D E TE R R E N CE B R I E F
INTEGRATED DETERRENCE IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC: ADVANCING THE
AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE
JANE HARDY | OCTOBER 2021
Executive summary
›
The Biden administration is developing the concept of “integrated deterrence” to advance a
networked approach to achieving its defence and security aims across a wide spectrum of
strategic competition with China.
›
The concept of a network is likely to be persuasive in the Indo-Pacific where not all nations are
prepared to choose sides between the United States and China. Although only some allies and
partners will seek high-end integration with the United States, fostering military interoperability
among the largest possible grouping of like-minded nations remains essential to the success of
integrated deterrence.
›
Australia is at the forefront of complex, multi-nation military exercises in the Indo-Pacific, and
already enjoys a considerable presence inside US Indo-Pacific Command. These factors offer
a sound basis for further Australia-US military integration within the Biden administration’s
emerging framework of integrated deterrence.
›
Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update actually pre-empted the US concept of integrated
deterrence by signalling Canberra’s support for a collective deterrence strategy, extending from
countering China’s grey-zone coercion to preparing for high-intensity conflict.
›
Deepening combined strategic, diplomatic and military planning between the United States and
Australia will be critical to the success of a collective deterrence strategy. This should involve
allied planning for high-value deterrence scenarios and the expansion of Australia’s access to US
forward operating locations in the Indo-Pacific.
US-AUSTRALIA
INDO-PACIFIC
DETERRENCE
DIALOGUE
Introduction
Australia and the United States have entered a
new era of strategic competition with China.
Following decades of US military supremacy
in the Indo-Pacific, Washington’s approach to
regional defence strategy is being re-evaluated in
light of a shifting balance of power.1 In Australia,
this has sparked debates about the sustainability of the United States’ military position in the
Indo-Pacific and what role Canberra should
play in collectively upholding the regional order.2
Washington is grappling with these debates,
aware that its regional alliance network is a key
advantage over its near-peer competitor, the
People’s Republic of China.
Australia recognises the challenges to the United
States’ ongoing ability to provide a conventional
security umbrella for Indo-Pacific nations as well
as the opportunities afforded by the US alliance
network. It is working to improve its security and
regional stability by leveraging the Australia-US
alliance and contributing to the development of
collective deterrence. The new Australia-United
Kingdom-United States trilateral defence technology pact (AUKUS) illustrates this approach.
At the launch, the leaders of all three countries
emphasised their focus on strengthening the
technological foundations of deterrence in the
Indo-Pacific, implying, though not directly stating,
that preventing Chinese military aggression motivates this arrangement.3 While the initial focus of
AUKUS will be the provision of nuclear-powered
submarines to Australia, it entails a much broader
commitment to empowering Australia through
deeper long-term defence materiel and technological integration.4 Coupled with the enhanced
Australia-US force posture initiatives announced
at the 2021 Australia-US Ministerial Consultations
(AUSMIN) — which will include new air, land and
maritime rotations, and a combined sustainment
facility on Australian soil — this arrangement will
accelerate the long-standing bilateral defence
integration agenda.5
How the United States views Australia’s future
strategic role will strongly influence the success
of Canberra’s regional defence strategy.
Currently, the Biden administration’s approach
to deterrence and the role of US allies and partners reveal two emerging themes. The first is that
deep integration between US and allied capabilities creates synergies for high-end war-fighting, bolstering both the perception and material
underpinnings of US strategic advantage. This is
the hard end of the deterrence spectrum. Indeed,
integration is rapidly becoming the byword for
the Biden administration’s defence and security
aims. Nowhere is this more important than in the
Indo-Pacific, where Beijing’s military evolution is
on display and relationships with allies and partners are being tested.
Integration implies deepening military-to-military arrangements among close allies and select
partners through acquisitions, interoperability
and joint training adjusted to emerging threat
scenarios. The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine initiAT ITS CORE, THE
ative displays a commitment
COMMITMENT TO
SHARE THIS SENSITIVE
to move forward on all these
DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY
fronts in an integrated way.
IS A POWERFUL SHOW
Its deterrence effect will be a
OF ALLIED UNITY AND
staggered one, manifest in the
RESOLVE TO PRESERVE
announcement itself as well as
THE REGIONAL
in the ongoing development
BALANCE OF POWER.
and eventual fielding of the
submarines. At its core, the commitment to share
this sensitive defence technology is a powerful
show of allied unity and resolve to preserve the
regional balance of power.
The second theme is that the United States
intends to work with its allies to build Indo-Pacific
collective deterrence more holistically. This sits at
the assurance end of the deterrence spectrum.
