CRIMINAL LAW I
CASE DIGESTS
Presented to the
University of Asia and the Pacific
School of Law and Governance
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Course
Criminal Law I under
Atty. Irene Mae Alcobilla
March 24, 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE I: Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations ............................................... 6
ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA ......................................................................... 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO PRIETO ..................................................... 7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED
DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ ............................................................................. 8
PEOPLE VS. SIYOH................................................................................................................... 9
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. VS. ROGER TULIN......................................................................... 10
TITLE II: Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State ........................................................ 12
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ETC. ........................................ 12
VS FIDEL V. RAMOS .............................................................................................................. 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUBEN BURGOS Y TITO ......................................... 14
RAMON S. MILO VS. ANGELITO C. SALANGA AND JUAN TUVERA .......................... 15
STONEHILL v DIOKNO .......................................................................................................... 16
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF........................................................................................... 18
TITLE III: Crimes against Public Order ........................................................................................ 19
ENRILE VS. SALAZAR ........................................................................................................... 19
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL AND RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O.
UMIL AND NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE VS. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE ........................................................................................................ 20
JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. HON. UMAR AMIN .................................................................. 22
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO DASIG ...................................................... 23
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO ............................. 24
VICENTE P. LADLAD VS. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO ..................................................... 25
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. ......................... 26
PEOPLE V. GERONIMO ......................................................................................................... 27
FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO VS. PEOPLE OF THE................................................................... 29
PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS ........................................................................... 29
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GRACIANO L. CABRERA ........................................ 30
UNITED STATES V. ABAD .................................................................................................... 31
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KAMLON HADJI ....................................................... 32
THE UNITED STATES VS. AURELIO TOLENTINO ........................................................... 34
ESPUELAS VS. PEOPLE ......................................................................................................... 35
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UMIL V. RAMOS ..................................................................................................................... 36
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE .......................................................................................................... 37
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN, VS. THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA/FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR. VS. HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO ............. 38
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA .................................... 39
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODIL ........................................................................... 40
HILARION SARCEPUEDES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ..................................... 42
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO TAC-AN ..................................................... 43
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BELTRAN ..................................................................... 45
PEOPLE V. DOLLANTES ....................................................................................................... 46
ENRIQUE TOTOY RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .......... 47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JULIO RECTO Y ROBEA .......................................... 50
PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM ..................................................................................................... 51
VYTIACO VS. CA .................................................................................................................... 53
ALBERTO VS. DELA CRUZ ................................................................................................... 55
ADELAIDA TANEGA V HON. HONORATO MASAKAYAN ............................................. 57
PEOPLE VS. ABILONG ........................................................................................................... 58
ALVAREZ VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS ............................................................................. 59
WILFREDO TORRES VS. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES ................................................ 61
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIOSO .......................................................................... 62
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KONG LEON A.K.A. KIM HUY....................... 63
TITLE IV: Crimes against Public Interest ..................................................................................... 64
DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE ................................................................................................... 64
PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN GALANO ....................................................................................... 65
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ AND LUIS MABUNAY ... 66
SALUD BERADIO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
................................................................................................................................................... 67
PILAR S. LUAGUE VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES ................................................................................................................... 68
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ................................... 69
PEOPLE S. SENDAYDIEGO......................................................................................................... 71
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE ....................................................................... 72
PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS ........................................................................... 72
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON AND
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN ....................................................................................................... 73
ENEMCIO V. OMBUDSMAN ................................................................................................. 74
LEONILA BATULANON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................. 75
FELIX NIZURTADO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE............................................ 76
GALEOS VS PEOPLE .............................................................................................................. 78
MICHAEL DAVA VS. PEOPLE .............................................................................................. 79
MARTINEZ VS PEOPLE ......................................................................................................... 80
JOSEPH E.ESTRADA VS. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, ET AL. ........................................................................................................... 81
GIGANTONI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................................... 82
LEGAMIA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ........................................................ 84
REOLANDI DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ......................................................... 85
HONORIO SAAVEDRA VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, AND GREGORIO M. RAMOS ............................................................................. 86
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ....................... 87
OUANO V. CA.......................................................................................................................... 88
TITLE V: Crimes Relative to Opium and other Prohibited Drugs ................................................ 89
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NOEL CATENTAY ..................................................... 89
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZAIDA KAMAD Y AMBING .................................... 92
PEOPLE VS AGULAY ............................................................................................................. 94
PEOPLE V ADAM .................................................................................................................... 96
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALDRIN BERDADERO Y ARMAMENTO .............. 98
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROA .............................................................................. 100
PEOPLE VS. ONG .................................................................................................................. 101
PEOPLE VS. PAGKALINAWAN .......................................................................................... 102
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ................................ 104
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS PDEA ............................................................................... 105
ATTY. MANUEL LASERNA, JR. VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFOREMENT AGENCY ......................................................................................... 109
MICHAEL PADUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES................................................... 110
PEOPLE V. SANTOS ............................................................................................................. 112
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNARDO F. NICOLAS ....................................... 114
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SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY,
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .................................................................................. 116
TITLE VI: Crimes against Public Morals: Immoral Doctrines and Obscene Publications and
Exhibitions ................................................................................................................................... 118
PEOPLE VS. KOTTINGER .................................................................................................... 118
PEOPLE VS. APARICI ........................................................................................................... 119
PEOPLE VS PADAN .............................................................................................................. 120
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO AND RUDY ESTORNINOS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS 121
FREDRIK FELIX NOGALES, ET. AL, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ................... 122
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TITLE I: Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations
BABA, KARLA MARIE B.
17-4137
ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA
No. L-409. January 30, 1947
Facts:
Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy and gave the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the following reasons:
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and
(2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation
of the Philippine Republic
Issue: Whether Laurel should be granted the writ of habeas corpus
Ruling: No.
1. The sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier.
The absolute allegiance of citizens must remain with the legitimate government. (Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon)
What is suspended is not the sovereignty itself but only the exercise of rights attributable
to the sovereignty. Therefore, there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The occupant has no power to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason because
such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for
the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army.
2. The change from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same sovereign people as provided by the
Constitution.
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BALBOA, NERISSA GLORIA J.
17-4147
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO PRIETO
G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948
Tuason, J.;
Facts:
Eduardo Prieto was prosecuted for treason on 7 counts and was found guilty on 4.
He was sentenced to death and to a fine of P20,000. Two witnesses gave evidence, but their
statements do not coincide on any single detail.
Juanito Albano testified that in March 1945, Prieto, with other Filipino undercovers
and Japanese soldiers caught an American and had him carry the American to town on a
sled pulled by a carabao. On the way, Prieto walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner
if the sled was faster than the airplane. The American was then taken to Kemetai
headquarters and after which he did not what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison
testified that in March 1945, he saw Prieto following an American whose hands were tied
and the Prieto struck the flier with a piece of rope.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Prieto guilty of treason.
Ruling:
YES
The Revised Penal Code provides that Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who,
owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, not
being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or
comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal
to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses
at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed
to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it. Furthermore,
Under the Philippine treason law defining treason, there must concur both adherence to the
enemy and giving him aid and comfort One without the other does not make treason.
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BALLESTEROS, RAMON NICOLO V.
17-4095
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias
WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-60100. March 20, 1985
Facts:
Accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of piracy and were sentenced to
suffer the extreme penalty of death. They contend that the trial court erred in imposing
death penalty despite their plea of non-guilt.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellants contention is correct
Ruling: No.
P.D. No. 532 amending Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that if rape,
murder, or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the
offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure
is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.
Art. 63 of the RPC also provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
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BALANUECO, RICHELLE QUEEN
16-4124
PEOPLE VS. SIYOH
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 318 of CFI Basilan, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM,
NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with
triple murder and frustrated murder. Being strangers and without lawful authority, armed
with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating
together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of
violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were
riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said
pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets,
merchandise and other personal belongings. The accused, with intent to kill, ordered them
to jump into the water and fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman.
The appellants contended that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the
prosecution, having only one witness and no evidence that the accused were also the one
who killed one of the victims because the remains were never recovered.
Issue: Whether the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
Held: Yes. The number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is immaterial. PD 532
considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the
guilt of respondents was proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was no other evidence
presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate story as to apprehend the
accused. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the
two persons they have identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view
in the proven conspiracy among the accused. The Conspiracy was established through the
testimony of the lone witness and survivor- De Guzman.
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BATAAN, XHAVIER BRETT KING D.
16–4005
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. VS. ROGER TULIN
G.R. 111709, August 30, 2001
Melo, J.:
Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular
gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the
accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr.detained the crew and
completely took over the vessel.
The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded
transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter,
the captive vessel returned to the Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected
and all the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree
No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters).
They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal.
Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing
him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by
the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
2. Whether the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation
under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Ruling:
1. No, the trial court did acquire jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court ratiocinated
that although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is
still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters. Further, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. In the case at bar, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy.
Ergo, the trial court did acquire jurisdiction over the case since although PD 532 requires
that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
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2. No, the trial court did not err in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 albeit he was charged as a principal by direct participation
under Section 2 of said decree and further did not constitute a violation of his said
constitutional rights. Under Section 4 of PD 532, Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates, such as giving them information about the movement of
police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by
such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy, shall be considered as an accomplice
of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code. Further, it is well–settled rule that if there is lack of complete evidence
of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to
the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor
of lesser responsibility.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte.,
Ltd. He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and
Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
maintenance while in port. The accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received
property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in convicting him as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 albeit he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under Section 2 of said decree and further did not constitute a violation of his
said constitutional rights since if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to the participation of
an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility.
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TITLE II: Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State
CADIZ, MARIA SOPHIA M.
16-4006
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ETC.
VS FIDEL V. RAMOS
GR No. 81567; 9 July 1990
PER CURIAM
Facts:
Eight petitions for habeas corpus were consolidated in this case. Petitioners claim that
their detention is unlawful since their arrests were made without warrant and that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, hence, the information filed against them
are null and void.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Umil case – the police had good reason to believe that an NPA member (Rolando Dural)
was being treated in a hospital based on information from the doctor/hospital
Buenaobra case – he admitted he was an NPA courier
Roque – subversive documents and ammunition were found at the time of her arrest; she
also admitted owning the documents
Anonuevo and Casiple case – agents found subversive documents and guns w/o permits
Ocaya case – she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant; ammunition and
subversive documents were found in her car
Nazareno case – he was identified by another as his companion in a murder case
The respondents assert that the privilege of habeas corpus is not available to petitioners
because they have been legally arrested and are detained by the virtue of valid
information filed in court.
Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged (Rolando Dural’s case), the
rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the NPA.
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus
Ruling: NO.
Rule 115, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court states the following circumstances when arrest
without warrant is lawful and valid:
•
•
•
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense;
When an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the indicating that the person arrested has committed it
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
Records show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have
been filed had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
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apprehended, so that their arrests without warrant are justified, and that they are detained
by virtue of valid information filed against them.
In the case of Rolando Dural, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion –
where it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. On the inciting to
sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest.
Finally, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safe houses pinpointed by NPA members.
NOTE: In all petitions for habeas corpus, the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner’s detention – from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up
to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition” and “only after such a
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
fact been satisfied.”
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CHUA, RAPHAEL RYAN D.
12-0881
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUBEN BURGOS Y TITO
G.R. No. L-68955. September 4, 1986
Gutierrez, Jr., J.;
Facts:
Ruben Burgos was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of subversion. According to police, Cesar Masamlok claimed Burgos
threatened him with a gun and forcibly recruited him to be part of the New People’s Army.
The next day, 15 policemen located and arrested Burgos without a warrant. They asked
him about his firearm, and after denying possession of the firearm, his wife pointed to a
place where the gun was buried. Burgos also pointed the policemen to a stockpile of cogon
where documents relating to the NPA were recovered. Masamlok also claimed that Burgos
urged NPA members to overthrow the government in a seminar he was made to attend.
Burgos was then assisted by an attorney in making an extra-judicial confession of guilt.
Burgos denied the confession and claimed that he was tortured and forced to sign the
confession against his will. His wife also testified that the firearm had actually been left in
their house by Masamlok 3 days before the arrest, when Burgos was not at home.
Issues:
(1) Whether Ruben Burgos was arrested lawfully
(2) Whether the search and seizure of the subversive documents was lawful
(3) Whether Ruben Burgos is guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
subversion
Ruling:
(1) No. The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of any offense apart from
information offered by Cesar Masamlok. Ruben Burgos was not in possession of the
firearm or any subversive document when he was arrested. Reasonable ground refers to the
identification of the perpetrator, not belief that an offense was committed, so it cannot be
the basis for the arrest. Thus, there was no valid arrest without warrant.
(2) No. There was no valid arrest, and there was no waiver or consent given. Failure
to object to the search does not constitute a waiver or consent to be searched. Thus, the
firearm and subversive documents were obtained against the constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and are inadmissible as evidence. Further, since
Burgos was not informed of his constitutional rights upon his arrest, his alleged admission
of ownership of the gun and surrender of subversive documents violated his right against
self-incrimination.
(3) No. The only remaining proof was the testimony of Masamlok, which was
uncorroborated. He is also an interested witness as his fate depended on his cooperation
with the authorities. Burgos is acquitted due to insufficient proof of guilt.
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GABRILLO, JOHN ANGELO M.
17-4084
RAMON S. MILO VS. ANGELITO C. SALANGA AND JUAN TUVERA
G.R. No. L-37007, July 20,1987
Gancayco, J.;
Facts:
On April 21, 1972 at around 10pm in Manaoag, Pangasinan, accused barrio captain
Juan Tuvera Sr., with some private persons (Juan Tuvera Jr., Bertilli Bataoil, and Dianong)
allegedly maltreated Armando Valdez through fistblows and by hitting him with the butts
of their guns. Immediately thereafter, accused Tuvera with members of the police force
(Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat), without legal grounds, detained Valdez
inside the municipal jail for about 11 hours. They were charged with Arbitrary Detention
under Art. 124 of the RPC.
Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition. Respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga, however,
granted the motion to quash by concluding that Tuvera was not a public officer.
Issue: Whether or not a barrio captain is a public officer who can be charged with
Arbitrary Detention.
Ruling: Yes. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the
policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
15
IMBANG, NAOMI
16-4007
STONEHILL v DIOKNO
GR No. L-19550. June 19, 1967
Concepcion C.J.
FACTS:
•
Petitioners herein were officers of a corporation in the Philippines; while
Respondents were several judges who issued, on different dates, a total of fortytwo (42) search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they
were officers. The warrants were applied by several prosecutors who were also
respondents in this case.
•
The search warrants were issued to search the persons above-named and/ or
the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code."
•
Petitioners contended that the search warrants contravened the Constitution and
the Rules of Court as the warrants did not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized and thus, were null and void.
•
Petitioners then filed before the Supreme Court (SC) an original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that the decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void, and commanding the respondents to return the documents, papers, things
and cash moneys seized or confiscated.
•
The SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioners as
the search warrants were general warrants which the Constitution commanded to
be eliminated, as the warrants authorized the seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of the petitioners, regardless whether they were illegal or
not. Also, the warrants were issued upon applications that did not state the
16
specific offense committed by the petitioners but only stated violations of several
laws.
