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NAME: ARATRIKA SEN
NAME OF INSTITUTION: INDRAPRASTHA COLLEGE FOR
WOMEN, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
TITLE: NURTURING BONSAIS – A STUDY OF LOAN
REPAYMENT IN MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY POSTCOVID’19.
COURSE: B.A. (HONS.) ECONOMICS
YEAR OF STUDY: IIIrd YEAR
CONTACT NO.: 8334913999
EMAIL ID: aratrikasen75@gmail.com
NURTURING BONSAIS – A STUDY OF LOAN REPAYMENT
IN MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY POST-COVID’19.
“Poverty is not just the lack of money. It is not having the capability to realize one’s full
potential as a human being.”
-
Dr. Abhijit V. Banerjee, Nobel Laureate.
In microfinance, the term “bonsai people” is used for those sections of society who are
economically challenged, i.e., those who have the potential to develop but like the bonsai tree,
do not have an adequate foundation to grow. In the 1980s, microfinance was introduced in
India as a solution to the poverty question – it extended loans, albeit at higher rates of interest,
to those sections of people, organized in the form of joint liability groups (JLGs) and Self-Help
Groups (SHGs), who could not make use of formal banking means in the absence of appropriate
collateral. The concept of microfinance was developed in 1976 by Mohammed Yunus in
Bangladesh through the Grameen Bank, and this was later implemented in India by NABARD.
Now a common household name, this banking service has done much to empower the
downtrodden, especially in terms of women empowerment.
However, with the global Coronavirus pandemic and government-mandated lockdowns, all the
hard work done by the microfinance sector was on the brink of collapse. And in India, where
the sector recorded a total loan portfolio in FY19 of $1.79 trillion and became a mecca for
potential growth of the lower-income groups, recent data from the RBI shows that serious
problems arose in the months after lockdown was lifted, particularly with loan collections. The
loss in supply chain and business operations hit hard on the daily livelihood of the JLGs &
SHGs who were exposed to economic uncertainty.
At the same time, we cannot ignore the effect of the lockdown on the business operations of
the microfinance organization as well. As a result of the shutdown in the economy and
subsequent stop in loan collections, microfinance organizations faced a severe cash shortage.
As per an analysis of financial sector ratings by ICRA, MFIs had around 10% of liquid
investment to asset ratio as on March 31, 2020.1 In the current environment, access to liquid
resources may prove to be arduous, mainly due to hesitation of investors as well as a strain on
1
Of the sample of 29 entities considered in the study, 7 had a liquidity cover less than 1 time.
borrowers’ cash flows. A similar fate was observed during demonetization, which further
proves the fact that MFIs are mainly daily wage earners involved in business activities
operating on small scales and are relatively vulnerable to external shocks.
1. IMPACT OF MORATORIUM POLICY ON BORROWER.
To understand accurately the impact of the RBI’s moratorium policy on the loan repayment
cycle, we take up the real-time example of a borrower in a joint liability group who had been
loaned an amount of Rs. 30,000/- by a microfinance organization in the 4th week of June 2019,
to be payable weekly for a total time period of 52 weeks. The borrower was charged a weekly
rate of interest of 26% payable on the amount of instalment.
The calculation of the Equated Monthly Instalment and the weekly interest payable on principal
amount has been shown in the Appendix (see Appendix A1 and Appendix A2). A repayment
schedule has also been shown below (Fig. 1.1a) to illustrate the disruption of payments due to
the moratorium.
As per original timeline, the principal line would have been the continuous straight line without
a kink. Initially, we observe that 39 instalments of Rs.660 were paid off before March 24, 2020
(total amount paid off by week 39 being Rs. 8747) when lockdown proceedings were initiated
by the government to combat the spread of COVID’19. Therefore, borrower effectively closed
his repayments from week 40, indicated by the kink at point 1.
The RBI had announced a six-month moratorium on all term loans outstanding on March 1,
2020, as well as on working capital facilities to help businesses and individuals tide over the
financial problems on account of disruption in normal business activities (shown by the
horizontal blue line). The moratorium period came to an end on August 31, 2020, as shown by
kink at point 2. Therefore, the moratorium caused the principal line to shift rightwards after a
hiatus, starting from week 40.
For our borrower, with 13 weeks of repayments due, if they were to resume reimbursements
from week 51 (as calculated in the original timeline, see Fig. 1.1a), they would have repaid the
entire loan amount with interest effectively within 64 weeks of availing the loan, i.e., by the
last week of November 2020.