While amorphous as a concept, collective deterrence involves efforts at every level of competition, from emphasising common interests and
building partners’ capabilities to resisting coercion and so-called “grey zone” tactics.6 While
commonly interpreted as a formal construct by
which allies aggregate their capabilities, assets
and posture to deter a mutual adversary, collective deterrence can also describe the actions of
loose coalitions of partners unbound by trea-
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ties or formal arrangements. Such partners may
seek to undertake coordinated activities or align
statements in order to communicate a consistent
deterrence message to common adversaries.7
The relationship between these two themes in
the administration’s thinking on integrated deterrence is unclear. Though the path forward on
integrated military capability is relatively obvious
for Australia and the United States, it is not yet
known whether deeper bilateral integration will
impact Canberra’s efforts to broaden its pursuit
of collective deterrence with other Indo-Pacific
nations.8 Addressing this gap will be increasingly important as US plans for the Indo-Pacific
evolve. It is possible “integrated deterrence” will
become an accelerated manifestation of collective deterrence. Either way, broadening regional
commitments to collective deterrence will only
be possible if prospective partners believe the
United States, Australia and other close allies are
capable of delivering — and intend to deliver —
regional stability and assurance to those facing
Chinese coercion. As such, the role of US allies in
the ongoing task of building regional interoperability and operationalising collective deterrence
must be made clear and credible.
This policy brief proceeds in four parts. Part
one explores what the Biden administration’s
new concept of integrated deterrence means for
the Indo-Pacific. Part two looks at the evolution
and requirements of interoperability among the
United States and its regional partners and part
three assesses the evolving state of defence integration between the United States and Australia.
Finally, the brief concludes with three recommendations for deepening integrated deterrence
through the Australia-US alliance.
Updating “integrated deterrence”
for the Indo-Pacific
The Biden administration has begun emphasising
the term “integrated deterrence” in its defence
policy discourse and international engagement.
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin refers to a
“new concept” of integrated deterrence to be
designed and carried out “hand in hand with
allies and partners.”9 In April 2021, Austin emphasised that effective deterrence today must span
multiple domains — air, sea, space and cyberspace — all of which are to be mastered and
stovepipes eliminated.10 Nothing short of this,
Defense Secretary
Lloyd J. Austin
III greets Navy
Admiral Philip
S. Davidson,
commander of
US Indo-Pacific
Command, at
Indo-Pacific
Command
headquarters
in Hawaii,
March 2021 (US
Department
of Defense)
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he added, will deliver the “credible, flexible and
formidable” deterrence required for a free and
open Indo-Pacific.11 Austin repeated this message
at the 2021 AUSMIN meeting, but still only at a
high level and without additional specifics.12 Likewise, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Colin Kahl describes integrated deterrence as
bringing together all instruments of US national
power — nuclear, conventional, space, cyber and
information — and integrating them across all
domains from direct conflict to hybrid non-military competition. Washington wants US allies
and partners linked up in this way to broaden and
deepen deterrence effects.13
The concept of integrated deterrence is not new.
Its Cold War meaning, for example, involved
calculating the combined effect of nuclear and
conventional forces on the Soviet Union’s strategic calculus in the European theatre.14 The
concept also includes familiar thinking on deterrence by punishment (imposing unacceptable
costs in retaliation to an aggressive action), by
denial (preventing an adversary from using
aggression to achieve its objectives at acceptable levels of cost and risk), and by entanglement (use of diverse military and non-military
instruments to persuade and dissuade, typically
through multilateral norm-building).15 The 2018
US National Defense Strategy encompassed
these historic definitions of deterrence and
sought to develop them into a “seamless integration of multiple elements of national power [and]
integrated action with allies” for “proactive and
scalable employment of the Joint Force, flexible theatre postures”16 — language that is similar
to that now being used by Biden administration
officials.
What is new about the way this term is now being
used is the focus on enhanced networking with
and between allies. Under the Biden administration’s expansive vision for integrated deterrence,
allies and partners may contribute to collective
deterrence efforts according to their level of willingness and capability — but will nevertheless
now be asked to contribute more toward shared
security objectives. Those already well integrated
may seek to aggregate their defence capabilities
with the United States, for example, in logistics
arrangements, information sharing or maritime
domain awareness. Australia moved decisively
in this direction in 2011 when Prime Minister
Julia Gillard and President Barack Obama jointly
announced Australia would host annual rotations of US Marines in Darwin and enhance air
cooperation with the US Air Force in northern
Australia.17 The Biden administration’s Deputy
Secretary for Defense Kathleen Hicks described
this kind of capability aggregation as a “federated” approach to regional security.18
Secretary Austin’s identification of allied networking as the central component of integrated deterrence implies a departure from the hub-andspoke alliance configuration of the Cold War
era. The concept of a network, as opposed to a
more hierarchical arrangement among unequal
US security partners, may be more persuasive
as a model in a region where not all nations are
prepared to choose sides between the United
States and China. Washington’s message is that
members of the network, such as Australia, can
demonstrate commitment and capability as a
force-multiplier for the United States’ provision
of conventional deterrence, shape it and enjoy
its protection, without ceding sovereignty.19 But
there is a second underlying message. That is,
those cynical of US intentions should consider
the possibility of a region dominated by a new
superpower whose intentions are not transparent, and whose modus operandi increasingly
involves military intimidation and economic
coercion.
