For Paper 1 Section B Criminal Law you need to know and apply the law in relation to all of the offences and defences outlined below. Remember as well that you need to demonstrate knowledge of and apply any of the other general principles of criminal law such as transferred malice and coincidence of AR and MR and any omissions where they are relevant to the scenario you are discussing. For each 25 mark application question you get 10 marks for demonstrating knowledge of the law and then 15 marks for your application of the law to the scenario. Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Assault Battery S.47 Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm S.20 grievous bodily harm/wounding with intent to cause some harm S.18 grievous bodily harm/wounding with intent to cause serious harm Assault – sentencing outlined in s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988 6 months imprisonment/£5000 fine Intentionally or recklessly cause the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence Element of Offence Law Case Act Cannot be an omission Constanza – letters - words are sufficient for an assault either written You must show the examiner or verbal what the positive act D did. Ireland – silent phone calls (sent a text message, shouted) constituted an assault Apprehend Immediate Personal Violence V must apprehend – so if V is unaware there is no assault. Did V faint or duck or worry etc? Logdon – pointed replica gun at V – V didn’t know it was a replica and so apprehended imm unlawful personal violence If it is obvious that there can be no force due to the circumstances then there is no assault Lamb – D and V playing with revolver didn’t believe it could fire – pointed gun at V and fired. V didn’t apprehend force as didn’t think it could fire Words indicating there will be no violence will cancel out V’s apprehension Turberville v Savage – hand on sword ‘if it were not assize day’ – words negated the threat Force must be immediate – doesn’t mean instantly but ‘imminent’ and ‘not excluding the near future’ Smith – D broke into Vs garden and was looking through the window. V was terrified and though D was about to break in – basis of fear was that V didn’t know what D was about to do Ireland – silent phone calls – V could fear D was about to arrive at her home Unlawful Causation Apprehension of lawful force will not amount to an assault D’s positive act must have caused V to apprehend imm unlawful personal force Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken D’s contribution must be the operating and substantial cause of death Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged Intentionally or recklessly causing V to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence Intends V to apprehend immediate unlawful violence Reckless in causing V to apprehend immediate unlawful violence D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Mohan – was it D’s ‘aim purpose and desire’ to cause V to apprehend imm unlawful personal violence? Cunningham – gas meter – where D is aware of a risk of a criminal consequence but goes ahead and takes that risk anyway Battery – sentencing outlined in s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988 – 6 months imprisonment/£5000 fine Intentionally or recklessly applying unlawful force to another Element of Offence Law Case Force Force can be slight – battery is Collins v Wilcock – police officers about contact somehow grabbed arm of V – this was enough between D and V to constitute force Touching is enough Thomas – D touched V’s skirt – this amounted to a battery ‘if you touch a person’s clothes while he is wearing them that is equivalent to touching him’ Can be an indirect act (eg a booby trap or throwing something at someone) Martin – D placed iron bar across door and shouted ‘fire’ – this amounted to an indirect battery DPP v K – D stole sulphuric acid from school and hid it in hand dryer – sprayed onto V – indirect battery Haystead – D caused child to fall by punching mother holding him – indirect battery to child If Indirect – add Causation! Unlawful Intentionally or Recklessly applying unlawful force If V gives genuine consent then the force is not unlawful General consent to ‘everyday contact’ ie bustling in corridors/tube etc Intention to apply unlawful force Recklessness as to the infliction of unlawful force Mohan – was it D’s ‘aim purpose and desire’ to apply force to V? Cunningham – gas meter – where D is aware of a risk of a criminal consequence but goes ahead and takes that risk anyway s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1864 – 5 year imprisonment An assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm Element of Offence Law Case Completed assault or You must have a completed (ie Ireland – the assault (silent phone battery all AR and MR elements) assault calls) caused ABH (psychiatric injury) or battery – I would STRONGLY Actual Bodily Harm suggest you discuss the liability for this as a separate ISAS first then go on to discuss the s.47 offence. Ordinary words Any injury (bruising, scratches etc) Psychiatric injury Occasioned Causation Chan-Fook – injury, hurt or damage. Actual means “more than trivial” Miller – “hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health and comfort of the victim” T v DPP – loss of consciousness, even momentarily can amount to ABH DPP v Smith – cut off ponytail – cutting hair is ABH as it is intrinsic to the individual Chan-Fook – does not include ‘mere emotions such as fear, distress, or panic’ Burstow – includes psychiatric injury The assault or battery you have discussed must have caused the ABH injuries Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act MR for the original assault or battery There is no extra MR required – D does not need to intend the injury or see any risk of it. Instead he must have intended or been reckless in relation to the original assault or battery Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Savage – threw beer over V and glass slipped and cut V – intention to throw beer = intention to apply unlawful force (ie the MR for the battery) which is sufficient for the MR of s.47 GBH without Intent (Malicious Wounding) – s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1864 – 5 years imprisonment Unlawful and malicious wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm without intent/with intent to cause some harm Element of Offence Law Case Unlawful Cannot consent to serious Brown – cannot consent to injuries of injuries unless specific s.47 and above exceptions for consent defence (discussed in a later ISAS if relevant) GBH/Wounding Do not need to prove both! Wound - Cut or break in the continuity of the skin JCC v Eisenhower – internal bleed in the eye didn’t amount to a wound – cut must be to the whole skin Remember – all wounds can be Wood (1830) – broken bone with no GBH injuries (as a cut injury etc cut to the skin is not a wound (could is clearly ‘serious harm’), but not be GBH though!) all GBH injuries are wounds! GBH - Serious harm Saunders – broken bone amounts to GBH – ‘serious harm’ Bollam – 17 month old had bruising seriousness to be assessed according to Vs age and health – bruising on