Courts tend to favor the
pensioner, but such constructional
preference is to be considered with
other guides to interpretation, and a
construction of pension laws must
depend on its own particular
language. (Board of Administrators v.
Bautista)26
2. Dangerous Drugs Act
In order to effectively fulfill the intent
of the law to rehabilitate drug users,
this Court thus calls on law enforcers
and prosecutors in dangerous drugs
cases to exercise proper discretion in
filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs is only and solely in
the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec.
15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated,
the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs
should only be done when another
separate quantity of dangerous
drugs, other than mere residue, is
found in the possession of the
accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
To file charges under Sec. 11 on the
basis of residue alone would frustrate
the objective of the law to rehabilitate
drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second
chance at life. (People v. Martinez)27
26
G.R. No. L-37867, February 22, 1982
27
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
Subjects of Constructions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Constitution;
Statutes;
Ordinances; and
Presidential Decree
1. Constitution
Is the issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress a
violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of church and state?
No. It was held by the Court in the case of
Aglipay v. Ruiz,28 that the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any
sectarian denomination. The stamps were
not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that church. On the contrary, it appears from
the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5,
1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist to this country." The officials
concerned merely, took advantage of an
event considered of international importance
"to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people."
Is it required, under the Constitution, for
the “Heads of Bureau” (ex. Bureau of
Customs) to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments?
No. The Court held in the case of Sarmiento
III v. Mison,29 that it is evident that the
position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact,
28
29
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
END Law Notes
as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments
need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
The power to appoint is fundamentally
executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications of such power
should be strictly construed against them.
Such limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. But,
it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII where it is clearly stated that
appointments by the President to the
positions therein enumerated require the
consent
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Is the imposition of income tax to the
salary of judges or justices constitute
diminution of benefits in violation of the
Constitution?
In the case of Perfecto v. Meer,30 the Court
ruled that the undiminishable character of
judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of
judges — personal and therefore waivable —
but a basic limitation upon legislative or
executive action imposed in the public
interest. Hence, not subject to any
diminution. Also, it was also confirmed in the
case of Endencia v. David,31 that when a
judicial officer assumed office, he does not
exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is
already attached to his office, provided and
secured by the fundamental law, not
primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his
independence of judicial thought and action.
30
31
G.R. No. L-2348, February 27, 1950
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
However, in the case of Nitafan v. CIR,32 the
non-taxability of salaries of judges and
justices was laid to rest when the Court held
that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable (the phrase
“nor subjected to income tax” was deleted).
The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.
Is the President prohibited to appoint a
Chief Justice two months immediately
before the coming of the next Presidential
election?
No. In the case of De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council,33 the Court held that the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to
the Judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates
that the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers,
but purposely made to reflect their intention
and manifest their vision of what the
Constitution should contain.
END Law Notes
specifically providing for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices. In particular,
Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made
by the President upon the submission of a list
of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the
Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in
the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15
and 16 of the Article.
Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have
no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition
to appointments in the Judiciary, because
their establishment of the JBC and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Section 4(1) and
Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory
construction that the ascertainment of the
purpose of the enactment is a step in the
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning
of the enactment, because the reason for the
32
33
G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
enactment
must
necessarily
shed
considerable light on the law of the statute,
i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should
be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose, and the court should
seek to carry out this purpose rather than to
defeat it.
2. Statutes
Definition of “Statute”
Statute is the written will of the legislature
solemnly expressed in according to form
necessary to constitute it as the law of the
state.
END Law Notes
Applies only to a specific person or
subject.
Kinds of Statutes as to Application:
1. Mandatory Law
Law
which
commands
something be done.
that
2. Prohibitory Law
Law
which
commands
something should not be done.
that
Kinds of Statutes as to Performance and
Effectivity:
Kinds of Statutes as to Scope:
1. Permanent
1. General Law
Applies to the whole state and
operates throughout the state alike
upon all people or all of a class. (Ex.
Civil Code of the Philippines, Tax
Code, Labor Code, etc.)
2. Special Law
Relates to particular person or things
of a class or to a particular
community, individual or thing. (Ex.
Violence Against Women and
Children Act, etc.)
3. Local Law
A law which relates or operates over
a particular locality instead of over the
whole territory of the state. (Ex.
Ordinances, etc.)
Kinds of Statutes as to Interested Parties:
1. Public Law
Affects the public at large.
2. Private Law
One whose operation is not limited in
duration but continues until repealed.
2. Temporary
Duration is for a limited period of time
fixed in the statute itself or whose life
ceases upon the happening of an
event.
Kinds of Statutes as to Purpose and
Nature:
1. Penal
A statute that defines criminal
offenses and specify corresponding
fines and punishments.
2. Remedial
A statute providing means or method
whereby causes of action may be
effectuated, wrongs redressed and
relief obtained.
3. Curative
A form of retrospective legislation
which reaches back into the past to
operate upon past events, acts or
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
transactions in order to correct errors
and irregularities and to render valid
and effective many attempted acts
which otherwise be ineffective for the
purpose intended.
1. Title
Heading of the preliminary part,
furnishing the name by which the act
is individually known.
As a general rule, can a law be applied
retrospectively?
In the case of City of Baguio v.
Marcos,35 the Court ruled in favor of
the respondent who sought to reopen
the cadastral proceedings because
the law itself (R.A. 931), by reading its
title, expressly gave them the right to
institute such case.
The court held in the case of Castro v.
Sagales,34 that statute does not thereby
operate retroactively; it is made to operate
upon claims formulated after the law's
approval.
The Court also ruled in the case of
Ebarle v. Sucaldito,36 that the reliance
of
the
petitioner-governor
to
Executive Order No. 264 should not
be countenanced. The very title of EO
264 speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no
mention, not even by implication, of
criminal "offenses," that is to say,
"crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order
could have very well referred to the
more specific term had it intended to
make itself applicable thereto.
Therefore, it is plain from the very
wording of the Order that it has
exclusive
application
to
administrative,
not
criminal
complaints.
"A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is one
which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or consideration already past.
Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating
to remedies or modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy
or confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a
retrospective law, or the general rule against
the retrospective operation of statutes"
It is argued that Republic Act No. 772 should
not be enforced as to accidents happening
before its approval, because it has
introduced changes affecting vested rights of
the parties. Without going into details, it
might be admitted that changes as to
substantive rights will not govern such
"previous" accidents. Yet here we are
dealing with remedies and jurisdiction which
the Legislature has power to determine and
apportion. And then it is hard to imagine how
one litigant could acquire a vested right to be
heard by one particular court, even before he
has submitted himself to that particular
court's jurisdiction.
Also, in the case of Lidasan v.
Commission on Elections,37 the Court
invalidated Republic Act No. 4790
because it has a defective title. The
Court held that the subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of
command."
Compliance
is
imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text
of the bill. In fact, in the case of House
Parts of a Statute:
34
35
G.R. No. L-6359, December 29, 1953
G.R. No. L-26100, February 28, 1969
36
37
G.R. No. L-33628, December 29, 1987
G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
Bill 1247, which became Republic Act
4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives where the
bill, being of local application,
originated.
persons interested, should be kept in
mind by the court.
The baneful effect of the defective
title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform
the members of Congress as to the
full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and
in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province
of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by
the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Of course, the Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. And this, to lead
them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.
2. Preamble
The part of a statute explaining the
reason for its enactment and the
objects sought to be accomplished.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is
whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not
be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that
the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope
of the act, is bad.
In the case of People v. Echaves,38
the Court dismissed the case against
the accused because Republic Act
No. 5440 punishes squatting in urban
communities and not applicable to
agricultural lands. The law does not
apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended
to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas
made by well-to-do individuals.
Also in the case of People v.