Increasing interoperability
among allies and partners
Australia views the challenges emerging in the
Indo-Pacific similarly, but not identically, to
the United States. Australia does not compete
militarily with China in the same manner as the
United States. But Australia can shape regional
dynamics by virtue of its geopolitical proximity,
deep relationships in the neighbourhood and
highly advanced military capabilities. As the
inaugural 1.5 Track US-Australia Indo-Pacific
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Deterrence Dialogue identified in 2019, “Australia
cannot independently deter Chinese coercion;
but it can complicate Beijing’s risk calculus by
supporting US deterrence efforts, building resilience, and fostering collective action in the Pacific
and Southeast Asia.”20
In support of those efforts, Australia has long
participated in building conventional interoperability with the militaries of this region. This
is demonstrated by its commitment to US-led
regional military exercises and its inclusion of
regional participants in Australian-led exercises
like TALISMAN SABRE, INDO-PACIFIC ENDEAVOUR and PITCH BLACK.21 Scenarios to address
non-traditional security threats increasingly
feature in these exercises and related regional
assistance programs. This demonstrates Australia’s responsiveness to key concerns of vulnerable nations, including the destabilising effects
of illegal activities, over-fishing, cyber intrusion
and climate-related disasters.22 Addressing these
non-traditional threats is a way of augmenting
hub-and-spoke alliance structures to network
with new partners. Indeed, regional militaries
have played key roles in exercising humanitarian assistance and disaster response scenarios,
providing operational lift for civilian assistance to
disaster zones spanning multiple national jurisdictions.23
Yet, even among close allies, multilateralising
military exercises and operations can be difficult.
Building interoperability is a slow and complex
task dependent on participating nations’ political buy-in, as well as their capacity and willingness to work within practical constraints such
as incompatible military hardware and software. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are few
examples of significant military interoperability
between Indo-Pacific nations in the absence of
US involvement, with the prominent exception
of Australia and Japan. With that said, regional
militaries are increasingly sharing assessments,
exercising together, and identifying barriers to
deeper technology, communications and operational cooperation.
The value of interoperability
The Biden administration’s multifaceted
approach to integrated deterrence demands a
range of approaches to give it practical effect.
First, building interoperability with a wide range
of partners is crucial. The compelling benefits of
interoperability may serve to influence attitudes
among regional militaries, building awareness of
the imperative for collective deterrence among
senior military officials. Second, undertaking
multilateral military conferMOUNTING COMPLEX,
ences and exchanges is
MULTI-FLAG EXERCISES
important to develop mutual
AROUND REAL-WORLD
understanding and can
SCENARIOS WITH
enable the delivery of collecTHE MOST ADVANCED
MILITARY ASSETS OF
tive messages that reinforce
CLOSE ALLIES REMAINS
consistency of purpose.
A POWERFUL DISPLAY OF
Third, opportunistic, loosely
DEEP INTEROPERABILITY
coordinated, high-end activAND THE CAPACITY
ities among capable nations
FOR INTEGRATED
are needed to signal credibilDETERRENCE.
ity and resolve to adversaries
and other nations. Finally, mounting complex,
multi-flag exercises around real-world scenarios with the most advanced military assets of
close allies remains a powerful display of deep
interoperability and the capacity for integrated
deterrence.
Several examples illustrate these ongoing efforts
to build interoperability and integration in the
Indo-Pacific.
In Honolulu, INDOPACOM and its component
commands — US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), US Army
Pacific (USARPAC), US Marine Corps Forces
Pacific (MARFORPAC) and US Pacific Air Force
(PACAF) — use their convening power to engage
counterparts on regional threats and potential
barriers to achieving interoperability.24 Among
the militaries, it is not uncommon for differing
interpretations, capability gaps and institutional
or political preferences to arise in ways that
are at odds with US preferences. Nonetheless,
counterpart commanders often have common
service-specific language, traditions and outlooks
that can bridge these gaps. Their own training
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Australian
Defence Minister
Peter Dutton,
Foreign Minister
Marise Payne,
US Secretary
of State Antony
Blinken and
Defense Secretary
Lloyd Austin at
the AUSMIN
Consultations
Washington, DC,
September
2021 (Getty)
involves exchanges and programs in the United
States, Australia and other western-aligned
nations. These experiences can smooth the way
for relatively seamless involvement in US-led
exercises and training on US-origin hardware.
Such regular interaction over decades can
deepen regional commitment to achieving
interoperability even if substantial quantities of
Russian and Chinese-origin military equipment
remain in use by many partners.25
More pointedly, like-minded nations have sought
to signal deterrence in the region through parallel or loosely coordinated military activity. For
instance, South China Sea transits by warships
from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, France,
the Netherlands and India occurred in close
succession during July and August 2021,26 signalling their shared commitment to maintaining a
“free and open Indo-Pacific.”27
Premier examples of integrated deterrence in a
war-fighting context are on display at the biennial
Australia-US exercise TALISMAN SABRE. It is one
of the region’s key high-end military exercises,
in which an increasing number of allies participate.28 This year, the Republic of Korea joined
TALISMAN SABRE 2021 for the first time, which
featured live-fire activities, amphibious beach
landings, cyber and space components and
other complex war operations. Personnel from
four of the five participating nations — Australia,
the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom
— operated from the same ship as an integrated
landing force for the first time.29 Crucially, TALISMAN SABRE elicits few regional criticisms and
has projected benign intent to non-adversaries
while signalling commitment and capability to
jointly deter adversaries.