a young baby did amount to serious harm Burstow – stalker V suffered severe depressive illness – psychiatric injury can amount to GBH Dica – HIV infection can amount to GBH Brown & Stratton – multiple minor injuries can amount to GBH together Inflict The D must have caused the GBH/wounding injuries Causation Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions Maliciously Maliciously means intention or recklessly causing ‘some harm’ ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Mohan – was it D’s ‘aim purpose and desire’ to cause V some harm? Cunningham – gas meter – where D is aware of a risk of a criminal consequence but goes ahead and takes that risk anyway Parmenter – injured 3 month old baby when thrown into the air and caught, D often did this with older children and didn’t realise there was a risk of injury. As didn’t foresee injury hadn’t been reckless so no s.20 offence Grievous Bodily Harm with Intent – s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1864 – Life imprisonment Unlawful and malicious wounding or causing grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension of any person Element of Offence Law Case GBH/Wounding Do not need to prove both! Wound - Cut or break in the continuity of the skin JCC v Eisenhower – internal bleed in the eye didn’t amount to a wound – cut must be to the whole skin Remember – all wounds can be Wood (1830) – broken bone with no GBH injuries (as a cut injury etc cut to the skin is not a wound (could is clearly ‘serious harm’), but not be GBH though!) all GBH injuries are wounds! GBH - Serious harm Cause Saunders – broken bone amounts to GBH – ‘serious harm’ Bollam – 17 month old had bruising seriousness to be assessed according to Vs age and health – bruising on a young baby did amount to serious harm Burstow – stalker V suffered severe depressive illness – psychiatric injury can amount to GBH Dica – HIV infection can amount to GBH Brown & Stratton – multiple minor injuries can amount to GBH together The D must have caused the GBH/wounding injuries Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken Intent to cause serious harm/prevent lawful arrest A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Taylor – V found with stab wound, difficulty proving if D had intention to wound – intention to wound is not sufficient for s.18 D must be proved to have intended to either: do some grievous bodily harm; or resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detention of any person. CANNOT be committed recklessly Mohan - was it D’s ‘aim purpose and desire’ to cause V serious harm? Woollin – was serious harm a virtually certain result of D’s actions and did D know it was a VC consequence? For resisting arrest – P must Morrison – police officer told D he prove D had specific intention to resist or prevent arrest, but not the injury. Only need to prove D was reckless as to whether his actions would cause a wound or injury when resisting arrest was arresting him, he dived through window taking officer with him Rowe – deliberately infected Vs with HIV by cutting holes in condoms etc – intended serious harm guilty of s.18 Fatal Offences Against the Person Murder Loss of Control (Voluntary Manslaughter) Diminished Responsibility (Voluntary Manslaughter) Unlawful Act Manslaughter (Involuntary Manslaughter) Gross Negligence (Involuntary Manslaughter) Murder – Common Law Offence – Mandatory life sentence ‘The unlawful killing of a reasonable person in being and under the Queen’s Peace, with malice aforethought, express or implied’ Element of Offence Law Case Unlawful Killing Must have a dead person! If no one has died go to Non-Fatal Offences! Queen’s Peace Reasonable Person in Being Self-defence Death penalty Not in wartime – killing enemy in war wouldn’t be murder Killing a prisoner of war would be under the queen’s peace and so could be murder Foetus in the womb Brain dead Causation The D must have caused the GBH/wounding injuries AG Ref No.3 (1994) – foetus deliberately injured and child died from these injuries – injuries ‘in utero’ cannot be murder Malcherek & Steel – Doctors turning off life-support not murder Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died - so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Malice Aforethought, express or implied Express malice – intent to kill Implied malice – intent to cause GBH Vickers – D broke into V’s cellar, attacked V by punching and kicking her to the head, she died from injuries – intention to inflict GBH which results in the death of V is enough for the MR of murder Whether express or implied – you then need to discuss if it is direct or indirect Direct – D intends to kill V Indirect – D did not intend the particular consequences but they were a virtually certain result and D knew this Mohan – D’s ‘aim purpose and desire’ to bring about the criminal consequence Woollin – D lost temper feeding baby and threw at wall – if the consequence is virtually certain to occur and D appreciates it is VC to occur then he has indirect intent Matthews and Alleyne – threw V into river knowing he couldn’t swim – jury is entitled to find intention but does not have to Voluntary Manslaughter – D is charged with murder and is able to plead a specific defence and ends up being convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Prove MURDER first, then prove LOC/DR Diminished Responsibility –s.2 Homicide Act as amended by s.52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 – discretionary life sentence D was suffering from abnormality of mental functioning which is due to recognised medical condition which substantially impairs D’s ability to understand nature of conduct OR form rational judgment OR exercise self-control and the abnormality provides explanation for D causing V’s death Element of Offence Law Case Abnormality of Mental Old law – abnormality of mind Byrne – sexual psychopath’s Functioning inability to control desires – Doesn’t have to be permanent abnormality means ‘a state of – just operating at the time D mind so different from that of killed ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal’ Recognised Medical Condition New/emerging conditions – D Dietschman – adjustment can call an acknowledged disorder specialist whose work has been Jama – Asperger’s validated, it is then up to the Seers – depression jury to consider the evidence Bailey – epilepsy Substantially Impaired Provides an Explanation s.52(1)(b) – AMF must have substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the three things listed in S53(1A). (a) to understand the nature of his conduct; (b) to form a rational judgment; or (c) to exercise self-control Simcox - paranoia English – PMT Reynolds – Post natal depression Alhuwalia – battered woman syndrome Byrne – sexual psychopath Moyles – schizophrenia Lloyd- need not be total, but more than minimal Egan – more than trivial…less than total impairment The AMF must be a significant contributory factor in causing D to act as he did Abnormality of mental functioning need not be the only factor that caused D to be involved in the killing but it must be the significant factor. D must prove on the balance of probabilities, that they were suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning caused by a RMC which SI them and provides an explanation for the killing. Loss of Control – s.54(1)(a)-(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 – discretionary life sentence D kills as a result of a loss of control which had a qualifying trigger and a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or similar way. Element of Offence Law Case Loss of Control D must have lost control (evident on/from the facts) – point this out in the exam – ie D has clearly lost control as can be seen by the way he…. S54(2) - does not need to be sudden. But a delay may be taken into account by the judge when deciding whether to leave defence to the jury and by the jury when deciding if the Alhuwalia – D had been abused by V over many years, when sleeping D poured petrol over V and set him on fire – under old provocation law appeal failed as not sudden – could however Qualifying Triggers killing resulted from a loss of control s.55(3)-(5) Coroners and Justice Act win out under new law s55(3) Fear of Serious Violence This is subjective, ie D doesn’t need to prove his fear was reasonable, just that it was genuine Violence must be in respect of D or some other identifiable person – not just a general fear of violence against anyone s55(4) - Things said or done of an extremely grave character and D has a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged Objective test – Whether D is justifiably wronged is for the jury to decide Camplin – homosexual rape followed by taunting – taunts were extremely grave character – very serious to D + justifiable to feel wronged Mohammed – finding boy in daughters bed was extremely grave to D (devout muslim), but not justifiable to feel wronged S55(5) D fears serious violence and things said/done On their own 2 triggers didn’t make D lose control, but combined they did S55(6)(c) - Things said/done cannot amount to sexual infidelity AG v Jersey v Holley – D’s GF told him she had just had sex with another man. He picked up an axe and she said “You haven’t got the guts”. Hit 7/8 times killing her. S55(6)(c), her infidelity would be disregarded by the court but taunting his lack of courage would still be relevant Clinton – D and V having relationship problems, D clinically depressed. V told D she had had an affair. D beat and killed V – where sexual infidelity is the only element it cannot be relied upon, however if it is integral to, and forms an essential part of the context along with other things said and done it is unrealistic to exclude it s.55(6)(a)-(b) - D cannot rely on the triggers if his FSV or being seriously wronged is due to D inciting them Standard of Self Control S.54(4) - LOC does not apply when D acted in a ‘considered desire for revenge’ s.54(1) – a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D would have acted the same s.54(3) – circumstances applies to all circumstances except those that affect D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint Camplin – 15 yr old boy killed sexual tormentor – reasonable man not confined to the adult male Mohammed – strict, bad tempered and violent D – temper would be disregarded Gregson – unemployed and depressed were circs Hill – D was sexually abused as a child – this was a circ Might have reacted in the same or similar way Clarke – RM might have lost control, reasonable man would not have head-butted, strangled and electrocuted his ex-girlfriend Involuntary Manslaughter – D does not intend to kill or cause GBH Unlawful Act Manslaughter – discretionary life sentence D commits an unlawful act dangerous act which was the substantial cause of death and has the MR for the unlawful Element of Offence Law Case Unlawful Act Must be a criminal offence, not Lamb – L and friend playing a civil wrong with revolver didn’t believe it could fire – pointed gun at V and fired – there was no unlawful act, as V didn’t fear violence so not an assault Franklin – civil tory not enough as basis Must be an act, not an omission Dangerous Church test Lowe – D convicted of wilful neglect of son – failure to act cannot support a UActMnsl conviction Church – all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise that it would subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm Causes Death Not enough to just frighten someone necessarily - where a reasonable person would be aware of the V’s frailty and the risk of physical harm to him, then D will be liable. Dawson – attempted robbery of a petrol station using pickaxes – V had a heart attack and died, fear not an act on its own dangerous enough for UActMnsl Watson – D threw brick through V’s window and broke in. 87 yr old frail V came to investigate, Ds physically abused V and left. V died 90 mins later from heart attack – Burglary could become dangerous as soon as condition of V became obvious to Ds Dangerous act doesn’t have to be aimed at V and can be aimed at property Mitchell – Post office queue – punch to intended V was dangerous enough and unlawful to constitute UActMns to actual V Goodfellow – D set flat on fire to get rehomed, wife and son died in resulting out of control fire – reasonable person would recognise that the arson of a residential building might cause some harm to another person White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died - so was the FC of V’s death Normal rules of causation Factual – ‘but for’ Legal – using unlawful act manslaughter cases where possible! Corion-Auguiste – D threw firework in enclosed bus station, general panic resulted in V being crushed – D was direct and substantial cause of V’s death Sohid – D in group who attacked V and friend on platform. V forced onto tracks V prevented from climbing back up – Original attack sufficiently serious as to be cause of death Carey – fight causing minor bruising, V ran away and died from heart condition – acts of violence/affray not dangerous enough for anyone to foresee some harm and wasn’t therefore serious enough to have caused the death AG’s Ref No.4 (1980) – D pushed V headfirst over railing, then dragged back upstairs by rope round neck. D finally cut V’s neck before disposing of body – D could be convicted of UActMnsl even though it couldn’t be shown which act actually caused death Kennedy – D on V’s request, filled syringe with heroin and gave it to V to self-inject, V died from drug – D hadn’t administered the noxious substance (an unlawful act) and so couldn’t be guilty of UActMns – V did the administering and so broke the chain Mens Rea For the unlawful act Le Brun – D hit wife on chin in fight, she fell unconscious, in trying to hide this, D accidentally hit her head on concrete, causing a fractured skull and death – although original act hadn’t caused death, the act and cause were part of the same sequence of events, the original punch was intended, unlawful and dangerous and part of sequence of events which was the substantial cause of death Gross Negligence Manslaughter – discretionary life sentence a person dies as a result of the negligence of another, and the degree of negligence by the defendant is sufficiently serious to make him criminally liable for the death Element of Offence Law Case Duty of Care