THOMAS HEYD
Marks on rocks, painted, engraved, or sculpted,
can be found worldwide, wherever there are suitable surfaces. In modern times, archaeologists
and anthropologists increasingly have begun
studying such marks in relation to their material
and social contexts, insofar as available. Frequently, such marks, moreover, display values
such as representational realism, abstraction of
figures, attention to line and paint application,
concern with the quality of the surfaces upon
which paintings or engravings are placed, composition, and so on, any of which values may
elicit aesthetic appreciation.1
Although apparently benign, such attention to
marks on rocks from the aesthetic point of view
may become subject to criticism, because it
may be supposed to entail a (problematic) form
of cultural appropriation. In the following, I begin
by briefly reviewing the notion of cultural
appropriation and the circumstances under
which it may be seen as problematic. After this,
I take note of claims to the effect that rock art
aesthetics entails problematic cultural appropriation and show that, given proper care, the
alleged problems can be avoided. I conclude by
arguing that a strong case can be made for the
aesthetic appreciation of marks on rocks.
I. APPROPRIATION AND CULTURAL APPROPRIATION
i. Appropriation. As of late, appropriation as
such has been treated as problematic on the
basis that it is equated with an illegitimate borrowing or taking of a valued item. Nonetheless,
until recently, appropriation had been considered
in a positive light, and even as a telltale mark of
humanity. It was understood to be a special
capacity to separate out from nature what
human beings find useful and to transform it
for their own use in ways that other species
supposedly cannot even imagine.2
To appropriate something is to make it one’s
property, which entails a right to privileged use
and to restrict access to it. Generally, this right
is claimed on the basis of transfer in the course
of legitimate purchase, gift, profit or earnings,
traditional ownership, and, ultimately, through
original acquisition from “the storehouse of
nature.”3 When appropriation is seen as morally
problematic, this is because it is perceived as
not legitimate, not fair, or, in general, not attentive to the rights and needs of those with prior
claims to the items appropriated. Notoriously,
the appropriation of indigenous peoples’ lands
in the Americas and Australia, on the basis of a
false application of the concept of terra nullius,
is a case in point.
ii. Cultural appropriation and its problems. In
the 1990s, the appropriation of culture, that is,
cultural appropriation, came into the spotlight
in countries such as Canada, the United States,
and Australia in the context of the acquisition
and transformation by members of mainstream
society of ideas, images, and art styles originally
generated by indigenous peoples and other
minority groups. Criticisms have been raised,
for example, with regard to stories adopted (and
adapted) from certain Canadian First Nations
groups; paintings reflecting imagery found on
West Coast Native totem poles; and music, such
as the blues, originally created by African
Americans.4
Cultural appropriation may be seen as problematic in at least three ways. First, when
cultural appropriation is perceived as the illegitimate taking of a cultural good, it constitutes
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Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation
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1. The appropriation of cultural goods by outsiders to the original culture may lead to
faulty portrayal of the members of that
culture through misrepresentation. As a
result of such misrepresentations, peoples
from small-scale societies may alternatively
enter our imaginations in a caricatured
fashion as “savage,” “noble,” “childlike,”
and so on.
2. Borrowed ideas, images, and art styles from
indigenous and minority groups may end up
being used in ways that make difficult any
further use of such cultural goods by representatives of the original culture. The swastika sign, for example, cannot ever more be
used naïvely, at least internationally, since
its adoption by the National Socialist (Nazi)
Party of Germany. Such borrowings cumulatively may erode a people’s capacity for selfrepresentation.
3. Insofar as the cultural appropriation is performed by people with different standards
than those prevalent in the original culture,
the application of those alien standards to
their cultural goods may entail a subversion
of the original culture’s voice.7
4. In cases in which cultural goods, such as
certain images, function as insignia that customarily are subject to authorization for use,
and that define the identity of a group, unauthorized use is equivalent to “the assumption
of a right,” and in these cases, cultural appropriation may literally be the appropriation of
identity.8
iii. Discussion. Criticisms of cultural appropriation such as these have themselves become
subject to objections. Where some see cultural
appropriation as theft, others see it as a legitimate, common (or even necessary) ingredient
in cultural creation (and re-creation). Where
cultural appropriation is seen as leading to the
deprivation of income legitimately belonging
to the groups that originally produced the cultural good, it is also seen as a propitious way of
generating interest in the source group, thereby
likely increasing its fortunes and standing.