Integrated deterrence and
the US-Australia alliance
Australia is very well placed to contribute to the
Biden administration’s development of integrated
deterrence. Canberra’s July 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) outlined major investments
in defence self-reliance and a reinvigorated focus
on strategic dynamics in Australia’s immediate
neighbourhood, ranging from the north-eastern
Indian Ocean through maritime and mainland
Southeast Asia to Papua New Guinea and the
South West Pacific.30 Defence Minister Peter
Dutton emphasised the mutually reinforcing aims
of the DSU — self-reliance, supply chain resilience
and interoperability with allies and regional part-
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ners — in a September 2021 speech just prior to
AUSMIN 2021, focusing on new Australian capabilities in space, cyber, artificial intelligence and
hypersonics.31
According to these declarations, self-reliance and
deeper integration with the United States are not
perceived by Canberra as mutually exclusive, nor
is integration with the United States incompatible
with ongoing efforts to broaden collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. On the contrary, by integrating deeply with the United States, Australia
aims to simultaneously enhance self-defence,
deter military and non-military coercion, and
contribute to greater regional interoperability and
commitment to collective deterrence.
This ambitious and inclusive approach to regional
defence strategy complements the United
States’ nascent efforts to integrate key allies into
networked security arrangements. Indeed, the
overarching message in Australia’s announcements was that it would seek to be more self-sufficient, more present across its northern littoral,
and more integrated with the United States and
close security partners across a spectrum of
competition from grey-zone coercion to high-intensity combat. Australia’s language preceded
and closely mirrors the style of integrated deter-
rence now being promoted by the Biden administration. Even in the absence of a shared strategic concept, this implies a convergence of views
between Washington and Canberra on the need
to collectively address wide-spectrum deterrence challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
A sound basis for integration
Significant integration between Australia and
the United States is already happening among
personnel from both countries within the US
combatant commands. Today, some 45 Australian defence personnel work inside INDOPACOM
or are embedded in its component commands.
A two-star Australian Army Major General
occupies the position of Deputy Commander
(North) in USARPAC, a two-star Royal Australian Navy Rear Admiral will join PACFLT in 2022,
one-stars work as deputies embedded into the
INDOPACOM Joint Offices for Policy and Planning and Intelligence, and others are spread
across the service commands. While forces
from other allied nations are also placed within
the US commands in Hawaii, Australia enjoys
outsized representation.32 This level of integration
is a testament to the United States’ willingness to
work seamlessly with Australia in its largest and
oldest command.
USNS
Rappahannock,
ROKS Wang Geon,
HMAS Parramatta,
USS America, USS
Rafael Peralta,
JS Makinami,
USNS Alan
Shepard, HMCS
Calgary, USS New
Orleans, HMAS
Brisbane and
USS Germantown
steam in formation
during Exercise
Talisman Sabre
2021 (Australian
Department
of Defence)
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INDOPACOM is a steward of this process. Its
commanders consistently welcome and invite
integration with Australia, pay close attention to
the diplomatic envelope surrounding military
operations and seek to entrench the cultural
and practical issues required for joint planning.
They are committed to implementing the DIME
— diplomatic, information, military and economic
— effects across US agencies and in concert with
Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and other
allies.33 Although US settings on information sharing remain siloed and strict for close allies like
Australia, there is an ongoing push to increase the
scope and efficiency of default information sharing within the alliance through the Australia-US
bilateral Security of Information Agreement —
which would enhance both nations’ ability to
devise deterrence effects and regional engagements in real-time and over the longer term.34
From interoperability to integrated
deterrence
Even so, building the combined capabilities of a
network of allies and partners to underwrite integrated deterrence in the region will be a complex,
long-term project. Among Indo-Pacific allies,
Australia and the United States are at the forefront
of moving decisively down this path. Crucially,
the 2021 AUSMIN communiqué detailed joint
force posture plans enabling deeper integration
across air, sea and land domains, all of which will
take place on Australian territory. This will include
rotational deployment of all types of US aircraft
in Australia; increased logistics and sustainment
capabilities of US surface and subsurface vessels
in Australia; and more complex and integrated
land exercises with greater combined engagement with regional allies and partners — in short,
a greater number of US military assets operating
with Australian forces, from Australian locations
and supported by new bilateral military facilities.35 This last item will impact greatly on Australia’s interlocking aims for self-defence, deterring
military and non-military coercion and simultaneously forging a regional commitment to collective deterrence.
A host of major interoperability training and
military exercises in the Indo-Pacific have long
supported this alliance integration agenda. These
include TALISMAN SABRE, INDO-PACIFIC
ENDEAVOUR, PITCH BLACK, INDOPACOM’s
PACIFIC PATHWAYS, and multilateral exercises such as the US-led RIM OF THE PACIFIC
(RIMPAC) and COBRA GOLD hosted by Thailand.36 Exercise MALABAR, now involving all
four Quad partners — Australia, India, Japan and
the United States — is the most recent addition
to the regional calendar.37 All provide important
opportunities for achieving closer interoperability among a broad array of participants.
Going forward, the challenge is to design and
conduct these exercises in ways that reinforce
the benefits to be had from operating with the
United States while advancing participants’
shared interests in defending a free and open
Indo-Pacific. Once regional militaries can put
the COVID-19 pandemic behind them and return
to regular training initiatives with Australia, the
United States, Japan and others, the benefits of
this accelerating agenda should become clearer.
