Administrative Law and Law on Public Corporations Casebook
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Administrative Law and Law on Public Corporations Casebook
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................. 2
Liban v. Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011, 654 PHIL 680-738).......................................... 6
Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, [June 7, 2011], 666 PHIL 140-224) ..................... 7
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit, et al. (G.R. No.
169752, 25 September 2007) ................................................................................................................ 9
The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic of the Phils. Peace Panel (G.R. No.
183591, 14 October 2008) .................................................................................................................. 12
Basco v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991) ......................................................................... 16
Lina v. Pano (G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001) ............................................................................. 18
Disomangcop v. Datumanong (G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004) .............................................. 20
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138810, 29 September 2004) ........................... 24
Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002) ................................. 26
Pimentel v. Aguirre, et al. (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000), in relation to Secs. 284-294, LGC ...... 27
Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004) ................................................... 32
ACORD v. Zamora (G.R. No. 144256, 08 June 2005)........................................................................ 34
Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011; and Resolution dated 28
February 2012) ................................................................................................................................... 37
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. and Prov. Of Camsur v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, 10 December 2014 ........... 43
Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008) ........................................................................... 45
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No. 176951, 18 November 2008; 21 December
2009; 24 August 2010; and 15 February 2011) ................................................................................... 48
Navarro v. Ermita (G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010) .......................................................................... 50
Navarro v. Ermita (G.R. 180050, April 12, 2011) - Resolution .......................................................... 53
Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999) .............................................................. 56
Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999) ............................................................... 58
Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)................................................................. 60
Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995) ............................................................. 62
Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26, 2001) .................................................... 64
Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010) ....................................................................... 66
Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986) ................................................................................ 68
Dela Cruz v. Paras (G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983) ................................................................. 70
Binay v. Domingo (G.R. No. 92389, 11 September 1991).................................................................. 72
Tano v. Socrates (G.R. No. 110249. 21 August 1997) ........................................................................ 74
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila (G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009) ........................................ 76
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Administrative Law and Law on Public Corporations Casebook
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052. February 13, 2008 ............................................. 78
(SJS) Officers v. Lim/Atienza (G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014) .............................................. 80
ARTICLE X ....................................................................................................................................... 82
Local Government .............................................................................................................................. 82
General Provisions .............................................................................................................................. 82
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
155650 July 20, 2006 .......................................................................................................................... 84
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. MARCOS G.R. No. 120082.
September 11, 1996. ........................................................................................................................... 88
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. [G.R. No.162015. March 6,
2006]................................................................................................................................................... 90
Drilon v. Lim (G.R. No. 112497, 04 August 1994) ............................................................................ 91
BATANGAS CITY et al vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION G.R. No. 187631
July 8, 2015......................................................................................................................................... 93
City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta GR 34915 24 June 1983 ................................................. 94
City of Cebu v. Spouses Apolonio (G.R. No. 142971, 07 May 2002) ................................................ 95
REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002 ............................................................................. 97
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 71169, 25 August 1989) ................................ 98
MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000) ...................................... 99
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc. (G.R. No. 148339, 23 February 2005) ..... 101
City of Manila vs Judge Laguio GR 118127 12 April 2005 .............................................................. 102
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007 ........................................................ 103
Republic v. Rambuyong G.R. No. 167810 Date: October 4, 2010 .................................................... 104
Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008] ....................................................................... 106
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC,
CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondents. G.R. No. 104732. June 22, 1993. 107
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO
J. CARDINO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012 ....................................................... 109
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner, vs. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents. G.R. No. 193536 ................................................................................. 109
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE
G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD
K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C.
ATILANO, Respondents. G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013 ............................................................. 111
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.
ANTlPOLO, Respondents. G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012 ......................................................... 113
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MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY,
Respondents. G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009 ............................................................................. 115
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 198742
August 10, 2012 ................................................................................................................................ 117
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents. G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009............................................... 119
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013.................................. 121
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO,
JR., respondents. G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998 .................................................................... 122
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG,
Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents. G.R.
No. 184836 December 23, 2009 ....................................................................................................... 123
RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y.
TALAGA, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 147927 February 4, 2002 ..................................................... 124
VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto
Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim
Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents. G.R.
No. 154512 November 12, 2002 ....................................................................................................... 125
ARSENIO A. LATASA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA,
Respondents. G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003 ........................................................................ 127
FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents. G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006...................................................... 129
MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002 131
Talaga Jr. V. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 169888, Nov. 11, 2008 .............................................. 134
Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992) .................................................................. 136
SALUMBIDES V. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 180917; APRIL 23, 2010) ..................................... 138
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015....................................................... 140
De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001) ................................................................... 142
Plaza v. CA G.R. No. 138464, 18 January 2008 ............................................................................... 143
Atienza vs. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005 .................................................................... 145
People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008) ............................................................. 147
Sales v Carreon (G.R. No. 160791 February 13, 2007)..................................................................... 149
LIZA M. QUIROG and RENE L. RELAMPAGOS vs. GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO,
G.R. No. 163443 November 11, 2008............................................................................................... 152
MONTUERTO V. TY AND SANGGUNIANBAYAN, G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008 .......... 154
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The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 222.
.......................................................................................................................................................... 156
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 ......................................................... 160
MMDA v Garin (G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005) ......................................................................... 163
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005) ......................... 165
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Liban v. Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011, 654 PHIL 680-738)
FACTS:
Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that
being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a
Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation
and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.
The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of
the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of
constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality
will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
HELD:
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such,
the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive
issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent
Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to
assist victims of war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among
others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution
aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was
created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva
Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the
PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities
and GOCC.
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Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, [June 7, 2011], 666 PHIL 140-224)
FACTS:
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011on August 19, 1999 ("the COA
Resolution"), with the subject "Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created
as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460
and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "governmentcontrolled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the
BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code."
The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).Finally,
the COA Resolution reads:
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS
RESOLVED, AS IT DOES HEREBY RESOLVE,to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an
opinion on whether the financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement
and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations.
xxxx
BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision,the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social,
Scientific, Civic and Research Sectorunder the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the
subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach
ISSUE: Does COA have jurisdiction over BSP?
HELD: After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the
applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, [the Supreme Court found] that the BSP is a public
corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to
Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers
and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation"
There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification.Article 44 reads:
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Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations forprivate interest or purposeto which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating
it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement
a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article
44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.
DENIED.
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Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit, et
al. (G.R. No. 169752, 25 September 2007)
FACTS:
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was
created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner,
as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or
the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which
may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet
in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the
protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the
cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the
Government is duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a
private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities.
On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.
ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.
RULING:
YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied. Essentially,
the “charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the
CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.
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And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows
that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted
on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
retrospective effect.
Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by
any agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of
the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily
and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally
accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a
common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be
managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws in force.”
Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s
initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered
government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary purpose
is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does
not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may
be private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the
public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private
corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that
a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of
service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for
the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or
convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public
benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering
public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so
with all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed
with gifts or donations from private individuals.
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The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the
latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered
cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the State as its own
device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to render
periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the
petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very
existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of
whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures of the
State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine
whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means
by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred
upon it.
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The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic of the Phils. Peace Panel
(G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008)
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect
of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing
the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art
2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would
be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
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x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations
as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
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The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association –
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution
to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of
the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
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particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples
of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro
people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed
or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality,
is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted
runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
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Basco v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
FACTS:
The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under PD
1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the
petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR
Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of
the following issues:
ISSUES:
(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized
by law.
(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary
to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.
(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other
gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative
of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has
the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere
creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even
take back the power.
(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore,
LGUs' have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises
governmental functions of regulating gambling activities.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not
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have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. On
the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still
decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a
matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations
of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.
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Lina v. Pano (G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001)
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA “ILLEGAL GAMBLING” LALO NA ANG
LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA’T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo’t higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA’T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala
A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng
lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito
sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo’t higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine
National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng
illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang “Jueteng”. 3
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent
Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1)
a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining
the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
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ISSUE: WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto in the said locality.
HELD: NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna, merely states the “objection” of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid
ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit
this in their petition. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto,
such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be
contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does
not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted
as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first
issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is
nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring
water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto
is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an
ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly
allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of
government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will
necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.
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Disomangcop v. Datumanong (G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004)
FACTS:
Sections 1 and 15 of Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras.
R.A. 6734 (“An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)
was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the
provinces and cities. Only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
E.O. 426, in accordance with R.A. 6734, was issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 12 October
1990, entitled “Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works
and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional
Government, and for other purposes.” (created DPWH-ARMM)
D.O. 119, 9 years later, on 20 May 1999, was issued by then DPWH Sec. Vigilar which created the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure
projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
R.A. 8999, almost 2 years later, on 17 January 2001, was approved and signed into law by President
Joseph E. Estrada. (An Act Establishing An Engineering District In The First District Of The Province
Of Lanao Del Sur and Appropriating Funds therefor)
R.A. 9054 was later passed by the Congress, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.” Like
its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and
the retained areas of governance of the National Government. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14
August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same
date.
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and District Engineer/Engineer II,
respectively, of the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur addressed a
petition to then DPWH Secretary Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the nonimplementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.
Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang then filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking the following principal reliefs:
(1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119
(2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing
funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and
(3) to compel the Secretary of DBM to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi
City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur only; and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area.
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ISSUES:
1)
Whether there is a justiciable controversy - YES
2)
Whether the petitioners have legal standing - YES
3)
Whether RA 8999 and DO 119 are constitutional and valid - NO
RULING:
1) JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks
of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive
department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy.
2) LEGAL STANDING
Both Disomangcop as Engineer IV/Officer-in-Charge and Dimalotang as Engineer II of DPWHARMM in Lanao del Sur are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing
all public works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of
their jurisdiction.
The creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office (D.O. 119) and the creation of First
Engineering District of Lanao del Sur (R.A. 8999) will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities
of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with
functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is
likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even
their jobs. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant
case.
3) On the Constitutionality Of R.A. 8999 And D.O. 119
A) R.A. 8999 NEVER BECAME OPERATIVE AND WAS SUPERSEDED OR REPEALED BY A
SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT.
The ARMM Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a
plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999
because it has to be submitted to a plebiscite. R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the
functions of the DPWH in the ARMM to the Regional Government.
R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. Absent approval of the people of the ARMM (thru
plebiscite) R.A. 8999 has not even become operative.
R.A. 8999 was also repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect.
R.A. 9054 advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering,
among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and
rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government’s jurisdiction over
infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it
destroys the latter law’s objective.
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Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A.
6734 and R.A. 9054. It contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
•
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.These cultures, as a matter of right, must
be allowed to flourish.