Where some see cultural appropriation as leading to inauthenticity, others see valuable cultural
development. Where some see threats to the
identity of indigenous and minority groups
in such appropriations, others see cultural
appropriations as ways in which hybrid cultures come about, which themselves may
become reappropriated by the original groups
as leavening for their own cultural renaissances. In general, where some see harms to
indigenous, minority, and even mainstream
cultures, others see overall benefits, which, on
consequentialist grounds, supposedly justify
cultural appropriation.9
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a straightforward moral problem. For instance,
if cultural appropriation leads to a loss of potential
income for the originary group, as may occur
when a musical style such as the blues, jazz,
and hip hop, or when Native North American
images on T-shirts, are marketed by outsiders
to the originary groups, it may be perceived
as unfair. The unauthorized taking of ideas,
images, and art styles from First Nations people
and other minority groups has been seen as a
continuation of European colonial appropriation
of land and other resources, or, alternatively, as
a continuation of the subjugation into slavery
of African American people. As such, cultural
appropriation has been perceived to entail
something equivalent to theft.5
Second, cultural appropriation may also be
seen as a cognitive problem, which itself may
lead to a moral problem. Insofar as cultural
goods go through cultural appropriation they
may undergo certain changes, which may
threaten their perceived authenticity.6 It has
been proposed, for example, that the blues
played by white people will fail to have certain
essential features because white people lack the
necessary experiences of suffering that are
particular to African American history. The
inauthenticity of the appropriated art form may,
moreover, lead to a moral problem insofar as
individuals both within and outside the originating culture may end up with cultural experiences of lesser value than they might have had.
Third, cultural appropriation is also said to
bring about a perceived ontological problem by
possibly threatening the identity of members of
the originary groups of the cultural goods in
question. In this way, it may also entail a moral
problem, since it may undermine the survival of
such groups as distinct cultural collectivities
and, ultimately, their standing as capable of
self-governance. The threat may be seen to arise
in at least four ways.
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Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation
II. AESTHETIC APPROPRIATION OF MARKS ON ROCKS
i. Aesthetic appreciation. Aesthetic interest in
marks on rocks is on the increase among nonindigenous as well as indigenous laypersons and
rock art researchers. While scientific interest in
rock art entails a focus on theory-dependent
interpretation of observational givens, aesthetic
appreciation entails a focus on the appearance
of those givens. While in order to arrive at satisfactory explanations, scientific research tends to
abstract from the way things seem to us, aesthetic appreciation makes the way things appear
to us its subject matter. As we will see, that is
not to say, however, that factual knowledge and
science have nothing to contribute to aesthetic
appreciation; on the contrary.
When aesthetically appreciating something, it
seems obvious that we would pay close attention to the immediate “sensory givens.” This is
relevant with regard to aesthetic appreciation of
the natural environment and of works in the
visual arts, for example, but not with regard to
works in literature, which may equally be
rendered via diverse media (such as through
sound recordings, tactile script, oral performance,
handwritten, and so on) and, if printed, via
diverse fonts, formats, or kinds of paper, and
so forth. Aesthetic appreciation in the case of
literature requires imaginative participation
above all. In fact, the role of the imagination is
essential even in the case of the aesthetic appreciation of the visual arts. For instance, aesthetic
appreciation of a landscape painting relies on
our imaginative attention to the way actual
landscapes have appeared to us in the past to
perceive the particular ways in which the artist
challenges, complements, or twists our set ways
of seeing.
Aesthetic appreciation also calls for factual
knowledge, since, to be fully appreciated, things
need to be understood within their context.
Notably, a painting with paint drips all over has
a different aesthetic value if created in the
Quattrocento than if made in the twentieth
century (for example, by Jackson Pollock); the
former likely is the result of an accident, whereas
the latter finds a particular significance in the
history of painting styles. So, insofar as it calls
for sensory acquaintance with, imaginative participation in, and knowledgeable consideration of
things, aesthetic appreciation requires information (possibly including information supplied
by science).11
Nonetheless, even while aesthetic appreciation may be guided by factual information, it is
evident that appreciation is deeply culturebound. Since it has to do with the way things
appear to each of us as persons grounded in particular cultural milieux, aesthetic appreciation
will be conditioned by the modes of perceiving,
imagining, and thinking that individuals have
acquired over time and in their particular cultural contexts. This fact has important consequences for the appreciation of manifestations
across cultures, especially when those cultures
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We cannot hope to fully address these issues
here, but may observe that the discussion
crucially revolves around the question whether
cultural appropriation is harmful or beneficial,
taking note of its effect both globally, with
regard to humanity in general, and locally, with
regard to the groups from whom cultural goods
are being borrowed or taken.10 Although, as just
noted, cultural appropriation often may be problematic, there are examples that show that
appropriation may be rather benign, innocent,
or beneficial. Consider, for example, the appropriation by rap musicians of stale mainstream
songs, bringing those songs back to (a new) life;
or the appropriation, both by professional and
amateur dancers worldwide (even in Japan), of
traditional, Gypsy flamenco dance styles; or the
appropriation (and redeployment) by visual
artists, such as de Chirico or Mimmo Paladino,
of classical imagery long relegated to the museums.
