5. What are the components of procedural due
process?
A. In a termination for just cause, due process
involves the two-notice rule:
a) A notice of intent to dismiss specifying the ground
for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his or her side;
b) A hearing or conference where the employee is
given opportunity to respond to the charge, present
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him
or her;
c) A notice of dismissal indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify termination.
B. In a termination for an authorized cause, due
process means a written notice of dismissal to the
employee specifying the grounds at least 30 days
before the date of termination. A copy of the notice
shall also be furnished the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) where
the employer is located.
Philippine Savings Bank VS. NLRC
Facts:
Private respondent Victoria T. Centeno started, as a bank
teller of petitioner Philippine Savings Bank, on November
3, 1965. Through the years she was promoted, becoming
on February 4, 1985, assistant cashier of petitioner’s
Taytay branch, at a salary of P2,672.00 a month.
From September 17, 1984 to November 15, 1984, private
respondent was acting branch cashier, substituting for
Mrs. Victoria Ubaña, who had gone on maternity leave. As
acting branch cashier, private respondent was in charge of
the cash in the vault and the preparation of the daily cash
proof sheet, which was a daily record of the cash of the
cash in the vault and was used as basis in determining the
starting balance on the next banking day.
had been attached to the debit ticket of Jose was a deposit
slip for P356,400.00, and not for P371,400.00.
An audit team reviewed the account of the branch and
found a P15,000.00 shortage incurred on November 16,
1984, the day private respondent turned over her
accountability to Mrs. Ubaña after the latter’s maternity
leave.
In the meantime, you are hereby preventively suspended
for a period of thirty (30) days effective January 8, 1985.
(Emphasis added)
The manager, cashier, clearing clerk and a teller, were also
given "show-cause" memoranda, but only private
respondent was placed under preventive suspension.
On November 16, 1984, Mrs. Victoria Ubaña reported back
to work. Before turning over the cash to Mrs. Ubaña,
private respondent Centeno deposited P356,400.00 in the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). However,
what appeared as amount deposited in the November 16,
1984 cash proof and batch sheets of the cashier and
clearing clerk, was P371,400.00, and not P356,400.00 as
shown in the Metrobank passbook. Petitioner later
charged that private respondent falsified the deposit slip
and made it appear that she had deposited P371,400.00
when actually she had deposited only P356,400.00.
All those required to show cause filed their respective
answers, except private Respondent. Instead she
requested the bank’s vice-president, Antonio Viray, on
January 15, 1985, to give her until January 18, 1985, within
which to file her answer on the ground that she needed to
consult her lawyer. Her request was granted but private
respondent nonetheless failed to answer the charges
against her.
On December 18, 1984, the branch accounting clerk, Lolita
Oliveros, discovered a discrepancy between the cash
deposit recorded (P371,400.00) in the cash proof and
batch sheets and the deposit actually made (P356,400.00)
as reflected in the Metrobank passbook. She called the
attention of the clearing clerk, Alberto C. Jose, to the
matter. They reviewed the records and found that what
Issue: WON respondent was illegally dismissed by
respondent.
On February 4, 1985, private respondent was dismissed by
the bank.
Decision:
Indeed private respondent was acting cashier for two
months, from September 17, 1984 to November 15, 1984.
During that period no shortage was ever reported. At the
time the cash in the vault was turned over to Mrs. Ubaña,
it was counted and the failure to record its amount at that
time can only mean one thing: that the cash turned over to
Mrs. Ubaña corresponded with the amount recorded in
the cash proof sheet on November 15, 1984.
Private respondent had faithfully served petitioner bank
for 19 years. Starting as a bank teller, she steadily rose to
the position of assistant branch cashier. Considering this
fact, petitioner should have been more careful in
determining liability for the loss rather than merely relying
on what it calls circumstantial evidence of guilt. The fact
that only private respondent did not answer the charge
when required in the memorandum of petitioner is not an
indication of her guilt. While we recognize that petitioner
has a wide latitude in dismissing a bank officer,
nonetheless, the evidence on which it acts must be
substantial.
