TITLE: REVIEWING STATE ACTIONS
PROVISIONS: N/A
(START) DATE: JANUARY 30, 2021
A. MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUGMENTATION
TITLE: BOBBIT, THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Cases that heightened the issue of the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to
constitutional questions:
1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas – dealt with the racial segregation
of children in public schools
• Racial segregation in public schools declared unconstitutional ("separatebut-equal" education is not equal)
• 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution – No state can "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law"
2. Roe v. Wade – dealt with the constitutionality of abortion
• 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution – the right to privacy that protects a
pregnant woman's choice of having an abortion falls under the protection
of the due process clause
Arguments defending the legitimacy of judicial review:
1. First Argument – Judicial review is Court's participation in the system of checks and
balances; judicial review insulates the judicial branch from politics
2. Second Argument – Judicial review is one way of ensuring government stability; to
avoid renegotiations of social contracts between people with unequal bargaining
power (because other branches of government have to respond to changing wants
and needs of the public)
3. "Third Argument" – Judicial review is legitimate in itself because the primary role
of the Court is to interpret the law
Types or Modalities of Constitutional Argumentation:
1. Historical Argument – based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
people who adopted such Constitution; the Constitution is examined under the
context of the period when the Constitution is formed
a. Example: The 1987 Constitution interpreted as a response to abuses
during the Marcos Administration
b. The WEAKEST argument according to Justice Leonen
2. Textual Argument – present sense of the words from the provision; the Constitution
interpreted under current circumstances
3. Structural Argument – practical result or principle of the Constitution is implicit in
the structures of government and the relationships that are created by the Constitution
among citizens and governments
a. Example: Separation of power among the three branches of government
4. Prudential Argument – the Court advancing particular doctrines according to the
practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way; based on a Justices' selfinterests or one's preferences
5. Doctrinal Argument – application of precedents/stare decisis
6. Ethical Argument – based on the traditions and values observed in the country
B. OVERVIEW - POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
TITLE: A. NACHURA, OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW (pp. 17–38)
A. The Power of Judicial Review
•
Judicial Review – power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution.
- Power is inherent in the Constitution.
- Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution: Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of Government.
1. Who may exercise?
- Power of the SC to decide constitutional questions.
- Constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the SC and implicitly recognizes
the authority of lower courts to decide questions involving the
constitutionality of laws, treaties, agreements, etc.
- Notice to SolGen is mandatory to enable him to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action is necessary.
2. Functions of Judicial Review
- Checking
- Legitimizing
- Symbolic
3. Requisites
- Actual case or controversy
- Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party
i. A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality which may
be set aside by the Court in view of the importance of the issues
involved; paramount public interest/transcendental importance
ii. “Present substantial interest” – such interest of a party in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him under substantive
law, to recover of the evidence is sufficient, or that he has a legal
title to defend and the defendant will be protected in payment to
or recovery from him.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
iii. A taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is a proper party to question
the validity of a law appropriating public funds.
- Requisites for Taxpayer’s Suit:
1. Public
funds
are
disbursed
by
political
subdivision/instrumentality
2. A law is violated, or irregularity is committed
3. Petitioner is directly affected by the ultra vires act
- The Government is a proper party to question the validity of its
own laws because more than anyone, it should be concerned with
the constitutionality of its acts
General Rule: a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied
to him, it is unconstitutional.
Exception: Facial Challenge, when it operates in the area of freedom of
expression.
Overbreadth Doctrine: permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute
even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if
applied to other not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.
Invalidation of the statute “on its face”, rather than “as applied” is permitted
in the interest of preventing a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression.
Facial challenge is the most difficult challenge because the challenge must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be
valid.
The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case
itself.
Bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution is
indispensable to the determination of the case.
Presumption of Constitutionality: Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
- Orthodox View: unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights and
imposes no duties; it affords no protection, creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it had not been passed at all.
- Modern View: certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized
Partial Unconstitutionality
- Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portions separability clause
- Valid portion can stand independently as law
TITLE: MENDOZA CHAPTER 1
Topic: Judicial Review of Constitutional Questions
Summary:
The author believes that we can enhance the values of our democracy by confining courts to the
role historically assigned to them in our system of separation of powers and by insisting on the
use of a differential calculus for measuring the validity of official actions. The question is not
whether we should do away with judicial review because it is counter majoritarian and
undemocratic. The question is whether we can make it do service.
