RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG,
petitioners, vs. THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and
AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
FACTS: Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.
The petition was set for hearing and notices thereof were published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3
Minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein,
filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1
March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. Hence,
the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONERS: citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez:
- The adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the
family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent
and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders
ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
ISSUE: whether or not Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction;
RULING: In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add
grandchildren in this article where no grand child is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what
is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
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LEGAL MAXIM: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: When a statute enumerates the subjects or
thing on which it is to operate, it is understood that it excludes all those not expressly mentioned.
What is not deemed included is deemed excluded.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly
defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its
face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. (LEGAL MAXIM: Verba Legis: If the statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation)
(LEGAL MAXIM: RATIO LEGIS) LEGISLATIVE INTENTION: The legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of
the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt.
The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would
have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the
Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph
(1) of Article 335.
BEFORE: Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have
no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity
and filiation where none exists by blood relationship.
PRESENT: Geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. Under
the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
PETITION: Denied
ELISEO SILVA, petitioner, vs. BELEN CABRERA, respondent.
FACTS:
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In the Public Service Commission, Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily
productive capacity and to sell the product of said plant in several municipalities of Batangas
province as well as in the City of Lipa.
Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public convenience to operate each a
15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that their service was adequate for the
needs of the public, and that public convenience did not require the operation of the ice plant
applied for by Cabrera.
Instead of the Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence
to be presented by applicant and oppositors, Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order
commissioned Atty. Antonio H. Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of
witnesses" in this case pursuant to the provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146
known as the Public Act
Attorney Aspillera conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary,
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission
in banc rendered a decision authorizing Cabrera to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City. The
oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat were overruled.
Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:
ERROR I. — That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in
contested cases; consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is
illegal and contrary to law.
ERROR II. — That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the certificate
to applicant-respondent Belen Cabrera.
ISSUE: Whether or not delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to
law. Whether or not the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to take the testimony of
witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act.
RULING:
SILVA’S CONTENTION: Petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney
Aspillera to take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the
Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178:
All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of the
Commissioner, acting either individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The Commissioners
shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases and those that may hereafter be
submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine, and shall proceed to
hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however, That (1)
all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for
reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the
affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a
decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the
Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners, who
shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to
render its decision. (Underlining is ours)
After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree with
the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner in which he
received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service Act.
Sec. 3 is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is authorized to
conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of
the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.
EXTRINSIC AID: CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
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BEFORE RA 178 AMENDED CA 146: The Public Service Commission have 2 members:
a. Public Service Commissioner - heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested.
There could therefore be no hearing or decision in banc.
b. Deputy Commissioner - acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service
Commissioner, and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead.
LEGAL MAXIM: RATIO LEGIS: The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146 evidently
believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service Commissioner or his deputy if properly
commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving
the fixing of rates.
Before amendment, particularly section 32 thereof, the Commission besides authorizing the
taking of depositions and the testimonies of the witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance
and justice of the peace in the provinces, also authorized the reception of evidence by the
Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions.
Then came Republic Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146:
o Commission to consist of:
 one Public Service Commissioners;
 two Associate Public Service Commissioner under the second section;
Under section 3, requires that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, be heard and decided
by the three Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be delegated to one
of the Commissioners alone. The inference is obvious. In contested cases like present, the
Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of evidence to
anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly
authorized. RATIO LEGIS
It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a mere
authority `to take the testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the form of a
deposition and not a reception of evidence, much less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for respondent), and so does
not violate section 3.
An examination of the record does not support this contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent
the Commission, act as a sort of Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive evidence, oral and
documentary, and pass upon petitions and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing.
He even addressed questions to the witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of
exhibits and admitted them. In the transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred
to as the "Commission" and the proceedings had before him on different dates as "hearings". After the
submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the "Case submitted".
It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or testimonies,
and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a deposition under the
provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera was rather that of a
Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a representative of the Commission that made
the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial, either overruling or
sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the question was overruled,
and then making his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.
CONCLUSION: Under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act
178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the
Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such: Reception of evidence consists:
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conducting hearings
receiving evidence, oral and documentary,
passing upon the relevancy and competency of the same,
ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the hearings, and
receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings.
