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Foreign Aid and Emerging Powers
Current debates on emerging powers as foreign aid donors often fail to examine
the myriad geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural tensions that influence
policies of Official Development Assistance (ODA).
This book advocates a regional geopolitical approach to explaining donor–
donor relationships and provides a multidisciplinary critical assessment of the
contemporary debates on emerging powers and foreign aid, bringing together
economic and geopolitical approaches in the light of the 2015 completion of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Moving away from established debates assessing the advantages and
disadvantages of foreign aid, this book challenges the current geopolitical
assumptions of the emerging powers concerning issues such as ‘South–South’
solidarity, shared development experience and ‘multipolarity’. It analyses how
donor governments ‘sell’ aid to recipients through enabling different cultural
assumptions and soft power narratives of national identity, and provides empirical
evidence on agendas such as aid effectiveness, aid for trade, public–private
partnerships and green growth aid. The text examines the role of, and relationships
between, the leading traditional and emerging-power Asian donors specifically,
and explores the different and contested perspectives and patterns of ODA policy
through an alternative account of emerging-power foreign aid to leading African
and Asian recipients.
This book provides a valuable resource for postgraduate students and
practitioners across disciplines such as development economics and geopolitics of
development, uniquely approaching the debate from the perspective of emerging
powers and donors.
Iain Watson is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Development
and Cooperation, Graduate School of International Studies, Ajou University,
South Korea. He was visiting fellow at the Centre on Migration, Policy and
Society (COMPAS), Oxford University, UK, from January to March 2013.
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Routledge Explorations in Development Studies
This Development Studies series features innovative and original research at the
regional and global scale.
It promotes interdisciplinary scholarly works drawing on a wide spectrum of
subject areas, in particular politics, health, economics, rural and urban studies,
sociology, environment, anthropology, and conflict studies.
Topics of particular interest are globalization; emerging powers; children and
youth; cities; education; media and communication; technology development;
and climate change.
In terms of theory and method, rather than basing itself on any orthodoxy, the
series draws broadly on the tool kit of the social sciences in general, emphasizing
comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes, and the application of
qualitative and quantitative methods.
The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid
Erik Lundsgaarde
Social Protection in Developing
Countries
Reforming systems
Katja Bender, Markus Kaltenborn and
Christian Pfleiderer
Formal Peace and Informal War
Security and development in Congo
Zoё Marriage
Technology Development Assistance for
Agriculture
Putting research into use in low income
countries
Norman Clark, Andy Frost, Ian Maudlin
and Andrew Ward
Statelessness and Citizenship
Camps and the creation of political space
Victoria Redclift
Governance for Pro-Poor Urban
Development
Lessons from Ghana
Franklin Obeng-Odoom
Nationalism, Law and Statelessness
Grand illusions in the Horn of Africa
John R. Campbell
HIV and East Africa
Thirty years in the shadow of an
epidemic
Janet Seeley
Evaluation Methodologies for Aid in
Conflict
Ole Winckler Andersen, Beate Bull and
Megan Kennedy-Chouane
Digital Technologies for Democratic
Governance in Latin America
Opportunities and risks
Anita Breuer and Yanina Welp
Governance Reform in Africa
International and domestic pressures and
counter-pressures
Jérôme Bachelard
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Economic Development and Political
Action in the Arab World
M. A. Mohamed Salih
Development and Welfare Policy in
South Asia
Gabriele Koehler and Deepta Chopra
Confronting Land and Property
Problems for Peace
Shinichi Takeuchi
Socio-Economic Insecurity in Emerging
Economies
Building new spaces
Khayaat Fakier and Ellen Ehmke
Foreign Aid and Emerging Powers
Asian perspectives on official development
assistance
Iain Watson
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Foreign Aid and Emerging
Powers
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Asian perspectives on official
development assistance
Iain Watson
Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2014
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2014 Iain Watson
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The right of Iain Watson to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Watson, Iain.
Foreign aid and emerging powers : Asian perspectives on official
development assistance / Iain Watson.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Economic assistance, Chinese 2. Economic assistance, Indian.
3. Economic assistance, Russian. 4. Economic assistance, Japanese.
I. Title.
HC60.W348 2014
338.91´5–dc23 2014000432
ISBN13: 978-0-415-72707-5 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978-1-315-85565-3 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by HWA Text and Data Management, London
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Contents
List of tables
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
viii
ix
xiv
1
1 The contemporary foreign aid debate and emerging powers
34
2 International relations perspectives: emerging powers and
the contemporary geopolitics of Asia
65
3 Geopolitics and Asian donors: China, Japan and South Korea
in Africa
103
4 Asian ODA: assessing emerging donors in the Asian region
152
5 Emerging powers, Asian foreign aid and the greening
of geopolitics
186
6 From aid effectiveness to public–private partnerships:
new agendas in Asian ODA
217
7 Conclusion
244
Index
248
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Tables
0.1
0.2
1.1
1.2
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
5.1
5.2
Top ten major recipients of individual DAC members’ aid as
a percentage of total DAC donor ODA 2001–2002
Top ten major recipients of individual DAC members’ aid as
a percentage of total OECD-DAC donor ODA 2011–2012
Top 5 recipients of net ODA per capita in 2011
Individual country DAC members’ net official ODA in 2012
Peer review of Japan’s aid: Japan’s 2010 list of top ten recipients
and gross ODA in $million
Japanese ODA to top five recipients classified as technical
assistance to Africa in $million
Total amount of Japanese ODA to sub-Saharan African top 10
recipients in 2010 in $million
Japan’s total bilateral disbursements of ODA to sub-Saharan Africa
from 2008 to 2011 in $million
South Korea’s ODA to sub-Saharan Africa between 2006 and
2010 inclusive
Comparison of South Korean and OECD-DAC priority sectoral aid
as a percentage of total bilateral aid in 2012
OECD-DAC total bilateral ODA received by sector in $million
Leading donors to Asian states (2010)
Top ODA recipients in 2011 in $million
Top ten net bilateral donor disbursements to Asia 2010–2011
Top ten donors to Asia as a percentage of each donor’s net bilateral
disbursements of ODA 2010–2011
South Korean bilateral ODA to Asia 2004–2008 and 2009–2010
gross disbursements in $million
Carbon emission ton per capita (2008); percentage of GDP for
sectors of education, health, and research and development
Leading countries for green patents as the average percentage of
world inventions (2002–2007)
3
3
47
49
110
120
120
122
123
127
127
154
154
154
161
176
196
197
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Preface
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline of 2015 is fast approaching
and questions are being raised as to what happens after this. Can we glean, for
instance, any indications from the current debates on aid, as to what global aid
policy (and institutions) will look like after 2015? Questions raised have been
who will be the main donors, and will we see a different aid approach, and if so,
what will it look like and contain? Initiatives such as ‘aid effectiveness’ are now,
it seems, part and parcel of what many commentators have come to regard as a
sign of a ‘new geography of aid’ or an Aid 2.0 paradigm. One of the trends over
the last few years or so has been that the MDG advocates have tended to focus
more and more on the ‘eradication of disease’ (MDG 6) as evidence of success.
Perhaps, this is because MDG 6 is relatively easy to quantify on the MDG
target ‘scorecard’. But this is not the whole story. The MDGs were, themselves,
conceived in a very different world of aid policy and underlying assumptions as
to the site and nature of development and poverty and their relationship. One of
these, a long-term assumption, was that poverty eradication would be achieved by
economic development, and that development was primarily achieved by Official
Development Assistance (ODA), and a mix of state and market policies, albeit
with different emphases by the different economic schools.
At the 2005 Group of Eight (G8) ‘Make Poverty History’ meeting, stateled foreign aid (or ODA) was primarily regarded as the remit of the developed
nations and the ‘best’ aid came from the blue-chip Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECDDAC). Now many of these nations find themselves in a climate of economic
austerity and debt. As a result, donor governments are now rebranding their aid
as a form of ‘soft power’ to be ‘from the people’ (rather than the government) in
an attempt to justify taxpayers money going overseas and to leverage influence
over recipient nations by a narrative of ‘reciprocity’ and global ‘inclusivity’.
This of course does not mean that ‘charity stops at the borders’. On the contrary,
private donations to charities are generally stable and there is also the increasing
influence of the so-called ‘new philanthropy’ and the role of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs). However, commonly held assumptions of who gives aid
and who receives aid are changing. The so-called ‘new geography of aid’ approach,
rightly in my view, moves us away from the idea that rich nations provide to poor
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x
Preface
nations, particularly when poverty (and different forms of poverty) is observed
in both developed and emerging nations. As a result, the rise of the emerging
powers during the 2000s, whether by design or coincidence, has led to a number
of questions over the future of the more Western dominated aid architecture.
Moreover, on reflection of their own development experience from many of
the emerging nations, many recipient states are beginning to question whether
they actually need aid, and if so, whether it would be better to receive aid from
those donor countries who themselves had this ‘shared experience’. Certainly,
the rhetoric of ‘South–South’ relations, ‘development partnership(s)’ and ‘noninterference’ from the emerging-power donors, is something that many recipient
governments find particularly attractive.
Moreover, there is an increasing view that rather than relying on aid, recipient
countries might be even better off by allying with the more powerful emerging
nations for a fairer (and freer) global trading system. Yet it is also the nature of
this allying between recipients and emerging-power donors that is impacted upon
by the underlying regional geopolitics of these inter (and intra) emerging-power
relationships.
In this respect, it should come as no real surprise, perhaps, that the literature
on emerging powers has focused on this new group of emerging-power countries
as potential alternatives to the more mainstream aid policies and those countries
which now have financial resources and geopolitical leverage. This has also
brought about a controversy regarding how emerging-powers aid is to be
measured and compared with ‘traditional’ or ‘mainstream aid’. For some, this all
represents a ‘seismic shift’ in global politics, whilst for others this has been a new
revitalisation of a ‘third world solidarity’ not based on ideology but, rather, on the
promoting the values of pragmatic development cooperation, mutual benefit, and
mutual respect for national sovereignty and non-interference.
However, in my view, what seems to be missing in the current literature
concerns an explanation of the strategic and cultural tensions within and
between the emerging powers. These relationships are dependent not only on the
sustainability of domestic economic growth but also on how the relationships
between donors and states are impacted upon by specific regional dynamics. This
regional relationship is reflected in how states market and ‘sell’ their ODA not as a
tool of foreign policy per se (this is a pretty much established argument) but rather
that ODA itself generates particular versions of national identity. As a result, the
narratives and interests involved with the construction of national identity also
affect the regional relations between donor states.
Ultimately, this means that the assumptions regarding ‘shared experience’,
‘South–South’ solidarity and how emerging powers are promoting (and reflecting)
multipolar diversity, also mean that questions concerning what is the nature and
content of this experience (and whose narrative of experience, solidarity and
diversity) are left unexplored.
Such questions have also been influenced by my own experience living and
working in South Korea. At the time of South Korea’s accession to the OECDDAC in 2010, as well as the hosting of the 2010 G20 and the later 2011 Busan High-
Preface xi
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level Talks on Aid Effectiveness, South Korean Official Development Assistance
(ODA) was placed into a narrative of national pride and national identity. Phrases
often used were South Korea’s ‘rise from the ashes of war’ and its miracle ascent
‘from recipient to donor’. South Korean pride in the installation of Ban Ki-moon
as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, and Korean-American Jim Yong
Kim as new World Bank Group President, in relatively quick succession, was
often manifested during the daily Seoul primary school runs where many school
buses had daubed on their sides slogans such as ‘future UN Secretary-Generals
on board’.
Asian donors
The book considers firstly, how the different dynamics of regional geopolitics
can directly and indirectly affect donor–donor relationships and how these
dynamics impact on donor–recipient relationships both within and outside the
region; secondly, how the activities of the emerging powers are juxtaposed,
superimposed and can act as a supplementary to these regional dynamics; thirdly,
the ‘rise of the BRICs’ which has somewhat tended to monopolise the emergingpowers agenda on foreign aid and its analyses. Whilst these groupings have been
identified in the literature, discussions concerning the strategic tensions between
these groups have yet to be placed within a conceptual framework. I have felt for
a while that the assumption of geopolitical ‘seismic shifts’ in the international
system (or multipolarity) has mistaken a particular post-2008 crisis moment for
a universal or evolutionary (albeit non-linear) understanding of the international
state system. Moreover, issues concerning the different contents and forms of
multipolarity from a regional perspective and how these impact on inter-state
relations can, I suggest, be further explored. The debates on emerging powers
and their distribution and forms of ODA can (and should) take into account the
growing economic imbalances, as well as political and cultural transformations,
within and between the emerging-powers nations. These dynamics also directly
and indirectly impact on their regional and geopolitical relations. That is, there
is some anxiety in many Asian donor states, concerning whether to ‘change
direction’ from a development model that has been so successful in the past.
Such strategic decisions on domestic development sustainability are crucial
for a donor’s ODA credibility and its domestic public support. Moreover, such
dynamics also directly and indirectly affect inter-state relations and policies that
impact on natural resource and economic trade issues.
Therefore, I have used my own background in International Relations (IR) theory
to argue that the policies and strategies of emerging powers take place not in some
abstract vacuum but within specific geopolitical and often regional geopolitical
dynamics. It is rightly pointed out that foreign aid reflects geopolitical patterns but
the book asks how and why and what kind of geopolitical patterns. These patterns
might suggest that ODA is either integral or a supplement to foreign policy, as a
‘loss leader’ or a testing of the waters of diplomacy as a way to outsmart donor
competitors to make sure the donor competition is reduced in a ‘winner takes
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xii
Preface
all’. A policy of ODA in recipient countries therefore represents, both directly
and indirectly, a microcosm of the dynamics of regional geopolitics between the
donors. These policies can also impact on the donor–donor relationships and their
position (and perceptions of that position) with respect to the neighbouring states
in the region.
The book will specifically consider the role of Asian emerging nations (China),
established middle powers (Japan) and new middle powers (South Korea). The
book considers the controversies as to whether aid from emerging powers can be
counted as ‘aid’ or whether aid is new or old, or a global ‘good’ or global ‘bad’.
However the book also considers why these controversies are occurring in the first
place and how these controversies implicitly link to a donor state’s own perception
of itself as a donor with a particular national identity and role. The justification
for this choice of Asian donors in the book is as follows. Firstly, that Asia is a
rapidly developing region with key mainstream and non-mainstream donor states
that all have their own direct (but different) experiences as foreign aid recipients
and now as donors. China and Japan are the second and third most economically
powerful nations in the world, and South Korea is emerging as a new middle
power. Secondly, leading Asian donor states have very different historical and
contemporary national models of economic, political and cultural development.
These models (and their sustainability) impact on how the donors ‘export’ their
development experience and gain credibility from this. Thirdly, the three major
Asian donor nations represent the different geopolitical forms of state as discussed
in my argument. China is a BRIC, South Korea is described as a ‘next 11’ new
middle power, and Japan is regarded as an established middle power and former
regional hegemon. These particular ‘brandings’ influence donor relationships
and donor–recipient relationships in the context of South–South relations and
different approaches to issues of ‘multipolarity’ and ‘solidarity’. Fourth, each
state represents different temporal and historical stages in foreign aid. Japan is a
long-term mainstream donor. China is a long-term donor but not an OECD-DAC
donor, whilst South Korea is a relatively new donor. South Korea and Japan are
both OECD-DAC members whilst China is not. Interrelated questions raised in
the book include:
•
•
•
•
How do the geopolitical dynamics between the principle Asian states directly
or indirectly link to their aid strategies and approaches?
How do the regional geopolitical dynamics between the Asian states as
donors or as traditional or emerging powers directly or indirectly impact on
ODA donor–recipient relationships?
Why and how do Asian donor states ‘sell’ their ODA to particular recipients?
What are the principal contents, types and forms of Asian donor aid?
The term Asian perspectives, therefore, is deliberately provocative but aims at
opening up questions concerning the relationship between identity and geopolitics
from a regional and emerging-powers approach. The book, therefore, acknowledges
the fundamental fluidity of regional boundaries and regional identity, currently, in
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Preface xiii
the post-Cold War era, being redrawn as a result of the rise of China, the US pivot
or rebalance (and their cool war), India’s ‘look East’ approach, the ‘Japan is back’
narrative, and South Korea being promoted as global Korea. Moreover, the role of
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and south Asia is being regarded
as the ‘new Great Game’ (along with Central Asia) which all unpacks a variety
of assumptions and perceptions of where continental and maritime Asia spatially
and temporally begins and ends. With emerging Asian driver interest in the Arctic
as well as ‘multiculturalism in Asia’ and debates over new trade initiatives such
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a fluidity in defining the borders, identities
and contours of the region as Asia or Asia-Pacific is very much underway. The
book also considers Asian ODA in the context of a number of newly debated
perspectives across the region (and domestically) with regard to the environment
and the role of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs), which I will argue have now
become increasingly more central to Asian ODA. Indeed what was once thought
to be the ‘next stage’ in aid policy or ‘aid effectiveness’ has become increasingly
problematic and a fifth high-level conference on aid effectiveness has, at the time
of writing, yet to be arranged due to the financial difficulties among the major aid
donor stakeholders and institutions.
I am grateful to my institution Ajou University in South Korea for providing
funding to present research work in Busan, Los Angeles, Seoul, Durham and
Oxford. My thanks also goes to all my graduate students from across the subSaharan African region and South Asia, who came to South Korea to learn about
the ‘miracle on the Han’, and who have provided me with much intellectual
sustenance and a fascinating learning experience.
My love and gratitude, as always, go to my wife Yuseon Yu and our daughter
Florence Anna, for all their love and support.
Seoul
November 2013
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Abbreviations
ADB
ADCF
AfDB
AFTA
AIFEH
APEC
APT
ARF
ASEAN
AU
BASIC
BIC
BRIC
BRICKS
BRICS
BRICSAM
CEMAC
CIA
CIVETS
COP
DAC
DAG
DBS
DMZ
DRC
EACP
EAS
ECOSOC
EIG
EITI
EMDC
EMDE
EU
FDI
Asian Development Bank
Asia-Pacific Development Cooperation Forum
African Development Bank
ASEAN Free Trade Area
Africa–India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Plus Three
ASEAN Regional Forum
Association of South East Asian Nations
African Union
Brazil, South Africa, India, China
Brazil, India, China
Brazil, Russia, India, China
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Korea
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
Central Intelligence Agency
Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa
Conference of the Parties
Development Assistance Committee
Development Assistance Group
Doing Business Report
De-militarised Zone
Democratic Republic of Congo
East Asia Climate Partnership
East Asia Summit
Economic and Social Council
Environment Integrity Group
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Emerging Markets and Developing Countries
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies
European Union
Foreign Direct Investment
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Abbreviations xv
FOCAC
FTA
FTAAP
GDP
GG
GGGI
GNI
GOC
GOJ
G7
G8 G20 G24
G77
HDR
HIC
HRW
IAF
IBRD
IBSA
IFC
IMF
IO
IOR-ARC
IPCC
IR
ITEC
JICA
KOAFEC
KOICA
KORDI
LCZ
LDC
LIC
LMIC
MDG
MIKT
MIKTA
MINT
MIST
MITI
MOFA
MOFAT
MOKE
MOSF
MOU
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
Free Trade Agreement
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
Gross Domestic Product
Green Growth
Global Green Growth Institute
Gross National Income
Government of China
Government of Japan
Group of Seven
Group of Eight
Group of Twenty
Group of Twenty-Four
Group of Seventy-Seven
Human Development Report
High Income Country
Human Rights Watch
India–Africa Forum
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
India, Brazil, South Africa
International Finance Corporation
International Monetary Fund
International Organisation
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
International Relations
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Korea–Africa Economic Cooperation Forum
Korea International Cooperation Agency
Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute
Low Carbon Zones
Lesser Developed Country
Low Income Country
Lower Middle Income Country
Millennium Development Goals
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia
Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ministry of the Knowledge Economy
Ministry of Strategic Finance
memorandum of understanding
xvi
Abbreviations
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NAFTA
NAM
NCEDCA
NCGG
NEPAD
NGO
NIC
NIEO
ODA
OECD
OECD-DAC
OPEC
PCGG
PPP
PRC
PRSP
RCEP
ROC
ROK
RTA
SAARC
SALT
SCO
SDG
SME
SSA
SSC
TAC
TICAD
TPP
TPSEPA
UAE
UK
UMIC
UN
UNCLCS
UNCLOS
UNCTAD
UNDP
UNEP
US
WEF
WTO
North American Free Trade Agreement
Non-aligned Movement
Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation
Agency
National Council on Green Growth
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Non-Governmental Organisation
National Intelligence Council
New International Economic Order
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Development Assistance Committee
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Presidential Committee on Green Growth
Public–Private Partnership
People’s Republic of China
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Republic of China
Republic of Korea
Reciprocal Trade Agreement
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Sustainable Development Goals
Small and Medium Sized Enterprise
Sub-Saharan Africa
South–South Cooperation
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
Tokyo International Conference for African Development
Trans-Pacific Partnership
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Upper Middle Income Countries
United Nations
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environmental Programme
United States
World Economic Forum
World Trade Organisation
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Introduction
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is assumed to be a pragmatically ethical
duty by donor countries and International Organisations (IOs) which helps
stimulate development and eradicates poverty in aid recipient countries (OECD
2010a, 2012c). ODA is also a pragmatic tool of foreign policy, yet the reasons,
objectives and intentions of a donor government’s policies often differ. Since
1999 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013a, 2013b) and the World
Bank’s ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs) have been the standard way
for aid recipients to make their case for receiving ODA. The PRSPs focused on
diagnostic mappings and outcomes (IMF 2013a). The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) list of aid recipients is assessed every three years. This assessment
depends on what donor and recipient governments consider to be recipient country
requirements (OECD 2012a, 2012b).
The OECD (2010b) approaches ODA as those flows on the DAC list which
are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments or by
their executive agencies and each transaction of which is administered with the
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as
its main objective. ODA is concessional in character and contains a grant element
of 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10% (OECD 2010b)).
In domestic party-political terms, generally, it is those on the left of the political
spectrum who want a broader definition of aid and development. This is so that
more state-led aid can be donated by widening the parameters. The Conservative
(and neoliberal) right tend to prefer assistance to be more narrowly defined by
the state and for assistance to come more from the private sector (business, NonGovernmental Organisations [NGOs] or charitable organisations) (Gulrajani
2011; Therein 2002). ODA is usually channelled from the state through donor–
recipient bilateral arrangements, as well as through multilateral institutions,
into the various sectors of a recipient economy. These sectors, amongst others,
include economic production and social infrastructure, government/civil society,
or humanitarian aid. ODA is not provided to finance ‘one off’ celebrity events or
military operations, although ODA can be used to help protect aid workers.
The OECD-DAC is ostensibly regarded as the ‘blue-chip’ organisation of
elite donor nations which set the global ODA standards, definitions and the legal
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2
Introduction
frameworks (OECD 2012a, 2012c). In 1999/2000 the United Nations (UN) (2000),
supported by the OECD-DAC, introduced Eight Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) (UN 2000) as global targets and as a ‘big push’ toward galvanising
global support and commitments ‘in a political climate that included awareness
of the rise of the emerging powers and an objective to ‘make globalisation work’
(Stiglitz 2006).
The 2013 MDG report concluded that the number of people living in extreme
poverty (according to the original MDG criteria those living on under $1 a day)
had halved between 1990 and 2010, with 2 billion more people having access
to clean drinking water (MDG 2013). However, to what extent this was due
to the successful implementation or effectiveness of ODA (or to other factors
such as rapid development in the emerging powers), remains unclear. With the
2015 deadline nearing, questions have now been raised as to what happens next.
That is whether to pursue a new set of MDGs within the current institutional
format or to pursue alternative capacities as a result of the changing geographies
of aid (Parr-Fukuda and Hulme 2009; Hulme and Wilkinson 2012; Sumner and
Mallett 2012). Asian donors within the OECD-DAC also have their own specific
histories and inter-state relationships within these mainstream organisations
(JICA 2010; KOICA 2010). For all donors, there is a growing realisation as to
the multidimensional nature of the causes and consequences of poverty, and, as
a result, perhaps the need for a more coordinated participation of development
partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors). These are
often credited as a myriad of ‘pro-poor’ policies based on furthering more global
cooperation. The World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report entitled ‘Equity
and Development’ also promoted the idea of ‘equal opportunities’ and producing
‘level playing fields’ for recipient countries and their populations. However, for its
critics, such World Bank initiatives are predominantly technocratic and overlook
the underlying structural inequalities within recipient countries, and between
recipient and donor countries.
The new geography of aid
The role of emerging powers in providing foreign aid assistance both within
and outside the OECD-DAC, is now galvanising new understandings of the
relationship between donors and recipients (Sumner 2013; Sumner and Mallett
2012). The new geography of aid approach is that the world is no longer divided
into ‘poor nations with poor people’ and ‘rich nations with rich people’. Instead,
the rise of the middle income countries and emerging-power states (as well as
patterns of poverty and marginalisation in developed donor states) mean that
there are areas of divergent income distributions and opportunities that transcend
previously ‘state-centric’ views. It is also becoming acknowledged that it is within
these rapidly (but unevenly) developing middle income countries, that a large
proportion of the world’s poor now reside (Flemes 2009). As such, the debate
concerns firstly whether rapid development will eventually ‘eradicate poverty’
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Introduction 3
or secondly whether rapid development creates its own forms of economic
unevenness and poverty.
However, at the same time, there are still major differences in the experiences
of the very poor in the Low Income Countries (LICs) and in the highly developed
nations. Such continued power and wealth differences are geopolitically manifested
in organisations such as the G7, G20 and G24. There is an issue therefore as
to whether ‘snapshot’ aid and development statistics, reflect the longer term
structural inequalities and continuities between the core and periphery in terms
of per capita income and income/wealth distribution (Carmody 2012; Kim and
Lightfoot 2011; OECD 2012b, 2012c, 2013; World Bank 2011a; World Economic
Forum 2013; World Trade Organization 2012).
Tables 0.1 and 0.2 show major recipients of DAC aid.
ODA, national interests and interventions
It is often assumed that ODA is a tool of foreign policy and that ODA is a resource
for securing the national interest of the donor. This particular view was cemented
during the Cold War as a particularly Western–US approach to state-led assistance.
Economic assistance, in general, was justified by a particular philosophy of
development economics (liberal Keynesian) and reflected in the norms and values
of the key Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the IMF (Lancaster
2007, 2008, 2011). Such assistance was a form of intervention by the donor in
the recipient country to impact on the development (and national security) of the
recipient country and donor country. The relationship between states is influenced
by their role within the international state system and their role as a donor or
recipient country (or both).
Table 0.1 Top ten major recipients
of individual DAC members’ aid as a
percentage of total DAC donor ODA 2001–
2002
Table 0.2 Top ten major recipients
of individual DAC members’ aid as a
percentage of total OECD-DAC donor
ODA 2011–2012
China
3
Afghanistan
4.0
India
2.4
DRC
2.7
Indonesia
2.3
India
2.1
Egypt
2.2
Vietnam
1.9
Serbia
2.0
Pakistan
1.5
Mozambique
2.0
Indonesia
1.5
Pakistan
1.5
China
1.5
Tanzania
1.5
Ethiopia
1.2
Philippines
1.5
Kenya
1.2
Thailand
1.4
Tanzania
1.2
Source: OECD 2012b, Table 32.
Source: OECD 2012b, Table 32.
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4
Introduction
As a form of ‘intervention’ by one state in the affairs of another, ODA has been
placed within a broader criteria of International Relations (IR). More broadly, the
intervention in IR has been understood as a variation of either direct or indirect
military interferences in another state’s domestic (or internal) territory (air strikes,
no-fly zones or ‘boots on the ground’), through to trade embargos/sanctions,
as well as economic resource transfers and government bribery, through to
humanitarian aid and the building of ‘prestige’ projects (Morgenthau 1962, 1967).
The objectives of these different forms of intervention have been to secure and
protect national interest and national security.
Given the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy, there have
been a number of critiques of foreign aid, ranging from concerns with ethical
hypocrisy, counter-productive economic policies, as well as the questionable
relationships with aiding and financing corrupt governments through so-called
rogue aid, and the issue of aid neocolonialism.1 Such debates have been sensitive
in the run up to the 2015 MDG deadline.2 An early example of the link between
aid and national interests (and the subsequent orthodox and revisionist responses
to it) was the 1948–1951 US-based Marshall Plan to post-war Western Europe at
a time of overwhelming US hegemonic power. The plan has served as a leitmotif
for subsequent state-led aid models with varying degrees of idealistic and realistic
appraisals.3 As a tool of foreign policy, ODA does not necessarily link directly
to the complexities of foreign policy decision-making but can, for example, be
indirectly and strategically used to overstretch another donor state’s resources, or
as a form of ‘soft power’ that hides ‘real’ national interests in a particular part of
the world but gains support as part of an alliance.
Foreign aid and emerging donors: the issue of classifications
Emerging, re-emerging, or rising powers have attracted considerable interest in
the broad fields of development and political science (Gray and Murphy 2013;
Hansen 2013; Kilby 2012; Kim and Potter 2012a, 2012b; Mawdsley 2012; Quadir
2013). The use of the term ‘power’ often replaces the original term ‘markets’
to indicate the ‘politics’ of this issue (O’Neill 2001, 2011; O’Neill et al. 2005).
Emerging-power donors have access to immense financial resources brought about
by their rapid development. Emerging powers, once aid recipients themselves
(and in some cases still aid recipients) also claim a ‘shared empathy’ or ‘shared
experience’ with recipients and challenge the hierarchical form and content of the
mainstream donor–recipient relationship. The reliance of donor and recipient on
a mutual ‘recognition’ of each other’s role and identity is, it seems, replaced by
the use of more equal terms such as ‘development partners’. Yet equality does not
necessarily mean ‘justice’ and there is a growing suspicion that emerging powers
are providing aid to establish alternative hierarchies (historical and cultural) and
to augment national interests.
Clearly, the emerging-powers debate is, as yet, to generate any consensus on
whether emerging-power donors represent a new paradigm of aid or whether they
donate fairer, better and ostensibly more effective aid than the traditional donors
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Introduction 5
(Brautigam 2011a, 2011c; Sanusi 2013). Mawdsley (2012) has argued that the
term ‘non-DAC’ can be used to mean a country that is technically outside the
official mainstream institutions but one that is providing often similar quantities,
qualities and types of ODA. Currently the OECD-DAC has 27 members
(including the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Iceland who all joined
in 2013). With the expansion of any organisation, the expectation that the ‘older’
members (inevitably) become more conservative or more mainstream (or that
mainstream is necessarily conservative or traditional) does not always follow.
In this respect, choices that states make in their regional relationships and with
institutions (or whether states decide to cooperate, defect, free ride, spoil, align,
reinforce or weaken alliances and institutions) is impacted upon not only by
‘realist’ distributions of power but also by perceptions of national identity and
a state’s ‘place in the world’. As Mawdsley (2012) pointed out, some aid donors
have been regarded as DAC and therefore as mainstream donors, but this does not
necessarily mean that these donors are ‘Western value orientated’ (Japan and now
South Korea) or Western in terms of a physical geography (Australia).
Post-colonial donors
Some writers prefer the term ‘post-colonial state’ to more specifically chart a
historical, albeit non-linear process. It is sometimes the case, however, that ODA
recipients and donors have been both colonisers and colonised states. Alesina and
Dollar (2000) identified post-colonial national political and economic interests as
being key determinants of donor aid distribution. In their view, an inefficient and
corrupt former colony often gets more donor ODA from its former coloniser than
those states with admirable records of good governance. At the same time, many
emerging donors are using aid to rekindle the narratives of their lost empires.
For instance, Turkey is providing its ODA to former Ottoman controlled regions.
Whilst the ‘shared colonialism’ narrative is emanating from many emergingpower capital cities, it is the Western donors who tend to want to play down
the former colonial relationship with the recipient. Alesina and Dollar (2000)
identified two sets of ‘colonial variables’ such as the number of years an aid
recipient was a colony of the donor, or whether the recipient was a colony of
another donor. However, in Asia, the question of determining what was or what
was not ‘colonisation’ is still not settled, and the assumptions that Alesina and
Dollar made do not allow for how the deciding of the ‘true’ ‘dates of origin’ of an
event is itself contested and constructed by elite and non-elite versions of national
identity.
ODA, national identity and cultural interpretations
Many debates concerning the emerging powers’ aid are about the issue of
‘newness’. The criteria employed usually consists of measuring aid quantity and
assessing the impact of the timing of the publication of various official White
Papers on ODA (The Guardian 2011). The question of newness also links to much
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6
Introduction
wider questions of national identity. For instance, the question of whether Chinese
aid is new or not, concerns (and to some extent is determined by) the different
official national identities of the Chinese state (as communist, or a BRIC state).
Moreover, this question also brings in the relationship, and particularly in Chinese
and Asian regional history, between understanding what counts as long-term or
short-term ‘change’ or ‘continuity’ or as a ‘change in and through continuity’
(Kissinger 2011). Whereas ODA can be used for ‘hard power’ economic and
political leverage, there is also the soft power dimension of ‘winning of hearts
and minds’. Soft power ODA has usually come in the form of social infrastructure
projects such as sports stadiums and conference complexes, as well as building
up local and national governance capacity infrastructure in the recipient country.
Often this has been understood as a contrived but albeit pragmatic approach to
obscure ‘hard power’ intentions and interests.
For many Asian donors, ODA is an instrument to reward recipient states for
recognising the donor as the official sovereign state. For instance, China and
South Korea still have their own ‘unofficial’ neighbours (Taiwan and North Korea
respectively). These ‘unofficial’ states are often ‘othered’ by official national
identity and national security narratives both spatially and geographically (that
the unofficial state still territorially resides within the remit or extension of official
state sovereignty) and temporally (that the unofficial state represents a false
historical trajectory). There can also exist different ‘historical periods’ within each
donor state as a result of rapid and yet unbalanced development, particularly in
the gap between urban and rural areas (Jacques 2012).4 Such disputes have been a
feature of ‘the textbook’ revisionist controversies and popular culture in Asia. For
instance, in July 2013 a Chinese computer gaming company released a product
called ‘Glorious Mission Online’ which simulated the conflicts over disputed
territorial sovereignty in the Asian region.5 For some, the recent territorial island
disputes are a portent of the future jockeying of position for maritime access to
natural resources in the Asian and Arctic regions (Chang 2010; The Economist
2013; Fackler 2013).6 This brings in the question of which states have the power
and legitimacy to claim influence over a particular geographical regional space
(Mahbubani 2013; Pritchett 1997).
Aid and national autobiography
Foreign aid has become a significant part of national branding of a state’s ‘place
in the world’. This notion of the ‘social construction’ of national identity has
been developed in IR literature by Wendt (1992). These constructivist approaches
regard certain norms (such as identity, culture and history) to impact on policy
choices. In this respect, phrases such as ‘from recipient to donor’ used in the
academic literature on ODA have also become an instrumental part of a donor’s
particular national branding. As a result, the donor state is promoted to share its
‘development experience’ with a myriad of designated recipient countries or to
act as a ‘development bridge’ or as a ‘humanitarian state’.7 This approach can
give a donor government both domestic and international legitimacy through a
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Introduction 7
further myriad of official state-led narratives of ‘national pride’ and international
responsibility as ‘shared development experience’. However, questions raised
can be ‘whose experience’ is being shared, and for what purpose? For instance,
Chris Alden has pointed out with respect to China–Africa relations, that
‘(S)ymbolic diplomacy, as in the promotion of national representation abroad,
plays an important role in China’s evolving relations with Africa’ (Alden 2008:
217; Roque and Alden 2008). This is a specific construction of particular stateled version of national identity and what Williams termed the ‘autobiography
of aid’ (Williams 2002). Moving on from the impact questions of aid, Williams
(2002) identified some key factors behind the construction of aid policy such
as bureaucratic norms and imperatives, institutional similarities with recipient
institutions such as funding experience, the role of expert technical knowledge
based on ‘shared development experiences’ and donor country perceptions of
global responsibility and global ethics. As Eyben (2013: 2) also noted recently,
identities refer to ‘not only how people see themselves … but also to how they
are seen by others. Importantly identities are emotionally charged, influencing
the quality of relationships and thus the possibilities for collaboration’. For many
states, this is a mix of national (and city) branding to attract investment (Anholt
2009; Future Brand 2013; Kelts 2013; Provost and Harris 2013).
The labelling (or self-labelling) of a country as an ‘aid recipient’ is not just a
matter of objective categorisations but also such labels can get into the very body
politik of a donor’s (and recipient’s) national identity (Lawson and Purushothaman
2003). These state-led strategies of national branding are evident in many
current and former Asian donor and recipient states such as Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia, India, South Korea, Japan and more recently the more generic ‘Made
in China’ and ‘Created in China’ brand (Kaiman 2013). Many governments are
projecting their states’ image through a spate of promotions of national history
and investment opportunities by using words which include the marketing dream
of the letter ‘k’ (Patria 2012) such as ‘incredible’, ‘remarkable’ or ‘sparkling’.
Many leading Asian donor governments are constantly ‘revising’ history school
textbooks. This top-down approach is justified by the view that their own national
experience of history has been ‘falsified’ by regional neighbours and that the
next generation of school leavers should know their ‘true’ national history. Some
revisionists have recently claimed that the post-World War Two architecture of
the Asian region was and is ‘inauthentic’ because ‘real’ Asian historical processes
(and historical injustices and conflicts) were never fully resolved due to ‘outside’
and ‘fake’ interferences.8
Rationale of argument
This book considers the impact of the emerging donors on the foreign aid
and MDGs debate through a regional geopolitics approach. The book focuses
specifically on the behaviour and activities of Asian donors. For this reason a
multi-disciplinary approach is developed but within the rubric of International
Relations (IR) perspectives. I have therefore mainly (but not totally) restricted
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8
Introduction
the discussion to explaining the activities of the current leading Asian donors.
I focus on China (as a BRIC country), South Korea (as a new middle power)
and Japan (as an established donor and former regional power). I use the word
China (to indicate the People’s Republic) and South Korea (rather than Korea) to
indicate the ongoing issues regarding the official recognition of ‘national identity’
questions which are intrinsic to how ODA is both justified and distributed.
The book considers how their interactions as regional states, aid donors and
traditional or emerging powers reflects and impacts on foreign aid policies,
approaches, and their justifications. I have restricted the study of their activity to
the recipient regions of Africa (where there is increasing Asian donor activity) and
Asia (the regional neighbourhood). Within these regions I have chosen particular
recipient countries where Asian donor interest is often competing and increasingly
significant, in order to highlight the broader patterns of donor activity as reflecting
the regional and geopolitical dynamics between the donors as regional actors. I
have focused on the two new ‘agendas’ of Asian donor ODA and on which Asian
donors have been particularly proactive. These are the ‘green growth’ policies
and the recent promotion of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs). Of course there
are a multitude of agendas and approaches currently in existence, but I want to
prioritise these two crucial areas which I argue are increasingly becoming their
own leitmotif for trajectories of Asian donor–donor behaviour in the wider context
of the post-2015 MDG era.
I want to avoid placing the argument in the burgeoning literature on whether
donor intentions or donor consequences are effective, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or can
provide instruments for poverty cures, resource curses or development miracles.
Various controversies exist on issues concerning the impact of donors on
recipient countries as a result of the ‘scramble’ for diamonds, timber, bio-fuels,
fish stocks, cobalt, copper, iron, to name but a few. Other issues often concern
the political impact of aid, or whether donor activity accelerates development
or reproduces patterns of neocolonial dependency through neglecting or even
destroying the local economy. Frankly, evidence can usually be found to prove
an argument by both sides of the debate, depending on who one talks to and
the data sets that one chooses to confirm suspicions. This trajectory takes away
an understanding of the wider political and economic contexts as to why aid
is provided at particular points in time and why particular options are chosen
(and promoted) by donors and recipients at particular points in time. Foreign
aid assistance or ODA does not occur in an economic or political vacuum,
but rather is a cause and consequence of complex donor–donor relationships
within a myriad of regional cultural contexts and geopolitical dynamics. My
aim is to question the assumptions concerning alignments and relationships
between donors and recipients such as ‘shared developed experience’ and
mutual solidarity. As a result, questions such as why, whose and what form of
alignments or experiences, are issues that are currently under-explored. Thus,
the more specific economic, political and cultural tensions between emerging
powers as donors (and how such tensions also impact on understanding the
relationships between emerging powers) are explored. For some, the emerging-
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Introduction 9
powers literature has already focused too much on these wider macro geopolitics
(Scoones et al. 2013).
However, ‘macro geopolitics’ approaches have not, as yet, attended to the
impact of the regional relationships between donors on ODA distribution, type
and form. Even for those who study Asian donors, these comparative analyses
are often done through a comparison of the institutional forms of aid distribution
and assessing the moral intentions of the donors (Kim and Potter 2012a, 2012b).
Instead, my focus is more on placing the Asian donor–donor relationships within
the wider context of regional geopolitical dynamics and exploring why certain
policy options are generated at certain points of time, and why certain choices are
made. These issues are addressed through the following broad questions:
1
2
3
4
5
What is the form, content and nature of regional geopolitical dynamics
between the major Asian donors?
What are the causes and consequences of these regional geopolitical
dynamics?
How, why and in what way do these regional dynamics impact on the form
and content of Asian donor ODA within and outside the Asian region?
Has the promotion of states as ‘emerging powers’ affected these geopolitical
relationships?
Does the emerging-powers agenda represent a resistance or an alternative to
mainstream donor activity or does it reinforce alternative forms and patterns
of power and hierarchy, and if so, why?
Regional geopolitics and ODA
The current US pivot (or rebalance) to Asia is generating plenty of strategic interest
as well as redefining the accepted boundaries of ‘Asia’. There are also issues of
distinguishing between a continental Asia and a maritime Asia strategy for states.
Consequently, the geopolitical patterns of state behaviour can both directly and
indirectly manifest as forms of donor–donor cooperation and competition in ODA
policy. Alternatively, regional geopolitical patterns can be supplemented (or be at
odds) with the policies and patterns of donor cooperation and competition with
regard to ODA policies in recipient countries. In this respect, donor activity in
the recipient country might be regarded as representing a microcosm of the wider
regional relationships between donors as established and emerging powers. In
this respect states are understood to have a behaviour both as ‘donors’ and as
‘states’ with interests. For instance, Japan and South Korea often have similar
ODA distributions and forms of ODA in many recipient countries. This might be
explained as a result of regional geopolitical cooperation or as a result of actual
donor competition to compete for and win influence in a particular recipient state.
Japan and South Korea may also cooperate as donors as a result of a mutual
anxiety about Chinese influence in the recipient country and a concern with
China’s role in regional geopolitics. In this respect cooperating on ODA matters
can also feed back into wider regional relations between donors. South Korea
10
Introduction
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and Japan also tend to focus their geographical distribution of ODA in areas of
US strategic interest as a result of their alliance network. China and South Korea
often have similar ODA geographical distributions in recipient countries and both
‘sell’ their ODA as an alternative to Japan’s more ‘Northern’ ODA. This donor
competition can often manifest itself as patterns of aid replication and emulation
of each donor’s policies in the recipient country. Moreover, these relationships
can also vary depending on whether recipients are geographically close to the
donors or not (Asia or Africa for instance), and to what extent the donors are
perceived as national security ‘threats’ by recipient states.
Asian perspectives and regional geopolitics
The term ‘Asian perspectives’ is often in danger of falling into ethnocentric traps
and stereotypes. Moreover, terms often used in IR literature such as Central
Asia, East Asia or the Asia-Pacific reflect strategic efforts by concerned states to
consolidate their own regional position through specific ‘official’ narratives of
national history and national identity. For instance, China prefers the term East
Asia to define its growing regional influence, whilst Japan and India prefer a more
inclusive ‘Asia-Pacific’ approach which also includes the US. In the early 20th
century, Mackinder’s ‘Heartland Theory’ amongst others, represented one way in
which a particular mapping and construction of political space came to influence
Western policy (Akiner 2011). Asia was also constructed in many Western
narratives as the inferior ‘other’ as opposed to the progressive West. Following
Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905, this fear of the East, particularly from Europe,
came to play a broader part in these negative Western representations of ‘the rise
of Asia’. Japan’s own recent construction of roads (through its ODA policy) along
the ‘West–East corridor’ (from Myanmar to the South China Sea) is representative
of how what counts as the borders of the Asian region is spatially and temporally
shifting as a result of and through foreign policies. Australia (2011) is another
example of the tensions between physical geography and national identity.
Yet at the same time, it is clear that such approaches can often end up as crude
stereotypes. Certain so-called ‘torn’ states often find themselves on the borders
of inter-regional spaces (Turkey/Ukraine) whilst other states act as a regional
‘bridge’ (Mexico/South Korea), which, in turn, can affect national identity (Burke
2010).
Resources and trading
The Asian region includes the key cooperative institutions such as ASEAN
(ASEAN 2012) and the more recent East Asia Summit (which now extends to
India, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Russia). ASEAN itself has extended
to include China, South Korea and Japan in an arrangement known as ASEAN+3
(APT) (Breslin 2007; Campbell 2013; Palmer 2013). In May 2013, Japan,
South Korea, India, Italy, Singapore and China were all granted Arctic Council
permanent observer status (Myers 2013). Accessing Arctic natural resources and
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Introduction 11
the tantalising prospect of shorter shipping routes from Asia to Europe have led to
competing national interests amongst leading Asian states. The associated claims
of sovereignty over the continental shelf represents what has been termed the
‘return of geography’ (Kaplan 2010a, 2010b, 2012). Some call the Arctic the new
‘scramble’ or the ‘great game’ (Borgeson 2009; Blunden 2012; Emmerson 2013;
Matioff 2013).
The Arctic Council decision indicated a microcosm of emerging geopolitical
and geoeconomic changes (Kim and Blank 2011; Leigh and Pallister 2005).
However, there is a legal governance structure in place through the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Ilulissat
Declaration (Young 2009). China and India are in an uneasy maritime
relationship in the Indian Ocean, with commentators focusing on the emergence
of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy and India’s ‘iron wall’ strategy. The
Asia–Africa link has been a key theme in several debates on foreign aid as a
result of the rise of China (Brautigam 2009; Moyo 2009, 2012; Zakaria 2012).
For many Asian donor states, there is also the issue of finding safer maritime
trade routes than the current Gulf of Aden, Straits of Hormuz and Straits of
Malacca. This is the emerging strategic maritime space of the Indian Ocean
(Ladwig 2009, 2010). Moreover, Asian demand for so-called ‘rare earths’ is
also underway, paving the way for geopolitical and geoeconomic disagreements
(Barclay and Smith 2013; Kwon 2009; Ting and Seaman 2013). There is also
the view as to whether regionalisation reflects a wider global convergence or
that regionalisation reflects a more divergent pattern but one that is based on
furthering intra-regional free trade within a ‘decoupled’ regional bloc as an
alternative to a specifically ‘Western’ form of globalisation. Distinctions are
also made between regionalisation as a process and regionalism as institutional
evolution which reflects local as well as global political economy dynamics
known as ‘glocalisation’ (Ba 2009; Beeson 2009).
Interpretive issues on the rise of the emerging powers
Within the Asian region reside the so-called Asian drivers (China, South Korea,
Japan). China, along with South Korea and India, in particular, are also placed
as ‘emerging powers’. With Asia’s real and perceived rise, there have been a
variety of debates on whether Asian states can converge and should ‘decouple’
from a Western dominated global order. For many rising Asian states this
choice reinforces a potential strategic conflict of interests between maintaining
regional relations as well as promoting increasing multilateral roles within global
institutions such as the Group of Twenty (G20) major powers, rather than the
alternative G20 of developing nations which was created in 2003 by the Brasilia
Declaration of IBSA.
Firstly, one of the problematic assumptions of the emerging-powers literature
has been that the world is undergoing a seismic shift to a world of multipolarity
(Vanaik 2013; Wade 2011). This multipolarity is often thought to be represented
by the rise of the BIC, BRIC, BRICS, BRICK, BRICKSAM, CIVETS, MIKT,
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12
Introduction
MIKTA, MIST, MINT and Next-11s. The Asian region includes three of the
BRICs (China, India and Russia), two Permanent Security Council members of
the United Nations (UN) (China and Russia) and two states (one BRIC and one
former regional hegemon) that would like to be UN Permanent Security Council
members (India and Japan). The region also includes several members of the
above groupings, including Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey. These
groupings are also characterised by a plethora of strategic relationships both
within the groupings and with other groupings.
There are also different cultural and regional perspectives concerning
the site and nature of ‘multipolarity’ (Haass 2008). Thus, each state has a
particular strategic worldview on multipolarity description and prescription for
policymaking. Moreover, the use of the term multipolarity and the associated
theme of ‘diversity’ causes tensions and conflicts between states which produce
and generate this ‘diversity’. Thus, whilst the literature acknowledges the different
‘typologies’ of emerging powers and the strategic tensions thereof, the reasons for
these tensions and the link between these geopolitical relationships and wider
geoeconomic and geocultural regional dynamics as donor and recipient, have not
been fully explored. Although not taking an area studies approach per se, this
book reaffirms Appadurai’s (1996) point that the broad discipline of area studies
can become ‘too comfortable with its own maps of the world, too secure in its
own expert practices, and too insensitive to transnational processes both today
and in the past’ (Appadurai 1996: 17).
Secondly, literature on the rise of Asia and the rise of the rest has often been
placed in the context of there being a zero-sum power shift from the West to
the East as another in a long line of historical cycles of the rise and fall of great
powers (Kennedy 1987). This literature also considers the reasons as to why
the larger powers collapse (Florig 2010; Hurrell 2006; Ferguson 2009, 2011;
Foot 2006; Friedman 2012a, 2012b; Hubbard and Kane 2013). The rise of China
for some represents an emerging G2 bi-polar system (Brzezinsky 2009; Wang
2011). However, the idea of there having been a seismic ‘power shift’ can also
be placed into a specific cultural context. This is an argument that focuses not
so much on a ‘changing of the guard’ or a ‘hand over of power’ approach but
one that implies that profound shifts represent a challenge to this conventional
understanding of ‘power’ itself. Ruchir Sharma (2012b) noted that the language
of the ‘rise of the west’ is used to describe the ‘rise of the rest’ but this zero-sum
approach to emerging-powers transition also fails to acknowledge the different
contexts and practices of power. The Asian region has its own particular histories
of approaches to power and inter-state relations, sovereignty (Singh 2010). For
Martin Jacques (2012: 567) the Asian region still represents a form of ritualised
tribute system, which explains why most countries in the region have largely
sought to move closer to China during the course of its rise ‘rather than hedge
with the United States against it’. Chinese perspectives in Jacques’ view, do not
accord with the European horizontal Westphalian system. As a result, there are
different interpretations of the meaning of multipolarity, of sovereignty and of
peace, harmony and diversity.
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Introduction 13
For Jacques, the Chinese view of inter-state relations is based on a Confucian
approach which stipulates that ‘The exemplary person harmonises with others
but doesn’t necessarily agree with them; the small person agrees with others, but
is not harmonious with them’ (Jacques 2012: 379). There is a theme in Chapter 2
which addresses the issue as to whether an understanding of Asian geopolitics
is possible by using either Western or non-Western concepts (Acharya 2011;
Acharya and Buzan 2009; Vasilaki 2012). These approaches might also determine
or affect the understandings (and assumptions) concerning the behaviour of the
Asian drivers (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). Furthermore, this interpretive issue
links into whether it is possible to identify a criteria for establishing a specific
‘Asian model’ of aid (McCormick 2008; OECD 2010b).
From solidarity to break up?
The ‘rise of the rest’ and the emerging-power states have often been put into
a broader heritage of earlier ‘Third World’ movements (Gandhi 1947). The
assumption in much of the recent literature on ODA is that the (re)emerging
powers represent a lineage of the earlier Third World solidarity movements
(Chin and Quadir 2012; Chin and Thakur 2010; Rowlands 2012; Shilliam
2011). Emerging powers are said generally to be challenging Western economic
and political institutions, which includes the OECD-DAC and Bretton
Woods aid regime (Filho-Saad 2013). The ‘Southern’ tradition has a strong
lineage going back to the Treaty of Montevideo (Montevideo 1960), as well
as the G77 (established in 1964 at the First United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development [UNCTAD]). Examples given are the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) (at the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences), through to the
1967 Charter of Algiers (Algiers 1967), the subsequent Lima Declaration of
1975 (Lima 1975) and the power leverage of the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries [OPEC] following the oil crisis of 1973. As Hansen (2013)
has recently noted, writers such as Mawdsley (2012) rightly favour a more
nuanced multidimensional approach in articulating and understanding the rise of
emerging powers. However, there are a number of intra-state tensions emerging
between the BRICs and between the BRICs and the next generation of new
middle power states. These tensions can be due to ongoing regional geopolitical
differences, uneven domestic development, historical regional antagonisms, as
well as particular tensions as a result of a jockeying of position between BRIC
Asian donors and old or new middle powers. Such tensions between emerging
powers are often sidestepped by the official narratives on South–South
‘solidarity’ such as that promoted at the recent 2013 BRICs summit, where,
with respect to BRICs–African relationships, it was noted that:
we support African countries in their industrialisation process through
stimulating foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacitybuilding and diversification of imports from Africa … We will seek to
stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support
14
Introduction
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industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition
security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We
therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in
Africa.
(BRICS 2013)
The BRICs meeting in 2010 also stressed that ‘we reiterate the importance of
the UN Millennium Declaration and the need to achieve the MDGs in an inclusive
process of growth and there should be no reduction in development assistance’
(BRICS 2010). The BRICS (2012) Delhi Declaration also promoted the mutual
shared experience ‘to further strengthen our partnership for common development
and take our cooperation forward on the basis of openness, solidarity, mutual
understanding and trust’ and that ‘attainment of the MDGs is fundamental to
ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable global growth and would require
continued focus on these goals even beyond 2015, entailing enhanced financing
support’ (BRICS 2012). The notion therefore of ‘commonality with diversity’ is
conventionally seen to reflect the multipolar nature of the changing international
system (Eyben and Savage 2013; Ziai 2011).
This is often regarded as a cement through which to generate a genuine
solidarity in the global South and without threatening the sovereignty of each
state through universal values. However, this promoting of diversity can often
reflect (and be a product of) increasingly tense geopolitical, economic and cultural
relationships. The grouping of emerging powers known IBSA (2004) was created
in 2003 (before the first annual BRIC Conference in 2009) and represents an
informal network of the three current BRICS states (Brazil, India and South
Africa) who are not permanent members of the UN Security Council. One issue
here, therefore, is whether or not the BRICS and IBSA groupings are used and
represent a reinforcing of solidarity between emerging powers or represent
strategic splits. At the same time these groupings have regional and institutional
roles and positioning as well as relationships with other developing nations and
Western nations (Brasilia 2003). This leads to a number of strategic prioritising
options for these nations as to where they see their role and how to achieve it.
These nations also recognise that they not only have a number of strategic options
but that their actions also represent particular roles and ideals for other nations
to fear or to emulate. For instance, China and Russia are often regarded as the
‘heroes’ of the South with power and influence to challenge the West (but from
within the UN), whilst China and Russia are regarded by other developing nations
(and emerging powers) as potential regional threats and as part of the ‘established
system’. Other middle power nations are regarded as ‘non-threatening’ and more
likely to voice the concerns and opinions of other nations.
However, emerging powers have a constant strategic dilemma of whether to
align or join ‘the elite’ or to be a more radical ‘hero of the South’ and assess
what ‘the South’ wants them to be. One other common issue with regard to the
economic and geopolitical sustainability of emerging powers, concerns whether
emerging powers can (or should) divert resources from a particular path or set of
Introduction 15
policy choices (to become more influential or powerful) which have in the recent
past led the emerging powers to be in a position from which such choices and
options have now become available. This is often a matter of risk awareness as
an emerging power may consolidate (but miss opportunities) or change direction
(and possibly undermine previous successes). Such issues are constant themes in
assessing the sustainability of the emerging powers.
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BRICs and emerging power sustainability
One of the themes of this book concerns the issue of the sustainability of BRIC
resources for ODA (BRICs 2010). This is both an economic issue and an issue
with regard to maintaining public support for ODA (particularly for democratic
donors) and ‘national identity’. There are now growing concerns with what is
regarded as unbalanced growth in the BRICs (Mason 2013). Those policies,
which have undoubtedly been successful in the past, are now seen by many as
becoming a fetter on future and sustained development (Chang 2001). Grant
(2013) has recently noted that although each country has its own specific
concerns, there is a general (indeed global) need for a domestic economic
‘rebalancing’ (Farzad 2012).
Firstly, the original set of emerging powers are now hitting what has been
termed the ‘Lewis turning point’. This is where rapid development has exhausted
the demographic pool of cheap labour (Alexandrioff and Cooper 2010; Farzad
2013; Kitto 2012). Sharma (2012a) is concerned that the ‘high hanging fruit’ of
a sustained growth based on domestic consumption and structural reform (rather
than export-led growth) is now more difficult to reach than the early ‘low hanging
fruit’, primarily because many governments have ‘missed an opportunity’ to (in
particular) build infrastructure and welfare support networks. However Sharma
(2012a) also pointed out that many governments have been concerned that if
such reforms had been put in place, a wrong timing of such reform would have
undermined the development model. In Asia, the memories of the 1997/98 crisis
are particularly influential in such decision making. Such narratives on ‘shared
experiences’ also play a part in China’s pre-emptive ‘bail out’ response to the
crisis, and have also been used to ‘sell’ Asian donor ODA to the Asian region.
However, the ‘second tier’ of emerging powers have much younger populations,
and economies with low inflation rates and growing sector diversification. For
instance as Allen (2011) has noted, in 2010 growth rates and the demographic
dividends were closely related. Colombia had 4.3 per cent growth (with an average
age of 28), Indonesia 6.1 per cent growth (with an average age of 28.2), Vietnam
6.8 per cent growth (with an average age of 27.8), Egypt 5.1 per cent growth (with
an average age of 24.3), Turkey had a growth rate of 8.2 per cent (with an average
age of 28.5) and finally South Africa had a relatively low growth rate of 2.8 per
cent but with an average age of 25.
These are clear demographic differences compared with a number of developed
countries and other emerging powers. Russia has a low population growth and
China’s ‘one-child policy’ means lower domestic consumption and higher savings
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16
Introduction
(due to minimal welfare distribution and family obligations to elderly relatives by
the falling rates of population of young Chinese). There are also concerns in Japan
with similar dynamics, although Japan has the problem of high public welfare
spending and an increasing welfare debt burden on its GDP. As a result of the
apparent resilience shown by emerging powers during the 2008 financial crisis,
there is much discussion about so-called ‘reverse decoupling’ or divergence from
the Western global order. However, current literature on emerging powers has
potentially mistaken a particular moment in political economy for a universal trend
and for a number of reasons. Firstly, the resources used by the emerging powers to
survive the crisis have also built up tensions in the domestic development model.
In China there has been a view that these tensions can be ‘overtaken’ by ‘shock
therapy’. However, snapshot statistics of GDP growth do not always tell much
about the underlying and longer term issues of economic resilience. Indeed, the
current global crisis has, albeit painfully, allowed many Western nations to begin
to address their own imbalances and perhaps create a more resilient state of ‘antifragility’.
Secondly, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2013) has argued that the recent waves of
social protests in emerging powers are a manifestation of these deeper structural
issues. The Chinese government often promotes an official version of Chinese
nationalism to legitimate its interests, but is keenly aware that any promotion
of nationalism can indirectly spark protests which can feed into a myriad of
anti-government protests. For some the new powers are particularly vulnerable
to protests if the domestic institutions do not have widespread domestic or
international resilience or legitimacy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Jim O’Neill
(2011) more recently identified a set of Next-11 states such as Bangladesh, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and
Vietnam. The term MIKTA is now being used to describe the next quartet of
the Next-11 countries that appear ‘most promising’ (Hawkesworth and Cookson
2013; Moore 2012). In this respect Australia again represents a ‘bridge’ between
Europe and Asian cultures. Yet the term bridge that is often used perhaps fails
to reflect on how this particular positioning also continually transforms national
identity and affects the domestic political debates about a state’s ‘place in the
world’.
Whilst there is a general view that absolute global poverty is receding in line
with the MDGs, much of this receding is due to the fact that a large proportion
of this demographic reside in these emerging powers and is therefore not
representative of a wider global trend. Nonetheless, increasing consumer power
in the global south from the new middle class has also led to wider debates
over corporate social responsibility and greenism, and its own impact on a
new development paradigm (Richey and Ponte 2013). Within several middle
income countries and emerging powers such as Thailand, Brazil and Turkey in
2013, protests from the new middle classes have been challenging government
policies on the streets. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
has also estimated that by 2030, 80 per cent of the global middle class will be
located in the South, with 70 per cent of the world’s total consumption by the
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Introduction 17
middle class from the Asia-Pacific region (UNDP 2013). Liberal groups often
see their own governments as riding roughshod over political liberties ‘in the
name of development’. Religious and non-secular groups often regard a particular
elite-led version of modernisation as inherently Western. In these circumstances,
unholy alliances between progressive liberals and religious fundamentalists or
right-wing nationalists often emerge. The view from the elites in power is that a
country’s national strength to be able to defend its principles can only come about
if rapid modernisation and technological advances are instigated. These domestic
dynamics are occurring in the wider context of debates on the future of the MDGs
and the future of resources and public support.
The MDGs and after
In 1999/2000 the UN (2000) introduced the MDGs. The emerging powers have
now added to the debate as to whether the world needs a new set of MDGs post2015. With the 2015 deadline nearing, questions have been raised as to whether
to keep on with the MDG format (Hulme and Wilkinson 2012). The OECD
(2012a) identified two new emerging trends to foreign aid provision: firstly, a
rise in poverty in the emerging middle income countries (MICs) classified as the
86 countries home to one-third of the world’s population who are living on less
than $2 per day (World Bank 2011b); secondly, in deciding how much more aid or
development financing would be required to be able to meet the MDG targets in
the LICs. In many LICs, a large financing gap means that ODA or private capital
flows have less of an impact on development. In this case, for foreign aid to work
and to be more effective, development infrastructure and institutional capacity
is first needed. As a result, emphasis is now being placed by the OECD-DAC on
generating a synergy of effective aid targeting and institutional capacity for aid
absorption. Thus, there are those in new ‘poverty trap’ conditions who are living
on more than $1.25 dollar a day but on less than $2 a day (in middle income
countries) where foreign aid has been reduced so as to be able to target those in
extreme poverty in the age of donor austerity.
At the 2005 World Summit, leaders from UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) had consensually agreed to identify the key trends, patterns and gaps
of and in aid distribution for the post-2015 era (UN-ECOSOC 2012). Focus was
to be placed on improving aid allocation and aid quality, as well as a mutual
accountability by promoting the UN’s version of South–South cooperation.
Side events were organised at the aid effectiveness high-level talks held in
Busan (2011) and at the Rio+20 Summit in 2012. The ‘drivers of change’ and
the future of ‘development cooperation’ were an acceptance of development
landscape changes or as a new geography of aid. It was assumed that development
assistance would remain vital for LDCs but that it was also necessary to reduce
recipient dependency on aid by enhancing aid quality, mutual accountability and
by promoting South–South and ‘aid and trade’ relations. Gender issues were
also a key part of this reflection. It was argued that the new geography of aid
(or aid 2.0 era) would mean an era with fewer ‘poor’ countries (but remaining
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18
Introduction
poverty in middle incomes countries) thus meaning that in the LICs, ‘the demand
for traditional aid within these countries – that is, resource transfer – looks set to
weaken’ (Sumner and Mallett 2012: 5).
Emphasis was to be focused on institutional capacity building through
project and programme aid pooling (Sumner and Mallett 2012). The UNECOSOC (2012: 9) stated that ‘A post-2015 development agenda should take
into consideration the new capabilities of emerging donors and the increasingly
important role of non-executive stakeholders in development cooperation’
(original emphasis). The UN (2013) currently regards promoting economic
development as including the end of extreme poverty, and as generating
interlinked social inclusion, environment sustainability and good governance.
The UN (2013) also accepts that historical context has changed since the MDGs
were initially announced because there is an increasing feasibility of ending
extreme global poverty given a ‘drastically higher’ human impact on development
through rapid technological changes and associated wealth creation. However
the language of such reports is often technical and depoliticised, and nothing
is attributed to the issues of whose interests are at stake and how these issues
actually emerge in the specific form they take (Liden 2013). Instead, emphasis
is rather abstractly placed in developing an urgent and radical change of course.
According to the UN (2013) a new set of MDGs might include the right to
development for all and an end to extreme poverty and hunger. This is through
a sustainable development ‘within planetary boundaries’ and by an effective
learning for all children and the global youth for their life and livelihood. Other
issues raised include gender equality, social inclusion and human rights for
all, as well as health and wellbeing for all ages. Emerging powers might also
provide financing for productive agricultural systems to raise rural prosperity,
and to empower inclusive, productive and resilient cities given their ‘shared
experience’.9 There is also interest in environmental issues including the curbing
of human-induced climate change, and to ensure sustainable energy by securing
ecosystem services and biodiversity and to create ‘well crafted’ set goals that
will help guide the public’s understanding (UN 2013).10
IR Perspectives realism, liberalism and critical approaches
Realism and liberalism
This book considers the dynamics of donor–donor relationships in this current
aid debate context, through a number of IR perspectives. For traditional realist
perspectives foreign aid is an instrument of national interests (Knack 2004;
Kragelund 2011; Morgenthau 1962; Mwase and Yang 2012). As Narlikar (2013)
noted, policy preferences are often framed by the behavioural expectations
of other states and on former outcomes of decisions and current and future
resource capabilities. Narlikar (2010, 2013) noted that inter-state relations are
permeated by competition and cooperation. For Narlikar (2013), the emerging
nations tend toward a more conflictual and distributive strategy with the North,
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Introduction 19
and, generally, a more integrative solidarity strategy with fellow South states.
States may also use alternative strategies and behaviour to cooperate or extend
their national power through what is known as soft power. In particular, middle
powers often promote a non-threatening ‘shared experience’ rather than shortterm expedient alliances based on threats and coercion. The role of international
organisations in the foreign aid debate is particularly sensitive for emerging
powers and middle powers in deciding whether they use organisations to
bandwagon larger powers, cooperate, free ride, spoil or defect from alliances or
institutions. The book uses this IR framework in order to explain the behaviour
and activity of Asian donors and their regional geopolitical relationships.
From Marxism to constructivism
Critical IR approaches do not take for granted that states are natural givens but
are, in fact, complex practices of social relations of production and associated
vested interests, rather than ‘in the national interest’ (Cox 1981). Foreign policy
and ODA policy is therefore a reflection of a specific ‘capitalist’ economic mode
of production and its dynamics. For example, elites in the North and elites in the
South often have common economic interests such as promoting neoliberalism
and the Washington consensus. Thus, inter-state behaviour and geopolitical
dynamics represent the crisis tendencies of capitalism rather than national
security dilemmas (Gills 2010; Mittelman 2013). Neo-Marxist and world systems
perspectives focus more on the underlying structural forces which continue to
divide the world into the core and periphery states, or a certain degree of strategic
movement in the ‘semi-periphery’. This is the issue that policies such as the
MDGs reinforce these structural inequalities, and ODA itself creates a form
of ‘aid dependency’. This approach places emerging powers as representing a
superficial ‘challenge’ to the West but which in effect represent and reinforce the
dynamics of the capitalist world system. Thus, rapid economic development in
the periphery or semi-periphery is a reflection more of continued core interests
in the structure of the capitalist world economy rather than an autonomous state
development. Moreover, there are the links between vested interests in the core
aiming to create new markets and extract resources in the South, and similar elite
interests in the global South (third world bourgeoisie). More recently writers have
coined the term ‘transnational class interests’ to indicate these ‘neocolonial’ links
(Robinson and Harris 2000; Robinson 2006). Contrary to the ‘new geography of
aid’ approach, these transnational interests have been in existence for centuries, if
the world is understood not through a ‘state-centric’ perspective but instead as a
‘holistic’ world system.
