FOURTH = CUSTODY
SIXTH = CHARGED
Officer’s Miranda violation does not make
Suspect’s subsequent interrogation by Detective unconstitutional. A violation
of Miranda does not taint derivative evidence (e.g., Suspect’s statement made
during the second interrogation).
the plain view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access
to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”
“seized” A person has been seized if, in light of all of the circumstances, “a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.” This allowed them to detain him for the
purposes of investigation and will not taint any statements that Student made during the detention.
A person under arrest is in custody and must first receive Miranda warnings before being subjected
to interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (Prior to any questioning, a person
under arrest “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.”)
Statements taken during custodial interrogations conducted in violation of Miranda are excluded
from the prosecution’s case- However, a violation of Miranda is a violation of a constitutional
“rule,” see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000), not a direct violation of the
constitution. Unlike direct violations of the constitution, Miranda violations do not taint derivative
evidence and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply.
U.S. Supreme Court held that, if a suspect was subjected to custodial interrogation without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, a subsequent confession by the suspect may nonetheless be admitted
if the totality of circumstances establishes that the second statement was knowing and voluntary.
Unless the police engage in an interrogation process that must “realistically [be] seen as part of a
single unwarned sequence of questioning subsequent custodial interrogation following a break in
the initial proceedings, Miranda warnings, and a waiver of rights is constitutional.
Suspect did not make such a request or demand; the statement “I’m not sure about this. Maybe I
need a lawyer” was ambiguous and equivocal.
Whether the police were required to read Student his Miranda warnings depends on whether he
was subject to in-custody interrogation.
A waiver of rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Here, the suspect waived his right
to remain silent under Miranda when he signed the waiver form. Custodial interrogation cannot be
reinitiated unless and until the suspect has been re-advised of his Miranda rights, has provided a
knowing and voluntary waiver, and (1) counsel is present and (2) the suspect himself initiated
further communication with the police, or (3) (if the suspect was released from custody after the
initial interrogation) at least 14 days have passed.
the Court held that there are “vast differences between Miranda custody and incarceration pursuant
to conviction.” The release of a person from interrogation and back into his “normal life” in the
general prison population ends the “‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
is offense-specific. right to counsel does not attach with respect to particular charges until formal
adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced (i.e., “at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment [or in some states, arrest warrant]
per se invalidity of a Miranda waiver following an adequate invocation of the right to counsel are
(1) where the suspect himself voluntarily initiates “further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police,” or (2) where the suspect is released from Miranda custody for a
period
of
at
least
14
days,
then
taken
back
into
custody
and
given
fresh Miranda warnings. Maryland v. Shatzer
unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Miranda right to counsel is not offense
Miranda applies whenever there is a custodial interrogation.
automobile exception such that police may search it based on probable cause alone, without a
warrant.
an overnight guest has standing to challenge an unlawful search
when a suspect is initially questioned without Miranda warnings and confesses, then is
read Miranda warnings and repeats the confession, the second statement will be barred only if the
court finds it is effectively simultaneous with the first statement. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600 (2004). Courts view such a procedure as an unlawful “two-step” interrogation that
renders Miranda warnings ineffective. Id. In determining whether the second statement is
effectively simultaneous with the first, courts will look at whether the officer asked the same
questions, how far apart in time the two statements were, and if the suspect made the statements
in the same place
Where the police act in good faith, and in the objectively reasonable belief that their actions
comport with the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be excluded even if the police technically
violated the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984). This
“good faith” exception
The officer made a lawful arrest based on probable cause that the suspect had committed a felony
offense. The officer then lawfully searched the man incident to that arrest, discovering the
fraudulent credit cards on his person. v. Robinson, 414 218 (1973). the officer arrested the suspect
in a public place, where an arrest warrant is not required
An interrogation is “custodial” whenever “a reasonable person [in the suspect’s position] would
[feel that] he or she [is] not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave,” considering the
totality of the circumstances
good-faith exception, as they did not know about this separate apartment prior to executing the
warrant To meet the requirements of the plain-view exception, (1) the item must be plainly visible
to the police; (2) it must be immediately apparent to the police that there is probable cause to think
the item is either contraband or evidence of a crime, without the need for any further testing,
touching, handling, manipulation, physical invasion, or examination of any kind; and (3) the police
must be lawfully on the premises where the item is located at the time they see it
interrogation is “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety,” any statement taken in
violation of Miranda is fully admissible in court.
a defendant’s statement obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights may generally be
used to impeach the defendant’s inconsistent testimony at trial, this impeachment exception does
not extend to other defense witnesses.