Key Points:
• The practice of judicial review in the Philippines derives as much from colonial
practice and history as from the extension to the Philippines of American
constitutional law, part and parcel of which, it was generally assumed, was the power
of the courts to determine the constitutional validity of the acts of the other
departments of government.
• The decision in Marbury v. Madison received acceptance from the legal profession.
It became a part of the tradition of the judiciary. The course of history has confirmed
the existence of the power of judicial review. The growing cult of constitutionworship coupled with the belief that the judiciary, more specifically the Supreme
Court, was its guardian, imparted to it an aspect of inevitability.
• Angara v. Electoral Commission
a. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
b. The testing of the content of a legislative act for its "intrinsic" constitutionality is the
exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the "judicial power," which is what is vested
by the Judiciary Clause in the courts, is not the same as the "power of judicial
review." "Judicial power" is "the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights."
c. The "power of judicial review" is the power of a court to determine the constitutional
validity of the acts of the other departments of the government.
•
Vicente V. Mendoza "The Nature and Function of Judicial Review"
a. Judicial review means the power of courts to pass upon the constitutional validity of
the acts of the other departments of the government in cases properly brought before
them for decision.
b. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
• Indeed, the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of courts to "cases and
controversies." Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2 states that the judicial power "includes the
duty of courts of justice ... to settle actual controversies . . . and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." On the
other hand, Sec. 5 gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus and appellate jurisdiction
in 1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity or any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is Reclusion Perpetua or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
• The exercise of the power of judicial review, even when unavoidable, is always
attended with serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary
way, and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy resort to
this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of
the people and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do
that.
TITLE: CONSTITUTION (1987), PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
TITLE: CONSTITUTION (1987), ARTICLE III, SECTIONS 1 & 5
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
TITLE: DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 727 PHIL. 28 (2014)
Case Name Disini vs. The Secretary of Justice
Topic
Cybercrime Law
Date
February 18, 2014
Ponente
Justice Abad
Case
summary
In this case, the petitioners sought to declare the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012 unconstitutional and void because it is believed that such law violates the
petitioner’s certain rights.
Ruling
Here, the court declares the following void and unconstitutional while the rest is
constitutional and valid.
a. Section 4 (c) (3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in realtime; and
c.
Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
1. What is the factual background of the case?
•
In this case, the petitioners sought to declare the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
unconstitutional and void because it is believed that such law violates the petitioner’s
certain rights. The petitioners cited in the case several provisions that they see as a
violation of their constitutional right especially right to due process, right to privacy,
and their right to property. According to the court, the application of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act is to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace especially when
everything is accessible to the web and several crimes can be committed solely in
this platform
2.
•
3.
•
What was the law/measure/act being challenged?
The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
What was it seeking to achieve or address?
The petitioners are trying to address several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention
Act wherein certain acts can be penalized and will allow the government to track the
violators.
4.
What was the fundamental state power involved? None
5.
Was there compliance with requisites of judicial review? None
6.
What was the ruling of the court? (Note: summarize in 1 sentence)
•
The court ruled some of the provisions unconstitutional and void while the rest was
deemed constitutional and valid.
7.
What was constitutional law doctrine/principle involved? N/A
8. What do you think is the most important passage and why? (maximum of
5 sentences)
• “The task is complicated by the context in which this task is to be discharged: a
rapidly evolving information and communications technology, which has been an
enormous force for good as well as for evil. Moreover, the Court is forced to grapple
with the challenge of applying, to the illimitable cyberspace, legal doctrines that have
heretofore been applied only to finite physical space. Fortunately, we have the
Constitution as our North Star as we try to navigate carefully the uncharted terrain
of cyberspace as the arena of the conflict between fundamental rights and law
enforcement.”
•
For me, this is the most important passage because we have to accept that the world
as we know it further evolving hence our laws too must evolve. Due to the
evolvement of the world especially cyberspace, the laws are now in conflict on
whether to tighten its laws to the point they are evading our inherent constitutional
rights or to just let the law be. Here, it is the governments duty to find a way to
resolve this issue by establishing a law that does not go beyond the peoples
constitutional right and at the same time promote peace and order inside the
community.
