FIRST DIVISION
[GR No. 46892. June 28, 1940.]
ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, appellant, v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., appellant.
Messrs. DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile on behalf of the appellant.
Messrs. Paguia and Lerum on behalf of the respondent, National Labor Union.
SYLLABUS machineries
1. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 103; CONSIITUTIONALITY; PURPOSES OF THE LAW; COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYEES. — Commonwealth Law
No. 103, which, as its title indicates, provides for the protection of the worker, creating an
Industrial Relations Court empowered to set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum
rent to be paid by tenants; to put into force compulsory arbitration between employers or
owners and employees or tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties for the infraction of its
decrees, it has been promulgated by the National Assembly by virtue of the precepts contained
in article 5, Title II; article 6, Title XIII; and Articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
2. ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; ID — In compliance with said constitutional precepts, the National Assembly
enacted Commonwealth Law No. 103, which creates the Industrial Relations Court, which is a
special court with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union v. Court of Industrial Relations,
GR No. 46727; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, GR No. 46496, concurring opinion of
Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Court shall
exercise jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any issue, matter, conflict or
dispute that affects or arises between employers and employees or workers, and between
owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and for relations between them, in accordance with and
subject to the provisions of the law. And article 20 stipulates that in the hearing, investigation
and resolution of any question or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the
court will act in accordance with justice and equity and the substantial merits of the cause,
without regard to technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be subject to any technical rules
of legal evidence, but will form judgment in the manner that it believes fair and equitable. Law
No. 103 grants the Industrial Relations Court full discretionary power to resolve and decide
agrarian and industrial disputes in the manner it believes fair and equitable, disregarding legal
technicalities, and the power thus granted is judicial and not legislative, for which does not violate
the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or equal
protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati case, W. & ZR Co. v. Comm'rs, of Clinton
County ([1852], 1 Ohio St., 88), cited in Rubi v. La Junta Provincial de Mindoro (39 Jur. Fil., 675),
"There is a real difference between delegating the power to enact laws, which necessarily
presupposes discretion as to what those laws should be, and confer power or discretion to
enforce them, discretion that must be exercised in accordance with the law. The first cannot be
done in any way; Second, there is no objection. The first cannot be done at all; against the second
no objection can be lodged." The first cannot be done at all; against the second no objection can
be
lodged."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
3. ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; ID — A simple reading of article 20 of Law No. 103 shows that the law has not
empowered the Industrial Relations Court to investigate and resolve issues and conflicts between
workers and employers, and tenants and owners, in an arbitrary and capricious manner without
abide by a certain standard of conduct. The article clearly provides that the procedural rules that
it adopts, to which the court must adhere, must be inspired by justice and equity, and prescribes
that the criterion that is formed must be based on the substantial merits of the case without
considering the technicalities or legal formalities. Law no. 103, which creates a special court
called the Industrial Relations Court with the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve
and decide agrarian and industrial conflicts in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity,
cannot be challenged on the grounds that it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the
Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as the municipal
courts, justices of the peace and courts of first instance for which the regulations of the courts
have
been
issued.
by
the
Supreme
Court.
4. ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; COMMISSIONERS. — The commissioner was appointed by the Industrial
Relations Tribunal in the exercise of his power conferred by section 10 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 and at the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and the court, respectively, the
parties were represented duly, they were heard and they presented the evidence that they had
available and believed it convenient to offer. Such inspection and hearings had the character of
an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute the due process of law guaranteed by the
Constitution.
5. ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. — The findings of fact made by the Industrial
Relations Court demonstrate that the contested order is supported by the result of the
investigation carried out by the commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented
directly to the Court. In said conclusions, all the evidence presented by the parties has been
considered and analyzed by the Industrial Relations Court, and the conclusion is inevitable that
the order is not arbitrary and is justified and supported by 108 proven facts.
6. ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; ID; PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEE WAGES. — The Industrial Relations Court, as has
already been said, is a special court and as such has the power to order the appellant to pay the
wages of its employees and workers who have been replaced. Sections 1 and 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103, as the former has been amended by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 254, confer
power and jurisdiction to the Industrial Relations Court to hear, resolve and decide all matters,
controversies and disputes between employers and workers and owners and landowners, and
the wages of 108 replaced workers, during the time they were separated from service,
DECISION
IMPERIAL, M .:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant against the order issued by the Court of
Industrial Relations on May 6, 1939, which required him to reinstate the 45 workers listed in the
petition of March 31, 1939, in their previous jobs or in others substantially equivalent to the 10
workers headed by A. Haber who were excluded indefinitely, within 10 days of receiving a copy
of the order; to pay these 55 workers the wages they should have received from the date of their
suspension or separation until the date of their reinstatement; and that pending resolution of
the other issues that the parties have submitted, the appellant abstains, under penalty of
contempt, from dismissing or excluding, without prior permission from the court, to any worker
or employee who was in his service at the time the dispute arose who is currently working in the
mines or who is reinstated to work pursuant to the order; and against the decision of the same
court of August 17, 1939 that denied the motion for reconsideration of the appellant presented
on
May
26,
1939.
On December 12, 1938, the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on behalf of the workers and
employees of the appellant who were members of said labor union, addressed a letter to the
appellant requesting 21 claims in favor of its affiliates. The letter was received by the appellant's
office in Manila in an envelope stamped by the Baguio post office on the 30th of the same month.
The appellant's officials called a meeting of their employees on January 2, 1939, and at which
they informed all their workers that some of the demands had been accepted and had already
been put into practice, others would be considered, and the rest would be considered. be
rejected for being unreasonable, and they were advised not to resort to violence and to observe
legal methods in settling their differences with the appellant. On the night of the same day, the
workers and employees of the appellant declared a strike and abandoned their works. The
appellant immediately reported this strike to the Department of Labor and requested its
intervention in order to resolve it. The Secretary of Labor appointed Adolfo Umengan, Special
Investigator of the Department, and Eladio C. Leaño, Public Defender of the Montanosa Province,
to intervene and find a way to solve the strike. These officials called a conference attended by
officials of the complainant, a representative of the strikers, and Luis Lardizabal, Head of the
Baguio Federation of Labor, a labor organization affiliated with the National Labor Union, Inc. As
a result of the conference, the parties agreed to the next friendly settlement:
"AMICABLE
SETTLEMENT
"In order to have the present strike of the contractors and laborers of the respondent company
who staged a walk-out on January 3, 1939, amicably settled, the parties hereby mutually agree
to end the said strike under the condition that all laborers will be readmitted upon the execution
of this agreement; provided, that all laborers whose services should be dispensed with due to
lack of work in those tunnels where they are no longer needed will be given not less than fifteen
days employment from the date of this settlement or resumption of work, and provided, further,
that as soon as the stops in 1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the services of men are
needed,the company will give preference to efficient laborers when reducing the personnel as
mentioned above in those working places and may transfer them to other divisions to replace
inefficient men."cralaw virtua1aw library
"In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a committee composed of Messrs. Luis
Lardizabal, Tomas Dirige, Victoriano Madayag, Maximo Conaoi, Daniel Lambinicio, and Juan
Cerilo and the Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. as represented by its President, Mr. Andres
Soriano, have hereunto placed their signatures this 4th day of January, 1939."cralaw virtua1aw
The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not show up
until 9 in the morning on the 6th of the same month. The appellant's management did not allow,
however, any worker to enter the underground section known as "830 level" for the reason that
the air had become stale due to the strike and it was necessary to renew it with fresh air with the
in order to avoid personal misfortunes. This precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal by
the appellant to allow them to work again, so they went on strike again. The strikers were
sympathetically joined by workers who worked at the mine called "680 division," which is another
separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory. Once again, the Department of Labor
intervened and through the mediation of Eladio C. Leaño, the workers returned to work on the
night of January 6, 1939, when the work in the mine gradually resumed.
