Occasional Paper
ISSUE NO. 302
FEBRUARY 2021
© 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech
or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.
Strategies for a
Two-Front Dilemma:
Lessons from History
Ashish Singh
Abstract
This paper examines India’s ‘two-front’ dilemma in view of its conflicts with China
and Pakistan, and the possibility that these two adversaries could join forces. The
author studies historical events that could help outline the strategies that have been
undertaken by certain countries to combat the combined power of multiple adversaries,
usually exceeding their own. These include the Napoleonic strategy and the Israeli
experience. In analysing these case studies, the paper focuses on the key questions that
the strategists raised while dealing with the two-front issue.
Attribution: Ashish Singh, “Strategies for a Two-Front Dilemma: Lessons from History,” ORF Occasional Paper
No. 302, February 2021, Observer Research Foundation.
“Gentlemen we are out of money; now we have to think.”
—Winston S. Churchill1
Introduction
T
he June 2020 clash between the Chinese and Indian armies
in Ladakh has increased the probability of a two-front
conflict for India. While the public discourse on a two-front
scenario usually focuses on relative strengths and defence
budgets, a war cannot be won without a winning strategy,
based on which, budgets must be allocated to relevant capabilities. Such
a strategy must draw on experience while also anticipating the character
of the next war, considering the changing contexts. For example, after
the brutal trench warfare of World War I, France had poured, by 1935,
one-fifth of its defence budget,
amounting to 7,000 million
francs, into the Maginot line
fortified defences. Despite this, it
lost World War II2 to Germany’s
superior strategy.
A war cannot be
won without a
winning strategy,
based on which,
budgets must
be allocated to
capabilities.
In the context of India’s
current situation, the term
“two-front” implies conflicts
with two countries that flank
India in separate directions.
The ongoing border tensions
between India and China have
increased the possibility that a conflict with either Pakistan or China
could result in them colluding against India—by either overtly or tacitly
combining their resources.
3
Napoleonic Wars
Case Studies
At the cusp of the 18th century, French Emperor Napoleon revolutionised
warfare, capitalising on the changes introduced by the French Revolution
of 1789. He formed a different kind of army, raised by conscription and
imbibed with a strong sense of loyalty to the state, putting at his disposal
greater combat power than his enemies. Napoleon’s genius lay in how
he organised and used this combat power.
During the Revolutionary Wars, France was repeatedly attacked by
coalitions of other European powers. These attacks were both ideological
and pragmatic, to prevent the ideas of revolution from unseating
other monarchies and to preserve the balance of power threatened by
Napoleon’s successes. From 1804, when Napoleon crowned himself
emperor (both king and general), till his final defeat and exile in 1815,
he fought what are now called the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s obvious
ambition was a threat to other powers, which catalysed the formation
of coalitions against France. While he did try to use diplomacy to
prevent such alliances, Napoleon primarily relied on statecraft and
military power to fight these coalitions. Additionally, France too formed
alliances; for example, in 1797, Spain and Netherlands fought with
France against the British and in 1800, France defeated the Austrians at
Marengo and Hochstadt after persuading Russia to withdraw.3 Where
Napoleon could not prevent enemy alliances, he would attack at either
the physical junction of their armies or play upon their disadvantages
of divided command. Often, he used political machinations to delay
the movement of armies to stop them from physically joining forces,
attacking and defeating isolated armies one after the other, using the
advantage of central position and interior lines of operations. In 1805,
he captured an Austrian army at Ulm while a deliberately delayed
Russian army was still advancing from the east (See Figure 1).4
Napoleon relied on statecraft and
military power to fight enemy
coalitions.
4
Case Studies
Figure 1:
The 1805 Ulm Campaign
Source: Napoleon, His Army and Enemies.5
In 1796, Napoleon interposed his army between that of Sardinia
and Austria in mountainous terrain and defeated them sequentially
from the central position.6 To ensure success, Napoleon employed the
terrain’s natural obstacles to keep the enemy armies divided. Moreover,
he would often block one army using a small fraction of his force for just
long enough to defeat the other army using the remaining manpower,
and then quickly switch to augment his blocking force to attack.
5
Figure 2:
The Beginnings of the 1796
Campaign
Case Studies
Sources: https://imgur.com/.7
Much of Napoleon’s military success is due to his innovation in
using the army. He frequently used conscription, formed large corps,
implemented a command-and-control system to synchronise the
movement of these corps (and divisions), gave them additional mobility
by living off the land, and increased firepower in the form of horsetransported Gribeauval guns.8 Increased mobility, both in the range
and speed of his growing armies, translated to superior combat power
during battle. Napoleon departed from the existing positional warfare
paradigm to battles of annihilation, sometimes pushing aggressively to
positions where the enemy was challenged to engage his army. Thus,
the object of his campaigns became the defeat of the field army of the
enemy.
Against coalition armies, Napoleon’s victories were contingent upon
speed of movement, allowing him to reach, engage and defeat one army
before the other could reach to bolster the first one. Strategically, it was
a combination of rapidly raised combat power, swift offensive action,
and the mastery of both the diplomatic and military aspects of strategy.
6
At the operational level of war, unified command and utilisation of
geographical advantage of the central position allowed Napoleon to
prevail over the divided command of multiple enemies.
Case Studies
Napoleon understood the importance of the economy in waging
war. With Britain directly funding continental powers, France was
kept embroiled on land, and it could not challenge Britain’s mastery
of the seas. Thus, while Napoleon did employ the “continental
system” to economically limit Britain by constricting its access to
European resources and markets, it was only partly effective. Since
Britain’s economy was sustained by far-flung colonies, not Europe,
it continued to grow, while the French economy increasingly turned
inward. To avoid overburdening French citizens, Napoleon’s large
armies increasingly depended on war to sustain themselves. He would
demand that defeated powers cede territory, pay indemnity for his war
costs, and sustain his large armies, which were increasingly positioned
outside France.9 Consequently, a vicious loop was established between
Napoleon’s ambition and the need for war to sustain its military tool.
Ultimately, he was defeated by the total power arrayed against him due
to their fear of his military successes.
Germany
Towards the end of the Napoleonic era, Germany (then Prussia)
witnessed a revolution in warfare. Around 1806, the military’s
General Staff worked as the brains for the military. However, unlike
the Napoleonic model, the German model separated the military and
political spheres, with the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) working as
adviser to the king and the war ministry working as the political and
administrative control of the army.10 In contrast, the Napoleonic staff
had functioned only as the eyes, ears, and conduit for the emperor’s
orders and was institutionally incapable of generating strategy. To tackle
the two-front situation in Germany, three military leaders sequentially
devised strategy during the latter part of the 19th century: Moltke the
elder, Schlieffen, and Moltke the younger.