The self-conscious copying of historically “great
art” in the 1980s, by artists such as Sherrie Levine,
Elaine Sturtevant, and Mike Bidlo, labeled
“appropriation art,” is an extreme example of
appropriation for the sake of a revitalization of art.
Given that at least some cultural appropriations may indeed be innocent, and possibly
even useful, either globally or to the indigenous
or minority groups affected through the stimulus that they may provide to cultural development, we may (roughly) distinguish between
“problematic” and “unproblematic” appropriation. So, is the aesthetic appreciation of marks
on rocks, commonly called rock art, a form of
cultural appropriation, and is it to be considered
problematic?
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ii. Aesthetic appropriation and its problems.
Most marks on rocks that are considered “rock
art” were made by people with very different
ways of perceiving, imagining, and thinking
from those of people rooted in mainstream historic European cultures.14 In this paper, I shall
not attempt to determine whether these marks
on rock justifiably may be called “art.”15 It is
certain, in any case, that, insofar as contemporary people of European cultural descent see
marks on rocks as related to what they consider
art, they bring into play deeply entrenched ways
of perceiving what most likely would be alien to
both prehistoric and non-European makers of
marks on rocks.16
For example, as Pippa Skotnes has pointed
out, few rock art researchers of European cultural
background have taken note of the possible variance in orientation from standard Renaissance
expectations of South African Bushman (San)
rock art images. On her view, “In many cases
paintings made on ceilings of caves, high out of
normal reach, or on walls of caves so shallow
that the only possible viewing position is on
one’s back” are such that, “re-orienting the paintings in reproduction according to Western (preModern) notions of the Vasarian frame may be
robbing the originals of an important component
of meaning.” She makes exemplary reference to
a panel from Sevilla in the Western Cape region
of South Africa that, on her account, has features
that bring about “a circular composition contrasting strongly with the kind of orientation all
reproductions of it suggest.”17
More broadly, it has been argued that philosophical aesthetics, along with the corresponding
practice of appreciation, is an eighteenth-century
European invention and, hence, idiosyncratic to
our own culture.18 Larry Shiner, furthermore,
has suggested that, since the notion of “art” is
rooted in the cultures of modern European
peoples, calling something from outside those
cultures “art” constitutes a ploy enabling our
artworld to control the cultural margins.19 Consequently, focusing on marks on rocks originating
in prehistoric and non-European cultures from
the aesthetic point of view may be perceived as
a taking or borrowing of images, a kind of
appropriation of culture. But, is it a problematic
form of cultural appropriation?
First, is it an illegitimate taking of a cultural
good, thereby constituting a straightforward moral
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are remote from each other in structure, geography, or time, since in those cases it is likely that
ways of aesthetically appreciating will be quite
different.
Notably, while large-scale societies, such as
have been constituted by Chinese, Indian, and
European peoples, have developed distinct and
explicit categories for things produced by recognized artists primarily for the sake of aesthetic pleasure, and a vocabulary for the critique
and appraisal of such items as art, small-scale
societies may have more integrated ways of categorizing, producing, critiquing, and appraising
aesthetically interesting objects. Regarding the
question “whether a people possess the concept
of art,” Stephen Davies comments, “What matters is not that they separate art from other
important concerns but that they make items
presenting humanly generated aesthetic properties, which are essential to the main purposes
served by those items.”12
For example, among the Yolngu of Northern
Australia, particularly skilled individuals make
designs with a brilliant shimmer (bir’yun). For
the Yolngu, the brilliance of their paintings is
a manifestation of ancestral power, and painters
are distinguished by their skill in achieving this
effect. Bir’yun may be called an aesthetic property, since it is assessed by the appearance of
the paintings according to certain conventional
standards, but to the Yolngu the property of
bir’yun is relevant only by way of its effectiveness in eliciting ancestral power.13
To properly appreciate the aesthetic properties exhibited in manifestations by people of
another culture, it may be necessary to acquire
an understanding of the specifities of how the
appreciation of aesthetic properties is integrated
into their mentality and their practices. The consequence is that proper aesthetic appreciation of
items offered for aesthetic appreciation across
cultures constitutes a considerable challenge,
not to be underestimated on the basis of the ease
with which we may “recognize” certain familiar
motifs, styles, or techniques. (Some prehistoric
rock art may appear like twentieth-century
abstract art; some African art may remind us of
Picasso’s cubism; but such similarities surely
can only set the stage for a questioning of
the validity of our conventional categories for
the assessment of the aesthetic import of those
works.)
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Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation
of the item according to certain practice-internal
standards.