DO NOT argue Caparo v Stone v and Dobinson – Dickamn tort law! voluntary assumption of duty Litchfield – D owned and Use the criminal cases and obvious relationships etc to show a duty of care Dr/Patient, Road users to each other, Public position, contractual etc Breach of Duty Failing to meet required standard – but higher standard than civil cases Gross Negligence Risk of death captained ship, knowingly sailed despite ship being in bad condition – 3 crew members died – captain had duty Singh – duty owed to tenant by D who was in charge of maintaining property Wacker – illegal immigrants died of suffocation due to D closing air vent - duty owed to one with whom D is complicit in crime Willoughby – D owned pub, V died in fire that D asked him to set - A duty can arise from a combination of factors Evans – V was heroin addict living with D and mother, D gave heroin to V to self-inject, V obviously overdosed. No medical help sought. Mother clearly owed DOC to daughter, D owed DOC based on state of affairs created by D that D ought to have known was life threatening to V Andrews (1937) – where there is a charge of gross negligence manslaughter, simple lack of care (enough for civil liability) is not enough - a very high degree of negligence must be proved before the crime is established Adomako - jury has to consider extent to which D’s conduct departed from the proper standard of care on him. Bateman – beyond a mere matter of compensation Bateman (1925) – ‘gross negligence’ by D as the basis of criminal liability ‘Does the conduct of the accused show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving of punishment?’ Adomako (1994) – D was an anaesthetist during an eye operation. Oxygen supply disconnected, V had heart attack and later died as a result of brain damage – competent anaesthetist should have noticed oxygen issue and D’s failure to do so was ‘abysmal’ Finlay – scout leader in charge, 10 yr old fell to death, safety procedures had been followed – must show disregard for life and safety, here D hadn’t shown that so not guilty Edwards – D allowed daughter and friend to play on train tracks and said they would warn if train approached – ignoring an obvious and serious danger/decided to take risk – this was grossly negligent Substantial Cause of Death Normal rules of causation – did the grossly negligent conduct of D which breached the duty of care actually cause death Factual Causation – ‘but for’ White – poisoned drink – ‘but for’ D’s actions would have died anyway – so not the FC of V’s death Pagett – human shield - ‘but for’ D’s actions the V would not have died - so was the FC of V’s death Legal Causation – the chain of causation must remain unbroken A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain Blaue – D stabbed V who needed blood transfusion, V refused based on religion, D guilty of murder – you must take your victim as you find them – thin skull rule Medical Treatment Jordan – D stabbed V in the stomach, given wrong injection by hospital – ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment broke the chain, D not guilty Smith – soldiers fighting, V stabbed, dropped on the way to medical treatment – ‘thoroughly bad’ medical treatment didn’t break the chain, wound still the ‘operating and substantial’ cause of death Cheshire – V shot and died from rare complication in medical procedure – Medical negligence/poor treatment CAN break the chain but only where it is “so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that…the contribution made by D’s acts…are insignificant” Victim’s own act Roberts – V jumped from car, alleged D had made sexual advances – V’s actions were reasonably foreseeable and so did not break the chain Williams – V jumped from car, alleged D tried to steal wallet – V’s actions ‘daft’ and so broke the chain Attempts and Property Offences Attempts Theft Robbery Burglary Attempts – s.1 Criminal Attempts Act 1981 D has intention to commit an offence and does an act which is more than merely preparatory Element of Offence Law Case More Than Merely Preparatory D doesn’t need to have AG’s Ref (No 1 of 1992) - D performed the last act before dragged V shed, with the intent the crime or have reached the of raping her and assaulted but ‘point of no return’ did not rape V – attempted as D doesn’t need to have performed the last act before the crime or have reached the ‘point of no return’ Embarked on the ‘crime proper’ Guellefer - D jumped onto a race track to try and stop race to get money back. D hadn’t ‘embarked on the crime proper’ and so conviction for attempted theft quashed. Test for MMP: 1. Had D moved from planning or preparation to execution or implementation? 2. Had D done an act showing that he was actually trying to commit the full offence, or had he only got as far as getting ready, or putting himself in a position, or equipping himself to do so? Intention D must act with intention to commit the offence. Geddes - D was found in the boys toilets in a school in possession of a large knife, some rope and masking tape, he had no right to be in the school. He had not spoken to any pupils or contacted any pupils. His conviction for attempted false imprisonment was quashed Campbell - D outside post office with fake gun, disguise and threatening note. Conviction for att robbery quashed actions were not ‘more than merely preparatory’ Boyle and Boyle - Ds found standing next to a door. Lock and hinge were broken. Trying to gain entry was an attempt, they were embarking on the crime proper. Tosti - D, intending to burgle took metal cutting equipment with him and examined padlock. No damage on lock. Guilty of att burglary Jones - D's partner told him she wanted to break up and she was seeing V. D bought a gun, got into V’s car wearing a crash helmet, obscuring his face, and pointed the gun at V. D convicted of attempted murder Easom - D picked up handbag rifled through it, then put it back without taking anything there was no evidence that D intended to permanently deprive so therefore could not be guilty of attempted theft AG’s Ref (Nos 1and 2 of 1979) If D had a conditional intent (i.e. intended stealing but only if there was anything worth stealing) he could now be charged with an attempt to steal For attempted murder P (and therefore you in a scenario) must prove an intention to kill (intent to cause GBH is not enough for attempted murder) Impossibility s.1(2) Criminal Attempts Act 1981 - ‘A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence….even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.’ Whybrow - D wired up his wife’s bath and caused her to have an electric shock - he was convicted of attempted murder Walker & Hayles - W and H threw V from a third-floor balcony. V was not killed Attempted murder CAN be committed with the MR of oblique intention to kill (Woollin) Shivpuri - D was convicted of attempting to be ‘knowingly concerned in dealing drugs’ He thought he was carrying a suitcase of heroin or cannabis, which was in fact dried cabbage leaves. D can be guilty of an offence which is physically impossible in the exact circumstances, but legally possible. Sentence If found guilty of attempted murder D can face a punishment of life imprisonment. If found guilty of an attempted indictable crime (GBH/ manslaughter) D can face the same penalty as if being tried on indictment for that crime. If found guilty of an attempted crime which is TEW D will be liable on summary conviction, and can face punishment for a summary offence. Theft - s.1(1) Theft Act 1968 – 7 years imprisonment A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention to permanently deprive the other of it Element of Offence Law Case Appropriation s.3(1) – assumption of the Morris – price tags rights of an owner assumption of any of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation Property s.4(1) - includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property Oxford v Moss – exam info confidential information does not constitute property s.4(3) – a person who picks wild mushrooms, flowers or foliage growing wild on any land not guilty of theft unless it is for sale/reward Belonging to Another Dishonesty Intention to Permanently Deprive s.4(4) – wild creatures cannot be stolen unless they have been reduced into possession s.5(1) – any other person having possession or control of it or having a proprietary right or interest s.2(1) – 3 examples when not dishonest (a) believes he has a right in law to deprive the other of it (b) belief he would have the others consent to the appropriation (c) he appropriates the property in the belief the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps s.2(2) – a person may be dishonest notwithstanding their willingness to pay s.6(1) - intention to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights; and a borrowing or lending… equivalent to an outright taking or disposal Turner (No.2) – car repair - a person can be liable for the theft of their own property Woodman – scrap metal - a person can be in possession of property even though they do not know it is there Ivey v Gentings - as confirmed in R v Barton and Booth 1.) What was D’s knowledge and belief of the facts at the time? 2.) (in light of the above) was his conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people? Lavender – council doors - D intended to treat the property as his own, regardless of the rights of the council – as such there was an ITPD Lloyd – cinema films – no ITPD as the ‘goodness, virtue and s.6(1) – borrowing in practical value’ had not been circumstances making it equal used up to an outright taking Robbery s.8(1) Theft Act 1968 –up to life imprisonment A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. Element of Offence Law Case Steals (Appropriation, Property, s.1-6 Theft Act 1968 Robinson - D had a right in law Belonging to Another; to the property (ie wasn’t Dishonesty, Intent to dishonest) and so there was no Permanently Deprive completed theft and therefore no robbery Force Sufficient to be noticeable Dawson and James – a nudge is considered enough to be force Jury to decide using the – it is for the jury to decide if ordinary meaning of the word what occurred amounted to ‘force’ force Threat of Force Timing of the Force Immediately before, or at the timeof the theft Intentional or reckless use of force Cannot be an accidental use of force alongside a theft. Bentham – Even if the threat is not real, the D’s intention to cause fear is what matters – use of a fake gun still amounts to a threat of force Hale – Theft can be a continuing act, it is for the jury to decide when the theft is complete and therefore whether force has been used during/after the theft – did D intent to use force? Or was he aware of the risk of using force and took it anyway?) In order to steal Force used for other purposes does not become a robbery if D later decides to steal Burglary- s.9(1)(a) and s.9(1)(b) Theft Act 1968 – 14 years inprisonment s.9(1)(a) – D enters a building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to commit theft, GBH or unlawful s.9(1)(b) –having entered a building or part of a building as a trespasser D steals or attempts to steal or inflicts or attempts to inflict GBH Element of Offence Law Case Entry Entry must be sufficient - for Ryan –D was trapped in the the jury to determine based on window so wasn’t effective the evidence entry but still convicted of burglary Building or part of a building Permanence - Includes inhabited vehicle or vessel Can be entry of part of a building As a trespasser Mens Rea Permission negates trespasser If D goes beyond permission then he can be a trespasser D must know or be reckless as to whether he is a trespasser PLUS: s.9(1)(a) – intention at point of entry to commit theft, gbh or criminal damage or Aggravated Burglary s.9(1)(b) - mens rea for theft or gbh at point of committing or attempting to commit these offences in a building s.10 – a person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits a burglary and at the time has with him a firearm or imitation firearm, any weapon of offence or any explosive B&S v Leathley – freezer with electricity used for storage for 2 years was a building Walkington – where D has permission to be in one part of a building but not another he can be a trespasser in that part of a building Smith and Jones – A person is a trespasser if he enters and knows he is entering in excess of the permission. Smith and Jones – D’s knowingly exceeded their permission to be in the house, permission was not given to enter and steal things Defences Insanity Automatism Intoxication Consent Self-Defence Duress by Threats Necessity/Duress by Circumstances Automatism – Bratty v AG an act done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing Element of Defence Law Case External Cause The cause of the automatism is R v T – exceptional stress may be an external – a complete defence external factor which can cause automatism – D as suffering from External causes could include: a PTSD from a rape and assisted in a blow to the head, an attack by a robbery swarm of bees, sneezing, Quick - D, a nurse, injured a patient. hypnotism, the effect of a drug He had taken prescribed insulin in the morning and then had a little to eat. When in hypoglycaemic state (too much insulin to sugar in blood) sufferers mental functioning is affected and they can become violent in later stages. D’s state of automatism was caused by an external factor – the insulin, and so he could rely on automatism as a defence. Hennessey - D charged with a TWOC and whilst disqualified. Claimed he was suffering from a hyperglycaemic state (high blood sugar) as he hadn't taken insulin to stabilise or eaten properly and so was acting unconsciously. Diabetes (which caused the high blood sugar level) was an internal factor and so automatism didn’t apply, but D could plead insanity. Burgess - Sleepwalking can be automatism but only if it is from an external cause eg a blow to the head Without Any Control D’s plea is that his actions were Broome and Perkins - D in a not under the control of his hypoglycaemic state drove home conscious mind, i.e. that his very erratically from work, hitting actions were involuntary and another car. He couldn’t remember that there is no voluntary actus the journey. Medical evidence Self-Induced Automatism reus and D does not have the mens rea suggested it