By sharing this information with a third party, the truck driver has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information
the officer might be able to do a search incident to arrest of the car if he arrested the driver but did
not immediately secure her, such a search would be limited to the passenger compartment of the
car and would not justify a search of the trunk. Answer option B is incorrect because the correct
standard to search the trunk is probable cause that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime,
not reasonable suspicion that it contains a weapon. Answer option D is incorrect because the officer
may lawfully detain a person under Terry for only a reasonable amount of time. Intentionally
delaying the citation to allow for a drug-sniffing dog to arrive would exceed the permissible
temporal scope of a Terry stop.
A statement must be suppressed if police engage in deliberate misconduct intended to thwart the
protections of Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Missouri v. Seibert
Use and derivative-use immunity bars the government from using a witness’s testimony itself, as
well as any evidence derived directly or indirectly from the testimony. The government may not
use the testimony as a lead to find other evidence. Any evidence obtained this way is inadmissible
There are two types of Miranda waivers: express and implied. Express waivers arise when the
accused explicitly waives his rights, whether orally or in writing. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. An
implied waiver arises when the accused, with full understanding of the accused’s rights, acts in a
manner inconsistent with the intent to exercise them—such as by speaking with the police after
the administration of clearly understood Miranda warnings.
it misstates the standard required for an arrest as reasonable suspicion; the correct standard is
probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment provides protection to individuals for situations in which they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Generally, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what
one knowingly exposes to the public, such as one’s physical appearance, clothing, handwriting,
and voice. Therefore, forcing a defendant to reveal these characteristics, such as by having the
defendant stand in a lineup, wear particular clothing, or give a handwriting or voice sample, does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment
Generally, if a defendant takes the stand in his or her defense, the prosecution may impeach the
defendant by pointing to prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda. See Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). However, if the prior inconsistent statement was made
involuntarily, the prosecution may not use it.
A protective sweep is a brief and narrow visual inspection of the areas in which a person could
hide. A protective sweep does not authorize inspection for weapons, contraband, or evidence of
the crime of arrest.
Interrogation” for Miranda purposes includes “any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
If the suspect has invoked the right to remain silent, interrogation may resume if the suspect’s right
to remain silent has been scrupulously honored
Here, the defendant’s right to counsel had attached with respect to the drug-trafficking charges for
which she had been arrested. However, because no formal charges had been initiated with respect
to the identification scheme, the right to counsel had not attached and the defendant’s claim will
not succeed.
A The affidavit was based on information from unidentified witnesses.
Correct
B The affidavit was not based on the officer’s personal observations.
C The affidavit was not corroborated by independent ev
The affidavit contained hearsay
Courts balance (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, (2) the informant’s credibility, and (3)
the truth of particular details in the tip in assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip
a Franks motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the affidavit to support a search warrant
contained false information, the defendant bears the burden of justifying the need for an
evidentiary hearing. To meet this burden, the defendant must produce evidence raising a fair
probability that statements in the affidavit are false and that the officer either knew they were false
or acted with reckless disregard of the truth. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The
defendant’s evidence must contain sworn affidavits or other reliable statements from witnesses, or
a satisfactory explanation for the lack of such evidence. If the defendant does all this, the judge
then treats the affidavit as though it did not contain the false statements. If the affidavit still has
enough information to establish probable cause, the court does not proceed to the evidentiary
hearing stage
An officer may only pat the outer clothing of an individual looking for weapons when conducting
a Terry frisk and may then seize an item only if the item’s contour or mass makes it immediately
apparent that the item is a dangerous weapon or contraband.
a frisk is not automatically a part of the Terry stop and requires its own justification.
The question of when interrogation may resume after the right to remain silent has been invoked
depends on whether the suspect’s right to cut off questioning by invoking the right has been
“scrupulously honored
Once a suspect validly waives the suspect’s Miranda rights, the police may interrogate the suspect
about virtually anything. Miranda waiver is not offense specific.
When a lineup is conducted after a defendant has been indicted, there is a Sixth Amendment right
to have counsel present. When that right is denied, as in the fact pattern here, any identification
made from that lineup is “tainted.” Not only is the pretrial identification inadmissible, but so is
any future in-court identification that directly stems from the initial improper lineup
procedure. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234-36 (1967). However, a witness may still be allowed
to make an in-court identification of the defendant if the prosecution can show that the in-court
identification was made entirely based upon knowledge gleaned from circumstances independent
of the illegal lineup.
A permissive presumption is a factual presumption that permits juries to infer a fact based on the
proof of another fact, provided that the inference is rational.