As noted already, the size of a society may
make a difference with regard to the degree of
specialization versus the degree of integration
of aesthetics, both its productive and its receptive aspects, but not with respect to the very
existence of art or aesthetic interest. We also
have documented evidence among many nonEuropean peoples from both small- and largescale societies for the use of terms clearly
expressive of aesthetic choices. These facts
seem best explained by supposing that people
from around the globe share a sense of aesthetic
appreciation, even if it is expressed differently
in different societies.23 Clearly, the aesthetic
point of view per se is not an idiosyncratic
European invention. It seems, rather, that the
mode of aesthetic appreciation developed by
European peoples simply represents one particular mode of aesthetic appreciation among
many.24
Second, does taking the aesthetic point of view
with regard to rock art pose a cognitive problem
by threatening the authenticity of those cultural
manifestations? To some people, the aesthetic
point of view seems to imply that we focus on
things in abstraction from the immediate functions that those things may have, or have had, in
their original circumstances.25 So, while to the
aesthetic appreciator a certain rock art panel
may be of interest because its harmonious
composition or delicacy of execution gives it
standing as art, the image may have had a
significantly different function in the lives of its
original makers. It may have served religious or
political aims by, respectively, indicating the
presence of the spirit beings or by marking
some important communal event. So, it may be
argued that the effect of taking the aesthetic
point of view is a distortion of the original
meaning of such marks on rocks.
We may observe, however, that, contrary to
what we may suppose, aesthetic appreciation
generally will be hampered if it does not take
note of the function that the things appreciated
have in their original contexts.26 This is evident
in the aesthetic appreciation of artworks in the
European tradition as well. For example, the
convention of giving extraordinary size to
certain figures, such as the image of the Virgin
Mary, in pre-Renaissance European paintings
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problem? Aesthetic appreciation of marks on
rocks certainly is not a literal taking of a good.
It is, rather, more like the investment in a point
of view, which may have repercussions because
of the attitudes and actions that it may seem to
legitimize. For instance, some rock art enthusiasts
may treat it as their right, and perhaps even
as their duty, to view rock art sites, even if
thereby conflicting with the limitations set by the
original makers or present traditional owners of
such sites.20
Moreover, as sites with marks on rocks are
progressively being opened up to the public for
its appreciation, cultural appropriation through
tourism may bring about problematic effects
because of the widespread commercialization
of rock art images. In the process, whole
industries specializing in T-shirts, jewelry, and
other assorted products displaying images borrowed from rock art sites have sprung up.21 As
of late, such derivative activities have become
the focus of critique by indigenous peoples
who decry the exploitation of their cultural
heritage by outsiders, all the while without
being recipients of compensation for this use
of their cultural resources.22 The perception
of panels of marks on rocks as valuable art
objects sadly may, moreover, lead to the literal
removal of rock art panels from their original
locations.
Aesthetic appreciation itself, however, cannot fairly be blamed for cultural appropriation
through uninvited visitation of restricted sites;
tourism and the ensuing commercialization of
rock art images; or the removal of rock art
panels. These are, rather, problems that call for
attention to proper cross-cultural etiquette and
reflection on the larger implications of one’s
perhaps innocent-seeming actions.
Furthermore, even if the European cultural
perspective on aesthetics is idiosyncratic, this
does not mean that to engage in aesthetic appreciation of marks on rocks necessarily is the
imposition of an alien point of view. As has
been shown by various authors, people around
the globe may lavish great care on the appearance of both special and common utilitarian
objects in their environment. When asked about
the point of their care, they direct us to the
importance of appearance for the effectiveness
of the item, to the pleasure that the appearance
may generate, or the rightness of the appearance
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those who were initially expected to view the
images.
This is evident with regard to the arts in the
European tradition as well. Sophisticated aesthetic appreciators of Renaissance paintings,
for example, will seek to become aware of the
specific training and intentions of their makers,
attempt to use the images only in such a way
that they are recognized for the value they have,
seek to determine the standards that their makers
expected as appropriate for their evaluation,
and, in general, try to accord the works and their
makers the respect they deserve on the basis of
the value present in the art. Insofar as aesthetic
appreciation of rock art or other artworks from
remote times and places requires intercultural
knowledge and sensibility it should contribute
to, rather than hinder, the development of intercultural perceptiveness and goodwill.
iii. Discussion. Aesthetic appreciation of images
on rock does not necessarily entail a problematic form of cultural appropriation. It is, of
course, very difficult to become fully aware of
the imprint of one’s own culture on one’s mode
of aesthetic appreciation. Moreover, it may be
difficult to adequately supplement that cultural
outlook, especially in the case of rock art manifestations, since very little information may be
available about the original makers’ standards
for aesthetic appreciation or the functions of
their works.