was possible for him to complete a familiar journey without being conscious of doing so and he would be able to react sufficiently to steer and operate the car. D was able to exercise some voluntary control he had not been acting in an entirely involuntary manner. – no automatism defence AG Ref No 2 of 1992 – reduced or partial control of one’s actions is not enough for non-insane automatism – here D drove his lorry along the hard shoulder and hit a broken down vehicle killing 2 children he claimed he was driving without awareness in a trance state – since he was still in control enough to drive the lorry not automatism Where D knows his conduct is likely to bring on an automatic state Bailey – D a diabetic failed to eat enough after taking his insulin – if the offence is one of specific intent then can be a defence as D lacks MR, however if basic intent then not – as D has been reckless in allowing himself to be in an automatic state If D is charged with a basic intent offence: • P must prove that D has been reckless in his selfinduced automatism • If it is caused through drink/illegal drugs/intoxicating substances D will be unable to plead (Majewski) • Where D doesn’t know his actions are likely to lead to a self-induced automatic state he has not been reckless (Hardie) Insanity – M’Naghten 1843 Rules Labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong Element of Defence Law Case Defect of reason D’s powers of reasoning must Clarke – D put 3 jars into her bag and be impaired Disease of the mind Legal term, not medical and must be an internal cause Can be a mental disease or physical disease which affects the mind and can be temporary – as long as occurring at time of offence D not knowing nature/quality of his act or not know he was doing wrong Where D is having delusions then they do not know the nature and quality of their act ‘wrong’ – means legally not morally wrong Misc Burden of proof lies on the defence who must prove that D was suffering from insanity at the time based on the balance of probabilities left store without paying. D was being absentminded and didn’t remember picking up the items – conviction quashed – DoR must be more than absent-mindedness or confusion Burgess – sleepwalking is within the legal definition of insanity – at trial Dr gave evidence that the sleepwalking was due to an internal cause of a sleep disorder Kemp – D suffered from hardening of the arteries to the brain, this caused D to have temporary loss of control moments during which he attached V with a hammer. D’s ordinary mental faculties of reasoning were affected and so it was a DoM Sullivan – D suffered from epilepsy and had aggressive fits, during which he injured a neighbour. Source of the DoM is irrelevant, it just needs to exist at the time of D’s actions Hennessy – High blood sugar levels due to diabetes were classed as insanity as the levels affected the mind Kemp/Sullivan/Hennessy/Burgess – all of these D’s were unaware of what they were doing Windle - D’s wife spoke often of suicide, D gave her 100 aspirin and when arrested said ‘I suppose they will arrest me for this’. He was suffering from a mental illness, however his words showed that he understood the nature and quality of his act as he knew it was legally wrong Johnson – D forced his way into a neighbour’s flat and stabbed him. Charged with s.20. D was a paranoid schizophrenic and was suffering from delusions, however it was agreed that D did know the nature and quality of his acts and that they were legally wrong M’Naghten rules – D thought he was being persecuted by the Tories and tried to kill a member of the Govt, but failed and killed his secretary. Where D is found to be insane, the verdict is ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ Element of Defence Misc Voluntary Intoxication Intoxication Law Covers intoxication by drink, drugs or other substances Case Whether D is guilty or not depends on: Whether the intoxication was voluntary or involuntary Whether the offence D is charged with is one of basic or specific intent (eg Specific Intent: s.18, murder, theft, Basic Intent: assault, battery etc) Where D has chosen to take an intoxicating substance Where D does not realise he strength of the intoxicating substance, this does not make it involuntary Allen – D was charged with buggery and indecent assault. He had been drinking wine with a friend and claimed he didn’t know the strength of the wine and this made the intoxication involuntary For a specific intent offence, VI can negate MR – if D is so intoxicated he did not form the MR he is not guilty Sheehan and Moore – 2 Ds were very drunk when they threw petrol over a tramp and set fire to him. They were too drunk to have formed any intent to kill/cause GBH. Therefore they were not guilty of murder (were guilty of manslaughter though!) Where D has the necessary MR despite his intoxicated state he is guilty of the offence – drunken intent is still intent AG Northern Ireland v Gallagher – D decided to kill his wife. He bought a knife to kill her with and a bottle of whiskey. He drank a large amount of whiskey before killing V. Convicted of murder. For a basic intent offence, intoxication is not a defence. By voluntarily becoming intoxicated D has been reckless, which is the DPP v Majewski – D had taken drugs and alcohol. When very intoxicated he attacked people in a pub and the officers arresting necessary MR for a basic intent offence – getting drunk is a ‘reckless course of conduct’ Involuntary Intoxication him. Convicted of s.47 – as the MR for these included recklessness, then a basic intent crime and D had been reckless to get intoxicated in the first place Richardson & Irwin (1999) Ds and V were university students. They had each drunk about five pints of lager. V was dropped 10ft off a balcony suffering serious injury. Fact of being intoxicated does not automatically make D Where D did not know he was taking an intoxicating substance. Where D voluntarily takes a nondangerous drug, although not specifically prescribed to him, the taking may be treated as involuntary and may therefore provide a defence if he does so nonrecklessly. Hardie - D took some valium (a sedative) and set fire to a bedroom as a result of his intoxicated state which was an unexpected reaction to the ‘nondangerous’ drug. Where D has the necessary MR when he commits the offence he will be guilty Kingston – Ds coffee was drugged by a blackmailer, he was shown a 15yr old boy who was sleeping and invited to abuse him, which D did. D had the MR for the indecent assault at the time and the fact he was involuntarily intoxicated dint affect this. Where D has no MR at the time of the offence he cannot be guilty of a specific intent offence or a basic intent offence – he has not been reckless in getting drunk Self-Defence/Prevention of Crime s.3(1) Criminal Law Act 1967 – a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime Element of Defence Law Case Misc Includes actions to defend oneself, as well as those to defend another. Force used must be Necessary Reasonable in the circumstances Necessary Burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove to the jury beyond all reasonable doubt that D