Geo-Politics In Arabian sea, Indian and Pacific
Oceans: Competition and Cooperation
What is the importance of the Indian Ocean?

The Indian Ocean covers at least one fifth of the world’s total ocean area

Is bounded by Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (known as the western
Indian Ocean), India’s coastal waters (the central Indian Ocean), and the
Bay of Bengal near Myanmar and Indonesia (the eastern Indian Ocean).

It provides critical sea trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa,
and South Asia with the broader Asian continent to the east and Europe
to the west.

A number of the world’s most important strategic chokepoints, including
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca through which 32.2 millions of barrels
of crude oil and petroleum are transported per day—more than 50 percent
of the world’s maritime oil trade—are found in the Indian Ocean Region,
which itself is believed to be rich with energy reserves.

Nearly 40 percent (PDF)of the world’s offshore petroleum is produced in
the Indian Ocean, coastal beach sands and offshore waters host heavy
mineral deposits, and fisheries are increasingly important for both exports
and domestic consumption.
Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?

China and India are dependent on energy resources transported via the
secure sea lanes in the Indian Ocean to fuel their economies.

India imports nearly 80 percent of its energy, mostly oil from the Middle
East, and is due to overtake Japan as the world’s third largest energy
consumer (behind China and the United States).

According to a U.S. Department of Defense report, 84 percent (PDF)of
China’s imported energy resources passed through Strait of Malacca from
the Indian Ocean in 2012.

As Beijing and New Delhi press to maintain economic growth, their
dependency on the safe transport of resources will likely intensify. China’s
growing global influence and India’s rapid economic rise have heightened
the ocean’s strategic value.

Meanwhile, the United States’rebalance to Asia—shifting from a foreign
policy dominated by the Middle East to one more centered on Asia—has
also been a contributing factor elevating concern over Indian Ocean
security. Diverse security challenges affect the region ranging from
natural disasters to concerns over energy security, piracy, and military
posturing.
How are China and India competing in the Indian Ocean?

Both countries have developed initiatives to bolster infrastructure and
other connections in the region, which the World Bank describes as
among the “least economically integrated.” Competition between Beijing
and New Delhi is not necessarily overt, but each country is seeking to
strengthen ties with smaller regional states to secure their respective
security and economic interests.

Beijing’s regional vision, backed by $40 billion of pledged investment,
outlines its One Belt, One Road plan—combining the revitalization of
ancient land-based trade routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt, with
a Maritime Silk Road. China’s ties with regional states have deepened,
including the influx of Chinese capital into construction projects in
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Since launching
counterpiracy operations in 2009, Beijing has become increasingly active
in the region.

China has also undertaken efforts to modernize its military, particularly its
naval
deployment
capabilities
to protect
overseas
interests like
personnel, property, and investments. Experts also argue that Beijing’s
forays into what is at times described as India’s neighborhood are driven
by China’s excess capacity challenges—incentivizing Chinese firms out
of domestic markets to compete in and open new markets abroad.

For its part, India sees itself as the natural preeminent regional power.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has doubled-downon fostering stronger
diplomatic, economic, and security ties with maritime states as a means
to strengthen India’s economy, establish its role a driver of regional
growth , and simultaneously diminish China’s growing appeal.

“It is India’s neighborhood that holds the keyto its emergence as a
regional and global power”. Though Beijing deflects claims of hegemonic
aspirations, it identifies security in the IOR (Indian Ocean Rim) as a
primary concern for Chinese “core interests.” In 2015, a white paper
charting China’s military strategy indicated a shift of People’s Liberation
Army Navy to focus on both offshore water defense and open seas
protection. Chinese behavior suggests that Beijing seeks to establish a
persistent regional maritime presence. It now boasts a semi-permanent
naval presence through its counterpiracy activities in the Indian Ocean
and has more aggressively asserted itself in the Pacific with extensive
patrols and land reclamation projects in disputed waters.