As the dismissal of private respondent is illegal, she is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without
loss of seniority rights and to the payment to her of
backwages. 13 The NLRC correctly limited the award of
backwages to three years, consistent with the rule at the
time of private respondent’s dismissal 14 R.A. No. 6715,
which amended Art. 279 of the Labor Code, awarding full
backwages to illegally dismissed employees, cannot be
retroactively applied to dismissals taking place before its
effectively on March 21, 1989. 15
Loss of trust and confidence is a cause for dismissing an
employee who is entrusted with fiducial matters, or with
the custody, handling or care and protection of the
employer’s property. 8 There is no dispute about this. But
the employer must clearly and convincingly establish the
facts and incidents upon which its loss of confidence in the
employee may be fairly made to rest, otherwise, the
dismissal will be rendered illegal.
Raycor Aircontrol System, INC. vs NLRC
Petitioner’s sole line of business is installing
airconditioning systems in the buildings of its clients. In
connection will such installation work, petitioner hired
private respondents Roberto Fulgencio, Rolando Laya,
Florencio Espina, Romulo Magpili, Ramil Hernandez,
Wilfredo Brun, Eduardo Reyes, Crisostomo Donompili,
Angelito Realingo, Hernan Delima, Jaime Calipayan, Jorge
Cipriano, Carlito de Guzman, Susano Atienza, and Gerardo
de Guzman, who worked in various capacities as tinsmith,
aircon mechanic, installer, welder and painter. Private
respondents insist that they had been regular employees
all along, but petitioner maintains that they were project
employees who were assigned to work on specific projects
of petitioner, and that the nature of petitioner’s business
— mere installation (not manufacturing) of aircon systems
and equipment in buildings of its clients — prevented
petitioner from hiring private respondents as regular
employees. As found by the labor arbiter, their average
length of service with petitioner exceeded one year, with
some ranging from two to six years (but private
respondents claim much longer tenures, some allegedly
exceeding ten years).
In 1991, private respondent Laya and fourteen other
employees of petitioner filed NLRC NCR Case No. 00-0302080-92 for their "regularization." This case was
dismissed on May 20, 1992 for want of cause of action. 4
On different dates in 1992, they were served with
uniformly-worded notices of "Termination of
Employment" by petitioner "due to our present business
status", which terminations were to be effective the day
following the date of receipt of the notices. Private
respondents felt they were given their walking papers
after they refused to sign a "Contract Employment"
providing for, among others, a fixed period of employment
which "automatically terminates without necessity of
further notice" or even earlier at petitioner’s sole
discretion.
Because of the termination, private respondents filed
three cases of illegal dismissal against petitioner, alleging
that the reason given for the termination of their
employment was not one of the valid grounds therefor
under the Labor Code. They also claimed that the
termination was without benefit of due process.
The three separate cases filed by private respondents
against petitioner, docketed as NLRC-NCR 00-03-05930-92,
NLRC NCR 00-05-02789-92, and NLRC NCR 00-07-0369992, were subsequently consolidated. The parties were
given opportunity to file their respective memoranda and
other supplemental pleadings before the labor arbiter.
On January 22, 1993, the Labor Arbiter issued his decision
dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. He reasoned
that the evidence showed that the individual complaints
(private respondents) were project employees within the
meaning of Policy Instructions No. 20 (series of 1977) 5 5a
of the Department of Labor and Employment, having been
assigned to work on specific projects involving the
installation of air-conditioning units as covered by
contracts between their employer and the latter’s clients.
Necessarily, the installation of airconditioning systems
"must come to a halt as project come and go", and" (o)f
consequence, the [petitioner] cannot hire workers in
perpetuity. And as project employees, private respondents
would not be entitled to termination pay, separation pay,
holiday premium pay, etc.; and neither is the employer
required to secure a clearance from the Secretary of Labor
in connection with such termination.
Issue: WON employees were illegally terminated by the
petitioner.
Decision:
We reiterate that this Court waded through the records of
this case searching for solid evidence upon which to decide
the case either way. But all told, neither party managed to
make out a clear case. Therefore, considering that in illegal
dismissal cases, the employer always has the burden of
proof, and considering further that the law mandates that
all doubts, uncertainties, ambiguities, and insufficiencies
be resolved in favor of labor, we perforce rule against
petitioner and in favor of private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed
Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one rendered
holding that petitioner had failed to discharge its burden
of proof in the instant case and therefore ORDERING the
reinstatement of private respondents as regular
employees of petitioner, without loss of seniority rights
and privileges and with payment of backwages from the
day they were dismissed up to the time they are actually
reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA G.R. No. 117565. November 18,
1997
documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts
amounting to Php 44,172.46 and made unliquidated cash
advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also
charged him with oppression and harassment after being
relieved without just cause after filing the 2 cases against
Lumiqued.