Conventional social constructivist approaches argue that there is a ‘reality’ of
state activity but that this reality is perceived and interpreted in different ways.
More critical perspectives argue that the concepts of IR themselves are reliant
on historical and power practices. Importantly, states as communities are reliant
upon practice of distinguishing self from other. Security threats are sustained and
represented as part of an ideological act. The project of creating an imaginary
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20
Introduction
community involves the homogenisation of nation space through exclusions of
others and how political space is represented and mapped through official and
unofficial discourses (Edkins 2009; Hutchings 2007, 2011; Murphy 2010). The
construction and practices of national identity are increasingly relevant to the link
between aid donor competition, national identity and regional geopolitics in Asia
(Park and Jeong 2012; Wiegand, 2009).
This book offers an alternative account of emerging power and in particular
Asian ODA from a specific regional perspective. The book aims to offer a specific
IR reading of these dynamics and yet also provides a wider multidisciplinary
context of how regional relations between Asian donors and their geopolitical
positioning as established and emerging powers reflect the key transformations
in the international system. However, at the same time these transformations
also reflect a myriad of uneven economic, political and cultural dynamics. By
addressing these dynamics the book aims to offer an alternative account of the
emerging powers’ ODA debate and the conceptual, strategic and normative
opportunities opening up as a result of the increasing likelihood that the 21st
century is to be ‘the Asian century’.
Notes
1 Common issues raised with ODA generally have been whether there is a conceptual
problem, or a bad policy alignment or a wrong prioritising of cause and effect (Lucas
1988). There are the well-known issues of rogue aid (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Six
2009; Woods 2005, 2008). Emerging powers are also challenged for using colonialism
as ‘shared experience’ to legitimate control over natural resources and in creating new
forms of aid dependency (Stolte 2012). Bhagvati (2010) has argued that foreign aid does
not alleviate poverty and that more emphasis should be placed on the market. This has
led to debates between writers in the BRICS who emphasise the need for continuing
state assistance to alleviate poverty (Mahr 2013). Firstly, there is a view that cutting
aid can produce failed states (Collier and Goderis 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2007).
Secondly, arguments have been made that foreign aid has ‘amplified’ democracy in
democracies, and reinforced dictators in dictatorships (Dutta et al. 2013). Thirdly,
foreign aid can crowd out nascent and established business. For instance, emphasis
on assisting the development of one natural energy sector can destroy investment in
other sectors such as manufacturing. This so-called ‘Dutch disease’ may also increase
the local exchange rates as foreign aid dollars are converted into the local currency.
The idea that global exchange rates can be altered by this foreign aid has been subject
to question (Rajan and Subramanian 2011). However, foreign direct investment
(FDI) and speculation can follow aid patterns causing fluctuations in exchange rates
(Garriga and Phillips 2013). Moreover, foreign aid can often mean that recipient
governments do not have to raise tax revenue, and as a result, citizens have less of
a stake in the political realm and thus democracy is eroded. This is what Dambisa
Moyo (2009, 2009a) termed ‘the Boston Tea Party in reverse’. Foreign aid that builds
economic infrastructure (transport/rail/roads) can also be used to extract resources
and a local abundance of a resource may be inflated in value by the global scarcity of
the resource. Local fighting over the resource may also arise as an indirect outcome
of relative local scarcities in other resources. Therefore the aid effectiveness agenda
has gone through its own evolution. The main conferences were convened at Rome
(2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). Issues that were more recently
identified include building feedback mechanisms and predictability. For others, aid
Introduction 21
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2
3
4
5
effectiveness is now part of a wider question of development effectiveness and the
whole questioning of ‘what is development’ with interest in inclusive development,
human development and social development. However, as Nancy Thede (2013) noted,
an assumed consensus over aid effectiveness can often hide disagreements on other
issues between OECD-DAC nations. Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan (2013)
also added to this debate recently, by noting that countries such as Nigeria do not
want emerging-power donors such as China to do everything, because that clearly,
‘wouldn’t be fair to the donors’.
‘We Can End Poverty: the MDGs and Beyond’ www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
During the early days of the Cold War, foreign aid was regarded as not just a moral
duty but also a means to stop the spread of communism (Kennedy 1961). There
were concerns that with the experience of the inter-war years, economic deprivation
could provide the climate for political extremism in urban and rural areas. The first
big push of state-led aid was traditionally regarded as the Marshall Plan (Marshall
1947). The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) then agreed
in 1960 to create the Development Assistance Group (DAG). This evolved into the
OECD-DAC (Hubbard and Duggan 2009; Hubbard 2009). During the 1970s, World
Bank President Robert McNamara (1973) focused on promoting the World Bank
institution as an inclusive forum to include countries such as China. McNamara also
took advantage of the period of Cold War detente and in 1980 China joined the World
Bank. President McNamara coined the term ‘War on Poverty’ inspired by the Pearson
Commission (named after Nobel Laureate Lester Pearson) which had famously
stated that whilst ‘development is an ancient concept’ it also implies, in the modern
context, ‘progress’ and ‘mans (sic) ability to master destiny’ (UNESCO 1970). This
ostensibly technocratic approach is also reflected in the OECD’s own approach in
determining how much foreign aid should be given in order to kick-start development.
Jan Tinbergen and Hollis Chenery calculated that 1 per cent of a country’s GNI would
be enough to jump start development in recipient countries. This figure was broken
down into 0.3 per cent private aid and 0.7 per cent official state aid or ODA (OECD
2010a). This figure has become the holy grail of ODA contributions, and was (in)
famously reiterated in the 2005 G8 Gleneagles ‘Make Poverty History’ communiqué
(Gleneagles 2005). Questions of financing have become a key feature of emerging
donors’ resources, given their huge financial reserves and given the increasing
austerity in the traditional donor community. The bar of ODA set at 0.7 per cent of
donor GNI, was in fact originally suggested at the 1958 World Council of Churches.
This council had wanted a neat and symbolic figure of 1 per cent of GNI to be given,
yet there was always a concern as to how private flows were to be distinguished
from official state aid. This of course still remains a key centre of controversy and a
myriad of counter-claims regarding and evaluating the exactness of how Chinese aid
is measured (Brautigam 2011b). The 1967 Charter of Algiers (Algiers 1967), formed
by the G77, also wanted more aid to be donated from the West, with connotations
of compensation for previous colonialism and therefore with the assumption that
colonisation had disrupted a particular historical trajectory.
The 1933 Montevideo Treaty is often evoked in the Taiwan case, that a state has the
right of territorial integrity even if it isn’t recognised as sovereign. Article 3 of the Treaty
is often invoked to clarify this that ‘The political existence of the state is independent
of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to
defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity,
and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer
its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts’ www.cfr.org/
sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897
‘New Chinese Game Based on Disputes Islands’ The Daily Telegraph 1 August www.
dailytelegraph.com.au/news/breaking-news/new-chinese-game-based-on-disputedislands/story-fni0xqlk-1226689691161
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Introduction
6 The Arctic Council comprises: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, the US,
Russia and Canada. At 60 degrees North, the US, Iceland and East Russia are defined
as Arctic states. At 66 degrees North, North West Russia and the Nordic states are
defined as Arctic states. UNCLOS is made up of 158 states, but is not ratified by the
US.
7 According to the World Bank (2011a), Low Income Countries (LICs) are defined as
those countries with a GNI per capita of US$1,005 or less; Lower Middle Income
Countries (LMICs) are those countries with a GNI per capita of between US$1,006
and US$3,975; Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) are those countries with
a GNI per capita of between US$3,976 and US$12,275; High Income Countries
(HICs) have a GNI per capita of above US$12,276. The BRICs acronym changed in
2011 when China invited South Africa to become the fifth member, and the acronym
BRICS was born. However, Jim O’Neill refuted the extension to South Africa, given
its low rates of relative economic growth.
8 ‘Japan’s Second World War Defeat was not just due to the Atomic Bomb’. South
China Morning Post, 9 October www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1327721/japanssecond-world-war-defeat-was-not-just-due-atomic-bomb-says-china
9 Brautigam’s ‘watching the watcher’s’ blog has detailed commentary on work on
Chinese aid to Africa. Yet surprisingly under-explored in the recent ‘local content’
literature are issues of African diasporas who are living, training and learning from
emerging powers’ own development models, particularly in China and South Korea.
Moreover, questions of explaining home-grown ‘indigenisation’ development, such
as ‘whose narrative’ of nationalism or ‘indigenous culture’ and in whose interests,
are also under-explored. Similarly, Ovadia (2013) does not include the role of
Islamic finance. Moreover, in discussions with Cameroonian, Liberian, Nigerian and
Ugandan government officials at a number of aid effectiveness/NGO conventions
held in South Korea, there have been contentious disagreements between official
government and non-state versions of ‘home-grown’ or indigenisation policies.
This is also the role of the diasporas in emerging powers in learning and sharing
the development experience from countries such as South Korea. What is also
increasingly on the agenda is the role of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
(Taiwo et al. 2012). The issue of export credits was included in an OECD (2005)
revision draft of what counts as foreign aid, in the context of reducing tied aid
and increasing untied aid (OECD 2006), that is, to reduce the number of credits
or grants that are either tied exclusively to purchases from the donor country,
or tied to purchases from the donor and one or more developing countries. The
significance of officially supported export credits was noted in April 1978 as a socalled ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ distinguishing between projects that are financed
with tied aid (still technically ODA) or those financed in purely commercial terms
and therefore not ODA.
10 The Economist (2011) has come up against particular criticism of its approach
to measuring and judging emerging-power aid and in particular Chinese aid
(Brautigam 2011a). In traditional ODA terms however, it is estimated that Chinese
ODA in 2010 was $2 billion or 0.04 per cent of its GNI, well below the 2010 DAC
average of 0.31 per cent. The OECD (2011a, 2011b, 2012a) has a different set of
norms than those espoused by China concerning how ODA is linked to commercial
arrangements by private actors and via official export credits. China’s grants and
interest free loans are often offered to social infrastructure projects (government
buildings/stadiums) with loans and credits used for productive infrastructure
(water, roads, ports) which complement FDI packages which are in turn contracted
to a selected Chinese company, often in so-called special economic zones in the
recipient country (Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2011). One striking feature of Chinese
and other emerging powers’ aid is that the aid is not channelled through the
national budgets, as is common practice with OECD-DAC or traditional donors,
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Introduction 23
but used directly on projects. Whilst aid is not tied to ‘conditionalities’ on good
governance, neither can aid be used for or tempt government nepotism or corruption
justified through cultural relativism or ‘diversity’. Instead, as with many emerging
donors, focus is with initiating and financing specific development projects that
are sewn together as a ‘win-win’ package. However, project specificity can also
undermine longer term macro development strategies and the actual process of the
state–business relationship is not always transparent to the recipient government,
never mind the recipient country’s labour force. The OECD excludes this nonconcessional aid in its measurements of ODA, whilst humanitarian aid is not
included in China’s ODA as this aid is often seen by Beijing as a short-term ‘stop
gap’. The OECD-DAC also wants a reduction of so-called ‘tied aid’ (donor aid
given on condition that the recipient procures materials from the donor country)
but this untying might unintentionally encourage more commercial terms such as
export credits, and, depending on the prevailing market climate at the time, might
crowd out the policies and benefits of ODA itself (OECD 2008). As a result, Large
(2008) argued that a lot of the literature on foreign aid has unintentionally produced
a number of false binary choices such as, is aid actually ‘new/old’ or is it ‘good/
bad’. Even so, despite this fair comment, certain trends in emerging-power foreign
aid do emerge. Firstly, emerging-power donors generally tend toward more explicit
emphasis on respecting ‘national sovereignty’ and territorial integrity rather than on
values and rights. Emphasis on territorial integrity and ‘non-intervention’ is often
applied to so-called quasi or ‘failed states’ unable to govern. This makes it much
easier for donors to make their case that they are respecting a state’s sovereign
independence, whilst being heavily active within its territory. Secondly, emphasis
is placed on development cooperation rather than donor–recipient relationships.
Further questions that have often been raised are as to whether South–South rhetoric
is (positively or negatively) just a form of state-led soft power paternalism as a
‘charm offensive’ (Chinaview 2007; Kurlantzick 2008). Thirdly, emerging-power
donors are accused of often undermining (intentionally or not) the traditional
institutions and encouraging policy fragmentation (Roopoonarine 2013). Fourth,
lack of conditionality or ‘non-interference’ can lead to further debt spirals in the
recipient country. Fifth, emerging-power donors often use their own imported
labour rather than the local workforce, which can hamper local development and
reinforce cultural segregations but which is promoted as ‘cultural diversity’.
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1
The contemporary foreign aid
debate and emerging powers
Introduction
Common phrases and objectives in the aid debate are for those living in aid
recipient countries to be helped to ‘be lifted out of poverty’ or to escape from a
‘recalcitrant’ poverty. Traditionally the view of both donors and recipients has
been that poverty can be quantified into extreme or absolute (according to the
World Bank group from 2008, defined as living on less than $1.25 a day) or is a
relative concept and process which impacts differently on different communities
and constituents. Overarching this particular issue is the widespread assumption
of previous mainstream donors and institutions that poverty occurs in ‘poor
nations’ and these nations can be helped and lifted out of their poverty by the ‘rich
nations’ and ‘rich donors’. The new geography of aid (or the Aid-2) approach,
however, suggests that poverty (however defined or quantified) occurs both
within emerging-power middle-income states and developed nations (Sumner
2013a, 2013b). Traditionally, poverty has been understood as ‘something’ that
can be technically eradicated through effective institutional mechanisms and by
economic and political development. However, conditions for short- and longterm poverty can be produced by uneven economic, political, cultural and social
processes. Moreover, eradicating or ‘solving’ poverty, through growth, does
not necessarily mean eradicating or solving processes of economic, political
or cultural discrimination, exclusion or inequality in a recipient country. On
the contrary, Sumner (2013b) noted that a lot of the world’s poor now live in
emerging middle income economies.
Sumner (2013b) also argued that there is a ‘double dilemma’ for aid donors.
This is because substantial amounts of aid are distributed to the emerging-power
countries but these countries may not in fact need large quantities of aid but rather
more effective ‘smart aid’ focusing and a redistribution of wealth. However aid
also goes to those recipient countries that cannot absorb these resources effectively
as a result of their lack of basic institutional and infrastructural development.
This chapter considers these processes and responses in the context of debates
over the post-2015 MDG agenda and how this links to ‘the new geography of aid’
approach. This also includes aid effectiveness approaches. The chapter considers
how or whether emerging-power donors are placed within these changing contexts
The contemporary foreign aid debate 35
and non-linear evolution of aid institutions and agendas. The chapter, however,
identifies the dynamics with regard to the sustainability of the emerging powers
and how this question both directly and indirectly impacts upon an understanding
of the inter-state relationships between these donors.
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So who actually gives aid?
The principle mainstream international organisation that deals with Official
Development Assistance (ODA) is the OECD-DAC (OECD 2012a, 2012b).
For states in such organisations, their national interests may cut across different
loyalties, alliances, policies as well as cultural and geographical links. Foreign
aid is given by OECD-DAC countries, and by OECD countries (who are nonDAC) but who are still reporting to the DAC and can be (and want to be) subject
to its peer review (Hungary, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Cyprus, Kuwait, Latvia,
Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates).
Non-OECD countries are also providing aid and reporting aid policy to the
OECD-DAC. Russia was the first BRIC country in 2011 to report its aid to the
OECD-DAC. Russia’s aid in 2010 was measured at a total net disbursement of
$472.4 million, two-thirds of which was provided bilaterally. Mexico and Turkey
are also emerging ‘bridge’ middle powers in the OECD that are providing aid but
are not in the DAC. According to the OECD (2012a) several countries outside
the OECD’s own membership have long played important roles in promoting
development cooperation, although there remain key distinctions in terms of the
major purpose and form of aid (tied or untied in particular) between these donors
and the OECD-DAC (OECD 2013). Manning (2006) had originally distinguished
between the non-DAC in the OECD (South Korea, Mexico, Turkey), non-OECD,
(or mainly Eastern European countries), as well as OPEC countries and other nonOECD countries (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Taiwan and Venezuela).
Ideologies of aid
The original Bretton Woods institution of aid provision (World Bank) followed by
the OECD was conceived in the era of state-led Keynesian economics. This pushed
the view that well-organised and channelled state resources could ‘kick-start’
development. One major paradigm shift in the foreign aid debate occurred during
the late 1970s with the emergence of the neoliberal Washington Consensus. This
market orientated ‘neoliberalism’ was distinguished from the more ‘consensus’ or
‘embedded liberalism’ of the Keynesian era which regarded state governance as
both protector and ‘progressive’. Jacqueline Best (2013) recently noted that the
inherent pressures for neoliberals and at the leading aid organisations is that the
very existence of poverty does not fit with the neoliberal economics of ‘trickle
down’ wealth. Yet the solution often put forward is to set the conditions for more
neoliberalism and a blaming of recipient governments and institutions who are
not fiscally ‘disciplined’ enough. However, recipient countries often complain
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
that further restructuring cannot be done as their economies are fully restructured.
Moreover, neoliberalism has still not yet produced the desired results, primarily
because the developed nations may talk neoliberalism but practise a round of
unfair protectionism and state subsidies.
Liberal approaches which still see a progressive role for the state, still regard
state-led aid as a technical remedy to poverty and as a reflection of domestic
welfare systems. Fiscal Conservatives who might also follow the neoliberal line
tend to see poverty as something that is either theologically ‘natural’ or a result
of a lack of initiative. Marxists regard poverty and aid as just two sides of the
same coin, both being produced by historically specific (not natural) capitalist
dynamics and vested interests which create a ‘dependency’ of the periphery
on core countries. However, emerging powers are using these instruments
of capitalism and the market through which to generate a power leverage to
create alternatives to the Washington Consensus. A lot of this shift in emphasis
as a normative and practical endeavour, particularly in Asia, can, in part, be
regarded as a form of national self-survival. Emerging powers, particularly in
Asia, have strong memories and shared experience of the post-1997 crisis and
subsequent IMF intervention or ‘one-size-fits-all shock therapy’. At the same
time, emerging-power states are now recognising that their ‘opening up’ to the
global economy has given the state an enviable economic power. In this respect,
the ‘Asian drivers’ are regarded as using globalisation as a mercantalist and
developmentalist policy.
In this respect, attention has turned to whether emerging powers are part of
an increasing convergence of globalisation, or a convergence of only a specific
type of globalisation. There is also the issue of whether emerging powers are
creating a globalisation (with Southern characteristics). Best (2013) argued that
as a result of the ‘technical’ language of neoliberalism, poverty is now regarded
as de-politicised social risk and vulnerability, rather than as a result of complex
economic and political decisions and interests. Mawdsley (2012: 218) also
pointed to this concern in one of her conclusions, stating that even if emerging
donors now bring in a new diversity of ideas, the worry is that ‘this will again
produce a technical and depoliticized understanding of development, both as an
outcome and as a process’. As a result some have begun questioning whether the
ODA debate is now verging on a post-aid trajectory (Mawdsley et al. 2013).
Beyond making poverty history
Just before the global financial crisis of 2008, the major OECD-DAC donors were
seemingly able to offer to cancel outstanding debts in several of the recipient
countries (to create a level playing field for market-based development) and to
make, what seemed at the time, realistic pledges to reach ODA levels at 0.7 per
cent of Gross National Income (GNI). Identifying the reasons and practices of
why and how the West constructs and presents images of poverty and famine to a
particular audience has been a major theme in critical approaches to IR (Campbell
2004). As Mueller (2013) noted, the hegemonic culture of pity can at the same
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 37
time also raise the profile of the big global events (Geldof 2013). The Group
of Eight (G8) Gleneagles (2005) communiqué ‘On Africa’ stated that ‘This is a
moment of opportunity for Africa. Its leaders have embraced a new vision for the
continent’s future which recognises their leading role in addressing the continent’s
challenges and realising its opportunities’. This was a shift in narrative from a ‘we
will help’ to a one of ‘we will help you to help yourselves’ and implicit within this
social contract narrative was that ultimate responsibility and ‘ownership’ rested
with African leaders and peoples.
Broader private investments including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were
also regarded as one of the basic conditions for inclusive growth (AfDB 2010;
Gleneagles 2005). In 2010, the Commission for Africa (2010) also continued
this social contract conditionality, and emphasised that the West can provide
the technical finance and tools, but responsibility still rested with Africans. The
Commission also proudly confirmed that this was a reasonable gesture given that
many individuals involved in the report were ‘from Africa’. However, there was
clearly no explicit distinction made between the elites and people, but rather a
top-down emphasis on investing ‘in people’ and by tapping into more resources
to generate ‘the rise in Africa’ and its middle class and business communities
(Enaudeau 2013). The term ‘unlocking’ market bottlenecks is also often used to
refer not only to a ‘magic secret formula’ of the market but also to an emergent
demographic dividend in both emerging powers and recipient countries. Different
from the original ‘demographic dividends’ of the ‘rise of Asia’ in the 1970s, ‘pools’
of labour now have potentially more access to technology and social media,
which can increase both economic skills and political awareness. For some, this
has also been a result of foreign aid resources in health and education (Lee and
Mason 2006). The concern, however, is that those who are gaining education
also have their expectations of future prosperity unfulfilled due to a wider lack
of infrastructural and general development, which can lead to further push-factor
migration and a widespread and dispiriting feeling of ‘wasting time’.
Evaluating the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
recent developments
A major assumption behind foreign aid, therefore, has always been that there is a
distinction between development and poverty. The mainstream goal of the major
aid institutions and donors has, nonetheless, been to match the cause of poverty
and economic development to the intended technical (and moral) outcome. As a
result, solving the wide-ranging issues of poverty by attaining the MDGs is still
regarded in this broad framework as feasible, but only if the right political will
and correct technical resources and know-how are made available and applied
(Annan 2010, 2012; Parr-Fukuda and Hulme 2009). Jeffrey Sachs (2005) also
made the case that human ingenuity and an abundance of resources mean that
global poverty could be solved through what is termed the ‘big push’. The big
push idea makes the assumption that development and poverty reduction are so
tantalisingly close as to be at the ‘tipping point’ of self-sustained growth. This
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
injection would also solve the ‘poverty trap’ where any money donated in too
small an amount simply goes into a continuum of short-term survival. This welltimed and well-modeled big push would mean that the ‘trickle of aid’ (as a ‘few
extras’ spent to make life a little better) would be overcome by an injection of
resources that would enable savings to rise.
One of the prevailing assumptions of the aid debate has been that the world’s
poorest live in poor and failing nations. These are the individuals whom Paul
Collier (2007) termed ‘the bottom billion’. The ‘pro-poor’ policies of the major
donors and multilateral organisations have therefore been to provide aid to the
bottom billion and often in the form of so-called target based ‘big push’ policies.
On the other hand, there is an emerging view that the majority of the world’s poor
now live in the emerging-powers or the ‘middle-income’ countries. Such a new
geopolitics of aid has a number of implications in determining where aid should
be given and what type of aid should be given. At the same time, middle income
poverty could also be placed as a continuity with previous patterns of inequality
(albeit at a different level) given the underlying (and continuing) structural
relationships between the developed and developing world. The timing of the
MDGs and the rise of emerging powers has inevitably led to linking the role of
the emerging powers to the possibility of the MDGs’ completion at the turn of the
Millennium (UN 2000). Yet the rise of emerging powers such as China has, for
some writers, somewhat skewed the actual success of the MDGs. This is because
those being lifted out of poverty as measured globally have been lifted out of
poverty only in China (Sumner 2013b). Brautigam (2009) often bases her points
on debunking the ‘common perception of China’ that China is engaged in its own
‘scramble for natural resources’. Brautigam has consistently argued that China is
not so ‘resource’ focused primarily because its forms of assistance are distributed
relatively equally across the African continent as well as elsewhere.
Yet from an international relations (IR) perspective, this can be understood
as a strategic aspect of China’s official ‘peaceful rise’ soft power narrative. The
main problem identified by critics of both the MDGs and Chinese involvement,
is that whilst the MDG goals may well be close to completion, the resources
that have been used to reach the ‘target bar’ have been ‘unnaturally’ used up and
maybe even undermined longer term development sustainability and resilience.
This point of contention challenges the assumption that having future based ‘time
bound targets’ will smooth over any such unevenness. Indeed, the setting of targets
by the aid institutions often fails to account for the complexity of social systems.
Moreover, there is often an implicitly patronising view that developing nations
(unlike the West) can be understood and captured by streamlined technocratic
fixes. There is, of course, also the underlying issue that poverty might have
been solved (perhaps even more effectively) without the MDGs. Whilst many
aid institutions employ researchers to ‘fix’ problems or to outline the variety of
combinations of outcomes based on modelling by in-putting previous scenarios,
there is also a feeling that this world of ‘data’ mining is constantly outpacing
the various models. This is the so-called ‘big data’ scenario where causation has
become a recognition of complex correlation (Zakaria 2013). This is because there
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 39
is not enough self-reflection of how governments can themselves reflect upon
and use these very research outputs (and models) in their policies and reports in
order to attract resources. Many recipient governments, for instance, have now
based their future national budgets on a pre-emption of future aid income. These
pre-emptive actions are then fed back into a predictive aid model which is then
pre-empted again by recipient governments and stakeholders in a self-fulfilling
feedback loop. De Mesquita (2013) has recently noted that ‘The actions people
take are created by the expectations of what other people will do in response’.
This makes quantifying cause and consequence variables for firing ‘magic bullets’
more problematic but has engendered an industry of more and more data collection
in the hope of outpacing such self-reflective scenarios.
Defenders of the MDGs tend to use their own counter-factual trump card that
‘it is better than it was’ (and probably better than it would have been, given
the early trajectories upon which the MDGs were originally based). However,
setting such bars (such as $1.25 a day as extreme poverty) always causes its own
‘traps’ and exclusions such as in middle income countries where those living
just above the bar would not receive the same amount of aid as compared with
those living at just less than $1.25 a day. Aram Ziai (2011) noted that the original
logic that informed the choice of particular MDGs was never really made
explicit enough, given that the goals were a part of the wider ranging Millennium
Declaration (UN 2000). The choice of MDGs for Ziai (2011) failed to connect
up to these wider issues. Jan Vandermoortele (2011) argued that the MDGs were
always too limited and too narrowly focused, and had unintentionally created
issue fragmentation leading to exclusive and vertical silos of policymaking and
vested interests. Moreover, he argued that quantification of poverty was arbitrary
and not actually in the spirit of the original Millennium Declaration (UN 2000)
from which the eight principle MDGs were taken. Quantification has also meant
that there is little in the MDGs concerning the broader substantive questions of
freedom, equality and tolerance. The UN Millennium Declaration (UN 2000)
also stated its commitments to making the ‘right to development’ a reality for
everyone. Hulme and Wilkinson (2012), in a further important reappraisal of
the MDGs in retrospect, also asked the deceptively simple question, did the UN
get it right, from the start? (OECD 1996). Extending the MDGs, however, might
also mean global complacency by abstractly raising ambitions, leading to future
credibility issues. William Easterly (2009b) noted what he has consistently
regarded as the peculiar arbitrariness of the MDGs: on MDG goal number one
(reducing extreme world poverty by half), the objective was always flawed
because there is a low ‘initial’ per capita elasticity in African states so on this
basis, Africa initially needs a higher economic growth for aid to actually work
and to lift countries over the tipping point.
Institutional responses: more technocracy
President Jim Yong Kim (2013) of the World Bank Group recently argued that
aid donor countries that are performing at high growth rates can reduce extreme
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
poverty by 2030 to 3 per cent if better technical instruments and more effective
and streamlined packages can be found. He argued that reforms should be
instigated within the World Bank’s own institutional aid processes and through
better technical capabilities. The group also includes the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC). These more effective capabilities would avoid the previous
institutional misalignments between short-term vested departmental interests
and World Bank missions. President Kim argued that realignment would also
generate more effective ‘development cooperation’ through public–private sector
partnerships. In a recent speech in Seoul, cited by national broadsheets, he noted
that with regard to promoting the private sector ‘In fact Korea is a little bit behind.
China has been very aggressively investing and they learnt a tremendous amount’
(Kim, Ji-hyun 2013).
The technocratic approaches and self-referential development outcomes of the
MDGs, according to Karver et al. (2012), were also critically weak on identifying
the underlying causes of poverty and the links to the wider issues of social justice
and social development. The MDGs were also, it has been argued, over specified
with multiple targets being focused on the same agenda and an assumption of
cause–consequence linearity. For instance, primary school enrolment was
clearly improved, but there was not enough emphasis on monitoring actual daily
attendance, or an awareness of the possibility that children were just repeating
their academic years or re-enroling elsewhere. This was especially in many
low income countries (LICs) where, by definition, routine data monitoring and
registration centralisation were not always possible.
Whilst such a criticism can of course be countered by the argument that further
aid focus can solve this issue, there is the constant concern that even if such targets
were met, then attention would go elsewhere and that by having ‘artificial’ targets
the unintended consequence is of causing disruption of perhaps more ‘natural’
processes. That is, targets are being met, but underlying this success has been
a reinforced mismatch between diagnostic problems and long-term solutions.
This means that resources may be used up too quickly to reach ‘artificial’ targets
which have not attended to more fundamental and unquantifiable issues such as
community organisation, gender equality, household management and children’s
rights. This ‘results-based’ approached is now being promoted by Asian donors
but through specific projects rather than through ‘abstract’ indicators. On the
other hand, a results-based approach creates a ‘goal’ orientated culture, which if
stretched toward the future can ‘iron out’ (rather than ‘smooth over’) short-term
bottlenecks.
The sustainable development goals
Sachs (2012) is now calling for a new set of ‘sustainable development goals’
(SDGs) to keep the public mind focused for the post-2015 era. Sachs (2012)
has also linked this development with a reappraisal of President Kennedy’s
‘Quest for Peace’. However President Kennedy rejected the ‘grand and magic’
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 41
remote formulae for peace and development, and emphasised the more concrete
‘gradual evolution of human institutions’ (Kennedy 1963). As China’s former
Premier Deng Xiaoping once put it, this is ‘crossing the river by feeling each
stone’. Developing nations may ‘leapfrog’ the development models of the former
aid recipients who are now aid donors, but who wish to ‘export’ their models
as further evidence of their own successful development. The leapfrogging is
a result of accelerating technological diffusion but also opening up issues of
patency ownership (The Economist 2008). However, one issue now emerging
is whether the aid recipient countries can have more than just technical national
sovereign ownership of road and rail links. Although the donor may not have
technical national sovereignty over the recipient territory, nevertheless, it is still
able to exert extra-territorial power leverage, waiting in the wings for its aid
‘on request’. This notion of ‘shared experience’ can also become a sharing of
incommensurable and ‘unique experiences’. For instance, South Korea’s aid is
often given in the form of adapting its own technology to recipient countries
which have no infrastructure or energy national grid. Samsung’s plasma
televisions are now being exported by South Korea to many African nations. The
televisions are battery operated due to poor electricity connections and the lack
of a national grid in the recipient country. Whilst this may build up soft power
support (particularly during global sporting events) this also has the potential to
flood the local market with imports (thus disrupting local business entrepreneurs)
and may actually reinforce future national infrastructure deficiencies by taking
away incentives for massive investments.
For Sachs (2012), the SDGs are a ‘triple bottom line’ approach by synergising
the processes of economic development, environment sustainability and social
inclusion. But he admits that there is no consensus as yet, particularly regarding
the angle of trade-offs between these pillars, even if the world, as he put it, has
now entered a ‘new geological epoch’. Sachs (2012) also argued that it is now
a question of ‘not what the rich should do for the poor’ but ‘what all countries
should do together for global wellbeing’. However, the point might also be
said to obscure the structural power differences between (and within) emerging
nations, and could be construed as a position which unintentionally abrogates the
previous responsibilities of the rich nations by claiming that ‘everyone is now
in this together’. Such abstract notions of ‘global cooperation’ also characterise
many of the Aid 2.0 approaches, where differences between nations are often
construed as a rather abstract ‘diversity’. Moreover, Sachs’s point follows the
ideational mantra of neoliberalism which is ‘we can help you to help yourselves’
but then ultimate responsibility for any continuing poverty resides with a lack of
disciplined leadership and governance in the recipient country. This is a position
which again obscures the structural inequalities between nations which lie under
the surface of the abstract ‘level playing field’ approach. However, this critique of
neoliberalism does not necessarily have to fall back on the ‘history’ blame-game
of colonialism and interference. On the contrary, many African governments
and a new generation of African leaders want to move beyond this issue, often
regarding this as an expedient tool of the more nationalistic governments in the
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
developing world (diverting attention from other issues) or as a Western mantra
which creates its own form of neo-colonial dependency which is based on pity
and guilt, and promoted through the actions of well-intentioned but ultimately
misguided Western development NGOs.
Nevertheless, Sachs does point out that the BRICs ‘will be critical leaders of
the SDGs’ but ‘will have their own internal challenges of balancing growth and
environmental sustainability’, as well as vulnerabilities to climate change, and
complex geopolitical roles (Sachs 2012). Debates on foreign aid continue as to its
usefulness and its impact (Easterly 2009a, 2009b). Sachs, according to Easterly,
is wrongly critical of those who would like to see an end to foreign aid. Sachs
criticises aid sceptics for not wanting to provide just $4 of aid for purchasing a
mosquito net to save a life. Easterly (2009a) agreed, but argued that surely this is
exactly the problem with an aid industry that can provide $6 trillion over a multidecadal period, and yet still be unable to provide a $4 mosquito net. For Easterly
this is not an isolated incident but is symptomatic of an aid bureaucracy whose
very structure diminishes responsibility and accountability. Easterly (2009a) also
admitted that the debates between Western economists on this are now becoming
‘mildly amusing’.
Not to be put off or dispirited, Sachs (2013a, 2013b) has taken up the big
push mantle again, and has argued that a moderate ‘market economy’ approach
is still the best way for creating economic development. This means that a new
set of global targets should now be constructed. Such ambitions are framed as
another ‘global push’ and a warning to the doom-mongers that the human spirit
will always push on and solve global problems (although this is always easier
for the more footloose global constituents than others). For instance, Sachs
(2013a) argued that cell-phones (provided by emerging donors) are now aiding
African businesses and that more efforts should be placed in securing public–
private partnerships (PPPs). I will consider this issue in Chapter 6. Such forms
of communication technology, however, whilst galvanising ‘connections’ for
a particular group, might provide little incentives for the local private sector
to invest in, or help develop, a ‘national grid’ infrastructure system. Moreover,
governments may also feel more disinclined to invest heavily in such national
grid systems, particularly those governments who may fear that a coordinated
national infrastructure will allow democracy (and electoral monitoring and data
gathering) to flourish. As a result, these ‘networks’ can potentially create socalled ‘enclaves’ and yet between these networks, territories and communities
may become more marginalised. Indeed the new geography aid approach in this
context might also be regarded as remaining ‘state-centric’ because it does not,
as yet, account for a growing trend of the ‘de-territorialisation of states’ as these
‘development enclaves’ or ‘NGO green zones’. Therefore global resources are
not so much flowing into recipient countries but ‘hopping’ (Ferguson 2005). This
polarity is also a feature of many of the middle income countries. Yet according
to Maurice (2013) the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme
poverty (below $1 a day) has clearly fallen from 47 per cent in 1990 down to 22
per cent in 2013.
The contemporary foreign aid debate 43
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Towards an Aid 2.0 paradigm and the post-MDGs
The OECD (2012b) recently noted that the world has achieved MDG number one
of halving the number of people living in absolute poverty under $1 a day. However
the OECD (2012b) also recognised that this is largely due to the high economic
growth in large emerging-power countries such as Brazil, India and China.
There is also the increasing role of other sources of revenue such as domestic tax
revenue and remittances from diaspora migrants. The OECD (2012b) emphasised
the need to leverage the full spectrum of additional finance and prioritise political
reforms in advanced and developing countries to help reach the level of social
development equivalent to the completion of the MDGs. In this same report,
the OECD (2012b) also mentioned the emergence of a new geography of aid,
by distinguishing between bottom-up approaches (which directly address those
transfers and expenditures that are targeted) and top-down approaches (which are
measured by the amount of development that is needed by a country to ensure that
there is enough economic growth to meet the MDGs). The bottom-up approach
assumes that targeted transfers and expenditures are paid out each year. As a
result, top-down financing occurs when a ‘finance gap’ or market bottleneck is
identified that can be resolved by increasing ODA and private financial transfers.
Such approaches are usually less effective in those countries where a greater
emphasis on financing has the smallest effect on long-term economic growth.
These are often middle income countries which have a skewed distribution of
wealth and low productivity rates.
These are states that are most likely to be unresponsive to top-down initiatives
which undermines the credibility of time-bound targeting such as the MDGs.
However, the OECD (2012b) also pointed out that for low income countries
it is less costly to boost the level of economic development through top-down
development finance than to pay in year after year. This approach was initiated by
the 2011 Busan Conference on aid effectiveness through the Global Partnership
for Effective Development Cooperation (Busan 2011). The initiative, however,
noted that although the longstanding Poverty Reduction Strategies of countries
are commendable, these programmes do not necessarily lead to growth and that
growth, by the same token, does not necessarily lead to poverty eradication. As
a result, Sumner and Mallett (2012) used the term ‘Aid 2.0 paradigm’. Thus, a
paradigm represents a set of conscious (and unconscious) norms and practices
that define a specific scientific discipline at a certain point of time. It is also rooted
in practices of interests, power and knowledge.
Indeed, at the third BRICS (2011) summit, there was a clear emphasis by
delegates on developing a paradigm that would promote greater inter-state diversity
through a shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation. At the
recent G8 meeting, emphasis was placed more on generating an open economy,
an open society, and open government (G8 2013). Whilst the ‘Aid 1.0 paradigm’
was based on the assumption that there are ‘poor people living in poor countries’,
an Aid 2.0 paradigm (that is both emerging from the BRICs and from the more
Western perspectives) is generally a paradigm that tends to regard the distribution
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
of wealth and poverty as being skewed within rather than between countries. This
is a result of middle income state development, and as a ‘global bad’ also requires
more collective global action. However the actors in this collective action of global
solidarity are yet to be identified, ostensibly as a result of the strategic tensions
between emerging powers and their own relationship with the West. Nonetheless,
a greater focus is, in this approach, placed on development risks and resilience, or
as Taleb (2012) recently termed it, ‘anti-fragility’. Critics of this approach have
said that such terms are all a part and parcel of a more de-politicised narrative
that neutralises (or obscures) the specific historical actors and causes of poverty.
Andy Sumner (2013b) more recently noted that the majority of the world’s poor,
by income per capita and in terms of the multidimensional character of poverty
(issues of economic diversity, inclusion, life expectancy, infant mortality, disease
eradication, education, sanitation, social equality and gender equality) live in
countries now classified as middle income countries.
Global South and emerging powers as recipients and donors
Emerging powers in the evolution of aid
To indicate the ‘power’ shift between the developed world and emerging powers,
during the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 stated:
Many emerging and developing economies have made great strides in raising
living standards as their economies converge toward the productivity levels
and living standards of advanced economies … The poorest countries have
little economic cushion to protect vulnerable populations from calamity,
particularly as the financial crisis followed close on the heels of a global
spike in food prices.
(Pittsburgh 2009: No 34)
A year later, in 2010, the BRICs met in Brazil (BRICs 2010) and called for more
reform of the existing global institutions by tapping into the Group of Twenty’s
(G20) role as a multilateral financial organisation and in finance cooperation.
Brazil had also wanted to showcase its growing and responsible geopolitical
role as a regional economic power and to use this in its bid to be a part of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council. Brazil called for ‘support for
a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law,
equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decisionmaking of all States’ (BRICs 2010). The BRICs (2010) declaration stated that ‘the
central role played by the G-20 in combating the crisis through unprecedented
levels of coordinated action’ is that the G20 was confirmed as the premier forum
for establishing international economic coordination. The BRICs (2010) also
called for a reaffirmation of ‘the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, with
a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative’, so that it can
deal with today’s global challenges to ‘reiterate the importance we attach to the
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 45
status of India and Brazil in international affairs, and understand and support their
aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations’ (BRICs 2010).
Karver et al. (2012) argued that identifying the leading actors for setting the
MDG agenda post-2015 is now the main issue given the rise of emerging powers.
Karver et al. (2012) also argued that the MDGs have ignored the wider issues
of growth and jobs, due to a number of key mis-targets such as on education
enrolment rather than educational content. This is a gap being filled by many
Asian donors such as South Korea and Japan, competing to promote their own
particular educational curriculums and achievements. The UN-ECOSOC (2013)
has also reported that the global community is now ‘moving away from North–
South relationships’ towards one of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.
The report suggested that South–South relations have a unique role to play in
development cooperation. Development cooperation actors, it was said, ‘must not
work in silos’ but build on equitable partnerships by reducing fragmentation and
duplication of projects. MDGs, the report stated, ‘remain highly relevant’ but the
report also indicated that assumed concepts and geographical assumptions (such
as West, East, North, South, OECD and non-OECD) now need to be revised.
There is also the question as to whether emerging powers (and emerging powers
providing ODA) have different geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics and
represent a reinforcement of the mainstream aid regimes, or a challenge ‘from
within’ or conversely a challenge ‘from without’.
Moreover, there is the question as to whether aid alternatives are supplementary
or a challenge to the mainstream institutions (from which middle power bridge
nations have a key strategic role). This also introduces the question as to the
content and form of alternative aid policies and institutions in terms of norms,
values and institutional forms (Tunis 2010). One recent issue in changing norms
has been in assessing the role of development financing to help complete the
MDGs. For instance, the Monterrey (2002) Consensus identified the issue as one
of a weak institutional capacity for recipient governments to absorb finance, due
to the politicised nature of required coordination between national ministries, and
as a result of frequent changes in government mandates as a result of the very
processes of democracy that many donors promote. The Consensus also focused
upon a number of suggestions regarding MDG development based outcomes.
The communiqué from Monterrey (2002) suggested the need for national aid
policies and strategies, to promote national development priorities indicators,
more effective institutional capacity development and implementation, better
monitoring and evaluating of country development strategies, more effective
alignment and harmonisation with national institutional systems, and a ‘levelling
of the playing field’ through encouraging South–South partnerships.
At the BRICS conference held in Durban, South Africa in 2013, emphasis
by the five participating states was placed on further promoting intra-BRICS
solidarity with the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank for enabling
financing of development projects in recipient countries. This initiative was also
mentioned as being an alternative to the Western aid institutions of the World
Bank, the IMF and the OECD-DAC, but has also been seen as an attempt by
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
Beijing to counter the power of the dollar (BRICS 2013; IMF 2013b). Yet a drop
in the status and value of the dollar would also hurt Beijing’s dollar reserves and
in this sense a mutual vulnerability is evident. Either way, a new Bank that would
be financed by the emerging powers and based on their own export-led foreign
reserves would further promote competition in the aid market (IMF 2013a).
Western powers may also regard the current ‘rise of the South’ as a challenge
to their dominance, but based on ‘Western’ capitalist terms and therefore not an
ideological or security threat in the sense of a new Cold War. During the Cold
War, what is now termed the global South, was known as the ‘third world’. There
is now a variety of terminologies such as ‘countries in transition’, emerging
countries, or post-colonial countries. These terminologies also determine the
content of particular state-led narratives on national identity and a soft power
‘state’s place in the world’ and what the state has to offer. This broad heritage
dates back to the 1955 Bandung Conference through to the NIEO of the 1970s.
Third world solidarity
The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was formally acknowledged on 1
May 1974 by the UN. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) has been traditionally thought of as being more ‘pro-South’ than the
mainstream Bretton Woods institutions. The 1st Millennium Group of Seventy
Seven (G77) South Summit was held in the Cuban capital of Havana (G77 2000).
With the highly ‘anti-Western’ symbolic hosting in Havana, its communiqué
stated that it was ‘fully committed to the spirit of the Group of 77 and China’
which has ‘helped our countries since the inception of the Group in the early
1960s to pursue a common and constructive course of action for the protection
and promotion of our collective interests and genuine international cooperation for
development’. The underlying rhetoric has been one of South–South partnerships
through bringing mutual benefits and through promoting shared experiences,
technological know-how, and a respect for national sovereignty through equal
development cooperation (Alden 2012; Alden and Alves 2009; Alden and Large
2011; Alden and Vieira 2005).
The 2013 UN Human Development Report also examined what it regarded as
a major key shift in global aid dynamics which is what it terms the ‘fast-rising
new powers’ (United Nations Development Program 2013). The report explained
that China had now overtaken Japan as the world’s second biggest economy based
on GDP data. India it stated, is also reshaping its future with new entrepreneurial
creativity and social policy innovation, whilst Brazil is lifting its living standards
through expanding international relationships and anti-poverty programmes that
are emulated worldwide.
The statistics in Table 1. 1 show that those recipient countries with relatively
smaller populations have higher relative rates of aid per capita but also indicate
how aid is widely dispersed and focused in areas, as I will argue later, of increasing
strategic maritime significance in the Asia-Pacific region. Non-OECD-DAC aid
from the BRICs is now often in the form of humanitarian aid in order to match the
The contemporary foreign aid debate 47
Table 1.1 Top 5 recipients of net ODA per capita in 2011
Tuvalu
4323
Marshall Islands
1568
Micronesia
1294
Palau
1340
Tonga
896
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Source: World Bank 2012, in $ million.
norms of the OECD-DAC. In this respect the BRICs are both emulating and yet
indicating through this their ability to compete with OECD-DAC. According to
the Global Humanitarian Assistance Development Initiative, in 2011 Brazil gave
$23m in humanitarian aid, Russia donated $28m, and India $19m. India was the
largest government donor to provide aid for the 2010 Pakistan floods ($25m) and
a big donor to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake fund ($40m). In 2005, China reported
giving $107m in humanitarian aid to the UN Financial Tracking Service, and has
provided aid to Zimbabwe, although China was criticised for its low amount of
aid to the Philippines in November 2013 following the typhoon. Nevertheless,
the point made by Brautigam and others was that in terms of its Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita, Chinese humanitarian assistance was higher than
commonly perceived. A lot of Chinese humanitarian aid has been given bilaterally
to the National Red Cross or National Red Crescent. South Africa spent $3.5m on
humanitarian aid in 2011.
The IMF’s (2013a) World Economic Outlook report noted that the rise of the
BRICs now reflects increasing economic strength, but with the view that from
a low start, whilst it is easier to catch up, it is also more difficult to sustain this
growth in the long term unless structural changes are made. The IMF report
also stressed the need for an acceleration in domestic demand in the BRICs
(Kilby 2012). During the recent 2008 global financial crisis, the BRIC countries
aimed at promoting solidarity and mutual commitment. Critics suggested that
such communiqués only served to show an increasing inter-BRIC rivalry and
uneasiness as a result of economic competition. The first BRICs summit on 16
June 2009 was held in Russia. Its first communiqué stated:
The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and
representation in international financial institutions … We underline our
support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the
rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated
action and collective decision-making of all states.
(BRICs 2009: Nos 3 and 12)
The IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF 2013b) also noted that emerging
markets and emerging powers may only have net increases in capital inflows
partly due to low interest rates in advanced economies, as a result of the financial
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
crisis and heavy government bond buying or ‘quantitative easing’ to stimulate
investment. The concern is that this is creating a number of unsustainable ‘bubbles’
and speculation pressure in emerging markets. UNCTAD (2012a, 2012b) recently
reported that new investments in Africa were now being made in green field sites
and start-up small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Around the time of the
G8 campaigns, there was a view that a new paradigm shift was underway (Payne
2005, 2006, 2008). Payne (2008) also argued that initiatives such as ‘Make Poverty
History’ continued to, problematically, frame poverty as an exception to neoliberal
rules. Payne (2008) also rightly argued, in my opinion, that there was (and perhaps
still is) too much emphasis, almost obsession, on generating aid harmony and aid
consensus in the leading institutions, which is good diplomacy but ignores muchneeded attention to specific issues of development in concrete time and space.
Emphasis on terms such as ‘consensus’ and harmony is also a feature of Asian
donor aid. However practices can often be imbued with power interests and seen
as more conservatively obscuring top-down paternal interests by excluding any
dissent to authority which is framed through narratives of disorderly disruption
and impudence. Recent OECD (2012a) figures attest to the impact of the financial
crisis on the established DAC donors, reflected as shown in Table 1.2.
The statistics also indicate relatively low ratios of ODA/GNI for Japan and
South Korea. This is despite Japan’s ODA being one of the highest as measured
in $million. Middle powers Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and Norway all provide a GNI to ODA above the 0.7 per cent recommendation.
On to high-level aid effectiveness
Aid effectiveness is usually placed as the next stage of the ‘Aid 2.0’ paradigm
of aid, but a next stage still primarily situated within the mainstream albeit nonlinear evolution of ODA as both norm and institution. One indication as to what
the post-2015 agenda might look like concerns high-level aid effectiveness
(Mawdsley 2012; Mawdsley et al. 2013). This innovation is currently manifested
in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Busan 2011).
The term ‘high level’ gives the game away really, being based on ‘shared
experiences’ at the elite end of government and the elite-led NGOs. On the other
hand there is a prevailing view that aid (and development) effectiveness is now
the most practical way of completing the MDGs by 2015, or at worst, a form of
rushed damage limitation in an acknowledgement that most of the MDGs will
not be met by 2015. Emphasis is placed on results-based aid, and on quality
rather than aid quantity. This also includes policies, amongst others, in reforming
the current national and international fiscal systems. The underlying philosophies
are to encourage country ownership, institutional alignments and policy
harmonisation through consensus, albeit there is a view that aid effectiveness
is merely a useful justification for governments to reduce aid pledges. Indeed, a
policy of reducing aid can be ‘spun’ by the more expedient donor governments
to indicate that their aid is more efficient and working much better in line with
the norms of the international community. The South Korean MOFAT (2012:
The contemporary foreign aid debate 49
Table 1.2 Individual country DAC members’ net official ODA in 2012
DAC
% ODA of GNI
2011
% change in real
terms 2011–2012
Australia
4983
0.34
8.4
Austria
1111
0.27
5.5
Belgium
2807
0.54
−12.6
Canada
Czech Republic
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ODA $US million
2011
Denmark
5459
0.32
3.6
250
0.12
−4.0
−2.7
2931
0.85
France
12997
0.46
−1.4
Finland
1406
0.53
−0.4
Germany
14093
0.39
−2.0
Greece
425
0.15
−16.1
Iceland
26
0.21
6.3
Ireland
914
0.51
−3.4
Italy
4326
0.20
−32.3
Japan
10831
0.18
−1.1
South Korea
1325
0.12
21.1
Luxembourg
409
0.97
1.3
Netherlands
6344
0.75
−6.6
New Zealand
424
0.28
1.5
4756
0.96
0.3
Norway
Poland
417
0.06
8.0
Portugal
706
0.31
−11.0
Slovakia
86
0.09
−1.5
Spain
4173
0.29
−47.3
Sweden
5603
1.02
−3.5
5.3
3051
0.46
UK
Switzerland
13832
0.56
−0.5
US
30920
0.20
−2.6
Source: OECD 2013, figures updated December 23.
239) has stated its ‘constant efforts’ to improve its institutional ODA policy
such as setting up the ‘Inter-Agency Grants Committee’. South Korea has
also encouraged the BRICSs to sign up, promoting this as ‘inclusive’ but also
providing South Korea with a middle power leverage over agenda setting as a
non-threatening state. South Korea’s 2010 ‘Framework Action Strategic Plan’
provided documentation of shared development experience, the need to reform
its grant system (and ODA to reach 0.25 per cent of GNI) and to develop strategic
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
partnerships, and credibility. There was a view that the Busan High-Level Talks
represented ‘the end of traditional donor–recipient relations in development
cooperation and recognising the role of diverse development actors including
emerging economies, civil society organisations and the private sector’ (MOFAT
2012: 240). However the issue of the different power leverages between these
actors was not developed. With 3,000 representatives from 160 countries, and
from 70 international organisations (IO)s, 100 parliamentarians and 300 civil
society organisations (CSOs), South Korea aimed to ‘bridge the gap’ between
the developed and developing nations. The obvious question that was raised at
the conference concerned the point that if the previous relationships had been so
successful for South Korea then why did they now have to be changed for other
recipients?
The approaches to aid effectiveness have gone through agenda, norm and
institutional evolution from the early meetings held in Rome (2003), Paris
(2005), through to Accra (2008) and most recently Busan (2011). The usual areas
include questions of country ownership, institutional and policy alignment and
harmonisation. However there are sceptical voices from the South suggesting that
the OECD-DAC approach to aid effectiveness is too close to the elite OECD (and
not the G24 or G77). The OECD-DAC secretariat and UNDP, however, currently
have a financial short-fall of over $4 million on the aid effectiveness programmes
and, as such, the hosting of a Fifth High-Level Convention is still being discussed.
There is debate as to whether these are teething problems or a terminal decline
in interest in aid effectiveness (Tran 2013). The more optimistic Paris (2005)
document statement by aid country donors stated:
We … resolve to take far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the way
we deliver and manage aid … we recognise that while the volumes of aid
and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid
effectiveness must increase significantly as well as its support partner country
efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance.
The Busan (2011) document also claimed that the earlier aid effectiveness
rounds, such as Paris (2005), had left much unfinished business and that whilst
the UN has the universal mandate on convening agendas and the UNDP country
presence, progress has been made in fostering South–South dialogue to complement
North–South relations as a strategy of common but differential commitments. The
final document from Busan (2011) went on to specify the need for:
a new partnership that is broader and more inclusive than ever before,
founded on shared principles, common goals and differentiated commitments
for effective international development. The nature, modalities and
responsibilities that apply to south–south cooperation differ from those that
apply to north–south cooperation … characterised by a greater number of
state and non-state actors, as well as cooperation among countries at different
stages in their development, many of them middle income countries.
The contemporary foreign aid debate 51
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South–South and triangular cooperation, new forms of public–private
partnership and other modalities and vehicles for development have become
more prominent complementing north–south forms of cooperation.
(Busan 2011: Nos 1 and 5)
The African Development Bank (AfDB 2010) has continued a discussion on
what has become known as development effectiveness. This was a subtle but
important distinction, as it implied that there were different and not necessarily
complementary types of state development and communities. The language
again was one of partnership equality, the building of ‘capable’ states (again
states are personalised as resilient and robust) and democratic accountability.
The final Tunis (2010) Declaration of that AfDB meeting included the idea of
generating sustainable South–South cooperation but as a so-called ‘partnership
of peers’. To some extent, the term peer can be deceptive, and can itself obscure
hierarchical relationships of monitoring, interference, culture, power and
authority.
Strategic decisions by BRICS and new middle powers such as South Korea
would be whether to accept two different trajectories (OECD-DAC and an
alternative) and to ‘bridge’. Joining the OECD-DAC has been, for new donors,
a sign of national prestige. On this view therefore, an alternative to the DAC
might be the domain of the more powerful Southern states and the BRICS with
the leverage to set up new institutions. At the same time, South–South solidarity
might be compromised by geopolitical and regional factors, and given the uneven
and different stages of country development. The more powerful Southern states
have also acted in the established UN structures but this does not necessarily
make the emerging powers ‘conservative’. This was a clear theme at subsequent
BRICS conferences held in 2012 and 2013 (BRICS 2012, 2013). The conferences
of solidarity placed an emphasis on improving donor and recipient financial
robustness and resilience (Kragelund 2011; Van Norren 2012; Kim and Lightfoot
2011). The BRICS (2012) New Delhi Declaration indicated the emerging
synergies between BRIC support of existing neoliberal institutions but at the same
time an objective of creating an alternative development bank to Bretton Woods.
Fahimul Quadir (2013: 321) similarly noted that the rise of emerging powers has
now ‘boosted prospects for changing the conventional practice of development
cooperation, which has been dominated by multilateral institutions and bilateral
aid agencies since the “invention” of development in the 1950s’. The BRICS
envisage a greater role for more inclusive global institutions such as the G20,
stating:
We do not support plurilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental
principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We believe
that such initiatives not only distract members from striving for a collective
outcome but also fail to address the development deficit inherited from
previous negotiating rounds.
(BRICS 2012: No 16)
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The role of the BRICS and new middle powers in the G20 shows the myriad
of other regional relationships. This can cancel out or undermine other alliances.
An increase in alliances can be seen to enmesh the more powerful nations. Yet
even when states are seen to promote similar agendas, this is not necessarily
a result of a policy per se but often an unintended consequence of underlying
frictions.
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Critics of emerging-power ODA
Firstly, there is the mainstream donor concern with the emphasis on maintaining
donor non-interference and respecting the national sovereignty of the aid recipient.
For mainstream views, such technicalities encourage poor governance and do not
promote democratic (and ethical) practices. Moreover, the promotion of a respect
for national sovereignty is regarded as a common respect for national ‘cultural
diversity’. A sceptical view has been that not only does a ‘respect for diversity’
rely on its own ‘universalism of diversity’ but this also cultivates a ‘moral
relativism’. In itself, this is seen as defensible and as a response to the moral
‘universalism’ that usually emanates from the West. A ‘middle way’ between
relativism and universalism has been promoted through the ‘commonality with
diversity’ approach. Yet, many Asian donor governments, despite this, also hold
particular (and paternal or hierarchical) views on racial and ethnic nationalism.
These beliefs are also potentially pragmatically counter-productive for those
recipient states which are built upon ethnic and racial diversity. Moreover, the
sanctity of protecting national sovereignty through ‘non-interference’ or ‘shared
experience’ is a technicality which does not attend to questions of what is actually
meant by ‘interference’ or sovereignty. That is, the issue of who defines these
terms and for what purpose. Indeed the existence (or potential) of any form of
aid immediately directly or indirectly changes the local environment. States
might in theory be sovereign, but they still require aid and investment owned and
leveraged by the donors. This is particularly problematic in those states which are
technically sovereign but where the enforcement of governance and monitoring
of donors is nationally low. This is where power is still concentrated in the major
cities and between the ‘gated’ elites.
Secondly, Monica DeHart (2012: 1367) argued that new forms of donor–
recipient partnerships are ‘based on common historical trajectories, structural
positioning and values among developing nations, especially in terms of the
desire for sovereignty and equality’. Yet, a challenge to the established donor–
recipient relationship may actually divert, obscure or reinforce more underlying
ethnic and cultural hierarchies even within the global South and between
emerging powers. Moreover, the notion of ‘shared experiences’ is a peculiarly
state-centric and elite-led view which obscures the underlying continuities of
‘shared experiences’ between national and transnational elites which include the
‘third world’ bourgeoisie (Robinson 2006); it obscures the different experiences
of particular constituents such as migrant workers, women, farmers and industrial
labour.
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 53
Thirdly, there is a concern with a significant emphasis on non-conditionality
and an emphasis on specific project support. The concerns here are that there is
a lack of coordination between donors and a potential for project duplication.
Moreover, there is the longstanding question of a propensity to use ‘tied aid’.
This assistance often comes in the form of technical assistance and infrastructure
projects. OECD-DAC donors tend to focus more on country assistance strategies
and macro-based architecture. Many emerging-power donors do not have country
assistance or budget support for a widespread pooling of resources. One issue
here is that as a result, emerging donor aid does not overstretch the weak capacity
of African governments. However, the consequence of this is that this restriction
will stop recipient country institutional capacity from reforming or changing and
being resiliently insured from any future shocks. The traditional donors tend to
want more monitoring and feedback accountability. This can lead to a concern
with ‘red tape’ and wasted emphasis on institutional coordination rather than on
getting the job done.
Emerging-power donors clearly offer an alternative to feedback and monitoring,
and (particularly from Asia as a part of Confucian etiquette) tend to not want to
have routine and inclusive meetings. Critics of this approach point out that such
‘creative pragmatism’ is simply a euphemism for further exclusion as local actors
are simply responding to decisions that have already been made elsewhere but
this process is ‘being seen to be transparent and inclusive’. On the other hand,
and unlike many Western donors, the Chinese tend not to want to ‘poach’ the
local staff from existing governments, NGOs and businesses. The Chinese often
bring or outsource their own staff to fill local positions. Another criticism is that
local staff are not ‘poached’ as the Chinese want their own workers for cultural
and language reasons, and to maintain the cultural hierarchies. At the same time
the Chinese do clearly encourage their workers and staff to live ‘humbly’ and this
is a practice which avoids concerns that foreign staff and workers often reside
in the so-called ‘green zones’ and at a distance from the local community. In
this sense this humility can underscore more subliminal practices of exclusion
as hierarchy obscured by an ethics of ‘hospitality to otherness’. However, as
Brautigam (2009) noted, even if the Chinese do not want to get involved with
local community issues, this was in any case the established practice of the World
Bank for a number of decades (Brautigam 2009, 2011; Jenkins 2012; Plafker
2007; Shambaugh 2013; Taylor 2010). For the West, the justification for not
getting involved with local cultural issues was often through the multicultural
narrative on having a ‘respect for difference’ but which itself can lead to cultural
segregations. For the Chinese and other emerging Asian donors, tensions within
local communities and potential cultural conflicts in recipient countries have not
been so significant given similar beliefs in the concept of ethnic homogeneity
in China, South Korea and Japan (Lancaster 2007). The BRICS (2013) summit
communiqué also stated that the 2013 summit had:
reaffirmed our commitment to the promotion of international law,
multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations (UN). Our
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
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discussions reflected our growing intra-BRICS solidarity as well as our
shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development
and cooperation. We also considered our role in the international system as
based on an inclusive approach of shared solidarity and cooperation towards
all nations and peoples.
Terms such as ‘we’ and ‘our’ clearly reflect an assumed approach to state–state
solidarity in producing the common forms of resilience for all, as a state’s ability
to sustain stronger and longer economic expansions, whilst experiencing shorter
and shallower downturns (Boorman 2010; G24 2013; IMF 2009, 2012).
Different South–South strategic choices
Domestic sustainability
The 2013 Human Development Report (HDR) (United Nations Development
Program 2013) has recently stated that a resurgent South is undoubtedly ‘uplifting’
but the South still requires the North, and the North in turn is increasingly
dependent on the South’s growing markets. The world, it stated, is also getting
more connected, with the developing world, as of 2010, creating 60 per cent of
the world’s economic output. Thomas L. Friedman put an alternative spin on the
terminology of the emerging powers by recently distinguishing between ‘the
high imagination enabling countries’ and ‘low imagination enabling’. The former
include many of the developed world countries, as well as the present and former
Low Income Countries (LICs) or Low Middle Income Countries (LMICs). These
countries are potentially bypassing the development strategies of the first wave
of emerging nations (BRICS) which relied on emulating the Western models
and focused their rapid growth on the so-called ‘low hanging fruit’ rather than
investing in more expensive and substantive innovations (Friedman 2012, 2013).
However, there are numerous views that the first generation of ‘emerging
powers’ are now increasingly becoming concerned with the development
trajectory and long-term sustainability. This ‘unevenness’ directly and indirectly
impacts on ODA policy, most obviously with respect to resources but also in
terms of ‘selling’ their development experience to potential recipients. These
middle income countries may have the greater rates of economic growth but these
states are also experiencing different and more ‘relative’ forms of poverty (as a
result of this growth). The BRICS undeniable success in being able to successfully
navigate the recent financial crisis also indicates that economic development in
emerging powers have now gone beyond the ‘critical mass’ of self-sustaining
development. However, there is also an argument that technological innovations
are now becoming more unique and more specific, perhaps not repeatable or easy
to emulate. In this sense, the paradox is that whilst previous technology can become
both quickly diffused and cheaper, the next generation of technology also becomes
more expensive and more patent protected through intellectual property rights, a
bone of contention between the US, the EU and Asian states. Such dynamics
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 55
can potentially impact on a country’s ‘resilience’ and can generate an ability to
‘leapfrog’ development stages. However, for those ‘first generation’ emerging
countries looking for a new development shift, this expensive technology as ‘high
hanging fruit’ becomes more difficult to access unless previous development
strategies and established institutions are reformed.
Such an approach to reform can be politically dangerous for ruling elites. This
would require institutions which would undermine the very success that these
states have had and which has left these states open to such criticism. Moreover,
there are the debates on whether there is (or was) in each BRIC or emerging power
an endogenous ‘tipping point’ or, alternatively, an externalised or ‘punctuated
equilibrium’ that had generated such rapid growth (Mukherji 2013). Hawkesworth
and Cookson (2013) noted signs of concern within the BRICs such as ageing
and declining populations, low productivity rates, high savings rates and capital
investment with increasingly diminishing returns. In terms of relative economic
growth, China is still expected to grow its domestic economy at double US growth
rates. This is leading to debates concerning Beijing’s ‘assertive authoritarianism’
or whether Beijing is pursuing a ‘different’ version of hegemony and whether
there is the need for establishing ‘new relations’ with the US (Mattis 2013). Each
BRIC, however, has its own specific domestic and international challenges. For
Brazil, its tradeable goods sector is still small, and there is a need for macro
stabilisation. Russia has continued issues with natural resource monopolies and
export reliance. India’s growth is regarded as more inclusive, but there are still
issues of much-needed infrastructure reform, agricultural reform, issues of food
security, deepening gaps between urban rich and rural poor, and a need for more
effective delivery of public services. China’s concern is on its continued export
reliance and a need for domestic consumption balancing, whilst South Africa has
ongoing concerns with social and economic inequality, social development, low
savings and an emerging skills shortage.
The Korea Herald (2013) recently quoted a statement concluding the 2013
Third Plenum of the Chinese Government on 10 November: ‘In a society with
rapid transformation and accumulating contradictions, in a fast-changing world
with fierce competition, every step we take towards the peak is a perilous
climb that bears risk and even crisis’. Now that the new Chinese leadership
has consolidated its position, there is a view that the ‘technocratic’ generation
have left, and that a new generation of more relatively ‘risk-taking’ leaders have
gained power, to respond to the build-up of tensions in the Chinese development
model. Warnings and portents of ‘the collapse of China’ have been around for
some time now. Yet, some say that this demise has been somewhat premature
or exaggerated, and that given China’s extraordinary growth, it would be
reasonable to suggest that this rate of growth could clearly not continue
indefinitely. For this reason China’s slowdown is to be expected. On the other
hand, this view is predicated on the assumption of the ‘uniqueness’ of China’s
rapid growth, and therefore any growth slowdown must also be unique and
will not have been witnessed or experienced before. One view is that China’s
economic growth just has to be rebalanced. However there are also concerns
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The contemporary foreign aid debate
that without the pressures of a democratic society, the top-down and more
cautious elite approach to wait and then ‘spontaneously’ channel resources to
fix a problem, allows other structural contradictions and tensions to build up,
whilst businesses and investors wait on the elite to make their decision. Such
waiting also builds up speculative pressures. Characteristic of many of the Asian
developmentalist approaches is this strategy of quicker and quicker responses to
‘outpace’ short-term bottlenecks and structural contradictions, through a waitand-see approach which is followed by rapid actions. Such forms of decision
making and top-down urgency or ‘spontaneity’ clearly require a hierarchical
and elite organisation which excludes other voices and derives a consensus not
through negotiation per se, but rather through narratives on ‘the national family’
or ‘the people’.