9.
Which modality of constitutional argumentation did the Justices use?
Textual Argument
•
TITLE: SPOUSES IMBONG V. OCHOA, 732 PHIL. 1 (2014)
1. What are the Fundamental Power of State involved?
• Police Power. Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 of REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10354 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is
not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any
information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information
they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State. Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding
into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.
2. What was the Law/ Measure / Act Being Questioned?
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law).
The foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law.
•
3. What was the law seeking to achieve / address?
• The Law shall protect and promote the right to health of women especially mothers
in particular and of the people in general and instill health consciousness among
them. The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society. The Law shall
likewise protect and advance the right of families in particular and the people in
general to a balanced and healthful environment in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. The Law also recognizes and guarantees the promotion and equal
protection of the welfare and rights of children, the youth, and the unborn.
•
Moreover, the Law recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality,
gender equity, women empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights
concern and as a social responsibility. The advancement and protection of women’s
human rights shall be central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health
care.
4. Did the petitioner comply with the requisites of judicial review?
NO.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz:
(a) There must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) The petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
1. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY. Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject
petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe
for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there
is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In
short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
2. LOCUS STANDI. The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing
3-4. QUESTION AND ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. With these said, even if the
constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR
5. How did the court rule?
• The Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does
not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
•
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right,
but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
•
Wherefore, the petitions are partially granted. Accordingly, the court declares R.A.
No. 10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared unconstitutional:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
6. On which modality of constitutional argumentation did the Justices rely?
• Historical. The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested
their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that
the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into
the mind the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption
of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and
optional religious instructions in public schools
•
Ethical. While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections
based on religious or ethical beliefs.
TITLE: FALCIS III V. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, G.R. NO. 217910, [SEPTEMBER 3,
2019]
Case
Name
Falcis v. Civil Registrar
Topic
Power of Judicial Review
Date
G.R. No. 217910, 03 September 2019
Ponente
J. Leonen
Case
This case is a petition for same-sex marriage. The petitioner sought to invalidate
summary Articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Code on constitutional grounds. Also, he and his cocounsels asserted that requisites for judicial review were met, because:
1. There is actual case or controversy – petitioners-intervenors were supposedly
denied marriage license in 2015.
2. There is legal standing – petitioner claims that he has personal stakes in the
outcome of the case, as he is an “open and self-identified homosexual who alleges
that the Family Code has a “normative impact.” This prevents his plans to settle
down in the PH. Also, petitioners-intervenors (LGBTs church) claim third-party
standing as the assailed laws were against their religious freedom.
3. Issue was raised at the earliest possible opportunity – petitioner argued that the
direct recourse to the Supreme Court is justified because the issue is
of transcendental importance.
4. There is a constitutional question necessary for the resolution of the case –
petitioner claimed that the very lis mota of the case is the petition’s question on
constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.
Note: petitioner also claimed that a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted
as these two provisions regulate fundamental rights such as “the right to due process
and equal protection, right to decisional and marital privacy, and the right to found
a family in accordance with religious convictions.
Ruling
The Court dismissed the petition primarily because the petitioners were not able to
meet the requisites for the exercise of judicial review:
1. There was no actual case or controversy – SC said that it is not enough that laws
and regulations are passed or are in effect when their constitutionality is questioned.
Judiciary interprets and applies the law. It does not formulate public policy, which
is the province of the executive and legislative branches. The petition is deemed a
political question as it concerns an issue, which is within the province of the
legislature. Facts are the basis of actual controversy. There must be sufficient facts
to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
2. Petitioner does not have locus standi/legal standing – SC said that parties must
show that the assailed act have a direct adverse effect on them. They should establish
that the assailed law has a DIRECT INJURY on them. Mere assertions of a law’s
“normative impact”; “impairment of his ability to find and enter into long-term
monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to settle down
and have a companion for life in his beloved country” cannot be recognized by this
court as sufficient interest. ANTICIPATION OF HARM IS NOT THE MEANING
OF DIRECT INJURY/INJURY-IN-FACT.
3. Issue is not of transcendental importance – petition failed to establish that there
was imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights that warrant a direct recourse
to the court.