However, under section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates,
any attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a Justice
of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses,
provided that the same is done under provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow
down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially where
the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission
may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or
circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of
amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.
Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the authority
so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside the order of
delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings had thereunder to be null and void. Setting
aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service Commission so that
evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of before any of
the Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing or hearings
to re-submit the evidence already presented and taken down, with such modifications and under such
conditions as they may agree upon, including such other evidence which they may wish to present. There
is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendantappellant.
FACTS: MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG violated Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4, committed as follows: The said accused have in his possession 1 home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal.
22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary
license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary.
LOWER COURT: The accused admitted that he had a gun without license. He presented 4 evidences
which proves his appointment as secret agent of Gov. Feliciano Leviste, then Governor of Batangas.
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A document stating his appointment as secret agent of Gov. Feliciano Leviste, then Governor of
Batangas.
a document issued by Gov. Leviste addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;
the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent;
a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he
was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda
LOWER COURT: rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.
The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
ISSUE: whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition. // whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm
RULING: The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.
LAW IN QUESTION: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,"
are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."6 LEGAL MAXIM: EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXLUSIO ALTERIUS
LEGAL MAXIM: Verba Legis: The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal
on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such
reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY VS. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, GR NO. 24116-17, AUG. 24,
1968, 24 SCRA 708
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of the distraint and
the sale at public auction by the principal defendant-appellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags
of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for
1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00.
LOWER COURT’S DECISION: Sustained the validity of the action taken by defendant-appellee
Municipality of Naga. The case is now before us on appeal. We affirm.
The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to collect from Cebu Portland Cement Company the municipal
license tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. on cement factories located within the Municipality of
Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and again. The demands made on the taxpayer have not been
entirely successful.
Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of
the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from receipt to settle the
account.
On July 6, 1961 the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was distraining
100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total
amount of P204,300.00. This notice was received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant,
Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission. At first, he was not in accord with the said letter,
asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the]
distraint ..."
In turn, the defendant Treasurer signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of
Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained from the
Cebu Portland Cement Company 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that the said articles or goods
will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction
of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00
due the Municipality of Naga Province of Cebu"
The notice of sale was posted by the municipal treasurer indicating the cement will be sold to the highest
bidder at public auction on the 27th day of July, 1961. However, no sale was held on July 27, 1961. It was
likewise stated in the appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: The auction
sale took place on January 30, 1962.
ISSUE: Whether or not the distraint and the sale at a public auction of the 100,000 bags of cement are
valid.
RULING:
1. On the validity of the distraint —
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY’S CONTENTION: In the letter of the Municipality of Naga dated
June 26, 1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it is alleged that the 10-day
period of grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.
It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law.
According to the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows:
Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time
required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distrain any personal property belonging to such
person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in
question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the
distraint."6
The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize
and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the
same, at the time required ..." Cebu Portland Cement Company failed to pay the municipal tax at the time
required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into
play. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory
provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. That was what occurred in this case.
PURPOSE OF DISTRAINT: TIMELY PAYMENT OF TAXES (RATIO LEGIS)
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Grace period is not included because the distraint would be useless as a method of forcing the
people to pay on time
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PRESUMPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS: It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend
to adopt laws which are unnecessary and ineffective. It intends to impart to its enactment such a
meaning as will render them operative and effective.
LEGAL MAXIM: MENS LEGISLATORES – go into the objective of the law
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY VS. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, GR NO. L-26712, DEC. 27,
1969, 30 SCRA 270
In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order
dismissing the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social
Security Act1 vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to
condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the
Social Security Act. LEGAL MAXIM: CASUS OMISUS PRO OMISSO HEBENDUS EST
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United Christian Missionary Society, Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers Church,
United Church Board for World Ministers, Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations, Board
of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in America
FACTS: Five petitioners originally filed separate petitions with the Social Security Commission, contesting
the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious missionary work in the
Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners.
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After several hearings, petitioners desisted from further contesting said coverage, manifesting that
they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its program of social
amelioration.
They instead filed their consolidated amended petition praying for condonation of assessed
penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount
of P69,446.42 for the period from September 1958-1963.