May 20, 1992 Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo
Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145, creating a
committee to investigate complaints against Lumiqued.
June 23, 1992 Lumiqued submitted his affidavit alleging
that the reason the cases were filed against him was to
extort money from him. He also admitted that his average
daily consumption was 108.45Li which is an aggregate
consumption of the 5 service vehicle issued to him and
that the receipts were turned over to him by drivers for
reimbursement.
July 3 and 10 Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted and Lumiqued was not assisted by a counsel
since he was confident that he can defend himself.
July 17, 1992 he was unable to attend the third hearing
since he suffered a stroke on July 10.
July 31, 1992 Investigating Committee issued a report
finding Lumiqued liable for all charges against him
December 17, 1992 Lumiqued filed a motion for
reconsideration.
April 1, 1993 The Committee informed Lumiqued that the
report was already forwarded to the President.
May 12, 1993 President Ramos issued AO No 52 finding
Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the
alteration of 15 gas receipts and he was dismissed from
service.
August 31, 1993 Lumiqued filed a Petition for appeal which
was denied. He then file a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he was denied constitutional
right to counsel during the hearing.
September 28, 1993 The second motion was denied.
FACTS:
May 19, 1994 Lumiqued passed away.
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The
Department of Agrarian Reform – Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
On Nov. 16, 1989 Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged
Lumiqued with Malversation through falsification of public
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure
to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the
hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could
not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the
presence of a counsel.
ISSUE:
WON the right to have a counsel during an administrative
hearing is necessary.
HELD:
NO. Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department
in the executive branch of the government, graduated
from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the
degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a
recipient of various scholarships and grants, and
underwent training seminars both here and abroad.
Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without
the help of counsel, if the truth were on his side. This,
apparently, was the thought he entertained during the
hearings he was able to attend.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or the law.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more
practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An
actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due
process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity
to be heard is the very essence of due process.Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person
is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted
by the committee.
Atienza v COMELEC
G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010
Facts:
Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP)
announced that his party withdrew support for the
administration of former Pres. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo.
However, Atienza, LPChairman, alleged that Drilon made
the announcement without consulting first the
party. Atienza hosted a party conference which resulted to
the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to
nullify the said election claiming that it was illegal
considering that the party’s electing bodies, NECO and
NAPOLCO, were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon
claimed that under the LP Constitution, there is a threeyear term. Meaning, his term has not yet ended.
However, Atienza contested that the election of new
officers could be likened to people power removing Drilon
as president by direct action. Also, Atienza alleged that the
amendment to the LP Constitution providing the threeterm had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held
that the election of Atienza and others was invalid since
the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with
the LP Constitution.
The COMELEC ruled that since the said Constitution was
not ratified, Drilon was only sitting in a hold-overcapacity
since his term has been ended already. Subsequently, the
LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before
respondent Drilon’s term expired which resulted to the
election of Roxas as the new LP president. Atienza et al.
sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of
the LP questioning the validity of the quorum. The
COMELEC issued resolution denying petitioners Atienza et
al’s petition.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al’s expulsion
as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a
membership issue that related to disciplinary action within
the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal
party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Issue:
WoN Atienza et. Al. was deprived of due process.
Held:
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from
the party is not a simple issue of party membership or
discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionallyprotected right to due process of law. They claim that the
NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from
the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on
party discipline are the equivalent of administrative
proceedings20 and are, therefore, covered by the due
process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.21
But the requirements of administrative due process do not
apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due
process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through
which certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality
"contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state
function."22 The constitutional limitations that generally
apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply too,
to administrative bodies.
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s
powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against
the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process
under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state’s
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to
due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against
arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed
by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the
specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts
apply. The right to due process guards against
unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties.23
Although political parties play an important role in our
democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state
and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party
does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within
the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has
no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to
prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if
any, that party members may have, in relation to other
party members, correspond to those that may have been
freely agreed upon among themselves through their
charter, which is a contract among the party members.
Members whose rights under their charter may have been
violated have recourse to courts of law for the
enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue
against the government or any of its agencies.