The German model
separated the military and
political spheres.
7
Case Studies
As CGS of Prussia from 1857 to 1887, Field Marshal Helmuth Graf
von Moltke laid the foundations of the way of war that Germany would
follow till 1945. Moltke was arguably the best practitioner of Clausewitz’s
theoretical edifice. He believed that strategy could not be pre-decided
but was a “system of expedients,” subject to constant changes. A believer
in directive control, against the Napoleonic style of close control of forces,
Moltke expected junior commanders to take the initiative within the
context of his grand design. This style of leadership would later result
in what is now called manoeuvre warfare, which depends on mission-type
orders. The Blitzkrieg was a later manifestation of this form of control
and utilised another of Moltke’s beliefs of cooperation of various arms
of combat power. Sensitive to technology, Moltke employed the power
of the railroad to rapidly move armies on a scale and speed hitherto
unprecedented, and the telegraph to orchestrate control. Further,
he laid the foundations of the enduring concept of the enemy army’s
destruction using strategic encirclement—Kesselschlact—first practised
on a smaller scale by Hannibal against the Roman army at Cannae in
216 BC.11 The essence of this fighting style was simple: locate the main
enemy force and destroy it “by mobilising national manpower, careful
planning, and a highly developed railroad system.”12 Moltke’s military
acumen was complimented by Chancellor Bismarck’s political acumen.
Otto von Bismarck was a master politician,13 his biggest legacy being
the unification of German states on the basis of Prussian power. Amongst
German states, Austria was historically dominant and France was the most
powerful neighbour that could influence who prevailed. Bismarck first
lulled France into neutrality, while Prussia fought and defeated Austria
in 1866. This helped him consolidate the support of other German
states, whose combined power he then used to defeat France in 1870.
In his quest for German unification under Prussian dominance, he was
opportunistic about relationships with other powers while appearing
to be non-aligned. Thus, he successfully avoided war with all parties
while keeping his focus fixed firmly on Austria, the one power Prussia
had to supplant.14 Bismarck was careful to not project any expansionist
intentions and reiterated his faith in the existing monarchical order to
assuage any fear in other states. He used misinformation by deliberately
leaking an altered telegram to the media, to provoke France to attack
Prussia. This perceived victimisation resulted in support from the
southern German states, a crucial step in unification. Even after this
8
Case Studies
combined power led by Prussia had defeated Napoleon III, following
the declaration of German unification in 1871, Bismarck was careful
to assure other powers that Germany harboured no more territorial
ambitions.15 Bismarck believed in the utility of power but used in a
controlled manner. His principle of self-restraint would later put him at
odds with CGS Moltke, who advocated for absolute victory.
As the CGS, Moltke had to plan for the problem of a two- or multifront war. For Germany, the highest probability was of fighting France
in the West and Russia in the East. A France-Russia-Austrian coalition,
though less probable, would be more dangerous. Moltke’s operational
doctrine relied on using an offensive approach everywhere until 1871.
While he won against France in 1870–71, the experience taught him to
modify his expectations of a quick victory. Thereafter, he settled on a
defensive–offensive strategy in both the West and the East, intending to
move in offence in the beginning, occupy defensible positions, prevent
enemy mobilisations, and have the enemy exhaust themselves against
his defensive firepower. Moltke allocated roughly equal forces in both
directions but later tilted to allocating more troops in the West, coupled
with faster mobilisation plans, since France too later reformed its military,
created border fortifications, and could potentially mobilise faster and
raise more combat power.16 In his initial intent in 1878, Moltke modified
his evenly balanced posture to be more defensive against France and
increasingly offensive against Russia.17 However, he continued to
envision diplomacy as the final tool, to end the conflict on amicable
terms. By 1888, Moltke had shifted to an offensive approach in the
West, with two-thirds of the combat power committed against France. At
the same time, he unsuccessfully attempted to reach an agreement with
Austria–Hungary for a military alliance against Russia. Towards the end
of his tenure, increasing military capabilities of his enemies once more
necessitated a quick victory against one, but the increased firepower of
the entrenched infantry made this impossible. He was now faced with
a two-front problem, unsolvable by available military means.18 Had
Moltke shared a better relationship with Bismarck, they might have
come up with a combined politico-military strategy.
In February 1981, Albert von Schlieffen took over as CGS. Schlieffen
differed from Moltke in several significant aspects. On the subject of
strategy, he believed that the “essential element of the art of strategy
9
Case Studies
is to bring superior numbers into action,”19 i.e. an offensive strategy
of annihilation. Schlieffen’s strategy, Kesselschact, became the theoretical
basis for the Schlieffen Plan used in World War I. He believed in
the close control of forces and the rigidly predefined schemes of
manoeuvre. Operationally, Schlieffen felt that the defensive firepower
of an infantry could be overcome by artillery, especially mobile heavy
artillery. While Moltke, keeping in mind political imperatives, believed
in the separation of political directions from military operations once
a war had commenced, Schlieffen took this a step further by ignoring
political context and concentrating on purely military solutions, never
going back to the war ministry even in case of a disagreement.20 This
separation would later contribute to the stalemate of World War I.
Under Schlieffen, the General Staff formulated 19 war plans for a
two-front war.21 The most crucial problem was the relative weight of
allocation of forces, i.e. which side to attack and which side to defend
against. Despite the advantage of interior lines, planners realised that
the initial movement of forces would decide the course of the war
strategy, with little scope for alteration thereafter. In boxing parlance,
the Schlieffen Plan would be the equivalent of “a left jab and a right
hook.” The plan rested on a sweeping thrust into France from the north
through Belgium and the southern Netherlands, while a small blocking
force held up the expected French thrust through Alsace and Lorraine
in the south. This made operational sense in light of the various
fortresses France had built on their common border in the south, and
the ambiguous defensibility of neutral Belgium and the Netherlands,
where France had created minimal defences. After defeating France,
the German army was to be rapidly switched East, to assist the small
‘holding’ force defending against Russia.22 However, considering the
rates of mobilisation of all countries, the distances involved, and the
time it would take to defeat one country, the concept of switching
forces after defeating one force was impractical. One analyst claims that
Schlieffen realised this impracticality, and in his final plan, he almost
ignored Russia to concentrate on his offensive against France.23
Schlieffen was succeeded by Helmuth von Moltke, a nephew of the
earlier Moltke, who also inherited the Schlieffen Plan in 1906. The
10
Case Studies
Figure 3:
Schlieffen Plan
Source: Willmott, World War I.24
younger Moltke not only inherited the plan but was also forced to use
it in World War I, albeit with some modifications, i.e. strengthening
the centre and not violating the northernmost Dutch territory for his
right advance, hoping that this would reduce international political
reactions. However, even the modified plan had significant drawbacks:
a) not factoring in international politics by assuming that violating
neutral Belgian (and Netherland in the original plan) territory would
not affect outcomes, and b) being too operationally ambitious, hoping
that the plan would unfold like clockwork, with the fighting advance
of 1,300 km and the marching rate of 32 km per day, winning a battle
11
Case Studies
of encirclement at the end of a long communication tether.25 The plan
ignored Clausewitz’s observation about the fog and friction of war. This
was especially true given the increased power of the defence due to the
arrival of machine guns in 1884; lethal artillery; and increase in the
total combat power of all belligerents post the 1870–71 French defeat,
by copying the German system of mobilisation and organisation of
General Staff.26 In any case, the right advance stalled into a stalemated
north-south trench warfare line, consuming soldiers in unprecedented
numbers. Thus, the basic premise of the Schlieffen Plan, i.e. a quick
victory against the first adversary, had failed.