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic,
cultural, and even religious diversities.
•
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of
a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government.
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether
geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decisionmaking by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to
delegate certain authority to more local governments. Decentralization comes in two forms:
A) Deconcentration - administrative in nature, transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices
B) Devolution - political decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for
the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units, more
liberal since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities grant greater autonomy to local
government units
In in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.”[
Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates the powers of the ARG, states:
Except for the areas of executive power mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by
the Autonomous Regional Government (“ARG”) of the ARMM. Programs relative to infrastructure
facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural extension and watershed management
do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted provision of law. Thus, the
inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to the
ARG.
E.O. 426 which was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734
officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government and the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to
the autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy.
The Congress, itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal
management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control
again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up. The challenged law
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creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved
to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. The continued enforcement of R.A.
8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which have
previously been handed over.
It bears stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to
ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states: Sec.
25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
B) DEPARTMENT ORDER 119 WAS ALSO RENDERED FUNCTUS OFFICIO
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office is violative of the provisions of E.O.
426. E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the
ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The office created under D.O. 119, having
essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which
have been previously devolved under the said executive order.
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that “all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.” With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily
follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED. The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio
state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary basis for the grant of the sought by the petitioners.
The issuance of a writ of mandamus is DENIED. There is no basis to compel respondent DBM Secretary
to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow
the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects
within its jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that “(f)unds for
infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government
shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act” passed by the Regional
Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly Public Works Act has been enacted.
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Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138810, 29 September 2004)
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner
a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution
provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein,
“provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Respondent argues that Resolution was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) & (d) of BP 337 (LGC of 1983)
which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses and is in the nature of a contract between Petitioner and
Respondent.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. There is no
law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever authority the LGUs had before,
the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued PD 1512 terminating all franchises,
permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments.
Today, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 436 only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or
cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate
and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area. It is clear
that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant
franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the
obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in
excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.
Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly,
we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig
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Administrative Law and Law on Public Corporations Casebook
drivers, the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits,
the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the operation of hotels, motels,
and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general welfare
clause.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It
uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV
system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large
regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. This is the same regulation
that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it
violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
1. The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436
insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the
NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. The fixing of subscriber
rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain.
2. Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer markets and
competition.[50] Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of
deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of
telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still unserved or
underserved. Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the
government in stimulating the growth and development of telecommunications, the State promoted the
policy of deregulation.
The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states:
WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a nationally
recognized cable television operators association, have enhanced the growth of the cable television
industry and must therefore be maintained along with minimal reasonable government regulations;
When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. Verily, in the case at
bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents approval.
PETITION GRANTED.
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Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002)
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed
the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments
or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose
will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs
and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
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Pimentel v. Aguirre, et al. (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000), in relation to Secs. 284-294,
LGC
FACTS:
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in Government
for Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government departments and agencies, including state
universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will
replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items. Section 4 also provided that pending assessment by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be
withheld. President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be
withheld.
ISSUES:
1. WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid
2. WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce expenditures by at least 25% is a
valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs as it is advisory only.
“Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body.” Under existing law, LGU, in addition to
having administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local
governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources
in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials
in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and
planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
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Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x In the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of
the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no
case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters:
(1) An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues; and
(3) The corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall
in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government
was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President
has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise
all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO
372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with
petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied,
we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and
implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding
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order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to
a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for
fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the
President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however,
that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice.
It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.
2. No. Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code
specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must
be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something
held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national
government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one
of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x
x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court
contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power
of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
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"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter."
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of
checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within
the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If
these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of
the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power
of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions
and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected
by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the
state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of
autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
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administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide.
The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in
Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency."
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
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Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 152774, 27 May 2004)
Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48
entitled “ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND
EQUALIZATION” which was later renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). The program was established to “facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government
Code.” The Oversight Committee constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 or The
Local Government Code of 1991, has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for its effective implementation. Thereafter the Oversight Committee issued
Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and
OCD-2002-001. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions,
insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and
2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual members of the
Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to
Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of
1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of
five billion pesos (₱5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
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Yes, the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Under Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Also, in Section
284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs’
share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40% and Section 285 on the allocation to Local
Government Units in the internal revenue allotment.
In the case at bar, the respondent put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos
LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach
on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.
Therefore, the provisos violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
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ACORD v. Zamora (G.R. No. 144256, 08 June 2005)
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of
expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National
Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became
RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTYONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations
Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an
amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be
used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted
by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a
separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter
amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court
the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor
Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision
XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section
1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the
GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the
IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”.
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue
that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its
release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted
by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.
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HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does
not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch
of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the
President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers
intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic,
then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is
qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that
Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the
IRA is, as held in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall
be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be
made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the
quarter of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the
laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The
pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.”
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year
2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the
amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
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Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011; and Resolution
dated 28 February 2012)
I.
THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter
and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same
date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1.
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3.
Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
in toto.]
1.
YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
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While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.
2.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill
can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
3.
YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
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[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization
in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in
a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective
terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is
a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion
is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
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3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
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Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3
of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed
is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any
way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides
only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.
And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
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unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
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Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. and Prov. Of Camsur v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, 10 December
2014
FACTS:
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner
the local government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years
1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted
to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular
(MC) No. 2010-83,entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public
Offerings,” which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting within 30 days from the end of each
fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government
unit a summary of all revenues collected and funds received including the appropriations and
disbursements of such funds during the preceding fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states
that non-compliance will be meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.
On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA
shall be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It also enumerated a list for which
the fund must not be utilized. Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial
Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the
assailed issuances of the respondent for being unconstitutional for violating the principles of
local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
ISSUE:
Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy?
RULING:
No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the
LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287
of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory
to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled
that the assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of
the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but
was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the
LGC.
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Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’sposturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the
discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty to map out their
respective development plans solely on the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs
accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development projects. They
may even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of
undertaking development projects.
Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of sanctions therein is a
clear indication of the President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the
issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new set of acts or
omissions which are deemed violations and provide the corresponding penalties therefor. It
simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement
of the 20% development fund and that non-compliance therewith may render them liable to
sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws.
Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in the mentioned issuances went
beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as
the Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans,
and procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads
that Local treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other accountable officers shall, within
thirty (30) days from the end of the fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible
and conspicuous places in the local government unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires
the posting of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved contract in
the procuring entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the
procuring entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full disclosure
of information on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest.
Pertinently, Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
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Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008)
Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan.
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province
of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its
Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it
is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the
plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were
the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October
2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007
"maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative
District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007.
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato
City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8
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On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which
maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier
directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao’s
reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the
COMELEC usurped Congress's power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach
the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to
nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its
administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No.
177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent
Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City.
Issue/s: (1) Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if yes,
whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without the
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
Ruling:
The petitions have no merit. The Court ruled that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces
and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void, and (3) COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional
assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may
hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member,"
refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of
a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only
Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district representatives
out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute
20 percent of the total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in
every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for
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district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need
now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can
create new provinces.
It is clear that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are
limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM
Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article
X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines."
Thus, Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate
only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, the
Court also ruled that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
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League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No. 176951, 18 November 2008; 21
December 2009; 24 August 2010; and 15 February 2011)
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
During the 11th Congress, the Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
"the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
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Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. The
petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue/s: 1) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2) Whether
the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive, application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress
shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain, and unambiguous, needing no resort to
any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect
or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending
cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.
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Navarro v. Ermita (G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers and
residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once
as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to have previously
filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds. They allege that the creation of the
Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly
deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation,
and rich resources from the area.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province
may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than 1) ₱20 million based on 1991 constant
prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and 2) a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO, OR a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the
assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual
population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did
not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor
Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes, the
2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was
₱82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the bill
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on
October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine
whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao,
Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
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On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of
Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite.
On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their
appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected
during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected
provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate
existence.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not
valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the
Local Government Code.
Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent
appointments and elections to the vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be
declared null and void. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat
Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte.
Issue/s: Whether or not RA 9355 (act creating new province of Dinagat) complied with the Constitution
and Section 461 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code).
Ruling:
No, RA 9355 did not comply with the provisions of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution in relation
to Section 461 of RA 7160. Section 461 provides that:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
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(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area
of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including
Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000, was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by
the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with
the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del
Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code.
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Navarro v. Ermita (G.R. 180050, April 12, 2011) - Resolution
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20,
2010, filed by Movant-Intervenors dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court: (a)
recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution.
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province
under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and
the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials
who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. During the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections,
the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of
Surigao del Norte challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. They pointed out that when the
law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the
LGC.
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision granting the petition. The Decision declared
R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area
in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and
the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the
provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that,
"[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is
not expressly provided in the law.
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution12 dated May 12, 2010,13 the Court denied
the said motions.
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions
will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the COMELEC Resolution
No. 8790 (May 12, 2010 Resolution) is not reversed; that they have a legal interest in the instant case
and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. The movants-intervenors’
election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will
have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
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Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their
constituents, they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion
of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province
such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be restructured; (2) the
services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated, and
(4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be
foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three
(3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355
operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from
the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court on February 10, 2010 declaring RA 9355 (Act creating
the province of Dinagat) unconstitutional may be reconsidered
Ruling:
The Court finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative
consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units
are economic viability, efficient administration, and the capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed
to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative
weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential
consideration.
It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section
450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section
461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities,
but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there
is a greater likelihood that islands or groups of islands would form part of the land area of a newlycreated province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine
legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
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component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent.
It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Furthermore, the land area, while considered as an indicator of the viability of a local government unit,
is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of ₱82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of ₱20,000,000.00 for
the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible
and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province,
they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
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Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999)
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others,
it downgraded the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as a ground that R.A. No. 8528
lacks a provision submitting the same for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at the bar. They also contend that the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor
General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended
that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to
vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a
plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended
their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its
reclassification.
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Issue/s: Whether or not RA 8528 governing the reclassification of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent city to a component city falls under Section X, Article X of the Constitution (creation,
division, merger, abolishment, substantial border alteration); If so, whether or not RA 8528 is
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the required plebiscite
Ruling:
RA 8528 is unconstitutional for failure to comply with the required Constitutional requirement on
plebiscites. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an
independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago
City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires
the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the
rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people
power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the
past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged, or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people.
Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as
a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging, or
altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy
thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the
independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by
the city will now have to be shared with the province.
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Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999)
Facts:
On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the
City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535,
the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department
of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for the said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a motion we duly noted.
