Contracts – Case Briefs (Chap. 3) Varney v. Ditmass (pp. 110 – 119) I. Plaintiff Varney, architect and draftsman, brought forth an alleged wrongful discharge/breach of contract against his employer, Mr. Ditmars. Cause of Action: Breach of contract; wrongful discharge of employee Facts (historical): P hired at firm; wanted to work for $40, but started at $35 D made several statements leading up to action, including that he would raise salary to 40 (which he did) and on Jan. 1st, 1911 would give P a share of D’s profits. Election night: P claims he didn’t want to work, D never expressly stated he had to – just that he “should work” – and P stays home sick (11/7 – 12/1). D fires P claims loss of wages, breach of contract Procedure: Trial: complaint dismissed Appellate: affirmed with costs Standard of Review/Rule: Promise must be in certain and explicit terms so that their full intention may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty. Question Presented/Issue: Was a definite, fair offer of contract made and accepted within reasonable certainty? Should plaintiff seek to recover daamges from the time period of 9/7 – 12/31? Is the promise to pay an employee a fair share – however unspecified at time of contract – of profits too vague to be emforced? For a contract to be valid, must the promise or the agreement of the parties be certain and explicit in order for their full intention to be understood to a reasonable degree of certainty? Answer: No, it was not. No, because he was not currently working and providing services during that time to qualify the requirements in the contract. Likely yes Ratonale: Reasonable + fair = intent Indefinite facts/factors: including profits to be shared by D (nominal) The amount is indefinite and difficult to trace. Quantum merit: work that has been done should be rewarded up to Nov. 7 No damages for 9/7 – 12/31 because he was not servicing the employer, per the original agreement; no evidence Holding: Affirmed lower court Concurrence/Dissent: evidence is the problem, but a promise to pay fair share isn’t always vague. Plaintiff has failed upon burden of proof to PROVE damages/contract, not because the terms were too vague. Holds for reversal and new trial. Dodge v. Trustees of Macon Woman’s College (pp. 120 - 122 ) II. Plaintiffs, several female students at Randolph-Beacon Women’s College, are suing the Trustees of RBWC for breach of contract. Cause of Action: Breach of contract; Facts (historical): Ps are a collection of female students Ps are suing Trustees Board for breach of contract Contract: the Trustees’ plan to transition to a boy/girl college violated the contract the plaintiffs made with the college when they accepted their offers of admissions. Ps request injunction to remain a predominately women’s college [remedy] Procedure: Trial: complaint dismissed; sustained demur (defendants file to prove that Plaintiff’s claim is legally insufficient) Appellate: affirmed Standard of Review/Rule: Promise must be in certain and explicit terms so that their full intention may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty. Question Presented/Issue: Did the plaintiffs’ breach of contract entitle them to receive a college education in a predominantly female academic environment for four years? Was a definite offer and acceptance of four years of education present in the contract, and then subsequently breached? Answer: No, and if it was they produced no proof No, no evidence of definite promise made Ratonale: No evidence of contract produced by Plaintiff (burden of proof) No promise found Holding: Affirmed lower court Concurrence/Dissent: disagrees with application of legal principles; doesn’t find pleadings incomplete, and argues that oral complaints should be acknowledged. III. Joesph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc v. Schumacher (pp. 123 - 125 ) Plaintiff, Martin, is a tenant who rents the Defendant’s retail store. Martin is thus suing for a breach of contract. Cause of Action: Breach of contract; Facts (historical): Martin rents for 500 first year; raised to $650 by fifth year Renewal of five year lease began, but D claimed he would raise the rent to $900 P got rental appraised, sought fair market price of %545.41 Contract: pg. 123, 30 days notice at agreed upon annual rents Procedure: Trial: complaint dismissed; sustained eviction Appellate no. 1: reinstated complaint and granted consolidation Appellate (NY Supreme Court): reverse appellate decision and trial court orders reinstated Standard of Review/Rule: Promise must be in certain and explicit terms so that their full intention may be ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty. Question Presented/Issue: Is a realty lease’s provision that the rent for a renewal period was “to be agreed upon” an enforceable contract/ “definite” promise? Answer: No, terms of agreement were indefinite and uncertain – no specificity. Ratonale: Contract holdings + definite terms (foundation for reasoning) Concern of substance, not form Renewal clause is indefinite; no formula; no glue binding to “fair market value,” it merely state “agreed upon by both tenant and landlord” Holding: Affirmed lower court; reversed appellate no. 1 Concurrence/Dissent: “agreed upon” should not prevent judicial intervention: i.e. those should still be just concerns to consider in reappraising and negotiating new rental price; rental should be overall evaluated at a reasonable market price.