was either; not acting in s/d, not acting to defend property or if he was, the force was excessive The use of force is not justified if it is not necessary. It will be deemed necessary in the circumstances which exist or which the D genuinely believed existed. No duty to retreat Proportionate Force The force used by D must be reasonable/proportionate in all the circumstances (including the actual circumstances, the circumstances D believed, the time available to D to decide on his actions, the risk to D, the risk to V) s76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008: s.76(3) The question whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be s.76(4) If D claims to have held a Williams – D was on a bus and saw a man assaulting a youth. In fact the man was trying to arrest the youth for mugging an old lady. D got off the bus and struggled with the man during which he was injured. On appeal, D was able to use protection of others element as he should have been judged according to Ds genuine mistaken view of the facts Bird - D is under no duty to retreat and does not have to wait for an attack to start. Striking first does not mean that force is unnecessary AG’s Ref No.2 1983 - D’s shop had been attacked and damaged by rioters. Fearing further attacks, he made petrol bombs. He was able to rely on self defence and that D can make preparations in self defence Clegg – Stolen car came towards check point. D fired at car after it had passed, since there was no danger when shot fired, the force was excessive and self defence could not be used Martin – Burglars entered D’s house in the night. D armed himself with a a shotgun and without warning fired 3 shots into the dark. One burglar was killed. Self defence rejected as force wasn’t reasonable particular belief as regards the existence of any circumstances— a) the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether D genuinely held it; but b) if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it, D is entitled to rely on it for the purposes of subsection (3), whether or not— i. it was mistaken, or ii. (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made. s.76(7) - outlines guidance when deciding whether the force used is reasonable in the circumstances a) a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; and b) evidence of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose. Palmer – it is ‘good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary’ Consent A person can consent to common assault, but not to ABH or greater harm, unless it comes within an established exceptions Element of Defence Law Case Misc Consent is not a defence to murder Pretty – Mrs Pretty suffered from MND and wanted her husband to assist in her suicide. HoL/European Court did not find that Art 2 created a right to die. Therefore, Euthanasia is a criminal offence Rice - Duelling, where the victim consents to running the risk of being killed, is illegal and the dueller who inflicts the fatal wound is guilty of murder Normal Sports Activities Extent of consent can be limited Recognised exceptions: Tattooing etc Properly conducted games and sports Reasonable surgical interference Dangerous exhibitions Brown – Consenting homosexual males took part in BDSM activities which caused a variety of GBH/wounding injuries – cannot consent to serious injury (so includes s.47, s.20 and s.18) Emmett - D and his partner engaged in ‘high risk’ sexual activity, which on one occasion left V with hemorrhages to the eyes and severe burns to the breasts. Consent not allowed for injuries caused for sexual gratification. While an event is being properly conducted and supervised within the rules and regulations of the sport there is consent Barnes – V suffered a serious leg injury following a tackle during a football match – criminal proceedings should only be brought where the conduct was sufficiently serious – most participants consent to such injuries When an incident goes beyond the rules/regulations then there is possibility of criminal liability but first the following would be taken into consideration: Type of sport Level at which being played Nature of the act Degree of force Extent of risk of injury State of mind of person causing the injury Horseplay and Sexual Activities True and Informed Consent Consent cannot be a defence if it has been obtained by deception (no True Consent) or the Victim has not made an informed decision (no Informed Consent). Jones – group of boys tossing each other into the air – indulging in ‘rough’ undisciplined sport or play not intending to cause harm Dica – biological GBH s.2- for transmission of HIV/AIDS – consent to sex does not mean consent to risk of sexually transmitted disease Tabassum – females consented to breast exams carried out by D who they believed was medically qualified. They had consented to a medical exam, but not any other purpose so they had not consented Richardson – consent to dental treatment accepted even though patients didn’t know D had been disqualified from practice Submission does not necessarily mean true consent Olugboja - V was raped by D’s companion and saw her friend raped by the same man. When D tried to have sex with her, she submitted. D claimed that this meant she had consented and that she knew the nature and quality of the act (ie sex). Sexual Offences Act 2003 puts this on a statutory footing in relation to sexual offences but the principle applies to all offences Informed consent – V is fully aware of all the risks involved in the activity. Dica - D knew he was HIV+ and had unsafe sex with a number of women who also became infected. At the time they had sex the women were unaware of D’s condition. Women D had slept with did not provide Informed Consent. They did not fully appreciate the risks involved and D’s failure to explain them could form the basis of his liability for s.20 OAPA Where it cannot be proved D had the AR and MR for the offence the issue of informed consent is irrelevant (as there is no offence to defend against) Slingsby - D caused internal injuries to V from the signet ring he was wearing. Neither D nor V were aware of the injury or the cause of it until the subsequent seriousness as a result of the wound becoming septic and V died. Her death was not the result of a criminal act as the defendant lacked the mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter, so the issue of consent was irrelevant. Age doesn’t necessarily mean there is no consent – the importance is they appreciate the nature of the act Burrell v Harmer – D tattooed 2 boys aged 12/13 with their consent. Consent defence not allowed as the boys were unable to understand the pain involved and what a tattoo was Mistaken Belief in Consent Consent may be a defence even when D is mistaken about its existence Aitken - RAF officers set a friend on fire when he was asleep (he was wearing flameproof clothing at the time). They honestly believed he would have given consent and their convictions for s.20 were quashed. Richardson & Irwin - Drunken students were acquitted of s.20 after dropping a friend off a balcony because they believed he was giving consent Duress by Threats D has been forced to commit a crime