TAX CONDONATION MEANING: opportunity given to taxpayers to write off an existing tax
liability (including interests and fines) by paying a defined amount.
In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged that as international organizations, they were
not subject to coverage under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social
Security System officials. They further claimed that the penalties assessed against them appear to be
inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent Commission which in the past allegedly permitted
condonation of such penalties.
Respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Social Security Commission has no
power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance. Respondent Commission set the
Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966.
At the hearing, petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. Upon petition of the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a period of 15 days to
submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would be deemed
submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum, and respondent System filed its
memorandum on August 4, 1966.
Respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition: In the absence of an express provision
in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it cannot legally do
so. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, cited by the parties, in their
respective pleadings, has been reiterated in Commission Resolution No. 878, wherein the Commission
adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation of the Social Security
Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium
remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act.
The petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent System, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, the amount of P69,446.42. Upon failure to comply with
this Order within the period specified herein, a warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province
of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy
the liability of the petitioners to the System.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social
Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.
RULING: We find no error in the Commission's action.
1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out
petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition
of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority of
condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty. LATIN MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS
The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that:
SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. — (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding sections shall
be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month
for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every
employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable for their payment and if
any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the
contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the date the contribution falls
due until paid . . .2
No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's
mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to
the System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed
penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take
lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's declared policy "to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death."3
In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction
between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another
who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment
the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed
premium payments by force of law. LEGAL MAXIM: DURA LEX SED LEX
2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and control
over the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority to condone the penalty for
late payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it may deem
appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act." The law does not bear out this contention. Section 4 of
the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission. Nowhere from said powers of
the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted expressly or by implication the authority
to condone penalties imposed by the Act.
LEGAL MAXIM: EJUSDEM GENERIS: ”other acts” under paragraph l, section 3, of RA 1161 is a general
term and the previous enumeration must include the acts which must have something to do with
administration; thus condonation is not included. Genre which would limit the general statement.
3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be
"funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."4 Being a mere trustee
of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent Commission cannot legally
perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property
rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor.
LEGAL MAXIM: RATIO LEGIS & MENS LEGISLATORES
4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room
for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent
Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of
social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading into the law
discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose
and intent of the legislature.
5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonation
of penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion
in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. They
invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases, in that they are non-profit religious
organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino people, and that their delay in the payment
of their premiums was not of a contumacious or deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a wellfounded belief that the Social Security Act did not apply to their missionaries.
The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the Court,
and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonations
would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. Nevertheless, assuming such
conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of September 22, 1966 makes of record
that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it reiterated in another resolution dated August 18,
1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand, pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal
Matters and Legislation, that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in
the Commission the power to condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the
penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."
6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. Granting that it had erred in the past in
granting condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again that "it is a wellknown rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent
correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part
of its agents."5 Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded, and was borne
out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of their original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social
security coverage. The point, however, is that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the
applicability of the Social Security Act to them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums
prescribed by law and thus incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late
payment. The proper procedure would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability
therefor, thereby preventing the penalty from attaching. This would have been the prudent course,
considering that the Act provides in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses
or neglects to pay may be collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal
Revenue Code, and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage, the
Court had already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman Catholic
Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission6 that the legislature had clearly intended to include charitable
and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the scope and coverage
of the Social Security Act.
7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing
the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by petitioners in their
second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due
opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument
and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum. The mere fact that there was a pending appeal
in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority
to condone penalties does not mean, as petitioners contend, that the Commission was thereby shorn of its
authority and discretion to dismiss their petition on the same legal ground. 7 The Commission's action has
thus paved the way for a final ruling of the Court on the matter.
QUIJANO VS. THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO. L-26419, OCT. 16, 1970,
35 SCRA 270
Dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed by the herein
petitioners-appellants Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenio T. Quijano to compel the herein respondentappellee Development Bank of the Philippines to accept said petitioners-appellants' back pay certificate
payment of their loan from the said appellee Bank, and to restrain the herein respondent-appellee exoficio sheriff of the province of Misamis Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of
the real properties the above-named appellant spouses had mortgaged with the Development Bank of the
Philippines to secure the loan aforementioned.