Purisima,39 the Court also dismissed
the case that was filed against the
accused because the preamble of
P.D. No. 9 expressly states that the
carrying of the bladed weapon should
be aimed at creating subversion,
rebellion,
insurrection,
lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, aid
In
determining
sufficiency
of
particular title its substance rather
than its form should be considered,
and the purpose of the constitutional
requirement, of giving notice to all
38
G.R. No. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980
39
G.R. No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
public disorder before
accused be penalized.
the
END Law Notes
said
That part of the statute which
announces the prior statutes or
specifies provisions which have been
abrogated by reason of the
enactment of the new law.
3. Enacting Clause
That part of the statute which
declares its enactment and serves to
identify it as an act of legislation
proceeding
from
the
proper
legislative authority.
6. Saving
A restriction in a repealing act, which
is intended to save rights, pending
proceedings, penalties, etc., from the
annihilation which would result from
unrestricted repeal.
4. Body
The main and operative part of the
statute containing its substantive and
even procedural provisions. Provisos
and exceptions may also be found in
the body of the statute.
7. Separability
That part of the statute which
provides that in the event that one or
more provisions are declared void or
unconstitutional,
the
remaining
provisions shall still be in force.
In the case of Aboitiz v. City of
Cebu,40 the Court invalidated
Ordinance No. 207 which was
enacted by the City of Cebu because
the power to tax is an attribute of
sovereignty and for it to be exercised
by a municipal corporation requires a
clear delegation of the power by
means of charter grant or by a
general enabling statute.
8. Date of Effectivity
That part of the statute which
announces the effective date of the
law.
9. When is the publication to be made
and when the publication to be
made?
Legislative
intent
must
be
ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision
alone. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. For taken in
the abstract, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word
or phrase is considered with those
with which it is associated. Thus an
apparently general provision may
have a limited application if viewed
together with other provisions.
Laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their
publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided.41
Also, it was held in the landmark case
of Tanada v. Tuvera,42 that the
publication of laws are so significant
because without publication, the
people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much
less a definite way of informing
5. Repealing
40
41
G.R. No. L-14526, March 31, 1965
Art. 2 of the New Civil Code
42
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees.
3. Ordinances
What is the essential requisite of a valid
ordinance?
It was held in the case of Primicias v.
Municipality of Urdaneta,43 that an essential
requisite for a valid ordinance is, among
others, that is "must not contravene . . . the
statute," for it is a "fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state."
Following this general rule, whenever there
is a conflict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance "must give way.
Can a prior special law be repealed by a
subsequent general law?
No. the rule commonly said is that a prior
special law is not ordinarily repealed by a
subsequent general law. The fact that one is
special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the
general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case.
Exception to the general rule:
However, it was held in the case of Bagatsing
v. Ramirez,44 that the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a
subject in general, which the general statute
treats in particular. The exactly is the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general,
i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax
Code relates to "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances
in general, the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that
43
44
G.R. No. L-26702, October 18, 1979
G.R. No. L-41631, December 17, 1976
END Law Notes
dominant force loses its continuity when it
approaches the realm of "ordinances levying
or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. There, the Local Tax Code
controls. Here, as always, a general
provision must give way to a particular
provision.
4. Presidential Decrees
Will a special law, like a Presidential
Decree, prevail over a general law, like the
National Internal Revenue Code?
The court held in the case of Commissioner
v. Philippine Airlines,45 that between
Presidential Decree No. 1520, on one hand,
which is a special law specifically governing
the franchise of PAL, issued on 11 June
1978; and the NIRC of 1997, on the other,
which is a general law on national internal
revenue taxes, that took effect on 1 January
1998, the former prevails. The rule is that on
a specific matter, the special law shall prevail
over the general law, which shall be resorted
to only to supply deficiencies in the former.
In addition, where there are two statutes, the
earlier special and the later general the terms
of the general broad enough to include the
matter provided for in the special the fact that
one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception to
the general, one as a general law of the land,
the other as the law of a particular case. It is
a canon of statutory construction that a later
statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute.
45
G.R. No. 180066, July 7, 2009
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed. No person should be brought
within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by
the statute. (U. S. vs. Madrigal, 27 Phil.
Rep., 347.)
1. Penal Statutes
General Rule:
A maxim in statutory construction
mandates that penal statutes should be
strictly construed against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. The
phrase, truly, may not be a mere clich
but, so also, it is not meant to wrongly
shield an accused from criminal liability. 46
In the case of US v. Abad Santos,47 the
Court held that it will not hold one person
criminally responsible for the acts of
another,
committed
without
his
knowledge or consent, unless there is a
statute requiring it so plain in its terms
that there is no doubt of the intention of
the Legislature.
A penal law cannot make an act
punishable in a manner in which it was
not
punishable
when
committed
(Prospective application of criminal law).
If the penal statute is clear and
unambiguous, it should not be strictly
construed against the State
Exception to the General Rule:
Whenever a new statute dealing with
crime establishes conditions more lenient
or favorable to the accused, it can be
given a retroactive effect.
The Court held in the case of People v.
Gachalian,48 that the final claim of
appellee is that inasmuch as the
provisions of the law (Minimum Wage
Law) under which he was prosecuted are
ambiguous and there is doubt as to their
interpretation, that doubt should be
resolved in his favor because a penal
statute should be strictly construed
against the State. This contention must
also fail if we are to be consistent with our
interpretation of the provisions of Section
15 (a) of the law. We have stated that that
section is clear and unambiguous and
covers the provisions embodied in
Section 3 of the law, and if such is the
case then there is no room for the
application of the principle invoked by
appellee.
Exception to the exception:
Where the offender is a habitual criminal
or when the new law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions or
existing causes of action.
Who is considered as a habitual
criminal/delinquent?
A person shall be deemed to be a
habitual delinquent if within a period of 10
years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robbery, theft,
estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty
of any said crimes a third time or oftener.
Violation of BP 22 constitutes malum
prohibitum
In case of doubt, how should a penal
law be construed?
46
Meriz v. People, G.R. No. 134498, November
13, 2001
47 G.R. No. L-12262, February 10, 1917
The Court held in the case of Meriz v.
People49 that the gravamen of the
offense under BP 22 is the act of making
48
49
G.R. Nos. L-12011-14, September 30, 1958
G.R. No. 134498, November 13, 2001
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares the
offense to be one of malum prohibitum.
The only valid query then is whether the
law has been breached, i.e., by the mere
act of issuing a bad check, without so
much regard as to the criminal intent of
the issuer.
The element of knowledge involves a
state of mind that obviously would be
difficult to establish; hence, the statute
itself creates a prima facie presumption
of knowledge on the insufficiency of
funds or credit coincidental with the
attendance of the two other elements.
The essential elements of the offense
penalized under BP 22 are (1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
The prima facie presumption that the
drawer
has
knowledge
of
the
insufficiency of funds or credit at the time
of the issuance, or on the presentment for
payment, of the check might be rebutted
by payment of the value of the check
either by the drawer or by the drawee
bank within five banking days from notice
of the dishonor given to the drawer. The
payment could thus be a complete
defense that would lie regardless of the
strength of the evidence offered by the
prosecution.
2. Tax Statutes
50
END Law Notes
How to interpret the exempting
provision of Tax Statutes?
The rule is that the exempting provision
is to be construed liberally in favor of the
taxing authority and strictly against
exemption from tax liability, the result
being that statutory provisions for the
refund of taxes are strictly construed in
favor of the State and against the
taxpayer (82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958;
Helvering vs. Northwest Steel Rolling
Mills, 311 US 46 85 L. ed. 29 S. Ct., 51
Am. Jur. p. 526).
In the case of La Carlota v. Jimenez,50
the Court held that Central is not entitled
to a tax refund because it is clear that
imported fertilizers are exempt from the
payment of the 17% tax only if the same
were imported by planters or farmers
directly or through their cooperatives.