On January 9, 1939, the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial Relations
Court in accordance with article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and said Court held the first
hearing of the matter on the 13th of the same month in the City of Baguio. At this hearing, the
21 claims of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. were discussed one by one, and an
agreement was reached by the parties on some of them, others were submitted to the decision
of the Court and the rest were left pending. be viewed and resolved later.
On March 31, 1939, with most of the aforementioned claims still pending decision, the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., filed a motion alleging that foreman A. Haber and 9 other
workers of the respondent had been indefinitely suspended on the 29th of the same month; that
these workers had previously been transferred to outside jobs in order to provide the
Complainant with an excuse to later remove them from the service; that another group of about
30 workers were fired by the company for no reason and without court authorization; and that
the suspensions and separations that were carried out were acts of revenge and discrimination
against the workers, for which reason it was requested that the officials of the appellant
responsible for said acts be punished for contempt and that the appellant be forced to reinstate
the workers in their original jobs inside the mines and pay them their salaries corresponding to
the period in which they were separated from the service. The appellant answered the motion
denying the alleged facts and alleged that Haber and his 9 colleagues were suspended for their
continuous loafing during working hours and for having constantly refused to work, and that the
45 workers headed by the foreman Victoriano Madayag were fired for having refused to name
those responsible for the mistreatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of March 30,
1939. The motion was heard on April 3, 1939 and at the hearing the parties presented their
witnesses. The court appointed one of its special agents to act as the appellant's mines and
conduct an investigation in order to supplement the facts learned during the hearing. After
considering the evidence presented before him and the facts found by the appointed
commissioner, the court in its order of May 6, 1939 declared the following facts
proven:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by the
respondent without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order of this Court
of
January
23,
1939." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent without just
cause." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In the same order, the Industrial Relations Court makes the following considerations that support
the
conclusions
reached: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was joined to refrain from discharging any
laborer involved in the dispute without just cause and without previous authority of the Court. It
appears and no denial of the fact is made by the respondent that the dismissal in one case and
the alleged suspension for an indefinite time in the other, which has all the effects of a discharge,
were made without seeking the authority of the Court." cralaw virtua1aw library
"The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended because of
continuous loafing and refusal to work was not established. The real motive behind the lay off
was the completion of their work 'outside.' Under the circumstances, the provision of the order
of March 21, to the effect that these men should be returned to their work underground after
the completion of their work 'outside' should have been observed. the men." cralaw virtua1aw
library
precluded their hearing or seeing clearly what transpired above them in the place where Moldero
was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the premises made by the investigator confirmed this
view. So far as is known, despite the investigations conducted by the officials of the company and
the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons
responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal
of the forty-five men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an over anxious desire on
the part of the company to get rid of these men." Despite the investigations conducted by the
officials of the company and the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities in
Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The
precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to have
been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these
men." Despite the investigations conducted by the officials of the company and the policemen of
the camp and by the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for
the stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the fortyfive men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of
the
company
to
get
rid
of
these
men."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The temporary transfer of these men to 'outside' work was authorized by the Court in said order
on the strength of the assurance of the respondent that no more work suited for them inside the
mines existed. It was directed, however, in the aforesaid order that as soon as their work outside
was completed the laborers should be immediately returned to their respective work inside the
mines. Subsequent events and acts of the officials of the respondent in charge of the mines have
convinced the Court that work existed and exists for the men inside the tunnels and their
transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the company to dispense with their services
as soon as the work outside is completed. The unwarranted discharges of Haber and nine others
and those of Victoriano Madayag and his forty-four companions amply demonstrated this
conclusion. Upon the company's own admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon
the findings of the investigator of the Court, more than four hundred (400) workers of different
classes among them, muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers and foremen coming from different
mines in the region have been employed by the respondent as fresh laborers. Almost all, if not
all, of these men are not members of the petitioner, the National Labor Union, Inc."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"At the same time the work in different tunnels and divisions in the mines are allegedly being
completed, the old workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the men found transfer
to other divisions being operated, the majority are being Instead of laying hands on the old men
laid off and making them work in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work
those laborers transferred to the 'outside' department, the respondent preferred to take in and
