IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MISSITUCKY
______________________________________________________________________________
GERALD COLLINS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
Case No.: 1:19-cv-0263
v.
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)
SNELBY COUNTY,
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Defendant.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
______________________________________________________________________________
Defendant, Snelby County, submits this brief of law in support of Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss. Based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff was offered and entered a
plea of guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence. As defendants are not constitutionally entitled to
evidentiary disclosures at the plea bargain stage, Plaintiff’s claims have no merit. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gerald Collins (“Plaintiff”) has a documented history of drug abuse and drug distribution.
(Complaint ¶ 6). In 2004, Plaintiff was arrested after a typical traffic stop uncovered six grams
of marijuana and nearly thirty grams of cocaine that was hidden in Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Compl. ¶
7). In 2005, a jury returned a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
Plaintiff was sentenced to eight years in the state penitentiary, five of which he served at the time
of his parole release. (Compl. ¶ 6).
In the same year of Plaintiff’s release, he met Ms. Laura Sanders. (Compl. ¶
11). Plaintiff moved into the home of Ms. Sanders after only knowing her for two-and-half
months. (Compl. ¶ 11). Approximately two-and-half years after Plaintiff moved in, Snelby
County Sheriff’s Deputies executed a lawful search warrant on the home. (Compl. ¶ 14). In the
basement of the home, the deputies found two kilograms of cocaine, the same drug at the heart of
Plaintiff’s 2005 conviction. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 6). The drugs were found in varying states of
division: one single brick and several smaller assorted packages, some near clearly marked
shipping containers, all totaled a street value of roughly $30,000. (Compl. ¶ 15).
After the drug bust, Snelby County law enforcement officers interviewed Ms.
Sanders. (Compl. ¶ 16). Ms. Sanders consistently maintained in multiple interviews that she had
no knowledge of the presence of the drugs and repeatedly implicated Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶
16). Unlike Plaintiff, Sanders’s criminal record consists only of three minor traffic violations.
(Compl. ¶ 13). Acting on all evidence available to them, officers arrested and charged Plaintiff
with his second offense of possession with intent to distribute on June 3, 2013. (Compl. ¶ 19).
After the grand jury returned an indictment against Plaintiff, he was appointed public
defender Christina Tran (“Tran”). (Compl. ¶ 21). Tran made a Brady disclosure request to
Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Middleton, who after diligently reviewing his case file for
all exculpatory evidence, informed Tran that no such evidence was in the possession of the
District Attorney’s office. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22).
Approximately a week before the search was executed on Plaintiff’s residence, two
separate law enforcement agencies joined together to arrest drug cartel supplier Ivan Schwartz
without the knowledge or inclusion of Snelby County officials. (Compl. ¶ 23). Schwartz and
Plaintiff are known associates, as Schwartz supplied Plaintiff with the drugs that led to his 2005
conviction. (Compl. ¶ 23). In an interview with Missitucky Bureau of Investigation (“MBI”)
agents, Schwartz alleged that Ms. Sanders was the recipient of the drugs found by the Snelby
County Sheriff’s deputies. (Compl. ¶ 24). The deputies had no knowledge of Schwartz’s
allegations at the time they conducted the search. (Compl. ¶ 24).
The MBI forwarded a report that included Schwartz’s allegations to the District
Attorney’s Office after Schwartz had completed testifying for the agency. (Compl. ¶ 25). The
current policy in the office would ideally have the report entered by a clerk approximately two
days after its receipt, but the District Attorney, in his discretion, made adjustments to
accommodate the hectic nature of the office and allowed for reports to be entered later. (Compl.
¶¶ 26-27). Accordingly, the report including Schwartz’s interview was not entered until a few
months after its receipt. (Compl. ¶ 26). The ADA, acting under the direction of his supervisor,
did not go back and check the reports that were still pending entry. (Compl. ¶ 28).
The ADA and Tran entered plea negotiations. Although the ADA initially declined to
negotiate for lower charges, he acknowledged that Plaintiff’s lack of nonviolent convictions may
warrant some leniency. (Compl. ¶ 31). Plaintiff rejected the ADA’s initial offer and accepted a
new plea deal for a reduced sentence of six years. (Compl. ¶ 32). Plaintiff began serving his
sentence in 2013 and was released on parole in 2016. (Compl. ¶ 33). In 2019, Tran accidentally
discovered the transcript of the Schwartz interview and notified Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 35). He then
filed the suit that is now before this Court demanding relief for the alleged violation of a right to
which he is not entitled.