Since Central "is not the planter
ultimately benefited by the fertilizers,
much less a cooperative within the
purview of Rep. Act No. 601, as
amended", the only possible conclusion
is that the imported fertilizers in question
are not entitled to the exemption provided
by law.
How to interpret tax statutes in case of
doubt?
It is the general rule in the interpretation
of statutes levying taxes or duties not to
extend their provisions beyond the clear
import of the language used. In every
case of doubt, such statutes are
construed most strongly against the
Government and in favor of the citizen,
because burdens are not to be imposed,
nor presumed to be imposed, beyond
what the statutes expressly and clearly
import. (U. S. vs. Wigglesworth [1842], 2
Story, 369; Froehlich & Kuttner vs.
Collector of Customs [1911], 18 Phil.,
461.)
G.R. No. L-12436, May 31, 1961
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
Hence, it was held in the case of Manila
Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of
Customs,51 that the trial judge was
correct in classifying dust shields
(manufactured of wool and hair mixed)
under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the
Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to
classify them under paragraph 141 of the
same section of the law, a provision
imposing a higher rate of tax. In
classifying the same, the Court took into
account the purpose of the article and
then acknowledging that it is in reality
used as a detached part or railways
vehicles. The second point is that
paragraph 141 is a general provision
while paragraph 197 is a special
provision. Where there is in the same
statute a particular enactment and also a
general one which is embraced in the
former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general enactment
must be taken to effect only such cases
within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular
enactment.
END Law Notes
indispensable requirement of law, the
non-fulfillment of which initiates the sale.
3. Labor Statutes
It should be noted that Article 4 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this
Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor
of labor."
In the case of Villavert v. ECC,53 the
Court ruled in favor of the mother of the
late Marcelino with regard to her claim to
the death benefit of the latter. It was
found out that there is no evidence at all
that Marcelino had a "bout of alcoholic
intoxication" (a sign of pancreatitis)
shortly before he died. Neither is there a
showing that he used drugs. Hence, the
Court ordered GSIS to pay for the death
benefit of Marcelino.
However, there is no room for
interpretation in case the provision of the
Labor Code is clear.
Notice of sale to the delinquent land
owners and to the public in general is
an essential and indispensable
requirement
In the case of Del Rosario v. NLRC,54 the
Court upheld the ruling of the NLRC
holding the petitioner and the Security
agency jointly and severally liable with
regard to the under-payment of wages
that was alleged by the employeessecurity guards.
It was held in the case of Serfino v. CA,52
that the assailed decision of the appellate
court declares that the prescribed
procedure in auction sales of property for
tax delinquency being in derogation of
property rights should be followed
punctiliously. Strict adherence to the
statutes governing tax sales is imperative
not only for the protection of the tax
payers, but also to allay any possible
suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to
enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the
delinquent land owners and to the public
in general is an essential and
51
52
G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929
G.R. No. L-40858, September 15, 1987
The Court ruled that when petitioner
entered into a Contract of Services with
the Security Agency and the latter hired
complainants to work as guards for the
former, petitioner became an indirect
employer of respondents-complainants
pursuant to the unequivocal terms of
Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code,
as amended:
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor .—
53
54
G.R. No. L-48605 December 14, 1981
G.R. No. L-64204, May 31, 1985
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
the officers of Philsa Construction and
Trading Co., Inc.
In the event that the contractor or
subcontractor fails to pay the wages of
his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shag be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the
contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
With regard to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the presumption of
compensability subsists in favor of the
claimant.
The Court held in the case of Manahan v.
ECC,56 that in case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the worker,
and that social legislations – like the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the
Labor Code – should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable
objective, i.e., to give relief to the
workman and/or his dependents in the
event that the former should die or
sustain an injury.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. —The
provisions of the immediately preceding
Article shall likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer, contracts
with an independent contractor for the
performance of any work, task, job or
project.
But if the claim for differentials and
benefits is directed to the foreign
employer, the valid and legal claims
arising from such violation will be applied
to the cash and surety bond of the PH
Recruiter filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) pursuant to POEA’s rules and
regulations which states:
Hence, the Court in this case properly
ordered GSIS to pay compensation
benefits to Maria with regard to the death
compensation benefit of her husband
Nazario who died due to “Enteric Fever.”
4. Naturalization Laws
"Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the
applicant"
The bonds shall answer for all valid and
legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the
license or authority and contracts of
employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee
compliance
with
the
provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations
relating to recruitment and placement,
the rules of the Administration and
relevant issuances of the Ministry and all
liabilities which the Administration may
impose.
In the case of Co v. Republic,57 the Court
denied the naturalization of the petitioner
on the ground that he did not file his
income tax return. The Court held that
our law also requires that petitioner must
have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the
community in which he is living.
Apparently, failure to file his income tax
return explicitly manifested that he has
not conducted himself properly in his
relation with our government. Hence, the
Hence, it was proper for the Court in the
case of Del Rosario v. NLRC,55 to dismiss
the writ of execution that was filed against
55
56
G.R. No. 85416, July 24, 1990
G.R. No. L-44899, April 22, 1981
57
G.R. No. L-12150, May 26, 1960
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
petition for
granted.
naturalization
was
END Law Notes
not
line with the public policy behind
probation, the right of appeal should not
be irrevocably lost from the moment a
convicted accused files an application for
probation. Appeal and probation spring
from the same policy considerations of
justice, humanity, and compassion.
But in the case of Pe v. Republic,58 the
Court granted the naturalization petition
of the brothers-petitioners even though
there is only one character reference who
testified in the proceedings because the
other witness, Panfilo Chua, could not
testify because he died shortly before
said hearing. The Court stated that it was
a valid excuse.
In the case of Yusi v. Morales,60 the Court
held that the “waiver rule” under the
Probation Law is unwarranted because it
is in the best interests of justice that the
court should take the necessary steps to
insure that the accused has been fully
apprised of the full import of his
application before the court acts on it.
Apparently, the Court found out that the
fact that the petitioners’ counsel of record
was not present when the petitioners
applied for probation with regard to their
estafa case.
However, in the case of Velasco v.
Republic,59 the Court ruled the
naturalization of the petitioner when he
had a convenient arrangement with his
family in order to show a token
compliance with the requirement of the
law that to become a Filipino citizen one
must have a lucrative income or
occupation. Apparently, the Court found
out that the Wilson Drug Store is partly
owned by his mother who has one-fifth
capital investment therein.
Also, in the case of Colinares v. People,61
the Court upheld the accused petition for
probation. The Court held that it is true
that under the probation law the accused
who appeals from the judgment of
conviction is disqualified from availing
himself of the benefits of probation. But,
as it happens, two judgments of
conviction have been meted out to Arnel:
one, a conviction for frustrated homicide
by the regional trial court, now set aside;
and, two, a conviction for attempted
homicide by the Supreme Court.
5. Probation Laws
Application for probation is an admission
of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of
conviction and that the application for
probation is considered a waiver upon his
part to file an appeal, it is in the best
interests of justice that the court should
take the necessary steps to insure that
the accused has been fully apprised of
the full import of his application before the
court acts on it.