For instance, the long-time association in
European peoples’ thinking of prehistoric and
non-European people with warlike behaviors
can have confusing effects in the appreciation
of rock art panels that display what appear to be
representations of battle scenes. Only by studying contemporary Aboriginal societies were
researchers able to show that, in most cases,
certain Northern Australian panels, which at
first seem to be battle scenes, actually are representations of dancers in full ceremonial attire
holding their weapons upraised. This fact, however, has an important impact on aesthetic
appreciation of the marks, since it changes their
meaning and, just as in the appreciation of artworks in the European traditions, the meaning
intended is as relevant as the formal aspects
exhibited.
Moreover, if it were suggested that we limit
ourselves to the scientific analysis (in narrow
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makes better aesthetic sense if seen as intended
to highlight the relative religious importance of
the various figures represented than if we were
to suppose that this phenomenon were the result
of arbitrary choice. Similarly, one can come to a
better aesthetic appreciation of the expressive
power of certain Australian rock art panels, and
of the custom of periodically repainting them
(“freshening them up”), if one is cognizant of
the fact that, according to Aboriginal people,
these panels show Ancestral Beings who
“painted themselves on the rock,” than if one
ignored it.27
Third, does the aesthetic appreciation of marks
on rocks suppose an ontological problem by
threatening the identity of the members of the artists’ originary group? As noted, the appropriation
of cultural goods by outsiders may threaten the
identity of a people if there is serious misrepresentation; if their images, motifs, and art styles
become associated with problematic ideologies;
if their representations are judged by extraneous
standards, alien to those according to which they
were fashioned, thereby subverting their voice;
and, in cases in which cultural goods, such as
images, function as insignia definitory of the
makers’ group, cultural appropriation may be
equivalent to the literal theft of the group’s identity. The threat to a group’s identity becomes
a moral issue, on the assumption that members of
groups only function as such if they can find
ways of substantiating their identity through
cultural markers.
The possibilities of misrepresentation, misuse, misjudgment, and unauthorized use of rock
art images are real enough. For instance, problems may arise through the development of the
tourism industry, which quickly turns into logos
images that were never meant for mechanical
reproduction. Such problems, however, are not
a direct function of aesthetic appreciation. They
arise if aesthetic appreciation is accompanied
by lack of intercultural knowledge and lack of
willingness to follow standards of intercultural
etiquette and respect. There is no reason, though,
to suppose that such threats to the identity of the
makers of rock art are inevitable. Satisfactory
aesthetic appreciation itself, as already noted, is
highly dependent on attentiveness to the cultural
context of images, the intentions of their makers,
the standards of aesthetic judgment within the
community of origin, and their significance for
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Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation
III. THE CASE FOR ROCK ART AESTHETICS
AND CONCLUSION
i. Cross-cultural aesthetics. A number of grounds
offered in the literature for engaging in crosscultural aesthetics apply equally well in the case
of rock art aesthetics. Notably, it has been
proposed that attending to the products of peoples
from other cultures from the aesthetic point of
view will enrich our understanding of those
peoples, while honoring their achievements.29
Such appreciation may also more generally enrich
our own capacity to aesthetically appreciate, as
has been well illustrated by the path-breaking
new aesthetic and artistic perspectives acquired
by Pablo Picasso, Paul Gauguin, and others,
which, at least partially, were due to such crosscultural appropriations.30
It has also been proposed that cross-cultural
aesthetic appreciation may contribute to a critique of our own narrow conceptions of art and
aesthetics, and of the mostly exclusionary
practice of art galleries, focused on European
models of art.31 In addition to these reasons for
engaging in aesthetic appreciation we may take
note of some that have to do with the unique
character of marks on rocks among the diversity
of existing cultural manifestations.
ii. The uniqueness of rock art. Rock art is
integrated into the natural world in a way that
few other humanly made objects are. Rock art
panels usually are located in remote locations,
relatively unimpacted by contemporary industrial, urbanizing, or “recreational” activities. In
contrast to most other art, rock art sites are
not dependent on extraction of materials from
nature for the creation of new artefacts somewhere
else.32 Instead, pictographs and petroglyphs are
made on location and generally are intended to
remain on site. Marks on rocks, that is, become
integrated into the natural site. As such, rock art
panels also offer us a special opportunity for
learning about their makers’ aesthetic appreciation of nature, insofar as it is reflected in the
content of the images, the choice of surfaces,
and the choice of locations in the land.33
Marks on rocks are also valuable counterimages to the growing aesthetization of the everyday as found in the societies of industrialized
countries. While in contemporary, consumptionoriented societies all aesthetic appreciation is
increasingly being trained onto objects intended
to tie us ever more into the reproduction of
exploitative relationships with other human
beings, nature, or even ourselves, the aesthetic
appreciation of rock art offers a paradigm of
resistance.34 Marks on rocks, exposed to the
environment, generally are subject to (humanly
uncontrolled) decay, mostly do not fit mainstream aesthetic tastes, often deal with our
connection to other parts of the natural (and
supernatural) world, are arduous to find and
reach, and usually are difficult to make sense of
without careful preparation.