•
However, by a Resolution, the writ was partially lifted insofar as the things seized
from the offices of the corporations above mentioned. Only the injunction as
regards the things found and seized in the petitioners’ residence were maintained.
Issue:
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrants issued to seize document and
other things found in the offices of the corporations where they were officers?
Ruling:
No.
Corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of their officers, regardless of the officer’s amount of shares of stock or
the interest he has in said corporations, and whatever the offices he holds therein.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
In the present case, petitioners being officers of corporations have different
personalities and thus, they could may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Therefore, petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrants authorized
to seize thing in the corporations where they hold offices.
17
JACKSON, LOIDA M.
174050
JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No L-64261, December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.
Facts:
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued two search warrants against petitioners.
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control
of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. These
items were alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ
of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles seized as evidence against
petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid.
Ruling:
No. the Court declared the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search
is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in this case, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
18
TITLE III: Crimes against Public Order
ADRIATICO, PAUL JULIUS HIPOLITO
16-4099
ENRILE VS. SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163. June 5, 1990.
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. He filed a petition for habeas
corpus alleging that he was held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist. Coaccused Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio also argues that the current case does not fall in line
with the Hernandez ruling. The information in Hernandez charged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas
the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed
on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Issue: Whether the crime of rebellion can be complexed with other crimes.
Ruling: No. The Hernandez doctrine should not be abandoned since the majority sees it as
good law. The President by repealing P.D. 942 that nullifies Hernandez and by enacting a
new provision Art. 142-A in the RPC which imposes the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period when acts punished by graver penalties are committed with
crimes under Chapter I of Title 3, made the doctrine binding. The Hernandez remains
binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed
on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Thus the accused were charged of simple
rebellion only.
19
ALGARME, DANIELLE KYM MARIE
17-4136
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL AND RENATO VILLANUEVA,
MANOLITA O. UMIL AND NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE VS.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE
GR Nos. 84851-82. October 1991
Facts:
The separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions. The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its
ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood
it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member
is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. It is elementary, in this connection, if these
laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
Issue: Whether the or not petitioners may avail of the writ of habeas corpus?
Ruling:
No.
The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released. In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the
detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July
1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in
accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow
that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without
warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one
occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the
CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of
Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof. With all these
facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say
that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a
Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without
warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without
20
warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and
which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting
the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is
important is that the Court be right.
21
BABA, KARLA MARIE B.
17-4137
JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. HON. UMAR AMIN
G.R. No. 93335. September 13 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.;
Facts:
Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with murder. Another information
charged him of violation of PD 1829 for harboring or concealing Gregorio Honasan which
delayed the latter’s apprehension. This was in connection to the alleged rebellious acts
committed by Honasan in connection with the failed coup attempt.
Issue: Whether Enrile could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 although
a rebellion case was already filed against him.
Ruling: No. Second crime was absorbed in the first.
PD No. 1829 Section 1 (c) states:
“SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows,
or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx
xxx
xxx”
The petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in the previous information in
conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Harboring or concealing his alleged
co-conspirator already falls under the first charge.
22
BALBOA, NERISSA GLORIA J.
17-4147
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO DASIG
G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993
Nocon,, J.;
Facts:
On August 4, 1987, Pfcs Manatad, Tizon, and Catamora were tasked to assist in the
manning of the traffic the streets of Mandaue City. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting
facility, Manatad manned the traffic, while Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself
at Norkis Trading Building. At about 4 o’clock, Catamora noticed 8 suspicious people,
among them were Nunez. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of them to
approach Manatad. He followed the two, but upon noticing that they were being followed,
they immediately went to the middle of the road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle.
Manatad was killed. The group of Nunez fled the scene.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officer were tasked to conduct a
surveillance on a suspected safehouse of the suspected sparrow unit. Upon arrival, the
group saw Dasig and Nunez trying to escape. Dasig threw a grenade, but was apprehended
and brought to the hospital. Nunez was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation.
On August 19, 1987, Dasig was interrogated at his hospital bed. He was assisted by
Atty. Parawan. Dasig did not reject the Atty. Parawan’s services. He was appraised of his
constitutional rights and the interrogation ensued. Dasig confessed that his group did kill
Manatad. He admitted that he and Nunez were members of the sparrow unit. He executed
an extrajudicial confession with the conformity od Atty. Parawan.
In his appeal, Dasig contends that his extrajudicial confession was legally defective
and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He also contends that he should be convicted at
most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Dasig guilty of murder with direct
assault
Ruling:
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Rebellion is committed by
taking up arms against the government, among other means. Appellant voluntarily
confessed his membership with the sparrow unit, but also his participation and that of his
group in killing of Manatad.
The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge. Acts committed in furtherance
of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion.
23
MANOTOK, MA. THELMA FRANCESCA T.
17-4146
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995
Kapunan, J.;
Facts:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking when a man suddenly walked
beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right
ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom
shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. The man and his companions
boarded a tricycle and fled. Lucilo died from the gunshot wounds.
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder, identified the man who fired at the deceased
as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew. In his testimony, Armenta informed the police
that Lovedioro belonged to the New People’s Army. The three other companions were not
identified. The Regional Trial Court found Lovedioro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder.
In his appeal, Lovedioro contends that he should have been charged with the crime
of rebellion not murder consequently, the killing of Lucilo should be absorbed in the crime
of rebellion.
Issue: Whether Lovedioro committed the crime of rebellion?
Ruling: No.
It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crimes. If no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases
of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated
to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
Lovedioro claims that SPO3 Lucilo, a mere policeman, was killed because he had
offended the NPA without, however, specifying what the offense was. His contentions are
general and non-specific without offering an explanation as to what contribution the killing
would have made towards the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. The evidence
on record leaves the impression that Lovedioro’s bare allegations of membership in the
NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
In many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political motive for mitigating the
imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by
common criminals.
24
BALANUECO, RICHELLE QUEEN ZAMBRONA
16-4124
VICENTE P. LADLAD VS. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013. June 1, 2007
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February
2006 declared a "State of National Emergency,". Police officers arrested Crispin Beltran
on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion
before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause. The trial
court affirmed the existence of probable cause.
Issue: Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion?
Ruling:
No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed —
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.
The elements of rebellion are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who
conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents. The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict
Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. None of the
affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading
a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits
alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion.
25
BATAAN, XHAVIER BRETT KING D.
16–4005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
G.R. L–6025. May 30, 1964
Labrado, J.;
Facts: On March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused
of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty–
one (31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI). Amado
was also the President of the Congress of Labour Organization (CLO). They were accused of being
members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in an armed
rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng
Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder,
pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by
HUKS.
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of the
crime committed required the denial of bail. More so, the complex crime charged by the
government against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested communist leaders and
was sentenced to life time imprisonment. The accused positioned that CFI erred arguing that rebellion
cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson and robbery.
Issue: Whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson or robbery.
Ruling of the Court: No, rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson or robbery.
Under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, “engaging in war against the forces
of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”.
These expressions imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1
crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.
Here, the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by
HERNANDEZ, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and
that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
Therefore, Rebellion cannot be complexed with common–crimes such as killings,
destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking
is not anymore correct more so that there is no legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY
ONE CRIME.
26
CADIZ, MARIA SOPHIA M.
16-4006
PEOPLE V. GERONIMO
100 Phil. 90
Reyes, J.B. L., J.
Facts:
On 24 June 1954, herein defendant-appellant, Federico Geronimo with Mariano Balgos
(allegedly officials of CPP and Hukbahalap or HUKS) and many others were charged with
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping for committing
the ff:
•
•
•
•
•
April 1949 – HUKS ambushed and fired upon the party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon and
her PC escort;
August 1950 – HUKS unlawfully forced the Cashier of the Provincial Treasury to
open the Treasury Vault in the Capital and took therefrom P80,000;
1951 – HUKS raided the house of police sergeant Nemesio Palo and shot and killed
him;
January 1953 – HUKS ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol;
February 1954 – HUKS killed a barrio lieutenant
On 18 October 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding Geronimo guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. Hence, the current
petition where Geronimo appeals that he should have only been charged with simple
rebellion because there is no such complex crime of rebellion with the aforementioned
common crimes.
Issue: Whether this is a case of a complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping.
Ruling: No.
As held in People v. Hernandez, rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed
uprising for the purposes expressed in Art. 134 and the overt acts of violence described in
the first paragraph of Art. 135. Thus, both the purpose and overt acts are essential
components of rebellion. Therefore, when common crimes are committed as a means to or
in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, the accused could only be
convicted of simple rebellion because all the other crimes are absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be regarded and penalized as distinct crimes.
However, not every act of violence is absorbed in the crime of rebellion when it is
committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the common crime is
committed for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, then it will be
separately punishable. This is because in such instance, the constitutive acts and intent
27
would be unrelated to each other and the individual crime would not be a means necessary
for committing the rebellion because it’s not done in preparation or in furtherance of the
latter.
In this case, the accused actually pleaded guilty for all the acts charged but that he only
committed them “as necessary means in connection & furtherance of rebellion” and the
information failed to charge that the appellant was impelled by private motives. Thus, he
is guilty only because of simple (noncomplex) crime of rebellion.
28
CHUA, RAPHAEL RYAN D.
12-0881
FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-14752. April 30, 1963
Labrador, J.;
Facts:
Francisco Cariño was found guilty by both the Court of First Instance of Manila
and the Court of Appeals as an accomplice in the crime of rebellion for agreeing to commit
criminal activities in conspiracy with 31 others for the purpose of overthrowing the
government and disrupting its activities, as a high-ranking member of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (Hukbalahap). These acts
included murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, as enumerated by the court. While
Cariño admitted that the crimes were actually committed, he vigorously denied any
participation in the said activities.
Evidence showed that Cariño provided shelter to Dr. Jesus Lava, a top leader of the
communists who was his former classmate and godfather of his child, and sent him food
and supplies from time to time, including cigarettes, powdered milk and canned goods. He
was also asked to use the alias “Turko” and addressed his letters to “Pinang” in their
correspondences to conceal their identities when communicating to Dr. Lava. He was also
found to have assisted in the conversion of $6,000 to its equivalent in Philippine pesos,
which was then delivered to the treasurer of the communists, and in opening an account for
two top-level communists, through his function as a ranking employee of the National City
Bank of New York. Cariño was later found present at a banquet by the Communists in
honor of Amado Hernandez, one of the supposed top-level members of the organization.
Issue:
Whether Francisco Cariño is guilty of being an accomplice in rebellion
Ruling:
No.
The acts of Cariño did not constitute acts in cooperation in the execution of the act
of overthrowing the government. An essential condition to be considered an accomplice is
that the person, with criminal intent, must cooperate with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. Cariño neither
took up arms against the government, nor was he a member of the Hukbalahap
organization. The acts of sending cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk, having
$6,000 changed to Philippine pesos, and helping Huks open bank accounts do not prove
any intention of helping him commit rebellion or insurrection, nor constitute previous or
simultaneous acts of uprising or rebellion. Cariño is absolved of the charges.
29
GABRILLO, JOHN ANGELO M.
17-4084
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GRACIANO L. CABRERA
G.R. No. 17748. March 4, 1922
Malcolm, J.;
Facts:
On December 20, 1920, policemen of city of Manila arrested a woman who was
allegedly a member of the household of Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia
Barracks in Manila. The next day, policeman Mojica was patrolling when he then come
upon several soldiers. A disorder took place and a soldier was shot and mortally wounded.
This caused a desire for revenge against the policemen of Manila. In the evening of same
day, soldiers of the Fourth Company then escaped through the window of their quarters
then divided into groups for attack upon the city police force. About ten to twelve
Constabulary soldiers fired the direction of the intersection of Calls Real and Cabildo
where an American policeman Driskill was stationed. Minutes later, another policeman
was shot dead in Manila. The following day, investigation in the shooting incidents
occurred. All the herein defendants were charged in on information filed in the CFI of City
of Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same court,
with the crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately
before different judges of first instance. All but eight of the accused pleaded guilty for
sedition. All the defendants were then sentenced to serve maximum imprisonment of ten
years.
Issue: Whether or not the common crimes are absorbed in sedition.
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court said that the common crimes are not absorbed in the
commission of the crime of sedition. Thus, it is proper to prosecute them separately from
the crime of sedition. Hence, all the defendants may be held liable for the crime of sedition
and other crimes they have committed as well.
30
IMBANG, NAOMI
16-4007
UNITED STATES V. ABAD
G.R. No. L-2335, August 9, 1906
Facts:
The defendant is a former insurgent officer who is found guilty of violating the terms and
conditions of his oath that recognizes the supreme authority of the United States of America
in the Philippine Islands. He allegedly denied to an officer of the United States Army the
existence and whereabouts of certain rifles, which had been concealed by his orders at the
time of his surrender in April, 1901.
Issue: Whether the violation of oaths of allegiance is equivalent to “treason and sedition”
Ruling:
Yes.
The violation of oaths of allegiance, and kindred crimes provided for in Act 292,
United States Philippine Commission, are included in the general terms "treason and
sedition" as used in the amnesty proclamation of 4 July 1902.
Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation by a subject of his allegiance to
his sovereign or liege lord, or to the supreme authority of the state." Sedition, in its more
general sense, is "the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state. Technical terms
of the law when used in a statute are ordinarily to be given their technical signification. But
in construing an executive act of the character of this proclamation, a court is justified in
applying a more liberal rule of construction in order to effectuate, if possible, the beneficent
purpose intended. Thus, the violation of oaths made by an insurgent officer is considered
an act of “treason and sedition” in this case.
31
MANOTOK, MA. THELMA FRANCESCA T.
17-4146
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KAMLON HADJI
G.R. No. L-12686 October 24, 1963
Per Curiam;
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Sulu convicts Kamlon for the (1) crime of sedition
and (2) kidnapping with murder. Kamlong Hadji appeals the trial court decision. He alleges
that the kidnapping with murder was committed in furtherance of sedition and should be
absorbed in sedition.
The facts of the kidnapping case are as follows:
One morning, Kamlon Hadji (Kamlon), with two other armed companions, Ulluh
and Angkang, looked for Hatib Ajibun (Ajibun) and Jamalul Alling (Alling), whom they
suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the Kamlon.
Threatening to kill, Kamlon and his companions seized the Ajibun and Along and brought
them to the residence of Kamlon.
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. They were brought to a
store in the nearby market place. Kamlon shot Jamalul Aling with his automatic carbine.
Ulluh, then, beheaded the corpse and tossed the severed head and headless body to the sea.
Meanwhile, Kamlon spared the life of Hatib Ajibun. Ajibun was brought back to Kamlon's
house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged participation in the disappearance of
two of his followers. Ajibun was found innocent by Kamlon. He was ordered to pay
P105.00 as fine and released.
Kamlon invokes the cases People vs Hernandez and People vs Geronimo to support
his appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether the kidnapping with murder should be absorbed in the crime of sedition?
2. Whether the cases, People vs Hernandez and People vs Geronimo can be invoked?
Ruling:
1. No.
No law or jurisprudence allows the Court to uphold the Kamlon’s claim that acts
of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. Common offenses of
murder etc. are treated as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.
Sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order;
murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the
State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime
directed against the lives of individuals.
32
Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in
the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully
kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or
implied.
The offenses charged in the information for sedition and murder are perfectly
distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. The crimes
of murder and serious physical injuries are not necessarily included in the information for
sedition.
2. No.
The cases, People vs Hernandez and People vs Geronimo cannot be invoked since
those two cases involved are the crime of rebellion and not sedition. When the Court held
in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed by "rebellion," the
common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the rebellion were
specifically charged in the information and, for that reason, were consequently necessarily
alleged to have been committed for political ends.
In the prosecution of Kamlon, the information makes no allegation of political
motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary,
the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but purely
motivated by personal vengeance.
33
LANUZA, LOUISE NICHOLE E.
09-9046
THE UNITED STATES VS. AURELIO TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 1451. March 6, 1906
Carson, J.;
Facts:
On 14 May 1903, Tolentino, as a writer and director of a theatrical work at the
"Teatro Libertad," in Manila, entitled 'Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas', unlawfully uttered false
and inflammatory seditious words and speeches and wrote, published, and circulated
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States (US) and the Philippines.
This tended to obstruct the lawful officers in the execution of their offices, and to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots, and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
in the Tagalog language. It was alleged that he violated section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission. (Sedition Law of 1901)
Issue: Whether in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was guilty of a
violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission or uttering sedition
words or speeches (Inciting to Sedition)
Ruling: Yes.
Sec 8 of Act No. 292 is committed through the following modes: (1) The uttering
of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb
the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly
concealing such evil practices."
In this case, the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily
tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest
and incite rebellious conspiracies to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government.
Therefore, the manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time
and under such conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even
principally a literary or artis devices. The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed,
with the costs against the appellant.
34
LAVIÑA, ALYSSA
16-4078
ESPUELAS VS. PEOPLE
No. L-2990. December 17, 1951
Facts: In 1947, Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken as if he were hanging lifeless from
tree and with a fake suicide letter of Alberto Reveniera to his wife and children, he sent it
for publishing to different local and international newspapers. The fake letter stated that
Alberto killed himself because he was ashamed of the Roxas administration and that his
wife to write to President Truman and Churchill that the Philippine government was
infested with many “Hitlers and Mussolinis” and that his children should burn Roxas’
pictures. Espuelas was convicted of publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether the acts of the accused constitute inciting to seditionsedition.
Ruling: Yes. Art. 142 of the RPC states “scurrilous libel” as a form of inciting to sedition.
The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the
pitch of illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods to redress the evils
which press upon their minds. A published writing which calls our government one of
crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which
reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the
disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
35
LEGASPI, KAYE
11-1802
UMIL V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital
with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5)
male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump The wounded man's name
was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,". However it was disclosed
later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. While confined, Dural
was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols. The respondents claim that the detention of the petitioner is justified in
view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142
of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
Issue:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Ratio:
Yes. There is no compelling reason to abandon the doctrine in Ilagan vs. Enrile that a writ
of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment is issued by the court where
said information has been filed. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its
abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether
or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before
whom the detained person is charged.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes. However, Rolando
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested.
36
LIRIOS, LADY MAY S.
16-4032
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951
Bengzon, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was convicted of inciting to sedition. That
between 9-24 June 1947, Mendoza had his picture taken, making it appear that he was
hanging lifeless at the end piece of a rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in fact
he was only standing on a barrel. Mendoza sent this photo for publication in several
newspapers of general circulation throughout the Philippines and abroad. He also attached
a suicide note wherein he made it appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed it to the latter’s supposed wife. The note contained an order to the
wife and children to spread word of the suicide due to discontent towards the Roxas
administration and to burn pictures of Roxas whenever they come across one. The note
also included a description of the government as infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis.
Issue: Whether or not the act committed by Mendoza constitutes seditious libel
punishable under Art. 142 of the RPC?
Ruling: Yes.
The accused is found guilty of inciting to sedition. The Constitutional right to
freedom of speech does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without
responsibility whatever one may choose. Thus, although citizens may criticize the
government and/or government officials, such criticism must be specific, constructive,
reasoned, tempered, and not merely a contemptuous condemnation. In the case at bar,
Mendoza’s letter is a scurrilo0us libel against the government because it contained
accusations towards the government and its officials as crooks and dishonest persons,
evening comparing them to Nazis and Facists. This kind of writing is punishable under Art.
142 because it used irritating language that centered not on persuading the readers but on
creating disturbance. It aimed to overthrow or undermine the security of the government
or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government. Such act is clearly against
public peace and is criminal not only because it tends to incite to a breach of peace but also
because it is conducive to the destruction of the government.
37
LOPEZ, JUNE KARLA P.
17-4067
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN, VS. THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND THE CITY
WARDEN OF MANILA/FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR. VS. HON. FRANCISCO
MA. CHANCO
G.R. No. L-34022/G.R. Nos. L-34046-7. March 24, 1972
Fernando, J.;
Facts:
The petitioners, Martinez and Bautista, were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged with
falsification of a public document while Bautista was charged with violation of the Revised
Election Code. They were arrested while the Constitutional Convention was in session.
The petitioners claim that as delegates, they enjoy a parliamentary immunity and
that by virtue of Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution construed together with Article
145 of the RPC, they are immune from arrest.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are immune from arrest.
Ruling: No.
Section 15 of Article VI clearly provides that the immunity from arrest does not
cover any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of the peace. The crimes against
which the petitioners were charged fall under “breach of the peace”. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained
and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. From the explicit language
of the Constitution, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity nor does Article 145
of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932
could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. As will
be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of the congressional immunity and
the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption
that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest
one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to
widen its scope. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke privilege from arrest.
38
LOPEZ, MICHIKO S.
10-1927
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 36278. October 26, 1932
Ostrand, J.;
Facts:
Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto Manahan, Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano Balgos,
Enrique Torrente, Urbano Arcega, Catalino Monroy, Francisco Rafael, Sotero Senson,
Remigio Tolentino, Dominador Reyes, Emilio Juan, Alberto Santos, Juan Lagman, Andres
Santiago, Angel Mesina, Felipe Cruz, Maximo Gutierrez, Dominador Ambrosio, Cenon
Lacanienta, Mateo del Castillo, Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo
Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, and Liboro Natividad were accused in the Court of First Instance
of the Manila of a crime against Illegal Association. Accused were allegedly members of
Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal
association. Principal purposes of the said association are: (1) to bring about, by use of arm
and force, the downfall of the present government, (2) to incite a revolt of the laboring
class, and (3) other similar objects tending to combat the fundamental basis of the present
social order. The accused assembled and congregated under the name of the Katipunan ñg
mga Anak Pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of the Sweat of the Philippine
Islands), another association having the same illegal purposes as the Communist Party of
the Philippines, at El Retoño Building, Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of Illegal Association
Ruling: Yes.
Evangelista, Manahan, Capadocia, Torrente, Arcega, Monroy, Rafael, Senson,
Tolentino, Reyes, San Juan, Santos, Lagman, Santiago, Mesina, Cruz, Gutierrez, and
Ambrosio, submitted that they were members of the Communist Party. Furthermore,
Balgos and Lacanienta campaigned for their candidacies as members of the Communist
Party and delivered speeches at several meetings of the Communist Party, advocating the
principles of the said Communist Party. Torrente is an editor for the newspaper Titis, an
organ of the Communist Party.
The defense of the accused is that the set up of the Communist Party of the
Philippines is not an illegal association, and that it preaches only a social but not an armed
revolution. However, the Court found the defense untenable as the constitution of the
Communist Party aimed to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and
sedition. Having these objectives qualifies the association to be illegal.
39
MAGNAYE, ISAIAH ATHRIENE
17-4049
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODIL
GR. No. L-35156. November 20, 1981
Facts: About 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch
inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market. While they were eating, they saw, through
the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their
attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian
clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached
appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun
that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana
appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana
After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio
Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and onehalf meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions. After the two were already
seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a
piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and
after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so.
Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea,
telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a doublebladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach
causing his death several hours thereafter. Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt.
Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. The accused, armed with a doublebladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, attack
and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official
duties, which directly caused his death.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of murder can be complex with assault upon agent of
authority.
Ruling: Yes, the Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because it was
established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and
without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with
a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a
finding of treachery, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill
his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling
motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official
duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence
of treachery in the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, identified himself as a PC
officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
40
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with
the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not
merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or
insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance
is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
41
MANOTOK, MA. THELMA FRANCESCA.
17-4146
HILARION SARCEPUEDES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-3857. October 22, 1951
Bengzon, J.;
Facts:
Hilarion Sarcepuedes and his wife pass the pathway across the land of Lucrecia L.
Bustamente, to go the town school. When Lucrecia ordered the closing of a pathway across
her land, the angered Hilarion sought Lucrecia Bustamante at the school premises to
demand an explanation on September 2, 1947. Lucrecia, a teacher-nurse, was about to
pierce an earring hole on the ear-lobe of a school child in the school clinic, when
Sarcepuedes arrived. One word led to another. Hilarion Sarcepuedes then hit Lucrecia L.
Bustamante, twice on the face, with his raincoat and violently pushed her to the window.
The Court of Appeals convicted Sarcepuedes of direct assault upon a person in
authority. Sarcepuedes filed an appeal by certiorari from the CA decision. He argues (1)
that Lucrecia was not a person in authority and (2) even if she was, Lucrecia was not
assaulted while engaged in the performance of her official duties.
Issue: Whether Hilarion Sarcepuedes is guilty of direct assault?
Ruling: Yes.
A teacher is expressly included in article 152 among the officials deemed to be
persons in authority.c Lucrecia L. Bustamante was, on the day of the commission of the
offense, a teacher-nurse of the San Enrique Elementary Public school, among her official
duties being to give health instruction to the pupils to instruct teachers about how to give
first aid treatment in the school clinic and to look after the sanitary facilities of the school.
Lucrecia L. Bustamente was engaged in performance of her official duties, when
the assault took place. At the time of the ill-treatment, Lucrecia was about to pierce an
earring hole on the ear-lobe of a school child in the school clinic. Such work was included
in her mission of giving treatment to the school pupils. Furthermore, it is unquestioned that
Sarcepuedes knew Lucrecia was a teacher-nurse.cha
Whether the motive for the offense was a dispute totally foreign to Lucrecia's
educational labors is immaterial. The fact that Lucrecia was hurt while performing her
ordinary Government tasks has been proven. She was pounced upon "while engaged in the
performance" of her official duties, within the meaning of direct assault under Article 148.
42
MURAO, JOSE PEPITO G. III
17-4085
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO TAC-AN
G.R. No. 76338. February 26, 1990
Feliciano, J.;
Facts:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen years and seven months old and deceased
Francis Ernest Escano III, who was fifteen years old, were classmates in Divine Word
College in Tagbiliran City. The appellant and victim were close friends as they were both
part of the Bronx gang however, Francis eventually withdrew from the gang and it
deteriorated his friendship with Renato. In September of 1984, Francis and Renato fought
as Francis initially got into a fight with Renato’s friend, Arnold Romelde. Another incident
involved graffiti on the wall of their third year classroom deprecated the Bronx gang and
described Renato as ‘bayot’ or homosexual. This all contributed to the altercation on
December 14, 1984 wherein Renato was asking a question to their Math teacher when he
discovered Francis sitting on his scrapbook. A fistfight ensued but Renato and Francis were
separated and eventually shook hands. However, before the schoolday ended, Renato had
returned to his home and took his unlicensed gun only to go back to his English III class to
fire at Francis. By the fourth shot he fired, Renato was able to hit Francis on the head.
Disgruntled, Renato went out of his classroom where an unaware teacher told him to help
Francis who was still alive inside their room. Thus, Renato went back to the room and fired
another shot at Francis’ chest to ensure the latter’s demise. Renato would then hold teachers
and students in the faculty room hostage but he eventually surrendered his gun to Philippine
Constabulary troopers aided by his father and brother. For his side, Renato argued that he
brought his gun in self-defense since Francis told him that he would bring his gun and that
he would not accede to a gun fight, Francis would go to Renato’s home and him and his
family. The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran convicted Renato of illegal possession of
a firearm and ammunition and using it to kill Francis as well as Murder qualified evident
premeditation, acting under the influence of drugs, and use of an unlicensed firearm. For
the said offense and crime, Renato was sentenced to death.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding Renato’s claim of double jeopardy?
NO. Double jeopardy only applies for a second prosecution for the same offense. In
Renato’s case, although his conviction root from the same acts, there is no double jeopardy
for the crimes or offenses committed are very much different and even punished by the
Revised Penal Code and special statute, respectively.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in enunciating that Renato shot Francis in contempt of
or with insult to public authorities?
YES. Although Renato fired at Francis in front of their English III classmates and teacher,
a teacher is only defined as a person in authority under Articles 148, 151, and 152 of the
Revised Penal Code. The same attribute does not apply for ‘public authority’ under Article
14 (2) of the Revised Penal Code without express mention of the same.
Ruling: Decision of the trial court is modified to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for illegal
possession and the deletion of aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, acting
43
in contempt of public authorities, and the deletion of special aggravating circumstances of
acting under the influence of dangerous drugs, and use of unlicensed firearm resulting to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder.
44
PALENZUELA, JHAEDELLE KHRYZSHA L.
17-4090
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BELTRAN
G.R. Nos. L-37168-69, September 13, 1995
Facts:
Mayor Quirolgico and patrolman Tolentino went to the Puzon compound to talk to
Beltran and his companions to surrender in connection with an incident where Beltran
shouted ―vulva of your mother‖ to Alvarado and Urbi. Mayor and patrolman suffered
gunshot wounds and the mayor‘s son died due to a simultaneous discharge of gunfire by
the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed direct assault.
Ruling: Yes.
The accused are guilty of murder and double attempted murder with direct assault
(under the 2nd form of direct assault). The accused attacked and employed force against
the mayor and police while the latter were engaged in the actual performance of duty and
the accused knew that they were assaulting persons in authority.
45
QUEVEDO, MIGUEL LEANDRO CERALDE
16-4004
PEOPLE V. DOLLANTES
Facts:
Pedro Dollantes and nine others were accused of killing Marcos Gabutero, a
Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. While the Barangay Captain was
delivering his speech, Pedro went to the middle of the dance floor while dancing. He then
brought out his knife and began challenging everyone as to who was the brave among them.
Marcos approached him and admonished him to keep quiet. However, Pedro stabbed
Marcos at his left arm then was held by Hugo Grengia before Hamlet rushed to stabbed
Marcos also at his back. Marcos died from the stab wounds he sustained.
The trial court found them guilty of complex crime of assault upon a person in
authority resulting in murder. All the accused submitted an appeal except Hugo submitted
a separate brief.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court erred on not giving importance to the testimony of the defense
witnesses.
Ruling:
No. 3 eyewitnesses positively indentified the accused. They were Dionilo, Bonifacio and
Marciana. The first 2 were not related to the victim and their testimonies were subjected to
a lengthy cross-examination and were found credible and free from material contradictions
by the trial court.