Yet such processes can also affect different constituents and different states in
unequal ways (Bremmer 2009). These imbalances include for some countries an
unbalanced geographical and urban emphasis (in China and Brazil toward the East
Coast cities). Some are also critical of BRICS governments for being unwilling to
use these reserves for more domestic and public service spending and economic
distribution of wealth, instead using their foreign reserves as international leverage
and as ODA. This is often criticised as a case of ‘missed opportunities’. In China
and across Asia, as Bremmer (2009) has noted, there are also ideological and
policy tensions between the so-called Guangdong market model of neoliberalism
and the Chongqing statist model. These models are symbolic of splits between
the neoliberal technocrats, those who want modernisation but with more ‘Chinese
characteristics’ and those who want a return to what they regard as ‘Mao’s
communist principles’, often in the rural and interior regions (Kitto 2012). Yet
opinions undeniably vary with regard to whether domestic consumption needs to
be increased or whether increasing productivity and the supply side can offset this
gap and continue rapid and future balanced growth. In the West this is often seen
as a trade-off, but in emerging countries the institutional structures can mean that
demand and supply side can be made to work together.
Nevertheless, some writers have suggested that the richer Chinese middle
classes are now taking their money out of China for fear of future collapse and
creating a self-fulfilling process (Chang 2001). Others see such changes in the
marketplace of middle class popular culture such as in the Asian movie market
(Obst 2013; Sharma 2012a). As a result of the ‘Lewis turning point’ and a reduced
pool of labour, labour costs in many BRICs are now rising and this is impacting
on export competitiveness and the need for a continuing low exchange rate
which puts up import costs. Such policies can cause frictions within and between
developed states and recipient countries trying to sell their products. Indeed, a
further tension arises as many recipient states are pushing for reform of what
they regard as a ‘skewed’ global trading system as a ‘Western’ trade regime, on
the basis that emerging powers are also ‘sharing’ this experience and are thereby
expected to show global South ‘solidarity’.
For Ruchir Sharma (2012b: 3–5), the idea of there being a wider ranging
convergence between the developed and developing worlds is a myth, and as he
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The contemporary foreign aid debate 57
put it, the ‘current fad in economic forecasting is to project so far into the future
that no one will be around to hold you accountable’. The typical and problematic
approach, he argued, looks back to the patterns of the 17th century to make similar
projections to explain the Asian century. Sharma (2012b: 7) goes on with this
thread, noting that ‘Although we can expect more breakout nations to emerge
from the bottom income tier at the top and the middle, the new global economic
order will probably look more like the older one than most observers predict. The
rest may continue to rise, but they will rise more slowly and unevenly than many
experts are predicting’. Sharma (2012b) also wrote that the BRICs have become
more over-leveraged, and that whilst they survived the recent crisis, they have yet
to go through the torturous restructuring.
Demographic deficits
Russia and China have particular concerns with population numbers. As I will
point out later, many Asian donors also have similar long-term concerns. For
instance, China’s ‘one-child policy’ is perhaps an example of how a top-down
approach to managing population control can result in counter-productive limits
to longer term and sustainable economic development. This policy has recently
been overturned by the incumbent Chinese government in an attempt to respond
to China’s ageing population and its ‘demographic deficit’.1 Sharma (2012b)
noted the so-called emerging demographic deficits in several of the BRICS
nations. He argued that the ‘demographic dividend’ generation of the 1980s
Deng era is now becoming a fetter on future economic prospects as an ageing
population with more males than females (a result of the one-child policy) has
reduced the numbers of future workers. Due to the rising costs of raising children,
even a government relaxation of the policy does not necessarily increase fertility
rates or make it financially easier for couples to have more children. Moreover, a
gender imbalance has led to a future generation of elderly Chinese men not having
family or state support. For Sharma, one way through this trend is to make it
easier for Chinese rural workers to have more substantive residential rights in the
cities. However, this would mean the need for more infrastructural and real estate
construction and public debt, to offset an increase in rising property prices due to
the increasing demand for housing.
Goldman Sachs’ latest set of projections have looked at more than 70 countries
globally and covers 90 per cent of current world GDP. Goldman Sachs expects the
BRICs to account for 40 per cent of global GDP by 2050 (O’Neill 2011). However,
a key distinction is often made between measuring the BRICS’s economic rise in
absolute terms and the issue of per-capita income GDP or distribution. It is the
issue of distribution which impacts on the argument as to whether such emerging
countries are able to provide long-term ODA and issues of domestic credibility
if there are high levels of domestic poverty. As a result of its rapid development,
by the middle of 2011, China held more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange
reserves, which was close to 50 per cent of its own GDP. The World Bank (2013a,
2013b) however has indicated the need for more regional and global rebalancing,
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and regarded the transition to a market economy in China, and elsewhere, as
incomplete rather than flawed. Sharma (2012b) pointed out that India’s growth
rate has slowed to 5 or 6 per cent from previous rates of 8 to 9 per cent over the
last decade. Sharma noted that if countries such as Nigeria or India, with a per
capita income of only $1,500, are only able to grow at 5 per cent per annum, then
there is clearly a structural problem. At the same time, with India now becoming a
major technological hub, start-up smaller businesses from the younger generation
are providing a boost to the economy. If a country with a per capita income level
of $20,000 such as South Korea grows at 4 or 5 per cent, then that, for Sharma
(2012a, 2012b), is a huge achievement. As a result of recent concerns, in 2013
Morgan Stanley named Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa as the
emerging ‘fragile five’ (Aslund 2013).
Geopolitics and diversity
The emerging powers are often regarded as promoting a shared solidarity but one
based on a recognition of national sovereignty and ‘diversity’. Yet this diversity
can itself be a result of underlying divisions and uneven developments within
and between emerging powers. The actual form and nature of this divergence,
and reasons for it, can be construed both positively and negatively by other
emerging-power states: firstly, to use the more powerful nations and ‘free ride’
or to recognise that such free-riding itself maybe construed as a threat both by
other BRICS and the Western nations; secondly, whether BRICS or emergingpower solidarity constraints or advances a state’s regional power; thirdly, whether
BRICS or emerging-power solidarity allows an emerging power to advance into
a more global and multilateralist position; and fourth, addressing the relationship
between BRICS solidarity and the regional solidarity patterns between the BRICS
and the regional surrounding nations. O’Neill (2011) talks of what he regards as
‘the growth map’, and says that if measured in absolute terms then the traditional
G7 are still strong but the relative picture shifts dramatically when important
emerging-power economies are taken into account. The conclusion he draws is
that emerging nations’ involvement at key economic summits such as the G20
means that future summit organisation must now be more open to the realities of
new powers, which can paradoxically strengthen older alliances and groupings as
‘defensive’.
Emerging nations might also strategically select to join such groupings to enter
into a particular global issue as a confirmation of their new status. O’Neill (2011)
decided that the term emerging markets could no longer be applied to the BRICs
and four of the N-11, these being Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
He also argued that these are countries with largely sound government debt and
deficit positions, as well as robust trading networks and huge numbers of people all
moving steadily up the economic ladder. These ‘next-11’ middle power countries
can be broadly linked to Ian Bremmer’s (2006) ‘J’ curve. Thus, if governments
relax control to create economic growth (by opening their societies to global
integration with) they risk domestic social and political upheaval. Yet if they keep
The contemporary foreign aid debate 59
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politics closed, they may limit the power of their economies which then creates
social and political instability through challenges from the new middle classes.
Similarly, for countries already politically opening, economic expectations have
risen and if not met due to slowing growth then this can also fuel nationalistic and
protest tendencies. Yet reforms to the original development model can also lead to
government vulnerability. Next 11s are also understood to be more strategically
flexible than the first generation of BRIC emerging powers by cultivating their
own forms of niche diplomacy and cross-cutting middle power alliances both
within and outside established regional and multilateral institutions.
Conclusion
The chapter has considered the evolution of the aid debate and the role of
emerging-power donors as understood in the current literature. The evolution
of the aid debate is now being influenced by, and can also be placed into, the
wider geopolitical transitions occurring as a result of the rise of emerging nations.
However, I have also suggested that more needs to be said about the actual
dynamics and reasons for these dynamics regarding inter-state emerging-power
relationships and between emerging powers themselves. The current literature
therefore does not as yet place the debate into the wider context of the critical
assessments of BRIC and emerging economic, political and social dynamics
from a regional perspective. Thus, in the following chapter I consider what these
IR perspectives are and how they can be used to explain and to understand the
specific Asian regional relationships between the established and emerging Asian
donor countries. These relationships and dynamics, I argue, play a key role in
determining the distribution and content of ODA.
Note
1 ‘China Reforms: One Child Policy to be Relaxed’ BBC News Online 15 November
2013 www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-China–24957303
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2
International relations
perspectives
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Emerging powers and the contemporary
geopolitics of Asia
Introduction
Determining the borders of the ‘Asian’ region and determining what counts as
an ‘Asian perspective’ is inevitably controversial. Such questions have been
created and influenced by a myriad of power interests, cultural exchanges and
representations, as well as contested territorial mappings (Victor Prescott 2003).
Moreover, technology and innovations in transportation and infrastructure are
now re-connecting many of the older East–West trading routes and ‘new Silk
Roads’. Interest in trans-continental railways (from Busan to Paris) and overland
trade and maritime shipping routes also play a considerable part in both national
and regional identity construction. These official and unofficial constructions also
impact on the geopolitical dynamics of the region. For instance, recently, there
has been Russian and Chinese interest in connecting the port of Hasan in Russia
to the port of Rajin in North Korea. This would make access to the Northern sea
routes easier for China. Russia and South Korea have called for a trans-Korean
rail-link. Along with a proposed natural gas pipeline, this initiative would also
enable South Korea to gain easier access to Russian Siberia’s abundant natural
resources.
Currently the geopolitics of Asia consists of a growing interest in the direction
of Chinese–US relations (Zoellick 2013). The relationship between China’s
‘dream’ and the United States’ (US) ‘rebalance’ has led to various predictions of
both an increasing interdependence between the states as well as an increasing
bellicosity. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive and have been termed
the US–China ‘cool war’ (Feldman 2013). China’s recent upsurge in regional
military activity has been described as a ‘cabbage’ strategy of unilaterally claiming
maritime territorial rights and then building up a network of security outposts
around this claim. This is leading to a series of ‘overlapping’ maritime, territorial
and aerial sovereignty claims. This strategy is, however, also aware of China’s
‘peaceful rise’ or soft power approach in the region, which builds up Chinese
strength through discreet micro-events or as a ‘crossing the river by feeling each
stone’. Similar strategies are used with respect to Chinese foreign aid. These
developments have also impacted on alliances between regional neighbours
South Korea and Japan. The sense in South Korea and China is that the US seems
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to be increasingly relying on Japan as ‘regional policeman’. This has implications
for issues regarding redefining the post-war Japanese constitution. South Korea is
deciding on where its strategic loyalties reside, either to Washington or to Beijing.
China is South Korea’s leading trade partner and yet the US is South Korea’s main
security guarantor. There are also changes in Indian–Chinese–Russian relations
concerning access over the ‘heartland’ of Central Asia and the sub-continent. This
‘cool war’ between a mutually distrustful and yet mutually reliant China and US
was termed by Niall Ferguson as ‘Chimerica’. This term was a ‘pun’ on the word
‘chimera’ used to describe the ongoing relationship between what Ferguson called
a ‘parsimonious China and a profligate America’ (Ferguson 2011: xvii). The term
‘Chindia’ has also been used to describe the growing economic convergence
and interdependence between China and India as BRICS nations. Here, there
is also mutual economic and military competition between the world’s biggest
authoritarian state and the world’s biggest democracy. This divergence was most
recently manifested in their role as host of the Olympic and Commonwealth
games respectively.
There have been studies identifying the relationship between foreign aid and
foreign policy (Tuman and Ayoub 2004). Such studies have aimed to match
foreign aid to the ‘national interest’ variable over a specific time period. Yet such
studies have not questioned the issue of who sets (and interprets) the boundaries
and the criteria of the ‘national interest’. As a result, such studies engage within
an already preconceived criteria of variables, and often conclude with a set of
‘hedged’ results, that donor states can be scientifically confirmed (rather than
discovered) to be motivated by a mixture of idealism and ‘realpolitik’ (Tuman
and Ayoub 2004).
This chapter takes a less ambitious direction by highlighting how international
relations (IR) literature can help explain geopolitical regional dynamics and
interrelationships between Asian donor states and as to why such expectations
about foreign aid (and associated policies) actually come about in the first place.
The chapter outlines a number of IR approaches to explain these inter-state
relations to suggest that ODA policy can reflect (and be used for) a number of more
subtle and indirect strategic options. These are to test a geopolitical relationship, to
supplement or to provide an alternative to a particular foreign policy, to generate a
sense of ‘national identity’, or as a diversion for specific ‘real’ or vested interests.
The chapter also considers the issue as to what counts as ‘Asian IR perspectives’
in the following ways: firstly, there is the issue of not only determining the content
and boundaries of Asian perspectives but also whether it is possible to use ‘Asian’
approaches in the same way as using ‘Western’ approaches in IR; secondly,
whether a specific Asian approach to IR can be located in Western approaches or
whether Western approaches can be, alternatively, found in various historical and
contemporary Asian approaches; and finally, whether Western approaches can be
used and applied to understand a specific regional system of ‘Asian geopolitics’.
The chapter considers the current geopolitics of the Asian region in order to create
a template of geopolitical dynamics and inter-state relationships which will be
used to explain Asian donor policy and approaches in the subsequent chapters.
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Current geopolitical changes in the Asian region
For Nye (1968) the ‘classic’ (state-centric) approach to understanding the
origin and existence of regions, is to regard a region as a specific geographical
area with an exclusive and limited number of states that cooperate through the
‘pooling’ of state sovereignty in order to solving common security problems. The
subsequent associations and institutions of regionalism are made up of states, and
yet these ‘supra’-regional entities also come, in different degrees, to influence
and potentially limit state sovereignty and autonomy (Hettne 2005; Mittelman
1996). Traditionally understood then, regions comprise a select number of states
with a variety of economic and political relationships and which share a common
identity, values and experiences as a dynamic for greater cooperation. Yet this
approach can often underestimate how the creation of ‘common identity’ and
regional solidarity also relies upon a set of hierarchical processes of ‘othering’.
These processes distinguish one national identity from another. In this sense,
regional ‘diversity’ or ‘commonality with diversity’ is often a result of a myriad
of specific practices of economic, political and cultural exclusions.
One of the paradoxes of Asia is that domestic or national cultures have their
official versions of ethnic and racial ‘homogeneity’ despite the official international
versions of a ‘commonality of diversity’ or ‘unity through (or in) diversity’.
Within particular regions there are also subregions, and those states that reside as
‘bridges’ on the contested borders of and between regions. Often these approaches
also tend toward an understanding of regions as having a pole or centre of gravity
and a regional periphery. Nye (1968) was writing at the time of the shifts in US
hegemony and the rise of Western Europe as a region during the Cold War. This
‘old regionalism’ was heavily influenced by East–West relationships and the
tensions between the Soviet Union and the US. For instance, regional spaces such
as ‘Central Europe’ disappeared as a result of the ‘iron curtain’ division of Europe.
This ‘old’ regionalism was also approached in IR through varying functionalist
and integrative theories (Breslin and Higgott 2000).
The post-Cold War era witnessed the emergence of ‘the new regionalism’,
often understood as representing the new ‘economic triads’ of America, a unified
Europe and Asia. During the post-Cold War era the overall impression has been
that the ‘Asian century’ now represents a simultaneous coupling of Asia to the
global economy. Yet Asia has a potential ‘decoupling’ strategy (as a region) away
from a specific form of Western (neoliberal) globalisation, led by a resurgent and
rising ‘China model’. Moreover, there is a view that given Asia’s rise over the last
few years, an Asian challenge to the West is now resulting in a process of what
has been termed ‘reverse coupling’, as global economic power and leverage shifts
Eastwards. Such processes make for difficult strategic decisions, particularly
for emerging middle powers and if regional formations are seen as a part of a
‘divergence’ from globalisation or led by the powerful regional hegemons. In this
respect, those emerging powers who are becoming more influential regionally,
and as a result of this increased leverage, also want to remain coupled up and
therefore influential in global multilateral institutions such as the G20.
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Recent leadership changes
Firstly, President Xi Jinping of China announced early in 2013 what Thomas L.
Friedman had once coined as ‘the Chinese dream’. This was a phrase seemingly
reflecting both the future aspirations of the new Chinese middle class, and perhaps
for the elite to consolidate (and legitimate) the current political system at a time
of economic transition. President Jinping has been seen to represent a shift away
from the generation of neoliberal technocrats, to a more risk-taking approach
in order to secure China’s longer term sustainability. This is an economic and
geopolitical strategic issue concerning whether the Chinese state continues along
the same path of development (but reforms it) or more fundamentally restructures
the state, and if so, what kind of restructuring might be required. Further issues
raised recently have been as to determining how long this process will it take, and
whether this economic or political restructuring resides (and is allowed to reside)
within the current development trajectory. There is also the issue as to how this
strategic ‘crossroads’ affects other states in the region. This issue is directly linked
to China’s ability to provide foreign assistance to its recipient countries. On the
other hand ‘similar’ sustainability issues in the donor states can also be ‘spun’ and
to derive recipient support and be ‘sold as’ a ‘shared experience’. From this, there
is the further question as to whether a Chinese model is necessarily a non-aligned
model that is a counter to Western globalisation, or a non-aligned model that
‘instrumentally’ uses globalisation to generate a more neo-mercantalist economic
and military response to the West, or a form of less proactive ‘soft bandwagoning’
or ‘soft balancing’ the West. Before President Xi Jinping’s accession, there
were also concerns, more generally in the region, regarding Chinese military
expansionism. Such fears were accentuated more recently in November 2013 with
news of subtle re-drawings by Chinese military cartographers of territorial maps
of the region. Thus, where once there had been ‘dotted lines’ signalling areas of
sovereign dispute, these had now become somewhat bolder and more trenchant.
Early in 2013, Prime Minister Abe (2013) of Japan boldly announced that ‘Japan
is back’ following two decades of economic stagnation and growing domestic
unrest with Japan’s constitution. This does not allow Japan to have an ‘offensive’
military outside of Japan’s territorial and maritime sovereignty (SwensonWright 2013). Following the 2013 inter-Korean crisis, President Park Geun-hye
of South Korea announced a politics of foreign policy based on ‘trustpolitik’
and by promoting domestic ‘happiness’ through the ‘creative economy’ (Keck
2013). President Park (2013) also made the wider point with regard to the Asian
region that it is witnessing an unprecedented and ‘paradoxical’ level of economic
convergences and simultaneous geopolitical divergences.
Geopolitical and geoeconomic changes
Firstly, the major IR perspectives on regionalisation were creations of the era of
Cold War bi-polarity and so-called ‘long peace’ (Ned Lebow 1994). Much interest
in post-Cold War geopolitical changes has, of course, been brought about by the
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International relations perspectives 69
‘rise of China’ and the US ‘pivot’ (Feldman 2013). Such dynamics between the
US and China also affect the possibility of alliance building (or alliance tension)
across the region, particularly between South Korea and Japan in their role within
the US security umbrella. There is a view from many in Washington that more
‘burden sharing’ of US allies should now be occurring. There is also the growing
status of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) but with divisions
occurring between the continental and maritime states and alliances within
ASEAN.
Secondly, there are the myriad of geo-economic dynamics in regional trade.
This is linked to the understanding of the Asian drivers and the impact of the
developmentalist model in the context of understanding the wider convergences
of globalisation and regionalisation (Buzan 2003). In this respect, the significance
of regional trade patterns resembles the broader issues of inter-state cooperation
and the relationships between aid and trade. The colloquial favourite is to describe
these regional trade patterns as the ‘noodle’ of Asia with the exponentially growing
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (known tautologically as RTAs). These
can often generate spill-over effects into deepening regional agreements and
institutions in other areas. Moreover, trade policies are also placed into political
narratives concerning the ‘borders’ of the region and which ‘trading partners’ are
Asian. For instance China prefers to focus on ‘Asia’ whilst the US, Japan and
India prefer a more broader ‘Asia-Pacific’ context. This is currently represented in
the new economic (and geopolitical) initiative called the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) (Obama 2011).
Paradoxically, however, increasing the number of trade and high level
agreements can also encourage agreement (or regional trade regime) defection.
This can occur due to the assumption that with so many other agreements there
is enough ‘insurance’ if cooperation on a particular issue (intentionally or not)
breaks down to maintain cordial bilateral relations. This leads to an exponential
increase in agreements with the hope that the sheer rate or velocity of agreement
numbers will outweigh or outpace any costs in breaking agreements or mutual
trust. However, these agreements have been argued to be ‘paper tiger’ agreements,
with states only wanting ‘to be seen’ to be cooperative, but actually with very little
chance of, or interest in, creating the institutional regional mechanisms to help
enforce the agreements. For Asian donors, this perception of Asia is particularly
troubling regarding their donor–recipient relationship and the issue of longterm trust and credibility in agreement making. Possibly however, this relative
difficulty of generating a regional bloc particularly in North East Asia is due to
the fact that the leading Asian states also have major bilateral and multilateral
agreements with states and regional blocs from outside the Asian region.
With regard to the Asian developmentalist state therefore, there is a view that
‘globalisation’ is a prerequisite for strengthening (rather than weakening) the
Asian driver developmentalist state. The developmentalist state has, historically,
strategically selected certain business sectors through which to develop and
to protect as a form of economic nationalism. This has encouraged patterns of
state–business networks. However, the developmentalist model came into some
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disrepute during the 1997 Asian crisis, with neoliberals claiming that the crisis
had come about due to not enough liberalisation, but with others claiming that
there was too much neoliberalism imposed on those states without the proper
legal mechanisms and absorptive capacity in place. The legacy of the 1997
crisis still plays strongly into Asian solidarity and negative attitudes towards the
Bretton Woods institutions. Leading Asian donors have often used this scepticism
as part of selling their ODA in the region as ‘shared experience’. Thus, there
are various issues regarding whether globalisation is necessarily ‘neoliberal’ or
whether neoliberal is necessarily ‘Western’ or has to be institutionally constructed
or imposed as a ‘top-down’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
Third, within the Asian region, Asian donor states are now promoting national
brand soft power. This is used to attract investment and to sell policies overseas
such as Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also tied to the success
of the domestic economic model through narratives of ‘shared experience’ and
‘win-win’. However, soft power can also create national antagonisms between
states as a result of a variety of government and public contestations over what
counts as the truth of national identity and national history (Park, S-s 2011).
These controversies can be particularly troublesome during times of economic
instability and uncertainty (The Economist 2008, 2011; Lee 2013).
Placing state strategies in international relations
(IR) approaches
The security dilemma is that the more secure a state feels (as a result of its
enhanced military capability) then the more it can provoke fear in other states.
These other states as a result, increase their own military capabilities and then
become a threat to the original state which is further provoked to increase its own
capacities. This scenario is then played out endlessly and relentlessly at both a
regional and global level. However, over the last few years the ‘human security’
approach (one that is widely promoted by Japanese ODA) has suggested that a
focus on individual security (rather than state security) means that as individuals
feel more secure (economically, politically, environmentally and culturally) then
the more individuals living in neighbouring states will feel secure. That is, by
attending to issues of poverty, human rights and ‘inclusive development’ these
underlying causes of conflict between nations are reduced. Thus, the more
economically developed and secure one state is, then the more other states are
secured. In this respect, the cycle of mistrust and conflict is broken. This is why
many development perspectives point out that by spending only a fraction of a
government’s military expenditure on ‘social development’ and human security
issues, the security of individuals (and states) is actually strengthened.
However, for Jervis (1978: 169) ‘many of the means by which a state tries
to increase its security decrease the security of others’. Power, for realists, is a
zero-sum game and is traditionally quantified as military and economic, or as
hard power, with its exercise and quantifiable results based on a mixture of threat,
sanctions and coercion. Power is the ability to get an actor to act in a different
International relations perspectives 71
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way than it otherwise would have wanted, as the control of intended effects
and matched outcomes. Power must also be recognised by others, and others
must also fear the possibility that a state will use this power in its self-defence.
Other states must also be aware that the opposing state does have the means and
capability (and the will) to attack. However, one issue often raised is how states
can provide this information which also must be credible and be believed. China
often communicates its rise as being ‘peaceful’ whilst this rhetoric can often be
interpreted (or deliberately misinterpreted) by its rivals in that China is ‘hiding’ its
true intentions as a controlled form of deception or ‘charm offensive’.
Realism
For Morgenthau (1978) realism stresses that the science of ‘politics’ is governed
by objective laws which have their roots ultimately in universal human nature.
Politics is regarded as an autonomous sphere of action from others such as ethics,
economics and culture. Realism assumes that power is universally valid whilst
maintaining that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions
of states but are filtered through concrete circumstances of time and place.
For Waltz (1979) neorealism stresses that it is the distribution of power in the
international anarchical state structure rather than human nature that can explain
state behaviour (Keohane 1986). For both realists and neorealists, the anarchical
inter-state system is during certain periods at peace. This is a result of a balance
of equal powers or when a strong state is able to act as a ‘hegemon’ and therefore
provide a supply of public goods. Other states may ‘free ride’ on these institutions
but have no incentive to challenge or counter-balance the hegemon. However, a
real or perceived decline in a hegemon’s military and economic power and its
willingness to ‘supply’, inevitably means that there will be a breakdown in those
international agreements which the leading hegemon is now unable or unwilling
to maintain. In this respect hegemonic decline can come about as a result of the
increased costs of maintaining its role, of ‘imperial overreach’ or through an
interconnected domestic breakdown in government or regime legitimacy. At this
point another nation, one that is no longer willing to ‘bandwagon’ the power, may
‘rise’ and be willing to contest with the original hegemon. The rising power will
also want to forge an alliance network of its own, both to consolidate its growing
power and to avoid any potential challenges to its own rise from emerging powers
and those states loyal to the original power.
This means that rising countries may then set up their own alternative regimes
and international agreements or institutions. Less powerful states are then pushed
into a decision as to whether to continue bandwagoning the old hegemon and
continue to use the original hegemon’s institutions, to begin to align with the
rising state, or to create alliances among themselves and become ‘non-aligned’.
Stanley Hoffman (1977) pointed out that the modern discipline of IR had
historically coalesced with the rise of US hegemony in the post-World War Two
era. As a result, the contested methodological issues over the years have been as
to what IR theory is for. Should, for instance, IR theory be scientifically based
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(prediction and explanation) or should it be a more interpretive or transformatory
approach endeavour? There is the issue as to whether it is possible to even have
a ‘theory of IR’ in the traditional and more reflexive sense, and if so, what is
the content of ‘theory’ and can (or should) this theory be universal or only be
understood and applicable to a culturally specific area or location (Callahan 2004;
Kristensen and Nielsen 2013; Paltiel 2010; Vasilaki 2012)? For many Western
realist approaches, the rise of China now taking place is (and represents) yet
another temporal cycle of hegemonic rises within the ‘universal’ state system. In
this respect, the realist view is that a relative redistribution of power (zero-sum)
has taken place and has shifted leverage from Washington to Beijing. As a result,
both powers are now recalibrating their relationship. On the one hand, for realists,
Washington is responding to these changes and preparing for an inevitable conflict
with China through its Asian pivot (or rebalance) and through its shifts to a more
flexible strategy in the Asia-Pacific (outposts and lily-pads). Beijing on the other
hand is waiting for its moment to strike the once dominant power. This strategic
approach makes for difficult decisions for both powers as to whether to pre-empt
each other’s actions (potentially leading to conflict) or to ‘wait and see’, at which
moment an opportunity for victory may have been lost. This is a dilemma for
the rising power insofar as if it waits, then the established hegemon is able to reorientate its resources in the delayed time period. However ‘a strike’ too early and
the rising power may undermine its own present and future capabilities, as a result
of not being fully prepared enough.
Many classical realists claim that it is not so much the direct security challenge
from the ‘new’ power on the older hegemon per se that can lead to conflict, but
rather, that conflict occurs as a result of the fear ‘of the rise’ of the new power.
The classical realists view such moments as traditionally based on more ‘agentcentred’ decisions rather than on the structural shifts of power proposed by the
more ‘mechanical’ neorealist perspectives. The application of these ‘universal’
laws is not unproblematic, and whilst such perspectives might very well predict
or explain an empirical scenario, this does not necessarily mean that a direct
cause–consequence relationship has been established. On the contrary, as critical
voices point out, such a scenario might be very much down to a number of other
coincidental and non-causal factors, particularly in a context where these theories
are not only reflected upon by policymakers (and can be de facto used to ‘justify’
actions), but such theories are also culturally different from the policy practices of
IR (and their assumptions) in a particular part of the world.
The notion of hegemonic rise and fall also leads to questions of ‘inevitability’
and whether to define this shift in power as either relative (hegemonic decline
theory) or as structural. The structural question is also the issue of the continuing
ownership of economic resources, technology and trust in its currency as a foreign
reserve. In this sense, there is a view (particularly with regard to US approaches
to hegemonic decline) that the hegemonic decline thesis merely abrogates
responsibility by the hegemon (Strange 1982). Moreover, there is a view that
narratives on ‘decline’ can become self-fulfilling and, in effect, encourage a
challenge from another state (Nye 2004).
International relations perspectives 73
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The role of middle powers in international relations
Whilst hegemonic theory has been used to explain the role of the ‘big powers’,
emerging powers are also said to be ‘middle powers’. Many states in the Asian
region have also been termed ‘middle powers’. Japan is said to represent an
old middle power, whilst South Korea is said to represent a new middle power.
For both realists and neorealists, middle or smaller states are therefore restricted
in their behavioural options but often counter-balance regional and global
hegemons through forming alliances, or to passively buffer or bandwagon the
larger global and/or regional state. Middle powers are too small to effect system
change whilst remaining big enough to generate a concern from the greater states
as a potential ‘rise’ and challenger or from smaller states who are more concerned
with emerging middle power regional hegemony. The hegemonic powers have
the sanction of using a traditional ‘divide and rule’ strategy toward the potential
smaller state alliances through the creation of a passive and conservative
middle power balancing ‘elite’ groups of states. Middle powers may also be
in competition amongst themselves, for instance between first mover and fast
follower states such as BRICS and next-11 states (for instance MINT, MIKT or
MIST).
Old middle powers emerged during the Cold War and tended to align with
or bandwagon either the US or the Soviet Union. These middle powers were
often regarded as ‘friendly’ or regionally passive (Australia/Canada/Japan). At
the end of the Cold War new middle powers also began to emerge. These new
middle powers, particularly in the global South, were seen to be more proactive
and catalysing new agendas and new ideas (such as ODA and green growth).
These states also tended to act as non-threatening bridge facilitators between
the developed and developing world, whilst getting cooperation and interest
in a specific issue agenda. These new middle powers have also tended to act
as ‘managers’ (i.e. setting up new and appropriate institutions and regulatory
frameworks or making existing institutions inclusive). Jordaan (2003) argued
that strategically, middle powers have an issue specific capacity and demonstrate
a propensity to promote a more conservative global cohesion and institution
building, rather than inspire more radical change in the world system, such as
the Soviet Union and China. In this respect, whilst the more powerful states are
active within the global institutions, these states also act as a potential ‘spoiler’
state within these institutions and thus act as more radical elements, contrary
to new middle power states who socialise more and act more conservatively.
Nonetheless, for states outside the institutions, all states within might be regarded
as ‘part of the problem’.
As Matthew (2003) wrote, middle powers are now developing beyond their
conflicted historic role as the ‘lieutenants’ of the great powers by operating
as the selective champions for global peace and justice, and by entering
creative high-impact partnerships with powerful coalitions of non-state actors.
The resources used for this internationalism can adapt to the criticisms from
smaller states that middle powers are also ‘using them’ to gain advantage but
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International relations perspectives
smaller states may also regard the middle power states as ‘heroes’ due to both
their power configurations of material as well as their ideological leverage
(Spero 2009). Thus ‘Middle powers remain pivotal because they do affect
regional security dilemmas and can influence how great powers might choose
to transform the anarchical international system’ (Spero 2009: 153). A middle
power might want to join (or want to be seduced into joining) ‘the existing
elite’ or might be intentionally or unintentionally used by the bigger states for
co-opting any future threats to the hegemonic system. In this respect, larger
powers may be seen as a beacon of ‘radicalism’ by smaller countries in terms
of the challenge to the West, but they can also simultaneously enjoy status quo
stability although as ‘spoilers’, a position which has often characterised the
role of China and Russia.
Questions have been raised as to whether a middle power can eventually ‘go it
alone’ or would it need to choose a superpower to align with whilst knowing that
this strategy might undermine its newly attained power and status. Hegemons
might also encourage a middle power ‘to look independent’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ so
that when the middle power is later called upon by the powerful state it exudes
‘neutrality’ beneficial to the hegemon’s own long-term ruling legitimacy in
the international system. This is a behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the
existing global order and its traditional organisations. This is to embrace more
compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace
‘good international citizenship’. There is also a reliance on ‘trust and credibility’
but this can be easily eroded if such policies are not enacted domestically. In this
sense, bigger powers may free ride on middle power allies, as middle powers have
more soft power credibility for maintaining and upholding international norms,
and are less fearful of ‘free riding’ or first mover initiatives. Middle powers can
develop their own ‘niche’ and new cross-cutting alliances which also require
new forms of middle power alliance consent and legitimation rather than an
alliance that is built on coercive threats. New middle powers have still to match
domestic credibility with international status. Larger powers or hegemons have
the resources to and might also encourage a middle power ‘to look independent’
or more ‘cosmopolitan’ so that when the middle power is later called upon by the
powerful state it exudes this ‘neutrality’ that is beneficial to the hegemon’s own
long-term ruling legitimacy.
States, liberalism and cooperation
According to Arthur Stein (1990), nations have no interest in cooperating if
their national interests can be secured on their own, without messy alliances
and entanglements. If these interests and outcomes are ‘naturally’ harmonised
then there is no conflict of interest. When most states have a preferred outcome
without a dominant strategy, and they are aware of other preferences, they also
aim to avoid the worst outcome. Here states don’t need to create an international
regime and can act autonomously as long as there are assurances of bilateral
reciprocity from other states. The problem occurs when the identified common
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International relations perspectives 75
interests of the organisation are not the preferred outcome of all the states
involved, and where the temptation of the gain of a defection outweighs the
costs of, in effect, not defecting. International agreements can break down if the
relevant institutions are inefficient or (perceived to be) illegitimate, even if the
demand for regimes is in existence. Another manifestation of cooperation and
convergence has been the rise of interest in regional institutions (Hurrell 1995,
2006).
The paradox of the anarchical international system in an age of complex
interdependence is that a continuing competition between self-interested and
power maximising states can actually lead to a greater cooperation between
these states as a result of increasing demand for international regimes (Keohane
1984, 2011; Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987; Krasner 1983). This demand is due
to increasing vulnerability and sensitivity of and between states to a myriad
of high and low politics security threats and actors. Krasner (1983: 3) defined
regimes as having ‘principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area’. Norms and
principles define the regime, whilst the rules and procedures regulate how
the regime works. This means that when regime norms change then there is a
change in (and of) the regime itself. The conditions needed to drive to a cohesive
and collaborative regime is usually higher than the level of power required to
maintain the regime, i.e. once it is set up, then there is momentum. The function
of the regime is not to preclude further negotiations, but, on the contrary, to
establish stable mutual expectations about others’ patterns of behaviour and to
develop working relationships that will allow the parties to adapt their practices
to new situations. Inter-state cooperation is usually understood as being based
on establishing a legal framework, to promote perfect information and to
establish low transaction costs. Regimes can facilitate inter-state agreement if
one or more of these factors is lacking. With a greater number of issues being
dealt with by the regime, the international organisation often has an increasing
and evolving issue-agenda as a result of issue linkages and the inclusion of new
members such as the OECD-DAC.
However, the insurance provided by regimes can also mean that states might
be less careful in their activities and can undermine regimes as a result of the
regimes’ very success. As such, power interests might help explain regime
creation but not regime persistence, yet whilst the regime grows and consolidates,
then regimes can also sometimes either reinforce or undermine the conditions
and the interests of the more established states, which had led to the creation of
the regime in the first place. Indeed disagreements can often represent a stronger
alliance as disagreements ‘between friends’. At the same time a strong alliance
or ‘special relationship’ can lead to tensions in a partnership, where one side
may feel that they are being taken for granted. In this case the strength of the
relationship may encourage ‘defecting’ whilst a weaker alliance may mean that
the parties involved may have to work harder to gain trust and this, in the long
term, can actually generate more reliability and credibility, as all states involved
would have more to lose having given more political capital to establishing and
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International relations perspectives
enforcing the relationships. In this sense, policies might not necessarily link to
direct interests but act as a form of deception and take attention away from ‘real
interests’ as well as exhaust another state’s resources in areas which are more
important to that other state.
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State-led soft power
Nye (2004) argued that soft power is the ability of a state to get what the state
wants, through attraction rather than through hard power coercion or through
payment (bribery). ODA has often been placed in this soft power strategic
framework. Emerging powers use soft power narratives as ‘recipient to donor’
to promote their national vision and promote a soft power sell such as ‘shared
experience’ and ‘development partnership’. States might also use a combination
of hard power and soft power or smart power which reflects on the geopolitical
scenarios in specific contexts. Liberal approaches also have a strong heritage
of prescribing free trade and liberal ideals to generate reciprocity and trust.
Both powerful and middle powers use soft power. Middle powers are often
through to be able to more credibly use soft power as ‘non-threatening’ rather
than as ‘deceptive’ (Callahan 2006; Lam 2007; Lampton 2008). Japan’s ‘cool
Japan’ brand has now been supplemented in the region by China’s ‘dream’ and
South Korea’s ‘global Korea’. There are several debates on understanding this
behaviour: firstly, as to whether soft power is an alternative to the use of hard
power in sensitive regional politics and is therefore regarded as ‘weakness’ rather
than strength; secondly, as to whether state-led soft power is a mere extension of
a state’s coercive hard power and the issue of where one draws the distinction;
thirdly, whether soft power can help a more effective exercise of hard power; and
fourth, as to whether soft power is a part of, or interrelated to, hard power. This
latter is the question as to whether soft power is the cause or the consequence
of the existence and the actual use of hard power. In this sense, different forms
of soft power might tend to produce different results when in combination with
themselves or with hard power at specific times and spaces. Paradoxically, it may
be the case that bigger powers have more status given that they are more ‘open’
to showing their power and their national interests. Many types of resources
can contribute to soft power but that does not necessarily mean that soft power
is the only type of behaviour emerging from these resources because hard
power and soft power can reinforce and undermine each other whilst there is
always a potential strategic combination between the two (or smart power). As
a part of public diplomacy soft power must rest on some semblance of shared
or common norms and values. Soft power diplomacy is also understood as the
communication of a state’s foreign policy which is used to mediate and manage
agendas and issues.
Yet state-led soft power is only credible if soft power signifiers and policies
are consistent with domestic politics. This is an issue with regard to ‘democracy’
and in terms of ODA, domestic development strategies and more recently
‘green growth’. Governments may also market a particular official brand
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International relations perspectives 77
image of their state as a ‘new donor’ or ‘global’ or a ‘peacemaker’. However,
domestically such symbols of official and often stereotypical national identity
are challenged by alternative narratives as to what counts as national identity.
Nye’s distinction between an actor’s sensitivity to change and the actor’s
ability to adapt to sensitive change (an actor’s capability or vulnerability)
is complicated by distinguishing between the ‘ex-post’ judging of the effect
of power by outcome and the ‘ex-ante’ judgement as to original intentions
and the expected result of behavioural power, before the action actually takes
place (Nye 2010). For Nye (2011), soft power affects an actor’s behaviour by
co-opting, enticing and shaping preferences (and their choice of preferences)
whilst simultaneously affecting the actor’s expectations. Moreover, it is
necessary to be careful to acknowledge the interpretive issue of judging the
effect of power because not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics (Nye
2011). Crucially, Nye (2011: 16) suggested that it is necessary to be careful not
to ‘confuse the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the
resource used to produce them’. Thus, Nye argues that many types of resources
can in fact contribute to a state’s official and instrumental soft power but this
does not necessarily mean that soft power is the only cause of the type of
behaviour emerging from these resources, given that instrumental hard power
and soft power can often reinforce and undermine each other. This means that
contextual intelligence is also needed in understanding the causal relationship
between hard and soft power and the changing temporal and spatial context
upon which smart power is effectively used. The conceptual puzzle is whether
soft power is either intended and/or perceived to be an alternative to hard
power, whether it requires the back up of hard power, whether it represents a
weakness or compensation for lack of hard power, or whether the system has
changed so much that soft power is in effect ‘the new hard power’. However,
Nye does concede that hard power resources are useful for insuring soft power
resources such as culture and technology. Official state-led narratives on
identity, heritage and history can provoke unintended and unforeseen actions
from other states. This has been a particularly sensitive issue in North East
Asia with regard to sovereignty claims over island territory, as well as national
identity and history textbook controversies.
Nye (2004) argued that as a part of public diplomacy, soft power must rest
on some semblance of shared or common norms and values. This is why intercultural exchanges between foreigners are productive by creating an enabling
environment through daily communication, simple themes and symbolic events.
Nye (2004: 105) argued that ‘Promoting positive images of one’s country is
not new, but the conditions for projecting soft power have been dramatically
transformed in recent years’. Questions raised are: Why does hard power
and soft power work differently either in geographical terms, or, in the same
location but at different times? Does a badly aligned smart power inevitably
lead to bad consequences, and might hard power undermine soft power and
even vice versa? Does an intended good aligned combination of hard and soft
power necessarily lead to a good result or outcome? Nye (2004: 83) wrote that
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International relations perspectives
‘Asian countries also have impressive potential resources for soft power. The
arts, fashion and cuisine of Asia’s ancient cultures have already had a strong
impact on other parts of the world for centuries’.
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Challenging state centrism in IR
The argument here is that the issues of inter-state cooperation, shared experience
and win-win is not to the benefit of ‘the national interest’ or an ‘ethical imperative’
by governments, but instead is to the benefit only of a small group of eliteled economic and political vested interests. Unpacking the ‘myth of the state’
as an ‘imagined community’ also indicates how national identity and national
policies themselves are a construct and an extension of certain vested interests,
mainly economic, in the justification and legitimation of a historically specific
form of economic mode of production and consumption (global capitalism).
These groups create transnational linkages between the elites in the developed
and developing world states by aiming to increase accumulation and profits,
thus leading to unequal relations of power and economic wealth. In this sense
the ‘new geography of aid’ approach can be placed in a broader and non-state
centric trajectory. Groups that aspire to any hegemonic dominance have also to
demonstrate their ability to pose technological solutions to a variety of urgent
problems that are now being related to nature and the environment. These are
connected to a host of other social relations such as class, gender, race and
national identity. Hegemonic groups therefore construct and demonstrate their
ability to pose ‘universal’, ‘national’ and ‘concrete’ problems and scientific
solutions to problems related to nature and the environment. Thus, the question
of environment and nature is intrinsically connected to a host of other historical
(and historically constructed) social relations such as class, gender, race and
nation. The development of a specific form of production can at certain junctures
lead to the empowerment of certain social forces and these social forces become
the bases of power in the different forms of state strategy (i.e. developmentalist,
neodevelopmentalist or neoliberal state). However, the understanding of power
and production also comprises the production and reproduction of what counts
as legitimate knowledge through values and the actions of political institutions
in the state. Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power
which in turn, influence the development of ideas and material capabilities (Cox
1981).
Cox (1981) had argued that production relations therefore give rise to
particular social forces that become the basis of power within and between
states. These interests are disseminated as being common sense and ‘natural’.
The state is therefore regarded as a social relation and the outward expansion
of the hegemony of a certain historic bloc and the local configurations of
social forces within particular countries (Cox 1981). In this respect, the idea
of multipolarity and the ‘rise of the south’ is regarded as a problematically
restricted state-centric approach, when in fact, there has always been a
connected elite group in the south, with their transnational interests linked to
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International relations perspectives 79
the elites in the global North (Robinson 2006). Moreover, as countries develop
to middle income status, these elites’ interests are reinforced by the uneven
development which in turn requires instruments of soft power for these groups
to retain power and legitimacy. In this respect, critical approaches to current
geopolitics and geoeconomics in the region would make the case that there are
underlying contradictions of capital accumulation which are requiring the deeper
marketisation of the developmentalist economies. In this respect the geopolitical
dynamics are a reflection of specific political interests rather than the ‘national
interests’, whilst the liberal approaches to cooperation and free trade mask over
underlying economic and social inequalities within each state. As a result, to
legitimate these interests, elite groups are turning to ideologies of ‘nationalism’
and stoking up nationalistic antipathies through which to obscure economic
contradictions. These contradictions include a lack of domestic consumption,
low level welfare systems and increasingly unbalanced economies. It is these
economic contradictions that form particular foreign policy decisions on the
basis of acquiring new markets and locating cheaper factors of production under
the mantle of ‘the national interest’. Moreover, state-led strategies of soft power
(and their realist analysis) also assume that there is a fixed and accepted concept
of ‘the state’ and ‘identity’. Yet a critical response to this would maintain that the
state itself and its particular ‘national identity’ are also constructs of particular
elite-led narratives on a state’s place in the world. As Katzenstein (1996: 22–24)
noted:
[I]n Asia the intensification of efforts to create new forms of multilateralism
designed to facilitate policy coordination is closely linked to contested
definitions of Asian identity … [T]he international and domestic societies
in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways.
Critical geopolitics perspectives recognise that security threats to the state
are ‘real’ but they are more interested in how this ‘threat’ is then sustained
and represented as part of an ideological act by media, language, power/
knowledge and the spread of education and the teaching of history. These
practices of nation-hood involve ensembles of acts to create nation-space and
nation-time. Thus, the project of creating an imaginary community involves
the homogenisation of nation space and the official pedagogisation of history
as learnt (or unlearned) through the so-called ‘gate-keepers’ of the established
educational establishments. State-sovereignty also creates its own internal logic
of abstract political time as unilinear and progress ‘inside’ and of political space
as a fixing territory through which and within which this political time flows.
Cultural framings of daily routines provide the social and cultural context for
present and future action based on expectations and strategic selections. This
approach has been key to making the link between ODA and a national selfidentity of ‘who we are’ and ‘what our values are’, further bringing up the issue
of ‘who are we’.
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International relations perspectives
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Non-Western IR for a non-Western region?
Nonetheless, the objective to pursue a non-Western IR in a non-Western scenario
is itself often subject to certain ethnographic biases. The defence for this has long
been that because IR has been so dominated by Western approaches, then some
kind of ethnographic ‘balance’ or even some form of ‘positive discrimination’ as
a redress, albeit carefully monitored, is required (Acharya 2011a, 2011b, 2011c;
Acharya and Buzan 2009; Shilliam 2011). Nonetheless, the issue as to who defines
the contours and content of this balance and whether this redress is a ‘fill-the-gap’
or a supplementary redress, or whether such boundaries can even be made between
Western and non-Western approaches, of course remain causes of much controversy.
Andre Gunder Frank (1998) argued that promoting ‘non-Western’ approaches
always carries the danger of its own exclusionary non-Western ethnocentrism,
reinforcing this exclusion, as it can never fully escape the ‘double bind’ of Western
logocentrism. Such limitations cannot be overcome, therefore, unless the approaches
actually ‘unthink’ the categories and the traps of Western social science (Wallerstein
2001). Frank suggested that there is, as a result of Western-centrism, a clear lack of
concepts through which to unthink and develop a ‘non-Western’ yet global approach,
a deficit of which Frank mused, ‘alas’ (Frank 1998: xxvi). For Frank (1998), the rise
(or re-emergence) of East Asia should come as no surprise if this is placed within a
more unifying global explanatory perspective. Moreover, how China perceives the
world and itself, and the world’s reaction to this self-perception is itself an aspect to
inter-state relations (The Economist 2009).
The question of perspectives, or of worldviews, is fraught with cultural and
methodological assumptions and a potential for an un-reflexive ethno-centricism.
Conventionally understood, a perspective is typically regarded as an attitude or
a way of experiencing, regarding or representing a view or issue. This invariably
opens up questions such as whose perspective or narrative (and of what) is being
used, as well as, whose perspective is deemed to be credible or legitimate or
not. There is also the issue as to who has the right ‘to speak for Asia’. Asian
studies were originally a part of the area studies perspectives, and there were
always ‘orientalism’ concerns, as to determining what counts as, and who defines,
knowledge and heritages of a particular area. This is not therefore an argument
that posits an existing or pre-existing ‘Asian identity’. However, there has been
much ‘Asian’ interest in developing a specific approach to the dynamics of IR
in the region. The debate usually distinguishes itself from ‘universal’ Western
perspectives. However this approach, in turn, has the concomitant danger of
‘reifying’ or stereotyping Western approaches. Consequently, issues raised
include whether Western approaches can be applied to Asia and if so, what would
this entail. Underlying this debate is the issue as to what is the methodological
objective of IR. That is, as a problem solving theory, then could it be argued
that Asian perspectives are just ‘better’ at explaining Asian geopolitics or not?
This might be seen as a Western approach but ‘with Asian characteristics’ or
an Asian perspective ‘but with similarities with the West’. This latter approach
has often been developed by reinterpreting and revisiting the classic Asian texts
International relations perspectives 81
and by locating similarities with Western classics and concepts. Nonetheless,
this approach has inevitably opened the way for the various post-structural and
relativist controversies surrounding the interpretation of words and texts and the
misappropriation of texts taken out of context and universalised.
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Early perspectives on Asia
Alternatively, there is a broader view that Asia was already within the auspices
of the Western system centuries ago, so a ‘fusion’ was already in place by
then. Another approach would argue that the Western approach is regionally
anachronistic for understanding Asia as it was based on a European history that
was geographically separated into ‘small states’ and very different from the open
spaces of continental Eurasia. An example of an early twentieth-century ethnocentric approach would be that of Mackinder (1904), who regarded central Asia as
‘the heartland’ of forests, marshes and steppes, by stating ‘Is not the pivot region
of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships,
but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is today about to be
covered with a network of railways?’ (Mackinder 1904: 434). Outside ‘the pivot’,
as he termed it, Mackinder went on by explaining ‘in a great inner crescent are
Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, India and China, and in an outer crescent,
Britain, South Africa, Australia, the US, Canada and Japan’. Mackinder also wrote
that the ‘United States recently become an Eastern power’ (Mackinder 1904: 436)
and that the real divide between East and West is to be found in the Atlantic
region with ‘France, Italy, Egypt, India and Corea, bridge heads and outposts’
(Mackinder 1904, original spelling). The rise of China can be understood as a rise
within the Westphalian system or as a rise in a region with specific hierarchical
characteristics. Interpreting this rise in each case can also occur with both Western
and non-Western approaches and interpretations. At the same time, China’s rise
also opens up questions as to deciding how the notion of multipolarity is to be
interpreted and what it represents regionally and globally (Deutsch and Singer
1964). Despite China’s increasingly proactive role in the Asian region, some
have also argued that its global responsibility role has as yet to match its regional
economic power (Beeson 2013). Again, one issue often raised here is that given
China’s official self-perception of being the ‘middle kingdom’ and at the centre
of the world, then China does not, and despite its ‘go global’ approach, have the
go-getting proselytising of the Western nations with their need ‘to convert others’.
The Asian international system
Literature on ODA and emerging powers often uses the term ‘multipolarity’
and identifies as particularly significant, the ‘equality’ of the donor–recipient
relationship as form of ‘gift’. Such descriptive and prescriptive assumptions can
be placed within a regional perspective which challenges these assumptions by
focusing on the different cultural interpretations of inter-state relations within
the region. For instance, China’s Chairman Mao had a particular non-Western
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and Chinese perspective on the term ‘third world’. During the time of Cold War
detente and increasing Sino-Soviet tensions, Chairman Mao placed the US and
the Soviets in the first world (to distinguish ‘decadent’ Soviet communism from
‘authentic’ Chinese communism), with the newly industrialising middle powers
(such as Brazil, Singapore and South Korea) located in the second world, and
other developing countries were placed in the third world category (MOFAPRC 2000). Descriptive (and prescriptive) terms such as bi-polarity, tripolarity
or multipolarity are also historically and culturally context dependent. The selfconscious branding of ‘China’s rise’ as peaceful development for instance, is also
occurring in an age of what China regards as an era of ‘multipolarity’. However,
the Chinese perspective on multipolarity is quite distinct from the Western
approaches to multipolarity which are based on a ‘horizontal’ Westphalian
worldview rather than through a hierarchical ‘tribute’ system (China 2011). The
US has also refashioned and rebranded its own role and strategy in the region as a
‘Pacific nation’ by using a common justification for its ‘rebalance’ and continued
presence in the region that it has ‘always been’ a Pacific nation, as the ‘move
Westwards’ (Liu and Wang 2013). Divisions are often made between the more
Western-centric ‘power’ balancing mechanical approaches to power clashes,
whilst the Asian approach is often understood as being more interested not in
balance per se, but in effective harmony.
This has historical precedent. For writers such as David Kang (2003, 2004), the
Asian region is intrinsically more ‘peaceful’ as opposed to the regular conflicts of
the amoral Hobbesian West and realism. Yet the Asian wars of the past (such as the
Imjin War of 1592) were more violent than wars in the West, and (triumphantly
Kang implies) involved many more resources than anything the West could muster
or imagine at the time (including the Spanish Armada). Kang (2003) also argued
that the realist ‘laws’ of orthodox IR do not always apply to the international
system of Asia. Kang (2004) argued that when a powerful state is rising, it is often
assumed in traditional IR that the smaller states will try and form an alliance in
order to balance or to align with the rising power, or to align or bandwagon with
another more established power. As a result, there have been a few studies aiming
to link the Asian system of hegemonic rise and demise to the hegemonic wars
between the ancient empires of Persia and the Greek states, as well as the later
Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome. For Kelly (2011), the Asian region is
also unique in the sense that there are no major religious or ideological extremes.
Yet for Kang (2012), the rise of China is not creating this expected fear in the
smaller and middle power regional states. Indeed, countries such as South Korea
and Japan would traditionally be expected to move closer together or towards the
US alliance, but in fact this has not occurred (although what is actually meant
by ‘closer’ is not elaborated by Kang). This lack of cooperation between South
Korea and Japan is often put down to the history between the nations (and official
versions of history as part of national identity ‘othering’). Indeed it may be
possible to suggest that such fear does not necessarily translate into action and
even if states may not seem to be conforming to ‘ideal type’ expectations, interstate expectations and manifestations of conflicts may be being played out inside
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and outside the region and concerning other issues. Indeed, one further view might
be that the more China conveys such information by wanting to ‘be seen to be
peaceful’, this itself increases alarm in the surrounding states. However, smaller
states may also refrain from showing fear by not embarking on strategies for
countering or aligning with other states as this may provoke the hegemonic state
to use this as a justification for further regional expansionism. Kang’s explanation
for the dynamics of what he sees as unique to the region, is that the Asian system
is hierarchically organised and is based on a network of common norms and
values as a ‘tribute’ system. The content of these norms and values could be both
the historically embedded ‘Confucian’ norms and values and specific diplomatic
norms and values which are created by ongoing diplomatic exchanges and which
may be ‘greater than the sum of the parts’. Kang (2012) argued that this system
has meant that there have been no major wars between Asian states since the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979.
For Kang (2004), a hierarchical organising principle in a particular international
system means that a rising hegemonic state does not ‘fold’ the smaller states
‘under its wing’. As a result, this does not cause the other states to balance or
hedge against the regional hegemon because they also benefit from the rising
power. This is because any attempt at balancing in the proximity of a region will
limit the benefits of future cooperation, whilst any premature aligning may also
put the smaller states in vulnerable positions. Thus a hierarchical system means a
system of a formal hierarchy but an informal and technically sovereign equality,
whilst the Western system is based on a formal sovereign recognition of equality
and an informal hierarchy (such as periods of hegemonic rise and demise).
This distinction is important for the foreign aid debate given that many Asian
donors often promote ‘South–South’ cooperation, non-intervention and respect
for national sovereign equality, and yet this rhetoric also obscures the deeper
hierarchies of tribute and inter-state relationships based on narratives of ‘self’ and
‘other’. In this respect, ‘unity in diversity’ and a harmony based ‘diversity’ also
implies an assumed hierarchical stability. Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping
(1974) put it at the UN that:
The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are vainly
seeking world hegemony. Each in its own way attempts to bring the developing
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America under its control and, at the same
time, to bully the developed countries that are not their match in strength …
(T)he Third World countries shared a common lot in the past and now face
the common tasks of opposing colonialism, neo-colonialism and great-power
hegemonism, developing the national economy and building their respective
countries … (T)he imperialists, and particularly the superpowers, are taking
advantage of temporary differences among us developing countries to sow
dissension and disrupt unity so as to continue their manipulation, control
and plunder … Differences among us developing countries can very well be
resolved, and should be resolved, through consultations among the parties
concerned.
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Japan and South Korea were, in this context, historically regarded as vassals of
China within the hierarchical tribute system. There are still controversial issues,
however, as to whether a unified Korea was a regional part of imperial China (but
not the People’s Republic). Clearly this question is also significant for the defining
of Chinese national identity whilst Japanese ODA to China is often implicitly
interpreted from China as war reparation and as a historical tribute. In this sense,
history, in Asia, is often seen as long term and cyclical (Feigenbaum 2011). For
China, the ideals of mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful coexistence are
key foreign and economic policy directives in the region (Womack 2013). China
also has a very specific approach to multipolarity (Singh 2010). Many Chinese
authors claim to be able to see and predict the future geopolitics of the region
through ‘hidden signs’ of the future struggles which are now shaping the multipolar
world. Deng Xiaoping used expressions from the ‘Warring States period’ of the 3rd
and 4th centuries BC (regarded by some as representing the first multipolar world)
to advise Chinese leaders on formulating a grand strategy through a subtle use of
what is known as taoguang-yanghui or to ‘hide brightness, and nourish obscurity’.
Womack (2004, 2013) argued that in a region with many asymmetric
relationships, the smaller parties should always be reassured of how win-win
provided by the dominant hegemon can be of mutual benefit if the relationship
is open ended and not exclusive to only a few states. This perhaps might explain
China’s charm-offensive approach to opening bilateral relations with ASEAN.
Moreover, depriving the smaller states of having other inter-state relationships,
Womack (2004) argued, can often lead to resentment and a grudging respect,
whilst the smaller states would rather buffer each other and form multilateral and
global alliances to counter-balance the regional hegemon in an emerging world
order (Shaw et al. 2007).
English school ‘commonality with diversity’
Similarly, from an IR ‘English school’ perspective, the institution of ‘war’ can in
fact be managed and paradoxically create a more robust reinforcing of norms and
values, which can then in future restrict the further spread of war. Hedley Bull
called this the ‘anarchical society’ but where the seeming contradiction in terms is
looking increasingly the ‘realist’ norm. Bull’s concern was to maintain a system
of ‘difference’ (commonality with differentiation) as his view was that aspirations
of ‘universal values’ both created resistance and instability from other states and
were merely an extension of a particular state’s values and interests in any case.
In this sense, cycles of crises such as over the Korean peninsula and between the
two Koreas, can generate a mutual and common culture of crisis management and
predictability within which states then play their games of brinkmanship. Hedley
Bull (2002: 9–13) wrote:
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states
have sufficient contact between them … (A) society of states (or international
society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests
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… regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one
another, such as they should respect one another’s claims to independence …
Firstly, a state’s self-survival is reliant upon its recognising that each of the states
in the system have common interests in maintaining their state sovereignty and in turn
recognise this commonality. Secondly, it is this recognition and constant vigilance
between states that actually creates a vibrant anarchical society through diplomatic
encounters and exchanges. Thirdly, these exchanges then begin to influence the
actual system, and understanding of the system itself, which then becomes reliant
upon the norms and values. These norms and values establish the existence and
consensus over concepts such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such a
process based on respect of sovereign and cultural plurality would be eradicated by
abstract solidarism and universalism. The eradication of plurality would sow the
seeds of conflict. Bull emphasised the term commonality rather than universality
in inter-state relations. This system allows for the maintained sovereignty of states
and therefore war is always a possibility, but this is preferable than through the
‘imposition’ of hegemonic peace from a powerful nation which universalises its
own interests and therefore causes further conflict.
The shifting geopolitics in Asia
From a conventional Western approach, the geopolitics of Asia has now come under
a lot of scrutiny, not least as a result of the numerous pronouncements about the Asian
century and the rise of China (Chung 2012; Chye 2012; Heijmans-Okano 2012). A lot
of this interest is undoubtedly linked to the success of the ‘Asian drivers’ (Camilleri
et al. 2013; Mohan and Power 2008). Chinese military expenditure is now estimated
to be over $100 billion a year, up 11 per cent from the period between 2005 and
2008. This indicates for some, an increasingly proactive and neo-mercantalist China
flexing its military muscles. The US is placed 9th and China is placed 41st in the
table of country military expenditures to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio. The
heaviest military expenditures per GDP were in the Low Income Countries (LICs)
or middle income states across Africa and the Middle East as recorded in 2011 (CIA
2012). India spent 2.43 per cent of its GDP on its own military expenditure and was
ranked 30th, with Brazil spending 1.4 per cent of its GDP and ranked 61st. China
and India have long had border tensions, but there is a growing view that both
these BRICs might start sharing military intelligence as a result of both countries
being concerned with a potential failed state in neighbouring Pakistan, instability in
Western China and Northern India due to religious and secession activities, and in
countering continuing US military expansion in southern Asia.
From the Indian Ocean to East Africa
Strategic interest now seems to be turning to the Indian Ocean maritime
territory. The strategic opportunities and concerns between securing maritime
and continental trade routes from East to West is reminiscent of the ‘heartland’
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and Central Asian ‘great game’ theories. Indeed, Indian Ocean trading routes or
what the Chinese have called the ‘the maritime Silk Road’ is now being used by
major Asian donor states as a historical prerequisite and state-led ‘experience’
justification for their presence in East Africa and South West Asia. Thus, for
many Asian donor states, whilst West Africa is still regarded as the domain of
Francophone and Anglophone donors, the subregions of East Africa are becoming
a key strategic outpost for the exporting of African resources and goods across,
as well as in and out of, the continent. China has now built deep-water sea ports
in Gwadar (Pakistan) and in Sri Lanka. Beijing is also outlining plans for port
development in Myanmar and on Tanzania’s coast. China is now Tanzania’s
biggest trading partner and its second-largest investor. China and Tanzania also
have expanding defence cooperation. China supplies a range of basic military
equipment to Tanzanian armed forces and the Tanzanian navy and coast guard are
organised on the model of the Chinese equivalent. This development is known as
the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ theory of interconnected military ‘outposts’ (Kotani
2011; MoFA-India 2013). The US has also shown an increasing interest in East
Africa (Obama 2013b).
The US is going through a reflection of its own Asian alliances, particularly
with small islands in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific as a ‘lily pad’ strategy.
However, traumatic experiences in Somalia and Kenya in the early 1990s still
have an impact on US relations with the East African subregion. The area is also
a key strategic post for Asia’s middle powers. In 2011, a South Korean vessel
was hijacked by pirates off Somalia, which subsequently led the South Korean
government to look for alternative shipping routes to Europe (Lee and Drew
2011). There is also the issue of sharing technology between strategic alliances
(Chul 2013). On linking issues of security and development in the region, at the
US National Defense University, President Obama stated (2013a):
Success on these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require
resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures –
even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. But
foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our
national security, and any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism.
Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars
that our assistance might ultimately prevent.
The current and ongoing ‘cool war’ between the US and China implies an
increasing economic interdependence with geopolitical divergence (Pant 2012;
Park, J-j 2011). For Japan and South Korea, one position emerging is that the two
states might begin to draw closer in order to counter-balance the rise of China
(Mochizuki 2007). This strategy is coupled with concerns from both countries
as to further US distraction elsewhere in the Middle East, the economic crisis
fall out, and a pivot to Asia focusing more on South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
However, for South Korea and Japan this issue invokes historical and identity
controversies (Shambaugh 2010, 2013). The policy of sharing information with
International relations perspectives 87
Japan caused widespread public controversy in South Korea in 2012, although
this was not necessarily with the policy per se, but rather, with the way that the
South Korean government had handled the issue without any genuine public
consultation. For many liberals in South Korea, South Korea should be acting as a
bridge nation rather than being tied into an unequal bilateral relationship with its
former colonial power of Japan or the US (Roh 2003).
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ASEAN and Asian geopolitics in the post-Cold War era
In the early 1990s there was a view that a regional model based on the EU as an
example of integration might be possible in the Asian region. For US allies such
as South Korea and Japan, there were domestic calls for increasing autonomy.
In South Korea this was represented by the liberal governments during the 1990
which first outlined South Korea’s ‘bridge’ role and a closer shift to China,
whilst many constituents in Japan had called for a reduction of US troops on the
island of Okinawa. This was therefore a response to potential isolationism from
Washington, but also an opportunity for the states to become less dependent on
Washington in the post-Cold War era. Many indigenous Okinawans had regarded
the US presence as a security against what they have long regarded as Japanese
encroachment on their own independence. As of 2013, there is a view that the
Japanese government is consolidating the Japan–US relationship as a response
to the ‘rise of China’ and yet by generating a more sceptical approach to China,
as in other nations, a concomitant rise of nationalism can also disrupt the US–
Asian relationship in the region. Moreover, with the end of communism and
Deng’s economic reforms in China, a shift more toward Beijing or at least an
accommodation with Beijing, was seen as possible in the post-Cold War era. In
1992 for instance, there was a recognition of the PRC by South Korea and as a
result, official diplomatic relations with Taiwan were broken.
Regional institutions such as ASEAN which were formed during the Cold
War as a potential counter to US influence, and as a bastion against communist
expansion, were also reinvigorated. This process became known as the ‘new
regionalism’ (Breslin 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Rozman 2007). ASEAN was originally
formed in 1967 during the Vietnam War period as a counter to US Cold War
strategic influence in the region, but at the same time ASEAN states and their
elites also feared the spread of communism. These tensions had led to domestic
splits within many countries between a more pro-US government and those civil
society movements with concerns as to a growing mismatch between the values
of freedom and democracy, and the support of the US for the anti-communist
and authoritarian governments in the region such as Indonesia, Thailand and the
Philippines (Lee 2009; Rehman 2009; Wiegand 2009).
China is often regarded as using forums of regional cooperation, such as
ASEAN, to create its own wider alliance network in the region. Yet ASEAN is
now said to be becoming more than just a ‘talking shop’ as it includes a new
set of emerging powers and middle-power Asian drivers such as Thailand and
Indonesia. These new middle power states have a strategic option to, as it were,
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enmesh the larger powers in a complex of regional networks or potentially to
diffuse the larger powers by playing them off against each other. With ASEAN
itself now being geographically divided into the more pro-China continental and
less China supportive maritime states, this also provides an opportunity for bigger
powers to ‘divide and rule’. Indonesia and the Philippines have been increasingly
concerned with the incursions of China into disputed maritime waters in the
South China Sea (Raine 2011; Shekhar 2012). China’s response to ASEAN is
highlighted by its foreign aid approach which is often construed as reflecting a
tried and tested ‘divide and rule’ or ‘reward’ approach. South Korea has been seen
by ASEAN as not only one of the big three Asian states but also as a ‘new middle
power state’ squeezed between superpowers. China, Japan and South Korea are
all aligning with ASEAN (known as the ASEAN plus three [APT]). ASEAN plus
six includes India, Australia and New Zealand, whilst China prefers to keep the
alliances more narrowly defined in its approach to ‘Asia’. China is pushing for
a stronger China–ASEAN alliance so as to pull ASEAN further toward Beijing
to balance Japan and to take potential regional allies away from Japan’s orbit. In
2002, China and ASEAN also signed their own Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (ASEAN 2002). This maritime area is once again
causing tensions between the major powers in the region, with the redefining of
overlapping maritime sovereignty which is also affecting air transport routes.