FACTS:
-
Gedeon and Eugenio Quijano filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the DBP, in the amount of P19,500.00;
-
-
-
-
Petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution No. 2533 on April 30,
1953;
o PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST: a person who previously held the rights or interests
currently held by another
The mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent-bank on March
23, 1954;
The said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several releases, subject
among others, to the following conditions:
o April 29, 1954: first release of P4,200 and the other releases were made subsequent
thereafter;
o July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the respondent-bank,
including interests, was P13,983.59;
o July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181,
wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14,000.00 for his
outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank, out of the proceeds of his back pay
pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;
The respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of
his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20,
1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved;
October 14, 1965, an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by Quijano,
and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank, the Provincial Sheriff, scheduled the
public auction sale for January 18, 1966, after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the
application for foreclosure filed by the respondent-bank;
Quijano and DBP agreed to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16, 1966 to February
18, 1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale."
TRIAL COURT RULING: Dismissed the petition, as already stated, and directed respondent sheriff to
proceed and continue with the public auction sale of the property mortgaged in accordance with the
foreclosure application of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines after due notice to petitioners.
QUIJANO’S CONTENTION: Our obligation was subsisting at the time of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953 and their application was approved in April 30, 1953.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of Quijano was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic
Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act to Republic Act 304, the original back pay law.
RULING: The appeal has no merit.
The pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the aforementioned Back Pay Law, as amended by
Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953,1 read as follows:.
An Act to Further Amend Republic Act Numbered Three Hundred and Four by Extending the
Benefits of the Law to Members of the Philippine Army and of Recognized Guerrilla Forces and
Officers of the Philippine Scouts and by Allowing the Use of Certificates of Indebtedness for the
Purchase of Public Lands and Government Properties, and for Payment of Obligations Subsisting
at the Time of Approval of This Act
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons
specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Amendatory
Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of
Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right to the Salaries and
wages as provided in section one hereof and notice of such acknowledgment shall be
issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due
the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines
within ten years from the date of their issuance without interests:
Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations
as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of
indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering
the whole or a part of the total salaries and wages the right to which has been
duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such
certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may
need for the payment of
(1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Amendatory
Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or controlled
by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to
accept the same for such settlement; AMBIGUITY: “obligation” – what is the
meaning? It has something to do with what you’re supposed to perform.
SOURCE OF OBLIGATION: MORTGAGE CONTRACT
Under the above provisions, the Government or any of its agencies does not have any discretion in the
acceptance of back pay certificates, when they are used by the applicants or original holders themselves
for the settlement of any of the obligations or liabilities specifically enumerated in the law.3 It is equally
clear, however, that the same provisions expressly require that the obligations — for which certificates of
indebtedness may be accepted as payments of — must be subsisting at the time of the approval of
Republic Act No. 897;
In the case at bar, such back pay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation
of an obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said amendatory Act on
June 20, 1953, which corporation may not, legally be compelled to accept the certificates.
It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on
April 80, 1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they
executed the mortgage contract only on March 23, 1954, and that the release of the amount of the
said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions
by said appellants. Under these circumstances, our ruling in the case of Rodriguez vs. Development Bank
of the Philippines is controlling.
In that case, Rodriguez obtained a loan from the said Development Bank of the Philippines to be received
by him in several releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and conditions specified in
the loan agreement. Pursuant to said agreement, Rodriguez received the first release in the sum of
P5,000.00 on May 27, 1953, while the subsequent releases covering the P9,000.00 — balance of the
loan were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953
When a balance of about P10,000.00 remained unpaid, Rodriguez offered to pay the said outstanding
balance of the loan with his back pay certificate. The Bank refused at first to accept the said tender of
payment in certificate, and when it accepted the same later, it limited its acceptance only to the amount of
P5,000.00 representing the portion of the loan released before the passage of Republic Act No. 897,
although the amount of the back pay certificate offered by Rodriguez was more than sufficient to cover
the total unpaid balance of the loan. So, Rodriguez instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Davao to compel the Bank to accept his back pay certificate in payment of his whole
outstanding obligation or, in other words, even for the portions of the loan corresponding to the releases
made after June 20, 1953. This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon appeal to this Court, the
dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale: PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
It cannot be said that appellant became indebted to the Bank for the total amount of
P14,000.00 from the date of the agreement. The releases of the balance of the agreed
loan were made dependent on certain conditions among which is the availability of funds.