4. Given that the first three requisites were not met, SC could not rule on the
constitutionality of the issue. Even if they did, they would still rule in the negative
as the petitioner failed to present substantial facts necessary to persuade the Court.
Arguments were based on speculations.
Note: SC said there was NO facial challenge. Petition did not have a showing that
there was curtailment of the right to freedom of expression to avoid the “chilling
effect.”
1. What is the factual background of the case?
- Case is a petition for same-sex marriage. It sought for SC’s decision to declare Articles 1 and
2 of the Civil Code unconstitutional. Petitioner further argued that the petition had satisfied the
requisites for judicial review (see case summary above).
2. What was the law/measure/act being challenged?
- Articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Code. Petition also pertained to a constitutional case attended by
grave abuse of discretion.
3. What was it seeking to achieve or address?
- To declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Civil Code unconstitutional. Petitioner also wanted the SC
to use a ‘fresh approach’ to the Court’s exercise of judicial power based on Justice Brion’s
separate opinion (but this, according to the SC, has no binding effect).
4. What was the fundamental state power involved?
- N/A
5. Was there compliance with requisites of judicial review?
- There was NO compliance with requisites of judicial review (see ruling).
6. What was the ruling of the court?
- The Court dismissed the petition primarily because the petitioners were not able to meet the
requisites for the exercise of judicial review:
1. There was no actual case or controversy – SC said that it is not enough that laws and
regulations are passed or are in effect when their constitutionality is questioned. Judiciary
interprets and applies the law. It does not formulate public policy, which is the province of the
executive and legislative branches. The petition is deemed a political question as it concerns an
issue, which is within the province of the legislature. Facts are the basis of actual controversy.
There must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
2. Petitioner does not have locus standi/legal standing – SC said that parties must show that the
assailed act have a direct adverse effect on them. They should establish that the assailed law has
a DIRECT INJURY on them. Mere assertions of a law’s “normative impact”; “impairment of
his ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as
injury to his “plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country” cannot
be recognized by this court as sufficient interest. ANTICIPATION OF HARM IS NOT THE
MEANING OF DIRECT INJURY/INJURY-IN-FACT.
3. Issue is not of transcendental importance – petition failed to establish that there was imminent
and clear threats to constitutional rights that warrant a direct recourse to the court.
4. Given that the first three requisites were not met, SC could not rule on the constitutionality of
the issue. Even if they did, they would still rule in the negative as the petitioner failed to present
substantial facts necessary to persuade the Court. Arguments were based on speculations.
7. What was the constitutional law doctrine/principle involved?
- Exercise of judicial review (see Nachura and Mendoza)
8. What do you think is the most important passage and why?
- “The task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is
better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise.” (VIII-F,
para. 1)
This passage very well represents the carefulness of the Supreme Court in deciding cases that
are within the province of the other branches of the government. While this is ‘correct’ in the
context of the PH legal system (e.g. principle of separation of powers, checks and balances), I
feel that this constrains some marginalized groups from getting the full support of the judiciary.
I think that SC decisions largely influence policy-making bodies, such as the Congress. With
the SC’s ruling in this case, I am under the impression that the highest court in the PH is still
hesitant in fighting for the rights of some minority groups, and in deciding novel cases involving
sensitive issues [but this is completely understandable with the deeply-embedded structures (e.g.
rules and regulations, laws, etc.) existing in the PH legal system]. Please connect this with
Mendoza’s point on “double standard of review” or the call for judicial activism (pp. 441
onwards).
9. Which modality of constitutional argumentation did the Justices use?
- Doctrinal. J. Leonen cited many SC decisions discussing the requisites of judicial review.
- Structural. The SC also discussed political questions doctrine – hence, the interaction between
the judiciary and the other two branches of the government (in this case, the Congress).