Nonetheless, such marks on rocks can be a
source of great aesthetic pleasure. The aesthetic
appreciation of marks on rocks, in other words,
offers us an alternative model for the enjoyment
of human creativity, little tied to the ever more
emaciated values of the “entertainment” industries, highly dependent on respect for crosscultural values, and attentive to a notion of cultural
productivity governed by natural context and
spiritual concerns.
iii. Conclusion. At first blush, the aesthetic
appreciation by people of European cultural
descent of marks on rocks may appear necessarily
to lead to a problematic form of cultural appropriation, given that the aesthetic perspectives
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archaeological or anthropological terms) of
marks on rocks, we may note that this is not
a sure way to avoid problematic appropriation,
since it is unlikely that the rock art makers
would have shared our particular scientific outlook and interests. That is, to take a scientific
perspective on rock art may be as culturally
appropriative as to take the aesthetic perspective.
Nonetheless, despite the difficulties in properly
appreciating rock art, and despite the possibilities
of problematic aesthetic appropriation, there are
strong, independent reasons for aesthetically
attending to marks on rock. Not to consider
marks on rocks from the aesthetic point of view,
when they are offered as such, constitutes a
kind of neglect.28 As potential appreciators, we
may miss out on valuable aesthetic experiences,
and, given the high value accorded to the aesthetic point of view in most (or perhaps all)
societies, it may indicate an unjustified (ethnocentric) discrimination of the rock art makers’
cultures.
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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
THOMAS HEYD
Department of Philosophy
University of Victoria
Victoria, British Columbia V8W 3P4, Canada
INTERNET:
heydt@uvic.ca
1. One result of such appreciation is that these marks
generally are known under the rubric “rock art,” even when
there is some debate regarding the question whether they
properly should be called “art.” Here, I will follow convention by making reference to these marks as “rock art,” but
see Thomas Heyd, “Rock Art Aesthetics: Trace on Rock,
Mark of Spirit, Window on Land,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (1999): 451–458, for an argument
that supports it.
2. See Tim Ingold, The Appropriation of Nature: Essays
on Human Ecology and Social Relations (University of
Iowa Press, 1987). The exclusive attribution of the capacity
for appropriation to human beings is not quite correct,
though, since we know of diverse other species (certain
birds and apes) that also appropriate nature, even with the
use of tools.
3. See John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (1689).
4. On cultural appropriation, see Bruce Ziff and Pratima
V. Rao, eds., Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation (Rutgers University Press, 1997); Richard Fung,
“Working Through Cultural Appropriation,” Fuse 16
(1993): 16–24; James O. Young, “Should White Men Play
the Blues?” Journal of Value Inquiry 28 (1994): 415–424;
Joel Rudinow, “Race, Ethnicity, Expressive Authenticity:
Can White People Play the Blues?” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 127–137.
5. We may add here the physical appropriation of
culturally significant items, such as the Parthenon frieze (the
so-called Elgin Marbles) or, more recently, the acquisition
of masks and pottery from looted sites by collectors and
museums. These concerns have been discussed in the
context of the repatriation of cultural property. See, for
example, J. H. Merryman, “The Retention of Cultural
Property,” U.C. Davis Law Review 21 (1988): 477–513;
and John Moustakas, “Group Rights in Cultural Property:
Justifying Strict Inalienability,” Cornell Law Review 74
(1989): 1179–1227.
6. For a careful, introductory discussion of various
forms of authenticity and inauthenticity, see Elizabeth
Burns Coleman, “Aboriginal Painting: Identity and
Authenticity,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
59 (2001): 385–402. For a critique of authenticity as a form
of ideology, see Larry Shiner, “‘Primitive Fakes,’ ‘Tourist
Art,’ and the Ideology of Authenticity,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 228–230. For a critique
of the way in which the concept of authenticity has been
applied to constitute the art of small-scale non-European
societies as “traditional” or “primitive,” see James Clifford,
The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Harvard University Press,
1988), esp. pp. 196–200.
7. “Cultural appropriation” is sometimes equated with
“voice appropriation,” tout court, but it seems more apropos
to specifically reserve the latter expression for those cases
in which legitimate forms of self-assertion or -expression
are thwarted.
8. This is Coleman’s argument with regard to the unauthorized use of Aboriginal art designs by non-Aboriginal people.
(See p. 396 for the quoted words.)
9. For objections such as those listed, especially see
Young, “Should White Men Play the Blues?”; Rudinow,
“Race, Ethnicity, Expressive Authenticity: Can White
People Play the Blues?” and James O. Young, “Against Aesthetic Apartheid,” Rendezvous: Idaho State University Journal
of Arts and Letters 30 (1995): 67–77.