Non-compliance with any of these conditions will not entitle the appellant to the release of
the balance of the agreed loan and conversely, will not entitle the bank to hold the
appellant liable for the unreleased amounts. Consequently, we hold, as did the trial court,
that:
"... the amounts released in July, 1953 and thereafter cannot be
considered as obligations subsisting in June, 1953. The defendant may
be compelled to accept a back pay certificate in payment of obligations
subsisting when the Amendatory Act was approved (Sec. 2, Republic Act
897). Republic Act 897 was approved on June 20, 1953. The defendant
may not be compelled to accept plaintiff's back pay certificate in payment
of the amounts released after June 20, 1953."
Herein appellants' situation is even worse than that of Rodriguez. Here appellants actually availed of
their approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the
corresponding releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the
mortgage contract on March 23, 1954. Undoubtedly, the approval by the appellee Development
Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants' loan application on April 30, 1953, appellants did not
thereby incur any obligation to pay the same; only after the corresponding amounts were released
to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach; and it cannot, therefore, be said that
the said loan was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897 on
June 20, 1953.
It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was approved by
the appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was perfected between them and said Bank, but it
should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of
the Bank to grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same could not
have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to them; and said release was
even subject to their compliance with certain conditions specified in the mortgage contract executed after
the approval already of Republic Act 897.
Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled
veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or
contributed to the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve
sympathy, for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are: LEGAL MAXIM: RATIO LEGIS &
MENS LEGISLATORES
-
To serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to
their wives and orphans.
To give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those
who have given their all for the cause of the last war.
LEGAL MAXIM: DURA LEX SED LEX
On the other hand, however, we cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the
clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of
law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and
-
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. LEGAL MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS
Thus, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of
back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court
has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its
purview.
Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24, 1948, they could not
validly seek to discharge it by application of their back pay certificate under Republic Act
304, on June 18, 1948, because that Act, in terms, limited any such application to
"obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act". (Sec. 2)
G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
presents.
FACTS: Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. Interpreted the words "products of the Philippines" in Section
2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that,
coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not
the products, which is the flour produced. That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues
assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to
respondent Court, as the construction it would place on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far
remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention the policy of the Act. We affirm.
In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was
an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs said that Republic Flour Mills, Inc. is liable for
the sum of P7,948.00 as wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows:
FACTS: Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the
manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.
- From December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded
from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater
- Commissioner of Customs assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in
the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest."
Wharfage is the fee charged by ocean carriers to cover the port authority's cost of using a wharf
to unload cargo from a vessel.
ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILL’S CONTENTION: that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or
government facilities [were] utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is
contrary to law. It should not, under its construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its
exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines", coming as they did from
wheat grain which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by
Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste."
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS CONTENTION: Petitioner was liable for wharfage dues "upon receipt
or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of
government-owned or private wharves."
Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under
the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our decision in Procter & Gamble
Phil. Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs. It did not feel called upon to answer the question
now before us as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its
memorandum.
RULING: We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm the decision of respondent Court of
Tax Appeals.
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid
on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ...
exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage
...."
One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are
exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. Petitioner appeared to have
entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent Court, it categorically asserted:
"Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of milling the
wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad." It does take a
certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting from
the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is
always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of
courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." Petitioner ought to have been
aware that deference to such a doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is
clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that. LEGAL MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS & UBI LEX NON
DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUIRE DEBOMOS & GENERALIA VERBA SUN GENERALITER
INTELLIGENCIA
- The law does not distinguish between domestic and international products.
- TAX LAWS: Tax exemptions are interpreted against the petitioners and in favor of the state.
2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While statutory
construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on one's predilections
as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a reasonable interpretation. It is
best to keep in mind the reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what obviously means." To paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be
eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation
arrived at does violence to the statutory language in its total context. It would be then to ignore what has
been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom in the construction of statutes to accept
their view advanced by petitioner.