Dionilo was few meters away from the scene when the brandishing happened. After Pedro
stabbed Marcos, Dionilo immediately wrestled Pedro to get his knife, which he succeeded.
Hugo then told him that he will die if he tries to intervene and nodded his head, giving the
signal to the other accused to rush in and stab the victim. His testimony was supported by
Bonifacio, who tried to approach the group but was held by Danny, one of the accused,
saying that they got what they are aiming for. Marciana also corroborated the previous
testimonies, stating that Hugo wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to know
that as a fact because Hugo told the crowd that he is a Barangay Captain.
While Hugo, Danny and Leonilo did not participate in the stabbing, they were liable
equally as principals as they were found holding stones, which they threw at the store
owned by the victim and his wife and participated in the kicking and dancing around the
dead body of Marcos. Furthermore, while delivering his speech, Hugo was telling the
people not to listen to Marcos for he said that he will not be a Barangay Captain for long
and never tried to help his compadre during and after the incident. Finally, the records show
that he died during the performance of his duty as the Barangay Captain and was in the act
of pacifying Pedro when he was stabbed to death. In the case of People v Hecto, this Court
ruled that “As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances
within the Barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who
thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person
in authority. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
46
RADOC, ROY PHILIPP TEHSAN
16-4047
ENRIQUE TOTOY RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005
Garcia, J.;
Facts:
On May 6, 1993, an information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly
committed on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La
Trinidad, Province of Benguet. The accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO,
knowing him to be a policeman, challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling
and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter
was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.
Peoples version is that on March 20, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Police
Inspector Edward M. Leygo, of the La Trinidad Police Station and SPO1 Basquial were
conducting routinary patrol on board a police car somewhere in Shilan when they came
upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the stall of accused Rivera-De Guzman
which was located along the Halsema Highway. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop
unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. I-91 which
prohibits the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the sidewalks or road
shoulders or within 15 meters from the center of the Halsema Highway. The driver
complied with the police directive. The policemen then escorted the truck back to
Poblacion and proceeded to the police headquarters.
Not long after, SPOI Bangcado and SPOI Dayap, were conducting patrol aboard a police
car somewhere at Km. 6 when they observed a truck loaded with chicken dung proceeding
towards Shilan. Immediately they called Inspector Leygo on the radio and informed him
that they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung. Inspector Leygo ordered them to restrain
the truck, as he would be proceeding to the area. The police were able to overtake and stop
the truck at Dengsi. Inspector Leygo confronted the truck driver and asked him why he still
insisted on proceeding to Shilan to unload chicken manure despite the fact that he was
ordered to go back earlier in the evening. The truck driver stated that he was just following
the orders of the accused. Immediately, Inspector Leygo turned around to see the accused
who had at that time alighted from his vehicle behind the truck. Inspector Leygo asked the
accused why he insisted on defying the ban on the unloading and loading of chicken
manure. Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and
uttered words like Babalian kita ng buto (I’ll break your bones). Ilalampaso kita (I’ll scrub
you). Pulis lang kayo (You are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words.
Inspector Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop uttering further
insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and then informed him that he was
47
being arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his
jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the
policeman. Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he
was being arrested. The accused responded by punching Inspector Leygo on his face,
particularly on his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the
accused. Finally, with the help of Policemen Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was
subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but he resisted until
Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to
accompany him.
The accused was brought to the police headquarters where Inspector Leygo immediately
called Mayor Tabanda who arrived and confronted the two protagonists. Mayor Tabanda
then accompanied the accused and Inspector Leygo to the Benguet General Hospital
where both were examined. In the medico-legal certificate of Inspector Leygo, his injury
described as contusion with 0.5 laceration, upper lip, left side with healing period from 5
to 7 days.
Trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. Motion for reconsideration
denied. CA affirmed trial court decision in toto. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of direct assault
rendered by the trial court.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that CA did not err in affirming the judgment of RTC.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance.
Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b)
when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon
a person in authority.
Firstly, the evidence on record clearly bears out that Lt. Leygo was attacked by petitioner,
not the other way around, as petitioner would want the Court to believe. Evidently,
petitioner’s anger started to burst when the truck driver reported to him that Lt. Leygo
prohibited the unloading of the chicken dung and ordered him to return, such that when the
same delivery truck was again intercepted by Lt. Leygos group, petitioners anger was too
48
much for him to contain. The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on the cop.
But the bigger question is, how then did the policeman sustain his injuries? It is highly
improbable, if not absurd, for the policeman to inflict it on himself. It is also very unlikely
that his co-policemen would punch him just to make it appear that the accused did it. The
accused admits of being at the place. He admits having been confronted by the policeman
but he denies that he ever lifted a finger against the policeman. Yet all the witnesses both
for the prosecution and the defense are in accord in saying that it was only the accused who
was in confrontation with the policeman. The only logical conclusion that can be derived
from this is that it is indeed the accused who punched the policeman.
Secondly, that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual
performance of his official duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform and
was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck
unloading chicken manure. Because the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La
Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck driver to return
from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck
driver to return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first intercepted, and on being
informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to assume it did
return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing
so. Lt. Leygo was in the performance of his lawful duties as a police officer when the
assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.
Thirdly, prosecution’s failure to present the doctor, who examined Lt. Leygo, arguing that
the alleged injury of Lt. Leygo cannot be proved without the testimony of the attending
physician is of no moment. If ever, the medical certificate is only corroborative in
character and is not an indispensable element of the crime of direct assault filed
against petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against petitioner is no less Lt.
Leygos credible and consistent testimony that he was punched on his face by the petitioner.
The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also shows that he is the kind who is
impatient with authority. His manner of answering questions bespeaks of one who has
trouble abiding with authority. He portrayed a very aggressive manner and his answers
were always on the defensive as if he had every right in this world to do and say whatever
he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of authority.
Petition is DENIED. Decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
49
SABADO, MARIONNIE C.
17-4149
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JULIO RECTO Y ROBEA
G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001
Panganiban, J.;
Facts: Appellant was charged with qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide for
shooting Melchor Recto, the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon,
with a de sabog (gun) while the latter was on his way home.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of direct assault was committed by the appellant
Ruling: No. The appellant did not commit the crime of direct assault.
Under Art.148 of the RPC, Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on occasion of such performance. The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more
common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a
weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender
lays a hand upon a person in authority.
Art. 52 of the RPC defines an agent of a person in authority as any person who, by
direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property,
such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority.
In this case, the victim Melchor Recto, being then the barangay chief tanod of
Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon, was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However,
since he was on his way home at the time he was shot, he was not engaged in the
performance of his official duties. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such
performance.
Therefore, the appellant did not commit the crime of direct assault.
50
SANGALANG, JOHN NORBERT P.
11-2836
PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM
Facts: Appellant Ladjaalam was charged with the following:
(1) The Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
(2) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
(3) Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
By virtue of a Search Warrant No. 20, thirty members of the Zamboanga City Police
conducted a police raid on the residence of herein appellant Ladjaalam and his wife. 10
meters before approaching the main gate of the said house of Ladjaalam, three bystanders
near the area shouted “Police Raid! Police Raid!”. Thereafter, the policemen were met by
a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor. There was also gunfire at the back
of the house. The police saw appellant Ladjaalam firing the M14 gun at the window of the
second floor. Upon reaching the second floor of the house, one of the policemen saw an
M14 rifle, unloaded it and counted 17 live ammunition inside the magazine.
The said M14 was unlicensed. Thus, appellant Ladjaalam was found guilty of
“Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition”. Also, for firing at the members of the
police who went to his residence to serve a search warrant, appellant Ladjaalam was found
guilty of Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Ladjaalam should be liable for the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition, as a separate offense from the crime of Direct
Assault with Multiple Homicide
Ruling:
No.
Where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide
for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search
warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.
Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
Section 1 of RA 8294, which amended PD 1866 provides that:
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other
crime was committed.
51
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which
includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case,
appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Appellant is only guilty of two offenses: (1) Direct Assault and Multiple Attempted
Homicide with the use of a weapon; and (2) Maintaining a Drug Den
Other Notes: The Search Warrant No. 20 served by the Zamboanga City Police was
eventually declared Null and Void for indicating several offenses in only search warrant.
Despite this, the arrest was still considered lawful.
52
SUMALINOG, JAZ ANN T.
101915
Case No. 27
VYTIACO VS. CA
G.R. No. L-20244-48, 24 Apr 1967
Zaldivar, J.;
Facts:
Appellant Jorge Vytiaco was charged before CFI of Palawan in three criminal cases
for: (1) Grave Threats; (2) Assault Upon in Agent of a Person in Authority; and (3)
Disobedience to a Person in Authority. On 12 Mar 1959, a commotion arouse between the
appellant and Rosalino Jagmis. Appellant was passing by the private market of Jagmis’
brother-in-law when he heard the Jagmis talking madly. Appellant tried to calm him down
but he failed, and instead, they started to grab each other. A PC soldier, Esteban Gapilango,
saw the two and separated them. Appellant went away but told Jagmis to wait and he would
get his gun. Apparently, someone already had relayed about the commotion so appellant
met his brother-in-law, Ramon Ramos, on his way carrying 2 guns. When Ramos was about
to give the gun, Gapilango approached to demand the surrender of the guns but he failed
after Ramos ran away. He was then held by the appellant and the latter was able to snatch
from him his pistol. Appellant then ordered Gapilango and Jagmis to raise their hands and
threatened them. Gapilango asked the appellant to return his pistol identifying himself as a
PC soldier. Appellant refused and went home without returning the pistol. Gapilango
reported it to the PC detachment officer and they went to appellant’s house to get the pistol
and promised the appelant to amicably settle the case but still the appellant refused. The
pistol was only given to the PC assistant provicial commander by the Vice Mayor of
Aborlan to whom the appellant surrendered the pistol. CFI found the appellant guilty in all
three cases. On appeal, CA acquitted the appellant on the 1st and 3rd case but found him
guilty of resistance and serious disobedience instead of direct assault (2nd case). Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of resistance and serious disobedience.
Ruling: No.
To be held guilty of resistance or disobedience to a person in authority or the agent of such
person, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the person
he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually
engaged in the performance of his official duties. What is punished as an act of resistance
or serious disobedience under the RPC is not the resistance or disobedience against a
person in authority or an agent of such person in his capacity as a private individual but in
his official capacity as an authority under law, or as an agent of law, while engaged in the
performance of his official duties.
In this case, there is a doubt as to whether the appellant had the intention to resist or disobey
a peace officer who was in the performance of his official duty and such doubt must be
resolved in favor of the appellant. The Court considered the refusal of the appellant to
53
return the gun to Gapilango as series of acts on his part to protect himself. The fact that
Gapilango was in civilian clothes and did not exhibit a badge and just simply identified
himself verbally after the appellant wrested his gun from him showed that there was no
assurance on the part of the appellant that Gapilango was really a peace officer.
Thus, the CA erred when it found the appellant guilty of resistance and serious
disobedience.
54
TIROL, COURTNEY ALLISON P.
14-0707
Case No. 28
ALBERTO VS. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. L31839, June 30, 1980
Concepcion, J.;
Facts:
Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working at the
Guest House of Governor Cledera (Provincial Jailer) on September 12, 1968. It was the
accused, Eligio Orbita (Provincial Guard), himself who handpicked the group of prisoners
to work at the Governor’s residence on September 12, 1968. Orbita, was prosecuted for the
crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner (Article 224). Believing that the escape of
Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Lt. Esmeralda (Assistant
Provincial Warden), the defense counsel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of
the information so as to include Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda as defendants therein.
The respondent Judge, Hon. Dela Cruz, directed the office of Edmundo Alberto
(Fiscal) to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration Article 156
in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code to determine whether the
Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation.
Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested that “no prima facie case
against Governor Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be charged.” However,
upon filing of Orbita of an Motion for Reconsideration, the respondent judge ruled
otherwise and ordered the inclusion of the names of the two in the criminal charges. The
Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, but the motion was denied on
February 18, 1970.
Issue: Whether or not Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of
Denaque under Article 156
Ruling: No.
Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by
removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a
person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his
confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in
the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that
person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his
escape.
The offenses under this article are usually committed by an outsider who removes
from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of
55
prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.
Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial
warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156.
56
TUOZO, LOURDES CLOUIE D.
14-2867
ADELAIDA TANEGA V HON. HONORATO MASAKAYAN
G.R. No. L-2719, February 28, 1967
Sanchez, J.;
Facts:
Petitioner Tanega was found guilty of slander by the City Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance, but CFI affirmed the
decision of the City Court. Petitioner was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision and declined to review on certiorari. The CFI directed that the
execution of the sentence will be on January 11, 1965. The petitioner filed a motion to
defer the execution on February 12, 1965 at 8:30 am. Petitioner failed to show up on the
said date and time. Respondent, Judge Masakayan, then issued a warrant of arrest on
February 15, 1965 and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. The petitioner was
never arrested.
On December 10, 1965 the petitioner’s counsel moved to quash the warrants of
arrest dated February 15 and March 23, 1965 on the ground that the penalty has
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether the penalty already prescribed
Ruling:
No.
Article 93 of the RPC provides that “The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence
xxx”. Accordingly, article 157 of the RPC provides the requisites to constitute an evasion
of service—when the offender is a convict by final judgement, the sentence consists of
deprivation of liberty, and the convict escaped during the term of his imprisonment.
Petitioner Tanega was convicted by final judgement, however, she was never arrested.
There was no evasion of service for the convict did not “escape during the term of her
imprisonment”. She never served her sentence in the first place.
Hence, the period of prescription cannot apply in her favor for she was never placed in
confinement.
57
VALDEZ, DARWIN MORENO
17-4066
PEOPLE VS. ABILONG
GR No. L-1960, Nov 26, 1948
Montemayor, J.;
Facts:
Florentino was initially convicted of attempted robbery, and sentenced with 2 years,
4 months and 1 day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the
radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila. Despite the sentence, he entered Manila
and lived as a vagrant only after a year. Hence, the Court of First Instance of Manila
charged him with the crime of evasion of service of sentence (Art. 157, RPC).
Abilong contended that the penalty of destierro is not an “imprisonment” as
punished in Art. 157 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not destierro is within the purview of “imprisonment” as punished in
Art. 157
Ruling: Yes.
In case of doubt, the Spanish text is controlling. It reads as “sufriendo privación de
libertad” from which the English translation of “imprisonment” was derived. However, the
Spanish text embraces not only imprisonment, but deprivation of liberty. When one is
sentenced with destierro, his liberty is likewise restricted.
Dissenting:
Part of the Spanish text is “fugándose”, which means “to escape.” The translation of
imprisonment is only correct because one can only escape from imprisonment.
58
VENUS, MA. DOMINIQUE M.
16-4011
ALVAREZ VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-1809, 23 January 1948
Feria, J.
Facts:
- On 21 June 1945, petitioner Alvarez was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua
for the crime of murder.
- On 21 October 1945, petitioner Alvarez, while serving his sentence, escaped from
prison.
- On 22 March 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced in Case No. 73820 to
three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correcional for the said
evasion.
- On 8 April 1946, the petitioner again escaped and evaded the service of the same
sentence.