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code
particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area;
seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its
Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnish a copy of the Quezon City
Council of barangay resolution; and
b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to
Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535. This, he argues, is clear
from the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on
the proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. Petitioner particularly cites its hearings held on October
3 and 27, 1997. He is silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee in the House
of Representatives.
Likewise, the petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local
government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of
Novaliches, in terms of income, population, and land area.
In their Comment, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General traversed all the allegations
of the petitioner. They claimed he failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. In their
memorandum, respondents argued that the petitioner had the burden of proof to overcome the legal
presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of
1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent
document supporting the petitioner's claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional. Respondents pray that
the present petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
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Issue: Whether or not RA 8535 providing for the creation of Novaliches as a separate city from 15
Barangays out of Quezon City is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No, every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations
clearly and unmistakably. The petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no
certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in
this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law
passed by Congress had complied with all the requisites.
Under the Implementing Rules, written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the
creation of a city, to be submitted by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of
a resolution. The petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only to
prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. Thus. the Court is
constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these requirements were met appropriately in the
passage of the assailed legislative act.
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Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)
Facts:
In this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted
into a component city.
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as the principal author. Other sponsors included
Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was
referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations
on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB
No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to
the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,"
was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May
19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB
No. 8817.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on
May 5, 1994, as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a
great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a
city.
The petitioners assert that RA 7720 is unconstitutional for converting the Municipality of Santiago as
an independent component city despite not having the requisite income (P 20,000,000.00). They came
up with this conclusion by dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the
1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty
Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
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Issue: Whether or not RA 7720 is unconstitutional for converting the Municipality of Santiago as an
Independent Component City despite allegedly not having the requisite income
Ruling:
RA 7720 is constitutional. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it
must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the
Department of Finance.
The contention of the petitioners that the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate for not excluding the Internal Revenue Allotments; that the
IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that
they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing, is of
no merit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without the need
for any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much-needed funds.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income.
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Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995)
Facts:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No.
7854
The petitioners claim that 1) Section 2 of RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, 2)
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X, and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution, and
3) Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law, (b) the increase in the legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill,
and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
Issue: Whether RA 7854 is unconstitutional for 1) its failure to identify the metes and bounds of Makati
City’s jurisdiction, 2) failure to comply with the population requirement under Article VI of the
constitution
Ruling:
No, RA 7854 is constitutional. boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within
the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately
will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code
in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
In the instant case, the Court cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. The petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the
land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
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cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of
the municipality."
The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty that will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at the bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854
is unconstitutional.
As to the required population, Section 5(3) of Art VI of the Constitution provides that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
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Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26, 2001)
Facts:
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from
the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of a twenty (20) day
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before
conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, the petitioner instituted another petition
(G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No.
8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon
and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one
subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions were later consolidated.
Issue/s: 1) Whether RA 8806 is unconstitutional for failure to conduct the plebiscite within 120 days
from effectivity thereof, 2) whether COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20)
day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting
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the plebiscite, and 3) whether RA 8806 is unconstitutional for violating Section 10, Article X for
merging two existing municipalities.
Ruling:
No, the petition is without merit. First, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on
December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. The law was first published in the
August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it
was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of
the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the
reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the
date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published.
Second, the petitioner provided no proof whatsoever to substantiate his allegation that the COMELEC
did not conduct an extensive information campaign as required. Consequently, we sustain the
presumption that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in
conducting the plebiscite.
Lastly, the petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality, or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Thus, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division
or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
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Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010)
Facts:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners, Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers, and citizens,
seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners
consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the
said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The 5 districts and their
respective population are as follows: 1st district (176,3830, 2nd district (276,777), 3rd district
(439,043), 4th district (372,548), and 5th district (429,070).
The petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue: Whether RA 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines
Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto
Ruling:
No, RA 9716 is constitutional. The petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second
sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
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population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" points to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
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Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986)
Facts:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island
of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985,
Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose
of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to
and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986.
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the Court
was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners
on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on
January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality, and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed upon and
resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely: the
Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay,
Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona, and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the
voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found the need to change the
prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will
be ventilated and given final resolution”. At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite
which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the
very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.
Issue: Whether or not BP 885 is unconstitutional for failure to comply with Section 3, Article XI of the
1973 Constitution (requirement of plebiscite in the unit or units affected by the creation of a new
province).
Ruling:
Yes, BP 885 is unconstitutional for non-compliance of the plebiscite requirement as provided by Section
3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. The constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever
a province is created, divided, or merged and there is a substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus
inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
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The Court finds no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional
requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount
of rhetorical flourishes can justify the exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an
alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is
claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units. The alleged
good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically
directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected, and complied with.
No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard
what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del
Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement
prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code. The “new” Negros Del Norte only has an
area of about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to the total area
of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. This does not meet the criteria of 3,500
sq km required under Section 197 of the Local Government Code.
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Dela Cruz v. Paras (G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983)
Facts:
The validity of Ordinance No. 84, issued by the Sangguniang Bayan of Bocaue, Bulacan, is questioned
in this petition for Certiorari.
There was the admission of the following facts as having been established: "l. That petitioners Vicente
de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor
of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner
Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That the petitioners had
invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3. That the nightclubs are well-lighted and have no
partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners-owners/operators of these clubs do
not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That
these hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is
suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or those
who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate there
is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan”.
Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance
No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue/s: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses.
Ruling:
No, a municipal corporation does not have the power to prohibit the exercise of law trade such as the
operation of nightclubs and the pursuit of lawful occupation just because these clubs employ hostesses.
The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal
authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class, we are
not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific
functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
If nightclubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. The Court had always stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
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cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained
by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly, the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Under RA 938, as amended and the Local Government Code, it is clear that in the guise of a police
regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case
of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments
made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
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Binay v. Domingo (G.R. No. 92389, 11 September 1991)
Facts:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A
BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED
AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY.
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose
gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon
fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief
from the Municipality of Makati.
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial
Assistance Program.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance
in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by the
petitioners were denied by the respondent in its Decision No. 1159. Bent on pursuing the Burial
Assistance Program, the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, reaffirming Resolution No. 60.
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner,
through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA
Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause
Ruling:
Yes, Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. In the case at bar, COA is of the position that
there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
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Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants
of Makati”. Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise
to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and,
in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exist so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by
promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the
benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit
of only a few individuals as in the present case." also deserves scant consideration. There is no violation
of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as the subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed
giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.
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Tano v. Socrates (G.R. No. 110249. 21 August 1997)
Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No.
15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT
OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1,
1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF".
To implement said city ordinance, then-Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No.
23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33.
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor's office, and courts,
petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. The
petitioners contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them
from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII, and Sections 2 and 7 of Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit
could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether
or not to issue the permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering,
possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away
the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitionersmembers of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing
their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion."
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based
thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition and furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
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Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 15-92, Office Order No. 23, Resolution No. 33, and Ordinance 2 are
unconstitutional
Ruling:
The assailed ordinances and office orders are constitutional. After a scrutiny of the challenged
Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, the Court
finds the petitioners' contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish
a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years;
and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April
1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC
and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts that endanger the environment.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It imposes upon the Sangguniang
Bayan, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances
to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result
in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."
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White Light Corp. v. City of Manila (G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009)
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law Ordinance No. 7774
entitled "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and WashUp Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
( TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as a defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it
was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well
as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and
Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of
the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC also notified the Solicitor
General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date,
MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which the RTC granted on December 28, 1992.
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from
the enforcement of the Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
Ordinance null and void.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 112471. However, in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as
a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance. First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
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movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since
it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents
in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,
liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC, and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. In their petition and
Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They
contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue/s: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance is null and void for violating the constitutional guarantees
of due process
Ruling:
Yes, Ordinance No. 7774 is null and void for being unconstitutional. The primary constitutional
question t is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due
process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by
the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may
be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as
their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as
well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
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Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052. February 13, 2008
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. The
respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001 then it became effective on December
28, 2001, after its publication.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the society.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines),
Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.
Issue/s: Whether the respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and 2) Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals. Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
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of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear, and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of the
respondent to do the act required to be done.
Furthermore, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondents the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city”. One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
Lastly, assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions
(Resolution No. 97, s. 2002, and No. 13, s. 2003) which ratified it and made it binding on the City of
Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally hinders respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
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(SJS) Officers v. Lim/Atienza (G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014)
Facts:
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. (hereinafter
referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof –
Ordinance No. 8027 – was enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security, and safety of the inhabitants
of Manila;" (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is not superseded by
Ordinance No. 8119. Declaring that it is constitutional and valid, the Court accordingly ordered its
immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil
terminals.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded
Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.
The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section
23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby
allowing, once again, the operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments" and "Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous[,]
Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous;
and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments" within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (13) in the Pandacan area.
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners
now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary to those
embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a
healthful and balanced environment are also included.
Issue/s: whether or not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil
companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Ordinance No. 8187 should be stricken down insofar as the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is
concerned.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 were declared as a
guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court
said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the concurrence
of the two requisites: a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila;" and a lawful method – the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the
land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan.
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Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without
a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives
and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with
the DOE. Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals,
they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.
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ARTICLE X
Local Government
General Provisions
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
In addition to national taxes, the Constitution provides for local government taxation. (Article X,
Section 5) (Article X, Section 6) Parenthetically, the Local Government Code provides that all local
government units are granted general tax powers, as well as other revenue-raising powers like the
imposition of service fees and charges, in addition to those specifically granted to each of the local
government units. But no such taxes, fees and charges shall be imposed without a public hearing having
been held prior to the enactment of the ordinance. The levy must not be unjust excessive, oppressive,
confiscatory or contrary to a declared national economic policy (Section 186 and 187) Further, there
are common limitations to the grant of the power to tax to the local government, such that taxes like
income tax, documentary stamp tax, etc. cannot be imposed by the local government.
Local Government Tax Law
Local government taxation in the Philippines is based on the constitutional grant of the power to tax to
the local governments.
Local taxes may be imposed, as the Constitution grants, to each local government unit, the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue to the local
governments (Article X, Section 5). With respect to national taxes, local Government units shall have
a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them
(Article X, Section 6).