hire other workers coming from different places because obviously they are not members of the
union." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
had worked for months and many for years in the mines of the respondent and it can not be
easily accepted that their experience gained in their particular lines in the very property of the
respondent would be inferior to that attained by the other workmen in other mines in the district
for an equal period of time. Their inefficiency as a whole group can not be successfully sustained
now because they were not transferred to surface work for this reason but because of the alleged
lack of work or completion of their work underground. Had any of them been inefficient in the
past, it can not be explained why such laborer continued in the service as the records of the
company abound with instances of discharges made in the past of laborers who were found
either inefficient or incompentent or whose services were unsatisfactory."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the mine but the evidence
stands uncontradicted that before the strike was called a petition was presented by the men to
the management carrying the signatures of about eight hundred (800) workers demanding higher
pay and better working conditions.When the men struck, the operation of the mine was
completely paralyzed and there is a strong indication that a great majority of the workers joined
openly the strike.It would not have been difficult for the respondent, with the means at its
command, to find for itself the employees and laborers who remained loyal to the company and
to consider those who struck as either members of the union or its sympathizers." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"The respondent's claim as to the motive for the suspension and discharges lacks substance and
support in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From all what appears, it is
inferred that the respondent desires to discourage membership in the union and to route it if
possible.The wholesale discharges were the expression of such desire.The acts in the mind of the
Court, are calculated to have two effects.They will not only immediately affect the discharged
laborers but would also discourage other laborers from joining or remaining members of the
union." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"The allegation that it has always been the policy to consider the laborer's connection with the
company terminated upon termination of the working place in which he is employed is not
supported by the facts. It has been shown that as a general rule when working in a place is
completed, workers are transferred to another working place in one level or to another level,
although in some instances days may elapse before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in
different
levels." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
But all these arguments are meaningless on the face of the finding of the Court that the
underground laborers transferred to the 'outside' work are not wanting in experience, efficiency
and other conditions alleged to be found among the fresh laborers. The special qualifications to
do particular work can not rightly be invoked in favor of the employment of new laborers most
especially in those cases of common or unskilled labor like muckers, trammers, helpers,
etc."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"Under normal circumstances, the exercise of Judgment of the employer in selecting men he is
to employ should not be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the
prejudice of members of a labor union whose rights should be safeguarded in consonance with
the policies of the law, the Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty to interfere to afford
protection
to
the
laborers
affected." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The appellant filed an extensive motion for reconsideration of the indicated order, a motion that
was denied by the resolution of August 17, 1939. The order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of
August 17 of the same year are the which gave rise to the appeal filed by the appellant.
The appellant maintains that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by Laws Nos. 254 and
355, is unconstitutional (1) because it violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) because
through it the National Assembly abdicated its legislative power in violation of the doctrine on
delegation of powers; (3) because the judicial powers that the law confers to the Industrial
Relations Court, considered separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and allow the deprivation
of liberty and property without due process of law; and (4) because assuming that the law is valid
and constitutional in its entirety, the portion, at least, of article 20 that provides that the
Industrial Relations Court "shall adopt its rules of procedure" it must be declared null and void
because it violates Article 13 of Title VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines which obliges the
Industrial Relations Court to observe the general rules of procedure applicable to the courts of
justice. The appellant alleges in this regard that since she has been subjected to an arbitrary
procedure different from that applied to other litigants in 105 Philippine courts, she has been
denied due process of law and the principle of equal protection before laws.
Commonwealth Law No. 103, which, as its title indicates, provides for the protection of the
worker, creating an Industrial Relations Court empowered to set a minimum wage for workers
and the maximum rent to be paid by tenants; to put into force compulsory arbitration between
employers or owners and employees or tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties for the
infraction of its decrees, it has been promulgated by the National Assembly by virtue of the
precepts contained in article 5, Title II; article 6, Title XIII; and Articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the
Constitution
of
the
Philippines
that
provide: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 5. The State shall take care to promote social justice in order to ensure the well-being and
economic
stability
of
all
the
town."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"ART. 6. The State shall protect all workers, especially women and minors, and shall regulate
relations between owners and tenants, and between labor and capital in industry and agriculture
The
State
may
establish
compulsory
arbitration." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"ART. 1. The Judicial Power shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in other lower courts
established
by
law." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
"ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe and distribute the
jurisdiction
of
the
various
courts,
.