It is difficult to assess whether momentum has
been lost after exercises such as RIMPAC and
COBRA GOLD were scaled down due to restrictions on in-person activities during the COVID19 pandemic.38 Critical to their success, and to
broadening the awareness of the imperative for
collective deterrence, are the personal interactions among troops, commanders and policy
advisers exercising together under common
command-and-control. While this process
advances slowly with the Indo-Pacific’s more
hesitant partners, Australia, the United States and
highly capable partners like Japan must move
ahead with deeper integration — continuously
sharing and honing threat assessments, reducing barriers to information sharing, testing the
congruence of doctrines and postures and planning joint operations.
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Policy recommendations
The following lines of effort between Australia and the United States could advance bilateral defence
integration in ways that demonstrate to regional partners the practical benefits of collective deterrence.
1. Explore options for combined strategic, diplomatic and military planning centred around
high-value deterrence scenarios.39
The US military should further involve and collaborate with Australia at earlier stages of US planning processes, as described in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy and indicated in the 2021
Interim National Security Guidance.40 Beginning with contingency planning for Pacific and Southeast
Asian scenarios that include grey-zone tactics or the limited use of force by China, Canberra and
Washington could consider combined command structures for maritime intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrols between the Cocos Islands,
Northern Australia and Guam. They may also consider expanding these joint efforts to include
India and Japan with access to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Japanese archipelago.41
2. Explore new force posture initiatives in Australia’s immediate region, including expanded
provision for the ADF to access US forward operating locations.42
Greater Australian access to US operating locations in Guam, the Philippines and Singapore could
significantly augment the ADF’s strategic footprint. This is congruent with the DSU’s call for an ADF
capable of mounting independent deterrence effects in Australia’s immediate region, countering
grey-zone coercion and leading coalition operations. Pursuing combined access arrangements
would also create opportunities for new exercises and peacetime deterrence operations, including
efforts to pool allied military assets and integrate crews and personnel.
3. Expand and improve allied coordination in support of third parties through increased maritime presence operations.
Canberra and Washington should progress from exercising opportunistic presence as a show of
support to third parties in contested regional waters to more explicitly plan for and coordinate the
transit of warships for a general deterrence effect. The US Coast Guard and Australian Border Force
should be brought to a joint planning table to identify ideal modes for combined maritime presence operations. Both countries should capitalise on London’s decision to deploy a carrier strike
group for a seven-month mission to the Indo-Pacific to plan future expanded deterrence activities
together in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.43
Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the
primary theatre for strategic competition
between the United States and China. Sophisticated forms of military and non-military coercion are driving efforts by the United States and
its allies to develop deterrence options across a
wide spectrum of operations. Australia’s commitment to self-reliance in deterrence capability, its
close alliance relationship with the United States,
and its sharper focus on its immediate neighbourhood provide a solid foundation for closer
Australian involvement in the operationalisation
of the Biden administration’s “integrated deterrence” concept. The challenge now is to do so
in a way that bolsters, rather than undermines,
efforts to reassure non-aligned regional nations
that the US-led alliance network will continue to
underwrite peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
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ENDNOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update,”
Australian Government, 1 July 2020, available
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House, “Interim National Security Strategic
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Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone
and Matilda Steward, “Averting Crisis: American
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Michèle Flournoy, “How to Prevent War in
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Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct”,
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4
(2019), p 22; Wallace C Gregson and Jeffrey
W Hornung “The United States Considers
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2021, Texas National Security Review available
at: https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/theunited-states-considers-its-pacific-sanctuary/
The Prime Minister, Minister for Defence,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Australia to
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Through New Trilateral Enhanced Security
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pm.gov.au/media/australia-pursue-nuclearpowered-submarines-through-new-trilateralenhanced-security; BBC News, “Aukus: UK,
US and Australia Launch Pact to Counter
China”, 16 September 2021, available at: https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837.
Tom Corben, Ashley Townshend and
Susannah Patton, “What is the AUKUS
Partnership?”, United States Studies Centre,
16 September 2021, available at: https://
www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/explainerwhat-is-the-aukus-partnership.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Marise Payne, “The Australia-U.S. Ministerial
Consultations Joint Statement: An Unbreakable
Alliance for Peace and Prosperity”, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2021, available at:
https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/
marise-payne/media-release/australia-usministerial-consultations-joint-statementunbreakable-alliance-peace-and-prosperity.
See: William G. Braun III, Stéfanie von Hlatky,
and Kim Richard Nossal (eds.), The Return of
Deterrence: Credibility and Capabilities in
a New Era (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
2018); Ashley Townshend and Thomas
Lonergan “Australia Must Adopt Unorthodox
Options to Disrupt China’s Grey Zone
Threats”, The Guardian, 28 September 2021,
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
australia-news/commentisfree/2021/sep/28/
australia-must-adopt-unorthodox-optionsto-disrupt-chinas-grey-zone-threats.
See, for example: Julianne Phillips and
Scott Wolford “Collective Deterrence in
the Shadow of Shifting Power” in Oxford
University Press, International Studies
Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 1, March 2021.
For the purposes of this paper, the focus is on
the thirty-six regional nations located within
the US Indo-Pacific Command’s Area of
Responsibility, plus the UK and France, which
have embedded and liaison officers inside
INDOPACOM see: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
“USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility,” US
Department of Defense, available at: https://
www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/
USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/]/.