However, certain taxes, such as the following, may not be imposed by local government units: (Section
133, Local Government Code and Tax Law and Jurisprudence by Vitug & Acosta, copyright 2000)
(1) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(2) Documentary stamp tax;
(3) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise
provided in the Local Government Code (Code) (except taxes levied on the transfer of real property
ownership under Section 135, and Section 151 of the Code);
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(4) Customs duties, registration fees of vessels (except license fees imposed under Section 149, and
Section 151 of the Code), wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues and all other kinds of customs fees,
charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government unit
concerned;
(5) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through,
the territorial jurisdictions of local governments in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges
or otherwise, or other taxes in any form whatever upon such goods or merchandise;
(6) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or
fishermen;
(7) Taxes on business enterprises certified by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for
a period of six and four years, respectively, from the date of registration;
(8) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code and taxes, fees, or
charges on petroleum products, but not a tax on the business of importing, manufacturing or producing
said products (Patron vs. Pililla, 198 SCRA 82);
(9) Percentage tax or value-added tax on sales, barters or exchanges of goods or services or similar
transactions thereon (but not fixed graduated taxes on gross sales or on volume of production);
(10) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation
of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water except as provided by the
Code;
(11) Taxes on premiums paid for reinsurance or retrocession;
(12) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of
licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;
(13) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported except as provided by the
Code (the prohibition applies to any local export tax, fee, or levy on Philippine export products but not
to any local tax, fee, or levy that may be imposed on the business of exporting said products);
(14) Taxes, fees or charges on duly organized and registered Countryside and Barangay Business
Enterprises (R.A. No. 6810) and on cooperatives (R.A. No. 6938); and
(15) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and local government units (Section 133, LGC)
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MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
Facts:
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction
the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport
Lands and Buildings.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among
the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that
MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot
tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any
public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue:
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes.
Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant
to such assessments, are void.
Held:
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
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MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must
have members.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority
and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order.”
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
“roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The
term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and
other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended
for public use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA
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charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The
collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees
are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility
instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will
happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway
of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real
properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and
Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of
the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was
not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was
merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous
body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is
owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAA’s assets adverse to the
Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax.
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However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not
exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private
corporations is subject to real estate tax.
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MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. MARCOS G.R.
No. 120082. September 11, 1996.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic
Act No. 6958, mandated to “principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control,
management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City, and such other airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu. Since the
time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes
in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter:
“Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. — The Authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.”
On October 11, 1994, however, the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for
realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner located at Barrio Apas and Barrio
Kasambagan, Lahug, Cebu City, in the total amount of P2,229,078.79.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified, claiming in its favor the
aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempts it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted
that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing Section 133
of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government
units:
“Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx
o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and local government units”
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA
is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code that took effect on January 1, 1992:
“Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege.— Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Section 234.
Exemptions from Real Property Taxes. — x x x
(a)
x x xx x x
(e)
xxx
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Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or
controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.”
ISSUE:
1. Whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial
use has been granted to the petitioner, and
2.
Whether the petitioner is a “taxable person.”
HELD:
1.
NO. Section 15 of the petitioner’s Charter provides:
“Sec. 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. — All existing public airport facilities,
runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently
administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interests and privileges relating on airport
works or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operations of air navigation,
aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority:
Provided, however, that the operations control of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids
to air navigation, airways communication, the approach control office, and the area control center shall
be retained by the Air Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air
Transportation Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The Authority may assist
in the maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment.”
It may be reasonable to assume that the term “lands” refer to “lands” in Cebu City then administered
by the Lahug Air Port and included the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for
real property taxes. This section involves a “transfer” of the “lands,” among other things, to the
petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by
the Republic of the Philippines.
This “transfer” is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner’s
authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, “the value of such real estate owned and/or administered
by the airports.” Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in
Section 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable.
2. YES. Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter.
It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect
of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes,
except real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in
light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or
“instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in
the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as
earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner.
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City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. [G.R. No.162015.
March 6, 2006]
FACTS
Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to establish and operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Section 14 (a) of R.A. No. 3259 states:
“The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of the franchise, xxx”. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government
Code of 1991” (LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the
Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties. Barely few months after the LGC took
effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633, amending Bayantel’s original franchise. The Section 11 of the
amendatory contained the following tax provision: “The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable
to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise,
xxx“. In 1993, the government of Quezon City enacted an ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon
City Revenue Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its
franchise.
RULING
YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power
to exempt, and the local government’s delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution
must be ruled in favor of the former. The grant of taxing powers to LGUs under the Constitution and
the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means
that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor
of municipal corporations.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this franchise” cannot be construed other
than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee,
namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business,
and (b) those properties which are not so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the
present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category.
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC, perfectly aware that the LGC has already
withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption from realty taxes, the Congress using, Section 11 thereof with
exactly the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” is the basis for Bayantel’s exemption
from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, the Court views this subsequent piece of
legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s
delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
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Drilon v. Lim (G.R. No. 112497, 04 August 1994)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For Approval And Effectivity
Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of Justice had, on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. Instead, it declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary
of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. By citing the distinction between
control and supervision, the lower court’s concluded that the challenged section gave the Secretary the
power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7
and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in
general.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the findings of the procedural requirements in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment
it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
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the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code.
The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. An
officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
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BATANGAS CITY et al vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187631 July 8, 2015
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation operates an oil refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas City,
which manufactures and produces petroleum products that are distributed nationwide. Batangas City,
through its City Legal Officer, sent a notice of assessment to respondent demanding the payment of
₱92,373,720.50 and ₱312,656,253.04 as business taxes for its manufacture and distribution of
petroleum products. In addition, respondent was also required and assessed to pay the amount of
₱4,299,851.00 as Mayor’s Permit Fee based on the gross sales of its Tabagao Refinery. The assessment
was allegedly pursuant of Section 134 of the LGC of 1991 and Section 23 of its Batangas City Tax
Code of 2002. Respondent proptested. the RTC of Batangas City rendered a Decision sustaining the
imposition of business taxes However it withheld the imposition of Mayor’s Permit Fee . Respondent
filed a Petition for Review with Extremely Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CTA. CTA Second Division granted the said
application and ordered petitioners to hold in abeyance the collection of the questioned manufacturer
and distributor’s taxes, conditioned upon the filing of respondent of a surety bond in the amount of
₱500,000,000.00.The CTA held that respondent is not subject to the business taxes. Upon appeal, The
CTA En Banc found no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the CTA Second
Division.
ISSUE:
WON LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in
the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum products.
HELD:
NO. The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty," and as such, inheres in the State. Such, however,
is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they are not the sovereign; rather, there
are mere "territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines. It is settled that a
municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. . The
power of LGUs to impose business taxes derives from Section 143 of the LGC. However, the same is
subject to the explicit statutory impediment provided for under Section 133(h) of the same Code which
prohibits LGUs from imposing "taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products." It can, therefore, be
deduced that although petroleum products are subject to excise tax, the same is specifically excluded
from the broad power granted to LGUs under Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business taxes.
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City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta GR 34915 24 June 1983
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. After seven years of not
enforcing the ordinance, Quezon City Council passed a resolution to stop any selling/transaction of
memorial who failed to complied with the requirement. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with CFI
a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul Section
9. City Government argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use. HP contend that if it under police
power the property should be destroyed in promoting general welfare. Court decided in favor of HP.
Issue:
Whether or not there is taking of Himlayang Pilipino’s property?
Decision:
Police power is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the
owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in
order to promote the general welfare.
Section 9 of Ordinance of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the
city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Expropriation requires payment of just compensation.
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City of Cebu v. Spouses Apolonio (G.R. No. 142971, 07 May 2002)
Facts:
·
The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against the spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo, alleging that it needed their two parcels of land for a public purpose, i.e. for the construction
of a public road.
·
The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of
P1,786,400.
·
The City of Cebu deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount representing 15% of
the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property
pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
·
Dedamo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because of the following reasons:
(a) That the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for public use, but for
benefit of a single private entity;
(b) That the price offered was very low; and
(c) That they have no other land in Cebu City.
·
A pre-trial ensued, but the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement to
partially settle the case.
·
Thereafter, the trial court directed the City of Cebu to pay the Dedamo the just compensation of
P24,865,930.00 based on the recommendation of the appointed commissioners. But the said
compensation was amended to P20,826,339.50, excluding an area which was not subject to
expropriation.
·
The City of Cebu elevated the case to the CA, asserting that the value of just compensation should
be based on the date of the filing of the complaint. But the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
Issue:
WoN just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No, the Court holds that just compensation shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property in accordance with Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160, a substantive law that must prevail over procedural law.
Under Art. 1315 also, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
In the case at bar, the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved
by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them
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and should be complied with in good faith. Since the petitioner did not interpose a serious objection
during the hearing, it is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation.
Thus, the petition is DENIED.
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REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square meters
of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, Petitioner made a deposit as
being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the property and ordering the
plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the property. It would appear that the National
Government failed to pay the respondents the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision.
The respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated
property. In response, the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof. Meanwhile,
Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated land to the Bulacan State
University. The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question
HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The ubiquitous character
of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. However, the power is
not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must
be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the
latter. In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the
actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. The expropriated property has
been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for
the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort where the
unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question.
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Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 71169, 25 August 1989)
Facts:
August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati, destroyed and removed the gates
constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences
located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of
Jupiter Street to public traffic. Subsequently, Petitioners brought the present action for damages against
the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasidelict A supplemental complaint was later filed by said Petitioners seeking to augment the reliefs prayed
for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of
the case. That the exclusivity of the said village was adversely affected and diminished due to the
opening of the said streets to the public. That the exclusivity of the said village was guaranteed in the
restrictions of TCT.
Issue:
Whether the Right to Non-Impairment of Contracts of the complainants was violated by the
Respondents in an resolution promoting the welfare of the general public?
Held:
No, while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it
has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people.’ Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government,” the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within
narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life. The court do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right
to property should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.
Undoubtedly, the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of
police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
“non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no
reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.
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MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000)
Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals which rendered a Decision on the merits
of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Issue:
Whether the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road
and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls?
Held:
No, It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed
in the charter itself, a “development authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to
the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision”
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of
the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
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It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
[1] Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 61 designating the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Executive Order No. 215, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the
Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal,
special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments,
it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In
fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2
specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first secure the
necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary. With regard to the issuance of
PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by
him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them
outside of residence. These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No.
1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the
decree.
[2] SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for
use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a
license to possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such
application, and before receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal
savings bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, or
in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearm:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and
organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms,
shall not be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond duly
executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be security for the
safekeeping of such arms.
[3] In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action
done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
[4] The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of
these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the
MMDA is expressly authorized “to set the policies concerning traffic” and “coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs.” In addition, the MMDA may “install and
administer a single ticketing system,” fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
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Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc. (G.R. No. 148339, 23
February 2005)
Facts:
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and outof-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed
to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal
of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia,
the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject
and lawful means.
Held:
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite
for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether
the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were
reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the
appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then
to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.