Two decades later, a version of the Schlieffen Plan would partly succeed
via the concept conceived as Sichelchnitt, “Sickle Stroke,” which later
became known as the Blitzkrieg. The Blitzkrieg was the reverse of the
Schlieffen Plan. Anticipating a British–French attack via Belgium, the
Germans planned to outflank them using a southern thrust through
the Ardennes, with the mass of combined armour and air assault, which
had previously not been practised by any belligerent.27 The German
case in World War II differs from the 19th century in terms of the multifront situation. While Moltke’s primary concern was the threat on two
fronts, Hitler’s Germany harboured expansionist aims. The political
aim of the war was driven by the National Socialist Party’s ideology, of
Lebensrauma,28 in the east and racial purification. The party additionally
capitalised on the unjustness of the Versailles Treaty to garner public
support.
In getting the military to execute his vision, Hitler had to seduce a
reluctant and conservative military, altering its strategy-making process.
The military had continued the German tradition of separation of the
military and political establishments until Hitler gradually replaced
what he called “timid commanders” (e.g. the army C-in-C Werner von
Fritsch, the Minister of War Blomberg) with officers whose operational
plans and styles agreed with his own. These included C-in-C Army
Group A, von Rundstedt; his Chief of Staff, von Manstein; and tank
expert Guderian. Most importantly, Hitler created a new organisation
at the apex of the military, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW),
responsible for the highest strategic planning, making himself its head.29
The military strategy formulation process was institutionally corrupted
by the process of “competition” between personalities and war plans that
a
Literally, “living space.” Between 1921 and 1925, Adolf Hitler developed the
belief that Germany required Lebensraum to survive.
12
Case Studies
Hitler encouraged. The military became technocratic and managerial in
its approach to solving problems and stopped independently assessing
political and economic ramifications, blindly accepting Hitler’s ideologybased assessments.30
This form of political-military synergy was responsible for Germany’s
initial successes against multiple countries as well as its later defeat.
The success of the German campaigns into Czechoslovakia, Poland
and the Scandinavian countries owe much to Hitler’s accurate political
assessments, including the sound non-aggression pact with the Soviet
Union in 1939. Through the 1930s, Hitler managed to prevent enemy
coalition against a weak but militarily ascendant Germany. To this end,
he had to “create peacetime schisms amongst the potential members of
a coalition against him, and, finally, defeat such coalitions piecemeal.”
To prevent Britain and France from joining forces, Hitler created the
image of a fierce military, made his political aims appear limited, and
structured Germany’s rearming. For example, he delayed Germany’s
naval armament to avoid alarming Britain, the dominant naval power.31
Repeated easy successes created an appetite for further military victories
within the military. The rearmament programme and the operational
innovation of using “armour” en-masse instead of using it as “barbedwire breakers” for the dominant infantry arm as in all other militaries,
contributed much to operational success.
However, these synergetic successes eventually led to the military higher
command to concentrate solely on implementing the military aspects of
political directions, and they stopped offering objective advice. This was
partly responsible for the gigantic blunder of Operation Barbarossa, the
attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. While Hitler did identify Germany’s
Lebensraum, in the East, it was militarily inadvisable to open another front
while its victory over Britain was not yet assured. There are two possible
explanations for Hitler’s decision. First, his belief that the Soviet Union
was planning to attack Germany and a pre-emptive attack was needed
(as Hitler conveyed to his officers). Second, an economic concern, since
“Hitler was told that it would be possible to carry on the war only by
the seizure of Ukraine, the Donetz basin and, above all, the oil of the
Caucasus.”32 Historian Adam Tooze supports the latter theory. Germany
knew that a war was looming with an economic giant, the US, and that
it would primarily be aerial warfare because of geography, for which it
would require oil from the Caucasus. Already, Germany relied heavily
on Ukrainian for wheat and Soviet for coal, iron and metal ore. With
the country’s dependence on Soviet imports on the rise, Hitler wanted
13
direct control over the resources.33 As with Napoleon, the war machine
needed fresh conquests to feed itself.
However, Operation Barbarossa was dependent on a quick victory,
before winter set in. The German military did not question this
assumption of a quick victory, focusing instead on the military aspects
of the campaign, including where the main thrust should be.34 Barring
a few exceptions such as Guderian, most of the OKW and OKH
(Oberkommando des Heeres – Army High Command) staff questioned
neither the strategic aspects of simultaneously opening a new front nor
the assumption of quick victory upon which the plan was contingent.35
This hubris was a result of excessive domination of the strategy-making
apparatus of the military by political will, the military’s eagerness for
military success, disregard for the economics of a multi-front war and,
above all, the lack of objectivity in its analysis. For Germany, this became
the beginning of the end.
Case Studies
Israel
Since its inception, Israel has faced threats from multiple directions. It
has consciously avoided external
alliances,
choosing
instead
an image of “autonomy … to
convince enemies and allies that
on critical matters she is capable
of acting on her own.”36 The
military has been its primary
tool in tackling these threats.
According to military historian
John Keegan, Israel has “a very
strong operational doctrine ...
of the unrelenting offensive,
led from the front.”37 Since the
country has had no defensive
depth, its chosen strategy has
been to fight “offensive battles outside its borders,”38 to deter adversaries
through decisive military victories.39 Consequently, the Israeli military
invested fairly early in airpower as an important component, but
adopted armour as its complementary tool only gradually, instead
preferring paratroopers and infantry. By 1956, half the Israeli defence
budget was allocated to the air force, after much debate between aircraft
and armour.40 The decision was possibly influenced by the fact that the
Lacking defensive
depth, Israel’
s
chosen strategy
has been to
fight“offensive
battles outside its
borders.”