- On 20 August 1946, he was prosecuted and sentenced in Case No. 14862 to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional for the second evasion.
- On 24 May 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm. He was
convicted and sentenced in Case No. 74312 to six (6) months of imprisonment with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
- On 23 December 1946, the President of the Philippines, through the recommendation of
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner absolute pardon of the
crime of murder.
Petitioner Alvarez contends that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons,
notwithstanding the fact that he was pardoned of the crime of murder.
Issue:
Whether the absolute pardon carried with it the remission of the penalties imposed for
evasions of service sentence.
Ruling:
No. Petition for habeas corpus denied.
Evasion of service of sentence or "jail breaking" is an offense defined and penalized as a
crime under the Revised Penal Code, while violation of a conditional pardon is a mere
infringement of the terms stipulated in a contract between Chief Executive and the
criminal, where the Chief Executive will release the criminal subject to the condition that
if he does not comply with them, he will be recommitted to prison and serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence.
59
“Violation of conditional pardon is not a public offense in the strict sense of the word,
for it does not cause harm or injury to the rights of other person nor does it disturb
public order; and if it does cause any harm it is to the violator himself who, for not
complying with the conditions of the pardon, has to serve again the unexpired portion
of the penalty imposed upon him for the commission of the offense which was
conditionally remitted or pardoned.
While the evasion of service of sentence is a public offense or a wrongful act separate
and independent from any other, and it is not righted or effaced by the pardon or
remission of the penalty imposed in the sentence against the accused for the crime, the
service of which the culprit tried to evade before the pardon.”
In the case at bar, the penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of
sentence have not been affected by the absolute pardon granted to him because he was
convicted of evasions of service of sentence before the pardon and while he was serving
said sentence of conviction for murder which was then still in full force.
Therefore, the Court held that the penalty for the crime of murder is different and
independent from that for evasion of service of sentence, and therefore the evader of service
of sentence must continue serving the punitive sentence rendered against him for the
offense of evasion, irrespective of the pardon or remission or the penalty for murder.
60
VICTA, CARLOS EMMANUEL ABOLA
13-2125
WILFREDO TORRES VS. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES
G.R. No. 76872
July 23 1987
Facts:
- Sometime in 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila of two counts of estafa. Petitioner was sentenced to a total prison term of
from eleven years, ten months and twenty-two days to thirty-eight years, nine
months and one day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75
- On April 18 1979, petitioner was granted a conditional pardon by the President of
the Philippines. The condition stated that the petitioner would "not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."
- Petitioner accepts the conditional pardon and was subsequently released.
- On May 21 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend
Wilfredo Torres’ rearrest on the grounds that he has violated the conditions of his
pardon.
- The grounds for the order are that Wilfredo Torres was found to have pending and
convicted criminal cases at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, some
pending appeal, and records from the NBI showing a long list of charges having
been brought against the petitioner in the years following his release.
- October 10 1986, minister of justice orders the rearrest and recommitment of the
petitioner.
- Petitioner impugns his rearrest and recommitment on the grounds that he has not
yet been convicted by final judgment and that he has not been allowed to be heard
in court before his arrest and imprisonment.
Issue:
- Whether a conviction by final judgment is necessary before the petitioner can be
rearrested and recommitted for violating the terms of his conditional pardon.
Ratio:
- No. A conviction of final judgement is not necessary. Wilfredo Torres’ rearrest
for violating his conditional pardon is valid. Petition dismissed.
- Determining whether a person has violated the terms of his/her conditional pardon
may either be a purely judicial act under the Revised Penal Code, Art. 159 or the
Revised Administrative Code under Sec. 64(i). The President in this case, opted
for the latter and is thus free from Judicial Scrutiny.
- Due process was also not denied as the petitioner has already been given the
opportunity to be heard by himself and by his counsel. This was so in the criminal
case by which he was initially convicted and granted the conditional pardon.
61
VILLANUEVA, VANESSA
02-1802
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIOSO
G.R. Nos. L-38346-47. December 23, 1984
Escolin, J.;
Facts:
Dioso and Abarca were members of the" Batang Mindanao" gang. Both accused were
serving sentence, Abarca having been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime
of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery. While serving their sentence at the New Bilibid Prison
in Muntinlupa, Rizal, they killed their fellow inmates Gomez and Reyno who were
members of Happy Go Lucky gang who have been suspected as authors of the slaying of
their gangmate.
Both accused voluntarily surrendered and entered plea of guilty that they inflicted fatal
blows while Gomez was lying down under a mosquito net and Reyno was taking his
breakfast. Clearly, neither of the victims was in a position to defend himself from the
sudden and unexpected assault.
Hence, the trial court found them guilty and imposed death penalty for the crime of murder.
Issue:
Whether a quasi- recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death penalty despite the
presence of mitigating circumstances.
Ruling:
Yes, a quasi a recidivist who committed murder shall be imposed a death penalty
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to
impugn the lower court's conclusion as to their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of the
death sentence imposed by the trial court by invoking the circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty. The court finds no necessity to discuss at length the effects of
such mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused
are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior
offense. As such the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the felony (murder) is death,
regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the
complete absence thereof. But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to
commute the death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua.
62
ADRIATICO, PAUL JULIUS. H.
16-4099
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KONG LEON A.K.A. KIM HUY
G.R. No. 3906-R. January 17, 1950
Labrador, J.:
Facts:
Police received information from a certain Moro Arais Mansu (Moro) that Kong
Leon (Kong) is selling illegally fabricated United States Gold Coins. The police then
acquired a search warrant, to which they sent Moro in advance to stall Kong. Police found
unfinished gold coins within Kong’s shop and clothing, to which he admitted that he made
such coins. In defense, he stated that the gold coins are out of circulation in virtue of the
United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934 (US Gold Reserve Act), and that prevailing US
and English jurisprudence does not punish fabricating or counterfeiting coins out of
circulation
Issue: Whether or not counterfeiting coins which are out of circulation is punishable
Ruling:
Yes
While the Court does not deny the existence of the US and English jurisprudence
not punishing such act, however they deem that this case must be seen as different. What
is present in this case is the fact that the circulation of such coins, even out of circulation,
as a means of trade and business of Kong Leon, that in the long run may lead to Kong
Leon’s production of in circulation coins, and the out of circulation coins be still used to
defraud people.
It is to be noted further, that the US Gold Reserve Act did not actually placed the
coin out of circulation permanently, but rather it only suspended the production. Hence,
the danger that these coins are used further, and eventually may be placed back in
circulation, increases the possibility that the coins be used in an illegal manner.
63
TITLE IV: Crimes against Public Interest
ALGARME, DANIELLE KYM MARIE
17-4136
DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE
GR No. L-16806 | December 1950
Concepcion J.
Facts:
Petitioner Sergio Del Rosarion, alongside Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del
Pilar, were convicted by CFI Davao for illegal possession of forged treasury notes. On
appeal the CA affirmed the decision for the lower court except changed the penalty and
was increased to 10 years 8 months and a day of prision mayor. Petitioner filed an appeal
by certiorari before the SC
Petitioner contends that the treasury notes (one peso bill and two peso bill)
showed to complainant, Apolinario del Rosario, which petitioner and other defendants
used to induce complainant Apolinario that they were counterfeit treasury notes were
real. The defendants succeeded to obtain 1700 pesos from complainant for the purpose of
manufacturing counterfeit money.
Issue:
Whether the or not the use of genuine treasury notes constitutes a violation of Art.
168 of the RPC.
Held:
YES
Ruling:
The use of genuine treasury notes for the purpose of manufacturing counterfeit
treasury notes by changing the serial no. is in violation of Art. 168 and 169 of the RPC
which the ossesion of the genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of the “ figures,
letters, words and sign contained” in which had been erased or altered, with knowledge of
such notes, as committed by petitioner is in violaion of said article.
SC affirmed in toto the decision of the CA, cost against petitioner
64
BABA, KARLA MARIE B.
17-4137
PEOPLE VS. BENJAMIN GALANO
G.R. No. 18701-R. December 2, 1957
De Leon., J.;
Facts:
Galano bought 4 balut eggs with a false pre-war one-peso bill of the Treasure
Certificate series. The word “Victory” at the back of the bill was written in ink. Although
the treasury certificate has been withdrawn from circulation, it was still redeemable at face
value with the Central Bank. Galano was convicted of forging treasury or bank notes on
other documents payable to bearer; importing, and uttering such false or forged notes and
documents (Article 166).
Issue: Whether Galano was correctly convicted under Article 166 in relation to Article 169
Ruling: Yes
The forgery in Article 166 (in relation to Article 169) of the Revised Penal Code may be
committed by either:
1. By giving to treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order
mentioned therin, the appearance of a true and genuine document; and
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures,
letters, or signs contained therein.
The bill was no longer legal tender. Affixing “Victory” was to give the instrument an
appearance of a genuine document. The aforementioned provisions do not only
contemplate fake documents or instruments given the appearance of a true and genuine
document, but also those demonetized instruments/documents.
65
BALBOA, NERISSA GLORIA J.
17-4147
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ AND LUIS
MABUNAY
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
Vickers, J.;
Facts:
Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justic Norberto
Romualdez of the Supreme Court as his secretary from November 1, 1921 to September
15, 1928. Mabunay was one of the candidates admitted to the bar examinations in 1926.
The Supreme Court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination
committee of the bar in 1926. Also, several attorneys were also appointed as members of
the examination committee and the correctors. The correctors reviewed and graded the
compositions, noting the grades of each answer, but such were written on a separate
notebook.
The final results were released and accused Luis Mabunay had a grade of 75%.
However, a later revision of the composition of the said accused showed that the grades of
73 in civil law and 64 in remedial law had been written on the first page of the said
compositions after striking out the grades of 63 and 58.
Estela Romualdez admitted that it was indeed her who wrote the 73 and 64. She did
this because as private secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as
corrector and at the same time supervisor of the correctors, she was authorized to revise
the compositions if such would do justice.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Romualdez and Mabunay guilty of
falsification.
Ruling:
Article 300 and 301 of the Penal code shows the technical meaning of the word
falsification. Among them are: xxx 2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. 3. By attributing to
persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them. xxx 6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning. xxx
Romualdez was not authorized to change the grades and such changes were made
when she knew that the papers belonged to Luis Mabunay. The acts of the accused are
covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in such a way as
to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the
grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials,
without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way
attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. The lower
court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator
and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez.
66
BALLESTEROS, RAMON NICOLO V.
17-4095
SALUD BERADIO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-49483-86. March 30, 1981
De Castro, J.;
Facts:
Petitioner was formerly an election registrar of the Commission on Elections whose
job was field work. She was charged after her retirement from the service with falsification
of public documents for allegedly having made it appear in her daily time records that she
was not absent from office when in fact she was at the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
attending to her cases. Petitioner admitted her appearances in said court, claiming among
that she is not under strict obligation to submit a time record and that she did not reflect
her appearances in court in said record as they were for few minute-durations only apart
from the fact that she has a standing authority given by the COMELEC to act as de oficio
counsel. The CFI rendered a decision finding her guilty as charged which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of falsification of documents
Ruling: No.
There are three categories of pubic officers which are exempt from requirements of
keeping and submitting the daily time records. These are: (1) Presidential appointees; (2)
chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and (3) officers in the three branches of the
government. Petitioner as Chief of Office and exercising supervision over four subordinate
employees would fall under the third category. However, assuming petitioner is under legal
obligation to submit the daily time records, the false entries did not constitute falsification
for having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. No criminal intent to commit
falsification can be imputed against the petitioner where under the attendant facts and
circumstances in the instant case, she had standing authority to act as counsel de oficio
given by COMELEC. The brief absences of petitioner could be absorbed within the
allowed coffee breaks. Besides, her brief absences did not in any way interfere with her
official duties.
67
BALANUECO, RICHELLE QUEEN ZAMBRONA
16-4124
PILAR S. LUAGUE VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar,
died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital on January 24, 1972 after he was confined in said
hospital since January 3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants
to the Superintendent of schools who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor,
Florencio Guillermo. A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks. The paychecks
delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying that on his
official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary
warrant indicated opposite his name. Pilar Luague, the deceased’s wife, received the
paycheck.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant
to return the treasury warrants issued in the name of her husband Illuminado, further
claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Guillermo discovered that
the treasury warrants had been encashed by appellant. The appellant used it to pay debts
incurred for the illness and death of her husband.
For signing the name of her husband as payee on three treasury warrants for purpose
of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Document. The appellant was charged with 3 counts of estafa thru falsification
of document but was convicted of falsification only.
The petitioner contends that she acted in good faith or had no criminal intent when
she cashed her deceased husband’s paychecks.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents
Held: No. The petitioner was acquitted.
The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the
petitioner signed her husband’s name to the checks because they were delivered to her by
no less than her husband’s district supervisor long after the husband’s death which was
known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses
of her husband’s last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to
the money as an advance payment for her husband’s vacation and sick leave credits the
money value of which exceeded the value of the checks.
Also, there was no damage incurred against the government as the deceased
employee deserved the salary his wife availed of. Even if there was falsification when she
signed for her husband, this was done with the knowledge of her deceased husband’s
supervisor that the husband was indeed dead.
68
BATAAN, XHAVIER BRETT KING D.
16–4005
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. L–67472. July 3, 1987
Paras, J.;
Facts: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila.
Assisting him in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving clerk. The Fund
Management Department (FMD) of the LBP is engaged in money market and securities
trading transactions. The securities which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in
turn deposited with the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati
Branch.
In 1982, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills of the
795th series with a total value of P3, 000, 000.00. Upon verification that Securities
Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of the
missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed
out with a red ink in the said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after them
of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of
the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9, 500, 000.00. Then at the bottom of the
SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then
upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora
Pigram When the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills
of the 795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.
Instead of following Reynes’ draft, Cabigas prepared his own report, at the bottom
of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
(incoming) dated March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the
figure "1,533." In 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the
Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082
in the amount of P500, 000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that
the LBP Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said
Treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. The NBI arrested them.
Reynes was acquitted but Cabigas was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. Cabigas
came to the solace of the Supreme Court asking to reverse the decision of the
Sandiganbayan the correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the
actual number of treasury under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak
the truth.
Issue: Whether Cabigas committed the crime of falsification of public or official document
under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful
statements in the narration of facts.
Ruling: No, Cabigas did not commit the crime of falsification of public or official
document under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making
untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
69
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article
171, which reads "by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts," the following
elements must concur, to wit:
a. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
b. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
c. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
d. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent of injuring a third person.
In the case at bar, there is nothing to show that the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged
falsification of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the
submission of which was or is required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner points
out that as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank. The form
was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience and also for reference purposes."
Petitioner therefore, was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said
DR SDUC.
Ergo, Cabigas did not commit the crime of falsification of public or official
document under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making
untruthful statements in the narration of facts since In the absence of such obligation and
of the alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document with which he is charged.
70
CADIZ, MARIA SOPHIA M.
16-4006
PEOPLE S. SENDAYDIEGO
G.R. No. L-33254, January 20, 1978
Aquino, J.