STANDARD OF DECISION
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a pre-trial defense asserted in response
to a plaintiff’s claim for relief and is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To resolve such a motion, the Court should (1) identify and disregard all
pleadings that are no more than mere legal conclusions and (2) determine if the remaining well-
pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Taking these facts as true and in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, if they do not possess enough heft to plausibly state a claim for relief, then the
pleadings are conclusory in nature. Id. Under such circumstances, a plaintiff’s cause of action
cannot survive and the motion to dismiss must be granted.
ARGUMENT
The issue presented by this case is that this Court should adopt the rule that criminal
defendants are not constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence disclosures prior to entering a
plea. This is an issue of first impression in the Sixteenth Circuit. Several circuit courts addressing
this issue consistently upheld that no constitutional right to such evidentiary disclosures exists at
the pre-plea stage, recognizing that to extend the right beyond the trial stage would run counter
to the Supreme Court’s purpose in creating the right. See Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142 (2d
Cir. 2010); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff, a criminal
defendant, voluntarily entered a guilty plea, thereby waiving all trial rights, including the right to
receive evidence favorable to him. Following the precedent established by the Supreme Court
and the reasoning of its fellow circuits, this Court should hold that the right to exculpatory
evidence cannot be invoked prior to entering a plea and grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
I.
PROSECUTORS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO TURN OVER
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO
ENTERING A PLEA.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution confers upon criminal defendants the right
to exculpatory evidence at the trial stage in Brady v. Maryland because it recognized that the
underlying principle of the right was to avoid an unfair trial to the accused. 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). Proper disclosure of evidence ensures that society’s goal to convict the guilty is secured
through fair criminal trials carried out by a virtuous justice system. Id. The Supreme Court
found that without such a safeguard, a prosecution that withholds upon demand evidence
favorable to the accused creates a trial that heavily burdens the defendant to such an extent that
the prosecution has become “an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice.” Id. at 88.
In the absence of a decisive ruling by the Supreme Court as to whether the right to
exculpatory evidence disclosures extends beyond criminal trials, three main arguments, widely
advanced by a majority of circuit courts, support the answer in the negative and articulate the
impracticality of extending the right beyond the scope of trial. First, to broaden the right of
Brady exculpatory evidence to the pre-plea stage is too far a departure from the justification of
the Supreme Court in declaring the right. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154; Matthew, 201 F.3d at
362. Second, the First Circuit correctly reasoned that due process safeguards already exist for
criminal defendants prior to entering a guilty plea. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382
(5th Cir. 2018) (Higginson, J., concurring). Third, a majority of circuits have correctly noted
that a defendant may enter a voluntary, knowing plea and waive the constitutional guarantees
associated with trial without full knowledge of all relevant facts. See Alvarez, 904 F.3d 382 (Ho,
J., concurring). Therefore, this Court should follow the reasoning of the majority of the circuits
that have addressed this issue and restrict exculpatory evidence disclosures to trial proceedings
only.
A.
Extending Brady rights to exculpatory evidence disclosures prior to entering a
plea substantially undermines the Supreme Court’s objective to protect the trial
right only.
The principle that underscored the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the disclosure of
Brady materials was to shield a criminal defendant from the miscarriage of justice. United States
v. Bagley, 43 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). In deciding Brady, the Court was appropriately concerned
only with the integrity and fairness of criminal trials. The Court used society’s interest in
securing guilty verdicts through fair criminal trials as a policy rationale for a defendant’s right to
exculpatory evidence at trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Thus, the Court ultimately held that failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence will constitute a due process violation only when “the evidence
is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment.” Id. Because guilt
is determined by a finder of fact, whether that be a judge or a jury, and the punishment of a crime
is imposed after the fact finder’s verdict, a Brady violation cannot be established until the
defendant has gone to trial. Therefore, the prosecution is under no duty to make exculpatory
disclosures prior to the defendant’s plea entry.
Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence are included in the definition of Brady
materials. Bagley, 43 U.S at 676. In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court took up the issue
of a criminal defendant’s right to impeachment evidence prior to entering a guilty plea. 536 U.S.
622, 625. The Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the balancing factors that weigh the
interests of the defendant against those of the government; however, as correctly noted by Justice
Thomas, the determination of the effect of such evidence is appropriately addressed at a criminal
defendant’s trial. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 634 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The majority
focuses on the “degree of help” impeachment evidence may provide to a defendant before
pleading, but the distinction it draws frames the right as one the defendant invokes in deciding
whether or not to go to trial, which fails to comport with Brady’s goal to prevent an unfair trial to
the accused. Id. Therefore, because the obligation of the prosecution regarding the disclosure of
impeachment and exculpatory evidence turns on fairness at trial and not usefulness before
pleading, the Brady right is accordingly not implicated prior to the entering of a plea.
Several circuit courts addressing this issue have held that criminal defendants do not have
a constitutional right to exculpatory evidence before pleading guilty. The Fifth Circuit correctly
held that at the core of the Brady right is the principle that an “impartial party’s assessment of
the defendant’s guilt is based on all the available evidence.” Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360. The
emphasis on the ability of a judge or jury to make determinations of guilt that were not the result
of prosecutorial misconduct or the withholding of favorable evidence accurately encapsulates the
Supreme Court’s purpose to protect criminal defendants at trial. Following this logic, the Court
concluded that the Brady rule’s narrowed focus suggests that without a trial, there cannot be a
constitutional violation. Id. At 361. Therefore, once a defendant chooses to plead guilty, he or
she foregoes the option of a trial, and no Brady violation can then be claimed.
The Fourth Circuit echoed this reasoning in United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263,
(4th Cir. 2010). There, the Court also correctly acknowledged the existence of the Brady right as
trial right that was designed to protect the integrity and fairness of the trial verdict and to
minimize the chance of an innocent person being found guilty. Id. at 285. However, the Court
noted that defendants who plead guilty admit their guilt, almost eliminating any concern of an
unfair trial caused by a prosecutor withholding evidence. Id.
Similarly, the First Circuit reached the same conclusion using the reasoning of the prior
case law. In United States v. Mather, the Court states that it is “universally acknowledged” that
the Brady right is a trial right. Mather, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010). Furthermore, faced
with the question of whether to extend the trial right to pretrial plea negotiations, the Court could
find no reason to do so, noting that doing so would “break new ground.” Id. Addressing the
argument that the importance of plea negotiations demands the extension, the Court ultimately
concluded that no evidence supported such an “unprecedented expansion” of the Brady rule, and
even considered itself warned that extending Brady would actually undermine the practice of
plea bargaining. Id.
The materiality standard the Supreme Court employed reflects its purpose in creating a
trial right only. Id. at 361. The constitutional obligation of the prosecution regarding
exculpatory evidence disclosures extends only to evidence “favorable to the accused that, if
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 67475). The Court states that the evidence is material only if there is a “reasonable probability” that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Before the Court in Bagley set the test for materiality, an argument was put forth that the
test for materiality should be framed in the context of a defendant’s ability to prepare for trial
instead of solely on the fact finder’s assessment of guilt. Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361. This
argument was correctly dismissed based on the reasoning that to do so would be at odds with the
scope and purpose of the Brady rule because such a standard would give a defendant insight over
the prosecution’s entire case, including incriminating evidence in addition to exculpatory
evidence. Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)). This would effectively
change the Brady rule to cater to a defendant’s personal taste regarding the act of pleading over
the risk of trial, which is beyond what the Supreme Court intended in holding the existence of the
right.
A minority of courts have attempted to adapt the Court’s materiality standard in Bagley
from the trial stage to the plea context. Id., at 363. The Second Circuit in Miller v. Angliker
held that a to demonstrate prejudice at the hands of the prosecution, a defendant must show that
there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2nd Cir. 1988). However, the
proceeding upon which the Second Circuit bases its adaptation is strictly a trial proceeding. A
plaintiff cannot establish materiality unless the case goes to trial and the suppression of
exculpatory evidence affects the outcome. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 924 (10th Cir.