3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the
legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrated. Its objective must be carried out.
Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at
war with the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an
ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that other exceptions may
be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire
to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to
sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the
coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a
clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself.
It does not now. LEGAL MAXIM: RATIO LEGIS, MENS LEGISLATORES, PRESUMPTION OF
EFFECTIVENESS
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER,
ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the
employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer
for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages — the court of general jurisdiction
or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?
Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National
Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was such an
order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order
assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show
cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such
persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily
restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use
of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao,
Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the
determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2
FACTS:
March 5, 1982: petitioner National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc.
April 17, 1982: Such employees charged Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. firm before the same office of
the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances.
May 3, 1982: There was a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio
Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the
union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted
for yes and three voted for no." 6
May 23, 1982. The strike began
July 9, 1982 private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers
and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order."
- It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufactumed)
August 3, 1982: This Court required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to
be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, - to
stop the strike while the case was going on "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in
Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to
restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of
[that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner
unions must abide strictly with ring division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or
egress from such premises.
July 15, 1982 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the
restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It
was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against
private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance The motion to dismiss was denied. Hence this
petition for certiorari (petition for higher court to review it, to be more fully infor
Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor
Code:
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares.' "
August 13, 1982: the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of
respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, on the other hand, instead
of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He said that respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction, and said that "the instant petition has merit and should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this
Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters
with jurisdictional.
But On May 1, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided
"that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and
other forms of damages." The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral
damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees.
May 1, 1980: Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the
original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide
"3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly
excluded by tills Code."
LEGAL MAXIM: GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGRANT:
- Actions for damages are handled by special law, in this case the labor code, over general law.
August 21, 1981: An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance
then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code.
Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a): "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment." This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2)
unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment." It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made
no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations.
Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and prohibition
lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is
therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional
trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he
entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within
the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. "The first and fundamental duty
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of
sixty years. LEGAL MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions.
They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court,
that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from
picketing or a strike. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed;
it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt.
3. No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry
of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express
provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice,
that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made
clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters.
It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal
of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management &
Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather
thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged
in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus:
"Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code
is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater
promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what
essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management
as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge,
is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts
in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further
action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary restraining
order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION,
INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.
FACTS:
TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the mandamus petition of Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila
Railroad Company Credit Union
SUPREME COURT: The union is seeking the reversal of the decision relying on what it considered to
be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023:
(1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute
an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary
or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement
and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other
demand owing from the member to the co-operative.
(2) Upon the execution of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative
by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains
unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative."
1
KMMRCCU contends:Under the provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its
members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and
salaries. There is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers
and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees'
wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the
salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees'
debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been
enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees'
credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member
of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is
to write something into the law which does not appear.
- The mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of
the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this
mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative
intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244
show the legislative intent on preference of credits.
ISSUE: Whether the contention of the union is correct?
RULING: Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee,
which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be
implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that,
therefore, respondent company did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023.
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it
would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.
1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no
ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid
objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be
done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was
pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: "It has been repeated time and time again that where
the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The
law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
born to that effect.LEGAL MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS
4
2. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base
his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented
him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, this Court
held. "Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a
tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful
exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled.
6
7
G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and KAYUMANGGI RADIO NETWORK
INCORPORATED, respondents.
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) which ordered petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Incorporated (RCPI) to
desist from operating its radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
FACTS: Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. has been operating a radio communications
system since 1957 under its legislative franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 which was
enacted on June 23, 1957.
1968: Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc established a radio telegraph service in
Sorsogon.
1971: another radio telegraph service was put up in Mindoro followed by another in Catarman,
Samar in 1976 and Catarman, Samar in 1983.
June 24, 1980: NTC decided that private respondent Kayumanggi Radio Network Incorporated was
authorized by the NTC to operate radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and in San
Jose, Mindoro.
December 14, 1983: Kayumanggi Radio Network filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. was operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose,
Mindoro without a certificate of public covenience and necessity. Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc., on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone services in the places subject
of the complaint are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by both the public respondent
and its predecessor, the Public Service Commission. In its supplemental reply, the petitioner further
stated that it has been in operation in the questioned places long before private respondent
Kayumanggi filed its application to operate in the same places.