because he has been threatened with death or serious injury Element of Defence Law Case Threat The defence must be based on R v Valderama Vega - D illegally threats to kill or do serious imported cocaine claiming he bodily harm. had done this because of: death threats made by drug gang, Jury are entitled to look at the threats to disclose his cumulative effects of all the homosexuality to his wife and threats financial pressures/rewards for his actions. . Threats to reveal his homosexuality alone would be insufficient to find the defence but could be taken into account when coupled with threats of serious personal violence. Threat to person reasonably feel responsible for R v Hurley – Australian case where duress defence accepted when threats had been made towards D’s girlfriend with whom he was living at the time The threat must be specifically related to the crime that has been committed. Cole - D claimed he and his girlfriend (and child) had been threatened in order to repay money that he owed. During the threat he was hit with a baseball bat. He did not have money so committed two Test for Duress Graham Test: 1. Was the defendant compelled to act as he did because he reasonably believed he had good cause to fear serious injury or death (a subjective test)? 2. If so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused have responded in the same way? (An objective test.) Relevant Characteristics This is in relation to the second part of the duress test: If so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused have responded in the same way? The mere fact that D was more pliable, vulnerable, timid or susceptible to threats than a normal person does not have an impact on the second part of the test. robberies to pay his debt threats to him were directed at getting repayment and not directed at making him commit a robbery. Not a sufficient connection between the threats and the crimes he committed Graham - K was a violent man and told D to help strangle V. D did so and V was killed. D pleaded not guilty - he had complied with K's demand to pull on the flex only because of his fear of K. D was convicted. Bowen – characteristics of a D which might make duress more likely and which ones would not be taken into account. Bowen suggested the following could be considered: age; possibly gender; pregnancy; serious physical disability which might inhibit self-protection; recognised mental illness or psychiatric condition. However, if D is in a category of persons whom the jury might think less able to resist pressure than people not within that category this can be considered. Immediacy The threat must be "immediate" or "imminent" in the sense that it is operating upon the accused at the time that the crime was committed. Also D can only use duress if the D is placed in a situation where Gill - D and his wife had been threatened unless they stole a lorry. But there was a period of time where D was left alone so could have raised the alarm – could not use the defence of duress. Self-Induced Duress there is no safe avenue of escape. Hudson and Taylor - Allowed to use the defence of duress because the police may not have been able to provide effective protection for this. (also age was a factor) Where D has brought the duress on himself through his own actions; for example where a defendant voluntarily joins a criminal gang and commits some offences, but then is forced to commit other crimes which he did not want to do under duress Sharp - D joined a gang who carried out robberies. He claimed that he had wanted to withdraw from the robberies before the last one where a man was shot dead. Couldn’t use duress as a defence. He knew when he joined the gang that they were likely to use violence, so he could not claim duress when they threatened him with violence. Shepherd - D joined an organised gang of non-violent shoplifters. D said he wanted to stop taking part but was then threatened with violence unless he continued. Conviction quashed - If he had no knowledge that the gang was likely to use violence then the defence of duress was available to him. Hasan - D associated with a violent drug dealer who told D to burgle a house in order steal a large amount of money that was in a safe there. The dealer threatened that if D did not do this then D and his family would be harmed. D, carrying a knife, broke into the house but was unable to open the safe. The defence of duress is excluded where D voluntarily associates with others who are engaged in criminal activity and he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence. Misc Duress is available for all crimes except for murder/attempted murder If D is voluntarily intoxicated and mistakenly believes he has been threatened he cannot use Duress as a defence. However, if the duress is irrelevant to the intoxication the D can still use the defence. Element of Defence Necessity Necessity Law Duress by Circumstancesextension of the law on the defence of Necessity. Necessity used to be available in specific circumstances eg – pulling down a house to prevent fire spreading, a prisoner escaping if the jail catches fire. Case ReA (conjoined twins) 2000 Dudley and Stephens necessity not a defence to the murder and cannibalism of the cabin boy! Sir James Stephen 1887 three requirements for the application of the defence of necessity: 1. the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; 2. no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved; 3. the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided. Duress of Circumstances D believes he, or those with him (for example, in a car) would suffer death or serious injury if he did not act by doing what he did Element of Defence Law Case Duress of circs available where Willer – D and passenger were on an objective standpoint D driving down a narrow alley was acting in order to avoid a when car was surrounded by threat of death/serious injury. gang of youths. D drove on the pavement at 10mph to get away from them and drove to police station. D charged with The 2 stage test from Graham reckless driving. Jury should applies to duress of circs also have been able to consider 1. Was D compelled to act as whether D drove under duress he did because he Conway – Passenger in D’s car reasonable believed he had had previously been shot. The good cause to fear car was stopped when P saw 2 death/serious injury 2. If so, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the same characteristics of the accused have responded in the same way men running towards the car, thinking they were the people after him and yelled at D to drive off very fast. D charged with reckless driving. Pommell – D was found by police at 0800 lying in bed with a loaded sub-machine gun. He told police he had taken it off some ‘geezer’ who was going to do some damage with it at 1am. Duress of circs should have been left to jury. Rodger & Rose – Ds were serving life sentences for murder – the original tariffs had been increased. Ds claimed they became angry and depressed and that this forced them to break out of prison. Duress of circs not allowed as the circs which caused the actions were internal to the D’s, not external as in other cases