2. IMPACT OF MORATORIUM ON LENDER
In the small-loans category, there are a total of 52 million consumers in India, out of which
1/3rd is associated with MFIs. The minimum ticket size of a loan is Rs.30,000 and maximum is
Rs.1,00,000. Therefore, the impact of the repayment halt affected the daily operations of these
institutions as well, in most cases leaving them without enough reserves to pay off operational
costs.
Let us consider the following example (Fig. 2.1a) of a tradeoff pertaining to a microfinance
organization between amount of loan amount to disburse and the rate of interest to charge,
keeping in mind that the latter is subject to a cap of 26% implemented by regulatory authorities.
The horizontal axis shows the amount of loan given out and the vertical axis shows the rate of
interest (r). Given the 26% cap on interest rate and market demand for loans, the maximum
amount of loan disbursed at that level is L. Therefore, the equilibrium point is at point A.
Now, after lockdown was lifted and businesses started their operations once again, it was seen
that the market demand for loans fell (shown by a leftward shift in Ld schedule to Ld'). The
reason for this fall in demand may be attributed to the halt in borrowers' cash flows, rendering
them unable to pay weekly instalments. As a result, the new equilibrium, assuming loan supply
remains constant, falls to B where ‘r’ charged is now 18% and loan amount disbursed is L'.
But operating at this equilibrium may be problematic for the MFIs, who have their fixed costs
to consider as well. These include capital costs and operating costs (salaries, etc.) which make
up a major portion of their revenue. Such costs are unavoidable and decreasing the interest rate
by 8% will not cover them.
In this case, an alternative for the MFI's will be to decrease r by only 4%, to cover costs. Here,
the opportunity cost would be to sacrifice more of the loan disbursements to borrowers to
prevent shutdown of the organization. Thus, the final equilibrium will be at point C, with L''
amount disbursed at 22% p.a.
In this scenario, the government can play the decisive role of ensuring maximum number of
borrowers receive loans by subsidizing the MFIs. By covering 4% amount of interest rate, the
government would leave the MFIs free to reduce interest rate further to 18% such that they can
cover their costs as well as increase their reach among borrowers, even though at a lower level
than before. In this scenario, equilibrium B will be Pareto Optimal. However, such a flip in
fortunes is not likely to occur, as the government cannot act on subsidizing without avoiding
the associated problem of inflation.
3. THE WAY FORWARD.
The Indian economy has been through several crises in the 21st century itself, starting from the
Kolar crisis (2006) to demonetization (2016), all of which had one commonality – it adversely
impacted loan repayments. However, the severest blow may have been dealt by the pandemic
in terms of losses which will go on to accumulate over time. It is no secret that the pandemic
has destroyed the structure on which the microfinance industry had been based.
When lockdown was imposed in March 2020, the economy came to an abrupt standstill, with
many of the borrowers losing their livelihoods. MFIs were suffering from a three-pronged
dilemma: non-repayment of instalments from borrowers, continuous outflow for expenses like
salaries, rents etc. and the obligation towards their lenders (Banks, NBFCs, etc.). RBI stepped
in with the moratorium policy for borrowers, but the combined shock brought the microfinance
industry to its knees. Post lockdown, the sector has started on the path of grudging recovery
and also led to the implementation of strategies like adopting alternative digital means of
repayment to compensate for social distancing restrictions.2
But there is also the bigger question of whether the sector will recover enough to bounce back.
It has been speculated that the sector will better itself once the dust settles, even after their
clients have been given loan extensions. One benefit of the MFI sector is that it can achieve
high levels of capitalization which may keep their insolvency at bay. Government
encouragement of capital infusion at the local level may promote entrepreneurship across the
base of a developing country’s population. However, this will not be possible without aggregate
expansion of MFIs throughout the nation. Currently, MFIs are combating the crisis by reducing
their lending to less than half of their pre-COVID levels. Another common reaction has been
2
The acceptance of technology has significantly increased amongst the clients and MFIs, and the latter have
also come up with several customized products for the clients to meet liquidity requirements.
to expand call-centre operations and digital channels of payment. This flexibility is allowing
MFIs to avoid the worst as the nation tries to adapt to the after-effects of the pandemic.
At present times, there is an even greater need for this sector. People at the bottom of the
pyramid will need credit to start their businesses, and MFIs will play a greater role in providing
it.
APPENDIX
A1. Calculation of EMI payment amount
A2. Calculation of interest payable on principal amount.
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