Facts:
These are three cases of malversation through falsification. In 1969 Licerio P.
Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson, an
employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers to secure
permits to release money for the alleged repairs of a bridge. The vouchers needed to be
signed by city engineers but it was proven that the signatures were falsified.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification. Sendaydiego died during the pendency of the case (but
it’s proven beyond reasonable doubt he is the principal, so his estate is liable for
indemnity). It was contested that Samson did not sign the vouchers but subsequently
proven that he did. His possession of such falsified documents gave rise to the presumption
that he also authored them.
Issue:
Whether there is complex crime of malversation through falsification in this case. NO.
Whether a private individual like Samson can be liable for malversation. YES
Ruling:
1. Falsification is not indispensable in malversation. The SC held that they could have taken
the money without the vouchers. Each voucher is a separate act of falsification and each
amount is a separate act of malversation.
2. If a person had in his possession a falsified document and made use of it (uttered) taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is he is the material author thereof.
Further, e private individual can be a principal in malversation since his acts were
indespensible to allow Sendaydiego to steal the money.
71
CHUA, RAPHAEL RYAN D.
12-0881
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82197. March 13, 1989
Cortes, J.;
Facts:
Manuel L. Siquian, municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, was charged with
falsification of public document under Art. 141 (4) of the RPC. He hired Jesusa Carreon as
clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, and issued a certification of the availability
of funds addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service of Manila as part of the
requirements. Carreon worked for five months but did not receive her monthly salary of
P120 as the treasurer told her that there was no money. It turned out that the budget for
Fiscal Year 1975-1976 was not enacted, so the annual budget was deemed to be the same
as the 1974-1975 budget, with no appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of
the Municipal Secretary. Charges were filed against Siquian, and he was found guilty by
the RTC and CA. In the current petition for review, Siquian contends that evidence showed
a lack of criminal intent and abuse of position, and that the statement “funds for the position
are available” is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, and therefore, he should
be acquitted of the crime.
Issue:
Whether Manuel L. Siquian is guilty of falsification of public document.
Ruling:
Yes.
The requisites under Art. 141 (4) of making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, having a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts, and the facts being
absolutely false, were met when he made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts
of the certification, which is a public document that he issued as a public official in the
exercise of his functions. It is clear that Siquian was aware of the failure to enact the budget
for Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and that no funds had been allotted for the position of clerk in
the Office of the Municipal Secretary for Fiscal Year 1974-1975, since he presides at all
meetings of the municipal council and signs all ordinances and resolutions. However, he
falsely certified that “funds for the position are available.” The statement is not a
conclusion of law but a statement for facts since it does not require the application of the
artificial rules of law. Additionally, in the falsification of a public document, the existence
of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary, and while good faith may be
a valid defense, it has not been clearly shown by Siquian. Therefore, the petition is denied,
and the decision of the RTC convicting Siquian of falsification of public document is
upheld.
72
GABRILLO, JOHN ANGELO M.
17-4084
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG
VILLALON AND FEDERICO DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 43659. December 21, 1990
Regalado, J.;
Facts:
De Guzman was charged with estafa through falsification of public document on
March 29, 1974. As the attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera (complainant), in 1964, De
Guzman forged his signature on the special power of attorney (SPA) to use it to mortgage
Carrera’s parel of land and obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power
of Atty. and mortgage contract) were later registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the land was bought by someone else, and Carrera
only knew about it when an action for ejectment was filed against him by the new owner
in 1972. The trial court dismissed the case against De Guzman on the grounds that the said
crime, which was punishable by prision correcional, already prescribed, pursuant to Art.
90 of the RPC. The SC affirmed the challenged decision of the trial court, ruling that the
crime prescribed upon the public registry of the power of attorney which is considered a
notice to the whole world.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the charge of estafa through falsification of a public document
has sufficient basis to exist in law and in fact.
2. Whether or not the crime has prescribed
Ruling:
1. YES. Falsification is only the means necessary to commit the estafa because
before the falsified document is used to defraud another, the crime of falsification was
already consummated. The damages were caused by the commission of estafa. The alleged
authorization given to De Guzman to get a loan from the Bank only pertains to the half
owned by Mariano’s brother. In his testimony, Mariano only quoted his brother.
2. YES. The start of the prescriptive period was when the falsified SPA was
registered in the Registry of Deeds on Feb. 13, 1964. In a crime of falsification of public
document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had
constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
73
IMBANG, NAOMI
16-4007
ENEMCIO V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 146731. January 13, 2004
Facts
Bernante, an assistant professor in a college, was convicted of the crime of slight physical
injuries. Because of this, he served a 20-day prison term from May 14, 1996 to June 2,
1996. However, in his leave application, he stated that he was on forced leave from May
15, 1996 to May 21, 1996, and on vacation leave from May 22, 1996 to May 31, 1996.
Because of this, Bernante was able to receive his salary because his leave applications were
approved. Because of this, Enemecio, a utility worker in the same college, filed a criminal
complaint for falsification before the Ombudsman against Bernante. The complaint
however was denied. Hence, Enemecio filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse
of discretion.
Issue
Whether there is grave abuse of discretion in this case?
Ruling
No. Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification
of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in
a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender
are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent to injure a third person. As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out,
Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose
where he was going to spend his leave of absence. “Legal obligation” means that there is a
law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Bernante may not be
convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false statements in a
narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation
leave and forced leave.
74
JACKSON, LOIDA M.
174050
LEONILA BATULANON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
Leonila Batulanon was employed by Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated as
a manager-cashier from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of
receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the
release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial
documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons
namely: Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion, Ferlyn Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon,
making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the
checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant,
never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names.
Batulanon misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit all said checks/cash.
Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents were filed against Batulanon. He pleaded not guilty to the charges. Medallo,
Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma were presented as witnesses. Medallo testified that Batulanon forged
the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. testified that Oracion is
Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in
1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.
The trial court and Court of Appeals found Batulanon guilty of Estafa through
Falsification of Private Documents.
Issue: Whether or not the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private
Documents.
Held: Yes.
Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Documents, the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial
documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law., Batulanon was convicted of three counts of
Falsification of Private Documents and Estafa under Art. 171 and Art. 315 of the RPC as
there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents.
In the case of Dennis Batulanon, said act does not fall under any of the modes of
Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she
used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of
the loan from PCCI.
75
LANUZA, LOUISE NICHOLE E.
09-9046
FELIX NIZURTADO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
G.R. No. 107838. December 7, 1994
Vitug, J.;
Facts:
On or about 25 August 1983, and for some time prior or subsequent thereto, the
accused, a public officer and the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, falsified and
attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it appear that on 25 August 1983, the
Barangay council met and identified T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood project when
in fact, no such meeting was held. Thereafter, the accused submitted the falsified resolution
to the Secretariat which endorsed the same to the Land Bank of the Philippines and
encashed LBP check in the amount of P 10,000 and where such amount was used by the
accused for his personal use and benefit.
Issue: Whether the accused should be liable for falsification of public document
Ruling: Yes.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Malversation of public funds or
property.—Presumption of malversation.—Any public officer who, by reason of the duties
of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property xxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal use.”
The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the
above penal provisions are that—
(a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds
or property.
In this case, Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime
through the falsification of a public document punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171
76
of the Revised Penal Code. “Art. 171 Falsification by public officer, employee or notary
or ecclesiastic minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
“x x x x x x x x x “2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate”;
Petitioner was able to encash the check on the basis of a resolution of the Barangay
Council, submitted to the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) Secretariat, to the
effect that a livelihood project had already been identified by the council. The money,
however, instead of its being used for the project, was later lent to, along with petitioner,
the members of the Barangay Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted
“misappropriation” within the meaning of the law.
Therefore, in falsification, the document need not be an authentic official paper
since its simulation is the essence of falsification. The act of the accused in falsifying the
document in order to misappropriate the public funds constitutes the crime of Malversation
through falsification of public documents.
77
LAVIÑA, ALYSSA
16-4078
GALEOS VS PEOPLE
Ponente: Villarama, Jr. J.
Facts:
Petitioner Rosalio Galeos was appointed as the Construction and Maintenance Man
by then Vice-Mayor Paulino Ong. In Galeos’ State of Assets, Liabilities, Net worth
(SAL’N) for the year 1993, he answered “NO” to the question “To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to
anyone working in the government?” In the year 1994 and 1995, he left the same space
indicating whether he has relatives working for the government unanswered. Ong’s
signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath.
Rosalio Galeos and Paulino Ong were charged with falsification of public documents under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, making untruthful statements to the narration of
facts. Section 79 of the Local Government Code prohibits Nepotism which allows relatives
up to the 4th degree of consanguinity to be employed at the same time in the Local
Government Offices. Paulino Ong’s mother and Rosalio Galeos’ mother are sisters.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners committed falsification of a public document under
Article 171
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes
in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by
him are absolutely false. In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that
the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Thus, petitioner made an
untruthful statement by indicating in his SAL’N that he did not have any relative at least
in the fourth degree of consanguinity working for the government.
78
LEGASPI, KAYE ANN SIOSO
11-1802
MICHAEL DAVA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
Fernan, C.J.
Facts:
On October 19, 1975, petitioner Michael Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's
license, while driving his car along Shaw, bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor
and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence, his driver's license was confiscated and he was charged with homicide
and serious physical injuries. One day, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores,
saw Dava driving a Volkswagen. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an
exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava, they had Dava
apprehended for driving without a license. When he was apprehended, he showed the
police officers a non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No.
0605870 issued by Agency Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about
the source of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate (Manalili) had secured it
for him. He was brought to the police station and charged with falsification of a public
document.
Prosecution witnesses, Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) testified that the license was "fake or illegally issued". Although the
form used for the license was genuine, the signature of the issuing official was fake.
Issue: WON the accused can be convicted of falsification of a public document
Held: Yes. Through misrepresentation that he had no driver’s license, petitioner was able
to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license.
A blank form of the driver’s license which is filled up with personal data and the signature
of the registrar of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was
simulated, becomes a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The
driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to
another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In
falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
79
LIRIOS, LADY MAY S.
16-4032
MARTINEZ VS PEOPLE
GR No. 194367 June 15, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts:
Herein petitioner, a detainee at the Manila City Jail, was convicted for illegal
possession and use of false bank notes. In the information filed against him, it was alleged
that he had asked the informant, Francis dela Cruz to buy a soda at the Manila City Jail
Bakery handing the latter a P500 bill. However, said bill was rejected at the bakery after
the employee recognized it as fake. Informant dela Cruz told JO1s David and Passilan
about the counterfeit bill and the two officers went to the petitioner’s cell for a surprise
inspection. It was further alleged that aside from the counterfeit P500 bill that Martinez
handed to dela Cruz, twenty-three (23) pieces of P500 bills were found in Martinez’ wallet.
Issue: Whether or not the intent to use forged or falsified credit instruments in one’s
possession is a necessary element to be held liable under Art. 168 of the RPC.
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner is acquitted of the crime of illegal possession and use of false bank notes.
The elements of the crime of illegal possession and use of false bank notes or other credit
instruments are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and
security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows
that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.
Thus, as held in People v. Digoro (GR No. L-22032, 4 March 1966), mere possession of
false treasury or bank notes is not a criminal offense because under Article 168 of the RPC,
the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to
use the counterfeit bills. The informant, Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly
gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. It was only the
jail officers who testified in court of the said transaction between the informant and
petitioner, hence their testimony is mere hearsay since it is not based on their personal
knowledge. Therefore, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakened the
prosecution’s evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which
manifested the petitioner’s intent to use a counterfeit bill.
80
LOPEZ, JUNE KARLA P.
17-4067
JOSEPH E.ESTRADA VS. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 156160. December 9, 2004
Chico-Nazario, J.;
Facts:
On 23 January 2001, the BIR placed petitioner's foreign currency deposit account
at Citibank Greenhills Branch under constructive distraint. Respondent Deputy
Commissioner Lilian Hefti was the one who issued the notice of constructive distraint.
Contending that the BIR action was unlawful, petitioner filed on 31 January 2001
a complaint against respondent BIR officials and respondent Citibank officers before the
Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly violating among others Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On 17 September 2001, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal
of the aforesaid complaint for want of probable cause to indict respondent bank and BIR
officials.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Hefti being the Deputy Commissioner of BIR had indeed
usurped the duty of the BIR Commissioner when she issued the notice of distraint.
Ruling: No.
Under Art. 177 of the RPC, in order for one to be held liable for Usurpation of
Official Function, there must be a clear showing that the person being charged had
performed an act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
government or any agency thereof, under pretense of official position, and without being
lawfully entitled to do so.
In this instant case, respondent Hefti was the one specifically charged with
Usurpation of Official Function, in view of her act of issuing the notice of constructive
distraint against the foreign currency deposit of complainant with the Citibank. While it is
true that under Sec. 206 of the NIRC as amended, the Commissioner of the BIR and not
any Officer of the BIR was the one granted with the power to issue a notice of distraint, it
bears to stress, however, that when Hefti exercised such function of the BIR Commissioner,
she was then designated Officer-In-Charge of the BIR by President Arroyo. As such, it
necessary follows that Hefti can now legally exercise the duties and functions pertaining
to the BIR Commissioner, including the issuance of a constructive distraint. Suffice it to
say that when Hefti issued the notice of distraint, she was clothed with authority to issue
the same in view of her appointment as the then Officer-In-Charge of the BIR. Hence, the
charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply to said respondent.
81
LOPEZ, MICHIKO S.
10-1927
GIGANTONI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L74727. June 16, 1988
Yap, C.J.;
Facts:
Melencio Gigantoni allegedly falsely represented himself as an agent of the CIS,
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) and represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PCCIS agent investigating a
kidnapping case. Gigantoni requested PAL to show records particularly the passenger
manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights as he was tracking the kidnapping case. To
convince the PAL officials, Gigantoni exhibited his identification card purporting to show
that he was a PC-CIS agent. His request was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado
Boro showed to him the requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured photocopies of the
requested manifest and the used PAL tickets of a Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor,
and a Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain Mining. Thereafter, Gigantoni left
the PAL premises. After which, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno inquired from Atty.
Boro about Gigantoni’s purpose in securing copies of PAL records. Suspicious of
accused’s real identity, PAL conducted a verification check with the PC-CIS. They learned
from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent as he had been
dismissed from the service for gross misconduct. Upon this discovery, Atty. Puno alerted
the NBI. The next day, when Gigantoni returned to the PAL office, he was brought by Atty.
Puno to their conference room. While waiting for the arrival of the NBI agents, in the
presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Puno confronted Gigantoni. The latter admitted
that he was no longer with the CIS and that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining
Corporation. Gigantoni said that he was simply checking on a claim for per diem of one of
their employees who had travelled. Upon the arrival of NBI agents, Attys. Puno and Boro
turned over Gigantoni to the NBI. They submitted a complaint-affidavit against Gigantoni,
charging the latter the crime of Usurpation of Authority.
Issue: Whether or not Gigantoni Committed the crime of Usurpation of Authority.
Ruling: No.
Gigantoni contended that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was only
suspended and was not yet informed of termination from the office.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and
falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under
pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency
82
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of
usurpation of authority, which is the charge against Gigantoni.