The Probation Law, said the Court in
Francisco, requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail himself of probation. This
requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto
wager on the result of his appealthat
when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation
as an escape hatch thus rendering
The underlying philosophy of probation is
indeed one of liberality towards the
accused. It is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. Probation is a major step
taken by our Government towards the
deterrence and minimizing of crime and
the humanization of criminal justice. In
58
59
G.R. Nos. L-7872-73, July 20, 1956
G.R. No. L-14214, May 25, 1960
60
61
G.R. No. L-61958, April 28, 1983
G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
In the case of Bello v. CA,63 the Court
held that in the construction of Rules of
Court, the Court is all the more so bound
to liberally construe them to avoid
injustice, discrimination and unfairness
and to supply the void — that is certainly
within the spirit and purpose of the Rule
to
eliminate
repugnancy
and
inconsistency — by holding as it does
now that courts of first instance are
equally bound as the higher courts not to
dismiss misdirected appeals timely made
but to certify them to the proper appellate
court. Hence, the Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and
ordered the petitioner to appeal the
judgment to the CA. In this case, the
Court liberally construed the Rules of
Court since they were confronted with the
thorny question (which has confused
many a practitioner), whether or not
municipal and city court’s judgment
should be taken directly to the Court of
Appeals or Courts of First Instance.
nugatory the appellate courts affirmance
of his conviction.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel
raised the issue of correctness of the
penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his
conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called
for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to
the level where the law would allow him
to apply for probation.
As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his
dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege
to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter;
to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the
Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal
law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
7. Expropriation Law
6. Rules of Court
The exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether directly by the State, or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule
in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property
is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the
plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides for the basic rule of thumb that
said "rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote its objective and to
assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding."
The Court held in the case of Imperial
Insurance Inc. v. Rosete,62 that the
respondent judge was unnecessarily
harsh when the Rules call for liberality in
such cases when he declared the
petitioner in default even though the
counsel for the private respondent
manifested to the respondent judge his
willingness to give the petitioner an
opportunity to comply with the
requirement of the court.
62
63
G.R. No. L-55630, March 6, 1990
G.R. No. L-38161, March 29, 1974
In the case of The City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila,64 the
Court
strictly
interpreted
the
expropriation action made by the City of
64
G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
Manila because there is no proof that
there is really a necessity to expropriate
and open the portion of the cemetery in
order to create an extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila.
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
LATIN RULES
ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by, the
legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently.
1. Verba Legis
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis
derived from the maxim, index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.65
The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to: have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the provision admit of any
qualification. If in the wisdom of the
Court, there may be a ground or grounds
for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of
exception,
such
as
when
the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due
to ensuing strained relations between the
employer and the employee.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is
that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There
is only room for application. As the
statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It
is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or “speech is the index of
intention.” Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum,
or “from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.”66
Also, it was held in the case of Victoria v.
COMELEC,68 the Court held that the law
is clear that the ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of the votes
obtained by each winning candidate of
the total number of registered voters who
actually voted. In such a case, the Court
has no recourse but to merely apply the
law. The courts may not speculate as to
the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words.
In the case of Globe-Makay Cable and
Radio Corporation v. NLRC,67 the Court
held that the wording of the Labor Code
is clear and unambiguous: "An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to
his full backwages. . . ." Under the
principles of statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from
65
Victoria vs Comelec, G.R. No. 109005, January
10, 1994
66 Bolos vs Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20,
2010
Lastly, in the case of Garcia
COMELEC,69 the Court held that
literal interpretation of Sec. 251 of
Omnibus Election Code is that only
winning
candidates
have
67
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994
69 G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015
68
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
v.
the
the
the
the
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
demandable right to be furnished a copy
of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (COCP). Second, it
amplifies the general rule that the
prescriptive period ought to be reckoned
from the actual date of proclamation, not
from notice through service of a COCP,
since the losing candidates are not even
required to be served a copy of the
COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns
the candidates to be more vigilant in
monitoring the results of the elections for
them to be conscious of the deadline for
filing an election protest, should they opt
to contest the results. Hence, the Court
reversed the COMELEC En Banc
decision in favor of Payumo and declared
that the latter filed out of period with
regard to his election protest.
spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law controls its letter.70
In the case of Paras v. COMELEC,71 the
Court held that the evident intent of
Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his
term of office. Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective
local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year
of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to
petitioner's interpretation of the phrase
regular local election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term.
2. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis
The spirit rather than the letter of the law.
A statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit
is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Put a bit differently,
that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as
if within the letter; and that which is within
the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to
interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent
of the law and its legislators.
3. Mens Legislatoris
Legislative intent or intent of the
legislature or mens legislatoris is a
controlling factor in the construction and
interpretation of a law. The letter of the
law gives way to the true intent of the
legislature. And when a statute is
susceptible
of
more
than
one
construction, the Courts shall adopt the
construction which will most tend to give
effect to the intent of the legislature.
In the case of Matabuena v. Cervantes,72
the Court invalidated the donation that
was made by the respondent’s deceased
husband because the ban on donation
between spouses, as enunciated in Art.
133 of the Civil Code, also applies to a
common law relationship. Apparently, the
said donation was made in 1956 before
they were married in 1962.
The legislative intent is not at all times
accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience,
an absurd situation or injustice. To
obviate this aberration, and bearing in
mind the principle that the intent or the
70
League of Cities of the Philippines vs Comelec,
G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009
The policy of the law which embodies a
deeply-rooted notion of what is just and
what is right would be nullified if such
71
72
G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
irregular relationship instead of being
visited with disabilities would be attended
with benefits. Certainly a legal norm
should not be susceptible to such a
reproach. If there is ever any occasion
where the principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit
of the law is as much a part of it as what
is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained.
Whatever omission may be apparent in
an interpretation purely literal of the
language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the
language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu
que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha
de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación
de sus disposiciones.”
The law may be harsh but that is the law.
In the case of People v. Macarandang,74
the Court held that the appointment of the
accused as secret agent to the assist in
the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detention of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of
a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
However, the case of People v.
Macarandang was later on reversed in
the case of People v. Mapa,75 wherein
the Court ruled that the law cannot be any
clearer. No provision is made for a secret
agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task
is equally clear. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."
In the case of Prasnik v. Republic,73 the
Court held that the law evidently intends
to allow adoption whether the child be
recognized or not. If the intention were to
allow adoption only to unrecognized
children, as contended, then the
provision of Article 338 would be of no
useful purpose because such children
could have been validly adopted even
without it. And we say so because a
natural child not recognized has no right
whatever and being considered legally a
total stranger to his parents, he may be
adopted under Article 337. The same
cannot be said with regard to an
acknowledged natural child because, his
filiation having already been established,
his adoption cannot be made under the
general principles governing adoption (2
Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore
need of an express provision allowing the
adoption of an acknowledged natural
child as an exception to the rule and that
is what is contemplated in the article we
are considering.
But in the case of People v. Escudero,76
the Court ruled that the appellant was
issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal
protection. It also appears that appellant
was informed by Col. Maristela that it was
not necessary for him to apply for a
license or to register the said firearm
because it was government property and
therefore could not legally be registered
or licensed in appellant's name. Capt.
Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant
received the firearm also informed the
latter that no permit to carry the pistol was
necessary "because you are already
appointed as CIS agent."
It should be noted that at the time the
accused committed the crime (1962), the
prevailing jurisprudence is People v.
4. Dura Lex Sed Lex
73
74
G.R. No. L-8639, March 23, 1956
G.R. No. L-12088, December 23, 1959
75
76
G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967
G.R. No. L-22291, November 15, 1976
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
Macarandang.77 The case of People v.
Mapa was only promulgated in 1967,
which is subsequent to the date of
commission of the crime.
provided in sections 199, 200, and 201
who must and who may bring such
actions; and it is very clear that it was his
intention to give such right to those
expressly mentioned in the above-cited
sections and to no other, following the
well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that
the above referred to three sections only
mention the Attorney-General, the
provincial fiscal, and the individual
claiming to be entitled to the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another.
It is to be inferred from this last provision
that the individual who does not claim to
have such a right cannot bring an action
for usurpation of public office.
5. Expresio Unius
This statutory construction principle
states that: where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it
may
not,
by
interpretation
or
construction, be extended to others. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.78
Also, in the case of Green Star Express
Inc.
v.
