PART VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
I. Executive power; definition and scope
a.. Privileges Inhibition and Disqualifications
b. Presidential Immunity: meaning and scope
Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001
Constitutional Law | Justiciable Controvery | Political Question | EDSA 1 vs
EDSA 2 | Resignation | Conviction by Impeachment as a Bar to Prosecution |
Presidential Immunity from Suit | Public Office is a Public Trust |
Theory of Derivative Prejudice
FACTS:
Former President Joseph Estrada was elected during 1998 elections. Sometime in October 2000,
however, several allegations of corruption and of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords were
made against him before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Some Congressmen moved to
impeach Estrada which caused several sectors, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos to call for
Estrada’s resignation. Some senior advisers of Estrada as well as a number of his cabinet resigned
from their positions. Impeachment trial commenced with Chief Justice Davide presiding.
The impeachment trial was put to a halt after the public prosecutors tendered their collective
resignation before the Impeachment Tribunal caused by the decision of 11 Senators not to open the
second envelope (an alleged secret account of Erap amounting to 3.3B Pesos in the name of Jose
Velarde). An indefinite postponement of the Impeachment proceedings was granted by the Chief
Justice.
The next day, EDSA 2 commenced with the PNP and AFP joining the crowd. In the succeeding
days, a chain of resignations from the military, the police, and the cabinet ensued. On January 20,
Supreme Court declared the seat for presidency as vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post.” At noon, Chief Justice, whose authority was later unanimously confirmed by SC,
administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines. That same afternoon, Estrada and
his family left Malacañang and transmitted a signed letter appointing then Vice-President Arroyo as
Acting President, citing Section 11, Article 7 of the Constitution, to the House Speaker and Senate
President.
Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. Estrada filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for prohibition which sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting
any further proceedings in cases filed against him, not until his term as president ends. He also filed
a petition for quo warranto praying for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Philippines “temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.”
RULINGS:
Political Question/Justiciable Controversy
1. The Court held that the cases at bar do not involve a political question and therefore falls within
the ambit of judicial scrutiny pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers of coordinate branches
of government.
2. Political question refers to those questions which, under our Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with the issues
dependent on the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
3. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.
EDSA 1 vs EDSA 2
4. EDSA People Power I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government while EDSA People Power II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected
the office of the President.
5. EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra
6. EDSA I presented a political question constitutional . while EDSA II involved legal questions
Resignation .
7. Using the totality test, the Supreme Court held that petitioner resigned as President – which was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
8. Facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
9. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) He acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo
as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) He emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) He
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) He assured that he
will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) He called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
10. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: (1) there must be an
intent to resign and (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
11. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at
the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him . He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid
prosecution.
Recognition of Presidency of Arroyo
12. The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability
of former President Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress
recognizing Arroyo as President is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat—it is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Supreme Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
13. Implicitly clear in the recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo as President is the
premise that the inability of former President Estrada is no longer temporary.
14. Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily since such claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that President Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Conviction by Impeachment as a Bar to Prosecution
15. The Supreme Court rejects former President Estrada’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted
for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His impeachment
trial was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
“Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. It will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
Presidential Immunity from Suit
16. Estrada does NOT enjoy immunity from suit. Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond with the ruling in In
Re: Saturnino Bermudez.
17. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character (plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption). Estrada cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser .
Public Office is a Public Trust
18. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It
declared as a state policy that “(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.” It ordained that “(p)ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
It set the rule that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel.” It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of
the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to “(investigate on its own,
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the
Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
Theory of Derivative Prejudice
19. The Court cannot adopt former President Estrada’s prejudice of the Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. theory of derivative prejudice , i.e., that the 20. Our Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they
cannot be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute
cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the
cases against the petitioner and petitioner believes that the finding of probable cause against him is
the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, July 29, 2004
Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused
with violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of
former President Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of
promoting his self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a
contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a
government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment
and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the
Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.
Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The
reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who
is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their
close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.
Non-sitting President’s immunity: In re: petition for writ of amparo and habeas data of
Noriel Rodriguez etc. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et.al., November 15, 2011
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated
with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when
4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45
caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army
(NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to
admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he
is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan,
Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside their house and took pictures for
around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets,
jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for
Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.)
Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan
and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against
NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her
position as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by
members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for
his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was
dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUE:
1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from suit
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies during her incumbency.
“Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but
not beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize
our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes
the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s
immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the
duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but this should not
abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in
enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the application of the
command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
c. Presidential/Executive Privilege
Definition/scope
Kinds of executive privilege
d. Executive and Administrative Powers in General of a President
Distinguish exec.power from admin. Power
(Art.VII, Sec.1 and Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution)
e. Power of Appointment; Definition in general
Kinds of Presidential appointmentsCases and legal basis : Sec. 14, Art.VII;
General vs. Urro, March 29,2011
G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011.
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner, v. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, ET AL., Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA
appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of
Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia
P.de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V.
Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents, for being appointed
as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo warranto petition
questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it
violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres.
Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and
Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the
Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular"
appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since the
appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the
constitutional ban on appointments,was officially released (perthe congratulatory letter
dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then
the petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new
and valid appointment was effectively made. The petitioner assails the validity of the
appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Lis mota literally
means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the
respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings,
what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to
institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro.
The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing
private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely
holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of
action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its
temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make
temporary (acting) appointments,unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the
Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the
office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the
NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.
Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that
the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive
Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment,
on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the
NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed
until apprised of the appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his
office without expressing any misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on be heard to
say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed
except for cause.