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City of Manila vs Judge Laguio GR 118127 12 April 2005
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) engaged in operating hotels / motels / sostels /
lodging business filed for Declaratory Relief against City of Manila for enacting Ordinance No 7783
for violating their constitutional rights being confiscatory and invading their property rights. The said
Ordinance prohibits the establishment of certain business and for those existing business forced to
relocate outside Ermita-Malate or to convert their business to allowable business in the area. Judge
Laguio decided in favour of MTDC declaring the Ordinance ultra vires. Hence the appeal from City of
Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the
motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected?
Decision:
Petition denied and decision of lower court affirmed. A valid ordinance must not prohibit but may
regulate trade and must not be unreasonable and for the public good. The problem is not the
establishment, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community, but the human activity that
may occur within its premises. The second option instructing owners to relocate qualifies taking w/o
just compensation. The solution will not end the problem but only relocates it. The conversion into
allowed business is essentially destroying property w/o due process and just compensation.
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SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007
Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and
the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from
joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of
the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of
an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
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Republic v. Rambuyong G.R. No. 167810 Date: October 4, 2010
FACTS
Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection against the National Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing as
counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor. NPC then filed
a motion for inhibition of Rambuyong arguing that he is prohibited under Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local
Government Code.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Rambuyong where it argued that
government-owned or controlled corporations are not included in the prohibition. Should the framers
intended so, it must have explicitly stated therein. In appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Rambuyong can represent NPC as counsel despite being a Vice Mayor. NO
RATIO
Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code provides that Sanggunian Members may practice their
profession or engage in any occupation or teach in schools except during session hours, provided when
the Member is also a member of the Bar, he shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case where the local government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party. Then, the Court quoted Section 2 (10) of the Revised Administrative Code which defined
“instrumentality” shall include regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations. With the foregoing provisions, it is clear without any ambiguity that NPC is
a government instrumentality tasked in undertaking development hydroelectric generation of power and
production of electricity from other sources. Further, being the Vice-Mayor, Rambuyong is deemed a
Sanggunian Member because Section 446 of the LGC provided that the sangguniang bayan shall be
composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer. As such, Rambuyong cannot represent
himself as counsel for Chu when NPC is an adverse party, pursuant to the abovementioned laws.
NOTES
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. —
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging
in any occupation, other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar
shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. —
Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a
different meaning: xxx xxx xxx
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(4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein. xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality — refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through
a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 2004 Decision and April 13, 2005 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72800 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Richard B.
Rambuyong is disqualified from appearing in Civil Case No. I-197.
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Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila.
His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one
of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong
barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment)
case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite
the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons
1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules.
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
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ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO
A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, Petitioners, v. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON,
Respondents. G.R. No. 104732. June 22, 1993.
FACTS
•
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and
unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to
the office . . . ." 2 Paragraph (d) reads—
"(d) Chairman/Administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority" (Emphasis supplied).
•
Petitioners, who claimed to be taxpayers, and employees of the US Facility at Subic; officers
and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in US facilities in the Philippines
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that" [n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure," 3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that"
[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint"
ISSUE
•
Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, that
for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
RULING
•
YES. In Section 7 of Article IX-B of the Constitution provides:
"No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
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"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries."a1aw library
•
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in
the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public
officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C.
Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6." . . . should be allowed to attend to his
duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment.
•
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential
appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless
limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since
only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion
to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice,
is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
•
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the
first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse
of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
•
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City
of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is
declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo
City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
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DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents. G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner, vs. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. G.R. No. 193536
FACTS
•
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte
in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009
a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation
in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
•
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted
that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had
already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order
dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February
2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that
during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the
same grounds.
•
The COMELEC EN BANC narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal records:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22,
1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court
of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several
years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC
Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation
Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the
corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and
Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos,
Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used
by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in
2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.
ISSUE
I.
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
II.
Whether or not the COMELEC “enforced and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election.”
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RULING
I.
NO. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start
since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
•
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office
is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
•
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized
by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local
Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition
on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs
to the petitioner.
II.
No. To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these
cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected
and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce
and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running
for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
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ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N.
ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE
ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents. G.R. No. 205033
June 18, 2013
FACTS
•
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2)
counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to
suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively,
which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order
commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge from Prison on March
18, 2009.
•
Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City, but was denied by Election
Registration Board, he then filed a petition before the MTCC. Pending the petition, he filed a COC as
a Mayor.
•
MTCC denied his petition, and the decision was affirmed by the RTC.
ISSUE
I.
Whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process; and
II.
Whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already
been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government
Code of 1991" (LGC).
RULING
I.
YES. It is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding
the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Thus,
the Court stated:
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice
to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself
bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to
other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law
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•
In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing
with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. Lest it be misunderstood,
while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC generally necessitates the exercise
of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12
or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on
account of final and executory judgments – as when a candidate’s disqualification to run for public
office is based on a final conviction – such exercise falls within the COMELEC’s administrative
functions, as in this case.
II.
NO. Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with
those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and
stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Section 40 (a) of the LGC
and Article 30 of RPC are reconciled.
•
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the
conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a)
of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from
the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to
run for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal.
•
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified
him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein
a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his
commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
•
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
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EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents. G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012
FACTS
•
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo)
filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny
due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior
to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible
for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same position.
•
COMELEC rendered a decision cancelling the COC of Lonzanida. Aratea took his oath of
office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC). On the same date, Aratea wrote the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as
Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification.
•
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18
February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out
of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in
the May 2010 elections.
•
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who
received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since
Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not
be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office
of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE
•
Whether Aratea (proclaimed Vice Mayor) or Antipolo (second- placer for Mayoral candidate)
is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
RULING
•
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at
all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
•
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility
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Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible
for said office.” The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties
and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, is found both in the Constitution and the law. After
being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible. One who has an
ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the
word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.
•
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. We quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:
As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already
ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the
list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission
En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of
Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc
resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on
the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by
final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other
words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in
law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor
Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest
number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
•
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified
to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.
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MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S.
TY, Respondents. G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009
FACTS
•
Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of material representation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty is a natural
born Filipino, being born in the Philippines by his Chinese citizen father and his Filipino citizen mother.
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America and became a citizen thereof and have been
residing in the U.S. for 25 years.
•
When Ty filed for his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007, he allegedly falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year and was
not a permanent resident of immigrant of any foreign country.
•
Japzon also alleged that, Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
but he never actually resided in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for a period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election. He further alleged that, even after the acquisition of Ty's Philippine
Citizenship, he continued to make trips to the USA. And that even though Ty had already took his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen
as proven by his travel records. He also had failed to renounce his foreign citizenship.
•
In Ty's answer, he admitted that he indeed was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to
work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. However, ty claimed that before he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he already performed the following acts:
1.
Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, an application for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship;
2.
On October 2, 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Philippine consulate General in Los Angeles;
3.
He applied for a Philippine Passport indicating his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and such application was approved;
4.
On March 8, 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his CTC from the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar and he had also registered as a voter in the said Municipality;
5.
He had again secured another CTC from the said Municipality on January 4, 2007;
6.
And finally, he executed a duly notarized Renunciation of his Foreign Citizenship on March
19, 2007.
•
And so, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship, and had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections.
•
During the pendency of the case, elections were already held and Ty had acquired the highest
number of votes and was declared as the Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
•
The COMELEC denied the petition for lack of merit. They held that Ty did not commit any
material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
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ISSUE
•
Whether or not Ty has complied with the residency requirement for elective position.
RULING
•
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position. It bears to
point that Republic Act. No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire
or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights
and liabilities under such circumstances.
•
Republic Act. No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, the said Act treats
citizenship independently of residence.
•
With that said, Ty's reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under the Republic Act No. 9225
had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. he could still retain his domicile in the
USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the said Municipal, becoming his
new domicile of choice.
•
How then could it be established that Ty indeed establish a new domicile in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar?
The principle of animus recertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to
return" to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has
been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom.
•
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous.
The term "residence" as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return.
•
To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions of juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote.
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TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,
Respondents. G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
FACTS
•
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August
8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to
a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
•
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as
the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
•
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen.
•
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She
lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
•
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M.
Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
•
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased
to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5 (2), and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship
ISSUE
•
Whether the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement.
RULING
•
NO. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already
deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.
•
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
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•
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a
foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an
attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of
the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise,
in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice,
may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court
is “satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held
to be a competent proof of that law.
•
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above
methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the
existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that
petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo
acted judiciously in disregarding the same.
•
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence
the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of
the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
•
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to
concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.
•
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a
person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August
29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
•
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual
citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.
•
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that
restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply therewith in accordance
with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek
elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible
to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
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GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents. G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009
FACTS
•
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
•
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed
that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from
the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Cordora concluded:
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance
on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is
not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
•
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
•
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same
arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE
•
WON there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an Election
Offense
RULING
•
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is
an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or
testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complain
•
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because
of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is
both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.
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•
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form
I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips
where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
•
Aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and
Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens
of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another
country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
•
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambunting’s naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements
of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent
upon citizenship.
•
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully
made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be
elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
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MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013
FACTS
•
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In
both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010
elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers
disqualification to run.
•
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010
elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC
en banc.
ISSUE
•
Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.
RULING
•
The petition is partly meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been
Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term
when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office
to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
•
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the
right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for
the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in
the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
•
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in
fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased
from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as
mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the
still then valid proclamation.
•
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
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BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998
FACTS
•
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988
for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon
the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he
was again re-elected as Mayor.
•
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve
for another term after that.
•
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion
for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.
ISSUE
•
WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
RULING
•
No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local
officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
•
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which
states that “…no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected….”
•
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an
elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he
is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have
fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
•
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
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SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.
TALABONG, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F.
ASILO, Respondents. G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
FACTS
•
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal
case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.
•
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought
to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term
limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160
ISSUE
•
Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for
a 4th term?
RULING
•
The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
•
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification
to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
functions of his office for a reason provided by law. Preventive suspension – whether under the Local
Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is an interim
remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or
criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt
or liability. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate
and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of
guilt or liability. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
•
Hence, the preventive suspension of public officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
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RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 147927 February 4, 2002
FACTS
•
Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their
COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.
•
Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he
was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he
again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the 1998
election.
•
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving
the unexpired term of office is considered as 1 term.
•
Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He
lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen,
thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
•
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
•
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”
ISSUE
•
WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive terms for mayor of Lucena City.
RULING
•
No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
•
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for
clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs
COMELEC).
•
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limits.
•
Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of
confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.
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VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy.
MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN
JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE
and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents. G.R. No.
154512 November 12, 2002
FACTS
•
COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of
Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
•
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
•
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the
disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground
that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having
served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately
prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
•
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And
COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
ISSUE
•
WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for
mayor in the recall election.