Nissin-Universal
Robina
Corporation,83 the Court held that under
the new Rules, service of summons upon
an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized. The rule now likewise states
"general manager" instead of "manager";
"corporate secretary" instead of merely
"secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of
"cashier." It has now become restricted,
limited, and exclusive only to the persons
enumerated in the aforementioned
provision, following the rule in statutory
construction that the express mention of
one person excludes all others, or
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Service must, therefore, be made only on
the persons expressly listed in the rules.
If the revision committee intended to
liberalize the rule on service of summons,
it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language.
Exceptions:
1) When adherence to such will lead to
incongruities and in a violation of the
equal protection clause of the
Constitution79
2) When enumeration not intended to be
exclusive80
3) No reason exists why a person or
thing is excluded81
In the case of Acosta v. Flor,82 the Court
held that if the legislator had intended to
give to all citizens alike the right to
maintain an action for usurpation of
public office, he would have plainly said
so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of
such far-reaching importance. A simple
provision would have sufficed for this
purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on
the contrary especially and specifically
77
G.R. No. L-12088, December 23, 1959
Martin Centeno vs. Victoria Villalon-Pornillos,
G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994; Lerum vs.
Cruz, G.R. No. L-2783, November 29, 1950
79 Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
88979, February 7, 1992
78
80
Manabat vs. de Aquino, G.R. No. L-5558, April
29, 1953; Escribano vs. Avila; G.R. No. L-30375,
September 12, 1978
81 People vs. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, July
31, 1962; Primero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
48468-69, November 22, 1989
82 G.R. No. 2122, September 13, 1905
83 G.R. No. 181517, July 06, 2015
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
Lastly, in the case of PAGCOR v. BIR,84
the Court held that the legislative intent,
as shown by the discussions in the
Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to
require PAGCOR to pay corporate
income tax; hence, the omission or
removal of PAGCOR from exemption
from the payment of corporate income
tax. It is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others as expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Thus, the express
mention of the GOCCs exempted from
payment of corporate income tax
excludes all others. Not being excepted,
petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as
coming within the purview of the general
rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate
income tax.
applicable only to things of the same kind
or class as those specifically referred to.
It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to
obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.
However, in the case of US v. Sto. Nino,87
the Court ruled that an iron bar with an
iron ball falls within the purview of "other
deadly weapon" as stated under Act No.
1780. In the said case the Court clarified
that the proviso to the Act clearly
indicates that in the view of the legislature
the carrying of an unlicensed revolver
would be a violation of the Act. By the
proviso it manifested its intention to
include in the prohibition weapons other
than the armas blancas (knives)
therein specified.
6. Ejusdem Generis
Under the well-known principle of
ejusdem generis, the general words
following
any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind
or class as those specifically referred
to.85
But in the case of Parayno v.
Jovellanos,88 the Court ruled that the
maxim ejusdem generis is not applicable
in the present case. Instead, what
applied in this case was the legal maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius
which means that the express mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of others.
In the case of Mutuc v. COMELEC,86 the
Court held that the use of tape jingle for
campaign purposes is not included
among those propaganda gadgets (i.e.
being made of pens, lighters, fans,
flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
and cigarettes, and concluding with the
words "and the like.") that are prohibited
to be disseminated pursuant to the
Constitutional Convention Act.
Hence, because of the distinct and
definite meanings alluded to the two
terms by the zoning ordinance,
respondents could not insist that
"gasoline service station" under Section
44 necessarily included "gasoline filling
station" under Section 21. Indeed, the
activities undertaken in a "gas service
station" did not automatically embrace
those in a "gas filling station."
What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle
of ejusdem generis, the general words
following
any enumeration being
Hence,
the
Court
directed
the
Municipality of Calasiao to cease and
desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50
84
86
85
87
G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011
Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717,
November 26, 1970
G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970
G.R. No. L-5000, March 11, 1909
88 G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
against petitioner insofar as it seeks to
close down or transfer her gasoline
station to another location.
administrative remedy provided by law
should first be exhausted.
8. Noscitur a Sociis
7. Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus
Est
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
the meaning of questionable words or
phrases in a statute may be ascertained
by reference to the meaning of words or
phrases associated with it.
Under the said rule, a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted
intentionally.89
In the case of Sanciangco v. Rono,92
Justice Teehankee dissents and says
that the basic position of barangay
captain and ABC president held by him
are essentially elective. He cannot fall
under Section 13(l) of the Act which
refers to purely appointive officials,
including active officers and members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
officials and employees of governmentowned and controlled corporations,
under the statutory construction rule of
noscitur a sociis.
90
In the case of People v. Manantan, the
Court ruled that the maxim "casus
omisus" can operate and apply only if
and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown
that the legislature did not exclude or omit
justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section
54 of the Revised Election Code, justices
of the peace were just called "judges."
Also, in the case of Aisporna v. CA,93 the
Court held that considering that the
definition of an insurance agent as found
in the second paragraph (Sec. 189 of the
Insurance law) is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive a compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the
first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
The appellate court has established
ultimately that the petitioner-accused did
not receive any compensation for the
issuance of the insurance policy of
Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the
accused was convicted by the appellate
court for, according to the latter, the
receipt of compensation for issuing an
insurance policy is not an essential
element for a violation of the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
But in the case of Rufino Lopez & Sons
Inc. v. CTA,91 the Court ruled that it is
more reasonable and logical to hold that
in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature
meant and intended to say, the
Commissioner of Customs, instead of
Collector of Customs in the first
paragraph and the first part of the second
paragraph of said section. By doing so,
Sec. 7 and Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 1125 will
be in harmony.
However, the Court still dismissed the
petition on the ground that the decision of
Collector of Customs should be further
elevated to the Commissioner of
Customs before applying for a judicial
relief based on the sound rule that before
one resorts to the Courts, the
89
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31,
1962
90 G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
91
G.R. No. L-9274, February 1, 1957
G.R. No. L-68709, July 19, 1985
93 G.R. No. L-39419, April 12, 1982
92
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
In the said case, the Court applied the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) which provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement
is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made clear and specific
by considering the company in which it is
found or with which it is associated.
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF WORDS AND PHRASES
It is well settled that the word "may" is
merely permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon a party. Under ordinary
circumstances, the term "may be"
connotes possibility; it does not connote
certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission
or possibility.96
a. Ordinary Meaning
It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without any
interpretation. Not only that; in the matter
of interpretation of laws on probation, the
Court has pronounced that "the policy of
liberality of probation statutes cannot
prevail against the categorical provisions
of the law."94
In the case of Capati v. Ocampo,97 the
Court ruled that stipulation as to venue in
the contract in question is simply
permissive. By the said stipulation, the
parties did not agree to file their suits
solely and exclusively with the Court of
First Instance of Naga. They merely
agreed to submit their disputes to the
said court, without waiving their right to
seek recourse in the court specifically
indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
In the case of Pablo v. Castillo,95 the
Court denied the application for probation
of the petitioner on the ground that
Section 9 paragraph (c) of the Probation
Law is in clear and plain language, to the
effect that a person who was previously
convicted by final judgment of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation.
This provision of law is definitive and
unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9,
paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous
conviction" as referring to a conviction for
a crime which is entirely different from
that for which the offender is applying for
probation or a crime which arose out of a
single act or transaction as petitioner
would have the court to understand.
Since the complaint has been filed (for
failure to finish on time the restoration of
Feati Building) in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, where the
plaintiff resides, the venue of action is
properly laid in accordance with Section
2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
In the case of Basania v. Luna,98 the
Court held that both the purpose and
language of Section 47 as amended by
Republic Act No. 4:388 indicate that the
enumeration
of
permanent
and
prominent objects that may be used as tie
points is exclusive. According to the
explanatory note of 11. No. 2522 (which
became R.A. No. 4388), its purpose in
amending Section 47 by making it
mandatory for the locator to indicate the
tie points of his claim is to eliminate claim
jumpers and Minimize overlapping of
claims." (Cong. Rec., H.R., May 13,
1963, pp. 1345-1346). In order to achieve
Since a prior conviction was entered
against the petitioner, penalizing her with
a fine of P4,648.00, the said conviction
automatically placed her within the ambit
of those disqualified from probation
under Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D.
