Isabelle van Bolhuis
2642300
Group – 6 – Steven Bommer
World Philosophy
1.
The idea of interculturality was brought into being, to ascertain how different philosophies, as well as
cultures and religions, can peacefully interact with each other1
The basic tenets and interpretation of intercultural philosophy, described by Pius Mosima (2016) and
Ram Adhar Mall (2014), I view as analogous in their basic presuppositions. Both taking it to be not
fixed, but flexible2, always having a point of view3, and valuing this diversity4.
On the other hand, their judgments on Comparative Philosophy do differ, not so much on the
understanding of the faulty historical application of this philosophical approach , but on their view on
if we should abandon/fix this approach. Let’s describe this field, its’ faults, and how Mosima and Mall
differ in how to improve upon it.
Comparative Philosophy – as the name implies – compares (traditions, cultures and so on). Mall sees
this as an important practice but advises us that this can only be meaningfully carried out if we take
the intercultural-orientation as a starting-point.5 Mosima directly criticizes Mall in his’ article, and
states that this comparison could foster relativism6, and we “need to distance ourselves from the
comparative-philosophy approach to interculturality.”7
Though they both agree on its problematic application in the past, such as the strong hegemonic bias,
and putting inflexible boundaries between West and non-Western philosophies.
These faults, leads us nicely into the next topic. As James Ingrams’ description of the problems with
Cosmopolitanism overlaps fittingly with those of Comparative Philosophy, moreover it fits with Mall’s
conception of Comparative philosophy: “don’t abandon, rethink”8
Let me elaborate what this approach of Ingram entails, and why this would be advantageous to follow
within World Philosophy. Ingram starts off by describing different theoretical perspectives within
cultural philosophy, concluding that all of these lead to faulty executions. He proposes his’ own
1
R. A. Mall “intercultural Philosophy: a Conceptual Clarification” (2014) - p. 71
P. Mosima “Introduction to African Philosophy” (2016) - p. 23
3
R. A. Mall “intercultural Philosophy: a Conceptual Clarification” (2014) – p. 70
4
Idem – p. 70
5
Idem – p. 81
6
P. Mosima “Introduction to African Philosophy” (2016) – p.22
7
Idem – p.23
8
J. Ingram “Cosmopolitanism from Below” (2012) – p. 67
2
solution, which instead of starting from above, which are the elites and Western society (i.e. the
Hegemonic bias, within Comparative Philosophy), we should look at it from below.
These descriptors “below” and “above”, I believe, also nicely coincide with an “intercultural
orientation”, as mentioned in lecture one, orientation reflects something spatial, orienting in this
example either from below/above. Though Ingram uses the word with a slightly different intend, he
views the problem of Cosmopolitanism in its form, and the solution should be sought at the same
level. 9 This might be the problem (and perhaps solution) for Comparative Philosophy, but I have not
ascertained this to be a problem for World Philosophy.
When Kirloskar in her lecture explained that World Philosophy, should follow Ingram’s approach, she
most likely referred to the commitment to dialogue10, always being subject to contestation11, and not
having one ideology (Western) be the ‘universal’ tradition12
That is also what I have most obtained from what ‘World Philosophy’ entails, “an intercultural
hermeneutical approach which is non-reductive, open, creative, and tolerant”13
An overlapping Venn diagram, where we retain our individual characters, and find a space to have
dialogue. As well as “that there are many philosophical traditions of significance in all regions of the
world, rather than just a few or one”14 Staying critical of my own Western bias and broadening the
way I view “Philosophy” altogether.
9
Idem – p. 72
Idem – p.73
11
Idem – p. 74
12
Idem – p. 71
13
R. A. Mall “intercultural Philosophy: a Conceptual Clarification” (2014) – P. 80
14
P. Mosima “Introduction to African Philosophy” (2016) - p. 21
10
2.
Let me start off with Descartes15 view on the soul and body, as his views and terminology is most
recognizable to us 16.
Plenty of us are familiar with Descartes’ dualism, the divide between the immaterial soul, and the
material body, which connect and interact with each other through the pineal gland.17 Before further
conceptualizing how Descartes sees the soul, we can already draw three similarities between
Descartes and Akan Philosophy.
Firstly, about this dualism, as stated by Gyekye18: “The Akan conception of a person, in my analysis, is
dualistic, not tripartite…”19. Secondly also making the distinction between the material and
immaterial, though the Akans add to this the ‘sunsum’(spirit). And lastly describing a connection,
between the material (body/honam) and the immaterial, through a mediator, (which is actually a
quite impressive similarity, as a strict dualist does not allow for an interaction20). For the Akan this
interaction goes via the blood (mogya)21, for Descartes this also includes the blood, but he adds to
this the animal spirits and the nerves.22
As promised, let me clarify Descartes’ understanding of the soul and the body, and the terminology of
the Akans.