There is a further regional debate with regard to Japan’s desire to be involved
further in the UN Security Council, that is, whether Japan might be helped by
China (as a fellow Asian power) or Beijing may attempt to ‘control’ or over-extend
Japan within the UN system (Bezlova 2005). Some have noted that these tensions
are now being further driven by an ‘Asian driver concern’ with emerging resource
scarcities (Narine 2009; Ravenhill 2013). Japan is also seeking to balance China
through Tokyo’s support for ASEAN.
As a result, questions emerge as to whether a strong ASEAN is being developed
by a larger power so the more powerful state can take full control over ASEAN
as a balance against the other regional powers, or whether the larger powers have
a strategy to create a weak or divided ASEAN in order to have more hegemonic
influence through a ‘divide and rule’ approach and create a more dependent
ASEAN. Moreover, a divide and rule strategy (but one that is promoted as
celebrating ‘diversity’) would make it more difficult for the other regional states
to gain a direct influence. In this respect, ASEAN would become a buffer for and
between regional superpower rivalries. On the other hand, if ASEAN becomes
increasingly required by the more powerful states in this balancing or buffer role,
then as a group, its leverage may increase. Whether this increase in collective
regional leverage is of benefit to particular states within ASEAN (particularly
for emerging powers) for strengthening (or weakening) their relations outside of
ASEAN is also a strategic dynamic. The role of ASEAN and its diversity is a key
aspect of Asian donor activity in the region as I will discuss in Chapter 4.
South Korea has promoted its own ‘shared experience’ solidarity with ASEAN
as being surrounded by larger regional powers and being badly affected by the
1997 Asian crisis. But South Korea also plays down the narrative of ‘vulnerability’
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International relations perspectives 89
for fear of being seen as ‘weak’ and therefore not a development model to follow.
Indeed, many in the South Korean elite want ‘global Korea’ to have a prominent
seat at the high table of organisations such as the G20 and OECD-DAC. This is
why self-styled bridge nations such as South Korea are often under pressure both
from being perceived as ‘selling out’ by developing nations and becoming part of
the ‘rich club’, and also being a potential competitor for other new middle power
states who are becoming increasingly proactive. Discussions ensue as to the most
effective type of balancing for all states as soft power based or institutional (Beeson
2003, 2013; Pempel 2010). For Ross (2012), the US pivot (or rebalance) to Asia is
increasingly counter-productive because it plays on exaggerating Chinese power.
US rebalance, China and North Korea
For China, the very existence of North Korea maintains the division of the
peninsula and avoids US expansionism. But the belligerent actions of North Korea
also keep the US in the region and North Korea’s actions often unsettle economic
development in the region. For some, China wants North Korea to reform but
remain an obstacle to unification because China’s concern is that future Korean
peninsula unification would leave the region subject to greater American influence
and could lead to further secessionist demands for slices of Chinese territory (with
its large ethnic Korean population). During the 2013 North Korean crisis, the US
administration seemed to recognise that further military exercises might also play
into this Chinese sense of foreign ‘encirclement’ and halted military drills, whilst
been fully aware that this itself might provoke misinterpretations of ‘weakness’
and might encourage further brinkmanship. However, for some, the activities of
the US, and the US pivot, may unintentionally give the impression and cultural
miscommunication of announcing underlying US fears over US hegemonic
decline (Perlez and Buckley 2013). For others, the pivot gives China an ‘excuse’ to
increase its military operations in the region, despite former US National Security
Advisor Rice’s point1 that the ‘rise of China’ is an economic opportunity for both
countries, which could ultimately lead to better security cooperation. Kissinger
(2011) termed this a US–China ‘co-evolution’. However there are those who
fear this rise as militarisation that is based on a particular expansionist brand of
Chinese nationalism due to domestic economic imbalances (Chang 2011, 2012).
Nonetheless, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that ‘We have
been emphasising the pivot to Asia for some time’ and that the ‘US is continuing
to urge a multilateral conversation about creating a recognised code of conduct
in the South China Sea in keeping with international law and the Law of the Sea
Treaty’.2 Beeson (2013) argued that the key issue for Washington and its allies now
is determining whether China represents another bi-polar threat and another Cold
War, or whether there is something different about this relationship both in terms
of economic context as well as cultural world views (Feigenbaum 2011; Raine
2011). From Washington, the decision seems to be whether the US continues with
a Cold War ‘hub or spoke’ model in the Asian region, or engages more in an
Asia-Pacific ‘lily pad’ strategy, creating a series of Pacific island outposts from
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International relations perspectives
Okinawa to Australia. There is also the issue of determining whether all this is
yet another realist zero sum game, and whether to forego influence in one area is
to gain on another issue in another region (Chang 2011, 2012). The new Chinese
premier Jinping made the point to President Obama recently that the Pacific Ocean
is still ‘big enough for two nations’, also implying that Japan does not feature in
this ‘cool war’.3
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China and Taiwan
The recognition of Beijing or Taipei has been a key issue in ODA policies. One
view is that the mutual non-recognition between the two states can paradoxically
lead to greater cooperation. Increasing trade between China and Taiwan across
the Straits has led many to suggest that a recalibration or reset of Beijing–Taipei
relations is underway. Many in Taiwan are concerned that increasing trade with
the mainland means the eventual absorption of Taiwan into the mainland China’s
economic gravity, which would lead in future to Taiwan becoming just another
economic region of mainland China, with inevitable pressure to absorb politically
as well. Others suggest that an increase in trade across the Straits actually creates
a further economic power for an independent Taiwan to be able to resist this.
However, there is also emerging a generational and demographic issue as many
Taiwanese with no memory of families fleeing the PRC, now want to construct
a specific Taiwanese identity, rather than continue with the issue of which is the
‘official’ one China. This is particularly the case for the Taiwanese Left, which in
turn has been often criticised by the Right as being ethnocentric and ‘racist’. This
means that Taiwanese national identity may at some point become split between
the ‘official China’ debate, or as to defining a specific Taiwanese national identity
whether as ethnic or civic nationalism.
Asia and India
David Camroux (2012) has noted that China and India had a generally strong
relationship during the Cold War as a mutual interest in promoting ‘nonalignment’. With Indian Prime Minister Singh’s ‘look East’ policy, China is
concerned that Japan could play a divide and rule policy with the two BRICs in
order to break any possibility of a joint BRIC alliance. However, Japan does not
want to be seen as being an obstruction to regional cooperation. An alternative
for Japan, it has been suggested, would be to ally with India and to play a bridge
role between India and US. The question is whether Japan would be content with
such a middle power bridging role. Japan, unlike South Korea or China, does
not see itself as part of the global South. India and Japan promote the East Asian
Community as being further inclusive of those states from outside the immediate
Asian region but having a Pacific coastline. Asian donors therefore, as a result of
these dynamics, aim to collect allies to reinforce regional status, which in turn
has implications for their more global aspirations. However, reinforcing regional
power and having global aspirations are not necessarily consistent with each
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other. Policies that increase any regional alliance forming (through ODA) can
mean that potential recipients and interests elsewhere are compromised. Beijing
prefers the format of an ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China) as a means to
project and to enforce its regional power. India’s ‘look East policy’ is extending
the Asian neighbourhood by providing a greater access to natural resources.
However a power gap exists between the established North East Asian powers
and challengers in south Asia. As BRICs states, China and India in their ‘Shared
Vision for the 21st Century’ are using this alliance to counter a potentially rising
Japan (Singh and Jiabao 2008).
In 2013, there was further India–China cooperation (Na et al. 2013). David
Scott (2008) called the China–India relationship, one of ‘congagement’ by
containing US and Japanese expansionism, and engaging in bilateral diplomacy.
However Japan has maintained that the BRIC alliance is artificial, whilst Japan’s
relationship with India is much more substantive and historical. In this sense,
neoliberal institutional approaches note that with increasing conflict potential each
side weighs up the costs and benefits of deepening cooperation (Komori 2012;
Mattis 2013). On 17 November 2000, Beijing set out the terms of its ‘peaceful
coexistence’ which included a mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit or ‘win-win’. For Ann Capling and
John Ravenhill (2011), the rise of China has now led to a number of entanglements
though avoiding any regional conflict which would damage economic progress.
Rosemary Foot (2006) pointed out that judging the scale and normative content
of China’s rise is still done through the West’s penchant for cut and dried ‘ideal
types’. This can often lead to misreadings and somewhat ethnocentric national
stereotyping, as to whether Beijing’s policy is ‘cuddly panda or menacing dragon’
(Gries 2005). Beijing’s stance in the UN is that by upholding UN law on sovereign
equality (despite its historical view on regional hierarchy) this gives the UN more
credibility in the post-Iraq war era (Chan et al. 2008; Chen and Yang 2013).
Globalisation(s), regionalisation(s) and cooperation
There is a long-running issue in IR as to whether regionalisation is a part of the
processes of globalisation or a counter-defensive force that states use to affront
globalisation. This broad debate rests on a number of implicit assumptions as to
what actually counts as globalisation. From the global South there is also a view
that a free and fair trade model of globalisation that does not rest on the more
narrow or technocratic excesses of ‘neoliberalism’ (and the ‘one size fits all’)
might also be possible. In this sense, distinctions are often made between ‘elite’led neoliberal globalisation and a more grassroots globalisation. Moreover, if
regionalisation is assumed to reduce state power, then one issue often put forward
is whether this process increases the power (or different forms of power) of a
specific or general form of globalisation ‘outside’ of the region. That is, whether,
in the long term, this in effect can reinforce state power as states begin to cooperate
through creating institutions of regionalism. Moreover, a regional bloc may also
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counter a particular form of ‘external’ globalisation and yet within the bloc may
promote a free trade model ‘with alternative characteristics’. The East Asian
region has been regarded as a functional site of economic interaction with dense
international production networks, and yet different from the EU which is based
more on multilateral rather than a set of bilateral trade links (Dittmer 2012). The
post-Cold War era witnessed the importance given to economic integration across
the regional triads. Therefore a mutual dependency can occur between the states
which reflect an ambiguity in how much states want to trade to help themselves
but a trading process which would also help their competitors (Chachavalpongpun
2013). Japan’s new Prime Minister Abe (2013) stated recently to Asian states that
‘Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am
here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.’ This
was a response to the point made by leading US scholars that Japan had drifted
into a ‘two-tier state’ of economic stagnation and military ambiguity (Armitage
and Nye 2012).
The group for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (2011) was formed
in 1989 at the end of the Cold War. APEC has been a key multilateral forum for
establishing free trade within the region but many of the free trade agreements and
RTAs are still in the context of bilateral relations. However APEC (2013) recently
stressed that it is to establish an agenda to define, shape and address next generation
trade and investment issues that a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)
should contain as a key way to advance APEC’s core mission to strengthen and
deepen regional economic integration and expand trade. The ASEAN Free Trade
Area was created in 1992 at the same time as the EU’s Maastricht Treaty and two
years before the NAFTA. In December 1997 (and in the aftermath of the Asian
economic crisis), ASEAN plus three (APT) was formed (Dent 2013). In 2011,
both the US and Russia became members of the East Asia Summit. The EAS was
originally an informal 2005 spin-off of ASEAN+3 (along with India, Australia
and New Zealand) as an elite-driven process with no formal organisation, making
it difficult for NGOs and other such groups to have a voice or impact. There is
a view that such organisations may create regional interdependence and spillover effects (Womack 2013). Ferdinand and Wang (2013) argued that within such
regional organisations as with other international organisations, the new insiders
often mimic the existing insider states’ behaviour in order to gain credibility and
status. In this sense behaving like others also suggests an acceptance of rules and
norms, maybe even peer group approval, but keeping a low profile or ‘hiding’
can also be a form of deception, as can a strategy of conformity without full
acceptance. Narine (2009) argued that through a subaltern realist approach (that
moves from the realist focus on big powers), ‘the rivalries between China, Japan
and the US – and potentially India and Russia – create a political space within
which ASEAN may exercise significant regional influence’ (Narine 2009: 370).
Thus, in May 2010 the three leading North East Asian states agreed to establish
an East Asia secretariat’s office in Seoul to address both top-down and bottomup regional cooperation issues. Furthermore, they also formalised trilateral
investment treaties in May 2012 to facilitate more intra-regional and cross-
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International relations perspectives 93
border foreign direct investment. Numerous ministerial meetings and soft power
academic exchanges have taken place to discuss diverse regional collaborations,
and benefits have also been recognised by generating common standards for
production technology, distribution, and logistic cross-border connectivity. China
has recently called for a trilateral secretariat to jump start the development of
regional institutions and governance in North East Asia. Dent (2013) highlighted
that 60 per cent of the world economy is now based in Asia. Dent (2013) regards
regions as an interaction of structures, processes and arrangements that are all
working towards a greater coherence that occurs within a specific international
region. These processes include micro level civil society forms of regionalisation,
and more macro level and state policy regionalism.
As the recent APEC (2013) communiqué pointed out, free-trade is historically
important for regional economic growth but APEC is also ‘recognising the range
of development levels, experiences, and systems across our economies’ so as
to ‘reaffirm the importance of supporting our ambitious vision for a seamless
and connected regional economy through our abiding commitment to delivering
effective economic and technical cooperation’ by playing ‘a leading role in the
global economic recovery’ in order to create ‘sustainable and inclusive growth in
the Asia-Pacific region’. At the subsequent ASEAN plus China conference, China
brought the narrative back to continental ‘Asia’, rather than maritime ‘Pacific’ and
proposed to further reinforce ASEAN with further Chinese cooperation. Beijing
also seems confident that ASEAN can and will be pulled into its orbit by making it
stronger and therefore easier to control, rather than to engage in a costly divide and
rule policy. At the 2013 China–ASEAN conference, Premier Li had put forward
a Seven Point Plan including the signing of a treaty on good-neighbourliness,
mutual friendship, and cooperation to provide legal and institutional safeguards
for bilateral strategic cooperation in order to move further forward with security
exchanges and cooperation (cited in Chua and Bandar 2013). This would also
include non-traditional security areas such as disaster prevention and relief, cybersecurity and joint law enforcement, and upgrading their free trade area by striving
to bring bilateral trade between China and ASEAN to US$1 trillion by 2020.
This would allow ASEAN countries to benefit more from regional integration
and China’s economic growth, and help to speed up the construction of interconnectivity infrastructure. There would be concerted efforts to help set up an
Asian infrastructure investment bank as a platform for financing intra-ASEAN
and various regional inter-connectivity and infrastructure projects. This improved
‘connective-ness’ between ASEAN and China would potentially segregate
ASEAN from the US. Japan is also pushing forward with its ‘connectivity’ issues
in the Mekong Delta area. Both strategies are reflected in foreign assistance to the
region, as I will outline in Chapter 4. Beijing has called for better use to be made of
the China–ASEAN Inter-Bank Association in line with China’s interest in creating
alternative development banks to the Bretton Woods institutions, although there
are concerns that China would use this as major financial leverage over respected
allies. Li called for China and ASEAN to create maritime cooperation by ‘joining
hands to build a 21st-century ‘maritime Silk Road’. This would give priority to
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94
International relations perspectives
such areas as maritime economy, maritime inter-connectivity and environmental
protection, exchanges in culture and technology. The 2011–2015 Plan of Action
to Implement the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity was reaffirmed. The ASEAN countries reaffirmed their
adherence to the one-China policy. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (ASEAN-FTA)
was formed in 1992, whilst in 2000, the Chiang Mai initiative was created, as
a result of the 1997 Asia economic crisis, as a regional bilateral currency swap
arrangement. There have also been discussions regarding using the Chinese
renminbi as alternative foreign reserve currency to the dollar. Former US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011a, 2011b) called this century ‘America’s
Pacific century’ as forward deployed diplomacy for ‘strengthening our bilateral
security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers;
engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment;
forging a broad based military presence and advancing democracy and human
rights’ (Clinton 2011a). Clinton (2011a) also noted that the ‘region is known as
the Asia-Pacific’ but that ‘sometimes the second word gets less attention than
the first’. However, in Hillary Clinton’s previous speech on the Asia-Pacific, the
phrase ‘emerging powers’ was actually followed with the words ‘including with
China’ (Clinton 2011b).
The China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is currently entering
into formal negotiations which was largely the initiative of China. China did not
want to lose out on the South Korean market as a result of its potential isolation
from the TPP if South Korea were to join the TPP. The TPP is a US-led free
trade initiative which has generated much interest from South Korea. However,
South Korea is also concerned with China’s response and the potential of losing
Chinese markets (Campbell 2013; Kim and Woo 2013; Tabuchi 2011). China
has been trying to push its own trilateral FTA with both South Korea and Japan.
The possibility of a China–Japan–Korea (CJK) FTA would therefore combine
the world’s two biggest economies along with the region’s third most important
economic engine. South Korea is also aiming toward a ‘bridging’ role through its
soft power.
The APT was joined by Australia, India and New Zealand to create the East
Asia Summit in 2005, and, in 2011, the US and Russia joined the East Asia
Summit (EAS). Another initiative has been the TPP which has been building on
the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEPA) between
Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei in 2006, who were joined by the US
in 2007, and in 2008 by Australia, Peru and Vietnam. Malaysia joined in 2010
and Canada and Mexico joined in 2012. Japan also made motions to join in 2013.
However, successive Japanese governments have been concerned with the power
of the domestic farmers’ lobby and the ‘soft power’ connotations of this lobby
in terms of Japanese food security and national self-sufficiency. This has major
issues for domestic government legitimacy and credibility. The TPP initiative,
however, is also said to potentially create a wider Asia-Pacific community but
as noted, ‘that would mean the Asia-Pacific’s second largest economy, China,
acceding to a free trade agreement largely shaped by US politico-economic
International relations perspectives 95
interests’ (Dent 2013: 979). Not only would China be excluded and probably
reject this initiative anyway, but also excluded would be APEC’s fourth (Russia),
seventh (South Korea), eighth (Indonesia), ninth (Taiwan) and tenth (Thailand)
ranked countries. Such regional initiatives can be regarded as either proactive or
passive, i.e. agreements are just a removal of existing trade barriers, or proactively
enhance cooperation and integration.
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Implications for ODA
The geopolitical regional patterns between donors directly and indirectly
affect and impact on Asian donor ODA interests. However any geopolitical
regional cooperation might simultaneously lead to a more aggressive inter-state
competition with respect to ODA policy and to how donor states project and
‘sell’ their ODA through state-led soft power. Alternatively, bilateral cooperation
over ODA and multilateral cooperation within aid organisations might not only
reflect the patterns of regional geopolitical cooperation but also act as a way for
maintaining donor–donor relationships amidst increasing regional instability.
Moreover, critical IR approaches outlined here show the significance of policies
not as necessarily instruments of the state but as constructing a particular version
of national identity. Cooperation and competition between the major Asian
donors is a result of the shifting changes in the region and the debate and policy
discussions concerning who to cooperate with and who to compete with.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the main IR approaches in order to explain the regional
dynamics between the Asian donor states. The chapter has identified the current
regional pressures that affect strategies and partnerships including the strategic
options regarding the forms of geopolitical and geoeconomic alliance building,
hedging, and bandwagoning and the reasons why. The chapter has also highlighted
the distinctive forms of strategic options and tensions that emerging powers face
in the region, and explanations as to their behaviour. Within the Asian region, the
BRICs, new middle power states, and former regional powers such as Japan, find
themselves operating with a number of strategic options for alliance building and
conflict. This process of regional competition and forms of regional cooperation
between the Asian donor states is now being reflected (although not directly) in
the Asian donor ODA policies.
Notes
1 ‘China’s Rise: an Opportunity not a Threat’ The China Daily 28 July www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/28/content_464280.htm
2 ‘Clinton to Visit Asia Amidst Territorial Spats’ The Korea Times 29 August www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/08/120_118486.html
3 ‘Chinese Leader Xi Jinping Joins Obama for Summit’ www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-china-22798572
96
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China, Japan and South Korea in Africa
Introduction
Africa has been at the centre of a variety of Official Development Assistance
(ODA) debates for some decades now. Africa has been supplied with a maze of
well-intentioned interventions from the ‘aid industry’, philanthropic individuals
and celebrities, all wanting ‘the African experience’. The creation of aid ‘green
zones’ has also proliferated and many elite aid agencies and NGOs often find
themselves in these secluded communities in the major African cities. Since
the 1984 Band Aid Christmas Single and the 1985 Live Aid concert, Africa has
entered the Western and mainstream donor consciousness. There have also been
the images of African war and famine victims and an ethical narrative of ‘we can
do more’ as itinerant ‘aid’ celebrities continue on their quest to eradicate global
poverty, but subject to criticism (Michaels 2013).
For many, the need for humanitarian and other forms of aid assistance was a
result of Africa’s ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. This was seen as a result not of ‘natural’
forces but of the enforced Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and subsequent
activities of repressive regimes that were bolstered during the Cold War (Carmody
2012). There is an argument now that what Africa needs is a further integration
into the processes of globalisation. Alternatively there is the view that this would
increase Africa’s marginalisation and that what African nations want is integration
into a more ‘authentic’ or ‘Southern’ defined free trade globalisation. In this sense,
the argument is that aid does not attend to the underlying structural inequalities
between core and periphery countries in the capitalist world economy. Aid can
problematically be regarded as a political instrument used so recipient countries
become more aid dependent and placed into the power of the core countries. This is
also an issue with regard to emerging powers’ donors on the question of ‘tied aid’.
This chapter considers how Asian donors are jostling for strategic influence on
the African continent. This is both for securing their direct state national interests
as well as to prevent donor competitors from securing a ‘winner takes all’ in the
more strategic recipient states. Recently, China secured a non-tender contract to
build a railway link between cities and ports in Kenya and to connect Kenya
with South Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (Khare 2013; Pflanz 2013).
This is in places an upgrade of an old British colonial line. Beijing is therefore
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confident that it will not be branded by the recipient government as a new coloniser
and that such initiatives also symbolically show the ending of the ‘old’ colonial
era. The language of ‘connectivity’ is increasingly apparent with such ambitious
projects. In this respect, the ‘win-win’ approach is based on promoting mutual
interests and ‘equality’ between donor and recipient ‘partner’ countries. However
this relationship is often maintained at the ‘elite-level’ and further questions might
be raised with regard to other constituents such as labour and local business issues
(Pflanz 2013). By creating more railway links, the recipient states may become
more integrated and this may produce objectives for a regional ‘bloc’ with intratrade links.
Currently, the forging of such regional zones is hampered by costly infrastructure
and tariffs. This is why many African nations sell products and materials outside
the region. However, a regional formation would provide potential leverage of
recipients over donors. Moreover, a specific donor ownership of infrastructure
(as loans or imported labour and resources) makes it difficult for other donors to
compete and to generate similar ownership and impact. In this respect, other donors
may replicate similar projects in different locations. Here, the recipient country
becomes a microcosm of wider regional geopolitical competition between donors.
Patterns of regional leverage by particular donors are increasingly prevalent,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The nature of this competition and why
it occurs is clearly important for any recipient government as it chooses where to
acquire donor assistance and from whom. Asian donors are using various forms
of state-led soft power through which to strategically sell their country ‘product’
to recipients by undercutting other donors’ soft power credibility. This chapter
argues that ODA policy itself is subject to distinctive forms of policy, and policy
choices, which reflect donor–donor cooperation and competition. The chapter
argues that providing ODA to African recipients is also being placed in the context
of the different narratives of South–South relations from Asian donors, and by
promoting forms of shared experience, history and ‘solidarity’.
Emulating the Asian drivers
Many African governments want to learn from the successful East Asian
developmental experience and to emulate the Asian driver model(s). However,
at the same time, many African governments still have some reservations with
some of the political and ethnic contents and assumptions of the Asian model.
Moreover, there is a view that the Asian drivers were successful at a very different
geopolitical time and order, namely the Cold War period. This has been the case
with various responses to the so-called ‘China model’, particularly in countries
such as Ethiopia, which have had their own particular and traumatic experiences
and memories of communism.
The Ethiopian famine of 1984 became the symbol both of the repressive nature
of the Mengistu regime and of ‘third world’ crises. Tensions can often emerge
in recipient countries between whether the recipient states can or should directly
emulate the Asian models, or whether the recipient countries can develop their own
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indigenous or ‘home-grown’ developmentalist model. In the newly democratic
states of the post-Cold War era, the domestic ruling political parties in many recipient
countries can be particularly vulnerable (politically) in tying themselves (and their
interests) to the resources and intentions of the donor states. Any direct or indirect
political problem from this ‘development partnership’ can induce accusations from
the opposition who often regard the incumbent government as being too close to a
particular donor, a point usually placed in ‘neocolonial’ terms. Governments may
also become trapped by a reliance on aid in order to maintain their own credibility
which simultaneously undermines their ‘loyal’ protection of national sovereignty.
And yet breaking any agreements, particularly on project-driven assistance, can
lead to a lack of development and a lack of credibility if growth stumbles. In this
respect, although ‘national sovereignty’ can be technically assured by the donor
state, a recipient government may survive or fall on widespread public perceptions,
and on whether it can continue to provide economic growth even if this growth is
not directly linked to or reliant on particular ODA projects.
Much of this understanding, for many, is a variation on a theme regarding the
domestic ‘contract’ between the government and people in donors such as China.
This is the ‘don’t ask questions as long as growth is occurring’ contract which is
an experience also shared by a donor’s ‘no questions asked’ or non-interference
policy toward its recipient countries at an elite level. In this respect, terms such
as ‘shared experience’ and ‘no questions asked’ ineluctably lead to subsequent
questions such as ‘whose experience’ and ‘who is (or isn’t) asking (or allowed to
ask)’ such questions.
For instance, one issue is that the project-driven emerging-power donors
who are focusing on infrastructure, may also shift resources elsewhere and
leave behind a more fragmented infrastructure system that is specifically based
on getting the resources out to port rather than to create a coordinated national
network. Moreover, whilst improving national infrastructure and information
networks can create a ‘national’ consciousness or imagined community, it can
also provide a logistical means for opposition outside the major cities to mobilise
against the government, particularly in fragile states. For instance, with its aid
being so widely distributed, one view of Chinese intent (contrary to common
perceptions and public opinion) has been that this does not make Chinese aid
purely expedient, immoral and ‘interest driven’ (Brautigam 2009; Iwata 2012).
However, an alternative view of this would be that this wide distribution confirms
China’s ‘soft power’ of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘disinterested rise’ and gives China a
more strategic flexibility in that a wide-ranging distribution of assistance can
represent more of a hedging (or a diversionary strategy) for a greater and more
focused involvement in particular recipient states of real interest.
Aid and level-playing fields
Firstly, one aspect of a lot of Asia donor aid has been in its financing of ‘debt’ relief
and debt cancellation programmes. This ‘debt cancellation’ offer was replicated
by the G8’s ‘Make Poverty History’ in 2005. The view was to create a ‘level
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playing field’ that would spur on economic development both through the market
and through ‘smart aid’. The assumption was that any difficulties in recipient
states were therefore the recipient governments’ responsibility. The concept of the
‘level playing field’ is controversial and is reliant, of course, on whether issues of
poverty are regarded as a structural economic question of inequality (Marxist) or
a ‘market failure’ or a so-called bottleneck question (neoliberal). For the former,
a level playing field that is advocated by neoliberals can only exist on paper, as
the neoliberal approach obscures and reinforces underlying structural inequalities
and questions of economy ownership, which are wrongly passed off as the
blame game of ‘inefficiency’ or ‘money squandering’. Even the ‘commonality
with differentiation’ approaches of aid effectiveness (according to the critical
perspectives of aid) do not attend to the underlying structural inequalities
between core and periphery countries. Instead the language is one of creating the
conditions for ‘country ownership’ and ‘country empowerment or choice’ which
are abstractly separated from the concrete realities of power distribution and longterm economic and aid ‘dependency’.
In this respect, the overarching neoliberal (and aid effectiveness) language
of technocratic problem-solving and ‘smart efficiency’ in essence ‘band aids’
problem caused by the underlying structural realities and therefore inevitably
de-politicising poverty as ‘something’ to be lifted out of. In this context, the
promotion of aid ‘commonality as diversity’ is regarded as just another way of
obscuring the structural homogeneity of ‘shared’ experiences for constituents of
developing nations and the majority of their peoples.
Secondly, the Group of Eight (G8) countries themselves later hit their own
difficulties in debt servicing as the financial crisis impacted on many of the G8
countries who now have GDP/debt ratio problems. At the same time Russia has
been able to increase its aid assistance as a result of its own natural resource
exports and by 2011 was the 25th largest donor of official assistance. To break
with other BRIC nations, Russia has started providing the OECD-DAC with its
aid information. Indeed, for many Asian donors, particularly South Korea and
Japan, their own lack of natural resources has meant that in selling their own
development model to countries with so-called natural resource curse, then both
countries are in danger of misreading the underlying development issues which
do not occur in donor countries with natural resource scarcity. A number of key
distinctions are often made between mainstream Western aid donors, mainstream
Asian donors, and non-mainstream Asian donors. Firstly, from the non-Western
perspective, there is a more explicit ‘on request’ form of aid rather than one based
on conditionalities. Secondly, there is a promotion of a ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘winwin’ and a reluctance to see aid through the prism of the hierarchical donor–
recipient relationship. Thirdly, there is more of an emphasis placed on country
ownership and on specific development infrastructure projects rather than on
humanitarian assistance or aid going through the national institutions. Fourth,
there is an emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral aid, and an emphasis
on ‘tied aid’ and concessional loans (rather than grant aid). The objective is to
establish recipient responsibility and ‘self-help’.
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Chinese, Japanese and South Korean aid
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China
According to its 2011 White Paper, the Chinese approach to aid is approached
as ‘unremittingly’ helping recipient countries to build up their ‘self-development
capacity’ (GOC 2011). China maintains that its foreign aid is based on a respect
for national sovereign equality and mutual help between developing states
and accommodates recipient countries’ interests to promote ‘friendly’ bilateral
relations (Ali 2012). Critics have pointed out that China is able to respect ‘equal
sovereignty’ outside Asia but that in Asia it maintains the ‘tribute’ system.
Moreover, there is the view that ‘mutual technical equality’ and ‘respect for
sovereignty’ potentially obscures underlying historical hierarchies of culture and
Confucian based paternalism.
Yet China’s 2011 document is also replete with words of Confucian humility,
such as ‘striving’ and to the ‘best of its ability’ as a soft power and self-conscious
recognition that China is ‘remaining realistic’ in providing aid that is ‘within the
reach of its abilities in accordance with its national conditions’. In this respect,
China also accepts that it is still a ‘developing country’ but fulfilling its due
international obligations (GOC 2011). China’s foreign aid began in the 1950s,
and is currently organised by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). This has
jurisdiction over foreign aid, whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
receives consultation and financing from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
Chinese Eximbank (although the allocation of the foreign aid budget is organised
by the National Development and Reform Commission).
Japan
Japanese aid officially began in 1960, and was originally channelled through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). In 1961, Japan was the first non-Western
state admitted to the OECD-DAC. Japan has, over the last few years, aimed to
terminate its foreign aid to China and yet has increased aid to India (JICA 2012b).
This termination, for instance, can be subject to a wide variety of interpretations.
Firstly, the original idea of providing and supplying ODA was to increase markets
for Japanese products in China and elsewhere, and to provide an outlet for
Japanese business and technology. Japanese ODA distinguishes between technical
assistance, grants, concessional loans and private sources. In this respect, Japanese
technical assistance became part of the ‘flying geese’ model of development in the
region, under the military umbrella of the US. Whilst Japan still requires Chinese
markets, Japan is also increasing regional competition with China. In this respect,
both countries view bilateral aid through the lens of a hierarchical relationship,
manifested as ‘tribute’ or ‘compensation’ or as ‘technological superiority’.
Secondly, Japan has been more focused on providing ODA as concessional
loans that were project driven ‘on request’ as well as programmes centred on
government-led infrastructure ‘big projects’. However, ‘on request’ was often
seen as referring to requests which were to Japanese companies (Lancaster
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2007). Japan was also regarded as being reticent in fully socialising or complying
with the DAC norms of ‘harmonisation’ which the Japanese tend to regard as
‘homogenisation’ and at odds with its strategy of innovation and flexibility. The
idea of ‘harmonisation’ is often critiqued by Western approaches as representing
‘Asian values’ of conservativism and elite-led exclusion of different ideas.
The Ministry of Foreign Affair’s (MoFA) 1992 ODA Charter also emphasised
the promoting of democracy and human rights to indicate its conformity with the
post-Cold War ‘new world order’ of the West, whilst simultaneously distancing
itself from China. Japan’s historical narrative of ‘from recipient to donor’ or
from ‘rags to riches’ has been replicated by South Korea’s narrative on ‘the rise
from the ashes of war’. Grant aid is provided by MoFA and then distributed
by JICA, and loan aid is provided by MoFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
and previously by MITI. JICA (2012a) defined its grant aid as ‘an assistance
method that provides necessary funds to promote socioeconomic development’
and is ‘financial cooperation with developing countries with no obligation for
repayment. Particularly in developing countries with low income levels, such
as Sudan and Pakistan, there is also increasing Chinese interest. Grant Aid is
broadly implemented for building hospitals, bridges and other socioeconomic
infrastructure, as well as for promoting education, HIV/AIDS programs,
children’s healthcare and environmental activities, which directly support
the improvements of living standards’ (JICA 2012a: 19). Grant aid is divided
into project and non-project aid, such as grassroots human security projects,
Japanese NGO projects, human resources development, counter-terrorism,
community building, support for fisheries and farmers, poverty reduction and
post-conflict building. ODA loans are promoted for their ‘efficient use of the
borrowed funds and appropriate supervision of the projects, thereby bolstering
developing countries’ ownership in the development process’ (JICA 2012a:
116). There are project loans (which include engineering service loans and
financial intermediary loans and sector loans) and non-project loans (which
include national programme loans, commodity loans for urgent imports and
sector programme loans).
MITI originally preferred to focus on broad interactions for economic interests
and tied aid, particularly after the 1997 Asian crisis, whilst MoFA has been
more concerned with promoting Japanese diplomacy and soft power. The METI
(Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry) has now replaced MITI. Japanese
ODA simultaneously promotes a ‘Western agenda’ on issues of democracy whilst
not ‘on condition’ by instead preferring an ‘on request’ approach. This is based on
technical expertise and the developmentalist model. For this reason, as a member
of the OECD-DAC Japan was criticised for continuing its aid to China in the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square violence in June 1989, in what for many
looked like using aid as a mercantilist policy of national interests. However this
emphasis on ‘technical assistance’ is also part of Japan’s policy that ‘transcends’
politics and promotes a ‘reassurance’ that Japan has moved on from its imperial
past (Black 2013). Japan’s policymakers define Japan’s interests and self-identity
through its ODA, separating development from issues of human rights. In this
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respect China and Japan, at first glance, can be regarded as having very similar
approaches.
Yet, at the same time, Japan also uses the ‘human security’ ODA approach as a
DAC member by defining itself in contrast to China’s aid and by promoting itself
as a ‘bridge’ between development and humanitarian issues. Similarly, South
Korea has responded by promoting itself as another form of ‘bridge’ between
the developed and developing worlds. According to JICA (2010), Japanese
ODA contributes to international cooperation and stability, and is being openly
promoted to increase the resilience and interests of the Japanese economy. Japan
and China by the late 1990s were, however, making moves for joint cooperative
projects for friendship and peace both in the Asian region and as part of the sharing
of overseas assistance as Japanese aid continued to flow to China (MoFA 1998,
2010). In this respect, ODA policy comes to represent state cooperation or can
be used as a gauge of state relationships. Alternatively ODA might be a ‘pressure
cooker’ release of inter-state tensions or as an insurance to allow for tensions to
occur in other areas and issues.
As Table 3.1 shows, Japanese ODA also follows a pattern of prioritising its
regional ally’s interests (the US) and yet uses this to promote its own ‘human
security’ agenda, promotes a historical form of loans and technical assistance to
the rising regional hegemony (as a form of leverage) and is active regionally in
rising lower to middle income states.
South Korea
The South Korean government has defined its ODA as grants and concessional
loans that government organisations offer developing countries for their economic
development and welfare improvement. Grants are funds that do not entail duty
to repay. Concessional loans come with a duty to repay, but on relaxed terms
with a grant element of over 25% (MOFAT 2010b). In 1991, KOICA was formed
and, in 1996, South Korea joined the OECD, subsequently joining the OECDDAC on 1 January 2010. MOFAT provides the grants and KOICA distributes the
grants, whilst the MOSF provides the concessional loans which are funded by
the Export–Import Bank of Korea. Like Japan, the main institutional divergences
occur between its economic interests and soft power diplomacy (ODA Korea
2011). In 2013, MOFAT was reorganised and split into the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) and trade issues are now under the remit of the Ministry of the
Knowledge Economy (MOKE). Like China, South Korea openly accepts its
own ‘developing’ status in order to advance the notion of ‘shared empathy’ with
recipients and to subliminally distinguish its aid from Japan’s ‘establishment
Western’ and even ‘foreign’ approach.
In 2009, South Korea’s leading recipients in Africa were Tanzania, Egypt,
Kenya, Senegal and Ethiopia (KOICA 2009: 37). In Asia, its leading recipients
were Afghanistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines (KOICA
2009: 34). One criticism has been that South Korea’s aid institutions are too
fragmented. However, this is justified by the ‘lack of experience’ narrative
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Table 3.1 Peer review of Japan’s aid: Japan’s 2010 list of top ten recipients and gross ODA
in $million
Iraq
1402
China
1196
Indonesia
1191
India
949
Vietnam
780
Philippines
559
Bangladesh
540
Tanzania
396
Turkey
354
Sri Lanka
288
Source: OECD 2010b: 7.
which turns a negative into a positive promotion of a ‘non-threatening’ and noncalculating ‘solidarity’ with developing nations. This institutional fragmentation,
however, can lead to competition between institutions for funding, and whilst
these institutions are becoming increasingly streamlined (as aid effectiveness) this
does not necessarily mean that the policies or management are becoming more
coherent. Critics of both Japan and South Korea also point to a higher than 60 per
cent tied aid rate. However, KOICA’s approach is to promote and identify the most
appropriate, efficient, effective, sustainable and influential use of aid (KOICA
2009). The majority of South Korea’s concessional loans usually go to the Lower
Middle Income Countries (LMICs) for maintaining economic ties and also to get
‘quick results’ with relatively little use of resources. Moreover, the LMICs do
not pose such a potential economic threat to the emerging-power donors as the
UMICs. In a response to criticism of its emphasis on concessional loans, South
Korea’s total grant aid (bilateral and multilateral) from 2005 to 2009 increased
from $210,014 million to $279,257 million (KOICA 2009: 166). Moreover, ODA
sector emphasis is also significant domestically insofar as aid levels (if made
public) can also impact on domestic support for aid, particularly if increases in
aid rate (or amount) for particular sectors such as education and health are greater
for the recipient than increases in the donor country.
Comparing and contrasting Asian donor perspectives
Firstly, Asian donors tend to focus on bilateral ODA, in ‘hard power’ economic
sectors such as social infrastructure (government/civil society), economic
infrastructure (communication/roads/rails/ports/energy grids) and production
(business/industry/financing/agriculture/fisheries). Secondly, it is perhaps
worth pointing out that there are a myriad of cultural issues at stake in the sense
that in many Asian Confucian cultures, ‘true friends’ in an equal development
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111
cooperation partnership should not have to ask impertinent questions about
the decision-making process or question donor integrity. Yet the domestic
institutional organisation and norms of the Asian donors reflect a more strict,
Confucian and paternalistic hierarchy which can cause a number of donor–
recipient misinterpretations. On the other hand, the relationship between
hierarchy and harmony is distinct from the Western view of harmony defined
through equality or consensus.
In this sense critics regard this institutional ‘hierarchy’ and ‘equality’ as
expedient instruments to justify particular policies. ODA from Asian donors,
therefore, broadly encourages values of self-help, responsibility, prudence and
humility, with an emphasis on local knowledge, and non-intervention without
conditionalities (Brown et al. 2013). As Brown et al. (2013) pointed out recently:
The aid community is living in interesting times – an age of choice, but also
an age of uncertainty about missions, goals, and methods. Aid is likely to
become more, not less, prominent as an element of international policy in
the ‘Asian century’ – because the economic engines of Asia will make it so.
Thirdly, the justification of Asian donor aid is usually based on the promotion
of a myriad of competitive and distinct shared experiences by promoting their
authentic historical links between donor and recipient (and by implication the
‘artificial’ historical links of their competitors). Fourth, there is the exporting of
strategic aspect of the indigenous development models (Japan and South Korea)
by promoting shared experiences of physical geography (‘lines of latitude’)
with regard to similarities in agricultural resources and climate change impacts.
Moreover, one country’s self-perceived soft power strength is often repackaged
by another donor as a particular weakness. South Korea, for instance, often
promotes its lack of historical ties and its ‘latecomer’ development status as
indicating that South Korea does not have any ideological or any threatening
colonial ‘baggage’.
China and Japan promote this aspect as a lack of solidarity and a lack of proper
development assistance experience outside of South Korea. South Korea in turn
promotes itself as ‘sharing the colonial experience’ and frequently places ODA as
a ‘reward’ to those recipient states who had helped Seoul during the Korean War.
However, critics argue that South Korea’s 1970s ‘miracle on the Han’ model now
bears no relation to the economic, political and ethnic realities in contemporary
recipient countries, and that its desire to ‘export’ and universalise a unique
historical model has neo-colonial and paternalistic connotations. The defence of
the ‘learning by mistakes’ approach has potential limits given that South Korea’s
soft power credibility is a key feature of its ODA package.
Fifth, China and South Korea both regard South–South relations in very
different strategic ways as a result of their particular geopolitical positioning in
the Asia region and to the international community. China regards South–South
as a bilateral relationship with recipient states, whilst South Korea promotes more
of a ‘triangular model’ of South–South relations between states with South Korea
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
as the pivot or ‘bridge’. Sixth, there is the ongoing issue of how the Asian donors
tend to focus more on ‘tied aid’ and where priority is given to bilateral loans rather
than grants or through multilateral aid organisations.
In this respect membership of the OECD-DAC has put pressure on Japan and
South Korea to also provide a higher percentage of GNI to their ODA, and yet
membership of ‘blue-chip’ organisations can often justify less resources going
to ‘less prestigious’ multilateral organisations. Moreover, Asian donors also
tend to focus on providing bilateral aid to the LMICs rather than on providing
humanitarian aid or assistance to the low income or lesser developed countries.
Top recipients are often clustered around this grouping with a gap to the next set
of country criteria. This is approach often justified on the basis of ‘results-based’
aid effectiveness. Indeed Japan is now (2012) encouraging the lower and upper
middle income states within regions (such as ASEAN) to help the other low
income states in ASEAN, with Japan as the ‘pivot’ in a triangular relationship.
There is also a pattern that Japan and China are promoting infrastructural
connectivity between these recipients in order to bring a cluster of states into
their orbit and away from donor competitors, leaving recipient states ‘in between’
more excluded.
Africa and Asian ODA
The paradox for many institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank has
been that to go through with their threat of cutting off debt rescheduling
and aid if the SAPs were not initiated, would mean that these institutions
would have less leverage over the recipient states at a time when the financial
ability to help pay off recipient debt amongst emerging powers is high.
However, by not enforcing conditionalities, aid and financial institutions can
lose longer term credibility. Emerging powers tend to avoid ‘on condition’
policies. Moreover, ‘spreading’ risk or aid amongst more partner countries
can generate more leverage from donors. This is because with more states
involved there is more ability to split any potential solidarity that challenges
donor power or geopolitical influence. This view is clearly at odds with the
perspectives that claim that because China has distributed its aid thinly across
Africa, then there is no evidence of its ‘national power’ scramble. However,
when a donor state may more directly involve itself in a particular country,
and whilst this is often regarded as ‘direct leverage’ and donor expediency,
such involvement can also lead to greater chances of project completion. A
donor’s reputation also depends on being ‘called back’ on request as a result
of previous experiences and results.
At the same time of course, a debt default can be dangerous for creditors.
One new development agenda in Africa regards a ‘home-grown’ take on state
developmentalism as the ‘Angolaisation’ of the economy. This is through local
content models of development which require businesses to employ and use
a particular percentage of local labour rather than to import foreign labour
and materials (Alves 2010; Ovadia 2010). This scenario is, therefore, a major
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113
challenge to those who argue that Asian donors, in particular, bring over their
own managers and labour to Africa and that this does not create local job
sustainability. These elite–elite partnerships further exploit the more vulnerable
local workers. Moreover, this concern has been linked to the wider ranging
issues of natural resource exploitation in Africa from Asian donors (De Billon
2001; Burgis and O’Murchu 2012; Callus 2013). For dependency and critical
theorists in IR, there is nothing new or necessarily unique in this elite-led or
‘comprador bourgeoise’ arrangement. Indeed employing local workers close to
the zones also means that wages can be paid at below subsistence levels, as
the reproduction and basic maintaining of a labour supply can occur through
non-capitalist forms of accumulation. In this respect, such ‘super-exploitation’
policies merely continue the ‘economic apartheid’ of the wider global system
of exploitation.
A further sceptical view of local content is that ‘home-grown’ aspirations
merely solidify particular narratives on ‘national ownership’ and nationalism
itself. There are questions as to what counts as ‘indigenisation’. In many of the
Anglophone and Francophone African diasporas in the emerging Asian donor
countries such as South Korea, the main difference between Asian countries and
SSA is often regarded as being the assumption of how real and perceived ethnic
homogeneity has been a mainspring of the development model in Asia, which is
inextricably different from African recipient experiences.
There have, of course, been a number of wide-ranging studies on Chinese
involvement in Africa (Brautigam 2009, 2010, 2011; Lum et al. 2009; Taylor
2006). This interest has been concerned with the impact of Chinese aid on
recipient countries. China published its own ODA White Paper in 2011.1 The
controversy has been over how to measure and compare Chinese aid with ‘ideal
type’ Western aid, and to challenge ‘common perceptions’ of Chinese aid from
the media and a (presumed) misinformed public opinion. Other normative issues
concern whether Chinese aid, as intention or by consequence, is just good or
bad, with most conclusions usually ranging from the more relativist argument
that there are difficulties anyway in comparing Chinese aid to mainstream and
OECD-DAC aid and, if they can be compared, then either Chinese intentions and
outcomes are favourable, or if not, then of course the intentions and outcomes of
Western aid are just as bad in any case. The imagery for such critics of Chinese
and Asian donor aid has been one of the ‘scramble for natural resources’ (Alden
and Alves 2009; The Economist 2010; McFerson 2010). However, debates on
toxic or rogue aid can also miss the point that many donors do not necessarily
provide assistance for their direct interests but provide assistance in order to make
sure their donor competitors are excluded in the ‘first past the post’ or ‘winner
takes all’ environment.
Africa rising
One increasingly vocalised view in development economics is that ‘Africa is
RISING’ – yet another acronym, but one which is becoming increasingly pertinent
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
in the aid debate of increasing Responsiveness, Inclusivity, Sustainability,
Integration and Global interests (The Economist 2011; Kaberuka 2010; Mahajan
2009). Whether Africa’s rise is due to the rise of China, or to the neoliberal
policies, or aid effectiveness, or the MDGs, is still up for debate. However, many
sceptics point out that Africa rising is not occurring across the continent and only
for a small middle class elite, and thus does not say anything about the distribution
or ownership of African wealth and resources. Nonetheless, one ongoing question
as a result, is as to whether African states need or want the aid or such ‘gifts’. With
rapid rises in GDP across the continent even during the turmoil of the financial
crisis, it is no surprise that such points are now increasingly prevalent. There are
concerns that this rise is in essence a ‘bubble’ as a result of China’s insatiable
natural resource hunger, and that once the Chinese economy slows, then African
growth will slow.
Carmody (2012) argued that one explanatory view is that Africa is rising as a
result of a greater integration into, and a coupling with, the global economy. The
notion of ‘included’ is particularly state centric and ignores how many groups,
regions and territorial areas of states have already been locked into the global
economy for centuries. The neoliberal narratives on a ‘reintegrated’ Africa imply
that integration means growth and therefore poverty eradication. However this
has to be put in the context concerning issues such as what particular form of
integration, convergence or globalisation is being advocated, and by whom?
One argument for instance is that Africa has had decades of poverty exactly
because it was fully integrated in a global value chain system based on neocolonial trade and dependency. Carmody (2012) has also stressed that the
orthodox neoliberal narrative is based on a particularly limited understanding
of ‘economic geography’ which claims that a ‘geographical marginalisation’
is the reason why many groups and states in Africa remain marginalised and
poor. Likewise, Jeffrey Sachs and others have argued that it is through better
infrastructure and more effective communication networks that marginalised
groups and countries can be integrated into the orbit of globalisation. Such
policies, Carmody (2012) recently noted, are also directed by what he termed
a ‘sleight of hand’ from the leading orthodox proponents and institutions
such as the World Bank Group, which tend to regard developing countries as
somehow lagging ‘behind’ the others but can catch up if policy and institutional
bottlenecks are eradicated through technocrats, capacity reform and a ‘big push’.
In orthodox terms a further spreading of integration policies by ‘smoothing’ out
of globalisation means a further pushing and pulling of countries into a global
trajectory (or through big push or neoliberal shock therapy). The interest in
Africa by the major geopolitical powers is also manifested and represented,
along with ODA, by FDI patterns and the increasing militarisation of many
African subregions, such as the Sahel states, through what Carmody termed a
process of donor flexibility and military hegemony or ‘flexigemony’ (Carmody
2012: 5).
Geopolitics and Asian donors
115
Where does Asian donor aid go?
China
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According to China’s 2011 White Paper:
The geographical distribution of China’ s foreign aid shows a comparatively
even coverage. The recipients cover most developing countries in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Oceania and Eastern Europe. About
two-thirds of China’s aid always go to the least developed countries and other
low-income countries. By the end of 2009, China had aided 161 countries
and more than 30 international and regional organisations, including 123
developing countries that receive aid from China regularly. Of them, 30 are in
Asia, 51 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Oceania and
12 in Eastern Europe. Asia and Africa, home to the largest poor population,
have got about 80% of China’ s foreign aid.
(GOC 2011)
In 2008, China’s assistance was being provided to 48 African countries, with
Japanese ODA also being provided to 48 African countries, and South Korean
ODA to 38 countries in the region. This distribution by Beijing is one reason why
its defenders point out the diversity of countries which suggests there is no skewed
emphasis on resource-rich countries as critics point out. Having said that, critics
have suggested that no country would be so obviously situated in areas of natural
resource surplus, and that interest in neighbouring countries is stemming from the
building of infrastructure road and rail links through which to transport resources
from a particular subregion. As Brautigam (2009) rightly pointed out, the Chinese
have very quickly and effectively ‘filled the gaps’ where Western aid has focused
more on humanitarian and social infrastructure. Thus, increasing infrastructure
and lowering transport costs has been key to global development. Whilst the
Chinese are emphasising the importance of the AU, nonetheless, Chinese officials
have indicated concern that subregional blocs such as CEMAC in West Africa, are
a potential threat to donor continental influence, particularly if these blocs begin
to become regional ‘fortresses’. In this sense, China as other Asian donors, require
their own subregional ‘policeman’ such as a Nigeria, an Ethiopia, a Ghana or a
Tanzania. Japan and South Korea have also tended to focus, as their role in the
OECD-DAC encourages, on now providing aid to the lesser developed countries,
perhaps also fearing further or future middle income competition. In this respect
China is not bound by regime rules and norms, and whilst Japan and South Korea
have both gained international credibility as non-Western OECD-DAC members
(and as a result of their own regional competition), both have lost the strategic
flexibility in aid distribution, sector choice and form of distribution, that China
commands.
Japan and South Korea are under much more pressure to focus on multilateral
aid and humanitarian aid, to reduce tied aid, and to provide more to lesser
income countries in line with OECD-DAC norms. All three Asian states are
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particularly active in Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Sudan and Tanzania (Hwang
2011). Tanzania and Ethiopia have been particularly popular recipients of
Chinese social infrastructure aid such as government buildings and sports
complexes, as well as hard economic infrastructure projects in roads and port
building on the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia’s AU building was built with the help
of Chinese aid. This led to staunch local criticism of the project that the AU
is meant to be a major symbol of African independence. Beijing is also using
food imports from Africa as a future leverage for the recipients to pay back
their concessional loans.
China, the Indian Ocean and East Africa
Lamont (2010) noted that China’s foreign investment and aid assistance is now
increasingly influential in India’s traditional ‘backyard’ of the Indian Ocean. China
is investing $700m in a special economic zone on Mauritius and has combined
its business and government interests. China and Indian ODA distribution and
organisation is also a part of the wider regional competition between whether it
is authoritarianism or democratic government that can provide the most effective
distribution of resources and aid for development. Each Asian donor is promoting
its own development experience through ‘soft power’ but whilst this theme is
taken up by recent literature, one question often missed is ‘whose or which group’s
experience’ is actually being chosen and invoked, and why? China’s participation
in Mauritius is also a key part of the island’s economic sector diversification away
from an essentially sugar cane and tourism driven economy into one of logistics,
information technology and provision of financial services. However, the island of
Mauritius has also been traditionally important to the Indian economy. Moreover,
the population of Mauritius is mainly of Indian diaspora origin. However, clearly,
China’s interest and relationship with Mauritius and other Indian Ocean countries,
together with Beijing’s strengthening naval power, threaten to challenge India’s
growing influence in the strategic region (Rehman 2009).
According to the FOCAC (2006), China has already aided the Mauritius
government in building a sports stadium (social infrastructure) a variety of
bridges and an airport terminal building. This is useful for the domestic Mauritian
government and its legitimacy, but also means that the recipient government is
now increasingly reliant on China for its own credibility. If it rejects China then
it loses investment; if it continues then it generates domestic opposition or too
much reliance on China. The key Chinese companies working in Mauritius are the
China Building Engineering Corporation and the Yunnan International Company
for Economic and Technological Cooperation.
As a response to maintaining the security of shipping in the Horn of Africa,
China recently joined US, NATO and EU anti-piracy exercises. South Korea
responded to its own vessel being hi-jacked by Somali pirates.2 The Chinese
leadership is promoting China’s role in the historic East–West ‘Silk Roads’ and
highlighting the mutual positive impact of the early voyages of Muslim Chinese
merchants and explorers of the 15th century to Africa. This is to generate a
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117
narrative of ‘authentic’ historic ties with the region. Turkey is also promoting
its particular historic role through a reinventing of Ottoman and Islamic routes
between the Middle East and Africa, and across the Gulf of Aden (The Guardian
2013). Turkey’s geopolitics of ‘neoOttomanism’ is a shift away from its objective
to become more tied to the EU. Japan is promoting its maritime heritage in the
region as connecting the Far East with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal
(JICA-Somalia 2013).
Somalia, long regarded as a failed state, is emerging as a key strategic nexus
between the Arabian peninsula and East Africa. In 2013 China reopened its
embassy in Mogadishu, and Turkey has instigated twice weekly flights from
Ankara and Istanbul to Mogadishu. There has been growing interest in building
deep water ports and promoting socio-economic development in Somalia. Japan
has recently provided a multi-million dollar grant to the Somali police-force
(JICA-Somalia 2013). The issue of Somaliland, however, is particularly sensitive
for China in terms of sovereignty issues. A relatively more successful and stable
Somali government might begin to change its relationship with Somaliland.
China’s credibility is particularly vulnerable to such shifts in status, if it is seen
to continue to invest and support a recipient government that allows a greater
autonomy for a territory within the bounds of an existing and internationally
recognised sovereign state.
China and the US: cool war in Africa
China’s tensions with the US are manifested in increasing maritime tensions
(Yoshihara and Holmes 2011). This maritime space is now affecting interest in
East Africa. Debt reliefs and donations have been provided to Tanzania, Ethiopia
and Kenya (FOCAC 2012). Interest in the Eastern region of Africa from the other
leading Asian donors (and US allies) such as Japan and more recently South Korea
is increasing. Chinese resources and its foreign exchange reserves from its rapid
export-led growth, now provide a clear financial leverage. South Korea and Japan
also have their obligations to OECD-DAC rules and norms (OECD 2009a, 2009b,
2010a, 2010b, 2011). Whilst this gives states a sense of due prestige and gravitas,
this, nevertheless, can restrict states if they are unwilling to defect. According
to the OECD (2013a, 2013b, 2013d) net ODA from most DAC countries has
been falling as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. However there have been
some middle power exceptions, with Australia’s ODA rising by 9.1 per cent and
Canada’s rising by 4.1 per cent. Japan’s net total ODA fell by 2.1 per cent, whilst
South Korea had the biggest increase of 17.6 per cent during the same period.
The 2011 OECD-DAC Peer Review of the US indicated that in 2011,
Afghanistan and Iraq were still top of its major recipient list (OECD-US 2011).
The US’s third and fourth main aid recipients respectively were (and before
separation) Sudan ($901 million) and Ethiopia ($769 million) (OECD-US 2011).
Egypt, Kenya and South Africa are also listed in the top ten recipients of US
aid. That same year (2011), China provided increased packages of ODA and
loans to Ethiopia (Levitt 2013; Lianxing and Xiakun 2011; Vidal 2011); this
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was recorded as one of the single largest humanitarian aid donations during the
famine. Ethiopia also plans to build 5,000 km of railway lines by 2020 with
Chinese aid. Kenya is regarded as mostly a trade and investment issue for
China and India, whilst for the US the emphasis is on stability as security and
democracy (USAID 2013a, 2013b). Interest in East Africa from the two powers
has been linked to the need for better infrastructure and port access. There have
been a number of recent reports regarding the significance of new shipping ports
now needed for a new generation of super cargo vessels to continue the increase
in maritime trade. The so-called ‘Supermax’ ships and ‘Panamax’ ports are now
expected to allow a new generation of 250,000 tonne tankers to carry more goods
and services. China, with the help of Chinese businessmen, has proposed cutting
a new $40 billion canal through Nicaragua as an alternative shipping route to the
Panama Canal. Nicaragua is also the second highest recipient of OECD-DAC
ODA in the America’s region, after Haiti. Indeed, many supertankers are now
unable to go through the Panama Canal due to their sheer bulk size as well as
due to the increases in average waiting time, sometimes up to three days. Instead
many ships are now taking the longer route around Cape Horn and thus opening
up trade outposts around southern Chile and Argentina. Chile has become a
part of the US sponsored TPP initiative. Interest in these routes is now opening
up questions as to establishing more port–port connectivity through a global
network of outpost locations (Yu 2013).
Many of these ‘Supermax’ ports and transport hubs or gateways are located
in West African coastal areas such as Mauritania (an iron ore terminal) and Port
Kamsar, in Guinea (a bauxite loading port). The port of Monrovia, in Liberia,
has been considered for a proposed port deepening for the 200,000 tonne vessels.
On the Indian Ocean coast there is growing interest in the building of more deep
water ports in Tanzania and Mozambique (Beijing 2012). As the White Paper of
the GOC (2011) put it in terms of the MDGs:
China has been increasing its aid for agriculture and grain production
in particular. In recent years, food security has become a global issue,
and China has adopted a series of measures to address this problem in its
foreign aid. For instance, at the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium
Development Goals in 2010, China pledged to establish 30 demonstration
centers for agricultural technologies in other developing countries, dispatch
3,000 agricultural experts and technicians to these countries, and invite 5,000
agricultural personnel from these countries to China for training.
Japan is back in Africa
Japanese aid is promoting a low carbon growth approach partnership with
Ethiopia (JICA 2013c). This is part of a wider ‘cool earth’ partnership. South
Korea is also at the forefront of pioneering low carbon green growth in Ethiopia.
From 2000–2011, Japan’s percentage of its total ODA to Africa rose from
18.6 to 45.7 per cent. South Korea’s rate slightly declined from 16 to 15.1 per
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119
cent during the same period (OECD 2013c: table no 29). According to JICA
(2009a) the goals of Japanese ODA to Africa include accelerating growth
through encouraging cross-border infrastructures in transport and energy,
supporting agricultural productivity and fulfilling the MDGs by the concept of
human security which includes issues of so-called ‘free’ development, as well
as development robustness, sustainability, inclusivity and resilience (Yokohama
2013). In 2009, Japan’s priority countries included Kenya (supporting economic
infrastructure and agriculture as an important East African hub), Tanzania
(agricultural development to reduce poverty), Uganda (humanitarian and postconflict relief), Sudan and South Sudan (sustainable peace and nation building),
Ethiopia (agricultural productivity and human security food issues), Zambia
(aid to people in need), Mozambique (rural and heath sectors), Madagascar
(food production), Angola (health and human resources), Ghana (industrial
development and rural area revitalisation), Nigeria (primary education) and
Senegal (health and education).
According to MoFA (2013b) one of newly elected Japanese Prime Minister
Abe’s first meetings as leader was on finalising economic infrastructure projects
in Ethiopia. However, each donor does not want the other donors in essence
to be ‘free-riding’ on their own projects. This is the reason why both project
replication and overall fragmentation are such concerns (Iwata 2012). MoFA
(2012b) in a new ODA White Paper, has recently stated that expanding support
to countries that share strategic interests, and the universal values of freedom
and democracy with Japan is crucial to maintain a free and prosperous and
stable international community with the goals of securing peace and stability
in developing countries. The statistics in Table 3.2 show Japanese technical
assistance to top recipients. This is a sector of which Japan has decades of
experience (JICA 2010, 2013a, 2013b).
Japan is increasingly concerned with its own maritime security issues in
East Africa as a result of piracy threats in the Indian Ocean. Thus Tanzania and
Kenya are high on Japan’s list of recipients. Japan, like China, is also building
infrastructure for subregional connections between African states, such as the
Nacala Corridor between Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia (JICA 2012a). Japan’s
main aid emphasis consists of economic and social infrastructure projects, as well
as agricultural projects and clean water maintenance, improving education, health
and peace making projects (JICA 2012a). Japan’s funding of ODA multilateral
institutions was measured at 17 per cent of its total ODA between 2004 and 2008
(Table 3.3). The OECD (2010b) peer review of Japan in 2010 had criticised
Japan’s growing preference for its penchant for ‘high profile’ projects.
Japan’s top ODA recipient in Africa is currently Liberia, a key US ally in West
Africa. The US is also beginning to focus on West Africa as cross-Atlantic trade
routes for oil and resources. Liberia has, however, had on and off relationships
with China regarding Monrovia’s shifting recognition of Beijing and then Taipei.
Liberia has also had a long-term relationship with India, as the government in
Monrovia also recognises India’s (as opposed to Pakistan’s) claims to the disputed
territory of Kashmir. South Korea’s ODA to sub-Saharan Africa has followed a
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
Table 3.2 Japanese ODA to top five recipients classified as technical assistance to Africa
in $million
Tanzania
37.80
Kenya
36.39
Ethiopia
33.59
Senegal
26.49
Zambia
25.79
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Source: MoFA 2012a.
Table 3.3 Total amount of Japanese ODA to sub-Saharan African top 10 recipients in 2010
in $million
Liberia
134.31
Sudan
119.08
Tanzania
104.60
Ethiopia
93.89
Cote d’Ivoire
81.26
DRC
80
Uganda
71.24
Ghana
70
Malawi
69.46
Mozambique
62.85
Source: MoFA 2011c.
similar trend. Both Japan and South Korea use Liberia as a ‘flag of convenience’
to lessen the costs of shipping goods to and from Africa.
According to MoFA (2011d) Japan’s highest rate of grant aid (rather than
technical cooperation aid) in 2010, was provided to Sudan which makes up 92.92
per cent of ODA, followed by Kenya (68.85 per cent), the DRC (66.19 per cent),
Ethiopia (65.88 per cent), Tanzania (65.87 per cent), Malawi (49.59 per cent)
and Mozambique (48.95 per cent). Japan is attracting recipients through nonconditional grants in areas of heavy Chinese loan activity. Raposo and Potter
(2010) pointed to the new maritime routes as being equivalent to a new ‘Silk
Road’. Japan also promotes its ‘human security’ doctrine, which is intrinsic to
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and TICAD (Johnstone
and Aoki 2013). Japan is clearly distinguishing itself from China’s focus on ‘hard
power’ aid and South Korea’s bridge power role.
In 2003 at TICAD 3, Japan pledged to extend its grant aid for ‘human centered
development’ and ‘ownership’ by $1 billion for health and medical services (MoFA
2003a, 2003b). At the TICAD conference held on 4 May 2008, Japan also pledged to
double its total net ODA, which was excluding debt relief but including multilateral
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121
funds for the Africa Development Bank (MoFA 2013a; TICAD 2013). The TICAD
5 Yokohama (2013) Declaration promoted the idea of creating state robustness and
resilience, rather than good governance which had been the decades-long mantra
of the OECD-DAC. In this respect as an established non-Western OECD-DAC
member, Japan had the leverage to shift the agenda to match its resource focus.
Japan also has an increasing emphasis on encouraging the private sector (Edstrom
2004). This has been termed a form of ‘discreet diplomacy’ as being both subtle and
effective (UN 2013).
Table 3.4 shows the rate of changes in Japanese ODA to SSA states from 2007
to 2010. The data shows decreases in Japanese aid to Tanzania and Kenya, at a
time when South Korea’s was increasing as Seoul’s priority states. Japanese aid
to Senegal increased at a relatively slow level. Japanese aid interest has slowly
increased in selected West African states which are under increasing Chinese
influence (Namibia). Along the strategic Indian Ocean region Japan’s aid has
been selective with increases to the Seychelles but reductions to Madagascar and
Mauritius where China and India are currently competing, and East African states
of which South Korea has made it known to other donors that it has fully prioritised.
There is a rising rate of Japanese ODA generally in the East Africa connectivity
states (Uganda), as well as emphasis on ‘humanitarian states’ (Malawi), although
previous ‘fragile states’ have seen a reduction in Japanese aid (Sierra Leone).
Japan and South Korea (Table 3.5) are competing for direct and indirect
influence across the different African regions. The strategic question seems to
be determined by donor resource capability to compete where there are equal
resources, or to strategically prioritise in a ‘winner takes all’ approach. Whilst
Asia suffers from natural resource scarcity, Africa alternatively suffers from
natural resource curse (Lawson-Remer and Goldstein 2012; World Bank 2012).
The biggest percentage increases in Japanese ODA to the region of sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) over the last few years has been to Sudan and South Sudan (along
with China and South Korea) and in post-conflict states (such as the DRC and
Cote d’Ivoire) where mainstream OECD-DAC has been particularly prevalent.
Increases have also occurred in Uganda and Ghana. These are also recipient
states with increasing South Korean influence and ‘smart aid’ prioritising. The
South Korean government has made it clear that Madagascar is a priority area
for growing South Korean food supplies and crops for bio-fuels, and would
be willing to bid high for land rights. South Korea’s geographical position
means direct access to global routes to the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean are
ultimately dependent on the status of territorial and resource tensions between
Japan and China maritime influence in the South China Sea. South Korea has been
particularly interested in opening trade routes along the Arctic Northern Seas.
Japan’s DAC peer review indicated that from 2007 to 2008 Japan was providing
its ODA to 146 countries, with the largest amounts of its grant aid being given to
Afghanistan, Sudan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, the DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda,
Mongolia and Indonesia (OECD 2010b).