.
." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
In compliance with the transcribed constitutional precepts, the National Assembly promulgated
Commonwealth Law No. 103, which creates the Industrial Relations Court, which is a special court
with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., GR No.
46727; Ang Tibay Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., GR No. 46496, concurring opinion
of Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Court shall
exercise jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any issue, matter, conflict or
dispute that affects or arises between employers and employees or workers, and between
owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and to regulate relations between them, in accordance
with and subject to the provisions of the law. Article 4 provides that the court shall take
cognizance, for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and adjustment, of any agrarian or
industrial conflict that motivates or give rise to a strike or work stoppage due to differences that
arise in the matter of wages, participation or compensation, hours of work or conditions of
sharecropping or employment, between employers and employees or workers, and between
owners and tenants or sharecroppers, provided that the number of affected employees, workers,
tenants or sharecroppers exceeds thirty, and that the agrarian or industrial conflict is submitted
to the court by the Secretary or of Labor, or by one or both interested parties, when the
aforementioned Secretary of Labor certifies as to its existence and the convenience of the
intervention of the court in the public interest. And article 20 stipulates that in the hearing,
investigation and resolution of any issue or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and
powers, the court will act in accordance with justice and equity and the substantial merits of the
cause, without regard to technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be subject to any technical
rules of legal evidence, but will form judgment in the way that it believes fair and equitable. Law
No. 103 grants the Industrial Relations Court full discretionary power to resolve and decide
agrarian and industrial disputes in the manner it believes fair and equitable, disregarding
technicalities and legal formalities, and the power thus granted is judicial and not legislative.
Therefore, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation
of legislative powers or equal protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati case, W. & Z.
R. Co. v. Comm'rs, of Clinton County '1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in Rubi et al v. Mindoro Provincial
Board, 39 Jur. Fil., 675, "There is a real difference between delegating power to enact laws, which
necessarily presupposes discretion as to what they should be, and to confer tribute or discretion
to enforce them, discretion that must be exercised in accordance with the law. The first cannot
be done in any way; against the second no objection can be raised." of Clinton County '1852), 1
Ohio St., 88, cited in Rubi et al v. La Junta Provincial de Mindoro, 39 Jur. Fil., 675, "There is a real
difference between to delegate the power to enact laws, which necessarily supposes discretion
as to what those laws should be, and to confer tribute or discretion to enforce them, a discretion
that must be exercised in accordance with the law The first cannot be done in any way; against
the second it is not possible to interpose ob "of Clinton County '1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in Rubi
et al v. Mindoro Provincial Board, 39 Jur. Phil., 675, "There is a real difference between delegating
power to enact laws, which necessarily implies discretion as to what those laws should be, and
confer tribute or discretion to enforce them, discretion that must be exercised in accordance
with the law. The first cannot be done at all; Against the second no objection can be made.
"Discretion that must be exercised in accordance with the law. The first cannot be done in any
way; against the second no objection can be made." Discretion that must be exercised in
accordance with the law. The first cannot be done at all; There is no objection to the second.
To reinforce the arguments in favor of the unconstitutionality of Law No. 103, the appellant
emphasizes what was resolved in the matter of Schechter v. United States (1935), 295 US, 496,
79 Law. ed. 270, in which the Supreme Court of the United States declared the National Recovery
Act unconstitutional. There is, however, a marked difference between said matter and the one
that is considered because the National Recovery Act instead of creating a court of justice,
together I believe with legislative power and I authorize the President of the United States to
enact codes prescribing the rules of procedure for carrying out the purposes of the law.