Descartes’ view is perfectly summarized in this passage: “for there are two things in the human soul
upon which all the knowledge we can have of its nature depends, on the one hand that it thinks, and
on the other that being united to the body it can act and suffer along with the body”23 The sole
function of the soul is thought, of which he distinguishes two kinds: volitions, and passions24
15
R. Descartes “The Passions in General and incidentally the whole nature of man” (1984, 1649)
I am assuming here that the readers are Westerners, mainly from the European continent (to keep in line
with World Philosophy’s prescriptions)
17
R. Descartes “The Passions in General and incidentally the whole nature of man” (1984) P. 340
18
K. Gyekye “The Relation of Okra (Soul) and Honam (Body): an Akan Conception” (1998)
19
Page 64 – Kwame Gyekye (1995)
20
Plato.stanford.edu - Dualism
21
K. Gyekye “The Relation of Okra (Soul) and Honam (Body): an Akan Conception” (1998) p.64
22
R. Descartes “The Passions in General and incidentally the whole nature of man” (1984) p.341
23
R. Descartes 1958, letter of May 31, 1643
24
R. Descartes “The Passions in General and incidentally the whole nature of man” (1984) p.335
16
These functions partially overlap with the Sunsum in Akan Philosophy, which pursues and experiences
desires25, and is our ‘personality principle26. However, the okra more closely resembles our
conception of ‘the Soul’27. And the Honam also closely resembles our, and Descartes’, view of the
body.
Focusing on this immaterial/material distinction, which they both use, I want to make a crucial
distinction: the priority which is given to each.
Within the Akan Doctrine there is a maxim stating: “All men are the children of God, no one is a child
of the earth”28, implying a priority to the immaterial, while Descartes notoriously prioritized the body.
This is further highlighted when looking at what both thinkers believe causes the death of a person.
Descartes stresses that death only occurs after a principal part (organ) of the body decays29 , while
Gyekye mentions that the okra (immaterial) is identical with life30, and “when a man dies, he is not
(really) dead”31.
I could add a multitude of ideas and explanations to this but ending with a statement of life and death
seems like a good way to end this passage (not to mention the word limit).
25
K. Gyekye “The Relation of Okra (Soul) and Honam (Body): an Akan Conception” (1998) p. 61
Idem p.63
27
Idem p.59
28
“nnipa nyinaa ye Onyame mma, oibara nnye asase ba” Danquah, The Akan Doctrine of God, 193
29
R. Descartes “The Passions in General and incidentally the whole nature of man” (1984) p. 329
30
K. Gyekye “The Relation of Okra (Soul) and Honam (Body): an Akan Conception” (1998) p. 59
31
Idem – p. 64
26
3.
I want to tackle this third question, by starting off with two exemplary quotes by the two authors,
which in my estimation, perfectly illustrate James’ view of the self and theview of the person in
African Philosophy. William James states: “A man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his”32,
Menkiti’s paper mentions John Mbiti’s well-regarded statement: “I am because we are, and since we
are, therefore I am”33
To stay within World’s Philosophy’s aims, and as I am a psychology student, I will apply my own
knowledge to this (while remaining critical). Within social psychology, and the field of “Group
Dynamics”, there is the “Social Identity Theory”, which states that your identity is compromised of
both personal and social identities. A continuum - picture gradually overlapping circles - slowly the
social and personal fusing into one. I view Mbiti’s statement as a fusion of personal and social
(communal) identities, as he uses “we”, and implying unity. While James’ quote is very idiosyncratic,
based around his’ possessions.
Even when later on James describes the “social self”, he describes wives and children as “bone of our
bone, flesh of our flesh”34. Furthermore he writes “…the recognition he gets from its mates”35,”a
man’s fame”36 , all giving us this egocentric viewpoint. And just when we might get some inclination of
community-based viewpoint, whilst he writes : “a man has as many social selves as there are
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind”37 He later adds: “…about
whose opinion he cares”38 putting it right back into the person-centered viewpoint.
From these last quotes, we can continue, and compare it to the African view on the human person.
James notes down “as many social selves”, implying a multitude, as well as a division; the Self being
put into constituents. I view this as contrary to what Menkiti describes: self-identity – within African
traditional thought – you come to possess, personhood is acquired. You start of as an “it”, and
gradually become more of a person, through the incorporation of the societal norms, and fulfilling
32
W. James “The consciousness of Self” (1890) p. 291
I. Menkiti “Person an Community in African Traditional Thought”(1984) p. 171
34
W. James “The consciousness of Self” (1890) P. 292
35
Idem – p. 293
36
Idem – p.294
37
Idem
38
Idem
33
your duties to the community. This, from my understanding, implies a ‘to become’ from nothing, and
not ‘being’ and division (as in James).
That already states two differences: personhood as acquired (African), versus personhood being
given, and a unity/wholeness of person (though at different degrees), versus having a multitude of
selves.
I’ve already somewhat described the different frame of references from which the person is viewed
within both perspectives but let me add to this.
On page 295 William James mentions the “club-opinion”, a social force which he mentions is one of
the strongest forces in life. This we could compare, to the community’s acceptance of that individual
within African thought. But whilst in African thought, you serve the community, and want to gain its
acceptance, more specifically: “communalism” is prioritized.39 In contrast, William James continues
from the “club-opinion” in the following manner: “…, the only reason following either of which is that,
so we best serve one of our social selves”40, a perfect example of individualism. And this
communalism contrasted with individualism, is in my opinion (and probably most people’s) the
biggest difference between Western and Africana’s interpretation of the relationship between the
individual and its social environment.
39
Bernard Matolino “The Concept Of Person In African Political Philosophy: An Analytical And Evaluative
Study” (2008)
40
W. James “The consciousness of Self” (1890) p. 295