Lloyd J. Austin III, “Secretary of Defense
Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change
of Command Ceremony”, US Department of
Defense, 30 April 2021, available at: https://
www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/
Article/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarksfor-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/.
10. Ibid.
11. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “Secretary
12.
of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM
Change of Command”, US Department
of Defence, 30 April 2021, https://www.
defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/
Article/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarksfor-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/.
Marise Payne, “Joint Press Conference with
Minister Payne, Minister Dutton, US Secretary
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of State and US Secretary of Defense”,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2021,
available at: https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/
minister/marise-payne/transcript/joint-pressconference-minister-payne-minister-duttonus-secretary-state-and-us-secretary-defense.
13. Colin Kahl, “Keynote Address: Colin Kahl
2021 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy
Conference”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 23 June 2021, available
at: https://ceipfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/
pdf/Colin+Kahl+Keynote_Transcript.pdf
archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/16/
remarks-president-obama-and-primeminister-gillard-australia-joint-press;
Department of Defence, “Marine Rotational
Force — Darwin”, Australian Government,
available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/
initiatives/usfpi/Home/MRF-D.asp.
18. See: Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks
14. Michael Chase and Arthur Chan, “China’s
Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic
Deterrence””, Rand Corporation, 7 April 2016,
available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1366.html; Adam Mount
and Pranay Vaddi, “An Integrated Approach to
Deterrence Posture: Reviewing Conventional
and Nuclear Forces in a National Defense
Strategy”, Federation of American Scientists,
4 January 2021, available at: https://fas.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/12/An-IntegratedApproach-to-Deterrence-Posture.pdf.
19.
15. Colin Kahl, “Keynote Address: Colin Kahl
2021 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy
Conference”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 23 June 2021, available
at: https://ceipfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/
Colin+Kahl+Keynote_Transcript.pdf; Garamone,
“Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese
Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence”; Ashley
Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone and
Matilda Steward, “Averting Crisis: American
Strategy, Military Spending and Collective
Defence in the Indo-Pacific”, pp. 14-19; Tim
Sweijs and Samuel Zilincik ‘The Essence
of Cross-Domain Deterrence‘ December
2020 in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual
Review of Military Studies 2020 pp 129158 available at: https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_8
16. US Department of Defense, “Summary of the
17.
2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge”, 22 January
2018, available at: https://dod.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-NationalDefense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, pp. 4-8.
The White House, “Remarks by President
Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia
in Joint Press Conference”, Office of the Press
Secreatry of the White House, 16 Novemebr
2011, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.
and Zack Cooper, “Federated Defense in
Asia”, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, December 2014, available at: https://
csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/141120_
Green_FederatedDefenseAsia_Web.
pdf; Kathleen Hicks, “Advance Policy
Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Nominee
for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary
of Defense”, Senate Armed Services
Committee, 2 February 2021, available at:
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Hicks_APQs_02-02-21.pdf.
Debate about AUKUS’ impact on Australia’s
sovereignty, however, is far from settled
in public discourse. See: An Address by
Senator the Hon Penny Wong to Launch
USSC Report “Correcting the Course”, United
States Studies Centre, 23 September 2021,
available at https://www.ussc.edu.au/events/
an-address-by-senator-the-hon-penny-wongto-launch-ussc-report-correcting-the-course.
20. Ashley Townshend, David Santoro and
21.
Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Revisiting
Deterrence in an Era of Strategic Competition”,
United States Studies Centre, February 2019,
available at: https://united-states-studiescentre.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/fe7/374/1df/
fe73741df51060febe071120504bc8611a0ec078/
Revisiting-deterrence-in-an-era-ofstrategic-competition.pdf, p. 2.
Department of Defence, “Talisman Sabre 21”,
Australian Government available at: https://
www1.defence.gov.au/exercises/talismansabre-21; Department of Defence, “IndoPacific Endeavour — Indo-Pacific Region”,
Australian Government, available at: https://
www1.defence.gov.au/operations/indopacific-endeavour; Department of Defence,
“The International Element of Exercise Pitch
Black” Australian Government, available at:
https://www.airforce.gov.au/about-us/history/
international-element-exercise-pitch-black
22. Considerations of nuclear deterrence, non-
traditional threats or ‘grey zone’ competition,
such as economic coercion, global systems,
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AI, cyber and space, are explored in more
detail elsewhere, although all elements
of US deterrence are interrelated.
23. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
“Indian Ocean Tsunami”, Government of
Australia, 19 December 2014, available
at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/
Pages/indian-ocean-tsunami; Mandeep
Singh, “Indo-Pacific Countries Work
Together to Meet Disaster Challenges,”
Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 16 November
2018, available at: https://ipdefenseforum.
com/2018/11/indo-pacific-countries-worktogether-to-meet-disaster-challenges/.
24. Indo-Pacom Public Affairs Office,
“USINDOPACOM and Republic of Fiji
Military Forces to Co-host Virtual 2020
Chiefs of Defense Conference”, United States
Indo-Pacific Command, 24 August 2020,
available at: https://www.pacom.mil/Media/
News/News-Article-View/Article/2323253/
usindopacom-and-republic-of-fiji-militaryforces-to-co-host-virtual-2020-chiefs/; U.S.