C. OVERVIEW – FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
TITLE: A. NACHURA, OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
Inherent powers of the State
1. Police Power
2. Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation
Similarities
1. inherent in the state, without need of express constitutional grant
2. necessary and indispensable
3. methods by which the state interferes with private property
4. presupposes equivalent compensation
5. exercised primarily by legislature
Distinctions
Police Power
Eminent Domain
- regulates liberty - affects only property rights
and property
- may be exercised by private
- exercised only by entities
government
- the property is wholesome
- property taken is and devoted to public
usually noxious or use/purpose
intended for noxious
purposes and may be
destroyed
- compensation is the full and
fair equivalent of the property
- compensation is the taken
intangible, altruistic
feeling that the
individual
has
contributed to the
public good
Power of Taxation
- affects only property rights
exercised
government
only
by
- the property is wholesome
and devoted to public
use/purpose
- compensation is the
protection given and/or public
improvements instituted by
government for taxes paid
Limitations
1. Bill of Rights
2. Courts may annul improvident exercise of police power
Police Power
• Power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
• Most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of the three powers.
Who may exercise?
• Inherently vested in Legislature
• Congress may validly delegate this power to the President, administrative bodies and to
lawmaking bodies of LGUs.
• LGUs exercise this power under the general welfare clause
Limitations (test for valid exercise)
• Lawful subject: interest of the public; activity or property sought to be regulated affects
the general welfare; if it does then the enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may
have to yield to the interest of the greater number.
•
Lawful means: means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
o Express grant by law
o Within territorial limits (for LGUs except when exercised to protect water
supply)
o Must not be contrary to law
For Municipal Ordinances to be Valid:
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or the statute
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. Must not be unreasonable
6. Must be general in application and consistent with public policy
Power of Eminent Domain (Power of Expropriation)
Jurisdiction
• RTC
Who may exercise the power?
• Congress
• By delegation, the President, administrative bodies, LGUs and even private enterprises
performing public services
Requisites
1. Necessity
2. Private Property, except money and choses in action
3. Taking in the constitutional sense
4. Public use
5. Just Compensation – full and fair equivalent of the property taken; fair market value of
the property
Judicial Prerogative
• Ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation for property taken in eminent
domain cases is a judicial prerogative.
Form of Compensation
• Paid in money and no other form.
• In agrarian reform, payment is allowed to be made partly in bonds because under the
CARP, “we do not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain;
we deal with a revolutionary kind of expropriation.”
Reckoning point of market value of the property
• Date of the taking or filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.
Principal criterion in determining just compensation
• Character of the land at the time of the taking
Entitlement of owner to interest
• Delay in Payment of Just Compensation: the owner is entitled to payment of interest if
claimed; otherwise, interest is deemed waived;
• Interest is 6% per annum, prescribed in Article 2209 of the CC, NOT 12% per annum
under Central Bank Circular No. 416, latter applies to loans or forbearances of money,
goods or credits or judgments involving such loans or forbearance of money, goods or
credits. The kind of interest here is by way of damages.
• In some expropriation cases, the court imposes 12% damages for delay in payment
which, in effect, makes the obligation on the part of government one of forbearance.
Who else may be entitled to just compensation?
• Owner
• Those who have lawful interest
Title to the property
• Does not pass until after payment
Right of landowner in case of non-payment of just compensation
• Does not entitle to recover possession of the expropriated lots
• Only to demand payment of the FMV of the property
Due process of law
• Defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
Writ of Possession, ministerial upon:
1. Filing of complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance
2. Upon deposit by the government of the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the
property per current tax declaration
The plaintiff’s right to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to Court approval and to
certain conditions, because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the
taking.
Right to repurchase or re-acquire the property
Property owner’s right to repurchase the property depends upon the character of the title
acquired by the expropriator: if land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition
that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property shall revert to the former owner, the
former owner can re-acquire the property.
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order:
1. Government lands
2. Alienable lands of the public domain
3. Unregistered, abandoned or idle lands
4. Lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired
5. BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
6. Privately owned lands
The mode of expropriation is subject to 2 conditions:
1. Resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted
2. Parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition
Small property owners:
1. Highly Urbanized Cities: not more than 300 sq. m.
2. Other Urban Areas: not more than 800 sq. m.
3. They do not own residential property other than the same
Power of Taxation
Who may exercise?
• Legislature
• Local legislative bodies
• To a limited extent, the President, when granted delegated tariff powers
Limitations on the exercise
• Due process of law, must not be confiscatory
• Equal protection clause, must be uniform and equitable
o Public purpose
o Territorial
Double taxation
• Additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction during the
same taxing period and for the same purpose.
Tax Exemptions
• No law granting tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of Congress.
• Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes exempt
• Revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes
exempt
• Proprietary educational institutions may be exempt subject to limitations provided by
law
• Grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes exempt
Police Power vs. Taxation
License fee v. Tax
• License fee
o police measure
o paid for the privilege of doing something and may be revoked when public
interest so requires
o amount collected is limited to the cost of permit and reasonable police regulation
(except when the license fee is imposed on a non-useful occupation)
• Tax
o revenue measure
o imposed on persons or property for revenue
o amount may be unlimited provided it is not confiscatory
TITLE: U.S. V. POMPEYA, 31 PHIL. 245 (1915).
Case
Name
U.S. v. Silvestre Pompeya
Topic
Fundamental Powers of the State
Date
August 6, 1915
Ponente
J. Johnson
Doctrine At common law, protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly
included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had
acquitted the accused of the offense, and it is the settled law of this court that former
jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although
no judgment be entered on the verdict and it was found upon a defective indictment.
The second jeopardy is not against the peril of second judgment, but against being
again tried for the same offense.
Facts
• The acting prosecutor attorney for Iloilo filed a complaint against
Silvestre Pompeya before the Court of First Instance in relation to an alleged violation
of the Municipal Ordinance of Iloilo (EO 1, 1914, Sec. 40(m) of the Municipal Code).
o Section 40(m). "With the approval of the provincial governor, when a
province or municipality is infested with ladrones or outlaws, the
municipal council is empowered: To authorize the municipal president
to require able-bodied male residents of the municipality, between
the ages of 18 and 50 years, to assist, for a period of not exceeding 5
days in any month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other
lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the
protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day in each
week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied man to
render promptly the service thus required shall be punishable by a
fine or imprisonment... in the discretion of the Court
o For refusing to render service, Pompeya was fined P2.
• Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer (a pleading in a lawsuit that objects
to or challenges a pleading filed by an opposing party), arguing that the act charged
against him does not constitute a crime. He also argued that it (Sec. 40(m) of the
Municipal Code) is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of
the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
• The CFI sustained the demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Thus, the
U.S. appeals to the SC.
Issue : Whether Sec. 40(m) of the Municipal Code is unconstitutional
Held: NO
Sec. 40(m) of the Municipal Code is constitutional.
•
•
•
•
The power exercised under the Act falls within the state's police power, and the state
was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same to the Philippine
municipalities (Structural Argument)
The Philippine Legislature has the power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the
people of the Philippine Islands (Structural Argument)
Historically, there was a "purely customary ancient obligation" to render service for
the protection of all during the period of tribal relations of the primitive man. This
was later made obligatory under the law. (Structural Argument/Historical
Argument)
The Act simply designates the cases and the method where people of the pueblo may
be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the
preservation of peace and good order (Structural Argument)
Note : Blackstone's definition of police power - The defenses regulations, and domestic order
of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are
bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good
manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
TITLE: ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL. 1155 (1957).
Case
Name
Lao Ichong vs. Jaime Hernandez, Sec. of Finance and Marcelo Sarmiento, City
Treasurer of Manila
Topic
Fundamental Powers of the State
Date
G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957
Ponente
-
1. What is the factual background of the case?
• Between 1935 to 1954, Statistics on the retail trade points to an increasing dominance
and control by the alien of the retail trade.
• R.A. No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was enacted to
nationalize the retail trade business. Among others, the law prohibits
aliens and associations, partnerships or corporations not wholly owned by Filipinos
from engaging directly and indirectly in the retail trade.
• Ichong, and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected
by R.A. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that the said
Act is unconstitutional because it denies them the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law.
2. What was the law/measure/act being challenged?
• R.A. No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.”
• The main provisions of the law are:
o (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in
said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act
or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
o (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the
United States;
o (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;
o (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in
the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business,
o (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a veri9ed statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their assets and principal assets of juridical entities; and
o (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who
die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
3. What was it seeking to achieve or address?
• The law purports to protect citizens and the country from the alien retailer. Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national
security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete
and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage.
4. What was the fundamental state power involved?
• The fundamental power of the state involved is police power because the law
regulates the conduct of aliens in retail business to promote economic independence
and national security.
5. Was there compliance with requisites of judicial review?
• Yes. The requisite of judicial review were present.