RULING
•
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
•
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”
•
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
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limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
•
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the
end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered
by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
•
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits
is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not
immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following
the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
•
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in
any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.
•
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate
re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
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ARSENIO A. LATASA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO
SUNGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003
FACTS
•
A mayor for 3 consecutive term of a municipality which became a city in the said mayor’s last
term is barred from running in the next preceding election if the said new city has the same territorial
jurisdiction when it was still a municipality.
•
Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was became
a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for
the May14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefore, and likewise disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo
M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition
to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner
Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos Citysince petitioner had already been elected and
served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa
filed his Answer, arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy
since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three
consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of
candidacy for the May14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the
post of city mayor.
ISSUE
•
WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly created city of Digos being the
mayor of Digos for 3 consecutive terms when it was still a municipality.
RULING
•
Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government
post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
•
In the present case, petitioner argued that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus, they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment
consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore,
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same
local government post. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
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government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
•
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for
three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as
their chief executive for nine years. The delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did
not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos.
•
T he framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
•
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to
be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it
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FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006
FACTS
•
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
•
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. The petition to
disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran
in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and
discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
•
The May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC
winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No.
6850 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte.
•
In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4 albeit
the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of
San Vicente
ISSUE
•
whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998
to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
RULING
•
YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule. For the
three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. With the view we take of the case, the
disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.
•
There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June
30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the
1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
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•
The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of
office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered
as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
•
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet,
Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who
“won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
•
However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled
by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The
absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
•
Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
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MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 149736.
December 17, 2002
FACTS
•
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:
(a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988
(b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
(c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994
and served up to 1995
(d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to1998
(e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
•
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in
the 14 May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
•
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s
election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution
ISSUE
•
Whether or not private respondent's incumbency to the post of governor following the recall
elections be included in determining the three--consecutive term limit fixed by law.
RULING
•
NO.
•
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves
the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.
•
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply,
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary
severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office
because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the
three‐term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local
official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.
•
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the
recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by the Constitution.
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•
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity
of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo
B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be
counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term
for the same position.
•
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would
in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes
cast.
NOTES
TO DISMISS
•
VITUG, J. (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.): The Constitution envisions a continuous and an
uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Not being a full term, a recall
term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior or subsequent
to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
•
MENDOZA, J., (QUISUMBING, J.): A term during which succession to a local elective office
takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local
official has served more than three consecutive terms. The Constitution excludes from the three-term
limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary
renunciation of the office by an incumbent. The period during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993 should not be counted. Since on
May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms,
his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position.
•
PANGANIBAN, J. (PUNO, J.): A recall term should not be considered as one full term, else if
would cut short the elected official's service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters' obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
In election cases, when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice
should be tilted in favor of the people's overwhelming choice.
•
AZCUNA, J. (BELLOSILLO, J.): The disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive
and the service is full and continuous.
TO GRANT
•
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.(DAVIDE, JR., C.J., AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and
CALLEJO, SR., JJ.): the recall term served by Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30,
1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995
to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and
contravenes Art. X, 8 of the Constitution. She voted to grant the petition and to declare respondent's
election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
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•
CARPIO, J., (CARPIO MORALES, J.): A recall term constitutes one term and that to totally
ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more
than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. Roman's
election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three- term limit imposed by the Constitution.
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Talaga Jr. V. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 169888, Nov. 11, 2008
FACTS:
Elan Recreation, Inc. filed criminal and administrative complaints against Mayor Ramon Talaga Jr. The
complaints "alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Lucena, had unlawfully
granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage
and prejudice of the complainants".
The administrative case was dismissed but the criminal charges were retained and filed by the Office
of the Special Prosecutor. Three informations were filed against Talaga Jr. in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. 3019. Later, only one of the informations was retained which alleges
that Talaga Jr. gave "unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy
Bang a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city". The prosecution moved for the petitioner's
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion. The petitioner, then, filed the present Petition for Certiorari with an
urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends, among other things, that the information do not constitute an offense. He
claims that under R.A. No. 3019, the law which he allegedly violated, the information must allege that
the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the government or private party."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against the petitioner is complete and constitutes the offense to
which he is being charged of.
RULING:
Yes. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information must allege that
the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the government or private party." The presence
of the word "or" clearly shows that there are two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First,
causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, and, Second, giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference. Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,30 the
Court ruled that violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
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1. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the validity or
sufficiency of allegations in an information, to wit:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him.
The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of
Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy
Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely,
granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in
violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
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Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)
FACTS:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup
d’état was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring
him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the
Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against
Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the
coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause
of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo
appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government.
Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner,
the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a
mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that
he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by
a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration
case moot and academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of
the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.
RULING:
1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative
case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
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most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the
acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to
the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner
of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court
had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power
of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP
337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)
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SALUMBIDES V. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 180917; APRIL 23, 2010)
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal
Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002, herein respondentsRicardo
Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian,all members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tagkawayan, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst
Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative
aspect of the case charged petitioners et al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA)
Rules and the Local Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the prayer to place
petitioners et al. under preventive suspension pending investigation. By Order dated February 1, 2005,
approved on April 11, 2005, it denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and Coleta,
both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the
case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason
and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of condonation applicable in this case?
RULING:
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconductto the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct,
if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the
condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot
be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to
uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion
of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed
coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be
the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold
appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged
with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee
of the elective official ahead of the latter actual reelection.
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor
of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently,
their infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners
fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in
ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their
imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.
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The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold
the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of
basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the
construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of
erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related
to upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action
without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it
appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon
the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability
for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside
from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the
expense, held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer
to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the
fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit.It added that current operating
expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the
conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year. DENIED.
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Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
FACTS:
The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite
the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption
of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there
thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since
a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is
extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of
the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
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Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence
of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance
of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
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De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)
FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that
the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn
S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The
CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the
Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would
warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
RULING:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law
and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following
grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion
Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing
collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of
other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
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Plaza v. CA G.R. No. 138464, 18 January 2008
FACTS:
A few months after his assumption as Governor of Agusan del Sur in 1992, petitioner Democrito O.
Plaza received separate administrative complaints against the following:
Tan for allegedly committed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Gilsano was
charged with neglect in the performance of duty, and Quismundo was allegedly committed a conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service Gilsano was charged with neglect in the performance of
duty, and Quismundo was allegedly liable for technical malversation, an act prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Pursuant to Book I, title Three, Section 86 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, Plaza issued Executive Order No. 01, series of 1992, creating a Provincial
Investigating Committee compose of the following petitioners:
Chairperson – Atty. Danilo Samson
Provincial Legal Officer
Secretary -
Ms. Fe Tan-Cebrian
Acting Provincial Personnel Officer
Member -
Hon. Virginia M. Getes
SP Member
Mr. Adulfo A. Llagas
Asst. Provincial Treasurer
Officer-in-charge
On various dates in October 1992, petitioner Samson, acting as Chairperson of the Administrative
Investigating Committee, notified private respondents of the administrative complaints. Private
respondents were required to answer in writing under oath within 72 hours from receipt together with
the affidavits of their witnesses, if any, and to state whether they would opt for a formal investigation
or would waive such right. Instead of filing their answers, private respondents filed separate Motions
to Inhibit/Dismiss seeking to inhibit Samson on the ground that he had no authority under the law to
conduct the administrative investigations because his appointment as Provincial Legal Officer had not
been acted upon by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur, which concurrence is of utmost
necessity to confer upon his appointment by the Provincial Governor the imprimatur of legality and
validity. Another issue raised by private respondents was that they could not expect to be given due
process and the cold neutrality of an impartial committee.
On October 26, 1992, Samson issued an Omnibus Order denying private respondents’ motions to
dismiss/inhibit.
On November 9, 1992, Plaza issued Memorandum Order Nos. 131-92 to 133-9214 ordering the
preventive suspension of private respondents for a period of 60 days effective upon receipt of the orders.
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Meantime, Resolution No. 11, Series of 199321 was issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur on February 11, 1993 reiterating the rejection of the appointment of Samson as
Provincial Legal Officer of the province for lack of the required 5-year law practice.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the suspension by Samson was valid
Whether or not employee are entitled to back wages
RULING:
YES. The CA opined that Samson’s authority as chairman of the PIC is not invalidated by the lack of
concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in his appointment as the Provincial Legal Officer.
Moreover, the preventive suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. It likewise ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
RTC was not a delay which would interrupt the running of the period of preventive suspension. Lastly,
the CA pronounced that to sanction preventive suspension pending resolution of an administrative case
is equivalent to indefinite suspension which the Constitution prohibits.
The preventive suspension of the private respondents is authorized by R.A. No. 7160. Section 85 (a) of
the LGC of 1991 states:
SEC. 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees. – (a) The local chief
executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days any subordinate official
or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee
under his authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves
pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
Clearly, the law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees
pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension given to private respondents cannot,
therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires
for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent
of the charges, but their suspension must likewise be unjustified.
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Atienza vs. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005
FACTS:
Ramon Atienza and Jose Villarosa were serving as the Vice-Governor and Governor of Occidental
Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, Governor Villarosa issued a memorandum that concerning the “Authority
to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of
the Sangguniang panlalawigan.” Vice-Governor Atienza argued that the authority to approve the
purchase orders of all the needs of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan are under the authority of the ViceGovernor as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Vice-Governor Atienza argued that the authority to Secs. 466 and 468 of the Local Government Code
already provides for the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branch. He also
reiterated that under this provision he has the authority to approve all transactions.
Respondent’s Arguments:
Governor Villarosa argues that in accordance to the provisions of DILG Opinion No. 148 allows him
to sign the Purchase Orders belongs to the local chief executive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Vice-Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with
the procurements of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
RULING:
Yes, it is under the authority of the Vice-Governor to is authorized to approve purchase orders issued
in connection with the procurements of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and
maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Under the Local Government Code provides that the
Vice-Governor
Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
Further, Sec. 344 of the same code provides that:
Sec 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers.- No money shall be disbursed unless the local
budget officer certifies to thee existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose,
the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability
of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the
department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and
legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water,
telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the GSIS, SSS,
LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the
disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are
disbursed.
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In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the officer nextin-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall be fully responsible therefor
In the above stated provision, it is said “vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the
head of the department who has administrative control of the fund concerned.” Being that the ViceGovernor is the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the position has administrative
control of the funds of the said body.