Technical cooperation aid was given in order of preference to China, Vietnam,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Laos, Bangladesh
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
Table 3.4 Japan’s total bilateral disbursements of ODA to sub-Saharan Africa from 2008
to 2011 in $million
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2008
2009
2010
2011
Angola
17.75
6.76
37.62
11.42
Cameroon
15.58
8.11
42.03
23.68
Cote d’ Ivoire
19.51
10.39
81.26
DRC
51.22
65.70
80
186.74
Ethiopia
47.12
97.76
93.89
119.70
Ghana
54.03
64.80
70
45.94
Kenya
8.79
33.66
36.72
79.74
Madagascar
20.37
19.03
9.62
10.70
Malawi
30.79
35.80
69.46
Mali
34.52
35.51
38.29
44.06
0.36
−2.07
−2.85
−2.44
23.72
60.67
62.85
48.49
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
8.17
N/A
9.66
39.82
40.59
25.21
Niger
16.93
35.06
25.16
15.86
Nigeria
28.96
28.88
23.87
38.57
Rwanda
17.75
21.34
22.82
24.28
Sierra Leone
14.13
37.44
12.21
26.53
1.62
9.06
9.57
Senegal
25.13
46.74
55.21
82.83
Somalia
23.27
22.64
29.07
51.97
109.64
111.03
119.08
96.72
Seychelles
Sudan
N/A
Swaziland
3.18
1.19
4.36
12.55
Tanzania
70.99
120.46
104.60
119.44
Uganda
57.01
54.05
71.24
57.12
Zambia
37.14
36.64
46.14
46.08
9.97
12.38
18.92
18.10
Zimbabwe
Source: MoFA 2011d.
and Tanzania. Concessional loans were given to, in order of preference, India,
Vietnam, Turkey, Malaysia, Morocco, Brazil, Armenia, Tunisia, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. In Tanzania, Japan aims to increase rice and food production (JICA
2013b). Both Japan and South Korea are now providing a variety of educational
resources to Tanzania and Ethiopia. In both recipient countries, schools are being
built (and curricula modelled) on South Korean and Japanese teaching practices.
Ethiopia is one of the very few countries in Africa not to have been formally
colonised by a European nation, so the underlying structure of Anglophone or
Francophone education systems is less significant. There is also a greater interest
Geopolitics and Asian donors
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Table 3.5 South Korea’s ODA to sub-Saharan Africa between 2006 and 2010 inclusive
(net reimbursements in $million)
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2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Algeria
1.82
2.72
3.46
2.6
2.89
Angola
10.09
17.41
25.92
28.34
18.83
Cameroon
0.31
0.27
0.74
0.18
2.57
Egypt
5.64
5.77
7.47
5.57
4.16
Equatorial Guinea
0
0.13
n/a
n/a
0.02
DRC
0.31
1.64
2.51
2.47
5.67
Ethiopia
2.29
3.3
4.39
4.16
10.2
Ghana
0.27
1.56
2.51
2.47
6.73
Ivory Coast
1.03
0.85
1.73
0.98
1.23
Kenya
Madagascar
15.47
2.6
1.79
4.5
2.79
0.05
0.52
0.31
0.56
0.51
Mali
0.01
0.27
0.42
0.44
Nigeria
0.42
–0.43
0.81
1.36
3.11
Rep. Congo
0.25
1.05
0.34
0.01
0.27
Rwanda
0.34
0.84
1.35
2.31
6.86
Senegal
0.85
2.43
10.25
5.92
14.85
Sudan
0.66
1.34
2.63
1.37
1.56
Tanzania
3.84
9.42
7.15
9.19
21.46
Uganda
0.16
1.29
0.68
1.24
1.98
Zambia
0.21
1.05
0.68
0.92
0.92
Zimbabwe
0.16
0.41
2.13
1.17
2.06
Source: ODA Korea 2011.
in West African states such as Ghana, from both Japan3 and South Korea.4 In a
recent report from the AfDB and the AU (2009) it was estimated that Algeria
had current offshore oil reserves of 300 million and onshore being estimated at
160–300 million barrels, whilst Angola’s offshore oil reserves were estimated at
160 million barrels and onshore at 160–300 million barrels. The report estimated
that there are approximately 160–300 million barrels each in Chad, Egypt, Gabon,
Libya, Nigeria and Tunisia. Angola and Nigeria currently produce, in total, 4
million barrels per year (Burgis and O’Murchu 2012; Callus 2013; Kim 2010).
Africa still has oil reserves which are estimated to be around 76.7 billion barrels,
which is estimated to be around 7.2 per cent of the world’s total estimated supply.
South Korea in Africa
In 2010 South Korean ODA was dispersed relatively equally to KOICA and
the Export-Import Bank (Exim), each with slightly more than the Ministry of
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
Strategy and Finance, with the MOFAT receiving around 10 per cent. South
Korea’s top ten recipients received 49 per cent of South Korea’s total bilateral
aid. In 2010, in response to peer review criticism, South Korea increased its ODA
to the LICs to 61 per cent of its total ODA, which was above the 53 per cent of
the DAC average. The OECD has reiterated this level to be maintained now that
a high target has been reached. However in 2010 South Korea was placed 20th
out of a list of DAC nations in providing ODA to multilateral organisations and
there were also issues of reducing ‘tied aid’ (OECD 2012b). The OECD (2011)
reported that Asian OECD-DAC to multilateral institutions from 2007 to 2009
was recorded for Japan at nearly $3billion and ranked 5th and South Korea at
$0.3billion ranked 21st. President Roh Moo-hyun first visited Africa in March
2006. KOICA’s (2010) aid to Africa has been concentrated for many years in
the oil rich countries like Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria and Angola. South
Korea’s growing appetite for diamonds was shown by the opening of KOICA’s
overseas office in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where such interests
are promoted as ‘shared experience’ with development and conflict (Kim 2010).
Many South Korean diplomats make the point that many African nations
are ‘divided’ like Korea. However, in many African nations unification
and ‘national identity’ was a result of European colonisation and not the
consequence of a ‘liberation’ from colonialism. The official Korean narrative on
unification is also based on a ‘belief’ in national racial and ethnic homogeneity.
This relationship is clearly at odds with the realities and experiences of African
nations. MOFAT (2010a, 2010b) promotes South Korean ODA as the ‘Korean
experience’. KOICA (2010) has committed itself to building two ‘Korea
Millennium Villages’ in Tanzania and Uganda and has also opened an overseas
office in the DRC. This is where diamond mining is prevalent. From 2008 to
2011, Ghana received a 24-fold increase in South Korean aid. Uganda received
double the amount of aid from South Korea than that from Japan, and Senegal
received much bigger increases in aid from South Korea, compared with a
slower rate from Japan (Matsumoto-Izadifar 2008). This indicates a priority
region for South Korea and a Japan more willing to focus aid in areas not under
such intense donor competition. Rwanda is also becoming a major recipient of
South Korean ODA. Rwanda (2008a, 2008b) has instigated a ‘rolling plan’ to
scale up and align with South Korean ODA (Kim, Y.-c 2013). At the centre of
the continent, Rwanda is situated between Anglophone and Francophone West
Africa, as well as impacting on Chinese and Asian interests in East Africa. As
Rwanda is a relatively small country, South Korea has banked on its promotion
as a ‘non-threatening’ state to initiate support from the government in Kigali.
At the same time, both South Korea and China are relatively more active than
Japan in countries such as Senegal, Angola, Rwanda, Madagascar, Tanzania and
Ghana. Ghana has recently been designated a priority for South Korea (EITI
2013). One view is that following the aid effectiveness Third High Level Talks
held at Accra in 2008, South Korea (host of the Fourth High Level Talks held in
Busan) and Ghana would be able to further cooperate on developing a consensus
over future aid effectiveness policies.
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South Korea is now also targeting the energy resource sector in Mozambique,
and in Uganda and Rwanda it is targeting food security issues. However this
approach is leading to criticisms both in South Korea and in Uganda that such
policies are not making either country self-sufficient but making them more
vulnerable to future disruptions to global food trade chains, food shortages and
periodic high food prices. There are also issues regarding pressures on the South
Korean government to continue subsidies to South Korean farmers. This is also an
issue in Japan (Lee 2013; Walt 2008). As Park (2010) argued:
Korea has recently increased its ODA to Africa, doubling its support to the
region through ‘Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development’. In an era when
the international division of labor and increased coordination are paramount,
maintaining this geographic focus is necessary. Although aid to other regions
is very important, as Korea scales up its giving it should stay focused on
East Asia, an area in which it has a comparative advantage. It is expected
that OECD/DAC membership will help fulfill the policy commitment of
expanding Korea’s contribution to the international community and will help
systematically improve Korea’s aid system … this experience could help
build a bridge between the two communities. If a ‘Seoul Declaration’ on aid
effectiveness is announced at HLF-4, it would greatly contribute to global
development, and it reinforces Korea’s national renaissance and further
enhances its image in the world.
Kang (2011) reported that South Korean exports to Africa were up 10-fold
between 1990 and 2010. Top destinations for South Korean trade exports were
Liberia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Morocco and Sudan. South
Korean FDI was going to Madagascar, Nigeria, Libya, South Africa, Mauritius,
Egypt, Ghana and Angola, with sectors including mining measured at 77 per cent,
but infrastructure at 1.2 per cent, where aid rather than FDI has been used to build
a ‘soft power’ image. The third Korea–Africa Economic Cooperation Forum
(KOAFEC III) reinforced these commitments. KOAFEC aims to consolidate the
understanding between Africa and South Korea and share development experience
(Chung 2012). There were two MOUs (memorandum of understanding) between
the African Development Bank and South Korea as a knowledge partnership
strategy and to build on the growing trade and investment flows between South
Korea and Africa. North and South Sudan and Rwanda were more recently
designated priority states. According to the NGO Grain (2009), which deals with
donor land acquisitions and land ownership particularly on food security issues:
Daewoo Logistics, a subsidiary of the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo
Corporation, is seeking to secure rights to 1.3 million hectares of farm land
in Madagascar – half of the country’s arable land. The land will be used to
produce maize for export back to South Korea. Daewoo says that the deal
will help South Korea to obtain food security. China, South Korea, Japan,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others – have been scouring the globe in search of
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arable land to buy or to lease for the production of crops for food or biofuels
… These crops are to be sent back to the nation that has acquired the land.
Sudan and South Sudan are now being termed as South Korea’s new
‘breadbasket’ for food, requiring infrastructure to be able to ship out of East
African ports (Jeong 2008). Similarly the powerful farmers’ lobby in Japan has
meant that the government is unwilling to open the economy up to competition
on food, and in what is seen as an attempt to undercut the national farmers’ lobby,
to grow food resources overseas. According to the OECD (2012b: 104–108), in
2010, Seoul’s gross bilateral aid was measured at 73 per cent of its total ODA,
with gross multilateral aid at 27 per cent of its ODA. Between 2006 and 2010,
South Korean aid to Africa rose from 14 to 16 per cent, to Asia from 49 to 67 per
cent and to the Americas from 7 to 8 per cent. To the least developed countries,
there was an increase from 26 to 40 per cent of South Korean bilateral ODA,
which is exactly on the DAC average in 2010 of 40 per cent. South Korean ODA
to the lower middle income countries (LMICs) had fallen from 58 to 43 per cent
but this was still higher than the DAC average of 37 per cent. To the upper middle
income countries (UMICs) South Korean ODA was recorded as stable at 3 per
cent but still below the DAC average of 9 per cent. In terms of sector distribution.
according to the OECD (2012a) South Korean ODA was channelled into the
sectors shown in Table 3.6.
Asia donors provide much higher percentages of ODA to the infrastructure
sectors. According to the OECD (2013d) bilateral distribution to African recipients
from all OECD-DAC members by main aid sector included those shown in
Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 shows how Tanzania and Kenya received the highest amount of
OECD-DAC aid for infrastructural projects and where Chinese projects are
accelerating. Humanitarian aid was at the highest levels in the DRC, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan and East Africa generally. KOICA
(2010) reported that the highest sector for South Korean ODA to Africa was in
the area of education, with ODA (as measured in $million) being provided to
Tanzania (9,640), Ethiopia (9,551), Rwanda (6,103), Tunisia (5,085) and Egypt
(3,896). The DAC Peer Review of South Korea noted that South Korea was now
‘building a strong reputation’ for its ODA policy, reflecting a more active new
middle power approach, and that South ‘Korea has also played a leading role in
the G20 development agenda, working closely with the OECD and often serving
as a bridge between DAC members and the BRIC countries’ (OECD 2012b: 24).
The OECD (2012b) also reported that South Korea had made significant
efforts to increase and improve both North–South and South–South relations
through what it regard as triangular cooperation, emulating Japan. South Korea’s
role in the aid effectiveness debates also emphasises a ‘me first’ or ‘first mover’
capacity. South Korea is quite open about its national interests where it sees ODA
as a key foreign policy component (OECD 2012b: 26). South Korea has priority
states Cameroon, the DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and
Uganda (OECD 2012b: 28).
Table 3.6 Comparison of South Korean and OECD-DAC priority sectoral aid as a percentage
of total bilateral aid in 2012
Administration
South Korea
DAC
43.8
40.5
7.3
3.4
Education
Health
10.7
5.6
Economic infrastructure
27.9
17.1
0.9
8.1
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Humanitarian
Source: OECD 2012a, Number 19.
Table 3.7 OECD-DAC total bilateral ODA received by sector in $million
Social
Burkino Faso
Cameroon
Economic
Production
424
90
253
Humanitarian
14
303
253
103
9
1034
713
93
421
Cote d’Ivoire
404
131
88
281
Egypt
296
138
213
76
Ethiopia
944
282
184
640
Ghana
652
258
295
1
Kenya
1489
727
104
523
Liberia
327
150
51
90
Malawi
544
170
149
10
DRC
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
589
54
213
10
1196
129
206
15
381
71
82
102
Nigeria
1244
357
131
11
Rwanda
513
160
156
26
Somalia
309
12
26
815
South Africa
889
78
31
20
South Sudan
531
74
51
501
Sudan
474
332
293
538
Tanzania
1264
322
285
43
Uganda
909
325
133
44
Zambia
655
280
178
14
Source: OECD 2013d.
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Shared experiences: recognition, colonialism and solidarity
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Sovereign and official recognition
China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has different forms
of leverage as compared with other Asian donors who wish to be permanent
members. China, along with Russia, is in the unique position of not being an
‘original’ and official state when the UN was first formed. The difference for Russia
is that its forerunner state (Soviet Union) no longer exists. Thus in Asia, China
and South Korea both have their unofficial ‘ghost’ countries (Taiwan and North
Korea) to compete and contend for official recognition as sovereign states and as
representing the ‘unified’ nation. During the first couple of decades of the Cold
War, Communist China wanted African support for its sovereign recognition and
for its accession to the UN Security Council in order to support replacing Taiwan
as the ‘one China’. China maintained what became known as the Beijing version
of the Hallstein doctrine in order to connect foreign assistance with sovereign
status and recognition.5 China, along with Russia, also promotes virulently the
UN’s legal standard on the sanctity of territorial integrity and national sovereignty
(UN 1962, 1974).
As a result, China is often criticised for standing on the side-lines of key
global and moral issues such as humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, and for
moving in to take advantage of ‘business partnerships’ in return for access to
natural resources on the basis of a respect for national sovereignty and ‘noninterventionism’. Yet China has been proactive in many UN-based operations,
given its role on the Security Council (Samy 2010; Saul 2013). China has had
12 peacekeeping missions in Africa since 1990, and is calling for a stronger
representation of developing countries in the UN system. China has also been
fairly proactive with the human security agenda but is careful with International
Criminal Court (ICC) issues (as is the US). The US is concerned that the ICC
system can be used to enmesh the US by smaller ‘rogue states’, whilst Beijing is
concerned that the system can be abused by the more powerful states. However,
China did not veto Western intervention in Libya, or pressurise the War Crimes
Tribunal that indicted Sudanese leader Bashir to be taken to the ICC. As such,
critics suggest that China, as a permanent Security Council member, can use
the ‘potential’ use (or non-use) of the veto as a mechanism through which to
put pressure on leaders in recipient countries. As Saul (2013) noted, Beijing’s
positions or intentions can often be seen as inconsistent as there is no direct
correlation between natural resource issues and the use of Security Council
vetos. For recipients to receive Chinese support and aid, they must not have
official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). China has
called for Asian states to ‘unite’ as Asians as a precondition for future regional
cooperation and on the basis of a respect for mutual non-interference and ‘no
questions asked’ (Breslin 2007, 2010, 2013).
These are the different versions of South–South relationships and solidarity
that emerge from hegemonic or middle power states. Rising hegemonic powers
might regard South–South as a potential alliance to challenge the existing
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129
powers, whilst middle powers can regard South–South as a form of alliance
to the rising regional power and within the existing power framework. These
strategic issues might also reflect different national and regional versions of
what globalisation, sovereignty and free trade can and should mean (Doha 2005;
UNDP 1994, 2013). There have been concerns from states in the region that this
is a part of the expansionist ‘rise of China’s’ charm offensive (Lancaster 2008,
2011; Provost and Harris 2013). However, critics have also argued that Chinese
ODA is a way for Beijing to reward those recipient states who are particularly
supportive of the ‘Beijing Consensus’, no questions asked (Kurlantzick 2006;
Provost 2011). Chinese President Hu Jintao (2005) and Premier Wen Jiabao
focused on promoting a particular narrative on South–South relations as ‘led
by China’ but within the established rules and norms of the UN framework.
The historical irony is that China originally regarded Westphalian expansion
of sovereign equality as a ‘Western’ ruse covering colonialism. President Hu
(Jintao 2005) explained:
Mutual respect and treating each other as equals have become an important
consensus of the international community. Respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, as well as respect for countries’ right to independently
chose their own social systems and paths of development, are not only
important principles enshrined in the UN Charter, but have increasingly
become guiding principles for countries with differing social systems and
development levels to establish and develop their relations.
(Jintao 2005: 3)
The Koreas
During the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea was the more internationalist, developed
and proactive Korean state across Africa. South Korea was more concentrated
on its own development. However during the early developmentalist era of
President Park (1961–1979) delegations were sent to Africa to gain a regional
recognition of the South as being the ‘official Korea’ and future ‘unified Koreain-waiting’. National identity narratives over the content of ‘authentic Korea’
include particular interpretations of official history, national heritage artefacts
and competition between the two Koreas over the number of World Heritage
Sites that are residing within their own territorial space. Neither North Korea
nor South Korea recognise each other as sovereign states and both their national
constitutions claim full sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula (Kim, S.-j
2013). There is a concern that South Korea is using its ODA to ‘reward’ and
pay back those recipient countries who helped South Korea during and after the
Korean War (1950–1953).6 Like Japan, South Korea is using a particular narrative
on highlighting its own historical ties to Ethiopia. Ethiopia had sent a number of
its elite troops from Emperor Haile Selasse in 1951 to fight in the Korean War on
the side of the South and the UN (Last 2012).7 The three democratic states (India,
Japan and South Korea) do recognise the importance of public opinion and one
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
new development in Japan and South Korea is the emphasis placed on cultivating
positive domestic public opinion attitudes on ODA (Chang 2010; Potter 2012;
Scheyvens 2005; Traphagen 2013). On the Korean peninsula, both Korea’s claim
that ‘the other Korea’ is using unification as ‘imperialistic’. Both Chinese and
South Korean narratives often place Japan as the ‘former regional hegemon’ and
‘coloniser’.
However, a generation of African leaders has been brought up on technological
imports from Asia which were, during the 1980s, mostly Japanese made and
Japanese innovated (Chung 2012). In countries such as Ethiopia and Ghana, many
imported motor vehicles were made by firms such as Toyota and Mitsubishi, whilst
motorbikes were made by Suzuki, Yamaha and Kawasaki, and the latest Walkmans
were imported from Sony. For many Ethiopians, for instance, memories of the
so-called ‘Japaniser’ approach of the 1980s has also meant a particular view of
modernisation (a Meiji Restoration in Africa). For instance, Japan had a relatively
strong historical link to Ethiopia in the modern era. Indeed, the rise of Japan in the
early 20th century was regarded by many countries as a form of solidarity against
European colonialism.
However, Ethiopia (like Liberia) was never officially ‘colonised’ by the
European powers. Indeed China was never fully colonised by Japan. Thus, in
those African nations that were officially colonised, the image of Japan can be seen
to be swinging between that of a non-Western liberator or just another powerful
hegemon. However, there was little criticism from Ethiopia regarding Japan’s
expansive role in Asia during the 1930s and 1940s (Maruko 2013). Paradoxically,
selected South Korean narratives on this historical link between South Korea
and Ethiopia have also focused on how Ethiopia provided elite troops to fight
North Korea during the Korean War. Yet the Korean War has been placed in South
Korean national history as having been caused by the ‘foreign’ division of Korea
which was a result of previous Japanese colonialism. Such narratives would seem
to place pressure on Ethiopia to ‘choose’ its donor. In this respect, the provision
of textbooks and subject curricula to African recipients becomes particularly
sensitive.
Nonetheless, during the early 20th century, Japan was often regarded by many
states as its own particular ‘hero of the South’. Japan’s ‘axis’ with Nazi Germany
was also regarded by many in the colonised states as a challenge to the old
European imperial powers such as Britain and France. However both Britain and
Japan also had similar imperial aspirations and concerns with ‘national liberation’
movements within their domains. In Korea, Britain and Japan collaborated over
resisting the Korean independence movement during the 1920s by closing down
publishing houses and imprisoning newspaper reporters and activists. Yet this
historical chronology has also generated an element of solidarity between India
and Japan, and more recently between India, Myanmar and Thailand. Prime
Minister Singh (2013) of India recently stated the ‘shared colonial’ argument in
2013:
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131
India’s relations with Africa are rooted in the history of our solidarity against
colonialism and apartheid. Mahatma Gandhi developed the tools of peaceful
resistance on this very soil. Our engagement with Africa has come a long way
since then and today we have built a new template for partnership in the form
of the India–Africa Forum Summit. This partnership is guided by the vision
and priorities of our African partners. India will assist Africa in charting its
own course through institution-building, infrastructure development and
technical and vocational skill development. The pan-Africa e-Network for
tele-medicine and tele-education, which is functional in 47 countries in
Africa, is a major success story of our institution-building partnership with
Africa. We are ready to work with our African partners on e-governance
to help bridge the digital divide in Africa. India is also happy to share its
experiences of participative political institutions, local governance, media
and civil society with Africa.
The growth of India as a BRIC therefore means little choice for BRICs as
emerging-power states both need to be involved in ODA for promoting their own
‘development’ prestige and to stop donor competitors in the ‘winner takes all’
approach to so-called resource diplomacy to secure oil, food supplies and rare
metals. The main competitor for resources is China. India imports 11 per cent
of its oil needs from Nigeria and is pushing for new territories in Angola. It is
estimated that India will overtake Japan to become the world’s third-largest net
importer of oil, after the US and China. In 2013, it was estimated that African
countries received approximately 7 per cent of India’s technical assistance budget,
and several hundred million dollars to help establish educational assistance in
Uganda, Ghana, Botswana and Burundi, where Japanese aid is also heavily active,
indicating increasing Indian–Japanese potential cooperation at crowding out
Chinese influence. The Second India–Africa Forum in Ethiopia also emphasised
the ties with India in the African independence struggle, and the need to align
a common position on UN Security Council reform where Africa and India are
‘under-represented’. The communiqué from the AIFEH (2011) held in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, also stated that:
Africa and India reiterate the mutual desire to expand economic cooperation
and trade and investment linkages between them. Recognizing that trade
and investment between Africa and India have increased, both Africa and
India agree to take further measures to continue to create a positive ambience
for such enhanced flows. Africa has also effectively utilized concessional
financial flows from India to Africa for supporting the development of its
infrastructure industry and services. Both sides agree to further expand
cooperation and sharing of experiences to increase trade, investment and
financial flows between India and Africa as they provide a common paradigm
of cooperation in the true spirit of South–South engagement.
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Geopolitics and Asian donors
At the India–Africa Forum (2011) emphasis was placed on capacity and value
added through South–South partnership and an Action Plan for the Framework
of Cooperation. Special care would be taken to encourage greater investment in
some of these sectors as well as to increase financial flows from the government
sector to achieve these objectives. India is committed to continue with increasing
numbers of scholarships in specialised areas like agriculture, science and
technology. Moreover, Japan’s increasing willingness to engage in collaborative
projects with India and share its expertise, can also make use of earlier Indian
access to other African nations and as a counter to China’s influence. Japan is also
able to counter accusations of its imperial past by maintaining its relations and
cooperating with the historically anti-colonial Indian state.
In this sense China and South Korea’s questioning of the ‘rise of Japan’ and
Japan’s colonial legacy can paradoxically benefit Japan, pointing out that other
states ‘have moved on’ and are more interested in technological power (a lack
of which is one reason why these states were subject to colonialism in the first
place) and no longer taking the bait of other Asian donors in framing Japan as an
‘imperial power in waiting’. In this sense Japan has aimed to separate its history
and politics from the economic and technical side of its ODA (JICA 2002, 2009b;
Na 2009). Yet this separation (and the soft power promotion of this separation)
can also counter-productively indicate a historical sensitivity which continues
to influence, directly or indirectly, domestic and international attitudes toward
Japan, particularly in the Asian region.
The perception of Japan as the ‘anti-European colonial’ hero followed the
defeat of imperial Russia during the Russian–Japanese War of 1904/1905. The
Japanese victory was the first instance of an Asian power defeating an imperial
European power. For many this victory was a watershed and defined the end
of the age of European colonialism; the Russian defeat created the conditions
for the communist revolution of 1917, which of course in turn then inspired the
communists in China. Through its ‘Great Asia Project’ Japan had defended its
regional expansionism on the basis that it was ‘liberating’ and uniting Asians from
European repression and ‘divide and rule’. In this respect imperial Japan was
promoting itself as different regional power. This is a familiar language, of course,
of all past and present major regional and global hegemons. Japan now promotes
its historical anti-colonial role in rebuking Italian interventionism in North and
East Africa during the 1930s with East African countries. Japan was regarded as
an ally of the Ethiopian Emperor with suggestions of there being a potential royal
marriage between the two nations (Bradshaw and Ransdell 2011). This ‘hero of
the south’ anti-imperialist mantle is now being used by China (Drifte 2006; Jain
2004).
In the post-war era, Japan’s Yoshida and Fukuda (1977) doctrines emphasised
Japan’s role in latest technology innovation and economic efficiency, so as not to
produce any backlash against or reminder of its war record (Edstrom 2003, 2004).
Japan, however, has also emphasised ‘heart to heart’ links with ASEAN and its
‘natural’ anti-colonial alliance with India (JICA 2012b). In the post-Cold War era,
Japan then began its competition for influence in Africa with the rise of China
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and an emergent South Korea. At the same time Japan has now shifted away from
resource extraction, just as China has started its resource extraction. However,
Japan has traditionally prioritised Asia in its ODA Charter, stating an intention to
enhance South–South cooperation with the ‘more advanced developing countries’
in Asia (MoFA 2003b). China is also often regarded as having its own interpretation
of South–South as a ‘third world hero’ but a part of the UN system. However this
approach is also different to the UN’s version of South–South relations as being
an inclusive part of North–South relations or as a supplementary to these relations
(Nairobi 2010).
Power and diversity
The Chinese approach to African culture(s) and civilisation is one based on an
assumption that civilisations are defined (like the Chinese Han civilisation) by
ethnic homogeneity. One point raised by Amy Chua (2007) is that the successful
and powerful states (and more specifically what she calls ‘hyperpowers’) in fact
promote the relative concept of ‘diversity’ both domestically and overseas to
sustain their relative power.8 In this respect, emerging-power narratives such as
India’s ‘diversity’ and China’s recognition of diverse countries with equal ‘national
sovereignty’ are signs of power, albeit in different forms. For India, diversity
‘makes up the state’ whilst for China diversity is defined by the different cultures
represented by different states in the sovereign state system. Diversity, therefore,
is subject to a myriad of different interpretations and usages. There is a view, for
instance, that diversity can be an excuse for governments (the relativist point)
not to have to provide adequate resources domestically and overseas to different
groups (Zakaria 2013). At the same time, whilst this narrative on ‘diversity’ for
China and other East Asian donors is promoted overseas, it often not promoted
domestically. Here elite-led narratives on ‘diversity’ as equality or ‘unity in
diversity’ or ‘commonality with diversity’ can also be regarded by the smaller
nations as both representing and obscuring underlying and uneven power interests
(Schoeman 2011). China regards foreign aid as part of its expected historical
tribute in the hierarchical system, whilst in Japan aid is regarded conversely as
recognition of Japan’s superiority in technology and the ‘gift’ becomes rooted in
its own power/techno-nationalism hierarchy.
The Addis Ababa (2004) Action Plan (2004–2006) proposed a partnership
between China and Africa featuring long-term stability, equality, mutual benefit
and comprehensive cooperation. Emphasising practical and comprehensive
cooperation, the Conference further promoted the sound development of China–
Africa relations. The Beijing Action Plan (2012) (2013–2015) established a new
type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality
and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. China
announced eight policy measures to strengthen cooperation with Africa and
support its development. The Sharm el Shiek (2010) Action Plan (2010–2012)
(including 49 African states) promised $10 billion from China in concessional
loans, along with more investment by Chinese enterprises. The success of the
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First Ministerial Conference marked the inauguration of FOCAC and created a
new platform for China–Africa dialogue and cooperation. According to former
Chinese President Hu (FOCAC 2012), ‘In a world of profound changes, the
Chinese and African peoples have high hopes for the growth of China–Africa
relations. This means that we should, with a keen sense of responsibility and
mission, adapt to new developments, set new goals, take new measures, and solve
new problems so as to open up new prospects in building a new type of China–
Africa strategic partnership.’
Emphasis here is being placed on new forms of aid, but based on a longstanding relationship. President Hu continued, ‘To open up new prospects for
a new type of China–Africa strategic partnership, China and Africa should
increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges’ and Beijing ‘should encourage
exchanges and interactions between our two great civilisations at various levels
and in various ways, strengthen exchanges in education, culture, science and
technology, health, sports and tourism, and increase contacts between youth,
women, people’s organizations, media and academic institutions of the two
sides’ (FOCAC 2012). The Ministerial Declaration of the 33rd annual meeting
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the G77 and China, on
25 September 2009, outlined the importance of South–South cooperation in the
Yamoussoukro (2008) Consensus, announced in the Ivory Coast city. Estimates
are that over $1billion of Chinese ‘grant/technical’ aid was provided to Africa in
2007, with China–Africa trade at approximately $100 billion and with Chinese
investments at a level of around $20 billion. Contrary to common perceptions,
however, as Buckley (2013) noted, China is not involved in the large-scale land
grabs. However, one addendum to this would be that China is in fact slowly
buying up land as the famous ‘crossing the river by feeling/groping for each
stone’. As Buckley (2013: 10) pointed out, the real paradigm shift in foreign aid
is occurring not so much from what China is doing or not doing differently on
the ground but rather ‘from a shift in how the world perceives Africa’s agrarian
future and China’s role in it’.
It is in this context that the former colonial European donors make the case
that they ‘understand’ African dynamics better. Yet this argument provides
emerging-power donors with an argument that European donors are still in a
neocolonial relationship with Africa. Brautigam (2010) has concluded that ‘some
in the West dismiss this important engagement as a new form of colonialism
or comfort themselves that China will prove an unreliable or even treacherous
partner, and that African countries will return to our embrace’ (Brautigam
2010: 45). China’s promotion of its ‘shared colonial experience’ (although not
formally colonised by Japan, but the victim of Japanese and British power) is
potentially counter-productive, with emerging suspicions from many recipients
as to why China continues this narrative. Hillary Clinton infamously used the
term ‘new colonialism’ to describe China’s involvement in Africa, but, and along
with many writers, in turn being criticised for framing Chinese intervention
as a ‘threat’ (Quinn 2011). China and South Korea often frame Japan as the
constant imperial threat in the Asian region (Johnstone and Aoki 2013). Whilst
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Japan has also pushed its own long-term historical links with Africa, other Asian
states spin this into a ‘Japanese colonial’ narrative (Kusano 2000). Moreover the
colonial narrative also from a Chinese perspective, unintentionally provokes
a ‘shared experience’ between India and Japan as both resisting and fighting
the British joining World War Two. Donor states strategically looked for
justification through having strong (and authentic) historical links between
donor and recipients.
In his 2013 Cape Town speech, President Obama highlighted the ties between
the anti-colonial movements in Africa and the origin of the US as a struggle
against British colonialism (Obama 2013). Liberia plays a particularly important
part in this ‘freedom’ narrative, given that along with Ethiopia Liberia was never
officially colonised. On the contrary of course, Liberia’s own origin is rooted in
the freedom of returning American slaves and yet this itself produced tensions
between ethnic groups and the well-known alternative version would be that the
American War of Independence did not free Southern slaves in practice, and that
the first anti-slavery movements actually occurred in the British colonial power.
Similarly, the Chinese view is that African nations also recognise the need for
states and institutions to be able to accommodate all interests inclusively and with
respect for national sovereignty (Jintao 2008; NEPAD 2011). As Deng Xiaoping
emphasised:
The African people’s struggles against imperialism, colonialism and racial
discrimination are developing in depth. The Republic of Guinea-Bissau
was born in glory amidst the flames of armed struggle. The armed struggles
and mass movements carried out by the peoples of Mozambique, Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Azania against Portuguese colonial rule and white
racism in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are surging ahead vigorously...
demonstrating the developing countries’ firm will and determination to
strengthen their unity and support one another in their common struggle
against the hated enemies.
(Xiaoping 1974)
Lines of latitude solidarity
China
Brautigam and Tang (2012b) recently noted that China is interested in generating
agricultural produce as food imports given the mass migration within China from
the rural areas to the cities, which is resulting in a higher demand for food and
creating a lower and ageing agricultural workforce. The argument of the shared
experience of similar ‘lines of latitude’ from the Chinese government (when
it brings over Chinese workers) is that Chinese labour is very familiar with a
similar agricultural topography such as the rice fields and grasslands of East and
West Africa. However, as one Senegalese9 government official explained to me,
countries such as Senegal are distinguishing between food self-sufficiency and
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food security. The latter is attained either through domestic production or trade.
The former is based on domestic production only. Trade has been encouraged by
the SAPs and for Senegal to engage in a free market export of its primary products
such as the staple crop of rice. Yet since the 2008 food crisis, the rise of China
has meant that Senegal’s main rice source in Thailand has now been reduced, as
Thailand now exports large quantities of its rice to its large regional neighbour.
This has led to the spread of food protests across Senegal, which also receives such
aid from China. However, the tragedies of the famines in China under Chairman
Mao during the Great Leap Forward are marginalised in favour of promoting
China’s own experience in feeding the world’s largest population. Brautigam
and Tang (2012a: 16) noted that many Europeans still assume that ‘they’ (the
recipients) will still come back to us as ‘the donors’ either as a result of quality
questions or a future impending crises in fragile emerging market economies. Yet
at the same time, recipients are also using Chinese aid as a leverage to be able to
refuse what can be regarded, justifiably or not, as poor quality European export
materials, to get a better deal from the traditional donors.
Japan
Japan is using ‘physical geography’ and ‘climate change’ empathy, through
its ‘disaster management’, to gain leverage with Indian Ocean coastal African
nations, particularly since the Tsunami of 2004, as well as India and Pakistan
(MoFA 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Varma 2009). Japan has been promoting itself with
African coastal states and island states, and as a long-standing maritime nation,
unlike the continental states of China and South Korea. Japan also promotes a
mutual understanding between donor and recipient in terms of the impact of
climate change and impact of natural disasters such as tsunamis (Indian Ocean
and East Africa experiences of Somalia, Mauritius and Tanzania in 2004) and
earthquakes. Buckley (2013) noted that China has a clear experience in sectors
such as agriculture and food security, given that it can feed 20 per cent of the
world’s population and with only 9 per cent of the world’s land.
Promoting historical ties as state-led soft power
ODA policy does not just occur within a particular historical period of trajectory
but ODA policy itself is a part of a state’s own reimagining of its own ‘place in the
world’ and a government’s particular approach to national autobiography. In this
respect, selected narratives on ‘official’ (and often diplomatic) history can become
a part of the promoting and official branding of a state, and a self-reflexive part of
its own strategic resources such as ‘soft power’. Chinese President Jinping (2013)
recently delivered a speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Centre
in Tanzania, stressing that China has a historical kinship with the ‘galloping
African lion’ (Jinping 2013). President Xi Jinping also stressed the positive and
profound impact of the early Muslim traders to East Africa and Zanzibar, on
Chinese–African relations. However, this approach is occurring at a time when
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the western provinces of China are now experiencing unrest from Muslim and
indigenous ethnic communities. There is also the Chinese relationship with India
and Pakistan to navigate. Debates surround questions such as which donor state
has the most ‘authentic’ historical ties with the recipient country. In contrast,
South Korea has promoted its lack of historical ties as non-threatening but also,
being a ‘late developer’, South Korea is not one of those new donor states that are
‘scrambling’ for Africa.
China’s foreign aid programme began in 1950, when it first provided material
assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Vietnam.
Following the Asian–African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, China’s
aid extended from socialist countries to other developing countries, particularly
in Africa. This is currently reflected in Chinese support for social infrastructure
such as building of embassies across the world, now characteristic of other BRIC
nations. Embassies are being (re)opened (implying the conflict time is over) for
elite-led links with Africa. In 1956, China began to provide its aid to African
countries, and in 1964, the Chinese government declared the Eight Principles for
Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries. In October 1971, with
the support of other developing countries recently being granted independence
(and therefore the number of potential supporters increased), China gained its
legal seat in the United Nations Security Council. Peking also established its
relations of economic and technical cooperation with more developing countries,
and funded the famous example of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA)
and other major infrastructure projects. On 31 December 1953, Zhou Enlai
proposed the ‘Five Principles of Peace’ including mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in
each other’s internal affairs; and equality and mutual benefit as a peaceful coexistence. Foreign aid was then based on the ‘Eight Principles of Engagement’
(Box 3.1) (Enlai 2010). These are also located in the appendices of the 2011 ODA
White Paper.
In 1978, China adjusted the scale, arrangement, structure and sectors of its
foreign aid as China was also going through its own domestic economic reforms
under Deng Xiaoping. Opening up markets and agricultural surplus, along with
the one-child policy, meant China strengthened its foreign assistance to the least
developed countries and paid more attention to the economic and long-term
effects of aid projects. China has conducted multi-form technical and managerial
cooperation with recipient countries.
In 1995, the Beijing government created the Export-Import Bank of China
which began to provide medium- and long-term low-interest loans to other
developing countries. There is clearly an area of controversy over measuring and
therefore reading into the intentions of China’s ODA (Brautigam 2009, 2011).
Beijing has also attached great importance to supporting the capacity building
of recipient countries. Officials from recipient countries often receive training
in China and play an important part in the cooperation of human resources
development between China and those countries. Thus, in 2000 FOCAC was
initiated, to become an important platform for dialogue between China and
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Box 3.1 The Eight Principles of Engagement
1
2
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3
4
5
6
7
8
The principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other
countries.
Respecting the sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches
any conditions or asks for any privileges.
Providing economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest
loans, and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary.
Aiming not to make recipient countries dependent but embark on the
road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
Helping recipient countries complete projects which require less
investment but yield quicker results, so that the latter may increase
their income and accumulate capital.
Providing best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China
at international market prices.
Encouraging personnel of the recipient country fully master the
technology.
Encouraging experts to help in construction in recipient countries will
have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country
(GOC 2011).
‘friendly’ African countries, and as an effective mechanism for pragmatic
coordination and cooperation in the new circumstances. The Chinese government
has also engaged with the UN High-Level Meeting on Financing for Development,
the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, the Forum
on China–Africa Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
the China–ASEAN Leader’s Meeting, the China–Caribbean Economic and Trade
Cooperation Forum, the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development
and Cooperation Forum, and the Forum on Economic and Trade Cooperation
between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries as a result of international
pressure (Jansson et al. 2009; Scheineson 2009).
India’s Prime Minister Singh has highlighted the importance of human resource
development and capacity-building assistance and that ‘The BRICS forum
offers another avenue for our cooperation. Initiatives such as the BRICS bank
could further leverage the collective capacity of the BRICS countries to assist
the transformation of Africa. This is an objective that India remains committed
to’ (Singh 2013). What is becoming a familiar pattern amongst emerging-power
donors is the historical link made and promoted between an emerging power and
‘Africa’ as a continent. It was China who, in 2011, invited South Africa to join
the BRICs, a move which for many was also seen as a strategic attempt by China
to create a five-nation organisation, allowing a particular balance to be in China’s
favour. However, Africa’s past economic experience with Europe also implies
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a need for caution, even for those donors professing to be non-colonial (Perlez
2006). India is selling its ODA as ‘mutual diversity and democracy’, in contrast to
Asian donor states with strong beliefs in ethnic and racial homogeneity, although
the content of these identity forms clearly differs. The India–Africa Forum (2011)
stated:
We further agree that this partnership will continue to be guided by the
principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of States; commitment to deepen the process of African integration,
dialogue among our civilizations to promote a culture of peace, tolerance
and respect for religious, cultural and human rights, as well as gender
equality, with a view to strengthening the trust and understanding between
our peoples; recognition of diversity and levels of development between and
within regions; collective action and cooperation for the common good of
our States and peoples and our desire to nurture harmonious development in
our plural, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies through the consolidation
and development of our plural democracy.
The 2000 Beijing (2000) Declaration and the Programme for China–Africa
Cooperation in Economic and Social Development both stated that ‘further China–
Africa co-operation in the economic, trade, financial, agricultural, medical care and
public health, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, human resources
development … and other areas … so as to promote the common development
of China and Africa’. The 2000 Beijing Summit also laid a foundation for the
all-around, sustainable development of China–Africa relations. China provided
African countries with US$3 billion in concessional loans and US$2 billion in
preferential export buyer’s credit. The China–Africa Development Fund invested
US$500 million in 27 projects. China has also cancelled 154 debts owed by 33
African countries, and increased the number of export items to China enjoying
zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa.
Critics and concerns of Asia in Africa
Firstly, there is the interminable issue of measuring aid controversy, with a variety
of differing approaches and criteria used, and which often ends up with the rather
staid debates on whether Asian is good or bad, and ‘whose aid is worse’. The
third high-level talks on aid effectiveness held in Accra (2008) emphasised the
need for donors to disclose information, to better define the aid scope and to
broaden data exchanges between donors so as to avoid replication of projects. As
Grimm et al. (2011: 30) also noted, the 2011 Chinese White Paper reported that
Chinese aid to Africa was roughly 45.7 per cent of its worldwide distribution of
ODA, with aid to Asia recorded at 32.8 per cent, and to Latin America 12.7 per
cent. Contrary to popular perceptions, since 2003, resource-rich economies have
received only on average 37 per cent of Chinese FDI outflows into Africa. For
Ali (2012), less resource rich countries such as Zambia (although questionable
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as mineral resources are evident in Zambia) and Tanzania, have received more
Chinese manufacturing in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and the tyre industry.
At the same time, USAID provided a $million compact in 2008 to civil society
(USAID 2013a).
Grimm et al. (2011) highlighted that whilst recipient governments may know
the overall value of complete projects, the problem is that knowledge about actual
flows and where these flows come from, as well as the process as to why and
how they are agreed upon in the first place, are somewhat limited. Grimm et al.
(2011) argued that the unwillingness from China to provide details on aid amounts
is often based on issues of concern with domestic reactions in China as to why
limited resources are going overseas. However this is a double-edged sword.
Brautigam (2011) pointed out that in relative terms ODA is small compared with
Chinese GDP. Former Premier Wen Jiabao had stated that China would provide
$10 billion in low-interest (three-year cycle) loans to African countries between
2010 and 2012. This issue has been consistently picked up by Brautigam (2011) in
her blogs. Brautigam has argued that some of these loans were concessional and
‘preferential export credits’ but only the concessional loans would be regarded
as official development assistance as delineated by OECD guidelines. However
given that China is not an OECD-DAC member, such policies from Beijing should
not be expected. Thus for Brautigam ‘Even if they all were to be counted as “aid”,
this would amount, on average, to $3.3 billion per year, divided among the 49 or
so countries with which China has diplomatic ties, or an average of about $67
million per country, per year’ (Brautigam 2011). Brautigam points out the proof
that Chinese aid amounts are not a resource scramble. For Chinese people, foreign
assistance is not a significant issue, the argument goes, due to Beijing’s relatively
low levels of assistance. There is of course an issue here as to what information is
actually disseminated to the Chinese public (and how much criticism is tolerated
or ‘contrived’), but a point raised in objection to this argument is that it is not so
much a matter of ‘quantification’ but rather the ‘perception’ that finite resources
are going overseas that can lead to domestic criticism. This perception is also a
reflection of ongoing relative imbalances within the Chinese economy. However,
the paradox is that the Chinese are also sensitive to the issue that its relatively
small aid amounts (and type) would inevitably be compared with Western donors
which might put Beijing in a sensitive position. There is also, it is suggested, a
general irritation from the Chinese elite toward what might be regarded as the
rather judgemental and rather ‘pushy’ Western NGO responses (Grimm 2012).
Secondly, states such as China and South Korea may have high GDPs but
domestically they lack a system of welfare safety nets for their own poor.
This leads to the suggestion that new donor Asian states are pushing through
ODA policies to improve their ‘national prestige’ but have yet to solve their
own problems of domestic poverty and social inequalities. Alternatively, the
point made is as to whether a country should have to reach a certain ‘bar’ of
development to be allowed to donate official foreign aid. The OECD-DAC along
with the UNDP is also concerned that growing competition between Asian states
may counter-productively lead to project replication and a waste of finite donor
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141
resources (Collier and Goderis 2009). A number of UNDP representatives in
Seoul have recently begun to caution against the dangers of project duplication
and the ‘swamping’ of the recipient domestic institutions by Asian donor aid.
This is being caused by the one-upmanship between the Asian donors as regional
neighbours.10 At the same time US allies such as Japan are now putting their
resources in areas that are not necessarily of direct interest, but there is the need
to maintain alliances with the US to counter the rise of China. In this respect, the
mainstream donors still retain much leverage over recipients.
The OECD-DAC and UNDP are pushing Seoul and Tokyo to generate some
kind of mutual agreement on lowering tied aid. However, competition between
these donors remains and is constantly updated and reported in each country’s
national media.11 Tied aid describes official grants or loans that limit procurement
to companies in the donor country or in a small group of countries. Tied aid
therefore often prevents recipient countries from receiving good value for money
for services, goods, or works. Untying aid or removing the legal and regulatory
barriers to open competition for aid-funded procurement, can increase aid
effectiveness by reducing transaction costs and improving the ability of recipient
countries to set their own course (OECD 2009b). Similarly, commentators such
as Steve Chan have pointed out that to those who suggest there is some kind
of Chinese conspiracy, empirical evidence clearly shows the reality of domestic
institutional factions within China (cited in Provost and Harris 2013). President
Hu Jintao (2008) in his speech made at the G20 meeting of 2008, also recognised
the need for a further rebalancing for both the global and Chinese economies.
The Chinese elite recognise that there are still the underlying and longer term
credibility issues for Chinese ODA, if the domestic Chinese export-centred
economic model is also coming under pressure from a variety of political and
social imbalances (Jayan 2012; Macfarlane 2006; Vickers 2013). China in its
sense of hegemonic ‘middle kingdom’ does not aim to ‘export’ a development
model, unlike South Korea in particular, but this reluctance may also be due to
questions over the domestic sustainability of the developmentalist model (Bisson
et al. 2010; Shaw et al. 2007).
Thirdly, government institutions from the West and from Asian countries
such as JICA and KOICA often locate their workers near the embassies and the
international chain hotels. These are the so-called aid ‘green zones’ in the major
city hubs but this makes it difficult to create solidarity with the broader local
population. In August 2010, the Chinese government sent a goodwill ship of staff
and medical equipment to help the peoples of Eastern Africa including Tanzania
and Kenya. The ship was moored off the coast and most of the 410 Chinese
medical practitioners and staff did not set foot on African soil. Critics were
sceptical as to China’s motivations with this sudden interest in humanitarianism.
This ship showed the cultural chasm between the ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover,
the unintentional symbolism of the ship was that the Chinese could sail away
whilst the vulnerable and poor were left behind. The name of the ship was the
‘Peace Ark’. Some aid and ‘shuttle’ researchers are keen to show their credibility
in having actually visited Africa. China often promotes the ‘humble’ character
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of its workers who live in relatively less affluent areas, and yet these areas
are still ‘segregated’ from the local population implying a continued cultural
hierarchy underlying ‘development solidarity’ and ‘partnerships’. The elite-led
Asian approach to foreign aid is also being balanced with a number of growing
concerns that Confucian communitarian development may lead to ‘exclusionary’
political and cultural practices in areas of sensitive cultural diversity and may
unintentionally provoke intergroup conflict. This is particularly the case if ODA
is perceived to be ‘aiding one side’ or favouring one community over the others.
Conclusion
With geopolitical competition in Asia as a result of the rise of China, the role of
the US and responses from South Korea and Japan, this competition is manifested
in the different ways in which the Asian donors are operating in Africa. ODA is
promoted through a myriad of state-led narratives claiming historical and anticolonial ‘shared experience’. In some recipient states Asian donors are directly
competing, in others donors are willing to allow their competitors to use resources
without competition as a ‘winner takes all’. The role of East Africa however is
becoming increasingly significant for all leading Asian donors. This chapter has
discussed the history and geopolitics of the three main East Asian foreign aid
donors and indicated where, why and how these geopolitics are manifested in
aid to Africa. The chapter has compared and contrasted a variety of Asian ODA
policies evolving from China, South Korea and Japan, all leading Asian states
in the ODA debate, contrasted by their different histories, and international
strategic positions (China as a rising BRIC, South Korea as the newest OECDDAC member and former recipient and middle power, Japan as an established
aid donor). The chapter has therefore highlighted how regional geopolitics and
tensions in Asia can impact on the patterns of Asian donor interest in Africa and
the distribution, form and content of Asian ODA.
Notes
1 The Chinese government stated in its 2011 White Paper that financial resources
provided by China for foreign aid mainly fall into three types: grants (aid gratis),
interest-free loans and concessional loans. The first two come from China’s state
finances, while concessional loans are provided by the Export–Import Bank of China as
designated by the Chinese government. Firstly, grants are mainly used to help recipient
countries to build hospitals, schools and low-cost houses, and support well-digging
or water-supply projects, and other medium and small projects for social welfare.
Secondly, interest-free loans are mainly used to help recipient countries to construct
public facilities and launch projects to improve people’s livelihood. The tenure of
such loans is usually 20 years, including five years of use, five years of grace and ten
years of repayment. Currently, interest-free loans are mainly provided to developing
countries with relatively good economic conditions. Thirdly, concessional loans are
mainly used to help recipient countries to undertake productive projects generating
both economic and social benefits and large and medium-sized infrastructure projects,
or to provide complete plant, mechanical and electrical products, technical services
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
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and other materials. Concessional loans are raised by the Export–Import Bank of
China on the market, and since the loan interest is lower than the benchmark interest
of the People’s Bank of China, the difference is made up by the State as financial
subsidies. The annual interest rate of China’s concessional loans is between 2 and
3%, and the period of repayment is usually 15 to 20 years (including five to seven
years of grace). 61% of concessional loans are used to help developing countries to
construct transportation, communications and electricity infrastructure, and 8.9% are
used to support the development of energy and resources such as oil and minerals
(GOC 2011).
The captain of the South Korean vessel (the Samho Jewelry) which was attacked
on 1 January 2011 by a Somali pirate vessel, was flown back to my University’s
Hospital Complex in Suwon, South Korea. The President later visited. The subsequent
Diplomatic White Paper highlgihted the incident as an example of the ability of ‘Global’
Korea to rapidly deploy its troops to secure its transport routes (MOFAT 2012: Chapter
Six). Photos of the President and Captain were soon adorning the hospital corridor. A
somewhat surprising national pride was also shown by some onlookers that the Somali
pirates who had been brought back to South Korea to face the legal process, were also
said to be particularly enjoying Korean food and Korean hospitality.
‘Chinese flee Ghana gold crackdown’ The Japan Times 27 July www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2013/07/21/business/chinese-flee-ghana-gold-crackdown/#.Ugeih86wf4Y
‘Ghana and Korea Sign 122.7 million dollar agreements’ Ghana News Agency www.
ghananewsagency.org/economics/ghana-and-korea-sign-122-7-million-dollarsagreements-42821
A doctrine initiated from West Germany (FRG) during the Cold War, that any country
that recognised East Germany (GDR) would not be recognised by the West German
government in Bonn.
Interview KOICA representative, Suwon, March 2012.
This also impacts on Ethiopian asylum-seekers and African migrants requesting leave
of stay in South Korea.
There have been critiques that this analysis is inherently tautological as expansive
powers are by definition geographically diverse. There is also the issue as to
whether the hyperpowers become intolerant and xenophobic exactly because they
are declining, rather than this intolerance being a cause of the decline. Nonetheless
Chua makes the point about relativism with a nice anecdote: ‘Two climbers are on a
mountain. An angry bear comes running towards them. One climber starts putting on
his running shoes. “You’ll never out-run the bear” his friend exclaims. “No I won’t”
his friend replies, “but I will out-run you.” www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCDwa_
hH2o8&list=PL81DA6B486E27527C
Interview, Suwon, October 2013.
‘Forum On China–Africa Cooperation 18 July 2012’ www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/
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‘Japan pledges $32 billion aid to Africa’ The Korea Herald 3 June www.koreaherald.
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4
Asian ODA
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Assessing emerging donors in the
Asian region
Introduction
The current geopolitics in Asia is being defined directly and indirectly by the cool
war between the US and China. The region also includes a number of BRICs
and Next-11 countries which are juxtaposed (or superimposed) within and upon
regional geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics. The three leading Asian donors
established the Asian Development Forum in 2010. This also includes India and
Thailand (Kitano 2012). This chapter considers the current patterns of Asian ODA
and how leading Asian donors are justifying and promoting ODA to the Asian
region. For Feeny and Clarke (2008: 198) the Asia-Pacific region ‘is often said to
be making good progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’
but ‘the region is extremely diverse and analysis at the regional level masks
significant differences in the progress towards the MDGs made by individual
countries’. They also argued that the MDGs have been criticised for being both
too ambitious and not ambitious enough, often masking reality by relying too
much on ‘averages’ and on quantitative rather than qualitative indicators.
The MDG yardsticks, they argued, were too narrowly defined. There was
also a flawed logic with MDG data collection given that in the poorest and most
marginalised areas, by definition, it would be difficult to get access to regular
and routinely quantifiable data. The recent keynote speech made at the first
Asian Development Cooperation Meeting (ADCF) (2010) argued that Asian
countries need to formulate new strategies to maintain growth momentum in ‘our
economies’. For instance, the smaller Pacific islands are now a relatively large
recipient of OECD-DAC aid and becoming increasingly significant strategic
‘outposts’. JICA-KOICA (2010) also noted that their ODA is similarly ‘grounded
in Asia’s own development experience’ and that ‘it is shaped by the concept of
mutual benefit’ which is now transforming the global development landscape
(JICA 2013).1
The chapter considers the role and approach of Asian donors in the Asian
region and discusses the reasons for the particular forms of distribution and aid
type from Asian donors. These reasons can be linked to the regional geopolitical
dynamics between the donors across the region. The chapter considers the way in
which the Asian donors ‘sell’ their ODA to Asian recipients in the region.
Asian ODA 153
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Distribution of Asian ODA
Table 4.1 gives a list of leading donors for each specific state in the Asian region
in 2010.
The top ODA recipients from the DAC (and non-DAC donors) in the Asian
region were reported by the OECD (2013) to be as given in Table 4.2.
As a BRIC nation, India still receives aid, along with its neighbour Pakistan.
As a new OECD-DAC member, South Korea has tended to follow DAC
distribution norms with recipients in Jordan and the West Bank/Gaza. South
Korea has also increased its aid to Nepal, a country sandwiched between China
and India, and a ‘shared experience’ country geographically and ideologically
caught, like South Korea, between two or three regional superpowers. In 2011,
the top donor bilateral net disbursements to Asian recipients were recorded as
given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 indicates how the US (and US allies) as Asian donors are particularly
proactive in the Asian region. It is in the Asian region where the leading Asian
donors also tend toward a focus on humanitarian and ‘natural disaster’ management
aid. Saudi Arabia is high on the list linking to oil resources with China. In this
respect the OECD defines and demarcates the region as East Asia, South Asia and
West Asia.
The shared Asian regional experience of the 1997–1998 Asian financial
crisis and its subsequent ‘contagion’ has led, over the last few years, to Asian
donor states selling their ODA to neighbourhood recipients through the ‘shared
experience’ of the crisis. This is usually through a narrative of shared empathy
in that the donors also experienced the ‘fall out’ of the crisis and the subsequent
humiliation of Western institutional conditions and bail outs. Yet many of the
South Asian ‘Tiger’ economies had their early shoots of development before
the 1997 financial crash being compromised by Chinese low wage export
competition. However, China and Japan played a major role in providing
assistance to these countries. During the 1997 crisis the Malaysian government,
for instance, had decided against borrowing more money from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Japanese government had also grown increasingly
dissatisfied with the IMF’s programmes and had stepped in with their own
financial packages and programmes. Moreover, there are also geopolitical
obligations for both Japan and South Korea as both countries are the regional
allies of the US. Both countries increased their ODA commitments to ongoing
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2009. In the
Asian region, only Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos received an increase in ODA
from Japan in 2010, whilst the Philippines and Thailand recorded the largest
reductions in Japanese ODA (MoFA 2011a, 2011c). Such patterns reflect the
link between domestic economic policy and the resources used for ODA. In this
respect Japan has taken a ‘strategic’ approach to promoting ‘smart aid’ and yet
this focus, as I will argue, also reflects distinctive geopolitical shifts particularly
in South Asia.
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Table 4.1 Leading donors to Asian states (2010)
Malaysia
US, Germany, Denmark, Australia, South Korea
Uzbekistan
South Korea, Germany, US, Japan
Turkmenistan
US, Germany, South Korea, Norway
Myanmar
Japan, Australia, UK, US, Norway
Kazakhstan
US, Germany, Norway, France, South Korea
Philippines
France, US, Australia, South Korea, Spain
Sri Lanka
Japan, Australia, France, South Korea, Norway
Thailand
US, Australia, Sweden, UK, South Korea
Cambodia
Japan, US, Australia, Germany, South Korea
Pakistan
US, UK, Japan, Germany, Australia
Vietnam
Japan, France, Australia, Germany, South Korea
Laos
Japan, Australia, South Korea, Germany, Switzerland
Nepal
UK, Japan, USA, Norway, Germany
Bangladesh
UK, US, Canada, Denmark, Holland
Bhutan
Japan, Denmark, Australia, Austria, Holland
India
Japan, UK, Germany, US, Norway
Table 4.2 Top ODA recipients in 2011 in
$million
Table 4.3 Top ten net bilateral donor
disbursements to Asia 2010–2011
Afghanistan
6711
US
8359
Vietnam
3514
Saudi Arabia
4575
Pakistan
3509
Germany
2962
India
3220
EU
2597
West Bank and Gaza
2444
Japan
2432
Iraq
1904
UK
2147
Bangladesh
1498
IDA
1828
Jordan
959
Australia
1664
Nepal
892
France
1039
Cambodia
792
Canada
948
Source: OECD 2013: 7.
Source: OECD 2013: 4.
Asian ODA 155
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From Asian crisis to ‘shared experience’ ODA
Japan is currently reassessing its own domestic economic policy and there
has been a wider ranging move toward a more Keynesian pump-priming
policy (‘Abenomics’) to stimulate the economy and to depreciate the value
of the Japanese yen, to make Japanese exports more competitive. In Asian
developmentalist states these debates have often polarised as to whether to ‘push
on’ with neoliberal reform (and gain credibility for austerity toughness) or to
construct a more ‘neo-developmentalist’ strategy. Moreover, there is debate as to
whether free trade necessarily means ‘neoliberalism’ and whether neoliberalism
necessarily means a Western-centric or a top-down ‘one size fits all’ approach.
In South Korea, the debate has swung as to whether the original economic crisis
of 1997 was due to the regulating inefficiencies of the developmentalist state/
big businesses relationship in the age of globalisation (the liberal argument), or
that neoliberal ‘deregulating’ reform had happened too quickly for the existing
institutional capacity (Conservative) or that neoliberalism hadn’t been enforced
quickly enough (liberal argument).
As a result of the crisis, the Conservatives in South Korea then began to
split between a developmentalist and pro-US free trade model of globalisation
(President Lee), and those Conservatives making the case for a classic
conservative ‘economic democratisation’ with emphasis on small businesses (a
creative economy for the ‘second miracle on the Han’). Such domestic tensions
also reflect South Korea’s domestic middle power credibility in ‘exporting’ its
model of ODA which is often promoted in rather nostalgic terms for the model
of ‘developmentalism’. The problem for donors is that many recipient countries
are ‘leapfrogging’ the traditional developmentalism models of the 1970s. Clearly
these domestic dynamics and economic sustainability issues both directly and
indirectly impact on the resources actually made available for ODA, as well as
having an impact on public support for ODA policies.
The first signs of the Asian crisis occurred in May 1997 when the Thai baht was
devalued by the government in Bangkok and a domino of currency devaluations
occurred across the region, leading to high import costs, inflation and investor
outflows. For some, the roots of the crisis could be tracked back to two countries
who later tried to ‘solve’ and ‘aid’ those countries in economic difficulties. China
had begun its meteoric rise but had maintained a relatively high exchange rate so
as not to spark a round of regional currency devaluations and export competition.
This currency level could be absorbed by a pool of cheap Chinese labour and high
demand for exports. Nevertheless, a cheap priced export sector also dealt serious
competition to other Asian states which began undermining other Asian drivers’
comparative advantage.
Moreover, Japan, as a result of its deal with the US (the 1985 Plaza Accords)
had agreed to allow the yen to float upwards, thus aiding the US trade deficit, but
as a result (and in order to remain competitive), led Japanese investment to pour
into South Asia to take advantage of cheaper labour and production costs (Bello
1999). In this sense growing regional interdependence was occurring as production
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156 Asian ODA
shifted from country to country. The regional process in Asia (paradoxically given
the domestic organisation of political institutions) is increasingly decentralised
and network orientated.
During the early to mid-1990s therefore, the emerging Asian driver countries
and several ASEAN nations (Thailand and Indonesia in particular) had now
begun to base their future economic growth on being able to attract more foreign
investment and maintain low costs, and had agreed to fix their domestic exchange
rates to the US dollar so as to create further confidence for foreigners who wished
to invest in these emerging Asian nations. This strategy also needed a constant
flow of foreign currency reserves which came from export growth.
During the mid to late 1990s, US interest rates then began to rise, partly as a
result of the US Federal Reserve’s attack on domestic US inflation. As a result,
so-called ‘hot money’ began to flow out of Asia’s emerging economies and back
to the US. Similar concerns now exist with regard to a possible future ‘tapering’
of US Federal Reserve bond buying or so-called ‘quantitative easing’ which could
lead to a subsequent interest rate rise in the US and would mean that money might
again flow out of the emerging markets back to the US. However, the mid-1990s
was a time where many Asian governments had already leveraged their present
and future development (and borrowing) on assumed future asset price rises.
Indeed most foreign money had gone into speculative real estate construction
rather than economy ‘fundamentals’. Thus, investor outflows from Asia caused
an exponential panic in this sector, and asset prices began falling. With collapsing
real estate prices, continued exports were expected to be the saviour and to bolster
investor confidence. However, the domestic exchange rates were still fixed high
to the dollar given that there was ongoing competition from China. This meant
that export prices were being undercut and that exchange rates were not being
allowed to respond in tandem to a relative fall in demand for exports. There were
also more structural issues emerging of limited productivity and labour pressure
for higher wages as many countries now hit the ‘Lewis turning point’ and cheap
pools of labour began to dry up. This process further squeezed export profits and a
rising middle class were now also buying the latest and relatively cheaper foreign
imports. This was making it difficult for domestic businesses to survive and
pressure began to build on governments for labour rights and human rights issues.
A fall in demand for Asian exports should, in a flexible exchange rate system, have
been expected to have ‘naturally’ led to a readjustment of the exchange rate and
offset such concerns. However the underlying depreciation of the currency was
occurring within a fixed exchange rate system. This meant a further speculative run
on the currency and a selling of local currencies as investors started to panic and
‘cut losses’. This led to the further selling of the local domestic currency, a further
currency depreciation, which meant that the domestic currency now flooded the
domestic economy. This began to create domestic inflationary tendencies and a
spiral of higher labour wage demands.
The constant difficulty for governments was in deciding whether the unfolding
events reflected the need for a technical market or currency readjustment, or
whether the processes represented a structural deficiency requiring costly and
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Asian ODA 157
painful ‘shock therapy’. For many governments, the latter would mean major
social unrest and a loss of government legitimacy, particularly with the increasing
leverage of the new middle classes. as well as the dangers of further capital
flight. Alternatively, a ‘wait and see’ approach may miss a costly yet effective
opportunity to pre-emptively solve a potential future crisis. It is no wonder that
governments come to rely more and more on immediate economic statistics and
the constant mining of ‘big data’ to gauge even the slightest hint of relief in the
markets. It is a difficulty for governments to maintain a perception of ‘stability’
in an era when economic data models clash with the ‘reality of perceptions’ and
pre-emptive decisions create self-fulfilling prophecies.
With fears from investors of an overvalued domestic exchange rate, many
investors had also gambled that a currency devaluation by the governments would
be unlikely, as this would disrupt all remaining confidence in the government
and would cause unprecedented economic meltdown and social and political
challenges to the incumbent leaders. Thus domestic exchange rates across Asia
still remained pegged to the dollar to maintain investor confidence but this policy
now required stabilising through massive government support and a greater
spending of government foreign reserves. However, the more governments tried
to stabilise the currency, the more this caused speculation as investors pulled out
for damage limitation. However with relative demand for exports still falling,
foreign currency reserves were also falling and could not be used to support the
domestic exchange rates. Governments now began to borrow heavily in order to
support their domestic currencies. This created an increasingly high debt/Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) ratio which generated fear amongst investors of future
tax hikes.
Governments also put up higher domestic interest rates in order to keep the
currency pegged to the dollar and to attract back the investors. Whilst this may
have quelled inflation concerns, the policy ended up further reducing domestic
consumption. For many governments, the options were to still keep going with
this pegging in order to keep confidence in the economy (but with losses and
debt and future credit rating concerns) or to change policy direction (which
would have created further capital flight and a credibility issue for future FDI
and credit ratings). Paul Krugman (1994) distinguished between ‘the paper tiger’
economies which later collapsed, and the larger countries such as China. For
Krugman (1994), writing before the 1997 crisis, it would be China in his view
that would still have a medium term demographic dividend to become a major
economic power, even with a fraction of total productivity gains (Krugman 1995,
2012, 2013a, 2013b). Yet emerging middle income economies which have been
based on the export-led model can also generate the law of diminishing returns,
meaning that increasing GDP at higher rates each year in fact wears out the
resources for long-term sustainability. Krugman’s point has entered a new era
with a projected dip in population and a rise in the number of single Chinese men
unable to start a family due to skewed gender dynamics and rising costs of living.
This demographic has historically been politically active if raised expectations
are not being met. Chinese property markets are also inflated as a result of an
158 Asian ODA
increase in single males buying apartments for wanting the security of starting
a family.
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The crisis as shared experience and memory
The experience and memory of the lead up to, processes and fall-out from the
1997–1998 crisis, particularly for the rising middle classes and current political
elites, has played a major part in the ‘shared experience’ narrative of the Asian
donors. The ‘bailing out’ and subsequent ‘shock therapy’ conditionality of the IMF
hit national pride. There was also an increase in financial remittances from the
various national overseas diasporas sent back to their families (and government).