968.
b. May and Shall
94
Pablo v. Castillo, G.R. No. 125108, August 3,
2000
95 G.R. No. 125108, August 3, 2000
96
Capati v. De Ocampo, G.R. No. L-28742, April
30, 1982
97 G.R. No. L-28742, April 30, 1982
98 G.R. No. L-34135-36, February 24, 1981
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
this Purpose it was deemed necessary to
specify what permanent and prominent
objects may be used as tie points: hence
the enumeration in the second paragraph
of Section 47 is significant that this
paragraph did not originally exist: it was
introduced By No. 4388. If the intention
were not to make its enumeration
exclusive, there would have been no
necessity for adding it to Section 47.
Besides, the last sentence of Section 4
as amended also by the states that the
declaration of location that has no
bearing and distance to a tie point us
herein described shall be null and void."
The phrase as herein described"
obviously, refers to the descriptions
contained in the second paragraph:
therefore if the tie point does not
correspond to any such descriptions. it
would not Be a valid tie point under
Section 47 as amended..
END Law Notes
her course in Nursing in college and was
graduated and given a diploma under this
name; and she exercised the right of
suffrage likewise under this name. There
is therefore ample justification to grant
fully her petition which is not whimsical
but on the contrary is based on a solid
and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid
confusion.
d. Previous
In the case of Rura v. Leopena,100 the
Court determined whether or not Rura
was entitled to probation because the
judge contended that the reckoning point
of the “previous” conviction should be
based on the dates of the commission of
the five (5) estafa cases filed against him,
which were committed on different dates.
However, the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Rura explaining that he applied
for probation he had no previous
conviction by final judgment. When he
applied for probation the only conviction
against him was the judgment which was
the subject of his application. The statute
relates "previous" to the date of
conviction, not to the date of the
commission of the crime. Hence, Rura is
qualified to apply for probation pursuant
to Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as
amended), more specifically Section 9
thereof.
c. Principally and Exclusively
In the case of Alfon v. Republic,99 the
Court ruled that the only reason why the
lower court denied the petitioner's prayer
to change her surname is that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and
Estrella Alfon she should principally use
the surname of her father invoking Art.
364 of the Civil Code. But the word
"principally" as used in the codal
provision
is
not
equivalent
to
"exclusively" so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated
child should choose to use the surname
of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
e. Every
It was held in the case of National
Housing Corporation v. Juco,101 the Court
upheld that the Civil Service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or
controlled corporation."
Since it was satisfactorily shown that
petitioner has, since childhood, borne the
name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth
records and baptismal certificate show
otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college
under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her
friends call her by this name; she finished
99
G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980
G.R. Nos. L-69810-14 June 19, 1985
"Every" means each one of a group,
without exception. It means all possible
and all taken one by one. Of course, our
101
G.R. No. L-64313, January 17, 1985
100
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
decision in this case refers to a
corporation created as a governmentowned or controlled entity. It does not
cover cases involving private firms taken
over by the government in foreclosure or
similar proceedings.
There is after all no clearly demonstrable
and convincing reason why the law would
allow municipal imposition of taxes on
gasoline and yet withhold such power if
the imposition is in the form of a sales tax,
when it was a known fact at the time of
the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act
in 1959 — and this still is true to this day
— that gasoline is of no profitable use to
the companies which own it unless
turned over to the consuming public
which, perforce, must pay for the right to
obtain that commodity.
Hence, the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission in remanding the
illegal dismissal case filed by Roco, a
project engineer of NHC and was
charged of theft and/or malversation, to
the labor arbiter was set aside.
f.
Punctuations
It was held in the case of Arabay Inc. v.
CFI,102 the Court held that under the
provisions of Section 2 of R.A. 2264, two
courses of action in the exercise of their
taxing
powers
are
denied
to
municipalities and municipal districts, to
wit:
Therefore, the refund to Arabay should
be granted.
g. Surplusage
In the case of Demafiles v. COMELEC,103
the Court still took cognizance of the case
despite of the contention of Galido that
the case is moot and academic since he
had took his oath and assumed office as
a mayor on November 22, pursuant to
Republic Act 4870.
a. To levy any sales tax in whatever
form; and
b. To levy any tax on articles subject
to specific tax under the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Obviously the frame of reference is
section 2 of the statute which reads:
The relevant proviso of Section 2 of the
Local Autonomy Act states:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the Municipality of
Sebaste shall be elected in the next
general elections for local officials
and shall have qualified [sic].
... Provided, That municipalities and
municipal districts shall, in no case,
impose any percentage tax on sales
or other taxes on articles subject to
specific tax, except gasoline, under
the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code….
Apparently, the last portion of the
provision — "and shall have qualified" —
is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated
jargon in or out of context, and does not
warrant the respondent's reading that the
term of office of the first municipal
officials of Sebaste begins immediately
after their proclamation.
Therefore, the Congress deliberately and
intentionally meant to put it within the
power of such local governments to
impose whatever type or form of taxes
the latter may deem proper to levy on
gasoline including a sales tax or one in
that form.
102
G.R. No. L-37684, September 10, 1975
The Court held that by the general rule
that the term of office of municipal
officials shall begin on the first day of
103
G.R. No. L-28396, December 29, 1967
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
January following their election, and so
the assumption of office by the
respondent Galido in no way affected the
basic issues in this case, which we need
not reach and resolve.
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144,
provides:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to
assist fiscal. — The Secretary of
Justice may appoint any lawyer,
being either a subordinate from his
office or a competent person not in
the public service, temporarily to
assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney
in the discharge of his duties, and
with the same authority therein as
might be exercised by the Attorney
General or Solicitor General.
Also, in the case of Capiz v. Ramirez,104
the contended provision states that the
title of the Act reads: "an Act to amend
and compile the laws relating to lands of
the public domain, and for other
purposes."
The contention of the respondent that it
includes privately owned agricultural
lands. Hence, the respondent does not
want to honor the right in rem of the
petitioner on the ground that the penalty
provided in section 122 of the “Public
Land Act” includes not only a nullity of the
contract but also a reversion of the
property and its improvements to the
Government.
The phraseology of section 17 of Act No.
867 before cited also affords an
illustration of the idea that the authority to
assist is separate and apart from the
general powers of the Attorney General.
In the language of this section, the
person appointed was
Apparently, the Court held that the
phrase "and for other purposes"
expresses no specific purpose and
imports indefinitely something different
from that which precedes it in the title. It
is, therefore, universally rejected as
having no force or effect wherever this
constitutional restriction operates.
1. to assist the fiscal in the discharge of
his duties and
2. to represent the Attorney General in
such matters.
If the two phrases meant the same thing,
then one of them would be superfluous.
There is no apparent reason for holding
that one or the other was a surplusage.
Having demonstrated that said Act No.
2874 does not apply to lands of the
respondent, hence, the action in rem of
the petitioner should be granted.
However, in the case of Lo Cham v.
Ocampo,106 the Court ruled that the act of
Dr. Lantin in signing and filing information
and
conducting
preliminary
investigations are valid pursuant to the
assignment made by Acting Secretary of
Justice Ramon Quisumbing.
Furthermore, in the case of Lo Cham v.
Ocampo,105 the Court held that the
clause "with the same authority therein
as might be exercised by the Attorney
General or Solicitor General" does not
exclude the latter authority.