In the Manual on the New Government Accounting System for Local Government Units, Sec 2ffi
provides:
Sec. 3ffi. Approval of Disbursements.- Approval of disbursement by the Local Chief Executive (LCE)
himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed, except for regularyly recurring
administrative expenses such as: payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water,
telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR,
PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the DBM and others, where the authority to approve may be
delegated. Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sanggunian
shall be approved by the provincial Vice-Governor, the city Vicec-Mayor or the municipal Vice-Mayor,
as the case may be.
Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, it is implied that the Vice-Governor has the authority
to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated to the operation
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers as well as purchase
orders.
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People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008)
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.
On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against
Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the crime
charged.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed
in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its
part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election
shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the
court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal
qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law and
that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition
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imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee
possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction,
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding
temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.
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Sales v Carreon (G.R. No. 160791 February 13, 2007)
FACTS:
During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz of Dapitan City, running for reelection, was defeated by respondent Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. On June 1, 18 and 27, 2001, his last month
in office, then Dapitan City Mayor Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including those of herein petitioners.
On July 1, 2001, the newly elected Mayor, Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr., herein respondent, assumed office.
On July 2, 2001, respondent issued Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments
signed by his predecessor on the ground that the latter violated Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution No. 01-988 in relation to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2001, imposing a ban
on issuing appointments in the civil service during the election period. Thereupon, respondent
prohibited the release of the salaries and benefits of the 83 appointees. On July 10, 2001, Patricio Sales,
one of herein petitioners, in his capacity as president of the Dapitan City Government Employees
Association, wrote the CSC Regional Office No. IX requesting its ruling on the matter. On July 16 and
August 3, 2001, respondent sent the said Office a position paper justifying his action, contending that
the questioned appointments were not only issued in bulk but that there was no urgent need to fill those
positions. On August 17, 2001, the CSC Regional Office No. IX issued an Omnibus Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, all premises considered: The eighty-three (83)
appointments issued by then Mayor Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, including those issued by the herein
requesting parties, are, therefore not considered mass appointments, as defined under CSC Resolution
No. 01-0988 and are thus, VALID and EFFECTIVE. Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 and 2, Series of
2001, issued by Mayor Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr., are hereby declared NULL and VOID, and accordingly,
The LGU-Dapitan is hereby directed to pay the salaries and other emoluments to which the 83
appointments are entitled to pursuant to the appointments issued to them.
On appeal by respondent, the CSC En Banc, on June 17, 2002, issued Resolution No. 020828 reversing
the assailed Omnibus Order of the CSC Regional Office No. IX, thus: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Omnibus Order dated August 17, 2001 of the Civil Service Commission RegionalOffice
No. IX is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commission hereby rules, as follows: The approval of all
83 appointments issued by then Mayor J. Cedrick O. Ruiz is revoked for being violative of Republic
Act No. 7041, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18 s. 1988, as amended, CSC Resolution No. 963332
on its accreditation and CSC Resolution No. 01-0988.
All promoted employees are reverted to their previous position; and Memorandum Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Order No. 2 issued by incumbent Mayor Rodolfo H. Carreon, Jr. are hereby declared
null and void. The CSC En Banc held that the positions in question were published and declared vacant
prior to the existence of any vacancy. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in
Resolution No. 030049 dated January 16, 2003 by the CSC En Banc. On February 13, 2003, petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On September 16, 2003, the appellate court
rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, sustaining the CSCs finding that the positions to which
the petitioners were appointed were already reported and published even before they had been declared
vacant, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7041; [2] and that there was no first
level representative to the Personnel Section Board who should have participated in the screening of
candidates for vacancy in the first level. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.
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ISSUE:
W/N midnight appointments cause animosities between officials
RULING:
This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue midnight
appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause animosities
between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those
appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending heir appointments instead of attending to
their functions. However, not all midnight appointments are invalid. Each appointment must be judged
on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the individual appointment and the circumstances
surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing
administration and shown to have been made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances
departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has struck down midnight
appointments. It is State policy that opportunities for government employment shall be open to all
qualified citizens and employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and
assume the responsibilities of the positions. It was precisely in order to ensure transparency and equal
opportunity in the recruitment and hiring of government personnel, that Republic Act No. 7041 was
enacted. Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Duty of Personnel Officers. It shall be the duty of all Chief Personnel or Administrative Officers
of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters, and local government units, to post in three (3)
conspicuous places of their offices for a period ten (10) days a complete list of all existing vacant
positions in their respective offices which are authorized to be filled, and to transmit a copy of such list
and the corresponding qualification standards to the Civil Service Commission not later than the tenth
day of every month. Vacant positions shall not be filled until after publication: Provided, however, that
vacant and unfilled positions that are: a) primarily confidential; b) policy-determining; c) highly
technical; d) co-terminous with that of the appointing authority; or e) limited to the duration of a
particular project, shall be excluded
from the list required by law.
SEC. 3. Publication of Vacancies. The Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission shall
publish once every quarter a complete list of all the existing vacant positions in the Government
throughout the country, including the qualification standards required for each position and, thereafter,
certify under oath to the completion of publication. Copies of such publication shall be sold at cost to
the public and distributed free of charge to the various personnel office of the government where they
shall be available for inspection by the public: Provided, That said publication shall be posted by the
Chief Personnel or Administrative Officer of all local government units in at least three (3) public and
conspicuous places in their respective municipalities and provinces: Provided, further, That any vacant
position published therein shall be open to any qualified person who does not necessarily belong to the
same office with the vacancy or who occupies a position next-in-rank to the vacancy: Provided, finally,
That the Civil Service Commission shall not act on any appointment to fill up a vacant position unless
the same has been reported to and published by the Commission. The foregoing provisions are clear
and need no interpretation. The CSC is required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such
publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units
in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they
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have been reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication. Here, the publication of vacancies
was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant. Clearly, respondents action
violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041 cited earlier. Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level
representative appointed to the Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the appointments to
first-level positions. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended, provides that the
Personnel.
Selection Board shall be composed of the following:
a. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel management;
b. Representative of management;
c.d. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office, department, or
division where the vacancy is;
Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the first-level and one (1) for the second-level,
who shall both be chosen by duly registered/accredited employees association in the department or
agency. The former shall sit during the screening of candidates for vacancy in the first-level, while the
latter shall participate in the screening of candidates for vacancy in the second level. In case where there
is no employees association in the department or agency, the representative shall be chosen at large by
the employees through a general election to be called for the purpose. Petitioners admitted that after the
retirement on April 22, 2000 of Beltran Faconete, the first-level representative to the Personnel
Selection Board, no other first-level representative to replace him was chosen by the Dapitan City
Government Employees Association. Yet, the city government Personnel Selection Board proceeded to
deliberate and recommend the appointments of applicants to the 43 first-level positions. Petitioners
contend, however, that although there was no such representative, the action of the Board is still valid.
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LIZA M. QUIROG and RENE L. RELAMPAGOS vs. GOVERNOR ERICO B.
AUMENTADO, G.R. No. 163443 November 11, 2008
FACTS:
On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos permanently appointed Liza M.
Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture
(PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Resolution No.
2001-1991 on June 1, 2001. The Order pointed out that the prohibition against the issuance of midnight
appointments was already laid down as early as February 29, 2000 in CSC Resolution No. 000550.
They argued that the subject appointment cannot be considered a midnight appointment because it was
made days before the expiration of Relampagos term, and that Quirog was already the acting Provincial
Agriculturist a year prior to said appointment or since June 19, 2000. Quirog had already taken her oath
of office, assumed her duties and collected her salary for the month of June, 2001, she had already
acquired a legal right to the position in question, which cannot be taken away from her either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. In
a decision dated July 23, 2001, the CSCROVII denied Quirogs and Relampagos motion for
reconsideration for lack of legal personality to file such pleading, citing Section 2, Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998. Even if Relampagos was the one who appointed
Quirog, he could not file a motion for reconsideration because his term as governor ha already expired.
The CSC also declared that the appointment of Quirog was not a midnight appointment as it was not
hurriedly issued nor did it subvert the policies of the incoming administration. Aumentado He insisted
that Quirogs appointment was a midnight appointment. Aumentado added that the selection board
which screened Quirogs qualifications was not validly constituted and that the subject appointment was
made more than six months from the time it was published on July 23, 2000 in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 0101142[17] dated January 10, 2001. Aumentado insisted that Relampagos made 97,
not 46, mass appointments on the eve of his term, 95 of which were invalidated by the CSC Bohol Field
Office and two, including that of Quirog, by the CSCROVII.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appointment of Quirog was a midnight appointment.
RULING:
The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond dispute
that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the subject position for a
year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently
appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more
than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog
had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for
said position to be permanently filled up. A careful evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the
issuance of the appointment of Quirog shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of
former Governor Relampagos which characterizes a midnight appointment. There is also wanting in the
records of the case the subversion by the former governor of the policies of the incumbent Governor
Erico Aumentado as a logical consequence of the issuance of Quirogs appointment by the latter. Both
elements are the primordial considerations by the Supreme Court when it laid down its ruling in
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prohibiting midnight appointments in the landmark case of Aytona vs Castillo, et. al. In any event,
respondent
Governor Aumentado, in a Memorandum3[36] dated March 4, 2003, has reinstated Quirog to the
permanent position of PGDH-OPA. Such act of respondent bespeaks of his acceptance of the validity
of Quirogs appointment and recognition that indeed, the latter is qualified for the subject position.
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MONTUERTO V. TY AND SANGGUNIANBAYAN, G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008
FACTS:
March 17, 1992, Montuerto was issued an appointment as Municipal Budget Officer by then Mayor
Supremo Sabitsana of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. On March 24, 1992, her appointment was
approved as permanent by Gerardo Corder, Acting Civil Service Commission Field Officer.
January 14, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Almeria, Biliran a Resolution entitled "A Resolution
Requesting the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, to Revoke the Appointment of Mrs. Melanie
P. Montuerto, Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of Almeria, Biliran for Failure to Secure
the Required Concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan."
Municipality of Almeria, Biliran submitted the 201 file of Montuerto to Civil Service Commission
Regional Office(CSCRO) which showed that her appointment lacked the required concurrence of the
sanggunian. On the other hand, Montuerto submitted to the same office a Joint-Affidavit by the majority
of the members of the Sangguniang Bayan which reads:
Since the regular session focused on the deliberations regarding the municipal budget, the concurrence
on the appointment of Municipal Budget Officer Melanie P. Montuerto was not highlighted and the
concurrence was inadvertently omitted in the Minutes of the Regular Session for 2 March 1992. But,
we can still fully recall that there was really a verbal concurrence on the appointment of Municipal
Budget Officer Melanie P. Montuerto x x x.
CSC Regional Office issued an order recalling the appointment of Montuerto on the ground that it
lacked the required concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Montuerto moved for reconsideration. Before resolving the motion, CSCRO invited Marcelo Maceda,
Jr., incumbent SB Secretary, to appear and bring with him any document showing that Montuerto's
appointment as Municipal Budget Officer had been submitted to the SB for concurrence.