The crisis became part of a national identity narrative and the diasporas’ ‘patriotic
duty’, with the government often being portrayed as defending the people against
the unfair leverage of the Western institutions and their harsh conditionalities.
Many Asian donors and emerging-power donors in general make it clear that
their aid is not based on such conditionalities. Tied aid is promoted as ‘mutually
beneficial’ and as a form of ‘non-interference’ based on self-help and encouraging
responsibility. The cultural view is that the West is profligate and encourages
credit and borrowing, which are not in keeping with ‘Asian values’.
This generational memory is perhaps an explanation as to why the Asian
drivers have witnessed a relative rise in savings as a protection against any future
shocks and as a result of minimal social safety nets. In China, with a growing
number of ageing single males (a result of the ‘one-child policy’ and gendered
cultural values) and an ageing population, many individuals now have to care for
two parents and four grandparents (known as the 4-2-1 generation). This leaves
the financial resources for consumption or for having a larger family increasingly
limited. Whilst this is clearly a rational personal decision, the combination of
such rational actions is one of the structural weaknesses in many of the Asian
drivers, as this lowers domestic demand (making the country more reliant
on export-led growth models) and therefore reinforces the tensions within the
existing developmentalist model whilst creating an economy that is increasingly
adverse to individual risk taking. Any risk that is being taken, is by the larger
conglomerates (with the help of the state) rather than from the innovative small
business sector. Indeed it is the larger conglomerates which are able to survive
crises due to their global presence and this has led to a dual phenomenon of a
‘decoupled’ economy (as these businesses have ‘gone global’ with state help)
alongside a ‘jobless growth’ back in the domestic economy.
Old and new middle classes generally tend to be simultaneously Conservative
(fear of economic ruin, debt and erosion of financial security) and liberal (want
more reform politically such as democracy and environmentalism). This enduring
tension can put varying degrees of reactionary and reformist political pressure on
the state to negotiate the ‘middle ground’ and to monitor the swings of middle class
moods during elections. Such swings also impact on public opinion toward ODA.
But this is not a direct causation. In fact, right-wing responses to immigration can
often be that being ‘pro-ODA’ means that developing other countries stops ‘them’
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Asian ODA 159
as immigrants coming over ‘here’. The state can often make its compact with the
middle classes so as to carry on with the present development model, whilst both
groups recognise the dangers of protests from more radical left-wing and rightwing groups.
In this sense the right-wing parties are usually regarded as tending toward a
more ‘anti-immigration’ line in order to protect national sovereignty and ‘national
identity’. Liberals can also veer toward anti-immigration rhetoric as a means
of protecting ‘national labour’ and through promoting what has been termed
an ‘illiberal multiculturalism’ in order to neutralise (or marginalise) the more
extreme right-wing oppositions to immigration. In many Asian democracies, the
liberal left paradoxically promotes narratives of ethnic nationalism as ‘protecting
the people’ which often come across as particularly ‘right-wing’ policies. Yet once
middle class expectations have been raised however, a continuation of the same
model and compromises might not be, in themselves, enough to quell protests,
and maybe even reinforce growing frustrations over local material and ‘nonmaterial’ issues such as human rights and the environment.
These debates are linked to the ODA issues in two principal ways. Firstly,
the domestic legitimacy of a development model is key to a state’s promotion
of its ODA policy to recipients. Second, and more prosaically, the success or
failure of a developmentalist donor state also impacts on how much ODA the
state can actually give and how much leverage it has with recipients. China
and South Korea, in particular, have promoted various pockets of autonomy
as ‘neoliberal zones’ within the state, so the question raised is whether this
autonomy represents the neoliberalisation of the state as harnessed by the
national developmental state or a strengthening of the developmentalist state
through neoliberalism.
From North East donors to South Asia recipients
According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2011):
The great paradox of the 21st century is that while global power is more
diffuse, the challenges that we are facing will require greater co-operation
than ever before. Climate change, resource security, nuclear non-proliferation
and terrorism all reflect this common reality. New ways of co-operation
will need to be deployed if we are going to be able to rise to these global
challenges. We cannot just rely on super powers. As Secretary Clinton herself
has stated, the United States does not and should not ‘go it alone’. Rather,
the US is looking to exercise leadership in new ways – to connect and create
partnerships that have the capacity to solve shared global problems. It is in
this way that I believe creative middle powers are well placed in bringing
together major, regional and small powers to shape and implement solutions.
India too is firmly on the rapid path to big economy status; Japan’s economy
remains the world’s third largest; Korea and Australia are major economies,
and Indonesia, Vietnam and others in East Asia are growing fast.
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160 Asian ODA
The top ten donors to Asia in terms of their percentage of total ODA were
as given in Table 4.4. The data indicate a relatively high level of Asian to Asian
donor–recipient relationships. South Korea has a relatively higher percentage than
Japan as a result of Japan’s more established global network. These donor to donor
and donor–recipient relationships are now occurring in, and reflecting, what many
regard as an age of inter-state multipolarity. The term multipolarity is intrinsically
culturally biased and as a result subject to a variety of interpretations, justifications
of policy and usages. The Chinese term ‘duojihua’ has often been translated as
multipolarism and was used to describe a specific period of globalism and as both
a descriptive ‘is’ and a more instrumental ‘should be’ concept (Womack 2004:
354). The five states (or alliance of states) that are currently being treated as a
part of this multipolarity by China, are the US, Russia, China, Japan and Europe
(EU). Womack (2004: 355) has noted, however, that other countries, also ‘prefer
a scheme of poles that included their own country as a pole and then closed the
door to the pole club just behind themselves’.
According to Gallagher (2011), China is now regarded by these other states as
the ‘motor of the world economy’, promoting its Beijing version of globalisation.
This is prompting interest from the other Asian donors, fearful of China’s rise, in
widening East Asia to the Asia-Pacific and to include West Coast Latin American
aid recipients such as Chile and the CIVET countries such as Colombia. Indeed,
South Korea recently increased its aid to Colombia and justified this to the
South Korean public by using the argument that Colombia had provided military
assistance to South Korea during the Korean War. The paying back of ‘debts’ is
promoted not as a gift but rather as an act of delayed obligation and gratitude.
This is projected with the intended meaning that the former aid recipient has now
developed and ‘made it’. This is a Confucian exchange narrative of reciprocity
being based on a ‘required remembrance of obligation’ and also implies that the
donor’s subsequent development was, in part, based on a multi-decadal obligation
‘to want to pay back debt’. Indeed this particular cultural form of ‘from recipient
to donor’ narrative also plays a part in a country’s national aid autobiography.
These national identity shifts are, in turn, opening up further questions of what
counts as (and who determines) Asian and Asia-Pacific identity (Kang 2012;
Park 2013). This question of Asian identity and Asian perspectives as ‘common
identity’ has also included the cross-cultural links and connections with other
regional organisations, particularly with regard to the littoral Indian Ocean states
(IOC-ARC 2013).
China, Japan and ASEAN
China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have had, over the years,
a number of common but at times divergent goals. In Chinese IR literature,
India (despite being a fellow BRIC) and Vietnam have often been placed within
a narrative of historical (and therefore future regional hegemon aspirations)
for imperial control over Goa and Cambodia respectively. On the other hand,
Asian ODA 161
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Table 4.4 Top ten donors to Asia as a percentage of each donor’s net bilateral disbursements
of ODA 2010–2011
South Korea
68
Japan
55
Australia
53
US
43
Germany
41
UK
39
Switzerland
31
Norway
31
Finland
31
Denmark
30
Source: OECD 2013: 4.
there have been various cycles of ASEAN anti-Americanism and ASEAN anticommunism. ASEAN countries have a common factor with China in terms of
the respect for national sovereignty and non-interference. Of course the question
as to what criteria are used in order to distinguish between intervention and nonintervention remains controversial at best, as does the question that a mutual
‘respect’ does not necessarily mean mutual equality. In the same way, the idea
of mutual benefit or ‘win-win’ does not always attend to the question of who
defines ‘benefit’ and what is the criteria of determining the ‘win’, that is, whether
‘winning’ necessarily means that both sides start from level playing fields,
particularly if winning also implies a ‘take it all’ or ‘first past the post’ approach.
Whether ASEAN as a regional bloc and institution has its own internal
evolving and particular regional common identity (more than the sum of the parts)
or whether influential emerging-power states within ASEAN now aim to utilise
the ASEAN platform for proving their leadership experience and promoting their
own global interests and agenda, is a constant theme. ASEAN is often portrayed
as having a ‘single voice’ but as a regional platform is clearly distinguished by
including states at very different levels of national interests, development and
geography.
With Chinese concerns over what Beijing sees as US encirclement in the
region, there is growing Chinese influence over ASEAN countries. However
the ASEAN is also being used by Japan and India to forge an alliance through
which to contain or counter the rise of China. Japan and India have also recently
accelerated their own development cooperation (JICA 2012c; MoFA 2011a,
2011c). Many maritime ASEAN countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines
have themselves been increasingly concerned with the military power of China
in the region (particularly over the South China Sea) and have, as a result, aimed
to consolidate their ties with the US and Japan. On the other hand, continental
ASEAN nations such as Cambodia and Laos have received increasing amounts
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162 Asian ODA
of Chinese support as China has implied that there is a geopolitical threat from
a hegemonic Vietnam. This is used as a useful leverage for China’s continuing
interest in the region. Such splits within ASEAN were evident in the now
‘infamous’ lack of a 2012 ASEAN final communiqué. Nonetheless, ASEAN has
now encouraged Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand to partake more fully in
the institutional process. However, ASEAN countries have been unable to produce
a unified stance on several issues such as ongoing South China Sea sovereignty
matters. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand have been more welcome to
China’s increasing economic and political presence and aid in the region as these
countries are within China’s continental orbit (Shekhar 2012). Both Vietnam and
Cambodia also recognise that tensions in the region between the major powers
might mean an increased leverage as these countries become ‘bridges’. At ASEAN
2010 the Philippines insisted that the communiqué should reflect the growing
confrontation between the Philippines and China concerning the sovereignty
over the ‘Scarborough shoal’. Vietnam had wanted the declaration to address the
ownership of exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Myanmar, Malaysia and Laos
will each chair ASEAN over the next few years. For each recipient country, the
donor has a particular way of addressing its geopolitical relations and what it can
offer through its ODA. ODA is justified through state-led narratives on ‘shared
experience’ and ‘authentic’ and equal historical ties. For instance, Japan’s 2012
ODA White Paper in a section entitled ‘Building Up Trust in Japan’ stated:
However, even after the deadline for achieving MDGs comes in 2015, there
will still be various issues. Now we face the question of what should be done
about development goals beyond 2015 (post-2015 development agenda). The
aim should be poverty eradication through high-quality economic growth,
and the post-2015 development agenda needs to be a framework for forging
partnership among various stakeholders who support each other, based on the
concepts of equity and human security. Based on the experience of providing
assistance and the results of development so far, Japan will further accelerate
its efforts towards achieving the MDGs, as well as continue to proactively
contribute to the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda.
(JICA 2012a)
According to MoFA (2010), the highest numbers of grant and amounts
of infrastructural aid to Asia have been given in order of preference to China,
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In its 2012 Annual Review,
JICA (2012a) promoted its relations with Thailand and Pakistan in the context of
disaster management and shared experiences. JICA also distinguishes between
East Asia, South East Asia (ASEAN and East Timor), South Asia (India, Bhutan,
Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan/Kazakstan/
Mongolia). In 2011, 35.6 per cent of technical assistance was provided to Asia,
and loans to Asia were recorded at 81.1 per cent of ODA, with grant aid recorded
at 43.2 per cent (JICA 2012b). South Asia is becoming strategically important
to Japan because of its location on the sea lane that connects East Asia with the
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Asian ODA 163
Middle East. Japan is also shifting some of its traditional ‘balancing’ emphasis
away from China to more alliance building with India’s ‘look East’ (Jain 2004).
However on technology sharing, Japan-China historical cooperation still continues
(Raposo and Potter 2010).
Japan uses the ‘shared experience’ of natural disasters to provide aid to countries
across the Indian Ocean (tsunami) and Pakistan (earthquakes) (MoFA 2009,
2011c). Similarly Taiwan uses its own turbulent experiences during the regional
typhoon season to garner its ‘shared experiences’ along with the Philippines,
Vietnam and Indonesia, and to export its own disaster management technology
(MOFA-Taiwan 2011). However, between the North East Asian countries, climate
change and detrimental environmental patterns (air pollution) are often linked to
questions of ‘threat’ from neighbours. Along with its ODA to Ethiopia, Japan’s
new Prime Minister Abe’s first ODA commitment was to provide further help to
the Philippines in order to build up Filipino coastguard security and the monitoring
of pirates (MoFA-Philippines 2012; The Japan Times 2013).
Like Taiwan, Japan recognises environmental impact solidarity with the
Philippines and with regard to natural disasters in the region. The aid is distributed
in the form of General Grant Aid (GGA) which includes paying import taxes and
duties for technology and other forms of assistance, value added tax (VAT), and
transport costs of moving equipment from port to project site. Japan also promotes
its historical role in the region, stating that it has ‘(L)ong provided assistance to
the Philippines as the top donor’ (MoFA-Philippines 2012). JICA has, as part of
its development cooperation, provided assistance to India for building the Delhi
Metro project, the Bangalore and Chennai metro rail, as well as expressways and
city ring roads (JICA 2012c; MoFA 2011b). Japan was the first country to provide
aid to India in the late 1950s. India at the time was pushing the non-aligned
movement, whilst Japan was tied to Western hegemony. By aligning with India,
for a variety of intentions and purposes, Japan is giving the signal that India’s own
anti-imperial history gives any of its allies a similar credibility. Other Asian donor
governments have made the case that this ‘restraint’ has not solved the problem of
Japanese expansionism which in effect, as they see it, is always present.
Yet in response, a point made is that China and South Korea would clearly not
countenance any revision to the Japanese constitution. One recent view has been
that Japan is using tensions in the region in order to strengthen its relations with
the US and therefore to gain US willingness for Japan to become more militarily
self-sufficient through a ‘share the burden’ narrative. According to Akihiko Tanaka
(JICA 2012b), current President of JICA, aid has kick-started Japan’s ‘shattered
economy’. Tanaka calls the new geography of aid a ‘two-way highroad’ given
that new middle income countries such as the BRICS and South Korea are also
providing foreign assistance.
China, Japan and Vietnam
The Chinese government’s 2011 White Paper mentioned that the first examples
of its aid programme were provided to North Korea and to North Vietnam (GOC
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164 Asian ODA
2011). Cambodia and Laos are now witnessing increasing amounts from all
the major Asian donor interests and aid. Paradoxically, imperial and modern
China have both historically regarded Vietnam as a rebellious disruption to the
tribute system of the Middle Kingdom. Japan in turn regards Laos, Cambodia,
Vietnam, Myanmar and, significantly, the Yunnan Province of the People’s
Republic, as a subregional group and as a priority area in its regional security
strategy. This approach is also implying or reintroducing unsettled questions
over Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty over Yunnan. China, through
its foreign aid promotion, has made no secret of its priority concerning territorial
integrity and the sanctity of national sovereignty. For China, this is not only
a legal issue, but also an ‘ethical’ protection of rights for those living within
the state. This is because it rejects the legal and ethical basis for ‘intervention’
on the basis of ‘universal’ values, which China regards as just the values of
the powerful. However, for other donors this ‘promotion’ of non-interference
could be seen as a sign of Chinese unease and sensitivity to such concerns.
The emerging-powers literature tends to obscure the underlying subregional
hierarchies between nations which were once themselves, despite the ‘South–
South rhetoric’, major regional powers and kingdoms. However, Beijing’s ODA
approach (like Tokyo’s) is a version of a ‘request based’ ODA in respecting
national sovereignty, but awaiting the call from recipients, however, also
implies a discreet paternal leverage of ‘we can choose to leave well alone but
will come when called’.
According to JICA-Vietnam (2013), and in reflecting Japan’s move to
bring Vietnam into its strategic orbit, the signing of the Japan–Vietnam Joint
Statement by both heads of state in October 2011, means that the strategic
partnership between Japan and Vietnam has strengthened. Vietnam’s ten year
Socio-Economic Development Strategy (2011–2020) now places a focus on
human resource development and infrastructure development. JICA is also
partnering up with Japanese industry, educational institutions, municipalities
and NGOs to provide comprehensive assistance for national building by
strengthening the international competitiveness of Vietnam (JICA-Vietnam
2013). An emphasis on education clearly implies much longer term and intergenerational commitments. Emphasis is not being placed on specific projects but
instead on ‘nation building’ programmes in line with OECD-DAC. Phrases such
as ‘by 2020’ imply not only long-term commitments rather than specific one-off
projects, but also that Japan will be able to maintain this level of investment.
According to MoFA-Vietnam (2010):
The Vietnamese side affirmed that the Government and people of Viet Nam
always remember and are sincerely thankful to Japan for its contribution to
Viet Nam’s economic and social development as the largest donor country
in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Viet Nam, and welcomed the
fact that the volume of Japan’s ODA to Viet Nam reached one hundred and
fifty-five billion yen in the fiscal year 2009, the highest level to date. Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung appreciated the progress on Japan’s assistance
Asian ODA 165
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to Viet Nam’s priority infrastructure projects such as the North South
expressways, Hoa Lac High-Tech Park, and the feasibility studies for the two
sections of the high-speed railway: Ho Chi Minh-Nha Trang and Ha NoiVinh. The Vietnamese side also explained the importance of the Da Nang–
Quang Ngai expressway and upgrading of Ha Noi–Noi Bai railway and drew
the attention of the Japanese side to these projects.
Japan’s relations with the Mekong region countries within ASEAN have
become increasingly cordial. Vietnam has given its support for Japan to
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The development of
infrastructure in the Mekong area is a strategic key for all donors, both to gain
access to areas for resources and for building projects, as well as for creating a
sense of ‘connectivity as identity’. The form and content of this identity clearly
depends on a donor state’s ability to project its ‘soft power’. A lot of this soft
power comes from direct human resource activity and volunteers on cultural
exchanges. Japanese ODA has often been used to provide the building of a
transportation network for the extraction of raw materials and products, and the
electrical power supply needed to coordinate this (Araki 2007; Kusano 2000).
Japan pursues an agenda of supporting democracy and national reconciliation in
the region. Moreover, promoting civil society and NGOs allows a greater costeffective participation of more actors for enhancing development cooperation,
and the kind of ‘inclusion’ that non-democratic donors are unable to access and,
as a result, may have greater costs in selling ‘soft power’. According to Section
Four of the 2012 Japanese ODA White Paper:
Many of the countries in the Mekong Region of the Mekong River Basin
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam) have experienced
long periods of war and conflict. Even after the war in Viet Nam that lasted
for more than 30 years until 1975, tragic massacres under the rule of Pol
Pot continued in Cambodia … During this time, the Japanese government
consistently contributed to stability and development in the Mekong region,
treating it as a pillar of Asian diplomacy. The countries in the Mekong region
have all traditionally been pro-Japanese and possess a wealth of natural
resources and workforces. Japanese companies have a particularly high
level of interest in the region … Mekong region countries are landlocked
with adjacent national borders. There are vast inland areas that remain
undeveloped. In other words, intra-regional cooperation for development
in areas, such as infrastructure development and resource development, is
indispensable.
(JICA 2012a)
Japan is pushing to further entice coastal and maritime aid recipients away
from Beijing, in China’s ‘heartland’ in southern Asia. Japan is also making the
case that it was not in the region to cause ideological combat, but was there
to provide peace and stability. Japan is also using the historical argument
166 Asian ODA
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of ‘traditional’ assistance through OECD-DAC and technical rather than
ideological experience. Indeed Japan’s role in the OECD-DAC is also useful
for donor states wishing to become a future member. The government White
Paper continued:
At the Fourth Mekong–Japan Summit Meeting held in Tokyo in April
2012, the Tokyo Strategy 2012 was adopted to put forward a new vision
for Mekong–Japan cooperation with the target year of 2015. Within this
strategy, new pillars for cooperation were established and include ‘enhancing
Mekong connectivity’ (support for intra-connectivity), ‘developing together’
(facilitation of investment and trade), and ‘ensuring human security and
environmental sustainability’ (support for disaster risk reduction, maternal
and child health, etc.) … Japan pledged approximately ¥600 billion in ODA
for a period of three years after FY 2013 and presented a list of 57 flagship
infrastructure projects for each country with an estimated total worth of about
¥2.3 trillion.
(JICA 2012a)
Japan announced in 2012 that it would provide 600 billion yen of its ODA
to Mekong countries over a three-year period. Japan also adopted the Mekong–
Japan Action Plan which contains specific actions and measures to realise the
Tokyo Strategy. In October 2010, ASEAN adopted the Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity, aiming at intensifying physical and geographical connectivity,
institutional connectivity and people-to-people connectivity in the region. At
the ASEAN–Japan Summit in November 2011, Japan announced projects for
enhancing ASEAN connectivity by utilising public funds from ODA and the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation with consideration given to ways of
mobilising private-sector funds. Moreover, Japan has also been contributing to
peace-building efforts in the Philippines, and assistance for nation-building in
Timor-Leste (JICA 2012c). In this respect Japan is content to be directly and
explicitly involved on issues of secessionism of which China is nervous. Varma
(2009) noted that China is aiming for more direct influence over regional allies
and regards ASEAN as a counter-balancer to growing India–Japan cooperation.
According to JICA’s 2012 Annual Report, Japan counts South East Asia as ASEAN
countries and Timor-Leste, and is aiming to decrease the divergences within this
group (JICA 2012b: 22). In terms of total Japanese ODA, Asia received 35.6 per
cent in technical cooperation, 81.1 per cent in concessional loans and 43.2 per
cent in grants.
Loans for this sector have meant that the donor can have more ownership and
leverage over the completed transport links. Grant aids were highest for public
works (64.2 per cent). The Annual Report pointed out that during 2007–2011
Japan helped to build 4,170 km of road infrastructure in recipient countries, which
is equivalent, the report said in its first few pages (and with connotations of Asian
connectivity), of a road between ‘Tokyo and Bangkok’.
Asian ODA 167
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China, Japan and Cambodia
Approximately 1,250 miles of road and seven bridges have been built in
Cambodia with Chinese aid. Cambodia has also reiterated its diplomatic support
for the one–China policy. For critics of Beijing, the building of roads as specific
projects does not make for a national reconstruction project. Moreover, there
is little cooperation between Asian donors and therefore the construction (and
replication) of infrastructure projects are mainly to connect Cambodia and China,
making it easier to transport natural resources not only directly from Cambodia,
but also from ports on the Indian Ocean, particularly through and from Myanmar.
China is also using ASEAN Chairs such as Cambodia to cut short debates and
to filibuster on maritime issues, and to influence the actual setting of the agenda
in the organisation. In this sense China, like Japan, is using a more pragmatic
‘technical’ and win-win agenda to set an agenda that avoids uncomfortable
issues and accusations of colonialisms or neocolonialism. Chinese investment
in Cambodia has totalled $9.1 billion since 1994, including almost $1.2 billion
in 2011. This was eight times more than the US investment (Chul 2013). China
invested a total of US$9.17 billion between 1994 and 2012. Chinese investment
in the textiles industry has increased Cambodia’s exports and has created
employment for women in rural areas. Chinese investment in the energy sector,
particularly in hydropower development, has helped reduce energy shortages. By
2012, China was Cambodia’s second-largest donor after Japan. Japan is the top
Asian donor country to Cambodia, accounting for on average around 25 per cent
of all assistance to Cambodia. Japan’s officially stated policy has been to provide
assistance that contributes to Cambodia’s sustained economic growth and poverty
reduction, keeping in line with the Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDPII)
and Cambodia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This is maintained
through closer consultations with the Cambodian government in policy dialogue
and other appropriate occasions.
For Japan, the economic development of Cambodia aims at the strengthening
of ASEAN integration (GOJ 2003). There are concerns that the government is at
risk of losing its autonomy and that its role in ASEAN might be marginalised if it
continues to put China ahead of ASEAN (Pheakdey 2013). The US has also been
critical of what it regards as China’s ‘vanity projects’ in Cambodia (Bangkok Post
2012).
China has generated criticism of Japan’s imperial role in the region and has
provided constant reminders of Cambodia’s own turbulent history under Japanese
rule. However China’s success depends on its uneasy relationships with present
Cambodians regarding previous support from Beijing for the communist and antiVietnamese Khmer Rouge regime of the 1970s. The aim of China seems to be
to pull Cambodia out of what Beijing regards as the more pro-US Vietnamese
and Thai orbits, which are, for Beijing, also gravitating toward India. With
present history in the region constantly a part of national history and of revised
national identity, ODA is then placed in a positive or negative narrative as a form
of reparation or war compensation. Japanese ODA has tended to be focused on
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168 Asian ODA
technical ‘win-win’ policies but this silence or exclusion of ‘the colonial era’ has
also led to a criticism of ‘ignoring’ the past, paradoxically by many right-wing
and nationalistic groups in other Asian donors countries. JICA and MoFA have
emphasised the growing importance of not just a rapid growth (with allusions to
China) but a growth in a more ‘balanced manner’ with proper legal reforms and
democratic governance, particularly in the capital Phnom Penh, at the gravitational
centre of the country. This is in contrast to China’s experience of unbalanced
development in the Eastern Coastal cities (JICA-Cambodia 2012, 2013). Japan
is promoting its ODA which focuses on peace-building and human security by
stating that the:
Japanese Government has a policy of expanding Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to Cambodia and the whole Mekong Region countries,
placing an importance on the regional partnership between Japan and
Mekong countries in order to assist ASEAN integration and to narrow the
development gap among ASEAN member countries. Based on this policy,
Japanese Government has been providing development assistance for hard
and soft infrastructure and promoting public and private partnership in
Cambodia. This cooperation and the ‘Agreement between Japan and the
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of
Investment’ in effect since 2008 have assisted Cambodia to develop basic
structure for investment leading to an increasing number of Japanese investors
in recent years. Japan has been the biggest bilateral donor to Cambodia since
1992 and Cambodia has supported Japan’s positions on various issues in the
international arena.
(JICA-Cambodia 2012)
JICA’s 2009 Annual Report made the case that aid to Cambodia has gone to
‘main roads and harbours’ and focused on ‘hard and soft economic infrastructures’
(JICA 2009: 35). Japan uses the term ‘kingdom’ to infer a similar history with
Japan’s royal past. This implies that it was not only Japan that had royal or imperial
aspirations, and that China’s communist party also seems to be in an inconsistent
position through its support for a country with such a legacy. Similar forms
of ‘solidarity’ have been used in Japanese relations with Ethiopia. Cambodia
is regarded as a transit point among multiple economic corridors including
the Southern Economic Corridor, the Southern Coastal Corridor and Central
Corridor. The Southern Economic Corridor and the Southern Coastal Corridor
(specifically the route between Sihanoukville port and the Vietnam border) are
mainstays of economic activities and development. According to MoFA (2006b),
from 2000 and 2006, Japan’s concessional loans to Cambodia increased from
$1.53 million to $9.50 million, whilst its grant aid fell from $65.32 million to
$56.93 million. During the same period, Japan’s technical assistance remained
relatively constant from $32.35 million to $39.86 million. Japanese aid to China
during the same period saw a reduction of its concessional loans from $397.18
million to $231.51 million, and grants were down from $53.05 million to $19.05
Asian ODA 169
million. Japan’s technical assistance remained at generally the same level from
$318.96 to $318.84.
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China, Japan and Myanmar
With India’s ‘look East’ policy under Prime Minister Singh, India uses the
‘shared experience of British colonialism’ to enhance its partnership with Japan
and Myanmar. Japan also uses the narrative of fighting European and British
colonialism, in an attempt to wrest away the ‘colonial’ criticism of its intentions
from Beijing and South Korea. As Wilson (2012) noted:
Myanmar has had mixed views about its shared colonial relationship with
India and the numbers of Indian workers who were brought to Myanmar under
British rule and stayed. It still looks to India for certain support, including
commercial support and (somewhat crudely) as a balance to China’s growing
stake in Myanmar. Overall, however, India makes a less-attractive market
for Myanmar’s business community, which sees China, Southeast Asia and
Japan and Korea as preferred opportunities.
China plans to transport crude oil across the Myanmar border and complete
an irrigation project in Myanmar. This North–South corridor route is in
contrast to Japan’s own current construction, through loans and grant aid,
of an East–West road corridor to connect Myanmar with Vietnam. China is
winning major contracts in Myanmar at the expense of companies from India
and other countries, but facing business resistance from western countries.
Such dynamics have also been apparent in countries in the region such as
Nepal where both China and India vie for domestic influence and where ethnic
conflict often becomes an instrument of ‘divide and rule’ from the powerful
neighbours, with their internal proxy support. With so much attention on the
nascent democratic shifts in Rangoon (Yangbon), many were also critical
of how the ethnic issues were often being marginalised by the leaders and
by elite-led discussions. China again finds itself involved in a country with
increasing rates of demands for secessionism or autonomy from ethnic
movements. Thus, the Chinese apparent lack of willingness to support or put
pressure on governments through its ‘no questions asked’ policy is not therefore
based simply on China’s alleged intentional or ‘immoral’ unwillingness to act
in a humanitarian way, but more that China doesn’t want to be seen to be
supporting a government which might have to grant some kind of autonomy
and political concessions to ethnic minorities in order to remain in power.
Work on a pipeline from Myanmar to China through sensitive ethnic areas has
been affected by armed clashes between Myanmar’s military and the Kachin
Independence Organisation in Kachin state. The major part of a 2,520 km long
trunk road that runs through China (of which 793 km are in Myanmar) is also
susceptible to such developments. Construction on the pipeline project (which
began in 2010) is also linked to an internal gas network to transfer the gas
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170 Asian ODA
received at the border in northwest China to the East Coast cities. This is now
becoming a major industrial hub (Dasgupta 2013).
For China, a proposed Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic
corridor could, it is suggested, change the geo-political map in Asia, whilst
China regards the ASEAN system as being representative of a return to the
idea of the form of historical tribute as well as a counter to the US and Japan
alliance (Hund 2003; Mansfield and Milner 1999). In 2010, China stated that it
will extend a $15 billion line of credit over the next three to five years to low
income ASEAN states in the region, and provide an additional $39.7 million for
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. China has also announced that it will donate $5
million to the China–ASEAN Cooperation Fund with an additional $900,000
to the APT+3 Cooperation Fund. Beijing has donated 300,000 tons of rice to an
emergency East Asia reserve fund to boost food security. China also proposed
a China–ASEAN scheme to create high-quality, high-yield crop demonstration
farms in ASEAN countries. China’s oil and gas imports still pass through the
Malacca Straits. Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam are uneasy
over Chinese intentions with the recent advances in its naval capabilities.
Maritime border nations such as Bangladesh now receive more assistance from
pro-US Asian donors as a buffer between Myanmar and India. South Korean
aid to Nepal suggests the importance that South Korea places on sharing its
experience on other geographic ‘bridge’ countries, with Nepal sandwiched
between India and China, and South Korea sandwiched between China and
Japan (Phadnis 2013).
For Japan, Myanmar is regarded as one of the last subregional frontiers
ready for opening up (Kent 2012). It was Japan in 1955 that first began giving
aid to Burma. Japan has been opening up projects in Myanmar again as one
of Prime Minister Abe’s first priority moves.2 Tokyo also wants to ensure that
Japanese firms gain future privileged access to resources and port access.
Myanmar is promoting democratic transition and opening-up and is expected
to be a new rising star. The US, the EU countries, Russia, India, Japan, South
Korea and China are competing to develop their own relations with Myanmar.
Japan resumed its economic assistance to Myanmar in January 2013 and began
waiving Myanmar’s debt in 2012 (JICA-Myanmar 2013). China still maintains
the largest investments in Myanmar and is still Myanmar’s biggest trading
partner. While China might not fear Japan strategically, there is a tactical issue
regarding new opening-up countries such as Myanmar (Qinrung 2013; Wassener
2013). Malaysia has a key strategic location on the major Indian Ocean sea
routes to Middle Eastern countries, from where Japan imports its petroleum and
Malaysia is also one of Japan’s major providers of essential natural resources.
The Malacca Straits still remain an important sea route for Japan but this area
is getting very crowded with competing Asian maritime and Asian continental
interests.
For South Korea and Japan there has been increased interest in the Northern
Arctic sea route. Japan also uses the 1997 crisis as soft power leverage and
‘shared experience’. One of the obvious difficulties with this sort of ‘solidarity’
Asian ODA 171
is that as each Asian donor ‘shares the experience and pain’ with recipients, each
donor is accelerating its own suffering to such a degree that it simultaneously
undermines its own development success and vulnerability. Japan also references
the 2008 Cyclone Nargis as a ‘shared experience’ with natural disasters and with
‘restorative development efforts’ (JICA 2009: 35).
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China, Japan and Laos
In Laos, China has been aiding a number of hydroelectricity projects with the
construction of a number of dams. Such activities are part of a wider concern
with river and water ownership, concerning the differences in the sovereign rights
of peoples and states at the source of the river, and the rights of those living
in the downstream river delta who may be subject to water scarcity and water
pollution from upstream. The issue of sovereignty over tributary systems on the
Mekong and Ganges has been recognised as a potential cause of future ‘water
wars’ conflicts. Indeed, as a result of climate change, responsibility for flooding,
high evaporation rates of ‘sovereign rivers’ and associated droughts and territorial
erosion, also embeds itself into inter-state relations. China has provided funds for
constructing a pipeline between Laos and China. The pipeline is a part of a $2.5
billion oil and gas pipeline project between the two countries. The China National
Petroleum Corporation aims to transport 12 billion cubic metres of natural gas
annually to reduce China’s dependence on coal and reduce its consumption by
30.72 million tons a year. This is part of a larger Chinese attempt to connect and
integrate Yunnan province up to the Indian border. However, the government in
New Delhi has not yet accepted the road connectivity plan as Indian links with its
‘southern partners’ have remained relatively stable.
The Indian government has invested in the East Africa Submarine Cable
(EASSY), promoting the view that India does not exploit but ‘adds value’, which
has been a key theme since 1964 when India set up its own aid organisation, the
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) (Schaffer 2013; Sinha and
Nataraj 2013; Wagner 2013). Indian aid to foreign nations has witnessed a fourfold increase from 2003 to 2012. Ninety-two per cent of India’s grants and loans
are provided to nations in the regional neighbourhood. For instance, Bhutan now
receives over 50 per cent of total Indian foreign aid, while Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar constitute 40 per cent of Indian ODA.3 Between
2012 and 2013 India’s foreign aid was estimated to be $1 billion, whereas the
corresponding Chinese aid was estimated to be over $10 billion (Nichenametia
2013).
Japan’s aid to Laos also has the objective of calming Laotian fears of an imposed
Washington consensus free market on its development. The concern from the
Laotian government is that export-led growth would flood the economy with revenue
that could not be absorbed. On one level this makes export-led developmental
experience particularly unappealing for Laos. At the same time, the government in
Vientiane is concerned that market reform will also flood the economy with cheap
imports. Japan’s aid is to solve the shortage of human resource skills, to strengthen
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172 Asian ODA
the central government to allow it to maintain control over provincial areas. In this
respect, the view is that Chinese ‘non-intervention’ and respect for ‘sovereignty’ is
actually a technicality and China can take advantage of a ‘fragile state’s’ inability
to govern and police its territory. Japan in contrast is providing its resources for
building social infrastructure and civil government structures (MoFA 2006a). Its
macroeconomic Policy Support 2000–2005 includes capacity enhancement for
tax collection, institutional transparency, independence of the banking sector, and
respect for regional diversity, another distinction from China.
Emphasis is also placed on human security and the MDGs, including primary
school education and maternal health care. This is regarded as national foundation
building ‘for self-help efforts’ later on. For Japan, Laos serves as what it calls
a ‘buffer region’ between Cambodia and Vietnam, and between China and its
interests in South Asia. Laos joined ASEAN in 1997 but is still regarded as
‘lagging behind’ so Japan now aims to make Laos a strong part of ASEAN. Laos
is also central in the relationships between Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
Myanmar and China’s Yunnan province (MoFA 2006b: 16 footnote 24). For
Japan, economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, but not
a sufficient condition. Laos is to be physically and symbolically constructed as
a ‘land bridge’ for greater intra-regional transportation to strategically block
Chinese incursions. Laos also has more direct hydroelectricity potential, as well
as potential access to minerals and rich forest resources. In this sense, ASEAN
includes subregional groups such as the ADB Greater Mekong Subregion
(GMS), the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the CLV (Cambodia,
Laos, Vietnam). The proposed East–West corridor road project is to connect
Central Myanmar, Thailand, West Central Laos and Da Nang in Vietnam. This
is in contrast to China’s more tribute and hierarchically based ‘north–south’
infrastructure project. In 2013, China agreed to give Laos US$49 million in
grant aid and 200 million yuan ($32.6 million) in interest-free loans. This
agreement was signed by Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thamavong and new
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The two leaders have also discussed a planned $7
billion high-speed railway that would link Vientiane to the Laos–China border.
This project has secured finance from China, at a time when bilateral trade
between the two countries amounted to $1.7 billion in 2012, which was a 32
per cent increase from the previous year (Bangkok Post 2013). There have also
been signs of increasing win-win cooperation with South Korea 2010.4 Japan’s
2010 OECD-DAC Peer Review also indicated Japan’s continuing role as a key
US ally (OECD 2010b). All Asian donors have expressed a growing interest in
increasing ODA to Pakistan and Central Asia. For instance according to JICACentral Asia (2011):
Central Asia and Caucasus regions are politically and geographically important
areas that are surrounded by Russia, China, South Asia, the Middle East, and
Europe. The regions are also strategically important to Japan, with their large
abundance of energy and mineral resources such as oil, natural gas, uranium,
rare metals, etc. The stability and development of these regions impact on
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the Eurasia region as a whole including Japan. From this perspective, Japan
provides support for nation-building to establish long-term stability and
sustainable development in the regions, taking into consideration a broad
regional perspective which covers Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regions
that border Central Asia.
China seems to be using a ‘wait and see’ approach before deciding what
form of assistance is to be provided to particular states (The Guardian 2013).
The Pakistan government is constantly caught in negotiating a difficult balance
between its high level strategic alliance with the US and the knowledge that this
alliance causes domestic threats to Pakistan’s legitimacy and instability. At the
same time the US recognises the need to give the Pakistan government a space
through which to handle the radical elements and ‘be seen to be tough on the
US’ for its own legitimacy, whilst also balancing domestic opinion concerns over
national security in the US and a worry that the Pakistan government is ‘using the
US’ and itself contains ‘radical elements’. A further dimension includes Pakistan–
Indian relations.
The assumption of strong emerging-power (BRIC) alliances between India
and China underestimates the geopolitical and geo-cultural tensions between
China and India as the competing regional powers over Pakistan and the
Central Asian region (Burke and Ahmed 2012). China recently built a Pakistan–
China Friendship Centre at the cost of an estimated $60 million, and included
banqueting halls and conference facilities as part of ‘high-level’ diplomacy
and by fusing Chinese and Pakistani Islamic styles. However the unintended
consequence has been to fuel local municipal concern with the maintenance
costs required to actually run it. The Chinese government regards Pakistan as
a key leverage ally with regard to India and the US, and Pakistan’s link with
Beijing’s Western provinces (The Guardian 2012). The US has recognised India
as being relatively less favourable toward the US and yet India remains in a
key alliance given the rise of China. Moreover, US–Pakistan relations are often
put under more stress at times of strengthening US–India relations. China’s
promotion of its historic ‘Islamic’ ties to Africa is in danger of awakening some
unrest in India. Japan argues that the BRIC relationship is artificial and that
Japan has much wider and more substantive historical interests with India.
However, with China increasingly giving more aid to Pakistan and social
infrastructure/humanitarian projects, this might be seen as a signal from Beijing
to New Delhi (as BRICS) that China’s relationship with India is strong enough
to cope with such tensions. Japan’s aid to Pakistan, for instance, is in line with
US demands for the sharing of responsibilities from its allies. However, this
aid would potentially undermine Japanese–India relationships, particularly if
India also becomes more sceptical with ongoing US interests in the increasingly
important Indian Ocean region.
Nonetheless, the level of bilateral Japanese ODA has generally fallen over
the last ten years. This is most obviously attributed to Japan’s own economic
difficulties during its so-called ‘lost decade’ (MoFA 2003; Potter 2012). Japanese
174 Asian ODA
ODA to India has become increasingly significant over the last few years,
particularly in terms of its technical cooperation in the Japan–India relationship.
The agenda on human security and disaster management has also been a key
aspect of Japanese ODA in South West Asia (OECD 2010a, 2011).
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US, Asian donors and Myanmar
In 2013, President Obama’s visit to Myanmar was followed by Myanmar Premier
Thein Sein’s visit to Washington.5 For some this was an indication that Myanmar
was now turning away from China, or at least ‘hedging’ between the two major
powers. However new investment funds and loan packages to help alleviate
the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis for ASEAN represent China’s
soft power campaign, indicated at the 2013 China–ASEAN summit. There was
a widespread belief at the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
conference that Chinese President Jinping had taken the opportunity (in President
Obama’s absence) to solidify ‘Asian’ political and trade interests and circumvent
Washington’s aspiration for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In 2012, the
Chinese aid package to Myanmar included a US$10 billion investment fund that
was geared for cooperation in infrastructure. A recent press statement from the
US-ASEAN (2013) mission stated:
Southeast Asia is in many ways perhaps our most vibrant, our most
dynamic region in the EAP world, but frankly in the global context as
well. And in Southeast Asia, the U.S. has and continues to invest very
heavily in our relationship with the span of countries from the big ones to
the small ones, as well as with ASEAN. So if we take a look at it, if we
start at the very big end of the scale, there’s Indonesia. We have a thriving,
comprehensive partnership with Indonesia. Obviously, there’s a special
connection between President Obama and Indonesia, but we have built out
and are continuing to build jointly a comprehensive partnership that spans
a wide range of issues.
President Obama’s meeting with the Thai Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra, in his first Asian trip following the 2012 Presidental election, also
indicated that the US is placing economic issues within a broader Asia-Pacific
framework rather than on an Asian platform (US-Thailand 2012). According
to USAID-Burma (2013), USAID ‘sees a need and an opportunity to engage
directly with organizations and institutions there to support political reforms,
foster ethnic reconciliation and strengthen the capacity of reform-minded
individuals and institutions’ and since 2008 ‘USAID has managed a program
focused on humanitarian assistance along the Thai–Burma border, in the
Irrawaddy delta and in Central Burma’ and ‘provided assistance to U.S. and
international organizations supporting human rights and independent media
in the country’. President Obama in his 2012 speech also used the historical
argument of ‘shared colonial experience’:
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I came here because of the history between our two countries. A century ago,
American traders, merchants and missionaries came here to build bonds of
faith and commerce and friendship. And from within these borders in World
War II, our pilots flew into China and many of our troops gave their lives.
Both of our nations emerged from the British Empire, and the United States
was among the first countries to recognize an independent Union of Burma.
(Obama 2012)
South Korea and Asian recipients
As a new middle power and a state not classed as a former or new regional
hegemon, South Korea is therefore promoting its ‘lack of historical’ ties as
a ‘clean-slate’ state and as a non-threatening bridge nation. At multilateral
diplomatic summits such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional
Forum, small and middle powers can often ally and act as a block to counter
or enmesh the stronger bargaining position of the major powers. Indeed, the
major regional powers understand that they are less effective in exerting their
will if they have to negotiate simultaneously with ASEAN. In this sense, as a
group, ASEAN can resist the machinations of the region’s major powers, but
it cannot exert pressure on them. South Korea is often compared to Taiwan as
a middle power and in sharing a role as being the ‘official representative’ of a
divided country (although Taiwan is not recognised internationally). Taiwan’s
ODA loans amounted to US$380 million in 2012, or 0.101 per cent of GNI
which is lower than the ratio of 0.28 per cent for the OECD donor community
as a whole and below the 0.7 per cent target set by the UN (Lowther 2013;
Shih 2011). Indeed, Taiwan is often directly affected by the seasonal typhoons
which also ravage the Philippines before veering north across Japan and west
across Vietnam and China. This ‘shared experience’ of natural disasters has
created a set of ‘disaster management’ inter-state cooperation and climate
surveillance mechanisms between donors and between donors and recipients.
In terms of gross disbursements as bilateral aid, in 2006 South Korea provided
49 per cent of its total aid to Asia and this increased to 67 per cent in 2010.
The DAC average between this period was estimated to be 34 per cent (OECD
2012: 105).
As Table 4.5 indicates, South Korean ODA has increased to Mekong Delta
countries and priority areas. ODA to Iraq and China has been radically reduced.6
South Korea and Japan are the top two donors in terms of having the highest
ratio percentage of their total ODA going to the Asian region. South Korea
provides more foreign aid than Japan to Central Asian states such as Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan. Part of this is due to South Korea’s focus on food and resource
security. South Korea’s own experience as a ‘bridge nation’ (one that it pushes and
promotes as ‘global Korea’ in multilateral organisations such as the OECD-DAC
and G20) can on the one hand be enhanced if surrounding states are in conflict
(and therefore it can work as a mediator), or on the other hand, if the neighbouring
states are cooperating, then bridge nations can often become more isolated but can
176 Asian ODA
Table 4.5 South Korean bilateral ODA to Asian recipients 2004–2008 and 2009–2010
gross disbursements in $million
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Afghanistan
8
59
Iraq
68
9
Bangladesh
20
36
Cambodia
25
27
China
20
n/a
Indonesia
25
30
Laos
11
26
9
36
Mongolia
Myanmar
7
n/a
Nepal
n/a
20
Pakistan
n/a
11
Philippines
17
27
Thailand
n/a
n/a
Vietnam
31
82
Sri Lanka
27
n/a
Uzbekistan
n/a
22
Source: OECD 2012: 106.
also mutually benefit from resulting regional stability. Japan–China relations have
shifted from one of mutual ‘good neighbours and friendship’ to a 1998 partnership
of ‘friendship and co-operation’ (MoFA 1998). South Korea in turn promotes
itself as a bridge, reflecting the experience of ‘shared colonialism’ and as an Asian
driver that is both a proactive and a non-threatening new middle power. The soft
power South Korean wave is also generated as an ‘attraction’ for workers. This is
leading to a number of developing country diasporas within South Korea. In 2009,
Joseph Nye (2009: 1) argued that:
South Korea has the resources to produce soft power, and its soft power is
not prisoner to the geographical limitations that have constrained its hard
power throughout its history … South Korea is beginning to design a foreign
policy that will allow it to play a larger role in the international institutions
and networks that will be essential to global governance.
South Korea ‘does not have the historical baggage that encumbers China
(feared for its power and size) or Japan (resented for its colonial and wartime
history)’ (Sook 2009, 2011). The South Korean government in its 2010 White
Paper (MOFAT 2010: 228) stressed, in a section entitled ‘Enhancing National
Prestige through Advanced Cultural Diplomacy’, that as:
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soft power is becoming increasingly important, culture has surfaced as an
indispensable element of a nation’s competitiveness and economic resource
that produces added value. To keep in pace with this changing global
environment, Korea has adopted cultural diplomacy as a new pillar of the
country’s diplomatic make up.
Like Japan, South Korea is also putting more emphasis on its ODA policies in
Laos.7 This is in the form of humanitarian aid, as well as educational provision
and an emphasis on KOICA volunteers and cultural student exchanges with
countries such as Indonesia.8 Yet at the same time, South Korea has its own
specific relationships with Laos through the prism of inter-Korean relations
and North Korean defectors. For instance, in May 2013 Laos sent back North
Korean defectors to North Korea (with alleged pressure from China), despite
a lot of domestic opposition in South Korea. A few weeks later South Korea
provided $4.3 million of aid to Laos, aiming to create a leverage over the Laotian
government with ODA averaging 4 billion won from 2009 (The Korea Herald
2013). The view in the US is that Washington does not place energy or resources
on prising Laos from China’s influence but the US, and allies in the region,
can provide Laos with some alternative options and channels for development
and growth through and within ASEAN which Laos joined in 1997. KOICA’s
approach to Laos is that:
Aid should be planned and implemented upon the needs of the local
community, not under the discretion of the donor state. … We have to blend
with the local community as we cannot procure all necessary material and
human resources from Korea. … Aid organisations are often blamed for
spending money, time and human resources on other states instead of on the
local low-income bracket. International aid, however, is not just a moral deed
but a crucial role for a country to play in the global society. We see ourselves
as salespersons for Korea, promoting its brand image and delivering its
culture to overseas countries.
(Bae 2012)
South Korean relations with Myanmar are often seen through the prism
of relations with the US and North Korea. In 1983, North Korean agents
detonated a bomb in Yangon that killed 21 people, including 17 visiting South
Korean government officials. North Korea also became an important military
ally of Myanmar during the 1990s. This has been a continuing issue for US–
South Korean relations aiming to put both hard power and soft power pressure
on Myanmar (Clinton 2012). With the new opening up of Myanmar, KOICA
aims to extend a grant aid in implementing national statistical system, social
infrastructure capacity building and a land reform programme for mechanised
farming and effective forest greening. Cambodia now receives the largest amount
in grant aid from South Korea after Afghanistan and KOICA (2010) operates
rehabilitation projects in the aftermath of the country’s war with the United States
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178 Asian ODA
and its western allies. Since first launching grant programmes in Cambodia in
1999, KOICA has increased its grant assistance to the country every year to reach
a total of $17.8 million in grants as of 2012.
Another area of South Korean aid is channelled through elite-led and religious
based NGOs (World Vision) and the supplying by KOICA of volunteers to
Cambodia. One of the main issues in Cambodia remains the clearing of minefields
which were left over from the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnam/Cambodia conflict
of the 1980s. South Korea has also been involved in land mapping techniques
and monitoring in Cambodia to set up a regional ‘zip code’ (KOICA 2009: 64).
Asia is increasingly high on the South Korean agenda (ODA Korea 2011). One
view has been that all these inclusions could provide Seoul with huge leverage
and status both regionally and globally. But regional and global dynamics can
also work against each other. South Korea may want a strong ASEAN to counter
China and Japan. Yet the bridging role between the North East and ASEAN may
be potentially contradicted by South Korea’s increasingly multilateralist position
which would undermine its credibility with ASEAN, whilst not having enough
influence to continue as a strong voice in more globally orientated institutions.
There is growing competition from fast learner and fast follower states such as
Indonesia.
In this respect, South Korea’s high percentage of ODA to the Asian region
could be seen as a means of both balancing Japan’s influence and showcasing its
ODA to other parts of the world. In this respect ODA is supplied to those areas
(often middle income states) where immediate rather than long-term results can
be recorded (ODA Korea 2011). Credibility can be obtained by giving more
ODA whilst at the same time, and particularly in light of the Busan High Level
Talks on aid effectiveness, reducing ODA can be spun as a recognition of a
country’s effective and streamlined aid policy for immediate ‘results based’
impacts.
Yet within ASEAN there is emerging competition from other N-11’s such
as Thailand and Indonesia. In 2009, the South Korean Government through its
soft power platform made public the New Asia Initiative aiming at strengthening
ties with ASEAN. Following the conclusion of the Korea–ASEAN FTA, South
Korea also hosted the Korea–ASEAN Commemorative Summit by inviting the
10 heads of state from the ASEAN member countries. In 2010, the relationship
between South Korea and ASEAN was further elevated to a strategic partnership,
expanding bilateral ties into a greater variety of areas, including culture, education
and security as well as the economy. South Korea actually ranked second following
China in terms of trade with ASEAN, and even unseating the EU, Japan and the
United States. As President Lee (2012) announced:
Korea is the only country in the world to join the ranks of advanced nations
after being one of the poorest nations in just the span of a generation
following the end of the War. For this reason, many ASEAN member nations
want to take Korea as their development model rather than advanced nations
since they are in a similar situation as Korea was. Indonesian President
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono once said to me that his country’s economic
development goals are clear, which is to emulate what Korea has achieved
up to now. Korea is already engaged in full-scale collaboration in many areas
with Indonesia, which has a population of 250 million … Thailand with a
population of 70 million is carrying out a national project similar to Korea’s
Four Major Rivers Restoration Project. Korea, China and Japan are now
engaged in heated competitions to win a contract for the project that will
begin in earnest early next year.
President Lee (2012) also alluded to Japan and China in wanting to cooperate
with South Korea as a pivot or bridge, stating in the same statement that ‘A week
before I visited Thailand last time, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
made a visit to the country. Last week, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also visited
the country’. As with Africa, President Lee (2012) was making the case that South
Korea is ‘slow and steady’, not rushing into the competitive scramble of the other
Asian donors, but acting with restraint. He stated that ‘In the past, about 90% of
ASEAN was a market for Japan. The establishment of the ASEAN–Korea Centre
in 2009 and the opening of the Korea–ASEAN Representative Office in Jakarta,
Indonesia, in September this year are significant in that connection. As such my
Administration has prepared new sources for the staples needed by the nation.
I hope they will serve as firm stepping stones for the incoming Administration
as the country continues to march toward a Greater Korea’. The South Korean
government’s New Asia Initiative seeks to upgrade Korea’s role as a power
player in Asia by engaging the region and creating stronger ties. The initiative
represents a shift in South Korea’s foreign policy focus from the US, China, Japan
and Russia, to the smaller regional neighbours. This shift will potentially expand
South Korea’s foreign policy focus from Northeast Asia to the Asian region.
However it is a fine balance. The shifting from the traditional powers remit (if the
big powers ‘allow’ South Korea leverage to do this) means potentially losing its
‘bridge facility’ and at the same time South Korea might be interpreted by smaller
nations as a ‘hegemonic’ state, as phrases such as ‘Greater Korea’ do perhaps
have more pejorative connotations, whilst rising Next-11s in ASEAN such as
Indonesia and Thailand may start flexing their own influence in the region and
directly with the more powerful hegemons. Both Thailand and Indonesia are now
starting to develop their own ODA approaches. Thailand now provides aid to its
own neighbouring countries in order to secure borders from migration through its
‘Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency’.
The scope of cooperation will be also extended from economy to security, culture,
energy and other sectors. By joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994
and by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in
2004, South Korea has also strengthened its relations with ASEAN. Before the G20
summit which was hosted by Seoul in 2010, ASEAN leaders had expressed their
hope that South Korea would, as a ‘bridge nation’, consider inviting the ASEAN
Chair to attend the G20 Summit which was held in Seoul in 2010 as a ‘seat at
the high table’ (ASEAN 2009). South Korea’s policies are replete with words such
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180 Asian ODA
as ‘bridges’ and ‘waves’. KOICA (2010) stated that it ‘has implemented grant aid
in order to support sustainable socio-economic development’ and ‘continues to
concentrate its program on Asia and Pacific countries, as Korea has reaffirmed its
commitment to ease development disparities in ASEAN countries’. As Yul (2004)
noted, many ASEAN countries send aid workers and volunteers to South Korea to
‘learn first hand about Korea’s development experience’ (Yul 2004: 92). According
to KOICA (2010), sectoral priorities in Asia now include the environment, health
and education. APEC (2013) has also specified the importance of accepting the
diversity of a range of development levels and experiences. However, there are
concerns that this emphasis ‘on diversity’ ignores the underlying power distinctions
and power leverages which are obscured by the language of ‘harmony’ and technical
assistance.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the role of Asian donors in Asia as a reflection of
the underlying geopolitical dynamics in the Asian region. The chapter also
set out the distribution of Asian ODA and its sector emphasis, as well as the
ways in which the Asian donors are legitimating their ODA to the region and
particular recipients. The impact of the Asian donors on recipient countries in
the region is increasing and this is creating patterns of donor competition which
is generating concerns with project replication in what is increasingly a very
crowded market. At the same time this is giving recipients increasing leverage.
The chapter has argued that the 1997 Asian crisis still plays an important role
in determining Asian countries’ responses to the West, mainstream institutions
and the regional neighbours. History, crises and conflicts are an increasingly
vital part of how Asian donors ‘sell’ their ODA and their own development
experience to prospective recipients and partners and how this process itself
impacts on a donor state’s own national identity and the perception of its role
in Asia. This self-perception, however, might not always match the geopolitical
and geoeconomic reality. It is also clear that ‘emerging powers’ in Asia cannot
be placed as ‘a group’ per se but have a set of constantly shifting priorities. This
diversity reflects forms of political, economic and cultural competition as well as
underlying power inequalities.
Notes
1 This has also been generated by cooperation on environmental issues in the region and
concern with the impact of China’s rise on regional levels of pollution such as ‘yellow
sand’.
2 ‘Japan’s Abe ends Myanmar visit with aid debt write off’ 26 May 2013 www.reuters.
com/article/2013/05/26/us-myanmar-japan-idUSBRE94P04M20130526
3 ‘Japan Helps India: Outline of Japan’s ODA to India’ www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/JapanIndia-Relations/Japan_ODA_India.html
4 ‘Framework Act on International Development Cooperation’ http://odakorea.go.kr/
eng.policy.Legal.do
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5 ‘Barack Obama Hails Burma’s Thein Sein on US visit’ www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-22565267
6 ‘Taiwan Hopes to Join ASEAN led RCAP Trade Pact’ The China Post 14 April 2013
www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/04/14/375996/Taiwanhopes.htm
7 Joint panel presentation with KOICA Vice-President, Wonju, South Korea, August
2012.
8 Discussion session at Ajou University, with the Indonesian Ambassador to South
Korea, Suwon, 2011.
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5
Emerging powers, Asian
foreign aid and the greening
of geopolitics
Introduction
The environment and economic development are traditionally thought to be
diametrically opposed (Nygren and Rikoon 2008). Sustainable development has
long been recognised as the ‘trade-off’ between the two. In this respect, economic
growth is fundamentally linked to questions of environmental sustainability.
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7 highlighted the importance of the
concept of ‘sustainable development’. This concept had emerged in narratives
on development following the 1987 Brundlandt Report which defined sustainable
development as ‘an inter-generational responsibility’ for meeting the needs of
the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to be able to
meet their own needs.1 Climate change debates have also led to issues concerning
the ‘resilience’ and adaptability of states, societies and economies in an age
of global environmental risk. Whether human induced or not, whether real or
not, the controversies concerning climate change have induced policies based
on quantifying and controlling ‘risk’ assessments, vulnerabilities and data sets
on possible scenarios. For IR, climate change has begun questioning the very
concept of national security and the meaning of the term ‘threat’. There are
also the various economic and environmental paradoxes of climate change. For
instance, climate change can open up trade routes and natural resources but at
the same time cause widespread flooding of agricultural areas which can create
food shortage crises and a movement of people as ‘climate refugees’ (Blaike and
Brookefield 1987; Cameron and Cloth 2012; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2011).
This ‘push and pull’ movement can create numerous tensions over access and
ownership of land rights, water resources and territorial rights.
For the developing world, environmentalists have often been regarded as
harbingers of ‘stopping growth’ and unintentionally depriving populations of the
benefits of economic growth. Environmentalism has been regarded as a ‘postmaterial’ or ‘middle class’ ethic, whilst the poor desperately search for their
economic survival. Moreover, it is often the poorest who are the most vulnerable
to the impacts of environmental damage, climate change and pollution. From a
geopolitical perspective, environmental legislation has often been viewed as a
way for the powerful nations to stop development and future challenges from the
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The greening of geopolitics 187
developing world. The various conferences also reflect geopolitical competition
and cooperation, whilst the leading nations themselves circumvent any green
legislation and often fail to cooperate. In this respect, ODA is interpreted by
developing nations as a ‘pay off’ not to develop, or, where ODA is channelled for
schemes of environmental protection, this itself is often regarded as reducing the
prospects for economic growth by ‘protecting green zones’.
Climate change has led many donor governments to be able to ‘share their
climate change experience’. China, as a large landmass state, also has diverse
climate changes issues such as growing desertification and glacier-melting in
the Himalaya region. China also suffers from urban pollution or ‘airpocalypse’.
Japan has its own particular issues with regard to the impacts of climate change
on rising sea levels (tsunamis) and nuclear energy (JICA 2012). JICA’s Annual
Report (2009) noted that its ‘activities focus on minimizing climate change
risks from the viewpoint of human security for socially vulnerable people’ and
undertakes cooperation that offers the co-benefits of greenhouse gas reduction
and sustainable development (JICA 2009). The term ‘minimizing’ clearly implies
that there is an acceptance of climate change but efforts to make states resilient
or ‘anti-fragile’. Moreover, there are issues regarding establishing specific
environmental rights (such as to live in a pollution free and safe environment)
and wider questions of human rights and labour rights. Under the authoritarian
regimes in South Korea (1961–1987) ‘environmental integrity’ rights were often
separated from democratic rights and the wider dynamics of a specific form of
uneven economic development within the developmentalist state. One recent
concern from groups such as Amnesty International has been that defining
‘environmental rights’ has not been linked to the wider social questions of labour
and human rights. Moreover, a focus on green issues through concepts such as
‘socially vulnerable people’ marginalises the link between climate change which
is not just ‘human induced’ activity but comes from the activity of specific human
interests in a specific historical form of development. However, South Korea is, as
a new middle power, increasingly proactive in setting the ‘green growth agenda’.
Across the Asian region, China is often blamed by its neighbouring states for
worsening seasonal phenomenon conditions such as ‘yellow sand’ air pollution
across South Korea and Japan. South Korea has been keen to engage with land
management projects in Mongolia to ease the yellow sand issue. China now
has its own climate change policy in response to the negative externalities of
its rapid industrialisation (China 2007; GOC 2011; Gong 2011). In this respect
the broader climate change issue has also been linked to questions over natural
resource scarcity (Lee, B. 2012; Kyoto 1997). The link made is usually that carbon
emitting resources are not only damaging the environment but are also becoming
increasingly scarce. On the one hand, as a result, resource depletion and resource
scarcity could be seen to be positive realities for environment sustainability and
provide incentives for a shift to a ‘non-carbon’ based development paradigm. On
the other hand, there is a view that economic growth can in fact continue along
the same development trajectory but through different mechanisms and strategies
of environmental adaptation and mitigation.
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The greening of geopolitics
The term green is, nevertheless, ubiquitous in development debates, with
phrases and neologisms abounding, such as green wash, green taxes, green
financing and, along with green growth investment, general concerns with ‘green
asset investment bubbles’. This is the concern that overspending in high-grade
‘green technology’ might unintentionally create speculation and an appreciation
of prices and costs in selected financial areas which cannot be absorbed or
sustained by existing institutional capacities and which crowd out investment
(Cancun 2012). There is also the issue as to whether the state should subsidise
green technologies.
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (GGKP 2013: 1) has
pointed out that ‘Green Growth seeks to fuse sustainable development’s economic
and environmental pillars into a single intellectual and policy planning process,
thereby recasting the very essence of the development model so that it is capable
of producing strong and sustainable growth simultaneously.’ Green growth is
also seen to be the answer to the current global economic crisis (as government
support and/or opening up markets for creative technologies) and to secure the
state from future environmental risks and threats. In this respect, climate change
is seen to be a direct cause of ‘traditional’ security issues (conflict over resources)
as well as more specifically ‘environmental security’ issues such as drought,
flooding, hurricane intensity and rising sea levels, which, in themselves, are often
more destructive to humanity than traditional ‘military’ conflict. This has led to
an interest in creating mitigation policies and adaptation policies so as to create
more robust and resilient so-called ‘critical’ infrastructures (energy, transport,
water supply links). Environmentalists from leftist NGOs have had concerns
with the realist ‘militarising’ of environmental security; also the more right-wing
environmentalists have wrapped up ‘environmental protection’ in a banner of
ethnic nationalism and ethnic security for ‘their people’. Yet many leftist NGOs
also use similar language of protecting the ‘land’ and the ‘people’. A further
recent issue in critical IR has been with the ‘new materialism’ approaches, where
land and soil erosion as a result of climate change and desertification, is in effect
blowing away ‘sovereign’ particles of territory from and across borders (Nyers
2012; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009).
This chapter considers the relationship between Asian donor ODA and emerging
green growth policies as a response to poverty and development concerns in an
age of climate change. Developed nations (as in the Aid 2 paradigm) are regarded
as neutralising major power inequalities through rather abstract talk of ‘global
cooperation’ and ‘diversity’. However, emerging powers, and in particular South
Korea, acting as a middle power bridge, are challenging this particular trade-off
and why. South Korea is using its experience of rapid development and the dangers
of ‘growth first, environmental integrity later’ to share with other developing
nations, whilst at the same time, and perhaps paradoxically, also promoting ‘green
growth’ with very little experience of this particular approach. The chapter also
discusses this in the context of the new agenda regarding the relations between the
Asian donor states and the impact on donor–recipient relationships of accessing
future natural resources and shipping routes in and across the Arctic. The access
The greening of geopolitics 189
to these routes and resources changes the relationships both between Asian donors
and impacts on the donor–recipient relationship for those ODA recipient countries
currently regarded as a donor priority for geopolitical strategic and resources
purposes.
Climate issues in Asia and Africa
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At Rio+20 in 2012, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2012) stated that in
response to climate change there must be no more:
reckless consumption of scarce resources … No more mortgaging our
long-term future for our short-term needs. We are here at Rio to advance a
new global model … Korea understands that you can never build national
prosperity without protecting the environment … the Global Green Growth
Institute was inaugurated in 2010.
(Ban 2012)
Africa and Asia are argued to be particularly vulnerable to climate change
threats because of an already fragile infrastructure and limited institutional
capacities of resilience and so-called ‘anti-fragility’. There is an interest in
many states in developing risk pre-emption and management strategies,
particularly for farmers and pastoralists (UNESCAP 2012). Other issues
include strategies for reforestation and the sustainable management of existing
land. This has led to an interest in new modelling techniques and cooperation
in Asia and elsewhere over disaster warning surveillance mechanisms (Prizzon
and Rogerson 2012).
According to the World Bank (2009), Africa has made significant gains in
improving its macro-economic management given that two-thirds of Africa is
still dry-land or desert, as well as being rain-fed agricultural land. Biomass still
accounts for 80 per cent of Africa’s domestic energy needs, and rain-fed agriculture
accounts for 30 per cent of total African GDP. The agricultural sector still employs
70 per cent of Africa’s population. This is causing vulnerability to climate change
induced weather patterns. The question is whether to focus on rural development
aid (and keep rural/urban distinctions), or whether to encourage a shift away
from an agricultural based economy. The latter strategy from environmentalists
in particular, can often result in rather ‘quaint’ and romantic visions of rural
communities. It is not so much the changing weather patterns but rather the
question of how the meteorological patterns are being disturbed. According to the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) this means more responsibilities for ‘impactor’
rather than ‘impactee’ economies. In this respect, green growth enables ‘a country
to continue its path of economic growth, while maintaining harmony between
the economy and the environment’ (ADB 2013: 47). The ADB report indicates
that the top ten countries measured by energy use of oil equivalent per capita are
Australia, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Thailand, Mongolia,
Indonesia and Pakistan (ADB 2013).
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According to the ADB (2013), climate change also raises issues of equity
because of the large differences in emissions, present and past, among
countries and their widely differing vulnerabilities to the effects of climate
change. Developing countries are required to take common but differentiated
responsibility as economies grow. Low carbon growth means using less energy
and improving efficiency, protecting natural resources such as forests, designing
new technologies and business models, and implementing policies. There is
a move away from macroeconomic labour and productivity toward sectoral
GDP, employment and patterns of specialisation, not consequences of growth
but fundamental to it. Growth is to be ‘accompanied by the conservation of
ecosystem services and greater social coherence’ as the ‘necessary conditions
for the Asian renaissance to be transformed into the Asian century’ (ADB
2013: 41).