14
air force was not an independent service but under the control of the
General Staff. Thus, budgetary debates focused more on the allocations
for different arms of the army, rather than the service—something that
brings out the “us versus them” mentality.
The Israeli state has always relied on its citizens to generate wartime
combat power. It is a nation of reservists, relying on one of the fastest
mobilisation schedules in the world to raise combat power in times of
war. This has been done within the context of the anticipated reality
of short wars, since Israel does not have the reserves for extended
fighting or sustaining long mobilisations. Its air force has been the only
arm where Israel has relied on largest-standing numbers and the least
proportion of conscripts and reservists. Table 1 shows the figures for
1979.
Case Studies
Table 1:
Ratio of Regulars to Conscripts
and Reserves
Army
Air Force
Navy
Regulars
Conscripts
Reserves
18,000
19,000
120,000
2,000
4,000
1,000
237,000
4,000
2,000
Source: Keegan, World Armies.41
This reliance on the latest technology of aviation bore fruit during the
1967 war. On 5 June 1967, starting at 07:45 a.m. and continuing till
10:35 a.m., the Israeli Air Force (IsAF) neutralised most of the Egyptian
Air Force. Thereafter, until noon, the IsAF deliberately paused to assess
the intentions of the other Arab nations. When it became apparent
that Jordan and Syria too had entered the war, the IsAF neutralised
their air forces too, followed by revisiting Egypt. This was the only
form of combat power where it could take 1.5 hours to evaluate and
decide which country to strike next, or whether to strike at all. Thus,
total control of the air allowed the Israeli army to capture Sinai, East
Jerusalem and the West Bank.42
15
Case Studies
However, the 1973 war put the Israeli offensive doctrine to test. At the
military level, the Egyptians had found a defensive counter in groundbased air defence and anti-tank weapons. They decided to retake
the Suez Canal, fighting a war for limited military gains but eventual
diplomatic victory. When Israel attempted to use its air force on the
Suez battlefront, it recoiled from the heavy casualties. According to Air
Force Commander (and later, President) Ezer Weizman, “[T]he missile
bent the aircraft’s wing.”43 On the ground, too, infantry-borne Egyptian
anti-tank weapons inflicted heavy casualties on Israeli armour.44
Consequently, Egypt successfully re-captured the Canal. An important
reason for Israel’s relatively poor performance was an increasing
divergence between Israeli political constraints and its military doctrine
of pre-emption. After 1967, Israel had started to rely increasingly on
US support. Despite intelligence about an impending Egyptian attack,
the military could not forestall due to political considerations regarding
the loss of US’ material support. This was especially applicable to the
air force, which needed no mobilisation to attack. Thus, the military
ceded the initiative,45 which eventually led to a significant political shift.
Having realised that the Egyptian military threat was now militarily
impossible to tackle, Israel not only agreed to peace with Egypt but also
gave away territory equivalent to almost half its country’s size to buy
this peace.
So far, the political-military structure for Israel has been ill-defined
but effective in generating strategy. The cabinet has held command
authority, which it delegates to the minister of defence. While there is
no formal division of responsibility between the minister and the Chief
of Staff (COS), the chiefs of General Staff expect the minister to restrict
himself to “organizational questions and not include operational
matters.”46 Against terror incidents, the IDF had considerable autonomy
for retaliatory strikes without political consultation. However, the three
“army area commanders,” responsible for geographical areas, and the
air force and navy commanders cannot act autonomously in the case
of regular wars.47 With minimal exceptions, the political leadership has
served in the military and often played leading roles in war, which has
eased the formation of an effective strategy-making process that allows
considerable leeway to the military. Further, the open relation between
the ministers and the COS, along with the military consciousness of the
entire society, has helped Israel strategise effectively.
16
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Single Nation vs. Combined Powers
In each of the case studies discussed in this paper, the power of the
single nation faced by multiple adversaries was lesser than the sum of
power arrayed against it. Thus, the first significant question of strategy
is: How is a country to match or surpass the combined power of its enemies?
As political scientist Kenneth Waltz argues, there are two methods
for a nation to increase its security: strengthening one’s alliances (or
weakening the enemies’) and growing one’s economic and military
power.48 Napoleonic France and Prussia/Germany relied on the former.
Their alliances provided either direct military support by increasing
total troop strength or helped by opening new fronts, as Japan did
for Germany in World War II. On the other hand, following the 1956
war, Israel elected to not form any formal military alliance, choosing
instead to rely on its internal combat power. However, material support
by allies, such as the US in 1973, allowed the country to replenish losses
from the war. This form of support is easier to commit to than pacts,
which promise troops, since its domestic and international political costs
are lower.
At the same time, alliances often prolong the duration of wars,
adversely affecting the single nation. In all three case studies, the
outnumbered militaries banked
on short wars for success: their
doctrines emphasised speed
and they could not sustain long
wars against combined larger
powers. Napoleon had to move
swiftly and win against one army
before another could arrive; the
Schlieffen Plan depended on a
swift decision in the West; Israel
does not have the economic
capacity to keep its reserves
mobilised for long. However,
whenever the country in question
has relied on the assumption of a
swift victory, it has fared badly, e.g. the defeat of the German military in
the Soviet Union. Once embroiled simultaneously on the second front,
Germany exhausted its resources to fight the military and economic
might of the US. Consequently, the length of World War II eventually
defeated Germany. “Coalitions meant that even if one belligerent was
heavily beaten in a campaign, or saw that its resources were inadequate
A nation increases
its security by
strengthening
alliances, and
growing one’
s
economic and
military power.
17
to sustain further conflict, it was encouraged to remain in the war by
the hope- and promises – of aid from its allies.”49 Historically, such aid
has been either direct combat power or indirect material and economic
assistance. For example, the US provided emergency military supplies
to Israel in 1973, and to Britain and other allies via the “lend-lease”
programme in World War II, allowing a besieged Britain to hold off
Germany until the US entered the war. Similarly, against Napoleonic
France, Britain funded France’s enemies to sustain their armies.50 This
significantly foils the expectation of short wars, upon which weaker
single nations often rely when facing multiple adversaries.
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Increasing Military Strength
In increasing a nation’s military strength, an important question is
how a nation can defray the costs of these efforts. One method is to
pass the cost of maintaining larger armies to defeated countries. Both
Napoleon and Germany did this. However, this method created a
vicious cycle of needing war to sustain larger armies, which then needed
more conquests. An alternate method was to rely on conscription,
and later reservists, to keep a relatively small army in peacetime but
raise it to large strengths in times of war. Started by the French, this
innovation was gradually adopted by other militaries. This strategy
works especially well for countries constrained by small economies and
working populations, such as in Israel. Israel’s method has been to keep
a small exceptionally potent military but rely on rapidly raised strength
of adequately trained personnel in times of war, especially for the army.
The more specialist technical arms, such as the air force and the navy,
rely on full-time personnel. The result is a calculated balance between
military need and economic constraints.
Conscription and universal military training to generate reservists
results in a crucial social effect: the militarisation and politicisation of
civilians. This was one reason that other European dynasties opposed
revolutionary France and initially did not want to adopt its military
recruitment system. Its changes promised egalitarianism, threatening
the social order and power relations between the ruling class and the
ruled. This social effect is especially visible in Israel, where “when fully
mobilized, the Army includes within its ranks virtually all able-bodied
men and many women,”51 equipping most member of the society to
fight. This in turn affects war doctrine, shifting it from limited wars to
total war, aligning it with Clausewitz’s idea of the total destruction of
the enemy. This was evident in both the French and German armies
in the 1800s. As German historian Gunter Roth says of Bismarck’s
18
leadership: “The great reform of the army in 1860, with the introduction
of general conscription, initiated the politicisation of the whole nation
… this became a people’s war, a total war.”52 This further explains the
widespread internal support for the shift towards offensive doctrines in
Napoleonic France, unified Germany, and modern-day Israel.
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Achieving Political-Military Balance
At the military level, in all three cases, the single nation turned to
offensive doctrines.53 In the case of Napoleon and Hitler, this was
personality and ideologically driven. However, even before Hitler, the
German school found this the only way to not cede the initiative to the
enemy and suffer reactive defeat, aiming instead to defeat their enemies
piecemeal. In Israel, too, a reactive strategy posed an existential threat.
Like Napoleon, the Israeli government pushed across enemy borders,
throwing a challenge that could not be ignored and using the provocation
to destroy the concentrated mass of the enemy. When both the people
and military turn to offensive doctrines, increasing political involvement
is needed to maintain balance by directing and controlling violence.54
Bismarck’s deft handling of politics during the German unification best
demonstrates this. Left to himself, Moltke would have attempted to
conclude every war with the total destruction of the enemy, rejecting
all political oversight once war had commenced. Bismarck provided
a counterbalance with his view that it was his task “to conciliate the
opponents as soon as he could and, in that way, to establish a peaceful
order as durable as possible.”55 Thus, while Moltke wanted total victory
through total defeat, Bismarck aimed for lasting peace by preserving
a balance of power. When this civil-military balance was upset as in
Napoleonic France and Hitler’s Germany, the military tool started to
dominate international political intercourse, overshadowing other tools
and leading to prolonged (and often pointless) conflict.
At the same time, political oversight, while essential, must not stifle
military initiative, which could result in defeat due to delayed decisionmaking, especially in a multi-front threat. To prevent such a scenario,
“Israel [has] made [a] provision against ‘defeat through debate’ by
accepting the necessity for a direct, unsupervised relationship between
the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff,” much like the “right
of personal access (Immediatvortag) to the ruler won by the Chief of the
Great General Staff in nineteenth-century Germany, which was justified
by similar anxieties about the security of the frontiers.”56 In sum, a
multi-front threat demands a close civil-military relationship to balance
political guidance and oversight with sufficient military autonomy
regarding how and when to use its power when the time to confer is
19
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
unavailable. For the successful execution of such a model, the military
must understand political imperatives and be educated in political
matters.57
The importance of increasing political-military synergy implies the need
for a two-way conversation. It is not enough for the political leadership
to set a Clausewitzian policy and expect the military to deliver. The
military must engage with the process, identifying policies that are not
implementable. Both Napoleon and Hitler made military strategy slave
to their political ambitions, leading to overreach and ultimate defeat.
Von Moltke, a more mature strategist, correctly sensed that the twofront problems did not have a purely military solution; however, his
belief in the subjugation of the military to political will did not allow him
to advise on policy. The increasing separation of political and military
operations from Moltke to Schlieffen caused the implemented policy
to become increasingly unreal. Schlieffen failed as a strategist when he
seemed “to have taken the technician’s view that his duty was fulfilled
when he did his utmost with the means available, and ‘made the best of
a bad job’ in compliance with the customs and rules of his profession.”58
By World War I, the political aim was impossible to achieve through
available military means, but the extreme political-military separation
did not allow the latter to express this. Similarly, in the years between
1967 and 1973, the Israeli military did not resolve the divergence of
political imperative of no pre-emption against its doctrinal reliance on
pre-emption, resulting in Israel’s poor performance in 1973.
Thus, a sound political-military relationship is critical in tackling
multiple enemies. The right balance allows the two forms of power
to work together in tackling the various combinations of threats
and opportunities presented by an increasing number of enemies.
Furthermore, the political and military establishments must share a
common vision of peace for the regional system as a whole, something
on which Bismarck and Moltke could not agree.
A sound political-military
relationship is critical in tackling
multiple enemies.
20
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Improving Infrastructure
An important aspect of increasing a nation’s power to match multiple
enemies is infrastructure, both the indigenous arms industry and the
infrastructure to support military doctrine. The importance of the arms
industry came into sharper relief in the 20th century. Warfare changed
from marching to make physical contact to mechanised mobilisation
with battles involving non-reusable projectile warfare. While artillery
and rifles had arrived well before Napoleon’s times, it was the subsequent
mechanisation, massed firepower, and the new tool of aviation that
increasingly needed industrial production. The German military’s
expansion in World War II was fuelled by a war economy that channelled
increasing amounts of labour and material into its military industry.
While it was ultimately out-produced by the US, it could sustain a war
for so long not simply because of its total economic stamina, but because
economic power was channelled into military production.59 In addition
to exploiting the resources of
conquered states, this defrayed
the costs of a foreign policy that
used war as its tool of conquest.
Infrastructure
is essential in
increasing a nation’
s
power to match
multiple enemies.
Comparatively, a nation as
small as Israel that relied on
deterrent strategies could not
afford to produce everything
that it needed, to fight war
simultaneously with multiple
nations. Until 1967, it relied
heavily on imports, which provided the best value for money. However,
the French embargo on arms during the 1967 war brought home the
critical vulnerability of foreign dependence. Consequently, from 1967
to 1987, Israel produced the items most critical to its offensive doctrine,
especially fighter aircraft and tanks. After 1987, realising that economies
of scale would make self-reliance too expensive in the long run, Israel
turned to imports again and combined it with “focused self-reliance,”
researching only unique weapons systems that did not exist elsewhere
or were not available for sale.60
21
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Furthermore, from 1979 onwards, the US supported a large portion
of the cost of supplying Israeli military. As compensation for signing the
Camp David Accords and agreeing to keep peace with Egypt, the Israeli
military became the biggest recipient of US military aid in the world, at
US$2 billion per year. While this aid can only be used to buy American
equipment, thus increasing Israeli dependence on the US, it sustains
Israeli stamina to prosper in the face of multiple enemies. Not only
does it provide Israel with free weapons, but it also guarantees that the
biggest armed threat has been detached from the 1973 coalition against
it, since Egypt is the second-largest receiver of such aid from the US (at
$ 1.3 billion each year).61 Egypt’s withdrawal from the equation reduces
the possibility of Israel being attacked, since the potential coalitions
against it will now be much weaker. Moreover, the US’ involvement
since 1979 has ideologically weakened the collective Arab identity, with
each state pursuing individual interests, allowing Israel to improve
bilateral ties with the states.62
In all three cases, the endeavour to increase geographical flexibility
of force application led to solutions dependent on mobility. In France,
between 1763 and 1767, Jean Baptiste Vacquette de Gribeauval
“succeeded in creating a powerful field artillery, able to keep up with
marching infantry and capable therefore, of playing a major role in
battle.”63 Napoleon, an artillery officer, would capitalise on the mobility
of this new form of firepower. His organisation of the Corps, too, helped
mobility. Von Moltke relied on railroads to provide mobility to move
armies faster as well as switch forces before the enemies could raise their
armies. Under the Blitzkrieg, armour and mechanisation, coupled with
airpower, provided this mobility.
Investing in Tools of War
An important issue in multi-front threats is to determine the forms
of military power that would serve as the primary tools of war. Since
all commanders relied on offensive doctrines, requiring either swift
movement or quick switching between multiple fronts, they needed the
most mobile and versatile forms of combat power. However, despite
this logistical need, the predominance of an infantry mindset (or any
other established doctrine) has historically acted as an impediment to
investment in other forms of mobility and firepower. Before Napoleon’s
time, artillery had to struggle to prove its worth.64 It was the same with
22
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
armour in the German army.65 Later, airpower had to make its case in
the Israeli military.66 Believers in the existing paradigms do not easily
accept the emergence of new ones. Yet, it was the adoption of these
innovations that resulted in the military successes of all three countries
against the larger numerical strengths of coalitions.
Israel presents the closest temporal example for the Indian context.
Almost since its inception, Israel decided to invest the bulk of its budget
in airpower as its most important military tool. There are three aspects
to this investment. First, it allocated the majority of its budget in the
artefacts of this form of power.67 Second, it invested in human resource
in this area, raising a large, highly trained standing air force which,
unlike the army, did not rely on reserves but was always available
to take the fight to the enemy.68 Third, this force was not raised in a
doctrinal vacuum but had clear guidelines regarding its role in wars
and how to fight it. While it was not seen as the primary striking arm,
this force was considered indispensable to success. Implicit here was the
IDF’s recognition that the enemies’ air forces posed the biggest threat.
Thus, as with Germany, armour was only gradually seen as the primary
striking arm, and its proponents had to press to establish this doctrine.69
However, excessive reliance on only one tool eventually backfired in
1973. The 1973 war drove home the limits of military power in Israel.
After the 1967 success, its reliance on the forward Bar-Lev Line
defences made its doctrine increasingly defensive. At the same time,
Egyptian investment in controlling the air medium via a coordinated
air defence–ground manoeuvre provided mobility advantage to the
Egyptians. As D.K. Palit notes presciently while writing the history of
that war, the biggest ramification of Egypt’s successful limited aims was
that Israel realised it would have to accommodate politically.70 The
result was the Camp David Accords, an event that brought both Egypt
and Israel unprecedented prosperity. More importantly for Israel, it
removed from the equation its most potent military threat.
The predominance of an infantry
mindset has historically acted as an
impediment to investment in other
forms of mobility and firepower.
23
Patterns of Strategy:
An Analysis
Successful Strategising
When faced with multiple enemies the single nation must first decide
between an offensive and defensive stance. Would it be better for it to
attack on all fronts or hold one country at bay while swiftly defeating
the other? The most important variable in this is time, i.e. which enemy
was a more impending threat and which could be defeated first. It
was because Russia had greater depth and would take longer to raise
and generate combat power that von Moltke decided to tackle it after
defeating closer France. Israel in 1967 decided to first address the
biggest threat, Egyptian military—and within that, its airpower. The
increasing tempo of war and the use of airpower compressed the time
between sequential blows at different points. For the offensive blow, two
opposite military options were to either defeat the weaker force first or
the stronger.
The single nation that has
outfought multiple enemies has
relied as much on how it generates
strategy as on the technological
means it has applied, with grand
strategy aligned with military
strategy. In all cases, the national
politico-military strategy has had
the institutional ability to direct
war effectively and strategy was
driven top-down. In France, it
was Napoleon who “primarily
concerned himself with strategy,
sensibly leaving tactical matters to his field commanders.”71 For the
Germans, the General Staff, an organisational innovation for the times,
controlled this strategy. During the start of World War II, Germany’s
most successful phase, the OKW provided political guidance to the
General Staff. In Israel, the IDF’s General Staff is responsible for
generating strategy.
When faced with
multiple enemies the
single nation must
first decide between
an offensive and a
defensive stance.
24
A
nation that faces the threat of collusion amongst
adversaries must itself ask crucial questions to strategise
successfully. The following questions are derived from
analysing the three case studies. These may also apply
against a single adversary, but become increasingly
important in a multi-adversary scenario.
Questions for India
QUESTIONS
INDIA’S STATUS
1
What are the forms of
overt and covert collusion
possible? How can collusive
strategies be divided at the
political and military level?
2
The civil-militarybureaucratic relations in
India, according to military
Are civil-military relations
scholar Anit Mukherjee,
balanced enough to
have been marked by an
generate effective strategies? absence of dialogue.72
However, a defence reform
process has commenced in
December 2019.
3
Is there a General Staff
or person that formulates
and recalibrates military
strategy? Does it work
in harmony with foreign
policy/strategy?
25
Its military possesses no
permanent General Staff
or national Commanderin-Chief to formulate and
direct unified tri-service
strategies. One Foreign
Service officer is posted in
the Ministry of Defence for
International Cooperation.73
Questions for India
4
5
6
QUESTIONS
INDIA’S STATUS
Would the nation go for
alliances or/and self-arming
against superior adversary
strength?
India has always prized
its non-aligned policy
and never entered any
military alliance. Towards
self-arming it remains
the second-largest arms
importer in the world.74
However, an “Atmanirbhar”
(self-sufficient) policy
implementation has been
started.
Should deterrent strategies
be offensive or defensive?
Historically, India has been
reactive (except in 1971,
and recent punitive strikes
against terrorist camps).
What are the predominant
tools of combat power? Is
combat power organised to
be flexible and mobile?
7
Does infrastructure support
mobility?
8
How is combat strength
raised in times of war?
b
Largest standing
army in the world75 (a
predominantly defensive
tool, least flexible or
mobile).b
7th Largest Navy in the
World76 (more offensive
tool, increased mobility and
flexibility)
4th largest Air Force in the
world77 (most offensive tool,
maximum mobility and
flexibility)
Border terrestrial
infrastructure being
created.78
Air Force has seen a recent
increase in heavy lift
capabilities.79
Large standing forces with
retired personnel serving as
reserves.
Armies measure strength in terms of personnel, while navies and air forces use
numbers of ships or aircraft .
26
W
hen a nation is faced with multiple threats, it must
formulate appropriate strategies. The following
points summarise the strategies employed by
France, Germany and Israel, in various points of
their history, to handle two- or multi-front conflicts.
1. The nations ensured a nimble politico-military synergy, which
involved controlling and assessing international relations. The
structure of civil-military relations had to be just right, with no
dominance of either.
Ashish Singh is an Indian Air Force officer. He has a PhD in military strategy
from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
Conclusion
2. Military success needed an apex body or a person to generate a
strategy for war. The single nation always had one such person or
staff organisation working to split the seams of the enemies’ strategy.
3. The single nation worked hard to invest in the raising, movement
and application of wartime combat power, at a speed faster than
the enemies’. The technological and organisational means of
implementing this might have varied with time, but continuous
thought went into effecting this application. Enhanced mobility was
a common capability that each successful military depended on.
4. In all three cases the single nation’s strategy turned more offensive
in an endeavour to either destroy one enemy before switching to the
next, or to deter aggression. This Clausewitzian aim of destroying
the enemy is not an automatic measure of victory for every military;
it is only one amongst many potential measures of victory. However,
switching was not always possible.
5. Outnumbered militaries put effort into developing operational
concepts to even the odds. These depended greatly on asymmetric
usage of new technologies in combined arms warfare.
6. Militaries consciously invested in a few key infrastructures such as
railroads and the indigenous arms industry, or elite arms such as
armour, paratroopers, and airpower to provide exponential combat
power at affordable costs.
27
7. To raise combat power, the nations rapidly raised forces by
mobilising a large part of the population, thereby keeping costs
down during peacetime.
8. The militaries depended on short wars for success and were hardpressed when wars extended beyond their expectations.
9. While leaders rarely realised the limits of military power, when
they did, the country benefitted. For instance, unified Germany
under Bismarck and post-1979 Israel used politics to solve what
was militarily unsolvable.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the most important challenges to three nations
that faced multi-front threats in history, and analysed their attempts
to solve them. In solving its two-front dilemma involving China and
Pakistan, India must learn from these challenges and responses. While
India’s solutions and answers will be unique to its context, the broader
questions remain the same.
28
1
Brian K, Sperling, “Gentlemen We are Out of Money …Now we Have to Think:
Prioritization of Objectives in a Resource Constrained Environment” (Research
Paper Air University, 2012), pp. 22.
2
John Keegan, The Second World War (1989;repr.,London:Pimlico, 1997), pp. 52.
3
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), pp. 160,162.
4
Peter Paret, “Napoleon,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.
130.
5
Adapted from “Napoleon, His Army and Enemies,” http://napoleonistyka.
atspace.com/map_Ulm_Campaign_1805.gif.
6
Paret, “Napoleon,” pp. 130. He used this stratagem in the 1796 campaign by first
defeating the Sardinians and then the Austrians.
7
Adapted from https://i.imgur.com/vOzu0zt.jpg and https://i.imgur.com/jw8qIZe.
jpg.
8
David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815 (1997, Arnold, repr. London:
Pimilco, 2003), Kindle Edition, Loc 271, 349. By 1790 the French Army was
using brigades and divisions. In 1800, Napoleon formed the Corps.
9
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 167-172.
Endnotes
10 Hajo Holburn, “The Prusso-German School,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.
283-284.
11 Helmuth Graf von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, Daniel J.
Hughes, ed. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell, trans. (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1993), pp. 44-47,107-114,123-125,130-133,178,257. For Cannae, see
Christer Jorgensen, ed., Great Battles: Decisive Conflicts That Have Shaped History
(Bath: Parragon, 2011), pp. 34-41.
12 Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic
Encirclement,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 303.
13 Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 103.
14 Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 103-122.
15 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 234-244, 274-275.
16 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
306-307.
17 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,”
pp.307.
29
18 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
308-310.
19 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
312.
20 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
310, 313-316.
21 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
310.
22 Donald Sommerville and Ian Westwell, The Ultimate Illustrated History of the First &
Second World Wars (Leicestershire: Hermes House, 2012), pp. 24.
23 Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp.
317-318.
24 H.P. Willmott, World War I ( London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 2003), pp.31.
25 Willmott, World War I, pp. 16-17.
26 Willmott, World War I, pp. 18, 19.
27 Keegan, The Second World War, pp. 49.
28 Jeremy Noakes, “Hitler and ‘Lebensraum’ in the East,” BBC, March 30, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml.
Endnotes
29 Keegan, The Second World War, pp. 30, 46-48. The origins of Sickle Stroke lay
with Manstein.
30 Michael Gayer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914 -1945,”
in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.581-589. For operations, the OKW was not
supposed to exercise control, which was to be done by the army high command,
the OKH. However, practically, Hitler’s interference in operational and tactical
matters kept increasing, especially after the reverses started. See Gordon A
Craig, “ The Political Leader as a Strategist,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp.491492,497.
31 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 180.
32 Guenther Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man, Captain Cuthbert
Reavely, trans. ( London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1952), pp. 97,103.
33 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy
( New York: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 420,425,452.
34 Craig, “The Political Leader as Strategist,” pp. 494-495. Also, Heinz Guderian,
Panzer Leader, Constantine Fitzgibbon, trans. (1952, repr. Dehradun: Palit
& Dutt, 1970), pp. 192. Even the Chief of Staff of the OKH General Halder
believed that victory would take 8-10 weeks. Guderian, while not part of these
organisations, disagreed.
30
35 Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 142-143.
36 Yoav Ben-Harin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic Doctrine (Santa Monica: RAND,
1981), vii.
37 John Keegan, World Armies (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), pp. 363.
38 Edgar O’Ballance, The Third Arab Israeli War (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), pp.
49. Till 1955, Israel’s main threats had been Jordan and Syria, after which Egypt
became the most powerful enemy.
39 Ben-Harin and Posen, Israel’s Strategic Doctrine, vii.
40 O’Ballance, The Third Arab Israeli War, pp. 50. As per another source, between
1957 to 1967, a sum of US$ 385.7 million, equaling approximately 66 percent of
the overall acquisition budget, was allocated to the Air Force. Itai Brun, “Israeli
Air Power,” in Global Air Power, John Andreas Olsen, ed. (Dulles: Potomac Books
Inc. 2011), pp. 142.
41 Keegan, World Armies, pp. 361.
42 O’Ballance, The Third Arab Israeli War, pp. 62-72, 269.
43 Itai Brun, “Israeli Air Power,” in Global Air Power, John Andreas Olsen, ed.
(Dulles: Potomac Books Inc. 2011), pp. 154.
44 Insight Team of the Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Andre
Deutsch, 1975), pp. 172, 195.
45 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 27-29.
Endnotes
46 Keegan, World Armies, pp. 362.
47 The actual relationship between political and military leadership has been
constitutionally ambiguous for Israel. The time pressure for fast reaction has
ensured a conscious attempt to not paralyse the initiative of the IDF and lead to
‘defeat through debate.’ Practically, the degree of involvement of the Defence
Minister or the PM has varied based on personalities. At the operational level,
Field Commanders have considerable autonomy to exploit success as per
unfolding circumstances. Keegan,World Armies, pp. 362.
48 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Long Grove IL:Waveland
Press Inc., 1979), pp. 118.
49 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 330.
50 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 177. pp. 177.
51 Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane,
1975), xii.
52 Gunter Roth, “Field Marshal von Moltke the Elder His Importance Then and
Now,” Army History, No. 23 ( Summer 1992): 5, www.jstor.org.
31
53 This is also predicted by International Relation’s Balance of Power theory or
Structural Realism theory: “States that face several adversaries may prefer
offensive doctrines.” Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 78.
54 Violence here is used in context of Clausewitz’s theory that war theory lies
suspended between the three forces of violence (people), chance (military) and
reason (politics). Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89. pp. 89.
55 Roth,” Field Marshal von Moltke the Elder His Importance Then and Now,”
pp. 6.
56 Keegan, World Armies, pp. 362.
57 General Andre Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France, Desmond Flower, trans. (1965,
repr. London: Cassell & Co., 1967), pp. 17. Beaufre felt that the “absence of any
political education,” for the officer Corps was a lacuna that contributed to their
poor strategic thinking and so to the rapid fall of France in WW II.
58 Gerhard Ritter, Schlieffen Plan (London 1958),v, vii cited in Rothenberg, “Molkte,
Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Encirclement,” pp. 311-312.
59 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction.
60 Uzi Rubin, “Israel’s defence industries – an overview,” Defence Studies, 17:3,
(2017): 228-241, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2017.13
50823.
Endnotes
61 Melissa Rossi, What Every American Should Know About the Middle East (New York :
Plume, 2008), pp. 12.
62 For example, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum ties Egypt and Israel in a
common institution along with Jordan, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy. Meanwhile in
2020, Israel started supplying natural gas to Egypt that possesses the needed
liquefaction plants to convert and then export it further.
63 William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since
AD 1000 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), pp. 170.
64 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 172-173.
65 Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 26,32. Guderain faced challenges from both
infantry and cavalry. With the infantry, it was a tussle between doctrines; would
armour be used to support infantry or function as an independent effecter? With
the cavalry, it was about replacement of the horse and lance with the motor and
cannon.
66 The first and third IAF commanders both resigned due to under-allocation of
budget. However, compared to earlier mentioned artillery and armour struggles,
the Israeli military and political leadership accepted airpower’s importance
faster. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, pp. 120.
67 Between 1957 to 1967, the Air Force was allocated 66 percent of the acquisition
budget with the Army at 28.5 and Navy at 5.3 percent. Brun, “Israeli Air
Power,” pp. 142.
32
68 See Table 1. The Air Force had a larger standing strength than the army, and
catered for the least ratio of reserves.
69 This investment in armour doctrine happened almost in parallel with airpower
investment, i.e. between 1956 and 1964. Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army,
pp. 186.
70 D.K. Palit, Return to Sinai: The Arab Israeli War 1973 (Dehradun: Palit and
Palit, 1974), pp. 172. Writing a year after the war, Palit concluded in this 1974
publication that Israel would now have to accommodate, anticipating the EgyptIsrael 1979 peace treaty by almost five years.
71 David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars 1803 -1815.
72 Anit Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Military in
India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).
73 https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/officer_directory.
74 Rajat Pandit, “2nd biggest arms importer, India 23rd on importer’s list,” Times
of India, March 10, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/2nd-biggestarms-importer-india-23rd-on-exporters-list/articleshow/74559063.cms
75 Snehesh Alex Philip, “Indian Army now world’s largest ground force as China
halves ground force, The Print, March 17, 2020 https://theprint.in/defence/
indian-army-now-worlds-largest-ground-force-as-china-halves-strength-onmodernisation-push/382287/
Endnotes
76 Christopher Woody, “These are the 10 Biggest Navies in the World,” Military and
Defence, April 12, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/these-are-the-10biggest-navies-in-the-world/articleshow/63734348.cms
77 Hemant Singh, “Comparision of the Air Forces of India, China and Pakistan”
Jagran Josh, October 12, 2019, https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/
comparison-of-the-air-force-of-india-china-and-pakistan-1509539251-1
78 Nikunj Deep Singh, “Strong border infrastructure and bolder strategic policy,”
Observer Research Foundation, October 24, 2020 https://www.orfonline.org/expertspeak/strong-border-infrastructure-and-bolder-strategic-policy/#:~:text=In%20
2018%2C%20the%20Indian%20government,health%20centres%20and%20
so%20on.
79 “Lift Capabilities of IAF,” http://www.cassindia.com/lift-capabilities-of-iaf.
Images used in this paper are from Getty Images/Busà Photography (cover and page 2) and
Getty Images/Otto Stadler (back page).
33
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