10. It is relevant to note here that, with regard to the
morality of cultural appropriation, it is not simply a matter
of toting up local harms and lining them up with global
benefits in a consequentialist manner, since, at least in some
cases, there also are issues of cultural property rights and
cross-cultural etiquette involved.
11. This is a point argued implicitly by Kendall Walton,
“Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review 79 (1979):
334–367; and explicitly, in different contexts, by Paul Ziff,
“Reasons in Art Criticism,” Philosophical Turnings, Essays
in Conceptual Appreciation (Cornell University Press,
1966); and Allen Carlson, “Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature,” and passim, in his Aesthetics and Environment
(New York: Routledge, 2000).
12. Stephen Davies, “Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition,” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (University
of Wisconsin Press, 2000), pp. 199–216.
13. Howard Morphy, “From Dull to Brilliant: The
Aesthetics of Spiritual Power among the Yolngu,” in Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics, ed. Jeremy Coote and Anthony
Shelton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 182–208.
14. There are also marks on rocks, some of which are
appreciated for their aesthetic values and some of which are
considered graffiti, made by European peoples in the historical period. Even though, to my knowledge, such marks are
seldom made the subject of serious study, they fall into the
category “rock art,” and their study might generate valuable
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developed among European peoples likely are
specific to those people. In other words, it may
seem that aesthetic appreciation would bring
with it the imposition of an alien perspective,
lead to distortion in the understanding of rock
art, and cause the subversion of the identity of
its makers.
I grant that cross-cultural aesthetics, as is
required by the appreciation of rock art,
constitutes a significant challenge. Nonetheless,
given proper care to respect and consider the
cultures of origin, aesthetic appreciation of
marks on rocks need not be problematic in the
senses just noted. Since there also are prima
facie strong, independent reasons for engaging
in aesthetic appreciation of this cultural phenomenon, I conclude that the aesthetic approach
to marks on rocks is both eminently appropriate
and generally desirable.35
Heyd
Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation
the universality versus the particularity of aesthetic values.
F. D. McCarthy, “Theoretical Considerations of Australian
Aboriginal Art,” Journal of the Proceedings of the Royal
Society of New South Wales 91 (1957): 3–22, moreover,
comments on the aesthetic values in Australian Aboriginal art.
24. See Davies, who argues for a transcultural aesthetic
based on a universal human interest in certain properties of
things. See also Denis Dutton, “But They Don’t Have Our
Concept of Art,” also in Theories of Art Today, pp. 217–238,
who furthermore argues that the differences between the
aesthetic manifestations of European and other peoples
generally have been exaggerated. Also relevant in this context
is Denis Dutton, “Tribal Art and Artifact,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (1993): 13–22, where he
argues against Arthur Danto, “Artifact and Art,” in the
catalogue ART/artifact (New York: Center for African Art,
1988), pp. 19–32, by claiming that, outside of the twentiethcentury artworld of European peoples, items considered “art”
do show perceptible differences from those not so considered.
25. See, for example, Overing; also see Silvia Tomásková,
“Places of Art: Art and Archaeology in Context,” in Beyond
Art: Pleistocene Image and Symbol, ed. Margaret W. Conkey
et al. (California Academy of Sciences/University of
California Press, 1997), pp. 265–287, who rejects the aesthetic point of view on rock art.
26. On this point, also see Morphy, “Aesthetics.”
27. Christopher Chippindale, The Archaeology of Rock-Art
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), emphasizes the importance of combining “informed” and “formal”
methods in rock art interpretation, when possible. Informed
methods rely on information gathered ethnographically,
whereas formal methods rely on what is given in the
representations themselves.
28. I want to emphasize that rock art, insofar as art made
by particular people for their own purposes, in principle, is
not a free good like the light of the sun. There may be good
reasons from the perspective of intellectual and cultural
property rights, and for reasons of cross-cultural etiquette,
not to visit or photograph or describe certain sites if they are
not offered as such by their makers or guardians.
29. Especially see Morphy, “Anthropology of Art.”
30. Diverse authors in the rock art and cultural appropriation literatures comment on the significance of crosscultural aesthetic influences for the enrichment of aesthetic
perspectives. See, for example, Skotnes, and also Ronald
DeWitt Mills, “Acculturated Art Forms of Three Central
American Indigenous Groups and Observations Concerning
Research Methodology in the Study of Contemporary Art,”
Rendezvous: Idaho State University Journal of Arts and
Letters 30 (1995): 35–49.
31. See Morphy, “Aesthetics”; S. Price, Primitive Art in
Civilized Places (University of Chicago Press, 1989).