Gigantoni admits that he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective
June 1980. This admission is supported by the record which shows the letter of Lt. Col.
Sabas Edades regarding said action. However, Gigantoni denies having been informed of
dismissal from service. No evidence or proof adduced showed that the dismissal was
actually conveyed to petitioner. Failure of the prosecution to prove that Gigantoni was
notified of his dismissal from the service negates the charge that he falsely represented
himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be
overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions,
as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly
notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption. Court found it convincing
that Gigantoni relied on the presumption that his act was an official duty, since he was
merely under suspension.
83
MAGNAYE, ISAIAH ATHRIENE
17-4049
LEGAMIA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 63817. August 28, 1984
Facts: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955
to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced
a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18,
1971. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon
was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced
her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the
Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after
Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher
evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed
"Corazon L. Reyes." For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio,
Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint, which led to Corazon's
prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is equivalent to 2/5 of that which
is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code per
advice given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to
Felicisima.
Issue: Whether or not Corazon Legamia violate Commonwealth Act No. 142
Ruling: No, Corazon Legamia did not violate Commonwealth Act No. 142. The woman
publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the
fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating
the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It
is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.
84
JACKSON, LOIDA M.
174050
REOLANDI DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 65006. October 31, 1990
Paras, J.:
Facts:
Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School and,
therefore, a public employee. As a requirement for his reappointment as the School
Administrative Assistant I, the educational requirement was at least fourth year college
undergraduate. He executed and filed in the office of the Civil Service Commission that
his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. in Liberal Arts, which he
allegedly obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges from 1950 to 1954. Both
the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court found Diaz guilty of violating Art. 171
of the RPC of falsification of an official document. Diaz contested by presenting his
transcript of records from the said college signed by Mrs. Yap in behalf of the college
president.
Issue: Whether or not Diaz is liable under Art. 171 of the RPC.
Held: No.
Diaz committed the crime of perjury. Pursuant to People v. Cruz and Art. 183 of
the RPC, the elements of the crime of perjury are: (1) That the accused made a statement
under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. (2) That the statement or
affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(3) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood. (4) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal purpose. All of the elements were met.
The transcript presented lacks the authenticating marks, which is the imprint of the
college seal and the signature of the President of the college. Mrs. Yap also denied that it
was her signature. Therefore, the TOR was invalid.
85
MURAO, JOSE PEPITO G. III
17-4085
HONORIO SAAVEDRA VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, AND GREGORIO M. RAMOS
G.R. No. 93173. September 15, 1993
Bellosillo, J.;
Facts:
On July 2, 1987, petitioner Honorio Saavedra Jr. entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Deed of Assignment with Pine Philippines Inc. (PPI) and Gregorio M.
Ramos as one of PPI’s owners, for shares of stock of the company to be transferred to
Saavedra in consideration of 1.2 Million pesos. The Agreement included an automatic
rescission clause in case of default by petitioner in one of the due dates. With 263,620
pesos balance to be paid on September 15, 1987, petitioner withheld payment and instead
deposited it in escrow since the sellers failed to comply with warranties stipulated. On
November 5, 1987, petitioner Saavedra, as president of PPI filed a complaint against
Ramos for damages. Ramos, however, questioned Saavedra’s authority since Saavedra
ceased to be PPI’s president when his shares of stock was automatically rescinded on
September 15, 1987. Ramos and his group filed a ‘Rescission of Memorandum of
Agreement’ with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and during the pendency
of SEC Case No. 3257, Ramos filed a criminal case for perjury against petitioner Saavedra
for declaring that he was president of PPI in the civil case for damages the latter filed
against Ramos. Despite Saavedra’s insistence that presidency of PPI and the propriety of
holding such title was still unresolved and pending in the SEC, the Provincial Prosecutor
and subsequently the Department of Justice upheld probable cause against Saavedra for the
crime of perjury on the basis of a certification by PPI Secretary Ramos is PPI’s rightful
president.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the perjury case against Saavedra can be sustained?
NO. With the rescission case still pending with the SEC, the provincial prosecutor unduly
upheld the propriety of Saavedra’s perjury case. The SEC should enjoy primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the propriety of the rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement and, as a result, the presidency of PPI. Despite the Provincial
Prosecutor’s power to find probable cause, the Provincial Prosecutor is also obliged to
prevent useless trial that preempts the decision of another tribunal. Moreover, an
unfavorable decision with the SEC would not necessarily mean that criminal prosecution
would have basis against Saavedra since a key element of perjury is willful or deliberate
assertion of falsehood which, apparent from the act of Saavedra in depositing the balance
in escrow, is not present in his case.
Ruling: Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted. Provincial Prosecutor and
Department of Justice finding of probable cause for perjury is set aside.
86
PALENZUELA, JHAEDELLE KHRYZSHA L.
17-4090
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012
Facts:
Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong. Spouses filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas
for violation of Article 183 of the RPC, for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping.
OSG shared the petitioner’s view and issued Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment relying also in Ilusorio case and the crime of perjury is the deliberate or
intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The case
was referred to En Banc because of the conflicting rulings in the case of Ilusorio (basis of
the petition) and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City
ruling.
Issue: Whether or not or not perjury was committed.
Ruling: Yes.
The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal
act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before
a duly authorized person. All of the elements of Perjury is present in this case. First, the
petitioner executed Certificate Against Forum Shopping, duly notarized in Makati City.
Second, deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in
Makati City, not Pasay City. The Information indicates that the Petitioner has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal
or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false.
87
QUEVEDO, MIGUEL LEANDRO CERALDE
16-4004
OUANO V. CA
Facts:
A property registered under RFC was offered for sale since the first one was
nullified due to a protest made by Ouano. In the second bidding, it was agreed that Echavez
would only make a bid, and if accepted, divide the property in proportion to their adjoining
parties. Echavez’s bid was accepted and deposited 20% of the preferred price. To ensure
the success of the enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only interested party headed by
Mrs. Bonsucan to withdraw from presenting a bid, which she agreed and paid Ouano’s
wife a sum of 2,000 for reimbursement of the expenses. While Ouano and his wife
delivered sums of money to Echavez, RFC never recognized the sharing agreement
between Echavez and Ouano, they only approved the sale of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not Ouano committed machination?
Held:
Yes. It found that the sharing agreement couldn’t be enforced in the absence of consent of
RFC and that the agreement had an unlawful cause. As the trial court stressed, Ouano and
Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as consideration for Ouano’s
refraining from taking part in the auction and also succeeded in causing another bidder to
stay away from the auction in order to reduce the price of the auctioned property.In doing
so, these acts constitute machinations in public auctions penalized under art. 185 of RPC.
The fact that the agreement is criminal in character, the parties not only do have cause of
action against each other, they are also liable for prosecution, things and price of the
agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of RPC.
88
TITLE V: Crimes Relative to Opium and other Prohibited Drugs
RADOC, ROY PHILIPP TEHSAN
16-4047
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NOEL CATENTAY
G.R. No. 183101. July 6, 2010
Abad, J.;
Facts:
PO3 Gerardo Quimson, a police officer, testified that on April 14, 2004 his anti-illegal
drugs unit received a report of drug trafficking by Noel Doroja Catentay alias Boy
(Catentay) at a billiard hall. This prompted the police to conduct a buy-bust operation at
the place.
PO3 Quimson was to serve as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Valdez was to serve as pick-up
officer. PO3 Quimson marked a 100-peso bill with his initials GQ to serve as buy-bust
money. The informant introduced PO3 Quimson to Catentay as someone who wanted to
buy P100.00 worth of shabu. After PO3 Quimson gave the money, Catentay took out two
heat-sealed, transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance from his
pocket and handed one sachet to the police officer. Upon receiving the sachet, PO3
Quimson scratched his head to signal the consummation of the transaction. PO2 Valdez
then approached and with Quimson introduced themselves to Catentay as police
officers. They apprised him of his constitutional rights, arrested him, and seized from him
the other heat-sealed sachet and the buy-bust money. PO3 Quimson then wrote the letters
GQ on the sachet he bought from Catentay and GQ-1 on the other sachet they seized from
him.
The officers turned over Catentay and the items they got from him to the desk officer at
the police station. The investigator, whom PO3 Quimson did not identify, then submitted
the sachets of white crystalline substances to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for examination. These were found positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The trial court found Catentay guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 or the illegal selling of 0.03 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrohloride, a dangerous drug, and sentenced him to the penalties of life imprisonment
and fine of P500,000.00. Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in full the decision of the trial
court. Catentay appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding sufficient evidence that Catentay sold prohibited drugs to
a police officer in a buy-bust operation in a billiard hall.
Ruling:
89
Yes. The Supreme Court held that prosecutions failed to establish the integrity of the
allegedly illegal substances that the police took from Catentay and presented in court.
The burden of the prosecution in a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to prove (1)
the identities of the buyer and the seller; (2) the sale of dangerous drugs; and (3) the
existence of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
The Court expounded on the requirement of proof of the existence of the prohibited
drugs. The prosecution has to establish the integrity of the seized article in that it had been
preserved from the time the same was seized from the accused to the time it was presented
in evidence at the trial. Here, the prosecution established through PO1 Quimsons testimony
that he got the two sachets of white crystalline substances from Catentay and marked them
with his initials. Since he testified that the sachets were heat-sealed and that he placed his
initials on them that would have been sufficient to ensure the integrity of the substances
until they shall have reached the hands of the forensic chemist.
The integrity of the seized articles would remain even if PO1 Quimson coursed their
transmittal to the crime laboratory through the investigator-on-case since they had been
sealed and marked. It does not matter that another person, probably a police courier would
eventually deliver the sealed substances by hand to the crime laboratory. But,
unfortunately, because the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who opened the
sachets and examined the substances in them, the latter was unable to attest to the fact that
the substances presented in court were the same substances he found positive for shabu.
But, while Catentay stipulated that the forensic chemist examined the contents of the same
plastic sachets that he personally received from the police, Catentay made no stipulation
that the substance contained in the plastic sachets that were actually presented in court is
the same substance that the forensic chemist examined and found positive for shabu. The
Court is guided by its ruling in People v. Habana which describes how the integrity of the
substance seized from the accused might be preserved.
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance
turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it by courier
to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that
possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is
imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to
place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably
with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on
the plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized
substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until
it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should
put it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance would
assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from
the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies
90
the nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own
mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the
police officers seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then
describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was
handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to
preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the
prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger,
laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of
custody, no matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them
has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been
tampered with or substituted while in his care.[18]
In this case, although the plastic sachets that the forensic chemist received were heat-sealed
and authenticated by the police officer with his personal markings, the forensic chemist
broke the seal, opened the plastic sachet, and took out some of the substances for chemical
analysis. No evidence had been adduced to show that the forensic chemist properly closed
and resealed the plastic sachets with adhesive and placed his own markings on the resealed
plastic to preserve the integrity of their contents until they were brought to court. Nor was
any stipulation made to this effect. The plastic sachets apparently showed up at the pretrial, not bearing the forensic chemists seal, and was brought from the crime laboratory by
someone who did not care to testify how he came to be in possession of the same. The
evidence did not establish the unbroken chain of custody.
The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE decision of the Court of Appeals
and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Noel Catentay y Doroja alias Boy.
91
SABADO, MARIONNIE C.
17-4149
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZAIDA KAMAD Y AMBING
G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010
Brion, J.;
Facts:
On October 16, 2002, the PNP Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern Police
District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig received information from an asset that a certain Zaida was
engaged in the illegal sale of shabu in Paranaque City. The Taguig police formed a buybust team where SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the
Php 300 marked money. The buy-bust team also arrested Leo who was found in possession
of one plastic sachet also suspected to contain shabu. The buy-bust team took the accusedappellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their office for investigation. The
recovered plastic sachets, marked as ES-1-161009 and ES-2-161002, were then brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu.
Issue: Whether or not the police failed to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling
the seized shabu
Ruling: Yes. The police failed to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the
seized shabu.
The Supreme Court, citing Mallillin v. People and Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
identified the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court.
In this case, SPO2 Sanchez’s testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu
was handled immediately after the accused-appellants arrest. Furthermore, his testimony
regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed to provide particulars on whether the
shabu was turned over to the investigator. The pieces of evidence presented also failed to
identify the person who personally brought and received the seized shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was
handled, stored, and safeguarded pending its presentation in court. Furthermore, the
forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before
the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the
specimen of October 16, 2002.
92
Therefore, the police failed to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling
the seized shabu.
93
SANGALANG, JOHN NORBERT P.
11-2836
PEOPLE VS AGULAY
Facts:
An informant at Police Station 5 of Novaliches informed the police that a certain
Sing had been selling Shabu at Brgy. Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City. A police
entrapment was formed, and the buy bust team went to the place where the alleged seller
of drugs was conducting operations.
The informant pointed the “drug pusher” to PO2 Herrera, the poseur buyer. Both
the informant and the Poseur Buyer approached Sing. The alleged sale of Shabu was
conducted, PO2 Herrera bought the Shabu using the P100 marked money. PO2 then
scratched his head which signaled the entrance to the scene of the rest of the buy bust team.
PO2 Herrera recovered two plastic sachets from Sing’s pocket. These were submitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. These sachets were found to have
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU.
Appellant contends that the Chain of Custody has been violated which warrants his
acquittal because the procedure according to Section 21(a) of RA 9165 was not followed,
which states that:
“(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs, SHALL,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;”
Issue: Whether or not failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21(a) breaks the
Chain of Custody of the illegal drug seized
Ruling:
No.
Non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21(a) of RA 9165 does not
warrant the acquittal of the accused.
Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Failure to comply with such procedure is a matter between the Dangerous Drugs Board
and the arresting officers. It is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for
the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered
consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not
undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the
Dangerous Drugs Board.
94
There is no showing of a broken chain in the custody of the seized items, later on
determined to be shabu, from the moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to the
investigating officer, to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. It was duly established by documentary,
testimonial, and object evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachets containing
the shabu that the substance tested by the forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were
well-documented, was the same as that taken from accused-appellant.
Note: Not all who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court.
95
SUMALINOG, JAZ ANN T.
101915
PEOPLE V ADAM
G.R. No. 143842, 13 Oct 2003
Callejo, Sr. J.
Facts:
Appellant Mangi Adam y Lumambas was charged for violating RA No. 6425 alleging
that on 17 Feb 1999, he sold and delivered shabu to a poseur buyer for and in consideration
of P2,000. Around 2:30pm on the said date, a confidential informant reported that he had
an agreement with a drug pusher for the purchase of 200 grams of shabu for P200,000.
With this, a buy bust operation was conducted. PO3 Rey Lucido acted as the poseur buyer
and brought with him the money affixing his initials “RL” on each genuine P1,000 bills.
When Adam arrived, the informant introduced to him PO3 Lucido as the buyer. Adam
showed to him the transparent plastic tea bag containing white crystalline substances. In
turn, PO3 Lucido handed over the envelope containing the marked money bills and boodle
money. After this, PO3 Lucido scratched his head (as a signal that the transaction had
already been consummated) and identified himself as a police officer. Adam then was
arrested. The trial court convicted him of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal claiming
that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of drug-pushing.