2007). Furthermore, like the proposed argument in Agurs, the Miller materiality test incorrectly
focuses the effect of withheld evidence on the defendant’s decisions regarding the merits of trial
instead of a judge or jury’s accurate and informed determination of guilt or innocence. Thus, the
Second Circuit’s rule constitutes an inaccurate modification to the Brady rule that seeks to create
a due process right where there is none. Matthews, 201 F.3d at 363.
B.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of impeachment evidence implies no duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence prior to pleading.
While the issue of disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea has been
raised and decided before the Supreme Court, criminal defendants have argued that an implied
distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence was made by the Court and therefore
warrants the disclosure of exculpatory evidence prior to pleading. No such distinction was made,
however, because the Constitution guarantees exculpatory impeachment evidence as part of a
basic “fair trial guarantee.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628. Similarly, the Supreme Court and several
circuit courts have held that the Brady right to exculpatory evidence exists to protect the fairness
of trial and its verdict. Thus, both impeachment and exculpatory evidence operate as tools to a
criminal defendant at the critical moment of trial and not before that defendant chooses to enter a
guilty plea.
1.
Impeachment evidence is not critical at the plea stage and precedence does
not distinguish between the two.
Impeachment and exculpatory evidence are identical in application and derive importance
only in relation to the fairness of trial. In Ruiz, the Supreme Court expanded its interpretation of
the Constitution’s guarantees to criminal defendants under Brady and found that, like
exculpatory evidence, impeachment evidence is “in special relation to a trial’s fairness.” Ruiz,
536 U.S. at 623. From that point on, the Supreme Court has consistently treated exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in the same way to define a prosecutor’s duty to provide Brady materials
prior to a trial. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154. The inherent fairness of a criminal trial turns on the
ability of an impartial party to fairly assess a defendant’s guilt based on all available
evidence. Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360. Thus, disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
evidence is properly made when it necessarily affects a judge or jury’s determination of a
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Id.
2.
Due process considerations impose no obligation on prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence prior to entry of a plea.
Many circuit courts that have addressed the issue of a right to Brady materials prior to
trial have correctly held that due process does not require that criminal defendants have all
evidence in hand before deciding to plead guilty. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 396; Moussaoui, 591 F.3d
263, 286. The due process considerations at the heart of the Brady right are built upon the
Supreme Court’s recognition of the potential disadvantage a defendant faces at a criminal trial
proceeding. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In its analysis, the Court created a balancing test to
effectively weigh the costs and benefits to each respective party of a criminal proceeding: it
considered (1) the nature of the private interest at stake, (2) the value of the additional safeguard,
and (3) the adverse impact upon the Government’s interests. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (citing Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).
A criminal defendant’s independent interest in receiving Brady exculpatory material is
relatively low compared to the substantial burden that the government would suffer if it were
obligated to produce Brady material prior to a defendant’s decision to enter a plea. Moussaoui,
591 F.3d at 286. Even if the degree of help the information would pose to the defendant is of
some significance prior to entering a plea, the defendant cannot count on the Constitution to
guarantee its delivery because it is wholly dependent on the defendant’s independent knowledge
of the prosecution’s potential case. Id. The prosecution, however, is not required to disclose its
potential case because the right is not implicated until the parties move to trial. Id. at 634
(Thomas, J., concurring).
Faced with other constitutional safeguards that already protect criminal defendants prior
to entering a plea of guilty, courts have correctly noted that no substantial benefit or value in
extending more protections exists that would justify the extra burden on the government. Ruiz,
536 U.S. at 631; Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 396 (Higginson, J., concurring). Ruiz specifically points
out that the existence of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure undercuts a criminal
defendant’s claim that without disclosure of Brady materials, innocent defendants will plead
guilty. 536 U.S. at 631. The Fifth Circuit expands on identification of pre-plea safeguards,
noting that the Constitution already has provisions in place to shield defendants from offenses
that might undermine the validity of a defendant’s plea: protection against prosecutors using
false evidence to obtain a conviction, protection against ineffective assistance of counsel, and
protection against the miscarriage of justice of an innocent pleading guilty. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at
396 (Higginson, J., concurring). Under the Federal Rules, defendants who seek to plead guilty
must engage in “extended, direct colloquy” with judges, who must confirm that a factual basis
supports every guilty plea. Id.; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)-(3). Thus, defendants are adequately
protected by existing measures that target disadvantage or prejudice prior to entering a plea.