There is also, the World Bank (2010, 2013) argued, a further need for
increasing state resilience and adaption capacity, as well as further disaster risk
management, climate change mitigation opportunities, and forest management,
knowledge and environmental capacity building. One technocratic response
has been in the scaling up of green finance to developing nations, not as a
compensation for environmental destruction wrought by development, but rather,
as an opportunity to create new paradigms of ‘green growth’. In this respect,
environmentalism is fundamental to accelerating economic growth and this socalled ‘virtuous cycle’ can be set in motion through the unlocking of technology
and infrastructure which are suffering due to current under-investment and low
productivity. The narratives of ‘breaking bottlenecks’ and promoting green
growth through the market, are often based on Cold War narratives that stateled communism, such as in the former Soviet Union and China, are examples
of how too much state power causes environmental wreckage. However, on the
issue of nuclear power, regarded as a policy for taking economies of carbon
addiction, some ‘nationalist’ environmentalists see the advantages of taking a
country off a dependency on coal and oil (and creating self-sufficiency). Others
regard nuclear energy (in itself) as not attending to the real issues at the heart
of a particularly problematic growth model known as industrial capitalism, but
having its own negative impacts on the environment at times of nuclear disasters
such as Chernobyl (1986) and at Three Mile Island in the US (1979). Moreover,
this is still a particularly sensitive issue in Japan and across Asia following the
Fukushima meltdown in 2011. South Korea has recently tended toward a more
nuclear energy based ‘self-sufficiency’ programme due to its energy vulnerability
on oil and coal imports. There have also been deals in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) concerning the export of nuclear technology. At the same time, many
environmental and ecological nationalist groups in South Korea regard the
nuclear programme not as energy ‘self-sufficiency’ or as ‘national sovereignty’
but as linked to the continuing ‘foreign’ influenced nuclearisation of the Korean
peninsula (along with North Korea) and not in keeping with traditional Korean
values.
The greening of geopolitics 191
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IR and the environment
Traditionally, climate change conferences have been criticised by realists
(irrelevant), by liberal rationalists (not effective unless legitimate institutions are
enacted for sustained cooperation) and by radicals (too much based on narrow
power interests and not innovative enough). The chronology of the myriad of
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) also suggests a trend toward diplomatic
deadlock, with many overlapping agreements reaching collective inertia with no
states (big, middle or small) willing to break through for various fears of tying
themselves into these ‘first mover’ commitments which will negatively impact
on economic growth, and concerns with defectors and free-riders. New middle
powers are particularly suited through reconstituting questions of power in the
middle power debate of what Moises Naim recently termed ‘minilateralism’.
Larger powers are often criticised for deferring important decisions due to
concerns that green legislation could be used by states to restrict their power.
Global cooperation is often restricted by the growing perception in the
developing world that the protocol and agenda of climate change agreements
represent a neo-colonial strategy to stop economic development and to neutralise
Western responsibility for adverse climate change under the mantra of ‘the
collective commons’ that ‘we are all in this together’. As the COPs recently
held at Cancun and Durban have showed, diplomatic breakdowns occur when
there are either low expectations with nothing for states to gain or agree upon,
or alternatively, where there are high expectations, there are higher chances of
credibility and legitimacy gaps.
The ADB (2009) has invested $600 million in what it regards as low carbon
resilient infrastructure in green transport and urban development, with climate
change being directly linked to geopolitics (Conley et al. 2013; Manicom and
Lackenbauer 2013). The UNEP (2010) stated that all governments should now
embrace a comprehensive portfolio of policy measures including sustainable
subsidies and other incentives to resource extraction and pollution in areas such as
energy, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, mining, and industry. Developing countries
and emerging economies, it argued, face specific challenges of achieving
sustainable economic growth, reducing poverty, and enhancing well-being, while
moving their economies towards a green transformation. The key issue was one
of balancing. In terms of the new geography of aid, the resilience and adaption of
states to climate change and the mitigation of the contributing elements that give
rise to climate change, raises numerous questions about whether these concerns
can be channelled through the existing political institutions to create regime
legitimacy (Keohane 2011; Ovodenko and Keohane 2012). The issue here is
whether green issues impact on traditional security questions and are reflected as
such, or whether they bring different kinds of security threats. Clearly, rising sea
levels are affecting the actual physical existence of certain islands in Asia, ones
which powers have identified as ‘outposts’ or ‘pearls’.
In the Asian region, issues have included trans-border risks such as yellow
dust and forest fires, whilst the East Asia Climate Forum of 29 May 2009, which
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The greening of geopolitics
galvanised South Korea as a leading player in the climate change debate and as
a potential ‘bridge’ between the developed and developing worlds, is attracting
considerable multilateral interest (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). Emerging powers
are again using their ‘shared experience’ and ‘mutual vulnerability’ narrative.
For instance, the South Korean and Vietnamese experiences of widespread
deforestation following the two conflicts, is a shared experience that both nations
are now using in terms of offering similar reforestation solutions to Indonesia and
the Philippines. However the idea of state-led strategy to solve climate change
issues goes against the grain of the wider global green debate which accepts the
‘relevance of radical uncertainty’ (Pellizzoni 2004: 544). Moreover, by introducing
the future-orientated time span of five-year plans, governments are entering the
domain of key philosophical issues concerning present and future human rights,
unintended consequences, and intergenerational responsibility (Caney 2008).
These trans-border risks now may mean the need to redefine the site and meaning
of security. This generates questions as to whether ‘the environment’ can be
understood in traditional ‘security’ terms or through its own security forms. Thus
a tension emerges as to whether environmental security is (and should have) its
own security framework and tied to wider issues of human security and human
development, or whether whilst it is regarded as not as important as high politics,
the processes of environmental destruction can directly and indirectly influence
and impact on the issues of high politics national security. For instance ‘water
wars’ and natural resource or land degradations can fuel local conflicts which can
feed into wider forms of inter-state conflict.
International green commitments
Formal inter-governmental climate change negotiations have been ongoing since
Stockholm (1972), and for supporters of such gatherings, there is a set of wellestablished cultures/norms amongst (and between) parties, whilst crucially, the
questions of ‘legacy’ of previous gatherings are continually embedded in present
and for future discussions. Emerging nations and new middle powers have the
direct experience of developing rapidly in a climate change conscious era and
this experience is used in their public soft power diplomacy. The problems are,
firstly, that great powers such as the US and China are often confrontational at the
negotiations, focusing on technicalities under the guise of ‘national interest’ and
unwilling to be ‘first movers’ for fear of free-riders. Thus, what emerged from
Kyoto in 1997 were strategic distinctions between the developed and developing
states, between the great and middle powers, and between land-based and small/
island states. Moreover, a view emerged that environmental agreements such as
Kyoto were in effect those agreements pushed by the non-great powers and thus,
given the pressing issue of climate change, have provided by default a strategic
opportunity for medium and smaller states to cooperate to proactively capture and
catalyse the agenda. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol First Commitment Period officially
finished in 2012 and at the 2011 Durban conference, delegates were discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of a number of following routes and options for
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The greening of geopolitics 193
the post-Kyoto era. This could be one reason why the COP at Copenhagen 2009
was so disappointing as delegates knew that as the deadline closed in, no state
was willing, at that time, to state its position explicitly before the structure of the
post-Kyoto era was actually known for fear of defecting, particularly from larger
states (Schroeder and Lovett 2012).
Middle powers do not have such concerns and have more incentives to act and
to cooperate as first movers. It is no coincidence therefore that new middle powers
such as South Korea now explicitly operate ‘me first’ initiatives as proactive
middle powers not waiting for big power decisions of defections. International
environmental regimes are examples of global cooperation among nation-states
where the regime building process involves complex deliberations over issues,
content and the decision making process to help develop and maintain a set of
explicit norms, rules and regulations. International regimes are created in various
sectors of international issues such as trade, human rights, child rights, nuclear
control and the environment. Climate change issues are perhaps different in the
sense that being more future and survival orientated they require specific forms
and contents of cooperation and collaboration.
Following the 2010 United Nations Cancun Summit there were calls by the
richer nations to set up a ‘green fund’ to aid low carbon development in the
developing world. Such a fund was interpreted by some developing countries
as a bribe simply ‘not to develop’. Bolivia called the agreement ‘eco-cide’. The
argument was that the West has for centuries plundered and exploited the South’s
resources whilst at the same time the West has exported its industrial waste to
the South and supported corrupt Southern governments with weak environmental
regulations. Indeed, by stopping economic development and even free market trade
(through Western protectionism), an environmentally conscious middle-class will
not emerge. The assumption of this argument is that people who have a certain
standard of high income security will begin to think about post-material issues
and purchase expensive green branded and organic products. On the other hand,
there is the view that ‘the poor’ are the most vulnerable to climate change impact
(but less responsible) and are therefore more likely to be more environmentally
conscious than the more footloose middle classes. The trade-offs between dealing
with environmental degradation and economic development have also been at the
core of the North–South divide. However, green growth policies advance the view
‘that economic growth and environmental sustainability are compatible objectives
and necessary for the future of humankind’ and do not require such trade-offs, and
therefore are to the benefit of the developing world.
Green growth and its South Korean advocates
The East Asia Climate Partnership advanced objectives such as generating a low
carbon urban development, water management, low carbon energy usage, and
protection of forests and biomass, as well as effective waste management. South
Korea is aiming to increase its ratio of ‘green ODA’ projects to 20 per cent of
its total ODA by 2020. Countries already receiving ‘green’ ODA are Mongolia
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The greening of geopolitics
(yellow dust), Vietnam (reforestation), Azerbaijan (sustainable approaches to
clearing environmental destruction by oil exploitation) (Kang 2011), Indonesia
and the Philippines (reforestation). Green growth is heralded by South Korea as
a way for the developing nations to develop and yet to maintain environmental
integrity (KOICA 2009; Presidential Committee on Green Growth 2010; Steiner
2010). Moreover, South Korea is linking ODA to green growth, indicated by the
June 2009 OECD Ministerial council meeting and the signing of the ‘Anticipation
of the Declaration on Green Growth’. As a state-led policy, GGK was officially
activated on 13 January 2010 when the South Korean National Assembly passed
the Low Carbon and Green Growth Act (Lee, M. 2011). The Green Growth Plan
seeks to promote the development of 27 core green technologies to provide future
engines of growth to the South Korean economy. According to MOFA (2013):
Sustainable development seeks to achieve economic development, social
development and environmental protection in a balanced manner. The concept
of sustainable development has been reaffirmed and widely acknowledged
as the guiding principle for global development since the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The
international community gathered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2012 for
Rio+20 Summit to reaffirm their commitment to sustainable development
… countries emphasized the importance of the three pillars of sustainable
development and agreed to establish an intergovernmental process that is open
to all stakeholders, with a view to developing the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs).
This opens out a number of interrelated issues. Firstly, whether green growth
means that the developing nations can bypass the traditional development
trajectories. Secondly, whether the aid recipients are in fact willing to bypass
trajectories that have led to the rapid development in the emerging powers.
Thirdly, whether green growth is supplementary to previous and traditional
development models. Fourth, whether green technologies allow the developing
nations to carry on a traditional development trajectory without the need for green
growth investment. There are concerns that designated ‘green growth zones’
might be protected (and yet this itself is a deeper market commodification of
natural resources) yet outside these zones, illegal practices of environmental
destruction such as logging continue (and are accelerated) as land becomes
scarcer and government monitoring becomes more focused on the protected zones
(Human Rights Watch 2013). Finally, there is always the underlying ‘free-rider’
conundrum that green efforts merely accelerate ‘business as usual’ growth on the
basis that green policies (or someone else’s policies) can ‘sweep up’ afterwards.
Many governments have therefore called for assistance on ‘green’ policing,
surveillance and monitoring technology but there are concerns that this is another
instrument of the state to restrict human rights and a new ‘green’ authoritarianism.
Nonetheless, green growth has become a part of South–south cooperation
(Khoday and Perch 2012). The green growth paradigm makes no distinction
The greening of geopolitics 195
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therefore between wealth creation and the environment by arguing that individuals
and countries can be wealthy only if the environment is built into development.
South Korea has identified that achieving a significant cut in emissions requires a
shift from energy-intensive industries to low-carbon ones (Park 2012). According
to the former South Korean Environmental Minister:
[O]ne of the fundamental problems with the current economic system is that
it is both economically and environmentally unsustainable in its reliance
solely on traditional energy-intensive industries … This new growth strategy
is also in line with the directions that the majority of advanced nations
take for their national development … those countries are committed to
achieving environmental conservation and economic growth at the same time
by investing in the development of new technologies and fostering green
industries.
(Lee, M.-h 2009)
In December 2013, the South Korean government initiated the Green Climate
Fund in Songdo, Incheon. This fund aims to provide investment opportunities for
green technology and is not a ‘compensation’ fund. The aim of green ODA is to
transfer value added carbon capture technology and carbon-neutral technologies
from advanced countries to developing countries. In this sense developing
countries and emerging economies are seen to face the specific challenges
of achieving sustainable economic growth, reducing poverty, and enhancing
well-being, while moving their economies towards a green transformation.
Balancing and retooling the economy are seen to be equally important policy
goals at the core of the green economy (Clifford 2010). It was the Republic
of Kiribati (a relatively large aid recipient in the Pacific) which gave its final
approval to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth
Institute (GGGI) that officially paved the way for the GGGI’s conversion from
an NGO into an international organisation. Thomas Hale et al. (2013) argued
that institutional gridlock is a paradoxical result of institutional success given
that there are ‘harder problems’ to solve at a time of increasing numbers of
‘emerging powers’.
For Hulman et al. (2012) green growth can optimise economic growth by
incorporating a more effective use of environmental and natural resources by
advancing social equity into a more ‘holistic’ model that can also cater for the ‘laws’
of uncertainty. Growth is therefore compatible (if not dependent) on improving
resource efficiency and social equity (Allen and Cloth 2012). According to data
from the African Development Bank (AfDB 2012), roughly half of BRIC aid is
now based on improving ‘green’ infrastructure such as building efficient transport
networks. According to the ADB (2013), spending on green growth is linked to
questions of ‘distribution’ and welfare. In this respect green growth might be
regarded in the long term as a more cost-effective way of increasing economic
growth but which also might encourage less need for governments to spend
on health care and ‘safety nets’, on the basis that the old and environmentally
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The greening of geopolitics
Table 5.1 Carbon emission ton per capita (2008), percentage of GDP for sectors of
education, health, and research and development
Carbon
emissions
(tons/capita)
Australia
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Bangladesh
Education
(% of GDP)
Health
(% of GDP)
Research and
Development
(% of GDP)
18.48
4.7
6.0
2.2
0.2
9
2.4
1.1
Cambodia
0.39
1.8
1.7
0.0
PRC
4.92
1.9
1.9
1.5
India
1.25
3.2
1.1
0.8
Indonesia
1.69
3.5
1.2
0.0
Japan
9.02
3.4
6.5
3.4
Laos
2.3
0.8
0.0
Malaysia
6.70
4.5
1.9
0.6
Mongolia
4.33
5.1
3.5
0.2
Myanmar
0.24
1.3
0.2
0.2
New Zealand
7.74
6.2
7.1
1.3
Pakistan
0.81
2.9
0.8
0.7
Philippines
0.80
2.6
1.3
0.1
Singapore
South Korea
9.16
2.8
1.0
2.6
10.31
4.2
3.5
3.5
Sri Lanka
0.61
7.1
2.0
0.2
Thailand
3.41
4.9
2.7
0.2
Vietnam
1.19
5.3
2.8
0.2
Source: Asian Development Bank (2013: 128).
unfriendly development model has been transcended. South Korea has one of the
largest per capita emissions of carbon dioxide in the region, and one of the lowest
levels of health care spending (Table 5.1).
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2013) Japan has the highest
rate of new green patents (Table 5.2).
The OECD’s (2009) original communiqué on green growth stressed that
‘Green growth will be relevant going beyond the current crisis, addressing
urgent challenges including the fight against climate change and environmental
degradation, enhancement of energy security, and the creation of new engines
for economic growth’. According to the OECD (2013b) a strong, stable and
sustainable future for developing countries can be achieved through green growth.
Countries in the developing world often have difficulties in capacity building
and using finance in the creation of a green economy due to the persistence of
an ‘informal economy’ and an urgent need for rapid development but with few
incentives for natural resource protection.
The greening of geopolitics 197
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Table 5.2 Leading countries for green patents as the average percentage of world inventions
(2002–2007)
Japan
20.8
Germany
17.8
US
14.1
South Korea
5.6
PRC
3.9
Canada
3.0
France
4.4
UK
4.3
Australia
2.9
Sweden
1.7
Source Asian Development Bank (2013: 161)
The OECD (2013a) also noted that there are a number of problems including
matching the long-term welfare benefits of green growth with short-term
transition costs. This can put pressure on newly democratic governments, as
well as on issues of coordination and pricing instruments over natural resource
ownership, and to encourage an investment policy based on technology innovation
and climate change adaption. For the OECD (2012), climate change and green
growth is undoubtedly an incentive for future technological development which
implicitly feeds into health issues and economic growth by enhancing capacity
and strengthening ODA by targeting those areas where private investment is
limited and resources scarce and part of aid effectiveness. The WTO argues
that green growth is an opportunity to open market bottlenecks and generate
market incentives. However governments also need to be clear as to what green
growth policy consists of, to allow for more predictability for risk takers (Hynes
2012). Such consistencies and regulations are the opposite of South Korea’s
green growth where leading chaebols prefer ‘spontaneity’ in regulation which is
justified as neoliberal flexibility but which can exclude other points of view and
actors. In this respect, this particular approach to spontaneity is only possible in
a centralised and exclusive hierarchical system.
South Korea and the GGGI
South Korea was chosen as the home of the Green Climate Fund. Officially
opened in November 2013, this is the multilateral financial mechanism
recently created to support the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(O’Donnell 2012). It has also been approved by the OECD-DAC. At the
2010 G20 Seoul Summit, South Korea’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Kim Sung-han, declared that ‘many issues today require unprecedented
international cooperation. Solving today’s complex challenges will require
“middle powers” to play a greater, more active role. Through various initiatives,
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The greening of geopolitics
such as its programmes in green growth and development cooperation, South
Korea has demonstrated the influence middle powers are having on global
governance and that they may be best suited to facilitate consensus building and
revitalize momentum for cooperation’ (Brown 2013; Kim, S.-j 2010; Kim, Jisoo 2013). For its supporters, the GGGI (2012) provides a credible platform for
a new style of diplomacy based on monitoring and regulating the sustainability
of climate change agreements as a ‘results based’ model (rather than in setting
the terms of the agenda per se) with the view that by breaking the cycle of
disillusionment and mistrust, a virtuous cycle for future regimes can be enacted
by new leaderships.2 As a new DAC member, South Korea has also initiated
a number of key green policies (Kim, Da-ye 2013). MOFAT (2008) described
the government’s ‘Low Carbon, Green Growth’ policy as the ‘nation’s new
vision’. The White Paper stated that this strategy not only impacts on ‘national
development’ but is also ‘a new global paradigm’ which aims ‘to make climate
change compatible with economic development’. The MOFAT also stated that
although South Korea’s responsibility for the historical emission of greenhouse
gases compared with those of developed countries with legally binding
mitigation obligations under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is relatively small, it is
actively participating in international society’s efforts to respond to climate
change. President Lee claimed that the middle power and more proactive
‘me first’ philosophy shown by South Korea is both a legal and a moral
commitment, and that ‘protecting the planet and achieving prosperity can go
hand in hand’.
Whilst South Korea is not legally bound by Kyoto, its first mover status aims
to attract support and credibility. President Lee announced a ‘low-carbon, green
growth’ on the 60th anniversary of South Korea’s founding. The number 60 is
very symbolic for Koreans as a time to reflect, and is known as ‘Hwan-gab’ (Lee,
M-b 2010, 2012). This growth model was also linked to the ‘green deal’.3 To
the UN, President Lee (2009) re-emphasised that ‘Global Korea’ will also be
‘contributing to the world’ and that:
Korea will embark on a path of actively contributing to the world and all of
humanity. This is the very goal that Global Korea aims for … Korea, while not
included in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), plans to make a voluntary announcement before the end
of this year, its midterm target emissions cut by the year 2020. Korea has
proposed to establish a Registry of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
(NAMAs) of developing countries at the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with a
view to inviting developing countries to voluntarily participate in mitigation
actions and providing the international support that they need.
(Lee, M-b 2009)
The Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) (2010) (disbanded
by the current Park administration in 2013, which now wants to promote
Green Growth 2 based on SMEs rather than on big businesses and government
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The greening of geopolitics 199
technocrats) stated that climate change poses no less of an economic and
security challenge to the global community, and lends urgency to a collective
global response. In particular, moves to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
suggest the need for an altogether different paradigm for long-term national
development strategies. President Lee hoped that South Korea would become
the main headquarters of the UN-backed GGGI. President Lee’s domestic green
credentials were, for supporters, finally proven by the Four Rivers Project.4
The PCGG had a goal of making South Korea the 5th top country globally in
green growth development by 2050. However there were concerns that state-led
targets might turn into state edicts and top-down micromanagement.5 The PCGG
had also outlined a set of ‘experimental visions’ which included reform to the
construction of rural development projects and urban green zones by advancing a
non-carbon green infrastructure (efficient public transport, creating hybrid cars),
and preserving wetlands as areas for soaking up CO2 emissions.6 The Rio+20
served as an international platform for promoting the South Korean governmentinitiated GGGI. This is a strategic cooperative body dedicated to pioneering and
diffusing green growth globally, which was converted into an international body
with the support of ‘like-minded countries’. Representatives from 15 countries
(including developed and developing nations) also signed a treaty to upgrade the
GGGI to develop ways to promote clean energy and to drive down dependence
on fossil fuels and improve alternative energy sources such as wind and solar
power.7 The Swiss Environment Minister in 2012 reflected these developments
by stating:
It may take another year, but that’s the only way we’ll end up with international
rules that everyone agrees on and which respect the sensitivities of all
members and the vulnerabilities of those who do not have the financial tools
to improve their own situation … Lowering customs duties could encourage
technological transfer, for example. There are a number of different ideas, but
we have to convince the international community … We have major partners
involved in the climate talk processes … which represent one-third of all
United Nations members, and the Environmental Integrity Group.
(Cancun 2012)
At the 18th session of the COPs held in Doha, South Korea as an Environment
Integrity Group (EIG) member (with Mexico and Switzerland), hosted a highlevel international conference called the Pre-Conference of the Parties Meeting
to push for ‘efforts to play a bridging role between developed and developing
countries in fighting climate change’ and ‘to create and implement national
and local-level strategies, policies and institutional mechanisms for green
growth’ (Na 2012). GGGI is also described as a new type of multi-stakeholder
institution that combines governments’ public reliability and the dynamic power
of the private sector partnerships by opening doors to specialists and generating
cooperation which is pragmatic and performance orientated. Currently, the
GGGI is active in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, the United Arab
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The greening of geopolitics
Emirates (UAE) and Cambodia, all listed as top recipients in South Korea’s 2012
OECD peer review. Together with other partner countries, specific green growth
projects range from household irrigation to deforestation issues.8 Since 2008,
the South Korean government has carried out the five-year EACP programme
and has offered help in five priority areas: water management, low-carbon
energy, low-carbon cities, waste management, and forestation. The government
has been conducting bilateral and multilateral environmental projects, inviting
government officials for training in South Korea, and conducting research in
green growth for developing countries. KOICA has accepted project requests
from 31 countries and conducted feasibility studies. For some, green growth
would also take South Korea off a reliance on a certain country’s oil which puts
South Korea in a tense relationship with its strategic allies.9
Domestic South Korean critics of green growth
One of the major issues for new middle powers is with maintaining their domestic
credibility with regard to a particular global agenda. This is a key aspect of their
‘soft power’ status to a domestic and international audience. However there
have been concerns within South Korea that the ‘green growth’ policies are
leading to a mismatch between international credibility and what is happening
within South Korea. Firstly, far from encouraging investment and creativity, the
Korean Federation of Small Businesses argues that its members are trapped by
competition from the selected state-backed big businesses and the problem of
sudden state regulation (green tape). This means that green growth is a continuity
of the old developmentalist state. Secondly, green growth has merely served as
a public relations platform for South Korean elite efforts to bolster the country’s
global soft power image. The term ‘green’ is deemed necessary to use on a project
to receive any financial subsidy or aid. The government has also created economic
and political competition between local communities and regions and local and
regional governments for government funds. However, those local businesses
who fail to close the green deal are held responsible for the failure by the local
citizens whilst chaebols maintain government backing as representing their vested
interests as ‘global Korea’ to the world. Thirdly, chaebols still tend to monopolise
the green technology sector with selected government support and therefore often
crowd out smaller businesses as part of five-year plans. South Korean ‘technonationalism’ puts faith in paternalistic ‘grand plan’ visions and technical solutions
rather than attending to the root causes of localised problems and their impact
on local communities. Fourth, the spontaneous execution of policies with no
accountability or ability to locate where and why decisions are actually made is a
continuing concern that obscures vested interests. Fifth, there is still a continuing
reliance on state–chaebol construction projects that have characterised South
Korea’s economic development.
There is concern that these projects are merely being reclassified as ‘green’.
Commentators such as Moon (2010) have argued that for some, GGK is ‘empty
rhetoric’ so as to cover up the government’s intention of pursuing a type of
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The greening of geopolitics 201
economic growth that is similar to that of the 1970s. Although the term ‘green’
has never actually been defined, green investment by South Korea’s thirty largest
business groups has soared by 74.5 per cent, and amounted to 15.1 trillion won
($12.7 billion). The Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) also indicated
that green industrial goods amounted to $6.7 billion in 2010 which was a sixfold increase from $1 billion in 2007. During the same period, exports in the
green and renewable energy sector grew seven-fold from $625 million to $4.54
billion. South Korean finance minister Bahk Jae-wan signed a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the former World Bank Group President Robert
Zoellick, launching a partnership to support research and investment in green
growth. Under the MOU, South Korea is to commit $40 million over four years
to a new Korea Green Growth Partnership Trust Fund. Samsung SDI is investing
in solar energy, planning to make $1.8 billion worth of investment by 2015, the
same year the ETS is expected to take effect in South Korea. Finally, there is
a view that green growth is just another forum for regional competition, which
is driving developed East Asian states to focus on green growth.10 Conservative
South Korean newspapers often highlight the external growing competition from
China that is provoking new green and cutting-edge technologies. For instance
in 2010 it was reported that Chinese research and development in this area was
calculated as being 2.5 times higher than South Korea’s rate. By 2015 the South
Korean government has pledged 40 trillion won for future green research in order
to play as it were regional ‘catch up’ (Chosun Ilbo 2010).
Global Korea as bridge
Scott Snyder (2012) regards Global Korea as a new form of South Korean public
diplomacy, promoting international peace, through a non-threatening and ‘shared
experience’ middle power credibility. MOFAT (2008) pointed out that global
Korea is becoming a state that combines the strengths of an advanced welfare
economy and self-reliant defense capability with significant educational, cultural,
and artistic potential and is accordingly needed and respected by the international
community. The pursuit of short term and piecemeal interests is not in keeping
with the vision of a Global Korea. However, citizens are now voicing discontent
with the top-down ‘global Korea’ narrative. The GGGI (2012) is facilitating and
encouraging investment and a diffusion of resource efficient corporate practices.
The GGGI also welcomes companies to engage in public and private ‘green’
projects. These projects are, however, creating segregated ‘green spaces’ which
for critics, are merely an attempt to monitor and inflate land prices for ‘green
asset’ investors.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) directive on green growth explained
that greening growth can alleviate the risks from future climate change as ‘a
combination of strategically allocating limited public resources, public support,
to promote private sector engagement, and increasing investor confidence’ (WEF
2013). Emphasis is on unlocking private finance and equity moving from high
capital costs in the early stages of investment to be financed in the local currency
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The greening of geopolitics
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as a protection from global fluctuations, backed by green bonds and project bonds.
At Davos in 2012, more than 50 chief executives and senior executives from
clean energy and infrastructure companies met with global financial institutions,
including the heads of sovereign wealth funds. The WEF Green Investment
Report stated that of the US$5 trillion investment needed in infrastructure to meet
the demands of global economic growth, about US$700 billion a year of this must
be in investments such as clean technology, greener infrastructure and energy
efficiency to avoid dangerous climate change.
Exporting green growth ODA
According to the OECD (2013b), examples of ‘green growth’ influenced ODA
can be identified in Indonesia and Ghana. There has also been an increase in
green taxes on forest management in Cameroon, and in Colombia a water
pollution tax has been levied. There have been various initiatives in Tanzania,
Uganda and Rwanda on eco-agriculture and the efficient use of agricultural
technology (UNDP 2010). South Korea’s green growth strategy was highlighted
by the OECD, with representatives from other emerging economies in the
region, notably China, India and Malaysia, as the ability to share successes on
enacting renewable energy policy, implementing low-carbon transportation,
and employing financial incentives for industries to make reforms to achieve
green growth goals. Ethiopia has also adopted a green growth development
model and is already making a number of investment plans based on GGGI’s
recommendations. Ethiopia is receiving aid for green growth from the EU and
China, and generating so-called ‘low carbon zones’ (Bailey 2013). However, one
issue has been that most experts at the GGGI are South Koreans and much of the
consulting is still based on South Korean development experiences (Jones and
Yoo 2011). In Ethiopia, South Korea’s ODA disbursements remained constant,
and yet a higher proportion went into the green growth sector, as a result of South
Korea’s leading middle power role in this global initiative (Bass et al. 2013).
Ethiopia has initiated a pre-eminent water power system and dam construction
is rapidly developing.
Emphasis is now being placed on developing macroeconomic stability
to be able to create a buffer economy from climate change shocks and ‘early
warning systems’ (Oxfam 2010; Ethiopia 2012; World Bank 2010). According
to the Green Strategy, the Ethiopian government aims to make Ethiopia a state
with carbon neutral middle income status before 2025. Along with China and
India, Ethiopia is expected to grow more than 8 per cent over the next five
years. However there are also concerns that capital constraints could lead to
investments in more conventional solutions and development trajectories that
may only require a low initial expenditure but result in longer term inefficiencies.
Instead, an expensive green financing from the start would, it is suggested, lead
to longer term resilience.
KOICA has now provided grant aid for financing a solar-powered electricity
facility for villages in Cambodia. Cambodia was the second country in the
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The greening of geopolitics 203
world most affected by climate change in 2011 (Hruby and Narim 2012).
Among the lower Mekong Basin countries, Laos and Cambodia have been
identified as the most vulnerable to climate change, in part because of their
limited institutional capacity to cope with climate related risks. Laos has been
experiencing small-scale weather extremes, which affect over 10 per cent
of the Laotian population. Recurrent floods and droughts are considered to
be the main natural hazards in addition to fires, landslides, erosion, tropical
storms, and disease epidemics, while floods mostly occur during the monsoon
season. Cambodia is considered to be more affected by climate change than
Laos, because it has a coastline. According to the Cambodian Ministry of
the Environment, the direct impact of climate change is reflected in changes
to the natural rainfall pattern, due to higher temperatures and rising sea
levels. Extreme weather conditions can harm fish production in Cambodia
by depleting stocks, and destroying fishery and aquaculture infrastructure.
Changes in fishery production are likely to have the greatest impact on the
people who depend on fishing because it is their primary livelihood activity.
These people are often poorer and more marginal than those who own land
and have other primary sources of income. In Cambodia, the National Council
on Green Growth (NCGG) is heralded as the Cambodian equivalent of South
Korea’s PCGG. Cambodia is also focusing on water resources management,
food security, forest conservation, renewable energy, as well as education on
green growth to improve a green quality of life.
The GGGI was recently invited to Phnom Penh to hold a series of workshops.
The GGGI is, in many ways, a consultancy forum. Under GGGI’s guide,
Cambodian staff members and students of the Institute of Sustainable Agriculture
and Community Development (ISAC) have learned how to build solar cookers,
solar home systems and Scheffler reflectors (Kim Da-ye 2013). Yet focus
on sectors such as these does not solve national resource issues and simply
segregates ‘green growth’ from the reality of economic development. Moreover,
in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, there is a view that many investors
are still more comfortable with ‘brown and dirty’ investments (but as sustainable
development or as corporate social responsibility) rather than the more risky and
costly technologies of green growth.
In South Pacific island countries such as Kiribati, KOICA now focuses on
strengthening these countries’ institutional capacity for utilising renewable
energy sources. South Korea’s aid agency announced it would lend a helping hand
to the country plagued with drinking water shortages and water contamination
in the hope of easing tensions over ‘water conflict’. KOICA also unveiled an
80 billion won climate change initiative to help Azerbaijan, Mongolia and
the Philippines respond to water-related problems. However many KOICA
volunteers are concerned with providing aid to ‘authoritarian states’ and KOICA
volunteers are increasingly vital for KOICA’s representation and South Korea’s
image ‘in country’. In the Indian Ocean region, the South Korean government
as the ‘first mover’ has handed over a satellite reception and analysis ground
system to Sri Lanka. This would allow Sri Lankans to make weather forecasts
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and take preventive measures based on the data transmitted from South Korea’s
meteorological satellites.
This sharing of ‘green’ experience, information and technology now provides
a strong incentive for states to cooperate to the exclusion of others. In Sri Lanka,
a solar power plant has been completed with the assistance of the South Korean
government and KOICA. Members of the GGGI have increased their ‘green
ODA’ ratio from 2008–2013 with Denmark now providing 13.86 per cent of its
foreign aid categorised as ‘green’, South Korea’s ratio is at 20 per cent, with the
USA at 3.04 per cent and old middle power Australia at 3.3 per cent.
Japan and China’s green growth ODA
For Japan, green growth is regarded as a response to economic downturns to
create a green stimulus and restructuring of the economy. Moreover, given the
2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis, Japan is particularly interested in green growth
as a way of sidelining its nuclear energy programme. Capozza (2011) noted that
by the early 2000s Japan had already begun decoupling its economic growth
and GDP from fossil fuel reliance. A considerable part of the fiscal stimulus in
Japan from 2008 to 2009 was environmental related. This was an attempt to link
the anti-crisis measures to the long-term goal of green growth and generating a
transition to a low carbon society (JICA 2012; Matsutani 2013; MoFA 2011). The
three cornerstones promoted are employment, growth and the environment. The
2001–2002 cycle was based on waste and clean water infrastructure. The 2008
stimulus was to be in effect a reflation of the economy which was struggling as a
result of a rise in the yen, which was due to Japan’s export-led growth and because
domestic prices were low due to low domestic demand (JICA 2012; OECD 2011).
Japan is promoting its shared experience on the impact of natural disasters and
maritime sea/river flooding through rising seas, as well as stressing the importance
of maintaining agricultural resilience. This is the ‘cool earth’ initiative. At the
fourth Mekong–Japan summit held in 2011, Japan consolidated its interest in
ODA to the region to environmentally vulnerable states, thus expanding the
concept of ‘security’ to issues of environmental and human security. At the fourth
Japan–Mekong conference the following issues were raised for ‘a future vision
for the region and establishes new pillars of Mekong–Japan cooperation’ which
‘will develop a “New Partnership for the Common Flourishing Future” between
the Mekong region countries and Japan and will contribute to the establishment
of ASEAN Community’. The shared experience is one of natural disasters and
vulnerability to flooding and earthquakes. The 2004 Asian Tsunami also projected
a shared experience by south east Asian/Indian Ocean coastal nations and Japan.
Japan is linking this to its overarching human security agenda within the OECDDAC. Thus:
We will endeavor to ensure human security for all people in the Mekong
region through their protection and empowerment. In order to achieve human
security and thereby sustainable development, it is necessary to promote low-
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The greening of geopolitics 205
carbon growth, to build a climate-resilient society, to achieve transition to
green economy and to preserve the natural conditions for the Mekong region.
Recognizing the importance of these efforts, we will enhance Mekong–Japan
cooperation on environment, climate changes, disaster risk reduction, public
health and food security and safety, and social protection. We strongly believe
that our cooperation in minimizing risks and harmonizing the economic,
social and environmental pillars lays a strong foundation for sustainable
growth in the region … We support efforts that will benefit all people in the
Mekong region and ensure human security. In this context, we established
specific goals for the Mekong region to achieve by 2015, which contribute
to achieve MDGs 4, 5 and 6 in the region. We will make an effort to achieve
these goals, recognizing that attaining universal health coverage is a key to
equitable society and sustainable development.
(MoFA 2012)
Chinese banks have vowed to offer strong credit support for the development
of a green economy amid China’s drive to promote ecological progress and to
curb regional pollution. At the same time, the Chinese government is now in
effect building a mechanism to provide positive incentives for green finance due
to its immense foreign currency reserves. Ten financial institutions are involved,
such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank,
Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China. This is also to enhance China’s
domestic credibility over green growth as this is an area of which South Korea
and Japan are particularly active in the aid market ‘gap’. By 2012, the Chinese
Construction Bank was estimated to have loaned about 239.6 billion yuan (about
US$39.04 billion) for clean energy, energy saving and other related environmental
friendly projects. Still, sceptics claim this is ‘token’ greenism and part of the
charm offensive by segregating off green development from business as usual
(BAU) development and actually provides an incentive for BAU to continue on
the basis that there is now an ‘insurance’ cushion of green growth which in China
is often regarded as ‘sustainable development’. Nevertheless, the term ‘green’
is clearly symbolic and gesturing towards China’s own ‘green revolution’ of the
1970s which brought about its rapid economic development.
The focus of National Agenda 21 was on restructuring the economy, promoting
technology advancement and improving energy efficiency, strengthening
education, training and public awareness on climate change, with a relatively low
level of economic development (China 2007). The White Paper on Foreign Aid
set out in 2011, stated that the Chinese government is now addressing climate
change in its mid- and long-term planning. As the GOC (2011) pointed out:
China was one of the first countries which have developed clean energy
sources such as biogas and small hydropower stations. Thus, it has advantages
in this regard when it comes to foreign aid. At the beginning of its foreign
aid efforts, China helped developing countries in Asia and Africa in utilizing
local water resources to build small- and medium-sized hydropower stations
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and projects of power transmission to meet the needs for electricity by local
people as well as by agricultural and industrial production. In the 1980s, by
working with relevant agencies of the United Nations, China imparted biogas
technologies to many developing countries. Meanwhile, China passed on
biogas technologies to Guyana and Uganda by way of bilateral aid. China’s
efforts achieved the expected results and helped the recipient countries reduce
their dependence on imported fuels.
China has steadily increased aid in coping with climate change. China has
expanded the scope of relevant aid to other countries. China has carried out
cooperation with Tunisia, Guinea, Vanuatu and Cuba in utilising biogas, has
assisted in the building of hydropower stations in Cameroon, Burundi and Guinea,
and has cooperated with Mongolia, Lebanon, Morocco and Papua New Guinea in
exploring solar energy and building wind-power stations (GOC 2011). In 2007,
China became the first developing country to formulate and implement a national
programme to address climate change. In 2009, China also put forward the goal
of action to reduce the per-unit GDP greenhouse gas emission in 2020 by 40–45
per cent. China has also adopted a range of major policy measures and targets to
mitigate and adapt to climate change during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–
2010) period. China is strengthening cooperation on science and technology, and
has implemented over 100 China–Africa joint scientific and technical research
demonstration projects. The Chinese government has aimed to bolster agricultural
cooperation and aid the construction of agricultural demonstration centres. China
has also offered support and assistance to small island states in the South Pacific,
the Caribbean and other regions.
China formulated and promulgated the Measures on the Operation and
Management of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects in 2005. China
also carries out capacity building to improve its capacity to promote CDM project
development, focusing on new energy and renewable energy, energy conservation
and the enhancement of energy efficiency, methane recycling and reutilisation and
other areas. A total of 1,560 Chinese projects have been registered with the United
Nations Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board. During the 12th FiveYear Plan period, China addressed global climate change as an important task in
its economic and social development, with scientific development being the key
theme in accelerating economic development (Cameron and Cloth 2012). China
maintains that specific arrangements should be made at the Durban conference
regarding developed countries’ emission reduction commitments, their support
to developing countries in funds, technological transfers and capacity building.
However there is still the issue of reporting mechanisms (Jihua and Forgach 2012;
Zadek 2013). China does not object to informal or small-scale consultations on
urgent issues outside the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol but as supplements
rather than substitutes for the negotiation process of the UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol (Watts 2011). Gong (2011) argued that those states outside the climate
change regime, along with the US and non-annex countries, are at an economic
advantage as they are not subject to international protocols or ‘green’ regulatory
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The greening of geopolitics 207
constraints. At the same time, not fulfilling these international norms or obligations
can mean a longer term undermining of soft power and issue-linkage credibility
(Clark 2005). Climate policy could become a catalyst for broader reform (Jotzo
and Zhang 2013). China has helped developing countries in Asia and Africa with
small and medium-sized hydropower stations and grid construction to provide
electricity for industrial, agricultural and household use. In the 1980s, China
cooperated with relevant United Nations agencies to introduce biogas technology
to developing countries. At the same time, China transferred biogas technology
bilaterally to Guyana, Uganda, and elsewhere which helped to reduce the recipient
countries’ dependence on imported fuel. More recently, due to the rising impact
of global climate change, China launched biogas technology cooperation with
Cuba, Guinea, Tunisia and Vanuatu, and built hydropower stations in Burundi,
Cameroon and Guinea. China has also become engaged in opening solar and wind
power cooperation with Lebanon, Mongolia, Morocco and Papua New Guinea.
Assessments
Domestic credibility for exported green growth rests on navigating both critics of
green growth from the right (a fetter and overregulation of business) and the left
(by breaking the trade-off idea between development and the environment, green
growth is a justification for more market commodification of nature and land grabs).
Green growth’s technicist and instrumental approach for critics, just continues the
paradigm of ‘growth at all costs’ by privatising ‘nature’ (natural capitalism) as
capitalism continues to create and search for new markets and outlets for a crisis
of global under consumption. The success of the GGGI therefore relies on an
international regime to increase its remit whilst at the same time remaining focused
on its original purpose. New middle powers have the advantage of the narratives
on South–South cooperation and ‘partnership’ models of win-win, and yet there
can also be strategic splits within these relationships and new forms of hierarchies
generated as a paradoxical result of this cooperation. Finally, maintaining
international political support will be an on-going task for the GGGI, with emphasis
on South–South cooperation. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were a
wake-up call, in that natural disasters and resource scarcities (‘water wars’) can do
as much damage as any military combat. In this sense security is now being tied to
issues of quantifying and living with ‘risk’, ‘robustness’ and resilience, providing
various mandates for innovation and insulation from external and unquantifiable
threats as states accept new security challenges which impact on their populations.
Asia and the Arctic
Climate change is paradoxically offering new opportunities for states in terms
of trade routes and resources. Arctic geopolitics impacts on a donor’s strategic
options and decisions regarding ODA distribution and type, and in terms of
future demand for resources from recipient countries. Shanghai recently overtook
Singapore as being the world’s number one maritime port. There is competition
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amongst many such Asian port authorities as world trade now pivots to the region.
Singapore and other traditional ports are rebranding themselves as offering new
services to different constituents of maritime trade. China is also building new
pipelines directly North and South through Thailand from Myanmar’s coastal
area which would bypass Singapore and the Straits of Malacca (Chen 2013;
The Economist 2011; New York Times 2011). Singapore’s form of port transit is
different from China’s ports which are used for exporting manufactured goods
and trade. Singapore, like China, also gained Arctic permanent observer status
in 2013, indicating a sense of increasing Asian state competition with regards
to alternative Northern shipping routes than the current Indian Ocean and South
China Sea channels. From the West, there is a fear of the new Asian scramble
for the Arctic which has also created various constructions of ‘polar orientalism’
claiming that the influence of Asian drivers will unsettle the ‘harmony’ of Arctic
cooperation and the environment. Singapore is now building and completing a set
of mass undersea storage spaces off the island, for storing the oil resources owned
by Asian drivers for guaranteed offshore supplies. Such storage holds could also
be used by Singapore for storage fees and leverage. Indeed, Arctic geopolitics is
altering traditional forms of leverage and power between the middle power states
and the emerging powers.
For instance, as a result of Norway giving the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese
‘dissident’ Lao Xiaoping, the Chinese government stopped importing Norwegian
food products and Norway’s salmon industry missed out on the Chinese market
(Lewis 2011). Beijing later recanted its approach because it needed Norway’s
vote on the permanent status election in the Arctic Council (Zakaria 2012). This
may also change the dynamic and geography of Asian interest in Africa and the
Indian Ocean routes, and open up new prospects for Singapore and other outpost
trade routes (Teo 2013). The Chinese have begun opening port routes in North
Korea (Rajin) which would allow easier access to the Northern routes (Demick
and Gionna 2010). Russian President Putin has pushed for the construction of
continental train routes linking North Korea with the Trans-Siberian railway but
this has led to concerns with how ‘climate change’ surveillance and monitoring
can be used for other monitoring policies (Shalalova and Brautlech 2013; Shin
2012). Such trading routes impact on the distinctions between maritime and
continental Asia, as well as the actual ‘boundaries’ of Asia.
Thus, the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’ is being supplemented by reports in
the Western media of ‘the new Asian scramble for the Arctic’ (The Economist
2013; Keskitalo 2007). A pre-emptive jostling of strategic position is occurring,
most explicitly and symbolically shown in 2007, when Russia unilaterally planted
a rust-resistant titanium flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, claiming Moscow’s
sovereignty and as a result, jump-started a round of legal and geopolitical claims
from other states. Indeed, so important is the potential of this north-eastern
area for many in Russia, at the time of the flag planting, there were even calls
for Russia to shift its capital and to pivot its centre of gravity from Moscow to
Vladivostok. The inter-state jostling is predicated on current disputes over how
to quantify and decide the actual definition of sovereignty and its extension with
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The greening of geopolitics 209
regards to the ‘depth’ and extension of these territorial claims. Thus, the depth and
angle of flag planting is increasingly controversial. For some commentators, the
Arctic scramble continues to reflect a regional geopolitical fear of a rising China
(Chen 2012; Jakobson 2012, 2013; Manicom et al. 2013). These relationships are
context specific but also affect further alliances and potential conflicts. ‘Outsider’
East Asian economies are now growing more dependent on access to maritime
space to sustain their economic development, leading to a scramble between East
Asian states and the ‘insider’ great powers in the Arctic. According to UNCLOS
Article 77, each country has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting natural resources within its established continental shelf. Exploring
and exploiting natural resources also includes the exclusive right to authorise and
regulate drilling on the continental shelf (UNCLOS Article 81). The continental
shelf is defined as the sea-bed and subsoil of submarine areas that extend beyond
a state’s territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin. A state’s continental shelf includes 12
miles of the territorial waters extending from its shoreline and can include the
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. A natural undersea land prolongation at 200 miles at the outer
continental shelf may also give a state another 150 miles. A recent Chatham
House report stated:
Many of the operational risks to Arctic economic development – particularly
oil and gas developments, and shipping – amplify one another … Given the
Arctic’s iconic status and sensitive environment, Arctic development is often
politically contentious, with sometimes opposing interests and perspectives
between local, national and international levels.
(Emmerson and Lahn 2012: 2)
India and China are claiming that they have scientific credibility on issues of
melting ice and water management, given their shared experiences in the Himalayas.
Singapore is concerned that its historic trade role could be blocked off if states begin
to use the Northern Sea route, as well as issues of agriculture food security and as
a low lying island, repeating a narrative that all states have direct vulnerabilities
(Emmerson 2013; Teo 2013). South Korean companies Samsung and Hyundai are
building dry-bulk carriers which are now navigating through the Arctic. Shipping
companies have also found a route that runs along the Russian coast from the island
archipelago of Novaya Zemlya in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. This is
reducing voyage time by almost 40 per cent in comparison to the routes which pass
through the Panama and Suez canals. Such access would also allow US–Asian allies
to avoid having to rely on their oil from ‘rogue’ states such as Iran and Venezuela.
Samsung and Hyundai are involved in dry-bulk shipping technology and icebreaking technology. This is currently being exported to Denmark and Norway.
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) have also been sending tankers, container ships and
other carriers into the region to market the products for potential buyers (Jakobson
2012). The new routes and issues surrounding this are affecting Asian responses to
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African recipients and reflect a number of ongoing territorial island disputes in the
Asian region. These disputes again re-emerged on the domestic political agendas
and regarding questions of national history and national identity during the run up
to the Arctic Council decisions. These geopolitical and geocultural relationships are
therefore potentially impacting on donor to donor competition and cooperation both
in and outside the region.
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Conclusion
Across many Asian states the trade-off between environmentalism and
development has been challenged. Whether green growth is a substantive
shift or a repackaging of developmentalism in crisis, or further deepening of
neoliberal globalisation, are issues discussed in this chapter. The chapter has
considered the green growth debate in the context of geopolitics and changing
perceptions of security and green ODA policy. Again issues raised include
whether cooperation is possible and green issues, whether new donors represent a
challenge to existing institutions and the strategic tensions with countries aiming
for development and recipient countries where green issues are often down
the agenda. The chapter considered and outlined recent green growth policies
from China, South Korea and Japan, discussing motivations and outcomes and
how these models are now being used in the foreign aid debate and using the
template from Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter linked to wider issues of the climate
change debate, tensions between the development and developing world and the
implications of the green ODA debate for these policies on recipient countries.
Middle incomes and emerging nations in East Asia are providing technology
and breaking through the debates and accusations of climate change between
the developed and developing world. Through this green growth is being used
by recipient models as a new paradigm that transcends the assumptions of what
development is and what it is for.
Notes
1 ‘MDG Target Seven’ www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ
A point raised by former South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister and South Korean
Ambassador to Malaysia (Lee, Jong-yoon), at an Ajou University GSIS sponsored
Symposium (22 November 2013), who identified the importance of maintaining public
attitudes in the linking of environmentalism to economic distribution. However, in
middle income countries such as South Korea there was still a widespread view that
environmentalism hurts the economy and puts big businesses in a weakened position.
In low income countries there is an argument that ‘greenism’ and green ethics can be
simultaneously built into a framework of growth given that there is low economic
growth to start with, allowing for a leapfrog challenge to the ‘growth first distribution
later’ or ‘growth first and environmental integrity later’ approaches of the original
Asian drivers.
2 GGGI Members include Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia,
Guyana, Indonesia, Kiribati, Mexico, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
South Korea, Philippines, Qatar, the UAE, the UK and Vietnam. The four non-state
The greening of geopolitics 211
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
representatives are GGGI Chair Lars Rassmussen, former PM of Denmark; Lord
Stern, UK; Kim Sang-hyup, Senior Secretary for Green Growth in Korea; and Montek
Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, India.
The Green New Deal has been crafted in line with such global trends, with its focus on
the following areas: 1) energy conservation, recycling and clean energy development
to build an energy-saving economy; 2) green transportation networks and clean
water supplies to upgrade the quality of life and environment; 3) carbon reductions
and stable supply of water resources to protect the earth and future generations; 4)
building of industrial and information infrastructures, and technology development
to use energy efficiently in preparation for the future.
The rivers in question are the Han, Geum, Nakdong and Yeongsan.
Comments made by former US Vice President Al Gore in a speech to invited students
and staff of Ajou University and local universities at the 2nd Green Purchasing
Conference, Suwon, South Korea, November 2009.
Comments made to author by Kang Seoung-soo, PCGG representative at Ajou
University, November 2010.
Comments made to delegates and author by the former South Korean Prime Minister
Han Seoung-soo at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Korean Political Science
Association, Sokcho, South Korea, 28 August 2008.
Editorials in major newspapers focused on the Fukushima disaster as a wake-up call
to move away from nuclear energy toward promoting reform in the electricity market
and green technologies, in ‘Building a Nation of Green Growth’ The Japan Times
8 June 2012 www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/06/08/editorials/building-a-nationof-green-growth/#.UeCnZs6wd00
‘Seoul to Halt Iranian Oil Imports by July’ The Korea Times 26 June 2012
‘White Paper China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change November
2011’ www.chinausfocus.com/library/government-resources/chinese-resources/
documents/white-paper-chinas-policies-and-actions-for-addressing-climate-changenovember-2011/
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6
From aid effectiveness to
public–private partnerships
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New agendas in Asian ODA
Introduction
In 2011, the Fourth High-level Talks on Aid Effectiveness were hosted by South
Korea at the port city of Busan. At the conference, a number of side-panel questions
raised, particularly by NGO representatives, were whether aid effectiveness was
to be seen as a part of an evolutionary aid trajectory, a supplementary to previous
aid policies, or a break with previous aid policies. For some delegates, aid
effectiveness was an indication of what a post-2015 MDG agenda might look like
(Fernandez 2013). More recently, terms such as ‘development effectiveness’ and
‘capacity building’ have become increasingly prominent. For sceptics, however,
aid or development effectiveness continues (and reinforces) an exclusionary and
hierarchical tradition of elite-led ‘neoliberal technocracy’.
After all, the Busan Conference was widely promoted as ‘high level’ which
was much to the consternation of many grassroots civil society movements.
Indeed, from the smaller non-government organisations (NGOs) there was a view
that civil society was being split into the ‘elite’ groups and those groups that were
being further excluded, the more the larger NGOs were being invited to their
‘seats at the table’. Nonetheless, the two most recent aid effectiveness high level
talks took place in Ghana (2008) and South Korea (2011), indicating a recognition
of the increasingly prevalent role of the emerging powers and global South as
particularly proactive in aid effectiveness agenda setting. This means a greater
focus on aid quality rather than on aid quantity. Indeed, in this respect, the term
aid ‘effectiveness’ is a misnomer or a linguistic ‘double bind’, for no state would
hardly wish to promote a policy of aid ‘ineffectiveness’.
At Busan there was a clear emphasis, from many delegates attending, on
encouraging country ownership of aid and better domestic as well as international
institutional alignment. This notion of ‘global cooperation’ seemed to fit into the
remit of the Aid 2 paradigm. Japan and South Korea, as members of the OECDDAC, have tended to follow DAC norms, and peer review suggestions, whilst
both countries have also promoted a more ‘non-Western’ approach to aid.
For South Korea this is crucial to its ‘bridge’ role, whilst as a more established
DAC member, Japan has paradoxically had more leeway to be able to develop
a more flexible and independent approach. In the post-2008 financial era of
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austerity (and with ongoing drops in tax revenue for state-led foreign aid),
attention has now turned to the possibility of keeping an aid regime going but
by restructuring aid provision through aid effectiveness as well as linking this
directly and indirectly to public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Ban 2013; OECD
2012a, 2012b). There has also been a growing interest in how donor countries
can, and to some respects now are, utilise the growth of financial remittances from
their country nationals living in the diasporas in developed and emerging-power
states, in order to provide extra sources of revenue in the recipient country (World
Bank 2011). The emerging-powers literature has assumed that there has been a
seismic shift in the international system with the rise of the BRICSs and yet there
is also a trend toward economic and geopolitical unevenness within and between
the emerging powers (Wassener 2013).
Thus, in this chapter I consider the role of Asian donor public–private
partnerships (PPPs) and the ‘aid for trade’ policies as tools for ODA and
development (Kim et al. 2011; World Bank 2007). All three leading Asian
donors are now involved in these public and private initiatives (Aoki 2013).
Indeed, many recipient countries are now seriously considering the ‘bypassing’
of the traditional routes to development (stages of growth and ‘big push’) and
instead preferring to utilise these partnerships and integration into global
networks of development, trade and technology. This approach has both its
detractors and its supporters in terms of the nature of this integration and
whether this integration accelerates long-term growth or short and longterm poverty. The use of smart phones and cell-phones is encouraging many
individuals living in once marginalised rural communities to begin to be able
to gain direct access to both the national and global markets. This has occurred
at the local market level, as technologies and satellite phones bypass uneven
national infrastructure and give local producers updated information on market
conditions and distribution information such as coordinating shipping and
‘pick ups’. This seems to be a revitalisation of Adam Smith’s ‘authentic’ ‘small
business’ classic liberalism in contrast to the top-down neoliberalism of the
Washington Consensus institutions.
This also implies that the ‘importing’ of developmental models from Asian
donors is an elite-led process and perhaps inappropriate for indigenous or homegrown development. From some delegates at the pre-G20 Bridge Convention held
in Seoul in 2010, there was often a use of the acronym ‘SWEDWA’ (Stuff We Don’t
Want). Yet donors such as South Korea now also recognise that the ‘first donor
phase’ of exporting a particular ‘top-down’ or high-level based ‘developmentalist
experience’ model to recipients, is not necessarily a ‘results-based’ guarantee,
despite its soft power promotion during the G20 and Busan Conventions.
Instead, there has been a growing interest in the exporting of more ‘grassroots’
rural development models (Park 2009; Tasie 2009). This issue has more recently
been tied to questions in South Korea, China and Japan, concerning ‘top-down’
sustainability and the importance of constructing ‘the creative economy’ through
more emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, this is
still very much early days and clearly a massive strategic and structural shift from
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Aid effectiveness 219
a successful economic model that many elites, due to their own interests, would
perhaps rather delay.
The link between establishing a ‘creative economy’ and PPPs is not
straightforward, as PPPs and even grassroots rural development programmes
can reinforce particular ‘top-down’ and authoritarian trajectories of development
(e.g. China and South Korea during the 1970s) and reinforce the previous
developmentalist state–business relationships. This chapter places these initiatives
within the context of the recent global financial crisis and aid effectiveness
debates, a time of increasing economic uncertainty. In those Asian donors that
are democracies, this can directly or indirectly impact on positive or negative
attitudes toward ODA provision and therefore aid policy. In this respect, there
can often be gaps between what voters demand of governments and what
governments feel they need to do for the international credibility of the state and
its particular geopolitical role. Often this can result in a myriad of ‘nationalistic
narratives’ from both governments and wider public opinion. However, at the
same time (and as a result of this economic uncertainty) Asian donor governments
are also increasingly aware of other problematic and domestic structural issues
such as long-term fiscal issues and emerging demographic deficit shifts in their
countries. These concerns in turn have recently led both the South Korean and
Japanese governments to introduce a set of ‘multicultural’ policies in order to
attract migrants and increase the population growth pool. These policies are now
beginning to impact on, and open up, issues of national identity and a country’s
own official and unofficial self-reflection of its ‘place in the world’. This
tentative social transformation potentially impacts on donor state perceptions
of ‘the foreigner’ as well as attitudes toward ODA and the criteria for assessing
government and societal international responsibility.
Sustainability of the Asian drivers
The US Federal Reserve has been particularly busy buying up government
bonds over the last few years, in order to keep US interest rates low with the
hope of stimulating investment and consumer borrowing in the US economy
through what has become known as ‘quantitative easing’. One concern,
however, is that these lower interest rates have not stimulated investment due to
a lack of confidence from investors and the unwillingness of the banks to loan
credit as a result of ‘risk’ assessments. Whilst the chopping up of financial risk
was originally regarded as an innovation for generating a security hedge for
individual firms, the splitting up of risk has also subsequently led to difficulties
in being able to locate the origin (and therefore the ‘magic bullet’ solutions) of
sectoral or local crises which can quickly become global and contagious. One
emerging question is whether ‘natural’ market signals (or ‘animal spirits’) will
be able to outstrip that other basic human instinct of ‘risk aversion’. Since 2008,
there has been a growing realisation that there had been too much financial
diversification and ‘risk packaging’ or ‘hedging’, which, as Ferguson (2008)
pointed out, was one of the principle dynamics of the rapid growth of capital
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220 Aid effectiveness
markets which were able to spread their risk and therefore lower the costs of
borrowing for investors.
As Breslin (2011) noted, the ability of East Asia to withstand the current
crisis, for some, has tended to imply not only that this is a ‘Western problem’
but that the Asian region is now (and can continue to be) in effect decoupled
from the insecurities of neoliberal globalisation and, therefore, has been able to
create its own capitalist model bulwark against unfettered and irrational Western
markets. At the same time, whilst as a region Asia has clearly managed the crisis,
one question currently raised is whether the resources that have been used to
successfully withstand the shock (and with memories of the 1997 crisis in the
minds of a generation of Asian political leaders with a determination of ‘never
again’, IMF 1998) now mean that long-term resilience and robustness may have
been exhausted.
More generally, there have been the Keynesian and neoliberal responses and both
schools fervently disagreed on how to generate sustained economic development
either through the institutions of the state (Keynes’ multiplier and demand side
pump priming) or through the free enterprise market (supply side economics)
(Skidelsky 2011). Skidelsky (2013) recently wrote in the South Korean press
about what he termed the ‘fallacies’ of the neoliberal argument. Firstly, Skidelsky
questioned the neoliberal point that the crisis had been brought about by too much
credit and too much wilful exuberance. As a response the neoliberals have called
for more ‘tightening’ and ‘proper’ housekeeping. However, if all investors and
consumers stop spending beyond their means (at the same time) then a rational
individual decision can lead to an irrational outcome for the economic system
which is now run on low demand which further reduces profits and economic
growth and then lowers demand.
This is what Keynes had termed the ‘paradox of thrift’. Secondly, there is
the neoliberal argument that the government cannot spend money that it does
not have. However governments can sell bonds and even if this means that
governments may have to pay back loans at higher interest rates, governments
can avoid this by just printing money. However this is politically problematic, and
a policy that might generate future inflationary concerns and thus further decrease
investor confidence. However, at the same time, a modicum of controlled inflation
reduces the value of the debt burden. Thirdly, a neoliberal view is that any issued
bonds and government borrowing will eventually have to be paid back by future
hikes in taxation. This means that people will save even more in the present in
case of any future taxation. But Skidelsky notes, from a purely economic position,
that usually governments do not have to pay back their entire debt all at once, and
can have ‘roll on’ capabilities. However, these capabilities are offset by issues of
‘soft power’ credibility and ‘credit ratings’ which impact on investor confidence.
Indeed, low interest rates have not inspired more borrowing for investment or a
willingness for creditors to take risks, but have merely been used for rescheduling
debt servicing (The Economist 2009).
The concern from neoliberals is with the high debt to GDP ratio (debt overhang).
This makes any future government and private borrowing more costly as well as
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Aid effectiveness 221
creating a ‘tipping point’ debt/GDP ratio which can crowd out investor confidence
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2010). In this sense, the so-called austerity politics used
to reduce the debt ratio through cutting public spending (and simultaneously
balancing the budget through selective tax increases – the fiscal cliff) is regarded
by neoliberals as the most effective response to the current crisis. At the same
time, and as a result of the dynamics of long-term government debt, many donors
and development agencies are now considering using the private sector to deliver
results-based aid projects. The role of the emerging powers, particularly the
emphasis on loans and responsibility, might be proactively shifting the agenda on
the role of the market and private sector away from ‘Western’ state-led Keynesian
inspired ODA (as in the original institutions of ODA at Bretton Woods and the
neoliberal versions) to alternative South–South versions of globalisation (Seoul
2010). These structural issues are increasingly apparent in the developmentalist
Asian donor states. In the donor states such as South Korea there is much debate
concerning how the larger companies are now outsourcing investments by ‘going
global’ but also with increasing state help for business interests. These practices
are based on ‘national pride’ which means that these businesses are ‘decoupling’
from the domestic economy which now suffers from the so-called ‘jobless
growth’ and which has witnessed a group of middle class constituents known
as the ‘housepoor’ (Kwon 2012). This group have ownership of assets due to
investments in the early 2000s but now have increasing debt burdens and falling
asset prices, leaving a gap in domestic demand due to the higher relative savings
from this group (Ahn 2013). This scenario is a perhaps unintended result of the
lower interest rates which were meant to be stimulating the economy by reducing
the cost of borrowing.
However, economic theory can underestimate wider cultural and social
psychological issues, particularly for those groups having recently raised their
expectations and their living standards in the middle income emerging powers.
According to Birdsall (2013), the new geography of aid of the future will occur
where most people ‘will live below the line that divides the materially secure
middle from the insecure’ where the ‘insecure are neither materially secure but
neither do the group live in extreme poverty’.
Changing demographics in the Asian drivers
Along with a myriad of economic and financial concerns, there remain perhaps
even more fundamental challenges for the sustainability of the Asian drivers.
This feeds, positively and negatively, into the changing domestic attitudes toward
national identity and towards perceptions of ‘the foreigner’ or the recipients of
aid. At the recent 2013 Third Plenary in China, the 30-year ‘one-child policy’ was
relaxed by the elite, but subsequently generated some concerns with the longterm benefits of this shift, given the increasing costs of child raising (particularly
amongst the new urban middle classes) as well as the issue of low fertility rates
and a relatively small female population. However, a further sceptical view has
been that this policy is merely to encourage greater numbers of children to be
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222 Aid effectiveness
born in rural areas so as to continue to provide a cheap pool of labour for the
continuation of the current development model. Moreover, an ageing generation
of Chinese males without spouses has now created a swathe of ‘dating agencies’
and a growing interest in marriages, particularly between Chinese men and
women from other regions of Asia. This, in itself, is breaking down a number of
cultural and ethnic stereotypes and definitions of what it means to be Chinese.
Similarly, with lowering birth rates in South Korea and Japan, demographic
changes are being ‘managed’ through a variety of ‘multicultural policies’ and
with increasing numbers of so-called ‘mixed race’ children. Such demographics
are also beginning to impact on the wider questions of national identity by
breaking down the myriad of ethnic and cultural assumptions which are officially
thought to have been at the forefront of why the Asian drivers have become so
economically successful.
Whilst South Korea and Japan share the problem of slowing birth rates and
ageing populations, Japan’s much higher social welfare spending is also creating a
growing fiscal crisis of the state, as a decline in younger workers means that future
tax revenues will decline. South Korea, on the other hand, has always lacked
such high level welfare spending. This has encouraged more savings but with a
more progressive approach to questions of immigration and multiculturalism. As
a result, the emerging Next-11 countries in the Asian region such as Indonesia
and the Philippines have an alternative trend of shared ‘demographic dividends’
(young and increasingly educated population) which have more in common with
many ODA recipient countries, particularly in Africa. This new ‘pool’ of labour,
therefore, is of a different generational form than the previous ‘low cost’ and ‘low
skilled’ labour pools from the 1970s and 1980s Asian developmentalist models,
particularly with regard to access to new cheaper technologies and social media
educational forms. Clearly, this process should not be over-exaggerated given the
enduring problems of poverty and deprivation in rural and urban areas. But on
the other hand, certain demographic and economic patterns do suggest that there
are distinctions now within and between emerging powers. These distinctions
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ emerging powers cannot be rendered as reflecting some
abstract concept of ‘diversity’ but, instead, reflects a more dynamic patterns of
state relationships and varying distributions of economic, political, cultural and
demographic power.
Changing national identity and public opinion
There are now pragmatic calls from many groups in the leading Asian donor
countries to push for a more open approach to migration. In those countries
which have based (or justified) their rapid development on strong beliefs in
ethnic homogeneity, this process undoubtedly brings in issues regarding the
role of ‘foreigners’, the impact of remittances on donor–recipient relationships,
questions of legality and human rights as well as ‘cultural diversity’ challenges.
Although many top-down multicultural policies often still tend to reinforce
varying aspects of economic, political and cultural segregations and stereotyping
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Aid effectiveness 223
(on the basis of celebrating difference), nonetheless, this is still early days. The
increasing numbers of ‘foreigners’ or ‘others’ in the Asian states changes not
only the relationship (and what is believed to count as) ‘foreign’ but also the
(hierarchical) cultural relationships between Asian countries. Some writers have
debated whether multicultural ideas and democratic values are intrinsic to Asian
culture or not. That is, how can Asian states deal with the contemporary struggles
for individual rights, as well as group and multiethnic rights (Kymlicka and He
2005)? In this respect, ODA becomes a way for a state to not only promote its own
national success but also redefine its national identity and package its ODA based
on ‘cultural diversity’ and a promotion of an understanding of ‘diversity’ along
with other recipient cultures.