Army Pacific Public Affairs, “Indo-Pacific Land
Power Conference”, United States Indo-Pacific
Command, 24 May 2021, available at: https://
www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-ArticleView/Article/2629764/indo-pacific-land-powerconference/; Hailey Haux, “Pacific Air Forces’
Commanders, Command Chiefs, spouses
gather for conference”, Pacific Air Forces, 3
May 2021, available at: https://www.pacaf.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2594187/
pacific-air-forces-commanders-commandchiefs-spouses-gather-for-conference/; Public
Affairs, “Multinational Exercise Rim of the
Pacific 2020 Concludes”, United States IndoPacific Command, 1 September 2020, available
at: https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticle-View/Article/2332853/multinationalexercise-rim-of-the-pacific-2020-concludes/.
25. Koya Jibki and Tomoyo Ogawa, “Russia locks
onto Southeast Asia to Boost Arms Sales”,
Nikkei, 28 July 2020, available at: https://asia.
nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/
Russia-locks-onto-Southeast-Asia-to-boostarms-sales; China Power, “How Dominant
is China in the Global Arms Trade?” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 26
April 2018, available at: https://chinapower.
csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/;
26. Jens Kastner, “German Frigate Heads to South
China Sea; Seeks to Dock at Shanghai”, Nikkei
Asia, 18 August 2021, available at: https://asia.
27.
nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/IndoPacific/German-frigate-heads-to-South-ChinaSea-seeks-to-dock-at-Shanghai; Ridzwan
Rahmat, “India, Vietnam navies demonstrate
interoperability in South China Sea”, Janes, 19
August 2021, available at: https://www.janes.
com/defence-news/news-detail/india-vietnamnavies-demonstrate-interoperability-in-southchina-sea; Mallory Shelbourne, “Destroyer
Performs FONOP, U.S. Navy Disputes Chinese
Claim That It Ousted Warship”, USNI News,
8 September 2021, available at: https://news.
usni.org/2021/09/08/destroyer-performsfonop-u-s-navy-disputes-chinese-claimthat-it-ousted-warship; Thomas Newdick,
“British And Chinese Aircraft Carriers Both
Underway In The Tense South China Sea”,
The Drive, 29 July 2021, available at: https://
www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41752/
british-and-chinese-aircraft-carriers-bothunderway-in-the-tense-south-china-sea.
Shinzo Abe, “Address by Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth
Tokyo International Conference on African
Development,” Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 27 August 2016, available at: https://
www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
28. This year, for instance, the Republic of Korea
joined for the first time with Japan and the
five-eyes nations, to address challenges
across all five strategic domains. See: Ashley
Townshend and Tom Corben, “Advancing
Collective Defence Through the AustraliaUS Alliance”, 9 Dash Line, 19 August 2021,
available at: https://www.9dashline.com/
article/advancing-collective-defence-throughthe-australia-us-alliance?rq=Corben.
29. Department of Defence, “Exercise Talisman
Sabre 2021 Officially Ends,” Government of
Australia, 1 August 2021, available at: https://
news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/
exercise-talisman-sabre-2021-officially-ends.
30. Department of Defence, “2020 Defence
Strategic Update,” Australian Government,
1 July 2020, available at: https://www1.
defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020defence-strategic-update.
31. Peter Dutton, “Address to the American
Chamber of Commerce in Australia,”
Department of Defence, 8 September 2021,
available at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.
au/minister/peter-dutton/speeches/addressamerican-chamber-commerce-australia.
32. For approximate figures: Canada, Japan and
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE AND PACIFIC FORUM
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the United Kingdom each have six personnel;
New Zealand and the Republic of Korea each
have two; and the Philippines has one.
33. The ‘DIME’ acronym has been used for
many years to describe the instruments
of national power. See: Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 — Strategy”,
United States Government, April 2018,
available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf.
Naval News, 27 August 2021, available
at: https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2021/08/australia-india-japan-andu-s-kick-off-exercise-malabar-2021/;
38. See: Megan Eckstein, “Navy Will Host
Scaled-Down RIMPAC Exercise in Hawaii
With At-Sea Only Events”, USNI News, 29
April 2020, available at: https://news.usni.
org/2020/04/29/navy-will-host-scaled-downrimpac-exercise-in-hawaii-with-at-sea-onlyevents; Wassana Nanuam, “US Contingent at
Cobra Gold Cut to 600”, Bangkok Post, 2 July
2021, available at: https://koreajoongangdaily.
joins.com/2021/10/07/national/diplomacy/
korean-diplomats-networking-moneydrinks-and-gifts/20211007170741348.html.
34. Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
“Agreement Between Australia and the
USA Concerning Security Measures for the
Reciprocal Protection of Classified Information”,
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
September 2002, available at: https://www.aph.
gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/
house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/
augustandseptember2002/report/chapt4.pdf.
39. United States Studies Centre at the University
of Sydney, “State of the United States:
An evolving alliance agenda”, 16 March
2021, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.
au/analysis/state-of-the-united-statesan-evolvingalliance-agenda, pp. 58-73.
35. This ultimately would see a greater number
of US aircraft deployed to Australia under the
Enhanced Air Cooperation Program, and the
enhancement Australian maintenance and
servicing capabilities to support rotations of US
surface ships and submarines See: Payne, “The
Australia-U.S. Consultations Joint Statement”.
