Metaphysica of Aristotle With Commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas (Book Epsilon) A Research Paper Presented to Rev. Fr. John Carl Robles, PhL - MA Sancta Maria Mater et Regina Seminarium Cagay, Roxas City In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For Subject course of Metaphysics BY Sem. Dale Andrew S. Aguihap January 2022 Outline of Study: I. II. Short Introduction The Method of Investigating Being as Being. how This Science Differs from the Other Sciences - Distinction of ‘theology’, the science of being as such, from the other theoretical sciences, mathematics and physics. III. The Being Which This Science Investigates - IV. Refutation of Those Who Wished to Abolish the Accidental - V. Four senses of ‘being’. Of these, accidental being is the object of no science. The nature and origin of accident. The True and the False as Being and Non-Being. Accidental Being and Being in the Sense of the True Are Excluded from This Science - VI. VII. Being as truth is not primary being. Conclusion Bibliography and Sources Short Introduction Aristotle himself described his subject matter in a variety of ways: as ‘first philosophy’, or ‘the study of being qua being’, or ‘wisdom’, or ‘theology’. A comment on these descriptions will help to clarify Aristotle’s topic. These causes and principles are clearly the subject matter of what he calls ‘first philosophy’. But this does not mean the branch of philosophy that should be studied first. Rather, it concerns issues that are in some sense the most fundamental or at the highest level of generality. Aristotle distinguished between things that are “better known to us” and things that are “better known in themselves,” In Book Epsilon (6), Aristotle adds description to the study of the causes and principles of beings “qua” beings. Whereas natural science studies objects that are material and subject to change, and mathematics studies objects that although not subject to change are nevertheless not separate from matter, there is still room for a science that studies things that are eternal, not subject to change, and independent of matter. Such a science, he says, is theology, and this is the “first” and “highest” science. Aristotle’s identification of theology, so conceived, with the study of being “qua” being has proved challenging to his interpreters. With the help of St. Thomas Aquinas, he was able to come up with his own commentaries and knowledge regarding with Aristotle’s Metaphysics which was letr on used by many philosophers. Chapter 1 In Chapter 1 of this brief book, Aristotle compares the science of nature, mathematics, and theology. The science of nature, or natural science, is that which studies natural organisms and processes. All rational activity, or all activity using the intellect, "can be divided into the practical, the productive and the theoretical" We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes1 (1025b) The principles and causes of beings are the object of our search, and it is evident that [we must investigate the principles and causes of beings] as beings. For there is a cause of health and of its recovery; and there are also principles and elements and causes of the objects of mathematics; and in general every intellectual science, to whatever degree it participates in intellect, deals with principles and causes: either with those which are more certain or with those which are simpler.2 The science of nature investigates those things that have within themselves a principle of change— that is, something within them that determines their growth, locomotion, and reproduction. The science of nature is a theoretical science, as it is not directly aimed at practice or production but rather aims for theoretical understanding. Mathematics is also a theoretical science, though its 1 Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 2 Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. objects, unlike those of the science of nature, are unchanging. That is, mathematical objects such as numbers and theorems are not subject to change. But all these sciences single out some one thing, or some particular class, and confine their investigations to this, but they do not deal with being in an unqualified sense, or as being. Nor do they make any mention of the “whatness” itself of things. But proceeding from this, some making it evident by means of the senses, and others taking it by assuming it [from some other science], they demonstrate with greater necessity or more weakly the essential attributes of the class of things with which they deal.3 Since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same.4 (1025b) Now at the end of this chapter, we are introduced to the idea that First Philosophy, metaphysics, is ultimately the same as theology. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while 3 Ibid, Page 365 Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 4 the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences.5 (1026a) He gives the second reason why this science is called theology; and the reason is this: the most honorable science deals with the most honorable class of beings, and this is the one in which divine beings are contained.6 Chapter 2 Chapter 2 examines accidental being. Accidental being is that which exists not of necessity and not for the most part—that is, neither that which exists always nor that which exists most frequently. The whiteness of a man, Aristotle says, is accidental being because "men are not always or for the most part white." However, he adds, "it is not an accident that he is an animal." That a man is an animal is a necessary part of his being; that a man is white is an accidental part of his being. since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen’ to be the accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the ‘what’, quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which ‘is’ potentially or actually: being’ has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. (1026a-1026b)7 5 Ibid, Page 58 Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 7 Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 6 Hence, there is no science of accidental being. If someone studies humankind, for instance, the object of study encompasses humankind's essential rather than accidental essence. Therefore, since there are some beings which always are in the same way and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise), and others which are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the accidental.8 Chapter 3 Chapter 3 discusses that you cannot refute the accidentals and that they are a certain chain reactions which leads to a certain point of time. That there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. (1027a)9 Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to something further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus refer the fortuitous – whether to matter or to the purpose or to the motive power, must be carefully considered. (1027b)10 8 Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 9 Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 10 Ibid, Page 60 Chapter 4 In Chapter 4 we could find that for Aristotle, truth is the expression of what is. In other words, truth is the expression of being. For we have sufficiently determined its nature. But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements. (1027b)11 Having drawn his conclusions about accidental being, the Philosopher now settles the issue about the being which signifies the truth of a proposition; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he determines the meaning of this kind of being. Second, he excludes it from the principal study of this science12 Therefore both being in the sense of the accidental and being in the sense of the true must be excluded from this science. For the cause of the former—being in the sense of the accidental—is the indeterminate, and therefore it does not come within the scope of art, as has been shown13 Conclusion Aristotle’s description ‘the study of being qua being’ is frequently and easily misunderstood, for it seems to suggest that there is a single subject matter “being qua being” that is under investigation. But Aristotle’s description does not involve two things; first, a study and second, a subject matter 11 Ibid, Page 61 Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 13 Ibid, Page 390 12 (being qua being) for he did not think that there is any such subject matter as ‘being qua being’. Rather, his description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter or being, and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being). Of course, first philosophy is not the only field of inquiry to study beings. Natural science and mathematics also study beings, but in different ways, under different aspects. The natural scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (they are subject to change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The metaphysician, on the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract way “qua” beings. So first philosophy studies the causes and principles of beings qua beings. Bibliography and Sources Aristotle) Ross, W. D (Sir William David) (editor). (2022). Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross [Complete in 2 volumes] (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. Aquinas, S. T., & Rowan, J. P. (1961). Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle Volume II. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