During times of economic uncertainty there is always the issue of ‘feelings’
about economic (in)security and the ‘perception’ of the threat to jobs coming
from migrants and foreigners, often from aid recipient countries. Around the
world, this can often lead to strongly nationalistic and xenophobic reactions. If
multiculturalism is tied to an official narrative of elitist and technocratic neoliberal
hegemony, how can it be wrestled away and reconstructed so that it is tied to a
richer form of grassroots democratic representation on issues of labour rights,
citizenship rights, employment contracts and pensions? Milner and Tingley
(2013) argued that the issue of donor state public opinion and foreign aid support
is usually derived from experience of the donor’s own welfare support network.
This is also the issue of having enough taxpayer revenue as well as a certain ‘bar’
of public spending domestically.
In their recent study of Uganda, Milner and Tingley (2013) noted that ODA
allows groups in the recipient country to bypass the dangers of clientalism
and nepotism, particularly if foreign aid goes through the national institutions
rather than to project-based development initiatives, as is often the case with
Asian donor aid. They argued that it is not just the quantity of aid that is an
issue for donor state public opinion, but it is also the type of aid (bilateral or
multilateral) and in what particular sector (MoFA 2012). As a result, domestic
donor support for ODA is generally based on whether foreign aid has been
successful in the past. There are also the wider linked questions of national
identity and multiculturalism, to questions of national diaspora within the donor
and recipient country. These are questions of ‘shared empathy’ which can be
either reinforced or challenged if there is a diaspora of recipient country groups
living in the donor country. Domestic support for aid is also determined by a
recipient country’s regional proximity. As critical IR perspectives point out, this
can reinforce the hierarchies of ‘otherness’ to distinguish self from these other
cultures. However, an exaggerated ‘foreign-ness’ or being ‘so different’ can also
imply a willingness by donors to provide more aid as the recipient country is
not a direct threat insofar as there are minimum historical relationships between
donor and recipient. Thus the notion of ‘shared experience’ does not necessarily
lead to equal ‘partners’ or solidarity but can generate alternative hierarchical
practices of ‘othering’. For many Asian donors, bilateral aid is preferred as there
is a subliminal sense that ‘common experience’ allows for more effective use of
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224 Aid effectiveness
aid, but this does not necessarily avoid the practices of self and othering (Court
and Narasimhan 2010).
For instance, according to the OECD (2003) review of Japanese public opinion
on Japan’s ODA, public focus has often been on linking aid to wider issues of
trade, war and humanitarian aid, with television images providing 89.6 per cent of
public information on ODA. In this respect, media images can reinforce patterns
and representations of ‘othering’ or between the deserving or the undeserving
‘other’. Between 1998 and 2002, MFA spent 435–791 million yen on development
education in order to create more domestic support for Japan’s ODA. The view is
that by promoting the public’s active participation in ODA affairs such as global
citizenship classes, this can strengthen the level of institutional collaboration
by local governments and district associations for international exchange (JICA
2009; Thernstrom 2005; Uchida 2009).
Returning shared experience
Domestic support for foreign aid also comes from those who have worked
in the recipient country. This is reflected in the way donor countries aim to
‘educate’ citizens over foreign aid. In Asia this is an issue of the educational
system structure as well as new issues regarding multiculturalism. South
Korean NGO and KOICA volunteers returning to South Korea often find it
difficult to repatriate and to get back on the South Korean job market. Much
of this problem can be traced back to South Korea’s top-down structure of
highly formalised education and a career structure which makes it a risk for
students to leave the system, even if working abroad clearly gives the student
a more self-reliant and rounded education. At KOICA headquarters in Gyonggi
province there is just one member of staff to help with such repatriation and job
searching, whilst it is estimated that the unemployment rate among returnees
is 66 per cent. Critics have suggested that to address this situation, a more
fundamental shift in South Korean higher education is required. To address
the above concerns, citizenship education is being encouraged through the
institutional ‘lifeworld’ of the school environment. According to Huddleston
and Kerr (2006), teaching global citizenship can be done through partnership
with parents and the school becomes heavily tied to the actions and the needs
of the local community. Global citizenship can be effectively promoted through
inclusive meetings and making sure all participants are effectively part of the
decision making process.
‘Schools of Global Citizenship’ have been set up for young South Korean
people to learn and to share their own lives. The NGO World Vision Korea also
visit schools with a ‘School of Global Citizenship for Youth’ programme. KOICA
is increasingly aware of the need to create an integrated strategy of providing
ODA in the context of local cultures and societies in both donor and recipient
countries. As Japanese and South Korean government officials have argued, the
public still wants to see immediate results and to know exactly what value they
are getting for their money. NGOs are becoming concerned that a narrative of
Aid effectiveness 225
foreign aid also implies that helping people overseas will mean they will stop
coming as economic migrants to the Asian drivers.
The context of public and private partnerships (PPPs)
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In a recent speech Pascal Lamy (2013), Director of the WTO, highlighted the
increasing opportunities that technology is providing for restarting global markets
through more effective use of logistics, information and communications:
Ethiopian farmers can settle contracts with their phones and be credited on
their bank accounts the next morning. Mobile money has exploded across
East Africa. Bangladesh is getting into business process outsourcing. Kenya
is now the world’s number one user of mobile banking. IT systems have
customs clearance times down to less than 10 minutes on some borders in
Central America. And other examples of where Aid for Trade was the spark
that lit the tinder … we still live in a world though where least developed
countries (LDCs) account for just over 1 per cent of this pie and 1.1 billion
live in absolute poverty. But this is a world in which those in absolute poverty
as a share of the total population in developing countries fell from 43 per cent
to 21 per cent between 1990 and 2010. A reduction of almost 1 billion people.
And at a time that trade barriers came down and WTO rules provided added
certainty. A coincidence? Not to my mind. With the post-2015 development
agenda starting to take shape, I believe that we can do more to ensure trade
plays a positive role in development.
The internet’s contribution to the African economies is currently only about
1 per cent of GDP compared with 3 per cent in developing nations, but the new
technology can help unlock opportunities. Mobile phone penetration is highest
in Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, with Ethiopia lowest at 24 per cent of the
population. However, many governments recognise the ‘leapfrog’ opportunities of
technology including areas of retail penetration, messaging for improved delivery
and pick-ups and exploiting a pent up demand from Africa’s increasing middle
class. New technologies can also bypass the educational bottlenecks and reliance
on outdated textbooks from donors. This issue would impact on donors such as
South Korea and Japan in their export to recipients of their own school curriculum
textbooks. Moreover, through satellite handsets, farmers would be better served
with up-to-date weather reports for improved crop selection and transport
productivity (rather than waiting for expensive aid infrastructure) (Manyika et
al. 2013). Kenya and Senegal are addressed as ‘leaders’ with followers such
as South Africa, Morocco, and emerging states such as Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire. This technological
connection has slightly different connotations to the ‘integration’ approaches of
globalisation. In this respect there seems to be more individual empowerment
involvement which potentially circumvents the wider debates on development,
aid and the legacy of the SAPs and impact of neoliberal globalisation.
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226 Aid effectiveness
The World Bank has now begun to focus on the role of the private sector in
development partnerships, publishing its ‘Doing Business Reports’ (DBRs). The
Bank has argued that ‘Just as good rules are needed to allow traffic to flow in a
city, they are also essential to allow business transactions to flow. Good business
regulations enable the private sector to thrive and businesses to expand their
transactions network. But regulations put in place to safeguard economic activity
and business operations, if poorly designed, can be obstacles to doing business’
(DBR 2013: 16). The UNDP (2004) has also identified the importance of the
private sector in aid projects, thus initiating competition between donors as to
which state has the most effective form of delivery and public–private partnership
models. Whilst as yet there is no broad consensus on a model of PPP, there is
an emphasis on promoting shared objectives and experience delivery, based not
totally on public procurements or the privatisation of utilities. This is through
making the recipient country more competitive in terms of its infrastructure, and
ability to cushion for risk transfers and risk taking. The term ‘partnerships’ is,
however, assumed to imply an equal relationship, one that is active or passive, but
one that can also build trust and insurance for more risk-sharing. Ban Ki-moon
(2008) stated in the context of the road to MDG 2015 completion that:
Frankly, I am worried that we are going to miss this historic opportunity to
reach the Goals. The very grave fact is that many countries are not on track …
Poverty is something that no one should endure. Markets can flourish only in
societies that are healthy. And societies need healthy markets to flourish. That
is why we have to boost our private-public alliance … We are talking about
the United Nations and business communities and private non-governmental
organizations, civil society, these are three important pillars. Now I am
meeting you as one of those three pillars. That is why we have to boost our
private-public alliance.
(Ban 2008)
The UNDP (2010, 2012) has regarded PPPs as a form of brokering, and
collaboration by encouraging partners who can bring multiple skills to dealing
with and solving the main development questions. PPPs were first introduced in
the UK by New Labour in the 1990s. This approach rejected the state-socialism
of old Labour but also rejected the market ethos of the new right ‘Thatcherites’
(Driver and Martell 2000). According to Jacob Hacker (2013), where the market
had failed the state was typically assumed to be able to in effect ‘clean up’.
This so-called ‘Third Way’, therefore, was part of a wider global project of the
1990s based on the UN’s Global Compact and ‘globalisation with a human face’
(UN 2000a, 2000b). This continued Kofi Annan’s (1999) own concerns with
globalisation at the turn of the millennium:
National markets are held together by shared values. In the face of economic
transition and insecurity, people know that if the worst comes to the worst,
they can rely on the expectation that certain minimum standards will prevail.
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Aid effectiveness 227
But in the global market, people do not yet have that confidence. Until they
do have it, the global economy will be fragile and vulnerable – vulnerable
to backlash from all the ‘isms’ of our post-Cold War world: protectionism;
populism; nationalism; ethnic chauvinism; fanaticism; and terrorism …
Let us remember that the global markets and multilateral trading system
we have today did not come about by accident. They are the result of
enlightened policy choices made by governments since 1945. If we want
to maintain them in the new century, all of us – governments, corporations,
non-governmental organizations, international organizations – have to make
the right choices now.
As state funds begin to dry up in the age of austerity and donor country debt,
there is an argument to say that foreign aid can and should be placed more
at the door of private businesses and left to the free market rather than to aid
bureaucracies. Ban Ki-moon (2013) also called for more multi-stakeholding and
Hubbard’s point was that:
No lesser masters of the market than Bill Gates and Warren Buffett have
declared that the market has failed poor countries … So rather than investing
in the continent’s businesses and ventures, these billionaires fund NGOs and
government projects for health, education, and technology … But … you’ll
realize that many African economies have never had a business market to fail
… In essence, the market never failed because it never really existed.
(Hubbard 2009)
Thus, in this argument, a thriving business sector must come before the
physical and social infrastructure. In fact, the Marshall Plan (the leitmotif of stateled aid) only worked because it provided grants and made loans to European
businesses (via the government) first, and then paid money back into a national
pot to fund the infrastructure (although there was already a basic infrastructure in
place). In the recent ADB evaluations (ADB 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012) emphasis
has been placed on promoting different contractual relationships between public
sector and private sector entities. For Birdsall (2013) the emerging powers are
now providing increasing levels of finance to the regional development banks in
order to achieve cheaper loans and to reduce borrowing costs for both donor and
recipient in the future.
Defining PPPs
Generally, a PPP agreement is defined as a long-term contractual relationship
between a public body and a private partner (or a consortium of private firms)
for the construction and operation of infrastructure. The private partner will be
in charge of building, managing and asset maintenance, service provision and
financing the investment, in exchange for regular payment by the government
and/or user charges. Distinctions have been made between Build Transfer Operate
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228 Aid effectiveness
(BTO) projects (construction by a private consortium, with private ownership
transferred to the government and then operated by the private sector) and BTL
(Build Transfer Lease) projects with construction by the private sector, with
public ownership by the government and then future leases by the government
back to the private sector. For Hawkesworth (2011) PPPs are the provision by
the private sector of a public service through a contract that can backload the
cash flow payment for the government arising from the provision of the service.
This is promoted as a sharing of risk between the public and private sectors. As
Hawkesworth (2011) noted, the percentages of infrastructure projects which now
count as PPPs among the OECD countries range from 0 to 5 per cent (Austria,
Germany, Canada, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Holland, Hungary, Norway,
Spain), from 5 to 10 per cent (UK, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, Italy,
South Africa, Ireland), from 10 to 15 per cent (South Korea) and from 20 per cent
(Mexico, Chile). In this sense it seems to be the emerging nations that seem to be
picking up the PPP approach.
A recent World Bank Development Report (World Bank 2007) argued that
PPPs have the potential to create jobs, and encourage entrepreneurship and
innovative capacity. Often the public sector is regarded as the primary provider of
infrastructure service and contents but the private sector then operates at agreed
costs with the government through a process of competitive bidding. This is seen
as a low risk option in difficult financial times for expanding the private sector
in helping the public sector for short-term and quick delivery projects. But the
government might also have its corporate favourites and connections, particularly
in developmentalist states. Contracts mean that the daily management issues also
go to a contractor who is paid for their labour and other costs. Lease contracts
occur when the private sector collects a revenue from the public sector but then
pays the contracting public authority an affirmage fee.
For instance, Cheng and Wang (2009) defined Chinese PPPs as ‘an
arrangement whereby private parties participate in or provide support for the
provision of infrastructure. A PPP project results from a contract between
government and a private entity to deliver public infrastructure based services’.
The Chinese have mostly preferred the BTO system. The first wave of PPPs
had ended by the 1990s as there was a view that the central government had
lost control of the local PPPs, and that local political power bases particularly
in the interior, were becoming seen as a challenge to the central government in
Beijing. However, often local government is used by the central government
as a scapegoat to dispel any criticism of Beijing policy leading to difficulties
in transparency and identifying the ‘chain of command’. This is a concern for
many Chinese aid recipients. A number of laws then ensued during the late 1990s
including the 2004 Method of Managing Urban Public Utility concessions and
the 2004 Decision on Reforming Investment Solutions. This followed the 1995
regulation of BTO by the Ministry of Foreign Aid and Economic Cooperation
concerning the amount of foreign exchange and foreign investment that could
be used in BTO projects. In 1999 a Tendering and Bidding Law allowed the
Chinese private sector to invest in areas where previously ‘foreigners only’ had
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Aid effectiveness 229
been allowed to invest. Indeed in Asian economies and societies the state-led
policy of ‘foreign only’ zones is promoted as a ‘respect for diversity’ but can
often have the unintended consequence of inverted racism/stereotyping and thus
lead to cultural segregations and hierarchies, justified on the basis of soft power
‘gifts’, ‘paternalism’ and ‘hospitality’.
There is, nevertheless, a concern that PPPs can help abrogate donor and recipient
state responsibility as issues become further depoliticised under the mantra of
‘diversity’ and technocratic pragmatism. The underlying reason for PPP growth in
the Chinese road sector is rising ownership of cars among the new middle class.
Therefore, to satisfy increasing demands and expectations, PPPs are seen as a
solution for alleviating the fiscal pressures of debt on the public sector and for
speeding up the infrastructure recovery process (Yoo 2010). This is also an issue
of the domestic credibility of donors as they sell their development experience or
development expertise overseas. However, without enforced legal safeguards for
PPPs, there are concerns that public authorities and private contractors engage
in speedy contracting which excludes the tax-paying and service-using public.
Making legislation allowing for consistency and an independent judiciary is an
important step to transparency, as well as promoting various practical measures to
curb strategic behaviour in the field of tendering (selecting the right contractors),
construction, operation and maintenance (effective quality supervision). For
some, introducing PPPs does not necessarily have depoliticising effects but, on the
contrary, can indirectly or directly pressurise governments to be more accountable
for a successful project. The Chinese view is that with the creation of top-down
formal rules, trust between the public and private sectors is eventually bound to
grow stronger (Liu and Yamamoto 2009).
Domestic donor credibility
Domestic credibility is key to legitimising a ‘shared experience’ with recipient
countries. South Korea’s approach to PPPs is more in the context of the Global
Compact (UN 2012; UNDP 2012). The (PPP) model can be more fundamentally
linked to a debate in South Korea between the political parties on the necessity
to improve small to medium business roles through economic democratisation
(Lee 2013). Economic democratisation is in theory centred on helping small and
medium enterprises while at the same time efforts are being made to curb the
economic monopoly exercised by the major businesses. There is a concern that
the South Korean developmentalist model itself is under pressure, and interest
as to whether the focus on small- and medium-sized business (SMEs) is the
beginning of a new development paradigm in South Korea or is another instrument
of the elite-led and paternalistic developmentalist state, which has unleashed
further contradictions of contraction, low consumption, negative interest rates
as well as low business investment and high saving ratios, particularly in the
Asian economies. Capital is now searching for new non-risk outlets backed by
government assistance. In South Korea, these contradictions are manifested
in the continuation of the export model and a tightening regulation on inward
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230 Aid effectiveness
capital flows for fear of an appreciating Korean won. This has led to inflationary
concerns through high price imports but with the need for maintaining low
interest rates to stop capital and hot money flows. Again what is at stake here for
its ODA concerns the credibility of the South Korean development model and
there are also concerns about the impact of business on ODA provision.
Firstly, business has narrow corporate interests and is using these partnerships
merely to promote a superficial corporate social responsibility. Secondly, the
size of the business means that in the South Korean case, specifically, it is not
the ‘free market’ but chaebol businesses which may counter-productively crowd
out local business within South Korea and in the recipient country. However,
there is an argument to suggest that if businesses are involved then recipient
countries have more trust in the vast resources of the established corporations.
The question is whether the partnerships are packaged and ‘exported’ as a
model and then have ‘add-ons’ as part of the model evolution, or whether the
partnership model can be cultivated at the local level as an ongoing process with
a built-in flexibility from the very start. This is also the issue of ‘local content’
and who sets the criteria on this and why. Thirdly, businesses are responsible
to their shareholders rather than the local population. However this argument
ignores the fact that shareholders can also be stakeholders and voluntary
donors to NGOs. Many larger NGOs are often shareholders in big companies to
enforce and make sure companies adhere to the Global Compact and other such
responsible initiatives.
For instance, in May 2007, SKT was the first among Korea’s Big 4 (Samsung,
Hyundai, LG, SK) to join UN Global Compact. SKT’s progress is evaluated
by the Corporate Citizen Committee. In 2009, SKT planned on establishing a
supporting committee as well as organising four committee meetings instead
of the semiannual meetings of previous years, thereby raising the level of
sustainable management. Samsung-Tesco-Homeplus also joined the Global
Compact in 2009. KOICA teamed up with Asiana Airlines to help provide funds
for buying textbooks to send to Cambodia. However if the local community is
involved there are a number of problems here such as the quality and age level
of textbooks to fit in with the country’s educational culture. For the state this
makes foreign aid easier to sell to a taxpaying public back home at a time of
economic austerity. PPPs were first introduced in the First Enactment of 1994
which was entitled ‘The Private Capital Inducement Promotion Act’ with an
amendment in 2005 as the ‘Act on Public–Private Partnerships in Infrastructure
Diversification’. Distinctions are made between Build Transfer Operate (BTO)
projects or construction by a private consortium, with ownership transferred to
the government and then operated by the private sector; or BTL (Build Transfer
Lease) with construction by the private sector, ownership by the government and
then future lease by government. In South Korea, BTO in December 2009 was
counted at $44.8 billion and BTL was recorded at $16.8 billion. The benefits for
the public are assumed to be smooth supply and product quality and efficiency.
For the private sector, there is the added inducement of a long-term relationship
with government (but dangers of patronage), and the government can save time
Aid effectiveness 231
and focus on other issues that the public are concerned with, therefore increasing
democratic accountability.
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Critics of the top-down model
Critics suggest that Chinese and South Korean PPPs are merely a continuity of
state and big business dominance. Moreover, many of the contracts are based
on ‘bundling’ and on a previous experience of good relations which can lead to
greater accountability and trust with no need for the lengthy tendering or contracts
but can also lead to patronage. Other concerns are as follows. Firstly, business by
definition has narrow corporate interests and is using these partnerships merely
to promote a superficial corporate social responsibility. Secondly, the size of the
business may counter-productively crowd-out local business within the donor and
recipient countries. However, there is an argument to suggest that if businesses
are to be involved then recipient countries have more trust in the resources of the
established corporations. The question is whether the partnerships are packaged
and ‘exported’ as a model and then have ‘add ons’ as part of the model evolution,
or whether the partnership model can be cultivated at the local level as an ongoing
process with a built-in flexibility from the very start. Thirdly, businesses are
responsible to their shareholders rather than the local population. However this
argument ignores the fact that shareholders can also be stakeholders and voluntary
donors to NGOs. This is not an either/or case and indeed, many larger NGOs
are often shareholders in big companies to enforce and make sure companies
adhere to the Global Compact and other such responsible initiatives. One recent
proposal from the top-down partnership advocates has been for the channelling of
public ODA grants into the social safety sector, which means local and national
government is also relieved from imposing higher taxation on the private business
sector to provide welfare.
PPPs and NGOs
One area has been in the way that NGOs need strategically (in their activity with
states and funders, as well as their workers and general public) to develop an
enhanced global moral compass aware of the tensions between universalism
and particularism, to improve the techniques of NGO advocacy and as service
providers, i.e. to make projects easily replicated, to rethink their ‘magic bullet
causality-politics at the table and on the ground, to be aware of the dangers of
too much information as compassion fatigue’ (Ebrahim 2005; Rugendyke 2007).
Organisationally a new focus has been on developing routines and norms of better
feedback through a need for the devolution of power as there might be a separation
from the board of directors, trustees and funders, and ‘those on the ground’. There
is also the need to accept a lack of predictability from community responses and a
constant reflection that NGO activity might be doing more harm than good. More
emphasis should be put on issues of local community participation through the
appropriate use of knowledge, how it is gathered and put together by reassessing
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232 Aid effectiveness
the criteria that are used, and how problems are actually framed in the first place.
Moreover, there is a case to be made that NGOs require vigilance on the use of
information within an NGO which allows managers to alter strategy based on firstly
informing employees and executives of current developments, and understanding
the processes that create the most effective means of communication. There are
not only technical issues of organisation, funding and use of information but
the need for rethinking the cultural assumptions of the aid debate, redefining
development and understanding the relationship between the cause/effect. That
is, the issue of how problems are actually culturally framed in the first place by
and through the narratives and assumptions that NGO managers and staff use
when facing a specific issue.
This is clearly an area for future research but links to the overarching
parameters of the aid debate discussed above. Interest focuses upon the role of
narratives, language and discourse in framing global issues. Ebrahim (2005) puts
emphasis on the impact of NGOs as knowledge makers, knowledge providers
and the way NGOs use knowledge. Distinctions are made for instance between
technical knowledge and ‘everyday’ shared stock of knowledge and practices
of knowledge, the role of shared assumptions and how these assumptions
evolve and change. Each NGO and funder, as Ebrahim (2005) argued, has its
own practices of communication, its routines of capital exchange, its routines
of resistance and antagonism. Indeed these concerns were recently addressed
at the United Nations 2009 World Civic Forum in Seoul. This included a
strategic debate on the role of NGOs in unifying through networking, by going
beyond technical and pragmatic responses and moving to the area of culture
and ethics whilst connecting these issues to substantive economic and political
marginalisation and exclusion.
Donor state NGOs and toward the post-2015 era
There are concerns that after 2015, as the deadline of the MDGs, smaller NGOs
such as Global Civic Sharing will struggle to attract this funding and that donations
will be transferred to the larger ‘corporate’ brand NGOs. This is because NGOs
are concerned with KOICA’s reaction to this and smaller NGOs might even
become financially stranded with KOICA’s emphasis on ‘corporate NGOs’ and
results-based effectiveness. Thus, a partnership with local businesses would
counter the fear of NGOs that they will run out of funds. NGOs and business
working together at the local level backed by a new global regime on corporate
responsibility would ease the pressure for the smaller NGOs. However, a big
business focus on elite NGOs would simply crowd out more creative businesses
and NGOs. For instance, bigger NGOs may take smaller NGO workers, offering
better job prospects and undoing years of trust building in the community. This
trust is cultivated by educational programmes and cross-cultural programmes,
often in the most basic but vital ways.
Smaller NGOs recognise that the developmentalist model of industrialisation
is a stage now being leapt over by many recipient countries. This means
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Aid effectiveness 233
alternative approaches to local initiatives and ownership. At the same time
an argument could be made that either this turns into a local cooperative
movement with ownership by the community, or it evolves into larger business
organisations with more shareholder funders. But the direction of initiative
challenges the old ODA models. For instance, the use of mobile phones means
there is no longer a reliance on traditional infrastructure such as rail and road
projects. Relatively cheap mobile phones are being assembled from imported
materials into countries such as Rwanda, which has become the first country
in the East African region to set up a mobile phone handset assembly plant. In
South Korea, this has been an issue for the Presidential Committee on Shared
Growth for Large and Small Companies which is still a form of a contradictory
paternalism, that is, the state provides top down support for small businesses.
This is an approach justified on the basis that as a Presidential commission, in
order to secure democratic and tax payer accountability, businesses need to be
monitored and the state needs to be continually interventionist in its promotion of
the ‘creative economy’. However, South Korean electronic goods manufacturer
LG is planning to establish a $1.4 million mobile phone handset assembly plant
in Kenya by next year. LG said the Nairobi-based company would lead to a
reduction in the prices of mobile handsets in Kenya by 15 per cent. KOICA
also recognise the need for more emphasis on the connections involved in
development strategy. For instance, small investment in street lighting bulbs in
Laos allows markets and businesses to stay open longer and make more profit.
Whether KOICA can sustain state-led funding for this strategy remains to be
seen, particularly if aid effectiveness is linked to a justification for reductions in
donor and recipient government spending. In this case a promotion of business
partnerships might not only fill the gap to reductions in state funding as a result
of ‘greater effectiveness’ but also offer alternative proposals and ‘packages’ of
aid project design.
For the South Korean NGO Global Civic Sharing, local community
development agencies, NGOs and local smaller businesses encourage local
communities to have a direct financial stake in the development programmes by
putting a small amount of money (25 cents) into a pool. The goal is for the local
community to be able to say after project completion ‘we did that’. Crucially,
no separation is made between the agencies and ‘the people’ as it is realised that
local community recipients are also business people and NGO workers with a
multitude of interests and stakeholding positions. This complexity tends to be
lost at the top-down level where recipients are all paternalistically framed as
‘victims’. The need for infrastructure investment around the globe is increasing.
In emerging markets, population growth and increasing urbanisation are driving
the demand for new roads, power stations, and schools. In the developed world,
significant reinvestment in ageing infrastructures is becoming urgent. Since this
need for investment in infrastructure comes in the wake of a financial crisis that
has severely constrained public budgets in many countries, there is a gap of
approximately $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion annually between demand and investment
in infrastructure.1
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234 Aid effectiveness
With similar calls for the South Korean government to focus more on
multilateralism and civil society movements from the OECD-DAC, smaller, multifaith or secularised NGOs are beginning to get funding from elsewhere, such as
the private sector. In this sense, the idea of partnership is purely based on previous
funding strategies but this relationship is now entering new territory at the local
community level. This is because the NGOs are concerned with KOICA’s reaction
to this and smaller NGOs might even become financially stranded with KOICA’s
emphasis on less risky and ‘corporate NGOs’ and result-based effectiveness. Thus,
a partnership with local businesses would counter the fear of NGOs that they will
run out of funds. NGOs and businesses working together at the local level backed
by a new global regime on corporate responsibility would ease the pressure for
the smaller NGOs. However the danger would be that the larger NGOs become
backed by chaebols and the smaller South Korean businesses would be backing
smaller NGOs. This would create strategic and uncoordinated competition with
the civil society community, which would fuel further project replication and lead
to a lack of self-sustaining community development. Moreover, a big business
focus on elite NGOs would simply crowd out more creative businesses and NGOs.
For instance, bigger NGOs may take over smaller NGOs’ workers, offering better
job prospects and undo years of trust-building in the community. This trust is
cultivated by educational programmes and cross-cultural programmes.
Since the Busan high-level talks in 2011, questions of effective aid ownership,
alignment and harmonisation have become key issues in the relationship between
the private and public spheres. Emphasis has been placed on local initiatives and
on projects to supply constant electricity to schools, which increase opportunities
for education access and enhanced quality and quantity of studying time in
Kenya. This initiative can be crowded out by state-based foreign aid. However
there is also a need for more co-ordination between the state and smaller
NGOs. Indeed smaller NGOs are not regarded as an immediate threat to state or
business interests and can therefore perhaps play a greater bridging role between
state and business. For instance, Global Civic Sharing focuses on tailor-made
projects and emphasises their so-called exit strategies. This means that the local
community recognises that the NGOs are providing the climate for long-term selfsufficiency rather than aid dependency. This would include a focus on improving
stakeholding from local businesses so as to avoid the aid trap and to go beyond the
Keynesian versus market options. Smaller NGOs, by recognising the importance
of funding from larger chaebol companies, nevertheless also recognise that the
developmentalist model of industrialisation is a stage now being leapt over by
many recipient countries.
This means alternative approaches to local initiatives and ownership. At the
same time an argument could be made that either this strategy turns into a local
co-operative movement with ownership by the community or it evolves into
larger business organisations with more shareholding funders. But the direction of
initiative challenges the old ODA models. For instance, the use of mobile phones
means there is no longer a reliance on expensive traditional infrastructure projects
such as rail and road projects. For instance, a small investment in providing street
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Aid effectiveness 235
lighting bulbs in Laos allows markets and businesses to stay open longer and
make more profit. In this sense, partnerships between small and big businesses
are encouraged in finding the balance between economies of scale and ‘small is
beautiful’.2 The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) offers loans to qualified
businesses in need of financial help. It helps them borrow money without collateral
by guaranteeing their loans. The fund is focusing on the construction industry.
The agency’s funds would back securities worth up to 3.7 trillion won that are
based on bonds issued by around 400 building companies. The amount of bonds is
on the rise, up from 835 billion won in 2012. The industries include green growth,
information technology, biotechnology, robotics, health care and education.
Smaller NGOs are sometimes criticised for their ‘parochial’ approach and
not having the resources for ‘seeing the big picture’. However, seeing the big
picture and ‘connecting the dots’ is in fact strategically possible from a grassroots
approach in today’s globalising world. Indeed, it is the centralised approaches
that often become ‘tunnel-visioned’ and fail to see the connections between the
cause and effect. For instance, the school buildings that Global Civic Sharing has
constructed are not simply ‘white elephants’, but are embedded and connected
to the local and regional infrastructure and improve the ability of teachers and
children to routinely travel to the school. This ability to travel to school creates
a predictable and regular pattern of behaviour with a knock-on effect. In this
sense, the community realises what they need for further development and this
development becomes self-sustaining and tied into a virtuous circle. There were,
however, concerns that local children’s incentives to go to school were merely to
evade their domestic tasks. The NGO creates a series of regular meetings between
its staff, parents and local leaders. The NGO may unintentionally raise hopes and
create disillusionment when funding dries up. However, partnership with smaller
local businesses could remedy this scenario. Indeed, a critique of big business
and elite NGO partnerships is that a lack of policy alignment due to self-interests
can lead to isolated successes but with no ‘spillover’ or self-sustaining virtuous
circles created. The strategic puzzle for NGOs I have spoken to is how to forge
a symbiotic relationship between policy co-ordination and flexibility on the one
hand, and to recognise that centralisation does not necessarily mean effective coordination on the other. There is a view from the smaller NGOs that this must not
lead to any institutional inertia and inflexibility. Indeed effective centralisation
and government handling can lead to confidence for businesses of different sizes
to begin their partnerships with NGOs for long-term ODA sustainability.
Economic democratisation and exporting the new village
movement (Saemaul Undong)
Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007) noted that when South Korea emerged as a donor
during the 1990s, it was basing its aid resources on promoting its particular history
and its unique and yet ‘shared experience’ with recipients. However the nature
of South Korean developmentalism is now under increasing pressure. This has
generated elite-led efforts at reform. This reform directly and indirectly impacts
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236 Aid effectiveness
on South Korea’s domestic credibility as a developed nation ready to provide
ODA. The new administration of President Park Geun-hye has aimed to shift the
structure of the South Korean economy to one of ‘economic democratisation’
and yet at the same time seems to be resurrecting her father’s ‘developmentalist’
legacy through various nostalgia narratives such as the ‘Second Miracle on the
Han’. Nonetheless, domestic economic credibility is vital for South Korea’s
middle power status.
In countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia, there has
been growing interest not only in PPPs but also in South Korea’s ‘New Village
Movement’ or Saemaul Undong as a rural development project model. As in
China, reform to the agricultural sector was seen as crucial to long-term rapid
development through greater productivity and surplus creation. This agricultural
movement in both China and South Korea was supplemented by the technological
innovations from Japan. This movement was regarded as being pivotal to South
Korea’s development success by modernising the rural areas, increasing savings
and allowing for rapid industrialisation based on subsiding chosen and selected
industries under the authoritarian state. Moreover, developing the rural hinterlands
would ease the pressure on government spending as a result of growing urbanisation
through reduced internal migrations. There was also the Cold War context, given
that the rural areas, particularly in Asia, were the spaces where communist and
often Maoist insurgents tended to mobilise (Vietnam, China, Nepal).
The re-named South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (replacing
MOFAT) now plans to systematically streamline village movement related
programmes which are currently run by various government branches and private
organisations. This is to help the movement become a global representative
of South Korean ODA. However several NGOs have argued that the model is
culturally inapplicable to other nations because of its highly government-centred
approach, whilst there is too much overlapping of programmes. This is due to
a large number of requests from recipient countries who want to emulate the
economic model but not the authoritarian model. In this respect both China and
South Korea have potential ‘soft power’ difficulties given their particular political
systems which were crucial to the country’s development. In this respect, many
South Korean academics tend to regard the authoritarian period as a ‘necessary
stage’ of inevitable linear ‘stages of growth’ development. Seoul is to take a twotrack approach of both an integrated and case-by-case development by sharing
experiences so that recipient countries can adopt the idea more efficiently. The
Committee on International Development and Cooperation under the South Korean
Prime Minister’s Office will begin to oversee the approach in 2014. The villageunit based rural development policy led to modernisation of the rural areas and
the growth of agricultural productivity, and laid the foundation for South Korea’s
industrialisation (Chung 2013). However, Tanzania’s own rural programmes
of the 1970s (known as ‘ujaama’) were based on a form of ‘African socialism’
rather than a way (as in Asia) for agricultural reform to kick-start modernisation
and industrialisation (Musoke 2013). Nonetheless, on the sidelines of the 68th
Session of the UN General Assembly, the South Korean Foreign Ministry and
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Aid effectiveness 237
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed a memorandum of
understanding of the Saemaul Undong Global Initiative (UNDP 2012; UNDPKorea 2013a, 2013b).
MOFA also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UNDP
in 2012 and 2013 to join hands with the UN body to globalise South Korea’s
rural development policy. However there are concerns that the movement was
based on assumptions or beliefs in ethnic homogeneity which do not match or
a view that cannot be shared with many recipient country experiences, whilst
many countries such as Mongolia and Vietnam have their own shared experience
of communism which is clearly not shared by the staunch anti-communism of
South Korea. ODA money might be well received by such recipients but a lack
of experience with the private sector would also mean that constant monitoring
would be required by development agencies and donors and this would go against
the grain of the ‘non-interference’ approach of emerging donor nations such as
South Korea. However, the South Korean government has allocated $50.8 million
to MOFA, KOICA, and the Ministry of Security and Public Administration which
is to export Saemaul Undong to these states in its 2014 budget. Seoul also plans to
host a regular international conference about Saemaul starting in 2014, which will
bring more than 2,000 officials from countries around the world and organisations
to share their experiences with the application of the approach, thereby creating
‘new mutual experiences’ (The Korea Times 2013).
Japan and PPPs
Japanese PPPs are focused on how the public sector constructs roads funded
by ODA then the private sector operates them. TICAD 4 raised the issue of
increasing consultation between government and investors to be based on coformulation of interests and technical expertise rather than ‘standalone’ projects.
JICA, like KOICA, is partnering up with large corporations such as Sony. Japan’s
interest in PPPs has been in exporting its domestic business model known as
Kaizen, a cultural export part of soft power (The Economist 2009; JICA 2013).
Kaizen includes the standardisation of an operation and its activities, effective
measuring of the operation (find cycle time and amount of in-process inventory),
gauging measurements against present and future requirements, innovating to
meet these requirements and to increase productivity, and standardising the new
and improved operations.
The Yokohama Declaration (2013: Nos 3.1 and 3.2) confirmed that the private
sector is to become a vital engine of growth, the private sector will be supported
and strengthened, greater private investment will be promoted, and the investment
climate and legal and regulatory frameworks improved. It stated:
We will encourage expanded trade, tourism and technology transfer, and
assist the development of the SMEs. We will also support regional integration
to expand intra-regional trade and create new opportunities for private sector
development and employment. To bolster the bases for growth, we will focus
238 Aid effectiveness
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on hard infrastructure, human infrastructure, and knowledge infrastructure.
Recognising the need for closer synergy between the TICAD process
and PIDA, we will accelerate the development of key hard infrastructure,
especially energy, transport and water, in both urban and rural areas, including
through greater use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).
Ernst and Young (2011) identified the significance of PPP projects between
cooperating Asian donors such as HITEC city Hyderabad and the Rajiv
Gandhi international airport in India which has gained from Japanese technical
assistance. Yet, as the aid effectiveness conference at Accra pointed out, there
also remain challenges in creating a regulatory environment and the need for more
feasibility reports. Between India and China there has been donor competition,
as manifested in social infrastructure projects such as hosting the Olympics and
the Commonwealth Games. In India, PPPs have been particularly important in
the areas of economic and social infrastructure projects. Distinctions are made
between design built contracts which save time and cost, allowing for milestone
linked payments and penalties, and the performance based contracts which occur
when the project is constrained by finite economic resources. The most common
forms are ‘user fee’ BTO models for the large-scale road and airports projects, and
an annuity model where the sectors and project do not entail user cost recoveries
such as user charges or toll booths.
Exporting the models
Ethiopia, now attracting attention from China and South Korea, has, with
Japan, set up the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute (EKI) with the help of JICA in
2011. This is a three-year project to help medium and large size companies
owned by both state and private businesses to help improve human resources,
management skills and productivity. EKI claims it has trained employees of
over 150 Ethiopian companies on the basics of the Kaizen philosophy and its
application, of which 30 companies have been implementing the principles. In
this respect, recipients are using to their advantage the wider aid market that
has emerged as a result of donor competition. In this respect, ‘Kaizen’ is not
approached as a technocratic management technique to improve productivity but
rather signifies the ‘holistic’ daily activities of each and every employee and to,
in essence, humanise the workplace. Kaizen is based on encouraging the active
involvement of the entire workforce as well as the management staff across
spans of flexible activities with special emphasis placed on nurturing the culture
of continual small improvements (JICA 2013; MoFA 2012). The methodology of
Kaizen involves making continual small changes, monitoring and adjusting as
opposed to the practice of long-term planning and project scheduling, which is
what the government in Ethiopia is known for. In this respect Japan is promoting
Kaizen as an alternative to the top-down approaches of China and South Korea.
Nonetheless, historically, Japanese management techniques have long been
criticised as a ‘soft power’ obscuring of what are in effect highly centralised,
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Aid effectiveness 239
hierarchical and coordinated business practices. Moreover, ‘sharing worker
experience’ is a policy to, in effect, lower worker resistance and lower union
challenges to management restructuring. Flexibility also means a more subtle
form of ‘deskilling’ or alternatively, an increasing of incremental skills which
challenges the ‘division of labour’ Western deskilling practices, but also means
that workers can become increasingly subject to potential replacements by those
with equally rounded multi-skills. In essence, this ‘harmony’ approach creates a
form of ‘homogenisation’ in order to keep labour demands for wages down, and
which also bypasses union specialisation memberships. However, the tradition
of hierarchical elitism in which Japanese companies and political authorities are
placed, is also a feature of Ethiopian political elite culture. In this respect, a
shared experience does not necessarily mean a ‘democratic’ experience (Lemma
et al. 2013).
Conclusion
The aid effectiveness debate has been seen as an almost inevitable and, to a degree,
a pre-emptive accelerator, to speed up MDG completion as damage limitation
rather than a qualitative new approach to aid. For some, this is simply too little
too late, and in effect a band aid over fundamental flaws in the Aid 1.0 paradigm.
Whilst there was a positive spin on aid effectiveness and ‘value added aid’, there
were also concerns that this was an excuse to actually lower aid amounts, either as
a threat for better government accountability or after the fact, with the reasoning
that lower aid amounts had proved aid effectiveness was in place and likely to
be working and therefore that donor agencies would be credited. In this sense
the narrative of aid effectiveness has focused on whether the impact of aid is
conditional on policy only, or aid can also be expected to have a separate and
positive impact, irrespective and independent of intended donor agency policy.
These are questions as to whether the allocation of aid to those states lagging
behind determines the opportunity costs of completing, globally, the MDGs; that
is, aid would have a bigger ‘snapshot’ impact on those countries but, in providing
aid to those countries nearly graduating and nearing a sustainable growth from
(and for) the ‘big push’, this would more likely mean MDG completion.
At the 2013 World Economic Forum (WEF 2013) it was accepted that the
recent financial crisis has put pressure on all states’ ability and willingness to
provide ODA. This chapter has argued that whilst the Asian donors and emerging
powers are playing an increasingly vibrant role in ODA, this role now needs to
be placed in broader issues regarding the sustainability of the emerging powers.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the debates on the role of emerging powers and
ODA and aid effectiveness began during and in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis. An interrelated aspect of this debate is public awareness and willingness
to provide ODA, and a pragmatic realisation that public and private sectors now
need to, and can, work together. These partnerships are not necessarily equal, and
yet the assumed leverage of the business sector is also reliant on state funding,
a willingness to take risks, and an awareness by communities of the diversity of
240 Aid effectiveness
options and resources now becoming available. At a time when many recipient
nations are now developing rapidly, the possibility of such partnerships may prove
irresistible (particularly the information and skills required and learnt) rather than
relying on a results based and ‘impact’ aid effectiveness.
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Notes
1 Group discussions at Global Civic Sharing, 1701, Garden Tower, Anguk, Seoul, on 27
May 2011 and interview with Kim, Min-young, Director of Global Civic Sharing, in
Seoul, on 27 May 2011.
2 Yonsei Wonju Campus, Korean Society for Public Administration, statements by
KOICA Vice-President, August 2012
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WEF. (2013) ‘Strategic Infrastructure Steps to Prepare and Accelerate Public–Private
Partnerships’ www3.weforum.org/docs/AF13/WEF_AF13_Strategic_Infrastructure_
Initiative.pdf
Yokohama. (2013) ‘Yokohama Declaration 2013; Hand in hand with a more dynamic
Africa’ www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000053.html
Yoo, Sung-kull. (2010) ‘Korea’s Case of Public–Private Partnerships in Infrastructure
Development’ www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/ppp_jakarta2010/rok.pdf
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7
Conclusion
Foreign aid assistance or ODA does not occur in an economic, cultural or
geopolitical vacuum. Donor states are in a myriad of complex inter-state and
geopolitical relationships. The emerging powers have altered the trajectories and
assumptions concerning the site and nature of geopolitics and the relationship
between inter-state relations and foreign aid. Some emerging powers have an
objective to be more involved in the mainstream aid organisations such as the
OECD-DAC; some emerging powers resist this temptation. The strategic options
(and justifications of these options and decisions) that emerging powers have
depend on the geopolitical dynamics not only between donor and recipient but
also between donors.
Moreover, the geopolitics of these inter-state relationships, as I have argued in
this book, are directly and indirectly manifested and impacted upon by a number
of specific regional dynamics. These regional dynamics are further manifested
in and through a myriad of economic, political and cultural relationships. In
the book therefore, I have tried to avoid slipping into the temptation of proving
whether Asian donor aid is substantively or instrumentally ‘good’ or ‘bad’. As I
have pointed out, the available data can, frankly, be used to prove either side’s
position. As I have also pointed out, the notion that ODA is directly or indirectly
linked to foreign policy is pretty much a conventional and well-established view.
Instead, I have focused here on providing a contemporary template of the actual
dynamics of Asian regional geopolitics and the interrelationships between Asian
donors in order to explore the role of China, Japan and South Korea in the aid
debate, and what particular issues and forms of foreign aid these donor countries
provide, and why. I have argued that these state interrelationships are based on
three underlying factors. Firstly, on their role as states in the international system
and specifically in the geopolitics of the Asian region. Secondly, their role as types
of donors of foreign aid. Thirdly, their role as emerging or established powers.
However, I have also pointed out that the very provision of ODA and the ‘selling’
of ODA by each donor state, is implicitly (and certainly explicitly) manifested as a
state’s construction and promotion of its national identity. Moreover, this national
identity is determined by particular groups and in both official and unofficial
terms. Indeed, one major characteristic of Asian donors is the continued existence
(particularly for China and South Korea) of ‘unofficial’ China and Korea in the
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Conclusion
245
region (Taiwan and North Korea respectively). This recognition tension has
impacted very much on the donors’ responses to their recipient countries. In this
respect, I have argued that the regional interrelationships between the donor states
are manifested as a microcosm of geopolitics in the recipient countries and in
terms of aid distribution, priority recipients and type and content of aid. However,
I have also argued that this is not a direct relationship. Indeed, I have stressed
that cooperation between donors states in the region can also lead to inter-state
tensions and competition in the recipient country, but these tensions can be
affected by other economic, political or cultural factors. Nonetheless, given the
wider strategic shifts occurring in the Asian region, I have indicated that Asian
donor activity in Africa and Asia does suggest a pattern of interest which reflects
the current geopolitical dynamics and shifts in and of Asia. These issues have all
been discussed in the wider context of the MDGs.
The book has tried to show how assumed concepts such as ‘diversity’ or
‘multipolarity’ are culturally specific and in fact representative of a myriad of
strategic options and behaviours by states as donors of ODA and as reflecting
distinctive geopolitical dynamics. Whilst I have avoided making any arbitrary
definition of ‘Asian perspectives’, I have nonetheless aimed to identify certain
common characteristics that perhaps distinguish Asian donors from states and
donors in and from other regions.
The role of the emerging powers has generated a number of strategic questions
of relations between emerging powers, different power leverages within this group
and relations between states and international organisations. I have considered
these issues in the wider context of different IR theories and in the specific
regional context of Asian geopolitics. I have also argued that these relations
can be both competitive and cooperative, and the nature and content of these
relationships in the region are also manifested, directly and indirectly, in both
donor–donor and donor–recipient relationships. By using IR approaches such as
realism and liberalism, I have shown why states compete and why they cooperate
and how, specifically, emerging powers and ‘middle powers’ are situated in often
paradoxical strategic positions and how these position impact on their approach to
providing (and selling) ODA and their behaviour toward each other and recipients.
I have argued that terms used by donor states (and commentaries) such as
‘shared experience’ and ‘mutual solidarity’ are a clear part and parcel of emerging
power justification of ODA activity and policy. However, the questions I have
raised in the book include ‘whose experience?’, ‘whose perspective?’ and ‘what
does this represent to different donor and recipient constituents?’ Examples of
these different experiences, for instance, occur between high-level delegates and
civil society actors but also within and between the elites and between actors
in civil society. In this respect, current literature has tended to under-explore
how contested narratives on experience and ‘national identity’ themselves
impact upon donor–donor and donor–recipient relationships. And, in turn, these
interrelationships affect ODA policy. I have also pointed out that the issues of
identity are intrinsically connected to the wider questions of public opinion and
an understanding of a ‘state’s place in the world’. In all Asian donors states, the
246
Conclusion
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impact of public support for ODA is increasingly tied to questions of domestic
economic sustainability and a wide variety of cultural perceptions. For instance,
at the High Level Symposium preparatory event for the 2014 Development
Cooperation Forum held in Ethiopia it was stated that:
The world has changed significantly since the conception of the Millennium
Development Goals. Despite the progress made, important gaps remain. The
geography of poverty has evolved. Inequality is on the rise. The challenge
of sustainable development is even more pressing. Meanwhile, a multipolar economy has taken shape. Emerging economies play a larger role in
development cooperation. So does an array of new and emerging actors:
Southern providers, the private sector, philanthropy and civil society
organizations.1
All the contemporary ‘buzzwords’ are included in such statements. However,
such terms, phrases and wordings are not discursively fixed and can often
imply different meanings in different contexts and to different domestic and
international audiences. These contexts can also represent the different cultural
interpretations and ultimately vested interests involved. The book has, therefore,
argued that the technical language of ‘win-win’ and ‘mutual understanding’ or
‘development cooperation’ can often obscure particular donor relationships not
based on ‘equality’ or even realist ‘power’ differences but on perhaps more
fundamental issues of cultural hierarchies which are intrinsic to national identity.
For instance, the terms ‘inclusive development’ and ‘development partnership’
can often mean an obscuring of diverse inequalities and power leverages in the
relationships and in such organisations. Nonetheless, emphasis on ‘inclusion’ was
further developed a year later at the 2011 Busan Aid Effectiveness convention,
including questions of ownership, alignment, harmonisation and the need for a
greater accountability in financial flows. Each Asian driver is thereby promoting
its own particular model of development and of globalisation.2 Indeed, I have
argued that the relationship between regionalisation and globalisation is becoming
increasingly complex as a myriad of alternative approaches to globalisation are
emerging in the post-2008 global crisis era. And the relationship between the state
and these processes is impacting on the sustainability of the donor country’s own
economic development. As I have suggested, the literature on emerging powers
in particular, has tended to ‘reify’ this particular era without attending to the
underlying dynamics and tensions now being addressed by Asian governments
with respect to their own sustainability, which is, I have argued, fundamental to
the credibility of ODA policy.
I have also stressed that the donors themselves are beginning to reach a
strategic decision whether to shift to a new domestic economic model or decide
whether this shift might in fact undermine the very success and credibility of
the development model. These tensions are manifested in economic terms but
also in areas such as demographics, cultural policies and the environment. These
issues are also manifested in key relationships and partnerships between state and
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Conclusion
247
business. All three major Asian donors are currently embarking on such questions
and policies, and the way that governments are responding, itself, becomes a key
facet of how recipients respond to the Asian donors, particularly as the ‘market’
for aid becomes increasingly crowded. Yet whilst emerging-powers and Asian
donors have undoubtedly created a competitive market for aid for recipients,
questions still remain as to whether this market is necessarily fair and free, and
whether the recipient countries have real rather than technical leverage in the
relationship. Indeed in a strange paradox, ‘solidarity’ between donor and recipient
might be becoming undercut not so much by donor intentions, but rather by
recipient rejections of donor aid unless the terms of the agreement are favourable.
Asian donor states share a unique commonality of foreign aid concerns,
yet at the same time offer very different historical and contemporary national
models. This has generated economic, military and cultural tensions. The book
has acknowledged the fundamental fluidity of regional boundaries and regional
identity, currently, in the post-Cold War era, being redrawn as a result of the
rise of China, the US pivot or rebalance (and their cool war), India’s ‘look East’
approach, the ‘Japan is back’ narrative, and South Korea being promoted as
global Korea. Moreover, the role of ASEAN and South Asia is being regarded as
the ‘new Great Game’ (along with Central Asia) which all unpacks a variety of
assumptions and perceptions of where continental and maritime Asia spatially and
temporally begins and ends.
The debate on emerging powers and their ODA is ongoing. There is no
consensus as yet. My purpose in the book has been to step back and place these
debates in the wider geopolitical patterns of the Asian region. At the same time,
I have argued that Asian donors have a complex and profound experience of
being recipients and donors. Within many donor countries there are still those
constituents and communities who receive ODA, and there are those whose
incomes are used by the state to provide and donate ODA. The new geography of
aid is clearly opening up major challenges to our understandings of development
and issues of responsibility. It has been my objective to indicate how and why,
in the context of the new geography of aid, Asian donor governments (and their
populations) are significantly impacting on the role and nature of ODA policies in
the context of the post-2015 MDG era.
Notes
1 2013 Ethiopia High-level Symposium on A Renewed Global Partnership for
Development for a Post-2015 era’ www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/dcfethiopia.shtml
2 ‘China Turns to Adam Smith’ The Daily Telegraph 16 November 2009, www.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6584906/China–turns-to-Adam-Smith.html
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Index
Note: Page numbers in italic refer to boxes
and tables. Page numbers followed by an ‘n’
refer to notes.
Abenomics, move toward, 155–157
ADB (Asian Development Bank), 189–190
Africa: aid controversy, 139–142; and Asian
ODA, 112–113; Chinese aid, 107, 115–
116; climate change issues, 189–190;
cool war in, 117–127, 120, 122, 123,
127; debt cancellation programmes,
105–106; East Africa, 116–117; emulation of Asian driver model(s), 104–107;
Japanese aid, 107–109, 110, 118–123,
120, 122, 123; natural resources, 106;
relationship with China, 133–135;
RISING, 113–114; South Korean aid,
109–110, 121, 123–126, 127; technical
cooperation aid, 121–122
African Development Bank (AfDB), discussion on development effectiveness, 51
aid: controversy, 139–142; distribution of,
115–116, 153–159, 154; Eight Principles of Engagement, 138; evolution of,
44–46; grant aid, 108, 163; ideologies
of, 35–36; and level-playing fields,
105–106; technical cooperation aid,
121–122
Aid 2.0 paradigm, basis for, 43–44
aid debate, assumptions of, 38
aid effectiveness. See also development effectiveness, approaches to, 48–52
aid recipients, labelling of, 7. See also
recipients
alternative aid policies, 45
Annan, Kofi, 226–227
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), 92–93
APT (ASEAN plus three), formation of, 92
Arctic, and the Asian region, 207–210
Arctic Council, membership, 10–11, 22 n6
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian
Nations): and Asian geopolitics in the
post-Cold War era, 87–89; and China,
87–88, 93–94, 160–163; goals of, 160–
161; growth of, 69; and Japan, 160–163;
membership, 10–11; and South Korea,
88–89; splits within, 161–162
ASEAN plus three (APT), formation of, 92
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 189–190
Asian donors. See also donors: and Africa,
112–113; and Myanmar, 174–175; perspectives, 110–112; shared experience
narrative, 158–159
Asian drivers: demographics in, 221–222;
emulation of, 104–107; rise of, 11; sustainability of, 219–221
Asian ODA: distribution of, 153–159, 154;
donors, 161
Asian perspectives, use of term, 10
Asian recipients, 175–180, 176. See also
recipients
Asian region: and the Arctic, 207–210;
changes in geopolitics, 67–70, 85–91;
climate change issues, 189–190;
early perspectives, 81; leadership, 68;
legitimacy of a development model,
159; narrative of reciprocity, 160; North
East donors and South Asia recipients,
159–174, 161; post-Cold War era, 87; regional trade patterns, 69; role of US, 82
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), 92–93
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). See ASEAN (Association of
South East Asian Nations)
autonomy, calls for, 87
Ban Ki-moon, 226
bandwagoning, 71
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Index
bottom-up approaches, effectiveness of, 43
Brazil. See also BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, China), emerging role of, 44
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China): Delhi
Declaration, 14, 51; Development Bank
initiative, 45–46; and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 14; and SDGs,
42; sustainability of resources for ODA,
15–18; tensions between, 13–14
Build Transfer Lease (BTL) projects, 228,
230
Build Transfer Operate (BTO) projects,
227–228, 230
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 49–51, 217
Cambodia, 167–169, 203
capacity building, 217
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism)
Projects, 206
cell-phones, provision of, 42
Charter of Algiers (1967), 21 n3
‘Chimerica,’ 66
China: aid to Africa, 107, 115–116; and
ASEAN, 87–88, 93–94, 160–163;
and Cambodia, 167–169; changes in
geopolitics, 86–87; ‘Chimerica,’ 66;
China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 94; ‘Chinese dream,’
68; Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) Projects, 206; climate change
issues, 187; demographic deficits, 57;
economic growth, 55–56; foreign aid
programme history, 137; green growth
ODA, 206–207; involvement with local
communities, 53; and Laos, 171–174;
lines of latitude solidarity, 135–136; and
Myanmar, 169–171; National Agenda
21, 205; participation in Mauritius, 116;
participation in Somalia, 117; promotion of nationalism, 15; relationship with
Africa, 133–135; relationship with India,
90–91; relationship with Japan, 88; relationship with US, 69, 89–90, 117–127,
120, 122, 123, 127; rise of, 81; single
males living in, 157–158; sovereign
recognition, 128; trade with Taiwan, 90;
and Vietnam, 163–166
China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement
(FTA), 94
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Projects, 206
climate change issues: overview, 188;
Africa, 189–190; Asian region, 189–197,
196, 197; assessments, 207; criticisms
249
of, 200–202; international green commitments, 192–193; and IR, 191–192;
South Korea, 190, 193–197, 196, 197
climate changes issues, China, 187
Clinton, Hillary, 89, 94
communication technology, provision of,
42
Conferences of the Parties (COPs), 191
constructivism, 19–20
cooperation, 91–92
credibility, domestic, 229–232
cultural interpretations, issue of, 5–6
DAC (Development Assistance Committee): major aid recipients, 3; reporting
to, 35
DBRs (‘Doing Business Reports’), 226
debt cancellation programmes, 105–106
Delhi Declaration, 14, 51. See also BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India, China)
democratisation, economic, 235–237
demographic deficits, 57–58
Deng Xiaoping, 41, 83, 135
Development Assistance Committee
(DAC): major aid recipients, 3; reporting to, 35
Development Bank initiative, 45–46
development concerns, and poverty, 188
development effectiveness, 51, 217. See
also aid effectiveness
development model, legitimacy of, 159
developmentalist model, 69–70
diversity: and geopolitics, 58–59; and hierarchical stability, 83; interpretations of,
133; and multipolarity, 12; promotion
of, 14; versions of, 67
‘Doing Business Reports’ (DBRs), 226
domestic credibility, 229–232
domestic sustainability, 54–57
donor-recipient partnerships, criticisms
of, 52
donors. See also Asian donors: Asian, 110–
112; credibility of, 229–232; effect of
financial crisis on, 49; non-interference,
52; post-colonial, 5; statistics, 154, 161
East Africa, 116–117. See also Africa
East Asia Summit, membership, 10–11
economic crisis of 1997: overview, 155–
157; as shared experience, 158–159
economic democratisation, 235–237
Eight Principles of Engagement, 138
emerging powers: overview, 4–5; and
globalisation, 36
environmental rights, 187
250
Index
Ethiopia, ties to South Korea, 129–133
ethnocentrism, danger of, 80
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financial crisis, effect on DAC donors, 49
Fiscal Conservatives, 36
food security, 125–126, 135–136
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as a condition for inclusive growth, 37
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
(FTAAP), 92
G8 (Group of Eight), ‘On Africa’ communiqué, 37
General Grant Aid (GGA), 163
geoeconomics, 68–70
geopolitics: changes in the Asian region,
67–70, 85–91; and diversity, 58–59; and
geoeconomic changes, 68–70; and ODA,
9–10
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), and
South Korea, 197–200, 203
Global Humanitarian Assistance Development Initiative, 47
global institutions, reform of, 44–45
Global Korea, 201–202. See also South
Korea
global South: as recipients and donors,
44–48; solidarity in, 14; strategic choices
for, 54–59
globalisation: and regionalisation, 91–92;
and the role of emerging powers, 36
grant aid, 108, 163. See also aid
green, use of term, 188
green growth agenda. See climate changes
issues
grid systems development of, 42
Group of Eight (G8), See G8 (Group of
Eight)
hegemon role, 71–72
hierarchical stability, and diversity, 83
historical ties, as state-led soft power,
136–139, 138
Hu Jintao, 129
human security agenda, 204–205
IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), grouping
of, 14
Ilulissat Declaration, 11
IMF (International Monetary Fund), World
Economic Outlook report (2013a), 47–48
India: relationship with China, 90–91; solidarity with Japan, 130–131
India–Africa Forum (2011), 139
Indian Ocean maritime territory, 85–87
infrastructure system development of, 42
Institute of Sustainable Agriculture and
Community Development (ISAC), 203
international green commitments, 192–193.
See also climate change issues
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Economic Outlook report (2013a), 47–48
International Relations (IR): and climate
change issues, 191–192; critical approaches, 19–20; debate on globalisation, 91–92; intervention in, 4; non-western, 80–85; perspectives, 18–20, 84; role
of middle powers, 73–74; state centrism
in, 78–79; state strategies in, 70–74
international system, 84–85
inter-state multipolarity, 160. See also
multipolarity
intervention, forms of, 4
IR (International Relations). See International Relations (IR)
Japan: 2012 ODA White Paper, 162, 165,
166; Abenomics, 155–157; aid to
Africa, 107–109, 110, 118–123, 120,
122, 123; anti-colonial role, 132; and
ASEAN, 160–163; calls for autonomy,
87; and Cambodia, 167–169; changes
in geopolitics, 86–87; green growth
ODA, 204–206; human security agenda,
204–205; Kaizen, 237–239; and Laos,
171–174; leadership, 68; lines of latitude
solidarity, 136; move toward Abenomics,
155–157; and Myanmar, 169–171; Plaza
Accords (1985), 155–156; and PPPs,
237–239; relationship with China, 88;
relationship with South Korea, 130–133;
solidarity with India, 130–131; trade process, 92; and Vietnam, 163–166
Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), 161–163
Kaizen, 237–239
Kang, David, 82–83
Kim, Jim Yong, 39–40
Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA), 203–204
Krugman, Paul, 157
Kyoto Protocol (1997), 192
Laos, 171–174, 177
leadership, changes in the Asian region, 68
Lee, Myung-bak, 178–179
level-playing fields concept, 105–106
Lewis turning point, reaching of, 15
liberal approaches, 36
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liberalism, 18–19, 74–76
Liberia, 119–120
‘lily pad’ strategy, 90
local communities, involvement with, 53
Low Income Countries (LICs), 22 n7
Mao Zedong, 81–82
maritime Silk Road, 85–87. See also trade
routes
market bottlenecks, use of term, 37
Marshall Plan, 4
Marxism, 19–20
Mauritius, China’s participation in, 116
McNamara, Robert, 21 n3
middle classes, characteristics of, 158
middle powers, role in IR, 73–74
MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea,
Turkey, Australia), 15
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):
2013 report, 2; and BRICs, 14; evaluation of, 37–42; post 2015, 17–18, 45
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): human
security agenda, 204–205; and South
Korea, 194
Montevideo Treaty (1933), 21 n4
multipolarity: shift to, 11–12; use of term,
160
Myanmar, 169–171, 174–175, 177–178
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), 13
National Agenda 21, 205
national autobiography, 6–7
National Council on Green Growth
(NCGG), 203
‘national grid’ infrastructure system development of, 42
national identity: changes in, 222–225; issue
of, 5–6
nationalism, promotion of, 15
natural resources: lack of, 106; shared experience of, 163
NCGG (National Council on Green
Growth), 203
neoliberal economics, 35–36
neo-Marxist perspectives, 19
New Delhi Declaration. See Delhi Declaration
New International Economic Order (NIEO),
46
new regionalism, emergence of, 67
new village movement (saemaul undong),
235–237
newness, issue of, 5–6
Next-11: geopolitics and diversity of, 58–59;
membership, 15
251
NIEO (New International Economic Order),
46
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 13
non-conditionality, emphasis on, 53
‘non-DAC,’ use of term, 5
non-governmental organisations (NGOs):
post 2015, 232–235; and PPPs, 231–232
non-interference, maintaining, 52
non-western IR, 80–85. See also International Relations (IR)
North Korea, recognition by South Korea,
129–133
Nye, Joseph, 176
Obama, Barack, 174–175
OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee): membership, 5; role of, 35
Official Development Assistance (ODA):
overview, 1; criticisms of, 52–54; and
geopolitics, 9–10; ‘green growth’ influenced, 202–204; major aid recipients,
47; sustainability of resources for, 15–18
otherness, hierarchies of, 223–224
‘Panamax’ ports, 118. See also trade
PCGG (Presidential Committee on Green
Growth), 198
Plaza Accords (1985), 155–156
port access, 118. See also trade
post-colonial donors, 5. See also donors
poverty: definitions of, 34; and development
concerns, 188; distribution of, 44; images of, 36–37
power. See also soft power, and security,
70–71
Presidential Committee on Green Growth
(PCGG), 198
project support, emphasis on, 53
public and private partnerships (PPPs): context of, 225–227; defining, 227–229; and
Japan, 237–239; and NGOs, 231–232
public opinion, changes in, 222–225
realism, 18–19, 71–72
recipients. See also Asian recipients: labelling of, 7; statistics, 3, 47, 154
reciprocity, narrative of, 160
regimes, and cooperation, 75–76
regional geopolitics. See geopolitics
regional trade, growth of, 69
regionalisation, and globalisation, 91–92
reverse coupling, 67
RISING, 113–114. See also Africa
252
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Rudd, Kevin, 159
saemaul undong (new village movement),
235–237
SDGs (sustainable development goals), and
BRICs, 42
security, food, 125–126, 135–136
security, human, 204–205
security dilemma, 70–71
self-labelling, of aid recipients, 7
Senegal, food security, 135–136
shared experiences: narrative of the Asian
donors, 158–159; natural disasters, 163;
returning, 224–225
shipping routes. See trade routes
Skidelsky, Robert, 220
social constructivist approaches, 19
soft power: promotion of, 70; state-led,
76–78, 136–139, 138
solidarity movements, Third World, 13–15,
46–48, 47
Somalia: China’s participation in, 117;
experiences in, 86
South Korea: aid by, 41; aid to Africa, 109–110, 121, 123–126, 127; and
ASEAN, 88–89; and Asian recipients,
175–180, 176; calls for autonomy, 87;
changes in geopolitics, 86–87; China–
South Korea Free Trade Agreement
(FTA), 94; climate change issues, 190,
193–197, 196, 197; critics of green
growth, 200–202; domestic tensions,
155–157; and the GGGI, 197–200;
Global Korea, 201–202; green growth
agenda, 187; and Laos, 177; leadership,
68; Lee, Myung-bak, 178–179; and Myanmar, 177–178; new village movement
(saemaul undong), 236; recognition of
North Korea, 129–133; relationship with
Japan, 130–133; and shared experiences,
224–225; shipping routes, 86; ties to
Ethiopia, 129–133
sovereignty: recognition of, 128; respect for,
52; role of, 12
states: centrism in IR, 78–79; IR strategies, 70–74; relationship between, 3–4,
74–76; and soft power, 76–78; system
of, 84–85
‘Supermax’ ships, 118. See also trade
sustainable development, 186
sustainable development goals (SDGs), and
BRICs, 42
system of states, 84–85
Taiwan, trade with China, 90
technocracy, increasing, 39–40
Third World solidarity movements, 13–15,
46–48, 47
top-down approaches: criticisms of, 231;
effectiveness of, 43
trade: port access, 118; regional, 69
trade routes, 10–11, 85–87, 207–210
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative,
69
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEPA), 94
UN Human Development Report (2013), 46
UN Millennium Declaration, 39
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), 13
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), 11
United States: and Myanmar, 174–175;
Plaza Accords (1985), 155–156; relationship with China, 69, 89–90, 117–127,
120, 122, 123, 127; role in Asian region,
82
‘unlocking’ market bottlenecks, use of term,
37
Vietnam, 163–166
Washington Consensus, emergence of,
35–36
World Bank: 2006 World Development
Report, 2; ‘Doing Business Reports’
(DBRs), 226; and technocracy, 39–40
World Economic Forum (WEF), 201
Xi Jinping: and ‘the Chinese dream,’ 68; and
historical ties, 136