Scope of the Equal Protection clause
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution
is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from the other. The
Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
People of the Philippines vs Cayat
G.R. No. L-45987 – 68 Phil. 12 – Political Law –
Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Requisites of a
Valid Classification – Prohibition from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there existed a law, Act No. 1639 otherwise
known as AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE SALE, GIFT, OR OTHER
DISPOSAL OF ANY INTOXICATING LIQUOR, OTHER THAN
THE SO-CALLED NATIVE WINES AND LIQUORS, TO ANY
MEMBER OF A NON-CHRISTIAN TRIBE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-SEVEN, AND TO PROHIBIT THE USE OF SUCH
LIQUOR BY ANY MEMBER OF SUCH A TRIBE. Cayat, a native
of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation
of said Act. He was then charged and was eventually
sentenced to pay P5.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He
averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He argued that
the law treats non-Christian tribes with discrimination or
“mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled”; that the law was an invalid classification
between native non-Christians and Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal
protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the
requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a
group have the characteristics that distinguish them from
others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied
with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
“accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not
seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less
capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far
adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards
them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to
equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed
by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true
equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in
education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization
and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with
the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
The SC also ruled: Act No. 1639 is designed to promote
peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to
remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth
and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and
unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its
ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino
people with a view to a greater Philippines.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 – G.R. No. 79777 – 175 SCRA 343 – Political
Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection
– Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the
constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social
Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption
by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring
full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was
enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law,
while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the four consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs
Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of
landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings
do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be
forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A.
6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian
reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian
reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent
domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process
for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian
reform program.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that
landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just
compensation has always been in the form of money and
not in bonds.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just
compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like
the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed.
What is contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with
the finding of just compensation by an administrative
body, then it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is even so
provided by RA 6657:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian
reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they
belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing
for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only
where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision
may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is
merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary
exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be
made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds,
and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for
just compensation.
Imbong vs Ochoa
Facts:
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the
law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the
poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use.
The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.
Issue: WON the RH law violates the equal protection
clause.
Decision:
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that
the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional
provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to
the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or
minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not
in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RHIRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which
added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore,
null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March
19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.
The Supreme Court upheld most of the RH Law as “not
unconstitutional,” while striking down eight individual
provisions that the Court determined violated
constitutionally-protected rights. First, on the right to life
of the unborn, while the Court opted not to make any
determination on when life begins, it found that the RH
Law itself clearly mandated that protection be afforded
from the moment of fertilization. The Court then noted
that the RH Law contains provisions embodying the
policy of the law to protect the fertilized ovum and that
the fertilized ovum should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation. To date, this determination has
resulted in the requirement that contraceptives be
certified as non-abortifacients before being made
publicly available. Second, on petitioners’ claim that
there are health risks to women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use
them, the Court noted that the attack on the Law is
premature because not a single contraceptive had yet
been submitted to the FDA for approval pursuant to the
RH Law.
The Court also ruled that, in accordance with the
principle of non-coercion, an individual conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the RH
Law’s mandates. The Court also applied the same
exemption to non-maternity specialty hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers, as it found no compelling state interest which
would limit conscientious objectors’ free exercise of their
rights in this regard. On the right to privacy, the Court
noted that decision-making on a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just the individual, and that it is “anti-family”
to allow minors to access non-emergency reproductive
health services, including contraceptives, without written
parental consent.
As a result, the government is still mandated to provide
free contraceptive services, ensure inclusion of
adolescents’ reproductive health education in the
educational system, and ensure access to post-abortion
care services. However, because the Court found certain
provisions unconstitutional, health care providers are
able to deny reproductive health services to patients
based on personal or religious beliefs in non-emergency
situations. In addition, spousal consent for women in
non-life-threatening circumstances will be required to
access reproductive health care, and parental consent
will be required in order for minors who have been
pregnant or who had a miscarriage to access
contraceptive services or undergo elective reproductive
health procedures.
Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commision
Facts:
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Issue: WON the mandate of the Philippine Truth
commission violates the equal protection clause.
Decision:
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification
G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012 | JOSE MIGUEL T.
ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of
the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJCOMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and
FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS: The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266
approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses
and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 0012011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In
its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the
crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al.
while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among
others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the
creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order
No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the
equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is
valid.
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is
intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to
the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power
in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had
been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to
the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team,
should be viewed not as an abdication of the
constitutional bodys independence but as a means to
fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its
mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate
the equal protection clause.