The last ground alleged against the validity of Law No. 103 is that the judicial powers granted to
the Industrial Relations Court are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they allow the deprivation
of liberty and property without due process of law; and that its article 20, at least, suffers from
this fundamental defect because it confers on the Industrial Relations Court the power to dictate
its own procedural rules, which contravenes article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution, which
prescribes that the Court The Supreme Court will dictate rules regarding pleadings, practices and
uniform procedures for all courts of the same category.
Article 20 of Law No. 103 reads as follows:
"ART. 20. Court Regulations. — The Industrial Relations Court will promulgate its procedural rules
and will have the other powers that generally correspond to a court of justice: It being
understood, however, that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of any issue or conflict,
and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers under this Law, the Court shall act in
accordance with justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be subject to any rules, legal evidence techniques,
but will form judgment in the way that it believes fair and equitable." cralaw virtua1aw library
A simple reading of said article shows that the law has not empowered the Industrial Relations
Court to investigate and resolve issues and conflicts between workers and employers, and
tenants and owners, in an arbitrary and capricious manner without submitting to a specific
standard of conduct. . The article clearly provides that the procedural rules that it adopts, to
which the court must adhere, must be inspired by justice and equity, and prescribes that the
criterion that is formed must be based on the substantial merits of the case without considering
the technicalities or legal formalities. Law no. 103, which creates a special court called the
Industrial Relations Court with the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide
agrarian and industrial conflicts in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, cannot be
challenged on the grounds that it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution
because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as the municipal courts,
justices of the peace and courts of first instance for which the regulations of the courts by the
Supreme
Court.
In relation to the validity and constitutionality of Law No. 103 AND ITS amendments, we insert
below the concurring opinion of Judge Laurel in the matter of Ang Tibay, supra, whose
observations will serve to strengthen the established proposition that the aforementioned law
and its amendments is valid and does not violate the Constitution.
"It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging
unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress which was threatening the
stability of governments the world over. Alive to the social and economic forces at work, the
framers of our Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties which faced them and
endeavored to crystalize, with more or less fidelity, the political, social and economic
propositions of their age, and this they did, with the consciousness that the political and
philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a great jurist, ’be doubted by
the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third.’ (Chief Justice Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk
Co., 147 WiS., 327; 133 N. W., 209.) Embodying the spirit of the present epoch,general provisions
were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring about the needed social and
economic equilibrium between component elements of society through the application of what
may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be
secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and opportunities which
should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis.’The
promotion of social justice to in sure the well-being and economic security of all the people’ was
thus inserted as vital principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in order that
this declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in
various sections thereof has provided the means towards its realization.For instance, section 6
of Article XIII declares that the State ’shall afford protection to labor, especially to working
women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.’ The same section also states that ’the
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.’ In extraordinary cases mentioned in section 16,
Article VI, of the Constitution, the President of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may prescribe, to
’promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.’ Albeit, almost at the
same time the Congress of the United States approved the National Labor Regulations Act (49
Stat., 449) on July 5, 1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act,we were in the Philippines
headway towards the adoption of our fundamental law, pursuant to congressional authority
given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights
we now find the following provision ’The right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.’ (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an
agitation in the United States which brought about the recommendation by the Commission on
Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights
as an amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle,
which may be expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the development of time
and circumstances.pursuant to congressional authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie
Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following
provision ’The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.’ (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the United States
which brought about the recommendation by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by
an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the
United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle, which may be expanded
and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the development of time and circumstances.
'An Act to define and regulate legitimate labor organizations.' (As to this last act, vide 'findings
and policy,' preamble [sec. 1] of the Wagner Act [49 Sta., 449]).