The reason is that the power to sign
informations, make investigations and
conduct prosecutions is inherent in the
power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney,
Section
1686
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
104
105
G.R. No. L-16197, March 12, 1920
G.R. No. L-831, November 21, 1946
106
G.R. No. L-831, November 21, 1946
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
as these words are
Administrative Code.
used
END Law Notes
in
the
The powers of the Solicitor General
bestowed on the appointee to assist the
fiscal must be held as cumulative or an
addition to the authority to sign
informations, which is inherent in his
appointment. In other words, the clause
"with the same authority therein as might
be exercised by the Attorney General or
Solicitor General" does not exclude the
latter authority.
The phraseology of section 17 of Act No.
867 before cited also affords an
illustration of the idea that the authority to
assist is separate and apart from the
general powers of the Attorney General.
In the language of this section, the
person appointed was (1) to assist the
fiscal in the discharge of his duties and
(2) to represent the Attorney General in
such matters. If the two phrases meant
the same thing, then one of them would
be superfluous. There is no apparent
reason for holding that one or the other
was a surplusage.
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
RULES ON CONFLICTING PROVISIONS
OF THE SAME STATUTES
In the case of Manila Railroad Company v.
Insular Collector of Customs,107 the Court
reconciled the conflicting provisions of Sec. 8
of the Tariff Law of 1909. The second point is
that paragraph 141 is a general provision
while paragraph 197 is a special provision.
END Law Notes
Almeda against respondent appellee Julian
Florentino, who was appointed as as
secretary of the Municipal Board, was
dismissed.
These paragraphs placed in parallel columns
for purposes of comparison read:
141. Manufactures of wool not otherwise
provided for, forty per centum ad valorem
197. Vehicles for use on railways and
tramways, and detached parts thereof, ten
per centum ad valorem.
Where there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and also a general one
which is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to
effect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of
the particular enactment.
Hence the Court affirmed the trial judge’s
decision in classifying dust shields under
paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law
of 1909, and in refusing to classify them
under paragraph 141 of the same section of
the law.
In the case of Almeda v. Florentino,108 the
Court held that the provisions of RA 183 and
RA 2709 (amending Sec. 12 of RA 183)
should be interpreted in limiting the power of
the Vice-Mayor under section 12 (as
amended) to the appointment of all the
employees of the Board other than the
Secretary, who is to be appointed by the
Board itself, as specifically prescribed by
section 14 of the Pasay city charter.
Hence, the Quo Warranto proceedings
instituted by petitioner appellant Policarpo
107
G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929
108
G.R. No. L-23800, December 21, 1965
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
RULES ON CONFLICTING PROVISIONS
OF DIFFERENT STATUTES
prevail over both Commonwealth Acts Nos.
548 and 146.
RA 409 vis-à-vis Articles 700 & 702 of the
Civil Code
Also, there is no provision, specific or
otherwise, which can be found in this statute
(Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting power
in the Public Service Commission to
superintend, regulate, or control the streets
of respondent City or suspend its power to
license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On
the other hand, this right or authority, as
hereinabove concluded, is conferred upon
respondent City of Manila. The power vested
in the Public Service Commission under
Section 16 (m) is, therefore, subordinate to
the authority granted to respondent City,
under said section 18 (hh).
In the case of Sitchon v. Aquino,109 the Court
held that articles 700 and 702 of Republic Act
No. 386, should yield to said section 31 of
Republic Act No. 409, not only because the
former preceded the latter, but, also,
because said section 31 of Republic Act No.
409 is a special provision specifically
designed for the City of Manila, whereas said
Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code are
general provisions applicable throughout the
Philippines.
Again,
houses
constructed,
without
governmental authority, on public streets and
waterways, obstruct at all times the free use
by the public of said streets and waterways,
and, accordingly, constitute nuisances per
se, aside from public nuisances. As such, the
summary removal thereof, without judicial
process or proceedings may be authorized
by the statute or municipal ordinance,
despite the due process clause.
Hence, the Court upheld the duty of the city
engineer to authorize the removal of a public
nuisance after due notice without the need of
a district health officer as contemplated in
Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code.
RA No. 409 vis-à-vis Commonwealth Act No.
548 and the Public Service Law
Also in the case of Lagman v. City of
Manila,110 the Court held that Republic Act
No. 409, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is
a special law and of later enactment than
Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public
Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146,
as amended), so that even if conflict exists
between the provisions of the former act and
the latter acts, Republic Act No. 409 should
109
110
G.R. No. L-8191, February 27, 1956
G.R. No. L-23305, June 30, 1966
Powers conferred by law upon the Public
Service Commission were not designed to
deny or supersede the regulatory power of
local governments over motor traffic, in the
streets subject to their control, is made
evident by section 17 (j) of the Public Service
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) which
provides:
“To require any public service to comply with
the laws of the Philippines, and with any
provincial resolution or municipal ordinance
relating thereto, and to conform to the duties
imposed upon it thereby, or by the provisions
of its own charter, whether obtained under
any general or special law of the Philippines.”
Also, it is not disputed that petitioner has not
been totally banned or prohibited from
operating all his buses, he having allowed to
operate two (2) "shuttle" buses within the city
limits.
Republic Act No. 409 vis-à-vis Article 2189 of
the Civil Code
The Court ruled in the case of City of Manila
v. Teotico111 that insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No.
409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
111
G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription
making "provinces, cities and municipalities .
. . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or
supervision."
In other words, said section 4 refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas
Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged
defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.
END Law Notes
The rule is that on a specific matter, the
special law shall prevail over the general law,
which shall be resorted to only to supply
deficiencies in the former.
In addition, where there are two statutes, the
earlier special and the later general the terms
of the general broad enough to include the
matter provided for in the special the fact that
one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception to
the general, one as a general law of the land,
the other as the law of a particular case. It is
a canon of statutory construction that a later
statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute.
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1520
permits PAL to pay whichever is lower of the
basic corporate income tax or the franchise
tax – (2%) of the gross revenues; and the tax
so paid shall be in lieu of all other taxes,
except only real property tax. Hence, under
its franchise, PAL is to pay the least amount
of tax possible.
Hence, the provision of the Civil Code shall
prevail.
PD 1590 vis-à-vis National Internal Revenue
Code
But in the case of Philippine Air Lines v.
CIR,112 the Court ruled that between
Presidential Decree No. 1520, on one hand,
which is a special law specifically governing
the franchise of PAL, issued on 11 June
1978; and the NIRC of 1997, on the other,
which is a general law on national internal
revenue taxes, that took effect on 1 January
1998, the former prevails.
112
G.R. No. 180066, July 7, 2009
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
RULE ON CONFLICT BETWEEN A
SPECIAL PROVISION OF A GENERAL
LAW AND A GENERAL PROVISION OF A
SPECIAL LAW
Revised Charter of Manila vis-à-vis Local
Tax Code
Present controversy in the case of Bagatsing
v. Ramirez113 is the apparent conflict
between the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Tax Code on the
manner of publishing a tax ordinance
enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila.
The lower Court declared the said tax
ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground
that the same was not published at all in two
daily newspapers of general circulation in the
City of Manila before its enactment. Neither
was it published in the same manner after
approval, although it was posted in the
legislative hall and in all city public markets
and city public libraries.
END Law Notes
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of
the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce the provisions of the charter or of any
other law or ordinance.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code makes cities liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any persons by
reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or
supervision.
On review, the Court held the Civil Code
controlling. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, the
Revised City Charter is a special law and the
subject matter of the two laws, the Revised
City Charter establishes a general rule of
liability arising from negligence in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas the
Civil Code constitutes a particular
prescription for liability due to defective
streets in particular.
In this case, the Court held that a chartered
city is not an independent sovereignty. The
state remains supreme in all matters not
purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must
yield to the constitution and general laws of
the state, it is to have read into it that general
law which governs the municipal corporation
and which the corporation cannot set aside
but to which it must yield. When a city adopts
a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its
charter general law of such character.