In recognizing the adverse impact on the government as the third due process
consideration for extension of a Brady right prior to entering a plea, courts have acknowledged
that to do so would create a demonstrably unjustifiable burden on the government’s ability to
efficiently carry out justice. As Ruiz decisively states, a rule that mandates disclosure of
exculpatory evidence prior to entering a plea risks a serious interference with the government’s
interest in securing factually justified guilty pleas. 536 U.S. at 631. Furthermore, the obligation
to present all available evidence prior to entering plea bargains would create a constitutional duty
where none currently exists and require the government to shift its focus and resources toward
premature trial preparation, which would undermine the plea bargain phase’s purpose as the
efficient, preferable resolution to criminal proceedings. Id. at 630, 632. The ability to waive
trial rights affords criminal defendants a better bargaining position during plea negotiations,
bringing them a chance at more lenient punishments in exchange for sparing the prosecution the
time and expense of identifying and preparing the necessary Brady disclosures that a trial would
require. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 399 (Ho, J., concurring). Even when compared to the two
considerations more favorable to a criminal defendant’s position, the burden to the government’s
interest clearly stands apart as an unjustifiable burden that supports Brady material disclosure at
the trial stage only.
C. A defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to the constitutional guarantees
inherent at trial and may do so voluntarily and knowingly without full awareness of
all relevant facts.
The Supreme Court noted that a defendant who enters a guilty plea waives the right to a
fair trial and other constitutional guarantees and required that, due to the constitutional
importance of those rights, the plea be entered into voluntarily and such waivers must be made
“knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970). Because the Brady right is a trial right, it is inherently included in the attendant rights of
trial and can be waived in the same manner as the likes of the rights against self-incrimination
and to a trial by jury. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 399 (Ho, J., concurring). Ultimately, a defendant can
make an adequately informed decision to waive the Brady right upon entering a plea of guilt.
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that a plea is not voluntary unless the prosecution
makes the same disclosure of exculpatory evidence that it would have had to make if the
defendant insisted upon trial. Id. The correct principle of law accurately describes that a
defendant must only “fully understand the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in
general in the circumstances” to enter a valid waiver. Id. Therefore, the law is not concerned
with whether a defendant is knowledgeable of the “specific detailed consequences” of waiving
the rights. Id. This means that a defendant’s plea will be accepted by the Court even if the
defendant was not informed of the various details attached to the waived rights or if defendant
operated under a form of misapprehension. Id. at 630.
II.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BRADY
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE UPON ENTERING HIS GUILTY PLEA, AND NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE MATERIAL EXISTS BEFORE TRIAL.
Plaintiff has no cognizable constitutional right to exculpatory evidence prior to entering a
plea. The Supreme Court has consistently reserved the right to exculpatory evidence to trial
proceedings as a safeguard against potential unfairness to a criminal defendant like Plaintiff,
which manifests in the ability of the trier of fact to make a well-informed determination of a
defendant’s guilt based on all of the available evidence. As a trial right, it was within Plaintiff’s
discretion to waive the exculpatory evidence to which he was entitled as leverage to secure a
more lenient penalty for his crime. Plaintiff did so when he held out for a better plea deal on the
advice of his attorney (Compl. ¶ 32). Because Plaintiff affirmatively, voluntarily, and knowingly
waived his rights, a trial was never reached, and the right was not invoked. (Compl. ¶ 29).
Where no trial has occurred, there cannot be a constitutional violation. Therefore, the
prosecution had no obligation to provide Plaintiff with the exculpatory evidence prior to his
guilty plea. (Compl. ¶ 37). Therefore, this Court should reject Plaintiff’s claim that criminal
defendants are constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence prior to entering a plea and grant
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
6871
Attorney for Defendant
1815 Gordon Street, 614
Bluff Town, Missitucky 40538
(915) 867-2797
6871@levensonosario.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon opposing counsel by
placing same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on April 29, 2020.
6871
Attorney for Defendant
1815 Gordon Street, 614
Bluff Town, Missitucky 40538
(915) 867-2797
6871@levensonosario.com