Rule 117 – Motion to Quash
136. Antone v. Beronilla | G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010
An information was filed against Beronilla charging him with Bigamy. Upon motion, the trial court quashed the
Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after herein respondent
presented a judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The quashal of information was NOT proper.
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and
void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the Information. This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be
raised in a motion to quash.
137. People v. Romualdez | G.R. No. 166510, 23 July 2008
Romualdez was charged for violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 for holding dual positions of Provincial Governor of
Leyte and Ambassador to foreign countries. He sought to quash the information alleging, among others, that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged because of lack of
allegation of undue injury to the government. Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash finding that there is no
basis for the allegation of damage and prejudice for the failure of the Information to state that Romualdez did not
render service in the two positions which he occupied.
The quashal of information was NOT proper.
Its conclusions are based on considerations that either not appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are
evidentiary details not required to be stated in an Information; are matters of defense. An Information only needs to
state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted
to undue injury or damage - matters that are appropriate for the trial. Specifically, how the two positions of
Romualdez were incompatible with each other and whether or not he can legally receive compensation for his two
incompatible positions are matters of detail.
138. Perez vs. Sandiganbayan
An information was filed by the Ombudsman against petitioners for violating Section 3(e) of RA3019 before the
Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reinvestigation by the petitioners, the information was supposedly to be
withdrawn but was only amended by the Special Prosecutor. Petitioners now challenged the filling of the amended
information arguing that such was invalid since it was made without authority of the OMB.
The amendment of the information should NOT be accepted.
The delegation of the power to authorize the filing of informations under Office Order No. 40-05 was only made to
Deputy Ombudsmen, and not to the Special Prosecutor. All that was delegated to the Special Prosecutor was the
discretional authority to review and modify the Deputy Ombudsmen-authorized information, but even this is subject
to the condition that such modification must be "without departing from, or varying in any way, the contents of the
basic Resolution, Order or Decision."
139. People v. Laggui, G.R. No. 76262-63, 16 March 1989
Eliseo Soriano was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and estafa. Respondent Judge Laggui found the accused
guilty of estafa but dismissing the information for BP 22 for being “fatally defective” for failing to allege that the
accused, at the time of issue, knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the bank. The court ruled that such
interpretation is erroneous since maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds.
Erroneous judgement CANNOT be annulled without violating the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded "not guilty," and was tried upon a valid and sufficient information (although
the lower court erroneously thought otherwise) and the case against him was dismissed by decision of the trial court
(hence, without his consent and not upon his motion), he has been placed in jeopardy or danger of punishment for
the offense charged. For this Court to re-assess the evidence against him pursuant to the Government's appeal, would
place him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
140. People & Heirs of Jane v. Honrales, 182657, 25 August 2010
Honrales was charged with Parricide before the RTC. Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the
information. While this was pending, an Information for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against
respondent before the MeTC. Defendant was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide. RTC thereafter granted the withdrawal of the information for parricide.
The case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for
parricide was still pending before the RTC. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is
filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the
charge for intentional parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case
filed before it. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
141. Villalon v. Chan, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009 &
142. People v. De Grano | G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009
Petitioner assails an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of
murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused from murder to
homicide. Petitioner contends RTC committed GADALEJ when it entertained the Joint MR with respect to Armando
and Joven despite the fact that they never appeared in court during promulgation.
The appeal may prosper without violating the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy. Accused who failed to appear without
justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. When the Decision was
promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration.
143. Suero v. People | G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005
An information was filed with the RTC charging Suero for falsifying an undated Inspection Report. Also, an
information was filed with the SB against Suero for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. On appeal to this court.
Petitioner contends that the charge of falsification of a public document now pending before the trial court is
necessarily inclusive of or included in the earlier Information filed with the Sandiganbayan. He claims that his
acquittal by the anti-graft court constitutes a bar to the present case under the doctrine of double jeopardy.
The case should NOT be dismissed
We hold that the instant case does not constitute double jeopardy, for which the following requisites must concur:
(1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. The test for the third
element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or
whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 shares two common elements with the felony under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code -- that the
offender is a public officer and that the act is related to the officer’s public position. However, the latter offense is not
necessarily inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of
those enumerated in the former.
144. People v. Torres | G.R. No. 189850, 22 September 2014
An information was filed charging siblings Torres with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. RTC
found the appellant guilty of murder but was modified by the CA ruling that the primary intention of the appellant
and his co-accused was to rob espino and killing was only incidental to the robbery. Appellant now questions the
modification claiming that such tantamounted to double jeopardy.