40. Townshend et. al., “Averting Crisis”, pp. 65-
36. Department of Defence, “Talisman Sabre 21”,
37.
Australian Government available at: https://
www1.defence.gov.au/exercises/talismansabre-21; Department of Defence, “IndoPacific Endeavour — Indo-Pacific Region”,
Australian Government, available at: https://
www1.defence.gov.au/operations/indo-pacificendeavour; Royal Australian Navy, “RIMPAC
2020”, Australian Government, available at:
https://www.navy.gov.au/operations-andexercises/rimpac-2020; Ryan Jenkins, “U.S.
Army Pacific: Leaving for Pacific Pathways”,
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 24 February 2020,
available at: https://www.pacom.mil/Media/
News/News-Article-View/Article/2092317/usarmy-pacific-leaving-for-pacific-pathways/;
Bronwyn Marchant, “RAAF Strengthens Ties
with US in Alaska,” Department of Defence,
3 September 2021, available at: https://news.
defence.gov.au/international/raaf-strengthensties-us-alaska. Spencer Garrison, “US,
Royal Thai Armed Forces complete 40th
Exercise Cobra Gold”, U.S. Army, 24 August
2021, available at: . https://www.army.mil/
article/249675/us_royal_thai_armed_forces_
complete_40th_exercise_cobra_gold.
Commander, Task Force 71 (Public
Affairs), “Australia, India, Japan, and
U.S. Kick-Off Exercise MALABAR 2021”,
41.
66; Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance”, The White
House, January 2021, available at: https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/03/03/interimnational-security-strategic-guidance/; United
States Studies Centre at the University of
Sydney, “State of the United States”, pp. 59-61.
See: United States Studies Centre at the
University of Sydney, “State of the United
States”, pp. 62-65; Tom Corben and Ashley
Townshend, “Quad Must Be a Seagoing
Deterrent”, Australian Financial Review, 24
September 2021, available at: https://www.
afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/quad-must-bea-seagoing-deterrent-20210923-p58u6e.
42. United States Studies Centre at the University of
Sydney, “State of the United States”, pp. 58-69.
43. The Royal Navy, “UK Carrier Strike Group
Completes Joint F-35 Missions and Exercises
with Republic of Korea”, Government of
the United Kingdom, 3 September 2021,
available at: https://www.royalnavy.mod.
uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/
september/03/210903-uk-carrier-strike-groupcompletes-joint-f-35-missions-and-exerciseswith-republic-of-korea; Alessio Patalano, “Why
is a British Carrier Strike Group Heading to the
Indo-Pacific?” War on the Rocks, 11 August
2021, available at: https://warontherocks.
com/2021/08/why-is-a-british-carrier-strikegroup-heading-to-the-indo-pacific/.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
JANE HARDY
Visiting Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy and Defence Program
Jane Hardy is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence
Program at the United States Studies Centre. She is a senior career diplomat from Australia with three decades of service in multiple embassies,
predominantly in the Indo-Pacific region. She is a published author and
speaker on cultural and strategic matters of key interest to Australia, the
United States and regional partners, with a current focus on the evolution
of the Australia-US alliance.
As Australia’s Ambassador to Spain, Consul-General in Honolulu and as a
senior diplomat in Washington, Seoul and Kuala Lumpur, Jane has worked
in-depth on advancing Australia’s strategic aims, shaping regional architecture and achieving results in multilateral organisations. She has also served
as Assistant Secretary in various posts within the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in Canberra, including the Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation Branch, the Strategic Issues and Intelligence Branch, and
the United States Branch.
Prior to joining DFAT, Jane worked in the NGO, business and university
sectors, and published on Australian indigenous art and analysis of overseas aid programs.
Jane holds a Masters of Arts from Monash University, a Bachelor of Arts
from Flinders University, a Bachelor of Arts from the University of South
Australia, and a Graduate Diploma in Foreign Affairs and Trade from the
Australian National University.
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge Ashley Townshend and Tom Corben for their
input into this brief, and express my appreciation to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade for their flexibility in supporting my role as Visiting
Senior Fellow to the USSC while on leave from my official duties. I would
also like to thank those colleagues retired from the Australian Defence Force,
the Department of Defence, DFAT, and the Office of National Intelligence,
who commented on early drafts of this policy paper.
This activity was supported by the Australian Government through a grant
by the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence.
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The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is a university-based research centre,
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The Foreign Policy and Defence Program is committed to providing policy-oriented research and
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The Foreign Policy and Defence Program receives funding from the following partners:
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DETERRENCE
DIALOGUE
The US-Australia Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue is an annual Track 1.5 initiative convened by
the United States Studies Centre and Pacific Forum. It aims to advance high-quality policy debate
about the evolving role of deterrence and counter-coercion in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific
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Cover photo: HMAS Ballarat and USS America conduct a replenishment at sea off the coast of Queensland during
Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (Australian Department of Defence)
This publication may be cited as:
Jane Hardy, “Integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific: Advancing the Australia-United States
alliance,” United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Pacific Forum,
October 2021.
Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own view, not those of the United States
Studies Centre or Pacific Forum. This research was peer-reviewed by both internal and external experts.