CASE #2
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS v. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO,
G.R. No. 101089; April 7, 1993
Ponente: J. Campos, Jr.
FACTS:
Private respondent does business under the name of Cipriano Trading Enterprises
(CIPTRADE), while Petitioner Estrelita M. Bascos does business under the name of Bascos
Trucking (BT).
Rodolfo entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the
former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes
Drive, Del Pan, Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Calamba, Laguna. To
carry out its obligation, Rodolfo subcontracted with petitioner to transport and deliver 400
sacks of soya bean with P156,404 from Manila-Calamba at the rate of Php50/ton. Petitioner
failed to deliver.
Consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost
goods.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary
attachment for breach of a contract of carriage.
RTC granted the preliminary attachment.
Petitioner contended the following allegations: there was no contract of carriage since
respondent leased the cargo truck; CIPTRADE was liable to them Php11,000.000 for loding
the cargo; the truck was hijacked during transit; the hijacking was immediately reported to
CIPTRADE; after prelim imnvestigation, information was filed against a certain Jose Opriano;
since hijacking is a force majure, petitioner is not liable to CIPTRADE
RTC rendered judgment in favor of CIPTRADE.
Petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Petitioner/ Bascos Trucking is a common carrier
(2) Whether or not hijacking is considered force majure
RULING:
(1) Yes. Bascos Trucking is a common carrier. The Court held that it is a common carrier
due to the following circumstances: the fact that the truck driver of petitioner,
Maximo Sanglay, received the cargo consisting of 400 bags of soya bean meal as
evidenced by a cargo receipt signed by Maximo Sanglay; the fact that the truck
helper, Juanito Morden, was also an employee of petitioner; and the fact that control
of the cargo was placed in petitioner’s care.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as" (a) person, corporation or
firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public." The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is
a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general
public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted."
In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking
business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are
conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.
Petitioner failed to prove that the contract executed between CIPTRADE was a lease
contract.
(2) No. Hijacking in the instant case, cannot be treated as force majure. Thus, the Court
affirmed the holding of the CA that the loss of goods was not due to force majure.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There
are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and
these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the
presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence in order to overcome the presumption.
"Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not be
allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like
thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force.
Wherefore, the petition was dismissed.
SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ vs. SUN HOLIDAYS, INC.,
G.R. No. 186312; June 29, 2010
Ponente: J. Carpio Morales
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent Sun Holidays Inc. before the RTC for
damages arising from the death of their son (Ruelito) who perished with his wife
when they were on the boat M/B Coco Beach III that capsized en route to Batangas
from Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro where the couple had stayed at Coco Beach
Island Resort (Resort) owned and operated by respondent.
The stay of the newly wed Ruelito and his wife at the Resort from September 9 to 11,
2000 was by virtue of a tour package-contract with respondent that included
transportation to and from the Resort and the point of departure in Batangas.
A certain Miguel Matute, scuba diving instructor, was originally scheduled to leave on
the Resort that same day but was advised to stay for another night because of the
weather. Meanwhile, petitioners’ son and his wife, were scheduled to trek to the other
side of Coco Beach mountain. The couple boarded the boat which will ferry them to
Batangas.
After getting hit by two big waves which came one after the other, M/B Coco Beach
III capsized putting all passengers underwater.
The passengers, who had put on their life jackets, struggled to get out of the boat.
Upon seeing the captain, Matute and the other passengers who reached the surface
asked him what they could do to save the people who were still trapped under the
boat. The captain replied "Iligtas niyo na lang ang sarili niyo".
Help came. 2 boats owned by Asia Divers rescued the passengers. Unfortunately,
eight of them died including Ruelito and his wife.
Petitioners demanded indemnification from the respondent for the death of their son
in the amount of at least ₱4,000,000.
Respondent denied any responsibility for the incident which was considered to be a
fortuitous event.
Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondent, as a common carrier, was guilty
of negligence in allowing M/B Coco Beach III to sail notwithstanding storm warning
bulletins issued by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) as early as 5:00 a.m. of September 11, 2000.
In its Answer, respondent denied being a common carrier, alleging that its boats are
not available to the general public as they only ferry Resort guests and crew
members. Nonetheless, it claimed that it exercised the utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of its passengers.
RTC dismissed the complaint and respondents’ counterclaim.
Petitioner sought for MR but was denied.
On appeal, CA denied petitioners’ appeal, holding, among other things, that the trial
court correctly ruled that respondent is a private carrier which is only required to
observe ordinary diligence; that respondent in fact observed extraordinary diligence
in transporting its guests on board M/B Coco Beach III; and that the proximate cause
of the incident was a squall, a fortuitous event.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent's boat is a common carrier and thus be held liable
for
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioners.
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, orair
for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to
coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law
on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the
Public Service Act.
Furthermore, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its
main business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of
respondent’s ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by its having its own
Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may
be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services are thus available
to the public.
The SC further ruled that the circumstances in the case at bar cannot be treated as force
majure, thus, still liable for the death of Ruelito and his wife.
The elements of a "fortuitous event" are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been
independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have
been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the
aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.
To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss. And it should have exercised due diligence to
prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous
event.
Petitioners are also entitled to indemnity for the death of Ruelito which is fixed at
₱50,000.29
As for damages representing unearned income, the formula for its computation is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary
living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 — age of deceased at the time of death]
Wherefore, CA’s ruling was reversed and set aside. Judgment is rendered in favor of
petitioners ordering respondent to pay petitioners the following: (1) ₱50,000 as
indemnity for the death of Ruelito Cruz; (2) ₱8,316,000 as indemnity for Ruelito’s loss of
earning capacity; (3) ₱100,000 as moral damages; (4) ₱100,000 as exemplary damages;
(5) 10% of the total amount adjudged against respondent as attorneys fees; and (6) the
costs of suit.