However, the case of City of Manila v.
Teotico114 is opposite. In that case, Teotico
sued the City of Manila for damages arising
from the injuries he suffered when he fell
inside an uncovered and unlighted
catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
The City of Manila denied liability on the
basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409)
exempting the City of Manila from any liability
for damages or injury to persons or property
arising from the failure of the city officers to
enforce the provisions of the charter or any
113
G.R. No. L-41631, December 17, 1976
114
G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
WHAT ARE EXTERNAL AIDS AND WHEN
ARE THEY RESORTED TO
the precise scope of the rule thus
adopted. All are agreed that in the
absence of the above cited provisions of
section 36 of General Orders No. 58,
which provides that an order discharging
one of two or more accused persons that
he may be a witness for the prosecution
"shall amount to an acquittal of the
defendant thus discharged and shall be a
bar to further prosecution for the same
offense," a corrupt and fraudulent
agreement, or an agreement not faithfully
with by the accused would be no bar to
further prosecution.
a. Origin of Statutes
The only question raised in US v.
Veneancio De Guzman115 is the accused
right to exemption from prosecution for
the crime thus committed, on the ground
that a former information, charging the
same offense, had been dismissed as to
him in order that he might testify as a
witness for the prosecution
The Court held that for the proper
construction and application of the terms
and provisions of legislative enactment's
which have been borrowed from or of
times essential to review the legislative
history of such enactments and to find an
authoritative guide for their interpretation
and application in the decision of
American and English courts of last
resort construing and applying similar
legislation in those countries.
b. Legislative Debates
Violation of RA 1405
In the case of China Banking Corporation
v. Ortega,116 the Court decided whether
or not a banking institution may validly
refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a
judgment debtor, by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
Experience, under English and American
procedural methods, has shown that
without the aid of informers testifying
against their coparticipants in crime,
many guilty parties would escape, where
the facts which would sustain a
conviction are known only to the guilty
persons themselves.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure
of the information required by the court
does not fall within any of the four (4)
exceptions enumerated in Section 2
(except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation), and that if the
questioned orders are complied with Tan
Kim Liong may be criminally liable under
Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest
Development Corporation.
However, from a review of the history and
development of the practice under
consideration, and reasoning along the
line of the above cited, we are all agreed
that the failure of the accused in the case
at bar, faithfully and honestly to carry out
his undertaking to appear as a witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his
coaccused, deprived him of the right to
plead his former dismissal as a bar to his
prosecution in the case now before us.
However, the Court denied such
contention. It merely required Tan Kim
Liong to inform the court whether or not
the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China
The Court found considerable difficulty
however in coming to an agreement as to
115
G.R. No. L-9144, March 27, 1915
116
G.R. No. L-34964, January 31, 1973
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
Banking Corporation only for purposes of
the garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not
allow any withdrawal until further order. It
will be noted from the discussion of the
conference committee report on Senate
Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977,
which later became Republic Act 1405,
that it was not the intention of the
lawmakers to place bank deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
a final judgment.
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing
discussion of the conference committee
report of the two houses of Congress that
the prohibition against examination of or
inquiry into a bank deposit under
Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of
a judgment. Indeed there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the
execution process. It is hard to conceive
that it was ever within the intention of
Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if
ordered by the Court, through the
expedient of converting their assets into
cash and depositing the same in a bank.
Violation of Sec. 27 of the Election Code
In the case of Salaysay v. Castro117
Petitioner contends that his case does
not come under section 27 of the Election
Code for the reason that when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor, he was actually holding said
office.
The Respondents, however, maintain
that the office Petitioner was actually
holding when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Mayor was that
of Vice-Mayor, the one to which he had
been duly elected; he was not actually
holding the office of Mayor but merely
117
END Law Notes
discharging the duties thereof and was
merely acting as Mayor during the
temporary disability of the regular
incumbent.
Sec. 27 of the Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. Candidate holding office. —
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city
official running for an office, other than
the one which he is actually holding, shall
be considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
In view of the possible uncertainty and
doubt as to whether or not a Vice-Mayor
by acting as Mayor can be regarded as
actually holding said office of Mayor, the
Court have to go back and resort to the
legislative proceedings had, particularly
the discussions and interpellations in
both houses of Congress leading to the
enactment of section 27 of the Revised
Election Code, with a view to
ascertaining the intention of that body.
After all, in interpreting a law, the primary
consideration is the ascertainment of the
intent and the purpose of the legislature
promulgating the same.
The Court held that the purpose of the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the
Revised Election Code was to allow an
official to continue occupying an elective
provincial, municipal or city office to
which he had been appointed or elected,
while campaigning for his election as
long as he runs for the same office.
In conclusion, we believe and hold that a
Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not
“actually hold the office” of Mayor within
the meaning of section 27 of Republic Act
No. 180; that a Vice-Mayor who files his
certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is
considered resigned from the office of
Vice-Mayor for the reason that is the only
G.R. No. L-9669, January 31, 1956
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
office that he “actually holds” within the
contemplation of section 27 of the
Revised Election Code and the office he
is running for (Mayor) is naturally other
than the one he is actually holding (ViceMayor); and that having ceased to be a
Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all
right to act as Mayor.
a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines and shall
provide protection to employees against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment
is a legitimate exercise of the police
power. It affords protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors,
and is in full accord with the constitutional
provisions on the "promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people."
Being in fact a social legislation,
compatible with the policy of the Church
to ameliorate living conditions of the
working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily
delimit the extent of its provisions to
relations between capital and labor in
industry and agriculture.
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended,
otherwise known as the Social Security
Law of 1954
The issue in the case of Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission118 is whether or not the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is
exempted from compulsory coverage of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended,
otherwise known as the Social Security
Law of 1954.
The request of the petitioner was based
on the claim that the said Act is a labor
law and does not cover religious and
charitable institutions but is limited to
businesses and activities organized for
profit.
Violation of BP 22
The issue in the case of De Villa v. Court
of Appeals119 is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court of Makati has
jurisdiction over the case in question.
Also, the said Petitioner also contended
that no offense was committed since the
check involved was payable in dollars,
hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529
(An Act to Assure Uniform Value of
Philippine Coin and Currency).
However, the Court ruled that it is
significant to note that when Republic Act
No. 1161 was enacted, services
performed in the employ of institutions
organized for religious or charitable
purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof
(sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That
portion of the law, however, has been
deleted by express provision of Republic
Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957.
This is clear indication that the
Legislature intended to include charitable
and religious institutions within the scope
of the law.
In this case the Petitioner contended that
no offense was committed since the
check involved was payable in dollars,
hence, the obligation created is null and
void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529
(An Act to Assure Uniform Value of
Philippine Coin and Currency).
The Court ruled that the information
under consideration specifically alleged
that the offense was committed in Makati,
Metro Manila and therefore, the same is
controlling and sufficient to vest
Furthermore, the Social Security Law
was enacted pursuant to the "policy of
the Republic of the Philippines to
develop, establish gradually and perfect
118
G.R. No. L-15045, January 20, 1961
119
G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)
Statutory Construction Reviewer
By: Ernesto N. Dayao, Jr., CPA
END Law Notes
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the case and over the person of the
accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a
criminal action.
Also, under the Bouncing Checks Law
(B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided
they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside
thereof . . . are within the coverage of said
law.
It is a cardinal principle in statutory
construction that where the law does not
distinguish courts should not distinguish.
Parenthetically, the rule is that where the
law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it.
Thus, where there is doubts as to what a
provision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on
the bill may be adopted.
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III,
unmistakably show that the intention of
the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject
thereof.
Hence, the Court dismissed the petition.
Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.
(Colossians 3:23)