August 22, 1984: After conducting a hearing, NTC ordered petitioner RCPI to immediately cease or
desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman Northern Samar; San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; andSorsogon stating that under Executive Order No. 546, a certificate of
public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities and
services including radio communications.
September 4, 1984: RCPI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an order dated
September 12, 1984.
October 1, 1984: the present petition was filed raising the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner RCPI is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and
necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in
Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
RCPI CONTENTION: The abolition of the Public Service Commission under Presidential Decree No.
1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications Commission under Executive Order No. 546
to replace the defunct Public Service Commission did not affect sections 14 and 15 of the Public
Service Law (Commonwealth Act. No. 146, as amended).
The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as follows:
Section 13. (a) the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the exercise of
its authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force: ...
Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:
(d) Radio companies except with respect to the fixing of rates;
Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public
service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate
from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or
"certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner. ...
RULING: We find no merit in the petitioner's contention.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23,1972, reorganizing the executive
branch of the National Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions
were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the
Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred
were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as
amended. With the enactment of Executive Order No. 546 on July 23, 1979 implementing P.D.
No.1, the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished
and their functions were transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission (Sec. 19(d),
Executive Order No. 546). Section 15 of said Executive Order spells out the functions of the
National Telecommunications Commission as follows:
Sec. 15. Functions of the Commission.-The Commission shall exercise the following
functions:
a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services,
radio communications petitions systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph system, radio and
television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service
communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such
public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by
international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and
radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting
systems;
d. Sub-allocate series of frequencies of bands allocated by the International Telecommunications
Union to the specific services;
e. Establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards, specifications in all cases related to the
issued Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same;
f. Coordinate and cooperate with government agencies and other entities concerned with any aspect
involving communications with a view to continuously improve the communications service in the
country;
g. Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a
larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to
maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission
finds it reasonably feasible;
h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities;
i. Undertake the examination and licensing of radio operators;
j. Undertake, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and transceivers; and
k. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
It is clear from the provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer
exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing
executive orders. The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order
No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained. LEGAL
MAXIM: CASUS OMISUS
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the
hands of a subject." Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign
power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by
virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. We ruled in Pangasinan transportation
Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission (70 Phil. 221) that:
... statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage,
but likewise to those already established and in operation ...
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the
Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by
its provisions. The petitioner cannot install and operate radio telephone services on the basis of its
legislative franchise alone.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can
operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous. Section 1 of
said statute reads:
Section 1. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the provisions, not
inconsistent herewith, of Act 3846, entitled.' An Act providing for the regulation of radio
stations and radio communications in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes;'
Commonwealth Act 146, known as the Public Service Act, and their amendments, and other
applicable laws, there is hereby granted to the Radio Communications of the Philippines, its
successors or assigns, the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and
operating in the Philippines, at such places as the said corporation may select and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications may approve, radio stations for the
reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephone,
including both coastal and marine telecommunications, each station to consist of two radio
apparatus comprising of a receiving and sending radio apparatus. (Emphasis supplied).
Section 4(a) of the same Act further provides that:
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised
by the grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to
the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a
license for such case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where
it desires to operate. It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to
the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. (Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 381). LEGAL
MAXIM: VERBA LEGIS
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and
necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such
certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations (See executive Order No. 546,
sec. 15, supra.; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao, 15 SCRA 75; Olongapo
Electric Light and Power Corp. v. National Power Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-24912, promulgated
April 9, 1987.)
It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the private
respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro.
Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put
up and operate a radio communications system in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the
public respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an applicant desiring to extend the same
services to those areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature
nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even
repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires. (Art. XII, sec. 11 of the 1986
Constitution). There is an express provision in the petitioner's franchise which provides compliance
with the above mandate R.A. 2036, sec. 15).
In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and
conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar
and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule, the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may modify or ignore them only when it clearly
appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14
SCRA 14). The petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be denied the authority
to operate its services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when the
public respondent disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to
public interest and the common good.
WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public respondent dated August 22, 1984 is hereby
AFFIRMED. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.