Sana vs. Career Exec. Service Board, Nov. 15 2011
Appointments solely made by President- read Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
f. Role of Commission on Appointments over appointments made by President
-(See Sec. 16, Art.VII, 1987 Constitution)
FACTS:
- Sarmiento vs. Mison, Dec.17, 1987
In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments. Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and professors of
constitutional law, filed the instant petition for prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned appointment violated Section 16, Art.
VII of the1987 Constitution. Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President is well within her authority to appoint bureau
heads without submitting such nominations before the Commission on Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the history of the
confirmatory powers of the Commission on Appointments (which is part of the legislative department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of
the President.
 Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent or confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very powerful, eventually transforming into a venue for horse-trading
and similar malpractices.
 On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, the 1973
Constitution placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle ground" in order to reconcile the extreme
set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. As such, while the President may make appointments to positions that require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also grants her the power to make appointments on her own
without the need for confirmation by the legislature.
Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:
 heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution;
 all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
 those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
According to the Court, only the presidential appointments of the first group of public officers are subject to the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. A review of the deliberations would show that bureau heads have been deleted from the first group,
precisely because they are lower in rank as compared to other officers enumerated in the same group.
Therefore, Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
- Sec.8(2), Art VIII, 1987 Constitution
- Sec, 1(2), Art.IX-B
- Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Appointments, Sept. 4, 1989
Appointment as sectoral representative (during the transition period) in the
House of Representatives requires confirmation by CA (falls in “other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution” of the “1st
group”).
FACTS:
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16 and Article XVIII, Section 7¹ of the Constitution, petitioner Deles
was among others who was appointed to a seat in the House of Representatives reserved for the
sectoral representatives in Article VI, Sec 5(1)². However, her (as well as the others) oath-taking was
suspended as it was opposed by members of the Commission on Appointments (CA) who insisted
that appointment of sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by it. Deles now petitions to
compel CA to allow her to office and to restrain the same from subjecting her to the confirmation
process.
ISSUE:
Is confirmation by CA required for the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives?
RULING:
Yes. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, it is
indubitable that sectoral reps to the House of Representatives among the “other officers whose
appointments are vested in him (the President) in this Constitution” referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the CA.³ Furthermore,
Deles’ appointment was ad interim, pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VII. Implicit therefore is the
recognition by the Pres. that Deles’ appointment requires confirmation by the CA. Petition dismissed.
¹ Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 7: Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral
representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Art VI of this Constitution
² Constitution, Article VI, Sec 5(1): The House of Reps shall be composed of xxx [those] who
shall be elected from legislative districts xxx, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations
³ Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by
express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of
members of the SC and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his
deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). But no such exemption from confirmation had been extended to
appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution (Quintos Deles v. Commission
on Constitutional Commissions, 177 SCRA 259)
Compare above with the following provisions and cases:
-
Sec. 9, Art. VIII
Sec. 9 Art. XI
Commissioner of Customs (based on the case of Sarmiento vs. Mison, supra
Bautista vs. Salonga, April 13, 1989
FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of
the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are
to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President,
vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive
officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited
power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments
that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments
solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the
1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress;
but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation
of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 86439
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Soriano vs. Lista, March 24, 2003
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the constitutionality
and legality of the permanent appointments, made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public
respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution.
The petition impleads Hon. Emilia T. Boncodin in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM). Petitioner, Elpidio G. Soriano, filed the instant petition as member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a taxpayer.
Public respondents were promoted to different ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on different
dates as follows:
Reuben S. Lista – Vice Admiral, Philippine Coast Guard
Domingo T. Estera – Rear Admiral, Philippine Coast Guard
Miguel C. Tabares – Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Arthur N. Gosingan – Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Efren L. Taduran – Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Cesar A. Sarile – Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Danilo M. Vilda – Naval Captain, Philippine Coast Guard
Elpidio B. Padama – Commodore, Philippine Coast Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission on
Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their
duties and functions. According to petitioner, their respective appointments are illegal and unconstitutional
for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging
their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.
In the same vein, petitioner opines that there is no legal basis for the DBM to allow the disbursement of the
salaries and emoluments of respondent officers of the PCG. Accordingly, he prays that respondent
Secretary Boncodin be ordered to desist from allowing such disbursements until the confirmation of their
respective appointments by the CA.
At the outset, the Court finds petitioner to be without any legal personality to file the instant petition. We
have ruled that a private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.1 In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that he has personally
suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be emphasized that a party bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of an act or statute must show "not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." 2
The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as
such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner has the legal personality to question the subject appointments, the
petition will nevertheless fail. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the PCG used to be
administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was
subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense (DND) pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of
Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.
However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the President, issued EO 475
transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He later on again transferred the PCG
from the Office of the President to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
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authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear
and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning.3
The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain" refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions
and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution,
the same need not be confirmed by the CA.4
Accordingly, the Court declares that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
was committed by respondent officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office as well as the disbursement
of their respective salaries and other emoluments by the respondent Secretary of the DBM are hereby
declared valid and legal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
By-passed appointment and its effect: see the case of Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,
2002
Midnight appointment: Sec.15, Art.VII, 1987 Constitution
Read the case of De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, April 20,
2010.
g. Power of Control and SupervisionMondana vs. Silvosa, May 30, 1955
h. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Villena vs. Sec. of Interior, April 21, 1939
Lacson-Magallanes vs. Pano, Nov. 17, 1967
i. Military Powers
j. Pardoning powers: Nature and limitations
Different forms of executive clemency
Pardon vs. amnesty
Other forms of executive clemency
k. Diplomatic power
l. Delegated power of the President
emergency power; scope;nature and conditions
m. Succession