Maceda issued a Certification which reads:
This is to certify that as per records kept on file by this office, there is no record that would show that
the appointment of Mrs. Melanie P. Montuerto, as Municipal Budget Officer of Almeria, Biliran was
submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for concurrence from June 1992 up to the present. However, the
SB minutes of the March 2, 1992 regular session pointed out the presence of a budget officer who
explained fully the details of the 1992 Municipal Annual Budget of Almeria, Biliran.
1. Likewise, Maceda submitted a copy of the SB Minutes of the regular session
held on March 2, 1992.
2. CSCRO No. VIII denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
7. CSC Central Office dismissed Montuerto’s appeal.
8. CA denied the appeal for lack of merit.
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ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of Montuerto as Municipal Budget Officer, without the written concurrence
of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the CSC and after the appointee had served as such for almost
ten years without interruption, can still be revoked by the Commission?
RULING:
YES.
a. The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of the Local Government Code, the head of a
department or office in the municipal government, such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be
appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members subject
to civil service law, rules and regulations.
b. Per records, the appointment of Montuerto was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for its
concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. Such factual finding of quasijudicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is deemed final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal by this Court.
c. Moreover, the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian is not
the concurrence required under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or
an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply
with the mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid
appointment, Montuerto acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even if she
had served as such for ten years.
d. Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.
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The Provincial Government of Aurora vs. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015, 757
SCRA 222.
FACTS:
Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative
Development Specialist II on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the
Province. On June 28, 2004, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted
to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora (the Field Office). Annexed to Marco's
appointment papers was a certification from Provincial Budget Officer Norma R. Clemente (Provincial
Budget Officer Clemente) and Provincial Accountant Wilfredo C. Saturno (Provincial Accountant
Saturno) stating that funds from the Province's 2004 Annual Budget were available to cover the position.
Due to the recall of the certification of the availability of funds, the Field Office disapproved Marco's
appointment in the Letter 12 dated July 5, 2004.
The Province, through Human Resource Management Officer Liwayway G. Victorio, served Marco a
copy of the Letter dated July 5, 2004. Marco was, thus, advised to refrain from reporting for work
beginning July 8, 2004, the day he received notice of the disapproval of his appointment.
Marco wrote the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (Regional Office), moving for the
reconsideration of the disapproval of his appointment. The Regional Office, however, denied
reconsideration in its Decision dated April 6, 2005 and affirmed the disapproval of Marco's
appointment.
Through the Letter dated May 17, 2005, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission. The
Province, through its Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of Marco's Letter on May
23, 2005. However, it failed to comment on the appeal within 10 days from receipt as required by
Section 73 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In the Resolution dated April 14, 2008, the Civil Service Commission granted Marco's appeal and set
aside the Regional Office's Decision dated April 6, 2005. It ruled that Marco's appointment was valid
since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds. As to the Letter withdrawing the
certification, the Civil Service Commission ruled that it did not affect the validity of Marco's
appointment because the Province "failed to submit documentary evidence to support its claim [that it
had no funds to pay for the services of Governor Ong's appointees]."
Thus, the Civil Service Commission ordered the Regional Office to investigate whether Provincial
Budget Officer Clemente and Provincial Accountant Saturno were administratively liable for certifying
that funds were available to cover the positions filled by Governor Ong's appointees but subsequently
withdrawing this certification. It ordered the Field Office to reflect the Resolution in Marco's
appointment papers and in his Service Record.
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The Province received a copy of the April 14, 2008 Resolution on May 21, 2008.
On July 22, 2008, Provincial Administrator Alex N. Ocampo (Provincial Administrator Ocampo), on
behalf of the Province, filed before the Civil Service Commission a Petition for Relief on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. According to him, the Civil Service Commission deprived the Province of an
opportunity to be heard when it failed to implead the Province as an indispensable party. He reiterated
that Marco's appointment was void since the Province had no funds to pay for Marco's salaries.
The Civil Service Commission denied outright the Petition for Relief. It ruled that Provincial
Administrator Ocampo had no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief absent an authorization
from the Provincial Governor. Moreover, a petition for relief was not allowed under the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Thus, Provincial Administrator Ocampo erred in filing a
Petition for Relief.
Provincial Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, this time with a written authority
to file from Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo annexed to the Motion.
The Civil Service Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that its April 14, 2008
Resolution had become final and executory considering that the Province did not file a motion for
reconsideration of this Resolution within the reglementary period.
Consequently, Marco requested the Civil Service Commission to implement the April 14, 2008
Resolution, which the Commission granted.
Provincial Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash
"Execution," arguing that the April 14, 2008 Resolution had already been implemented. As the Civil
Service Commission had ordered, the Province reflected the April 14, 2008 Resolution in Marco's
appointment papers and in his Service Record.
The Civil Service Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash
"Execution." It noted that the Province still refused to reinstate Marco despite the April 14, 2008
Resolution and thus clarified that this Resolution necessarily resulted in the approval of Marco's
appointment and his reinstatement as Cooperative Development Specialist II.
A Petition for Review under Rule 43 with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order was filed
before the Court of Appeals. For the first time, the Province argued that Marco was a midnight appointee
since Governor Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her tenure. Therefore, Marco's
appointment was void.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review and affirmed the implementation of the Civil
Service Commission's April 14, 2008 Resolution.
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The Court of Appeals ruled that the April 14, 2008 Resolution already became final and executory since
there was no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period. Although the Province
filed a Petition for Relief before the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals held that the
remedy of a petition for relief is not allowed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. Moreover, the Province failed to prove the extrinsic fraud that allegedly prevented it from
filing a motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Civil Service Commission correctly denied the Petition
for Relief.
On the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed Marco's appointment.
The Province filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Relief is allowed under civil service rules.
RULING:
No. The Province erred in filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals, as no appeal may be taken from
an order of execution. Instead, it should have filed a petition for certiorari — the appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, should have dismissed the Province's appeal outright. Rule 50, Section
1 (i) of the Rules of Court allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal where the order appealed
from is not appealable.
The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments. Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is removed from the power and
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it." The
judgment remains immutable even if it is later on discovered to be erroneous. The doctrine "is grounded
on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error,
the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to
amend final [and executory] judgments will result in endless litigation."
The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to decisions rendered by the Civil Service
Commission. A decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory if no motion
for reconsideration is filed within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule VI, Section 80 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service:
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Section 80. Execution of Decision. — The decisions of the Commission Proper or its Regional Offices
shall be immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, in which case the execution of the decision shall be held in
abeyance.
In this case, the Province, through its Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of the
Civil Service Commission's April 14, 2008 Resolution on May 21, 2008. Thus, the Province had until
June 5, 2008 to file a motion for reconsideration.
However, the Province failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the April 14, 2008 Resolution within
the 15-day reglementary period. With no motion for reconsideration seasonably filed, the April 14, 2008
Resolution became final and executory on June 6, 2008.
In addition, the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment is not among those provided under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This means that the remedy is not allowed
under civil service rules. Even assuming that a petition for relief may be filed before the Civil Service
Commission, the party must show that the assailed judgment became final through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence.
Here, the Province failed to refute that it received a copy of the Civil Service Commission's April 14,
2008 Resolution. It was given an opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of administrative due
process. It did not even justify why it failed to file a motion for reconsideration despite its receipt of the
Civil Service Commission's Resolution. Contrary to the Province's claim, there was no extrinsic fraud
since the Province was not prevented "from fully and fairly presenting its defense”. The Civil Service
Commission correctly denied the Province's Petition for Relief.
Since the April 14, 2008 Resolution already became final and executory, it may no longer be reversed.
The Civil Service Commission correctly granted Marco's request for the Resolution's implementation.
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MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
FACTS:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due
to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to “decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient
access to the mass transport system.” The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the power to direct operators to
abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s
power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the PreTrial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDA’s
power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to
abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3)
provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should
they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this
time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the
MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s
and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public
Service Act. MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or
orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To
them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department
apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. And petitioners maintain that
the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and
to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add
that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing
officials, but not between third persons.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination It cannot be gainsaid that
the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean,
among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that
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[they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s] enforcement."
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private investment
in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also
tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases
at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC
which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development
and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the
Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O.
No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies
concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA
is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been
validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power
requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing
the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on
national roads. Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least,
a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the
people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the
exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed
immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however,
impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened In the subject ordinances, however, the scope
of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be
able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Finally, an
order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service
Act. Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the LTFRB) was empowered to "impose
such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests
and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates
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the LTFRB to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable
extension of its existing facilities.
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MMDA v Garin (G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005)
FACTS:
One day, Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05
August 1995. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s validity (which is 48 hours from date of
apprehension), the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
the return of his driver’s license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Since
there was no reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction in
Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the
provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers
granted to it bySec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of
fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the
judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. The MMDA also refuted
Garin’s allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy making body of the
petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. ActNo. 7924 and directed
the court’s attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995which
authorizes confiscation of driver’s licenses upon issuance of a TVR.
Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95- 001,
as he claims that it was passed by the Metro ManilaCouncil in the absence of a quorum.On 23 October
1995, the RTC granted the preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered the MMDA to return the
respondent's driver’s license. On 14 August 1997, the RTC rendered the decision in favor of the
respondent.Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented MemorandumCircular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the
Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT,
which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers’ licenses
as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists within redeemed TVRs were given
seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license
or vehicle platesAlthough this case was considered as moot and academic by the implementation of
Memorandum Circular No. 04,Series of 2004, the Supreme Court believed that it was but proper to
address the current issue for the proper implementation of the petitioner's future programs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, which created the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the MMDA to confiscate and suspend or
revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations?
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RULING: By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the case of Metro Manila Development Authority
v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power,
let alone legislative power, and that all of its functions are administrative in nature.
Police power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Thus, as held in the
aforementioned case, . . . “[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the
Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of
the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:..” Although
petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration
and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, it still needs a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but
not enact, ordinances. Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
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Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005)
FACTS: This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo,
and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying,
for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through
Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. The
petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the territorial
jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be
constructed in Watershed reservation Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of
Province of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term
of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A temporary restraining order was then filed.
Although petitioners did not raised the question that the project was not consulted and approved by their
appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the
dump site’s permanent closure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..
RULING: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No.
635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code,
which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that
it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdiction." Likewise Section requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by
government authorities and the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in
Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Section
2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the
temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the
ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade
made by
the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would
oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
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Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants
the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of th(e) Code.” These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources
products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance;
[Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within
the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating
the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with
the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services
and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
…providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and
watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ….and,
subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water
supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and
reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the
consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.
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