A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an enclosed structure, such as a shed; therefore,
the officer conducted a search by entering the shed.
incriminating statements made before Miranda warnings were given were admissible because they
were reasonably prompted by concern for public safety.
There is no right to counsel issue here since Trice has not been indicted nor has he faced any formal
charge or proceeding. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). And, in any event, no right to counsel
applies to photographic evidence whether formal charges have been laid or not because the suspect
is not confronting the state or witnesses against him.
The Fifth Amendment concerns itself with issues of compulsion; the Sixth Amendment concerns
itself with insuring the defendant has aid of counsel at critical stages of a prosecution, including
interrogation, surreptitious or not
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). In Henry, Nichols was approached by the
government and asked to listen for any incriminating statements his fellow cellmate, Henry, might
make. Nichols, like Holloway here, did not adhere to the instruction to act as a passive listener and
prodded the defendant to discuss his crime. The Supreme Court held that this amounted to
deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements
post-indictment interrogation by the State or its agent is a critical stage of the prosecution requiring
the presence of counsel in the absence of a valid waiver
A person must be mentally competent to waive her rights
Absent waiver, a post-indictment line-up conducted without the defendant’s lawyer violates the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel
role at a line-up. That is not the case. Counsel is a passive observer. The point of the lawyer’s
presence is to detect and note prejudice and suggestive influences, and to use this information to
question and cross examine witnesses at trial.
Supreme Court has held that officers may “detain an occupant of the place to be
searched,” Michigan v. Summers, supra, and may use “reasonable force to effectuate the
detention,”
the smell of marijuana and Yasmin’s admission gave the officer probable cause to believe there
was marijuana in the truck, and he was entitled to search all containers that could contain it.
"A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search,
including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . .
. engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect . . . or enter a burning building to put out a fire and
investigate its cause."
no violation of the Fourth Amendment because drug manufacturing is a highly regulated industry
and the government’s substantial interest in assuring properly manufactured and labeled drugs is
furthered by the inspection program which provided an adequate substitute for a warrant. permits
warrantless inspection of closely regulated industries
Correct. This question is based on United States v. Argent Chemical Laboratories, 93 F.3d 572
(9th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Amendment protects against intrusions caused by civil inspections as
well as intrusions caused by conventional law enforcement methods.
Police do not need probable cause to believe a suspect is at home in order to execute an arrest
warrant in the home. Nor do they need to allege that a suspect is at home in order to secure an
arrest warrant. They do, however, need reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is present at his
residence at the time they enter to arrest
Probable cause means that a reasonable person would believe that a crime was in the process of
being committed, had been committed, or was going to be committed
the police secure incriminating statements through an undercover agent at a time when the suspect
is not in custody (a prerequisite for the application of Miranda) and has not been formally charged
with the crime of securities fraud (a prerequisite for the attachment of the right to counsel
There was probable cause, and the police, by virtue of being lawfully in the house pursuant to the
search warrant, did not need an arrest warrant. Although it is true that police need a warrant to
make an in-home arrest, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), if the police are already in the
home lawfully, either because of an emergency, or consent, or having a valid search warrant, then
no arrest warrant is necessary. And, with a valid arrest, police may automatically conduct a search
incident to the arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Such a search includes a
search of the person and the area, including drawers, immediately surrounding the person.
The exclusionary rule prevents the government from using most evidence gathered in violation of
the United States Constitution. The decision in Mapp v. Ohio established that the exclusionary
rule applies to evidence gained from an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona established that the exclusionary rule applies to
improperly elicited self-incriminatory statements gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
and to evidence gained in situations where the government violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. However, the rule does not apply in civil cases, including
deportation hearings. the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not permit the
police to forego a warrant
if the suspect’s counsel is not present, the police may not reinitiate questioning, even if their
objective is only to see if the suspect would like to waive the right to have counsel present.
In order to seize something in plain view (1) the incriminating character must be immediately
apparent (satisfied here) and (2) the officer must be (a) legally in the place where he can see the
object (also satisfied here) and (b) must have lawful right of access to the place because he either
(i) possesses a warrant or (ii) there is a valid exception to the warrant (neither of which is the case
here.). Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). While plain view here provides probable cause
to secure a warrant, it does not eliminate the need for a warrant
police have probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car based on the parking lot attendant’s
descriptions and the immediate and geographically proximate sighting of the car and persons
who match those descriptions. The search of the trunk is not a problem here because there is also
probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of the crime such as the proceeds and the
guns. Once probable cause extends to a car, the police may look everywhere in the car where the
suspected evidence could be, including the locked trunk