"Commonwealth Act No. 103, .approved October 29, 1936, was originally Bill No. 700 of the
National Assembly. More light is shed by the explanatory statement of the Bill than by what
transpired in the course of the deliberation of the measure in the legislative chamber.'This bill,'
thus begins the explanatory statement of Bill No. 700, 'creates an Industrial Relations Board...and
provides for mandatory arbitration...in accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the Constitution,
which provides that 'The State may establish compulsory arbitration." "Incorporating the
conclusion reached by a committee appointed, a year or so before it was observed that 'under
current legislation'" — evidently referring to Act No. 4055 — 'there is no adequate instrument to
prevent
strikes.
xxx
In the United States labor legislation has undergone a long process of development too long to
narrate here, culminating in the enactments of what were commonly known as the Clayton Act,
the Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
The Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the Federal
Government in the settlement of labor disputes, which device is aimed at the avoidance of
unnecessary friction between labor and capital and the establishment of industrial
peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that country and of pronouncements made by its Supreme Court
reveals a continuous renovation and change made necessary by the impact of changing needs
and economic pressure brought about by the irresistible momentum of new social and economic
forces developed there. In the light of changes that have occurred, it is doubted if the
pronouncements made by the said Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v. New York, 198, US, 45) or
in 1908 (Adair v. US, 52 Law. ed. 430, 208 US, 161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US, 1) — cases
which are relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum — still retain their virtuality
at the present time. In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar development, although
of course to a much smaller degree and of different adaptation giving rise to several attempts at
meeting and solving our peculiar social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth Acts Nos.
37, 104, 139, 211; Presidential Message to the National Assembly, September 2, 1936; Executive
Order No. 49, S. 1936). The system of voluntary arbitration envisaged by Act No. 4055 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by the enactment of the
aforementioned Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of changes that have taken
place, it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People
v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440) — also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum — still
retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interests." it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement made by this
court in the case of People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440) — also relied upon by the petitioner in its
printed memorandum — still retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire
has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interests." it may likewise be doubted if the
pronouncement made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440) — also relied
upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum — still retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interests."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
xxx
"In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and by it, our Government no longer performs the role of a mere
mediator or intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter." cralaw virtua1aw library
In her following statement of error, the appellant alleges that the conduct of the investigator,
the investigation he carried out and the manner in which the Industrial Relations Court heard the
matter deprived him of an impartial and fair hearing, and constitute the deprivation of his
property without due process. Of law. To demonstrate the lack of foundation for the allegation
of error, we believe it is sufficient to reproduce below the manner in which the investigation was
carried out by the commissioner appointed by the Industrial Relations Court and the manner in
which the hearing was held by said court, as set forth in the order of May 6, 1939.
"Hearing was held on April 3, 1939, where witnesses for both the petitioners and the respondent
testified. To supplement the facts brought out at the hearing, the Court ordered one of its Special
Agents to proceed to the premises of the mines to conduct a further investigation." cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The commissioner was appointed by the Industrial Relations Court in the exercise of his power
conferred by section 10 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and at the inspection and hearings held
by the commissioner and the court, respectively, the parties were duly represented. , were heard
and presented the evidence that they had available and believed it convenient to offer. Such
inspection and hearings had the character of an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute
the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution.
The appellant also maintains that the order of May 6, 1939 is arbitrary because there is no
substantial or competent evidence to support it. On this point, the conclusions of fact established
by the Industrial Relations Court show that the challenged order is supported by the result of the
investigation carried out by the commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented
directly before the Court. In said conclusions, all the evidence presented by the parties has been
considered and analyzed by the Industrial Relations Court, and the conclusion that the order is
not arbitrary and is justified and supported by the proven facts is inevitable.
The last indication of error is related to the part of the order of May 6, 1939, which provides that
the appellant pay the 55 replaced workers the wages they stopped receiving during their
separation from service. The appellant maintains that this part of the order is equivalent to an
award for damages that the Industrial Relations Court cannot pronounce because it lacks
jurisdiction. The claim is not meritorious. The Industrial Relations Court, as has already been said,
is a special court and as such has the power to order that the appellant pay the wages of its
employees and workers who have been replaced. Sections 1 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, as the former has been amended by Section 1 of Act No. 254,
The writ of certiorari is denied and the order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of
the same year are confirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So it is ordered.
Avanceña, Diaz, Laurel, and Moran, MM., are satisfied.