China’s ambitions in the region have been described by many scholars
by the “string of pearls” metaphor, which holds that China is taking on
economic and investment projects with Indian Ocean states to secure
ports or places where its military forces could set up naval facilities or at
the very least, refueling and repair stations. Chinese experts dismiss this,
claiming that China seeks access, not bases, for economic gain.As rising
powers, China and India’s pursuit of partnerships with smaller regional
states is inevitable.

Still, “maritime competition between China and India is still nascent and
should not be overblown. “tit-for-tat politico-military escalation” is possible
in the larger Indo-Pacific, a region spanning both the Indian and Pacific
oceans.
What fuels China-India tensions?

China-India relations are fraught, colored by historical disputes and the
perceived threat to India of China’s rise. Tensions have persisted despite
overtures by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. Much of the friction stems from alongstanding
disputealong a 2,400-mile border in India’s Arunachal Pradesh and
China’s Tibet and the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War along the
Himalayan border.

The expansion of a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean has
heightened India’s concerns. Beijing says its activities are commercially
motivated and intended to better protect its interests and people abroad.
However some think that ramped up Chinese presence in the Indian
Ocean and elsewhere is consistent with Xi Jinping’s intention of making
maritime power central to achieving Chinese dominancein Asia.

While China’s aims are disputed, both sides continue to ramp up military
capabilities in the ocean region. China continues to deploy greater
numbers of naval forces to support counterpiracy operations in the
western Indian Ocean, and invests and sells arms,includingtanks,
frigates, missiles, and radar, to India’s neighbors.

Beijing is currently restructuring its military: Xi Jinping announced in
September 2015 that the People’s Liberation Army would cut 300,000 of
its troops to redistribute resources to sea and air capabilities. As China
adapts its military force to meet its global ambitions, its posturing has
grown bolder.

In October 2015, China finalized the sale of eight submarinesto Pakistan,
and in recent years, Chinese submarines have docked at the Sri Lankan
port of Colombo and the Pakistani port of Karachi.

More still, Beijing’s land reclamation efforts and assertive behavior in the
Pacific could bleedinto the region

India is also reinforcing its regional maritime presence. “Activating
partnerships and expanding capabilities in the Indian Ocean has
beencentral to her quest for security.

The country has vowed to spend billions to build up its navy, including
anti-submarine capabilities, has sent vessels to visit the South China Sea,
and called for freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes as part of its Act East policy.

The construction of military bases, modernized equipment and fleets,
new maritime assets, and the expansion of security tiesare all part of New
Delhi’s push to assert itself as the region’s leader. Modi initiated the first
bilateral India-Australia exercises and India participated in multilateral
naval games in the Bay of Bengal with the United States, Australia, and
Japan.

David Brewster of Australian National University says there is little doubt
that despite India’s traditional principle of nonalignment, outreach to the
United States, Australia, and Japan are calculated moves that could play
a significant role in counterbalancing China.
Is India Ready To Be a Power in the Pacific?
For some time now, many have argued that India should assume the role of the socalled “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean and across the Asia-Pacific.
Taking on this responsibility will require it to assert its strategic goals across the
region. But given the evolving security environment in this region, it is quickly
becoming apparent that many countries, including the United States, want India to
step up perhaps more than New Delhi itself wants to. Furthermore, it also seems that
India’s understanding of the role is significantly different from those making these
demands.
Despite New Delhi’s reassurances, it has yet to build a “blue water navy,” a force
capable of operating in open seas and projecting power to areas of strategic interest.
The Indian army continues to be the favorite child of the Indian military, with nearly
half of the defense budget typically going to the ground forces. On the other hand,
the navy has seen a reduction in its allocated budget from 19 percent in 2012 to 2013
to 16 percent in 2015 to 2016. As of January 2015, the Indian navy had a shortage
of 1,322 officers and 11,257 sailors. In the past, there have been reports of acute
shortages of ships and helicopters. Furthermore, a series of mishaps aboard Indian
naval ships and submarines led to the resignation of former Naval Chief DK Joshi
in February 2014 — the first resignation of a leader of the armed forces since Indian
independence in 1947.
With the Indian navy clearly facing numerous organizational challenges, why is
Washington encouraging New Delhi to take on the role of the net security provider
in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific region?
In 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that India should be a net
security provider; Leon Panetta implied the same in 2012. The most recent and
significant acknowledgment of the Pentagon’s push for India’s role as a net security
provider was outlined in the U.S. Department of Defense’s recently released “U.S.
Asia Pacific maritime security strategy” which noted that the United States is
“seeking to reinforce India’s maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in
the Indian Ocean region and beyond.”
At the crux of all this is India’s geographic location. During his September 2015
visit to India, Australian Defense Minister Kevin Andrews said that “Australia
recognizes India’s critical role in supporting the security, stability, and prosperity of
the Indian Ocean region and the stability of a wider, rules-based global order.”
Despite the challenges the Indian navy faces, the country’s geographic location
allows it to assert itself in the Indian Ocean region in a manner that exceeds its
capabilities. India’s long eastern coastlines provide access and command over the
Bay of Bengal, while its western coast provides access to the Arabian Sea. The
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located close to critical sea lines, provide
comfortable access to the Malacca Straits and the southern reaches of the Indian
Ocean.
Its naval limitations aside, New Delhi’s contributions in fighting maritime piracy
both off the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia are noteworthy. The Indian navy’s
performance during natural calamities and in search and rescue operations (SAR)
after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Maldives Fresh
water crisis of 2014, and during SAR operations for MH370, demonstrate its
strength.
But to be the net security provider for the region, this is not enough.
India must articulate a clear policy with political will to direct it. It will have to get
involved in regional developments and take a lead in creating mechanisms and
frameworks, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean
Dialogue, while simultaneously joining existing ones (like the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum and the Maritime Silk Road) to expand its reach. Last
July, the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Evan Garcia encouraged India to play a
greater role in the South China Sea when he remarked that India “is not an invited
guest, India should be at the head table” when it comes to policing the South China
Sea. Nations such as Singapore and Vietnam also share these sentiments.
Furthermore, many navies — the United States, Australia, Indonesia, Japan,
Vietnam, Philippines, or Singapore — stand ready to cooperate with the Indian navy.
But India can only deliver the guarantees it hopes to through increased participation
at regional security forums, where it can shape the discourse and, in doing so, define
the role that it is willing to play.
India’s own definitions of what being a net security provider entails and what a blue
water navy looks like, also differ from that of countries involved in the region.
India’s definition of power projection in its area of interests may not necessarily
align with the definition outlined by other Asia-Pacific nations. India’s interests in
securing the Indian Ocean are likely to substantially converge with those of Pacific
powers like the United States. But in areas like the South China Sea, which form a
“secondary area” of interest for the Indian navy, the overlap may be considerably
less.
In October 2015, India’s Defense Minister Shri Manohar Parrikar released India’s
revised maritime military strategy document for 2015 (IMSS-2015), which offers a
definition from the Indian perspective of what it means to be a net security provider.
The Indian Navy, for the first time, has defined the phrase “net security provider” as
maintaining “the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing
prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment,
against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these.” However, the
definition does not include the geographical scope of the region where India would
pursue the above defined role, which reflects Indian hesitation to assert beyond its
immediate strategic considerations.
The pressure for India to emerge as a regional leader and as a net security provider
is high, and will only increase. The support from nations in the Chinese maritime
neighborhood (Vietnam, Philippines, and Singapore) is encouraging, but perhaps
their expectations exceed India’s own vision.
India’s current leaders have suggested that India is willing to play the role of an
active security provider. After former Prime Minister Manmohan Singhdeclared that
India is well-positioned to be a net security provider, the Modi government has taken
a firmer stand through its engagement with its maritime neighbors, joint strategic
visions, and collaborations with regional navies. The Asia-Pacific is ready for a new
discourse on maritime security. India is a central part of the discussion on maritime
cooperation and security in the Indian Ocean region, among Australia, United States,
European, and Southeast Asian countries. What the region now requires, however,
is a bit of patience while India charts its own policy and adds its own substance to
this narrative, before it can truly emerge as a net security provider.