32. Although, as Sven Ouzman (personal communication,
2000), notes, rock paintings often depend on paint materials
that may have been mined at locations distant from the
painted sites: “In southern Africa, the majority of San rockpaintings are made from exotic ferric oxide that was mined
20km–400km from where the rock-painting occurs.”
33. For further details on the uniqueness of and perspectives
offered by rock art, see Heyd, “Rock Art Aesthetics”; also see
Thomas Heyd, “Aesthetics and Rock Art: Art, Mobile Peoples,
and Aesthetic Appreciation in Australia,” Arqueologia 25
(2000): 9–18; “Rock Art and the Aesthetic Appreciation of
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understanding of the phenomenon in question. See Sven
Ouzman, “‘Koeka kakie, hents op bokkor of ik schiet!’
Introducing the Rock Art of the South African Anglo-Boer
War, 1899–1902,” The Digging Stick 16 (1999): 1–5.
Throughout the paper, I use terms such as “the cultures of
people of European descent” to make reference to the
mainstream cultures commonly called “Western,” which
ultimately have their roots in Europe but are now expressed
on diverse continents. I choose not to use the term “Western,”
since it is geographically ambiguous. (Notably, Europe is
West of Jerusalem and Mecca, but so is all of Africa,
whereas Australia more properly is east of both Europe and
Jerusalem and Mecca.)
15. But see Heyd, “Rock Art Aesthetics,” for discussion.
16. This is not to say that art is the prerogative of contemporary people of European cultural descent; for discussion
see, for example, Howard Morphy, “Aesthetics in a CrossCultural Perspective: Some Reflections on Native American
Basketry,” Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford
23 (1992): 1–15. Also see John Halverson, “Art for Art’s Sake
in the Paleolithic,” Current Anthropology 28 (1987): 63–89,
for an account of the origins of art that precisely appeals to
Paleolithic rock art as its first instance. See also the references
to the discussion in the philosophical context, below.
17. Pippa Skotnes, “The Visual as a Site of Meaning:
San Parietal Painting and the Experience of Modern Art,” in
Contested Images: Diversity in Southern African Rock
Art Research, ed. Thomas A. Dowson and David LewisWilliams (Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).
18. See Joanna Overing, “Aesthetics as a Cross-Cultural
Category: Against the Motion” in Key Debates in Anthropology, ed. Tim Ingold (New York: Routledge, 1996),
pp. 260–266; see also Alfred Gell, “The Technology of
Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology,” Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics, pp. 40–63.
19. Shiner, “‘Primitive Fakes.’”
20. Notably, some sites were meant to be seen only by
initiated individuals, or by members of one particular gender, for example.
21. See, for example, Thomas Dowson, “Off the Rocks,
Onto T-Shirts, Canvasses, etc.,” and Peter Welsh, “Commodification of Rock Art: An Inalienable Paradox,” both in
Rock Art Ethics: A Dialogue, ed. William D. Hyder
(Tucson: American Rock Art Research Association, 2000).
22. See, for example, Adrienne Tanner, “B.C. Natives
Put Stop to Commercial Use of Ancient Artwork: Trademark Petroglyphs,” The National Post (Canada) February
14, 2000.
23. See, for example, Jeremy Coote, “Aesthetics as a
Cross-Cultural Category: For the Motion,” in Key Debates
in Anthropology, pp. 266–271; Morphy, “Aesthetics”;
Howard Morphy, “Anthropology of Art,” in Companion
Encyclopedia of Anthropology, ed. Tim Ingold (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 648–685; Morphy, “From Dull to Brilliant”; Anthony Shelton, “Predicates of Aesthetic Judgment:
Ontology and Value in Huichol Material Presentations”;
and Jeremy Coote, “‘Marvels of Everyday Vision’: The
Anthropology of Aesthetics and the Cattle-Keeping
Nilotes,” in Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics, respectively,
pp. 181–208, 209–244, and 245–273. Evelyn Payne
Hatcher, Art as Culture: An Introduction to the Anthropology of Art (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1999),
pp. 197–207, provides a useful discussion on the issue of
45
46
Debates in Anthropology, pp. 251–254. On general strategies of resistance to commodification in contemporary
society, see, for example, Hal Foster, “Readings in Cultural
Resistance,” in his Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural
Politics (Seattle: Bay Press, 1985), pp. 157–179.
35. I am indebted to Sven Ouzman and John Clegg for
careful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, as well as
to an anonymous referee of the JAAC.
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Natural Landscapes,” News95 International Rock Art
(Pinerolo, It.: Centro Studi e Museo d’Arte Preistorica, 1999);
and “Northern Plains Boulder Structures: Art and Foucauldian
Heterotopias,” in Foucault and the Environment, ed. Éric
Darier (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 152–162.
34. Concerning the importance of cross-cultural aesthetics in potentially countering the aesthetization of the
everyday, see James F. Weiner, “Introduction,” in Key
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism