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Operation Condor, The U.S., and Argentina’s Military Junta
Christopher Fowler
fowler.christopher@knights.ucf.edu
Latin American History 4512
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Abstract:
In 1976, Argentina was faced with a coup d’état that saw Peronist president, Isabella
Peron, ousted from power by the Argentine military. For the next 7 years, Argentina would be
headed by a military junta and this period would be marked by extreme political repression. This
era became to be known as the “Dirty War,” where an estimated 30,000 political dissidents
disappeared at the hands of the military government. However, the military junta did not act
alone. Under the United States backed program, “Operation Condor,” the military junta received
assistance in the forms of monetary backing and military training. This paper aims to explore the
connection between Argentina’s military junta and United States backed Operation Condor.
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Operation Condor, The U.S., and Argentina’s Military Junta
The 1970’s proved to be a tumultuous time for Latin America, Argentina included.
During this period, Argentina saw itself embroiled within a political struggle between its citizens
and its military government. Appearing to have started with the military coup against sitting
Argentine President Isabella Peron in 1976, the Argentine populace would be led by an
extremely repressive military government until 1983. During these 7 years, the military
government would perform acts of abduction, torture, and murder against anyone deemed
subversive. By the end of their reign in 1983, it is estimated that around 30,000 Argentines were
“disappeared” by the military government. Recently, through both discoveries of information
like the Paraguayan “Archives of Terror” by Martín Almada and information from declassified
documents released by the US government, we have learned that the actions performed by
Argentina’s military government were a part of a wider multinational operation known as
Operation Condor.
As it turns out, Operation Condor was a multinational intelligence organization that
received assistance from the US and featured the Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil,
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Operation Condor would allow these
countries to collaborate and share information with each other in order to locate and kill political
dissidents. Ultimately, Operation Condor provided the framework for these countries to locate
and eliminate their political enemies across borders.
The aims of this research paper are to explore the connection between Argentina’s
military government and Operation Condor as well as how the United States was involved. To do
so, this essay will first try to understand the origins of Operation Condor and the series of events
that precipitated its formal initiation in 1975. Then, the essay will attempt to answer the question
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of how Operation Condor operated and in what means did the United States provide assistance.
Finally, the findings of these explorations will prove to what extant both Argentina’s military
junta and the US government cooperated with each other within the confines of Operation
Condor.
This essay features information gathered through both primary sources and secondary
sources. Some of the primary sources gathered include declassified documents from US
government agencies that include the CIA, FBI, State Department, the DOD, and the
InterAmericana de Intelligencia Nacional. These declassified documents provide an
understanding of the organization, intentions, and methods of Operation Condor. The secondary
sources include two articles titled “Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation
Condor” and “Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System” by political scientist J.
Patrice McSherry. The first article explores the origins of Operation Condor by providing the
historical context of its inception while also exploring how it was instituted. The second article
explores the measures and tactics of Operation Condor by providing an in-depth look at how the
operation was conducted. The last secondary source is the essay, "Modernization and Military
Coups," by Guillermo O’Donnell. O’Donnell’s essay details the rise of the Argentine military in
the politics of Argentina and how that led to Argentina cooperating with the U.S. under
Operation Condor.
Origins of Operation Condor
The coup d’état that saw Argentina’s military force themselves into power in 1976 was
not necessarily a new phenomenon for Argentine citizens. In fact, Argentina’s history is replete
with instances where the military steps into power by overthrowing democratically elected
leaders. The coup of 1976 follows an extensive list of subsequent coups that date back to the
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overthrow of Juan Peron in 1955. While there had been other military coups in Argentina’s
history, the overthrow of Juan Peron is somewhat special as the motivations and ideology behind
it, and the subsequent period that followed provided the basis for the Argentine military’s
involvement in Operation Condor.
In the run up to the overthrow of Juan Peron, the politization of the military was
becoming quite evident as avenues to effect political and institutional change were becoming
sequestered. The military would begin to see itself as a somewhat patriarchal figure to the
country and would take it upon themselves to correct the course of the country when they
deemed that the civil government had failed to do so. This belief is exemplified by the
commander-in-chief of the army, General C. Toranzo Montero, during this period between 1955
and ’66, who stated that the responsibility for upholding “the republican way of life against all
extremism or totalitarianism” fell onto the military.1 This belief would set a precedent for the
intervention of Argentina’s military into the civilian government and provide the motivation for
joining Operation Condor.
One other development during this period from ‘55 to ‘66 that is essential to understand
Argentina’s involvement in Operation Condor is the modernization of the Argentine military. To
modernize, in 1964 Gen. Oganía sought help from the U.S. in the form of a “program of military
assistance” and the adoption of the “Doctrine of National Security.”2 This move would ensure
the modernization of military weapons and equipment, but it would also include the training of
methods and techniques that would be used to stave off the tide of leftist movements.3
1
Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups." In The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics,
edited by Gabriela Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, 403. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
2
Ibid. 404.
3
Ibid. 404-406.
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Ultimately, Argentina’s modernization of its military opened the doors to U.S. influence in the
area and the U.S. would use that influence to cooperate with Argentina in their ideological war
against communism.
It is essential to understand that U.S. and its foreign policy at the time was embroiled
with the Cold War and was committed to stopping the spread of communism. In the wake of
Cuba’s communist revolution, Latin America was seen as a place ripe for leftist movements and
the U.S. was happy to support Argentina’s adoption of the Doctrine of National Security. Under
the Doctrine of National Security, Argentina was willing to conduct an “internal warfare” against
those deemed “subversive” and that the type of “internal warfare” could include “ideological,
economic, or political” warfare.4
The factors that precipitated Argentina’s involvement in Operation Condor can be seen in
the period from ‘55 to ‘66. As the military became more politicized, authorities within it
conclude that they must be responsible for safeguarding Argentina from leftist movements. Their
agenda would coincide with the U.S.’s agenda of stopping the spread of communism and allow a
partnership wherein Argentina would adopt the Doctrine of National Security. From ’66 onward,
political instability and leftist movements would continue to rise within Argentina and would
eventually lead to the Argentine military’s involvement into and the formalization of Operation
Condor. The language used in the Doctrine of National Security describes exactly the kind of
warfare and repression used in the execution of Operation Condor.
Operation Condor: Organization, Methods, and Execution
4
Ibid. 406.
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Operation Condor was first formalized on November 28th, 1975, after a secret meeting
took place in Chile, hosted by the Chilean secret police in Santiago.5 A secret document,
obtained by the National Security Archives, includes the conclusions of that first meeting, which
provides considerable details about the establishment of Operation Condor, the intelligence
sharing of participating countries, and the facilitation of political repression. The countries listed
in the document include, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The document lists
several recommendations on how these countries will proceed under Operation Condor and they
include, the “multilateral … exchange of subversive information,” the establishment of a
“coordinating office, with the purpose of providing information on people … linked to
Subversion,” and the “establishment of a complete Directory … to request directly from them
any information on people and organizations directly or indirectly linked to Marxism.”6 The
implementation of a intelligence sharing network and the subsequent sharing of information on
any dissident or persons “linked to subversions” made up the first phase of Operation Condor.
Phase two included the “evaluation of the results from the First Phase and proposing information
to facilitate the drafting of a feasibility project of the System being discussed.”7 Finally, phase
three included “approving of the Feasibility Project of the System and assigning funds for its
implementation.”8 The “feasibility project” referenced in the document refers to the act of
suppressing those persons linked with subversion. A declassified document from the Department
of Defense mentions that the third phase included “the formation of a special teams … who are
to carry out operations to include assassinations against terrorists or supporters of terrorist
5
InterAmericana de Intelligencia Nacional, "Acta de Clausura de la Primera Reunion InterAmericana de
Intelligencia Nacional,” The National Security Archive, last modified November 28, 1975. 1.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4356254-03-Acta-de-Clausura-de-la-Primera-Reunion.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid. 2.
8
Ibid.
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organizations.”9 At its inception, Operation Condor created a network in which those involved
could gather and share data on political dissidents at home and abroad. Through Operation
Condor, these countries were able to facilitate a means for the extrajudicial killings of their
political enemies.
Operation Condor represented a large multinational intelligence and counter-terrorism
operation, however, “terrorism” in this case was very broadly defined as “subversion.” The U.S.
State Department echoed this point in a document that described Operation Condor, “the
problem begins with the definition of ‘subversion’ – never the most precise of terms.”10 The
document would continue by adding that the scope of Operation Condor “has grown to include
everyone that opposes government policy.”11 While political enemies and leftists were the
obvious targets of the operation, so too were union leaders, students, teachers, intellectuals,
priests and nuns.12
Argentina would turn out to be one of Operation Condor’s most active participants by
aiding in the “disappearance” of individuals targeted by the regimes of Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay. According to estimates, Argentina managed to disappear 127 out of 132
Uruguayans, 36 out of 72 Bolivians, 51 out of 51 Paraguayans, and 9 out of 16 Brazilians.13 119
mutilated bodies of Chilean leftists would be discovered in Argentina in 1975.14 Bodies would
9
John L. Bohach, and Paul A. Coughlin. "Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report." The National
Security Archive. Last modified October 1, 1976. 2.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/19761001%20Special%20Operations%20Forces%20small.p
df.
10
Harry W. Shlaudeman, "ARA Monthly Report The "Third World War" and South America." The National Security
Archive. Last modified August 3, 1976. 3. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/0000A02E.pdf.
11
Ibid. 3.
12
J. Patrice McSherry. "Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor." Latin American
Perspectives 29, no. 1 (2002): 38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185071
13
Ibid. 39.
14
McSherry, J. Patrice. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System." Social Justice 26, no. 4 (78)
(1999): 156. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29767180
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also regularly wash up on the shores of Buenos Aires and they were oftentimes mutilated beyond
recognition.15
The U.S.’s Connection to Operation Condor
While declassified documents from various U.S. agencies show an apparent surprise
reaction to Operation Condor, these same agencies were deeply aware of their actions and
involved in its implementation and execution. To effectively run Operation Condor, the countries
involved had to construct and maintain a wide-ranging communications system through which
they would share their intelligence. The telecommunications system they used was known as
“CONDORTEL,” and it was created with the help of the CIA, “who played a key role in setting
computerized links among the intelligence and operations units of the six Condor states.”16 In
fact, the CIA helped link the operation to a U.S. communications system in Panama, which
covered all of Latin America. A State Department document revealed that the communications
system is “employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the Southern Cone
countries.”17 The CIA would also share intelligence with Operation Condor, sometimes
providing “lists of suspects and other intelligence information to the military states.”18
Conclusion
To conclude, the highly volatile political landscape within Argentina from the period of
‘55 onward led the Argentine military to become more politicized. Their military then took it
upon themselves to be responsible for taking control of the country when the civilian government
15
Ibid.
Ibid. 151.
17
Robert White, "Subject: Second Meeting with Chief of Staff re Letelier Case," The National Security Archive, last
modified October 20, 1978, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010306/condor.pdf.
18
J. Patrice McSherry. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System."
16
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could not stave off the tide of ever-increasing leftist movements. This ideological reasoning
precipitated the coup d’état’s seen in the period of ‘55 to ‘66 and eventually in ‘76 with Isabella
Perón. This period also coincided with the Cold War and the U.S. forged a partnership with
Argentina wherein they would adopt the Doctrine of National Security, which subsequently
influenced them to wage an ideological war against leftist and communists’ movements, or
otherwise known as “subversive” agents. This would eventually lead them to join the U.S.
backed Operation Condor, where they would engage in at home and cross border operations
against these broadly defined “subversive” agents and organizations. Ultimately it would leave
thousands of dead in its wake, with over 30,000 Argentine citizens having been “disappeared.”
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Bibliography
Bohach, John L., and Paul A. Coughlin. "Department of Defense Intelligence Information
Report." The National Security Archive. Last modified October 1, 1976.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/19761001%20Special%20Oper
ations%20Forces%20small.pdf.
InterAmericana de Intelligencia Nacional. "Acta de Clausura de la Primera Reunion
InterAmericana de Intelligencia Nacional.” The National Security Archive. Last modified
November 28, 1975. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4356254-03-Acta-deClausura-de-la-Primera-Reunion.
Shlaudeman, Harry W. "ARA Monthly Report The "Third World War" and South America." The
National Security Archive. Last modified August 3, 1976.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/0000A02E.pdf.
White, Robert. "Subject: Second Meeting with Chief of Staff re Letelier Case." The National
Security Archive. Last modified October 20, 1978.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010306/condor.pdf.
McSherry, J. Patrice. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System." Social Justice
26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 144-74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29767180.
McSherry, J. Patrice. "Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor." Latin
American Perspectives 29, no. 1 (2002): 38-60. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185071.
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O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Modernization and Military Coups." In The Argentina Reader: History,
Culture, Politics, edited by Gabriela Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, 399-420.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.