Party Terry Concept 1. Negligence Case A. Duty of care B. Causation C. Compensatory damages Melissa Beatrice 1. Negligence A. Duty of care Caparo v Dickman B. Factual causation Barnett v Chelsea Hospital C. Remoteness of damage Morris v Murray D. Volenti non fit injuria Gunness v Ramdeo 1. Negligence A. Duty of care B. Factual causation C. Remoteness of damage D. Volenti non fit injuria E. Contributory negligence F. Novus actus interviens Froom v Butcher *Where does the seatbelt factor in? *Where does the doctor factor in? Melissa 1. Whether Steve is liable for the injuries to Melissa notwithstanding that she knew of his inebriated state before getting into the car with him. According to Lord Wright in Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. v McMullan, “negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was owing.” Consequently, Terry would have to establish that Steve owed him a duty of care. For a duty of care to have existed, there must have been a relationship of proximity, the harm sustained by the Plaintiff must have been reasonably foreseeable and it must be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability (Caparo v Dickman). The law imposes a duty on all motorists to other motorists and passengers to exercise reasonable care and skill in all the relevant circumstances because it is foreseeable that failure to do so will result in death, serious injury and damage to infrastructure. Likewise Steve owed Melissa that same duty of care. Next, Melissa would have to prove that Steve breached his duty of care by not exercising reasonable care and skill. The general rule from Nettleship v Weston is that a person who holds himself out as having a particular skill will be expected to show the average amount of competence normally possessed by persons doing that kind of work or having that skill, and he may be liable for negligence if he falls short of that standard. The reasonable driver would not be intoxicated, pass out behind the wheel of their car, run a red light and crash into another person’s car. Thus, Steve fell short of the standard of care of a reasonable driver and breached the duty of care owed to Melissa. The other element that must be proven is that Steve’s negligence was the cause of Melissa’s injuries. Firstly, in applying the but-for test from Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management, but-for Steve driving intoxicated and crashing into Terry’s taxicab, Melissa would not have been injured. Secondly, Melissa’s injuries must not have been too remote a consequence. The general rule is that the Defendant can only be liable for those consequences which were foreseeable, and the test is that the foreseeable harm must have been the same type, kind or class as the one which actually happened to the Plaintiff (Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound). Here, it was foreseeable that a person driving while heavily intoxicated may end up in a car accident and that the driver or passengers may be severely hurt because alcohol lowers a person’s focus, making it less likely that they will drive with reasonable care and skill. So, Melissa’s injures were the same type as was foreseeable. Steve may try to absolve himself of liability for Melissa’s injuries if he can successfully raise a defence of volenti non fit injuria. Volenti non fit injuria, is a complete defence based on the concept that no wrong can be done to one who consents. Hence, a Plaintiff who voluntarily assumes all the inherent risks involved with an activity absolves the Defendant of the responsibility for injury or loss arising from those activities. For example, in Morris v Murray, a case with factual similarities to this one, the Plaintiff brought suit against the administrators of Mr. Murray's estate after he was severely injured in a plane crash. A heavily intoxicated Mr. Murray was the pilot of the plane and was killed in the crash. Both the Plaintiff and Mr. Murray were engaged in heavy drinking shortly before boarding the plane. The court reasoned that the Plaintiff knew that the deceased was drunk and that flying with him created an obvious and great risk for safety. The Plaintiff fully accepted the risk of injury and impliedly discharged the deceased’s duty of care. The maxim of volenti non fit injuria applied and the Defendants were not liable. Similarly, Melissa knew that Steve was heavily intoxicated but still accepted a ride from him. When she did that, she accepted the risk of injury and impliedly discharged Steve’s duty of care. However, courts are reluctant to find volenti and are more inclined to accept a claim of contributory negligence. A person is contributorily negligent "if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable prudent man, he might be hurt himself" (Froom v Butcher). Steve may claim that Melissa was contributorily negligent for remaining in the car even though she knew that he was too inebriated to drive. A similar situation happened in Gunness v Ramdeo and the court held the Plaintiff contributorily negligent because the risk of injury by the Defendant’s driving outweighed the difficulties to the Plaintiff to find other transport, so he did not have to stay in the vehicle. Beatrice 2. The last issue is whether Steve is liable for the injuries to Beatrice notwithstanding that: A. She knew of his inebriated state before getting into the car with him. B. She was wearing a seatbelt as required by law, but it failed to work. C. Mr. Hope was unable to repair an injury to her spinal cord which resulted in paraplegia. In terms of liability for Beatrice, Steve owed her the same duty of care as Melissa and breached that duty in the same way. In terms of causation, but for Steve’s actions, Beatrice would have gotten hurt regardless of whether the seatbelt was working. The seatbelt may have only reduced the severity of her injuries. For remoteness of damage, Steve may claim that the treatment by the doctor was a novus actus interveniens. This is an intervening act that is sufficient to break the chain of causation between the Defendant's negligence and the Plaintiff's injury, thus relieving the Defendant from liability. Where a Defendant’s negligent act is followed by the negligent act of a third party, this act might be enough to break the chain of causation and the third party will be held liable instead of the one who triggered the chain of events. However, the doctor was not actually negligent because there is no evidence that he fell short of the standard of care expected of a surgeon in those circumstances. The procedure carried a 56% risk of injury but was necessary to save Beatrice’s life. Even if he was negligent, his actions would not have broken the chain of causation because serious injury to Beatrice was a natural and probable consequence of Steve’s actions. The same defences for Melissa also apply to Beatrice. Conclusion Steve would be liable for the injuries to Melissa and Beatrice who would most likely be contributorily negligent and whose compensatory damages would be reduced by an appropriate amount.