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole
purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel
was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as
well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those
subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in connection
with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men,
it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and conditions
shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO
and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. CJ Puno
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding
apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional
ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the
fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned 8or
controlled corporations with original charters.] This is
because elected public officials, by the very nature of
their office, engage in partisan political activities almost
all year round, even outside of the campaign period.
Yung appointive officer, deemed resigned pag nagfile ng
coc. Unlike elective officer.
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.b) Any person holding
an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned
from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.,
who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to
give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they
are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the
filing of their CoCs.
The SC in its 2009 decision penned by Justice Nachura
ruled that the said resolution is not violative of the equal
protection clause. Hence this motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the provision on the deemed resigned
is violative of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not the provision suffers from Overbreadth
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned 8or controlled corporations
with original charters.] This is because elected public
officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in
partisan political activities almost all year round, even
outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is
the inevitable essence of a political office, elective
positions included
The law does not violate the equal protection clause.
Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the
deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as
mere obiter dictum. the legal dichotomy created by the
Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are
material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of
the appointing authority. The dichotomized treatment of
appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not
merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline
of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is
outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise
to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
2. No. According to the assailed Decision, the challenged
provisions of law are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
posts, without due regard for the type of position being
held by the employee running for elective office and the
degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Ruling:
1. No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our
Constitution to limit the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political activities is
too plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices.
Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different,
yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by
the partisan potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated
by a powerful political machine that has amassed the
scattered powers of government workers so as to give
itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on
the reins of power.
The restriction is valid regardless of the position sought,
even for baranggay elections. it is well to note that from
as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election
Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these
nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special
rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations
which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election
Code. In any event, even if we were to assume, for the
sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section
13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to
elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth
challenge would still be futile.
1.
Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner
under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 of the Act 4221 because nowhere it states
that it is to be made applicable to chartered
cities like the City of Manila.
2.
Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal
protection clause for being an invalid
classification because its applicability is not
uniform throughout the country for each
provincial board has its own discretion to
provide or not to provide a probation system,
allocate funds for the probation officers based
on the discretion of each provincial boards as
regards their own locality, etc.
PEOPLE VS. VERA (1937) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
Issue: WON the assailed provision is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
G.R. No. 45685, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937
Held:
Doctrine: Requites for a valid class legislation: (1) must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional
for being violative of the equal protection
clause.

Class legislation discriminating against some
and favoring others in prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable
must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative
power. Each provincial board has its own
discretion to provide or not to provide a
probation system, allocate funds for the
probation officers based on the discretion of
each provincial boards as regards their own
locality, etc. What if the other province decides
not to adopt probation system, or it decides not
to have salary for the probation officer?

it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act
creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11
of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the
Facts:
1.
Private respondent (Cu-Unjieng) was convicted
of a criminal charge by trial court of Manila.
2.
He filed several motions for reconsideration or
new trial but was denied. On 1936, the SC
remanded the case to the original court of
origin for the execution of judgment.
3.
While waiting for the new trial, he appealed to
Insular Probation Office (IPO) for probation but
was denied.
4.
However, Judge Vera, upon another request by
petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for
hearing for probation.
5.
Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for
the latter has no power to place the petitioner
under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 of the Act 4221 (i.e., the grant to the
provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person.)
Petitioner’s contentions:
equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad.
Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126594 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill
of Rights – Equal Protection
The Legislative Department – Undue Delegation
Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which banned residents, firms,
associations and corporations from maintaining foreign
exchange accounts abroad without permission from the
Central Bank. Several informations were filed against
her. During the pendency of the cases, Central Bank
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign
Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically
allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to
maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the
circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular
pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ.
960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the informations
filed against her based on the new circulars. The RTC
denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal.
Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has
been violated, among others, as the new circular was
purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases
lodged against her.
She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central
Bank Act (which allowed the Central Bank to issue
circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power
because the said law allowed the Central Bank to
legislate (define crimes) penal laws and
determine penalties therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are
correct.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank
Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which
allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B.
Circulars concerned merely spelled out the details of the
offense. These circulars are mere administrative
regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to have
been violated by Marcos.
Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court
said “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the aforementioned
provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at
her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a
legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures
belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as
respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the
foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her
constitutional right to equal protection of the law was
violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such
objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at
the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage
therefor, and not at their present posture.”