• There
is an actual case or controversy because the law seeks
to prohibited aliens (Chinese) from engaging in retail trade.
• The petitioners have legal standing because they are aliens who are engaged in the
retail trade.
• The issue was raised in the earliest possible opportunity because it the
petitioners filed it to the Supreme Court to invalidate the law.
• The issue of constitutionality of R.A. 1180 is the lis mota of the case. It being
violative of the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
6. What was the ruling of the court?
• The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the assailed law.
• They reasoned that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control. The statute
is within the scope of the police power of the state.
o
That the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise
of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
7. What was the constitutional law doctrine/principle involved?
• Police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection are supposed to
coexist. The State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
• The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
8. What do you think is the most important passage and why?
• If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then
economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real
and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of
others, especially if not of their own race or country.
• I just find these sentences ironic because the Supreme Court mentioned in the latter
part of the case that the Constitution grants special rights to the U.S. and are thus,
not prohibited from engaging in retail trade, more so, in other political and economic
relations of the state. Further, this implies that although the Philippines is an
independent state with its own Constitution, it is not genuinely experiencing freedom
and liberty.
9. Which modality of constitutional argumentation did the Justices use?
• Historical because the Court traced the legislative history and intent of the assailed
law and found out that the framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence
of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically
declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public
interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade.
• Textual because the Court applied the provisions of R.A. 1180 as it is written.
• Structural because the Court mentioned that its duty is to determine if the law falls
within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the provisions of the
Constitution. Further, it mentioned that remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature, thereby giving credence to the principle of
separation of power.
• Prudential because the Court highlighted the importance of economic independence
and national security, enabling national retailers to expand and dominate the retail
industry.
• Doctrinal because the Court’s decision was guided by jurisprudence.
•
TITLE: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION, INC.
V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, 127 PHIL. 306 (1967).
Lower Court
Supreme Court
held that Ordinance 4760 is and adjudged it reversed the lower Court’s decision and
"unconstitutional,
the injunction issued
and, therefore, null and void." Issued an injunction lifted forthwith.
against Ordinance 4760
Facts:
1. On 5 July 1963, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No.
4760 for being violative of the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is
not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guarantee
against self-incrimination.
2. Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it
fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
3. Lower Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is violative of the due process clause.
Held:
No. Ordinance 4760 is not violative of the due process clause.
There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Municipal Board) is valid.
Without a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case,
there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside
Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the
kind from operating for purposes other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
of the city government." The due process contention is likewise untenable There is no
controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that
matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and
result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours.
Such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injunction on the Ordinance
in question.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
TITLE: AGUSTIN V. EDU, 177 PHIL. 160 (1979).
Case
Name
Leovillo Agustin v. Romeo Edu (as Land Transportation Commissioner) et al.
Topic
Fundamental Powers of the State
Date
February 2, 1979
Ponente Justice Fernando
Doctrine In Calalang v. Williams, the Court identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state
Facts
•
•
•
•
•
President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) no. 229, which authorizes the
Land Transportation Commissioner to cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning
Devices to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles.
LOI no. 229 was amended by LOI no. 479 which states:
o "The Land Transportation Commissioner shall require every motor
vehicle owner to procure from any source and present at the registration
of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device,
as described herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle
owner. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate
such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order."
Pursuant to such LOIs, Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, which set forth
the Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Agustin, an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, alleged that his motor vehicle was
already equipped with blinking lights which could very well serve as early warning
devices.
o He says that LOI 229 and LOI no. 479 violates the provisions and
delegation of police power. He characterized such Instructions as
oppressive, unreasonable, and arbitrary.
o According to him, manufacturers and dealers will become instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy early
warning devices.
SC issued a TRO before proceeding to resolve the case.
Issue : Whether LOI no. 229 is a valid exercise of police power
Held: YES
The challenged Letter of Instruction is a valid police power measure. Nor could the
implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an
exercise of legislative power because LOI 229 is clearly intended to promote public safety.
• The Court argues that the President has the necessary statistical information and data
to cause the enactment of such measures. During that period, nighttime vehicular
accidents are common.
• According to the Court, Agustin questions the wisdom behind the LOI, not if
President has the power to enact such. The Court does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice, or expediency of legislation
• Calalang v. Williams - identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state.