There was NO double jeopardy.
When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant. In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed
to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate
court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment.
145. Torres v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 599
Sps. Aguinaldo filed a complaint against Torres for falsification of public document. Prosecutor’s office recommended
the filing of an information, which was filed before the MeTC. SOJ reversed the findings of the investigating
prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information. A motion to withdraw was filed which was granted by
MeTC.
The refiling of the information upon reinvestigation is allowed.
A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court,
their legal effect varies.
Motion to withdraw - the order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after 15 days from receipt
thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation.
Motion to dismiss - the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final 15 days after receipt thereof, with
prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Unlike a motion to dismiss,
a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once
the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
146. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, GR 183994, 30 June 2014
A criminal case for violation of BP 22 was filed by respondent against petitioner Co. In the absence of Uy
(respondent’s representative) and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed in open court. Uy filed
a motion to revive the criminal cases. Granted. Co argued that the dismissal became permanent 1 year after the
issuance of the order, not after notice to the offended party. He insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and
the RTC’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be w/in 1 yr.
The provisional dismissal of the criminal case has NOT become permanent.
Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites to the time-bar in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 8, Rule 117:
(1) prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of
the case; or both of them move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(2) offended party is notified of the motion;
(3) court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
(4) public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case
In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal cases or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least 3 days
before said hearing. The order of dismissal shall become permanent 1 year after service of the order of dismissal
on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived.
147. Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
Petitioner Ivler was charged with 2 separate offenses: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Ivler pleaded guilty to the 1st criminal case.
Ivler moved to quash the 2nd criminal case for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence. MeTC denied.
The second information should be quashed based on double jeopardy.
The charges of the 1st and the 2nd information are based on the same Article of the RPC, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses (reckless imprudence). Although the results on the 2 informations were different,
prior conviction/acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense.
148. Los Banos vs Pedro GR 173588
Pedro was accused for violation of the election gun ban. He later filed a motion to quash the information after the
preliminary investigation didn’t materialize. His basis is that he had a certificate to carry the gun. His motion to quash
was granted. Private Prosecutor appealed claiming that the certificate was falsified which caused the RTC to reopen
the case. Pedro opposed the reopening the case claiming that the dismissal is already permanent.
The time bar rule in Sec 8, Rule 117 is NOT applicable in this case
A dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another. While the
provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a
motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A MTQ is a class in itself. A
necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Sec. 3, Rule 117, then the appropriate
remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under Sec. 3,
then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions
required by Sec. 8 obtain.
149. People v. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, 6 August 2019 (supra)
Solar was charged with Murder with the qualifying circumstance of Treachery and abuse of superior strength. CA
then lowered the charges to homicide because the information failed to show how treachery was attendant. The SC
charged him with Murder again and now Solar claims that he can no longer be charged of Murder due to the defect
in the information.
The re-charging Murder is proper
Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad term
to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior
strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance.
Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill of
particulars under the parameters set by said Rules. Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the
Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He voluntarily
entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the
waivable defects in the Information,
150. De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, 10 October 2017 (supra)
This case is in relation to the entry of drugs in the National Bilibid Prison. De Lima filed for the prohibition of the
investigation but the DOJ Panel continued since there was no order preventing them do so. After the investigation 3
Informations were filed against De Lima and her co-accused , she later filed a motion to quash claiming the lack of
authority of the DOJ Panel; however a warrant was then issued against them. She later filed a petition for certiorari
claiming GADALEJ since her MTQ was not yet resolved.
MTQ need not be resolved first before issuing a warrant of arrest.
The judge had no positive duty to first resolve the MTQ before issuing a warrant of arrest. Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 required
the judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only 10 days.
Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner’s position that the trial court’s issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an
implied denial of her MTQ, the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present
petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from
an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain
and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial
RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL
151. BAYAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 143689-91, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA 415
Three Information charging Petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two counts
of malversation through falsification. The parties submitted a “Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents,” which had
been duly signed by the petitioners. However, they moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents,
reasoning that they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pre-trial order approving them, which was
denied.
The pre-trial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel are binding.
Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless for good cause.
Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases. The new Rules
on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Once they have validly and
voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that
they may be placed at a disadvantage during the trial. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify,
shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the
parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.