Issue: Whether appellant Adam is guilty of attempted sale of shabu.
Ruling: Yes.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in Court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In
Roble vs. Arbasa, the Court held that the essential elements of a sale are the following: (a)
consent or meeting of the minds, that is consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the
price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent.
Meanwhile, under Sec.21(b) of Art. IV of RA No. 6425, it states that, “The same penalty
prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any
attempt or conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases: (b) Sale, administration,
delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs;…”
In this case, Adam intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of
the intended crime by showing the substance to PO3 Lucido but the sale was aborted when
the latter identified himself as a police officer and arrested Adam. There is no evidence that
both talked about and agreed on the purchase price of the shabu. There is also no evidence
that Adam handed over the shabu to PO3 Lucido but merely showed the bag containing
the shabu and held on to it before it was confiscated by PO3 Lucido. Moreover, there is no
evidence to prove that Adam was aware that the envelope contained money.
96
Thus, appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted sale of shabu as defined in
Sec. 21(b) of Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425
97
TIROL, COURTNEY ALLISON P.
14-0707
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALDRIN BERDADERO Y ARMAMENTO
G.R. No. 179710, June 29, 2010
Del Castillo, J.;
Facts:
On March 28, 2003, an Information was filed against appellant Aldrin Berdadero y
Armamento for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The allegations of the
Information stated that on March 25, in the afternoon, Berdadero willfully and unlawfully
sold and delivered shabu at Arrieta Subdivision, Batangas City.
According to the prosecution, the Investigation Section of the Batangas City Police
Station received a report from an informant that the appellant was selling shabu. Thus, a
buy-bust operation was organized. Thereafter, two police officers (PO3 Balmes and PO2
Villas) and the informant went to the target area and parked the van they were using in
front of Berdadero's house. Berdadero handed the informant 2 plastic sachets of shabu in
exhange for marked money. The police officers who were observing the transaction from
inside the van apprehended the appellant and recovered the marked money from him, then
took him to the barangay hall to record the entrapment operation and the evidence seized.
According to the defense, Berdadero claimed that he was a victim of a frame-up.
He testified that at around 2:40 in the afternoon of March 25, two men came to his house
and introduced themselves as locksmiths. His mother allowed them to enter and showed
them the defective keys. After a while, the men left, but they returned 10 minutes later,
kicked the door open and handcuffed him. He asked why he was being arrested but no
explanation was made.
The Regional Trial Court of Batangas City found Berdadero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having violated Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of
Appeals denied such appeal for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence against Berdadero was obtained in violation of Section
86 of RA 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the
PDEA
Ruling: No.
A perusal such provision shows that it is silent as to the consequences of failure on
the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buybust operation, in the same way that the IRR is likewise silent on the matter. However, by
no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an
arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an
arrest inadmissible.
98
Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement
bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal
drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Moreover, the same provision states
that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board shall be
responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act.
It is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities
be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the lead agency in the campaign against the
menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having
a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can
enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs.
It is therefore clear that PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas possessed and acted with
authority to conduct the buy-bust operation, making the same valid.
99
TUOZO, LOURDES CLOUIE D.
14-2867
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROA
G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010
Perez, J.;
Facts:
The Quezon City Police District received an information from an asset that a
certain Joel Roa was peddling shabu somewhere along Senatorial Road in barangay
Batasan Hills. A buy-bust operation team was then immediately formed by the QCPD.
PO2 Galacgac, the poseur-buyer, introduced himself to Roa as a user who wants to buy
shabu from him. The accused then handed PO2 Galacgac a small sachet with white
crystalline substance. In turn, PO2 Galacgac sent a signal to his team that the transaction
was complete. The buy-bust team then arrested the accused and brought him to the police
station.
The confiscated substance was then tested, and yielded a positive result that the
substance was shabu. Two separate criminal charges under RA 9165 was filed against the
accused. The accused entered a plea of not guilty to both charges, and a joint trial for the
two interrelated charges thereafter ensued. The RTC found Roa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The case was then brought up to the Court of Appeals, but CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
In this appeal, the accused denies that he was caught, in flagrante, selling and
possessing shabu and claims that he was just a victim of police frame-up for QCPD failed
to cooperated with PDEA about forming a buy-bust operation.
Issue:
Whether QCPD’s failure to cooperate with PDEA discounts the existence of a genuine
buy-bust operation, which gives credibility to his alibi that he was merely a victim of a
frame-up
Ruling:
No.
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP
and the Bureau of Customs to maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters.
This provision, however, does not make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non
for every buy-bust operation. A buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned
by section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Police authorities may rightfully resort to
apprehending violators of RA 9165 with the support of PDEA.
Hence, a buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with PDEA and
cannot give credibility to his alibi.
100
VALDEZ, DARWIN MORENO
17-4066
PEOPLE VS. ONG
GR No. 175940, Feb 6, 2008
Tinga, J.;
Facts:
Anson Ong was charged with the crime of illegal possession and sale of shabu. A buy-bust
operation was initiated through a tip-off of by a female walk-in informant. SPO2 Saballa
and the informant were to meet the accused at the Heritage Hotel. Ong was inside his car.
When they were about to hand the boodle money to Ong, somebody ran away with the
money. The latter then throw the money in a white car which is driven by Chito Cua, who
is later arrested (but his case was dismissed later).
Both RTC and CA found Ong guilty of the said charges on finding the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible.
Issue: Whether or not the credibility the prosecution witnesses pass the “objective test”
Ruling: No. In dubio pro reo.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object (corpus deliciti), and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. (proof of
transaction)
There was disharmony and incoherence of the testimony of the witnesses. This is why the
accused was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The inconsistencies were:
1. That the informant only appeared before the buy-bust operations vs. Coballes’s testimony
that informant reports to the office every now and then.
2. That Saballa didn’t know how much shabu he is going to buy despite being the poseurbuyer.
3. That the shabu was dispensed by the defense counsel
4. That Ong was found negative of fluorescent powder.
5. That the prosecution lost Ong’s driver’s license.
6. That the policeman, in spite of having a motorcycle, chased in foot the runner of the boodle
money and likewise failed to succeed on the same.
7. The supposed leader (Chief Lachica) denied his involvement in the actual operations.
8. Lachica can’t recall the amount of the drug deal when he himself provided it.
101
VENUS, MA. DOMINIQUE M.
16-4011
PEOPLE VS. PAGKALINAWAN
G.R. No. 184805, 3 March 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
On 20 July 2004, an informant arrived at Taguig City Police Station Anti-Illegal DrugsSpecial Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) and reported the illegal activities of a certain
person named “Berto.”
Police Senior Inspector Paat immediately formed a “buy-bust” team with Police Officer
Memoracion (PO1 Memoracion) as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the police officers as
back-up. After the P500.00 buy-bust money was marked and recorded in the blotter, the
buy-bust team, together with the informant, proceeded to Captain Ciano St. in Taguig City
where Berto lived.
When the team arrived, PO1 Memoracion and the informant went up to Berto who was
leaning against A wall. The informant introduced PO1 Memoracion to Berto as a taxi driver
who wanted to buy “shabu.” After Berto took the P500.00 buy-bust money from PO1
Memoracion, Berto showed three (3) plastic sachets of shabu in his palm and asked PO1
Memoracion to pick one. Once PO1 Memoracion took hold of the shabu, he took off his
cap,which was a signal for the rest of the buy-bust team to close in and arrest Berto, Berto
became suspicious so he attempted to flee the scene but PO1 Memoracion was able to stop
him and ordered him to empty his pockets. The other two (2) sachets of shabu were
recovered from him. Berto was later identified as appellant Virgilio Pagkalinawan
(Pagkalinawan).
The buy-bust team then brought Pagkalinawan to the Taguig City Police Station for
investigation. The confiscated sachets were then brought to the Crime Laboratory where
they where they were tested positive for the dangerous drug methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
The RTC found Pagkalinawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II, of The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002 (RA 9165).
On appeal, Pagkalinawan contended that there was no compliance with the law as to the
proper requirements for a valid buy-bust operation. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the proper requirements for a valid buy-bust operation were complied with.
Held:
Yes. Appeal Denied.
102
Ruling:
Yes, the proper requirements for a valid buy-bust operation were complied with.
To determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, the objective test must be applied. In
People vs. Doria, the Supreme Court considered the nature of the police activity involved
and the propriety of police conduct. It held that, “the inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct.”
As held in People vs. Doria, in applying the objective test, the details of the purported
transaction during a buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown such
as the initial contact between poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the
promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery
of the illegal drug subject of the sale.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment
(employment of ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker)
and not instigation (means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him) to capture Pagkalinawan in the act of selling a dangerous
drug. It was the informant who made the initial contact and was the one who introduced
PO1 Memoracion as a buyer of shabu. Pagkalinawan immediately took the buy-bust money
and showed PO1 Memoracion the sachets. PO1 Memoracion then gave the pre-arranged
signal to the other police officers to arrest Pagkalinawan.
The facts categorically show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The
police officers conduct was within the acceptable standards for the fair and honorable
administration of justice. Hence, the requirements were complied with and the buy-bust
operation was valid.
103
VICTA, CARLOS EMMANUEL ABOLA
13-2125
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 161658
November 3 2008
Facts:
- On Dec. 23 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486 prescribing rules and
regulations for mandatory drug testing as per Sec. 36(g) of RA9165.
- The testing was to be a requirement for candidates for public office in line with
the May 10 2004 national elections.
- Petitioner Pimentel, Senator of the Republic and Candidate for Re-Election assails
the constitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486.
- He claims that the requirement of a drug test imposes additional requirements for
a senatorial candidate in addition to those already provided in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution.
- Additional requirements according to Pimentel, is tantamount to COMELEC
adding Senatorial Qualifications to the Constitution.
Issue:
- Whether Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 as well as Resolution No. 6486 are
unconstitutional and void.
Rulihng:
- Yes. Any law or administrative rule that is in conflict with the constitution shall
be void.
- In the absence of a Constitutional Amendment, Congress may not make additional
or lessen the qualifications of Senatorial Candidates.
- Congress is without such power, and therefore, COMELEC is too. COMELEC
cannot validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes.
104
VILLANUEVA, VANESSA
02-1802
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS PDEA
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008
Velasco, J.;
This is a consolidated case of the following:
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 158633. November 3, 2008.
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
G.R. No. 161658. November 3, 2008.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Facts:
In these petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue. The challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine
the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in
the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
105
and regulations, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Pimentel v. COMELEC
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re election in the May 10, 2004 elections filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He
asserts that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution
No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Social Justice Society v. DDM & PDEA
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. First, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Second, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. Third, a person’s constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA
106
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and
for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue:
Whether paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the equal protection clause?
Held:
Paragraphs (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluantarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The
intrusion into the employees privacy under RA 9165 is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
The court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness"
and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
107
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined
from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
108
ADRIATICO, PAUL JULIUS. H.
16-4099
ATTY. MANUEL LASERNA, JR. VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFOREMENT AGENCY
G.R. No. 158633. November 3, 2008
Velasco, J.:
Facts:
These consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of Republic Act 9165 (RA
9165), known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. Petitioner Manuel Laserna
(Laserna) assail the requiring of mandatory random drug testing for persons charged with
a crime having an imposable penalty of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day.
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel (Pimentel) assails the fact that the law imposes an additional
qualification for a senator, hence infringes the Constitution. Petitioner Social Justice
Society (SJS) assails the mandatory random drug testing for students.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of RA 9165 are unconstitutional
Ruling:
Yes for senators and persons charged with a crime having an imposable
penalty of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day (Pimentel and Laserna petitions), and
no for students (SJS petition)
It is to be noted that the said law aims a mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing. Furthermore, the legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, those who are found
positive for use are not deemed as criminals, and may even be exempt from criminal
liability if they voluntarily submit themselves to rehabilitation.
A law cannot bend the Constitution, as such there are only five (5) requirements as
to those who are to be candidates for the senatorial position, and the imposition of the drug
testing is but an infringement of the Constitution.
On the other hand, drug testing for students is deemed to be proper for the schools
are in loco parentis, hence less rights of privacy are present for the students due to the fact
that they are subject to parental authority. The legislative intent to discourage drug use is
achieved by not announcing who are subject to drug testing ahead of time.
Finally, drug testing for persons charged with a crime having an imposable penalty
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day is deemed unconstitutional, for the intent of
suspicionless testing cannot be achieved. In a criminal prosecution, a person is named
defendant as a suspect for a crime. In this regard, the drug testing may be a cause for
criminal prosecution.
109
ALGARME, DANIELLE KYM MARIE
17-4136
MICHAEL PADUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 168546 | July 2008
Quisumbing J.
Facts:
Petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde where charged in violation of
Comprehensive Drug Act of 2002 for selling dangerous drugs before the RTC of Pasig
Branch 168. Petitioner at the time the information was files was a minor. When arraigned
petitioner assisted by his counsel de oficio entered plea of not guilty. But during the pre
trial conference in February 2004, petitioner to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter
plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted under Sec 70 of RA No. 9165. The
prosecutor did not object and therefore he was re arraigned and sentenced him to suffer
an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging he is a minor and first time
offender under PD 968 of the Probation Law of 1976. However even after Post Sentence
Investigation recommending Padua to be placed on probation public reposndent Judge
Agnes Reyes-Carpio denied the petition on the ground that a person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege pursuant to sec 24 of RA 9165. Padua’s
subsequent appeal and motion for reconsideration were denied and dismissed
respectively.
Issue:
1. Whether the or not the CA erred in dismissing his petition
2. WON Padua right under the Juvenile Justice Welfare Act (RA 9344) was
violated
3. WON sec 32 on the Rules on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law apply with
petitioners case
Held:
1. NO Since the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of
statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for probation. The law is
clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.
2. And 3. NO. Since Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344
could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found
guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child
110
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
111
ONG, ROBERTO RUIZ B.
164002
PEOPLE V. SANTOS
G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Facts:
On March 8, 2003, Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc were arrested for the possession and
sale of shabu through a buy-bust operation. Santos acted as the front where he received the
money and Catoc would distribute the substance.
They were charged with the violation of Section 5 of Article II of RA 9165 for the sale of
illegal drugs. They were both sentenced with life imprisonment and 500,000 pesos in
damages. Catoc was also given an additional charge of possession with an extra 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years imprisonment and 300,000 in damages.
They both filed a motion attesting that denying the buy-bust operation taking place which
would suggest a frame up by the arresting officers. Likewise, the RTC denied such a motion
stating that the buy-bust operation by the SDEU operatives was legitimate and regular. the
CA affirmed such judgement of the RTC. The CA noted that such inconsistencies of the
appellant’s testimonies could hardly be an evidence for a frame up and where was no ill
motive was put forth by the appellants. Hence this case where they question the arrest and
the penalties involved.
Issue: Whether the penalties imposed upon the accused are proper and appropriate?
Ruling: yes, the penalties imposed were proper and appropriate.
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In this case it was seen that all of the elements committed by the accused and was further
proven with the consistent testimonies of the arresting officers. As for the case of
possession of Catoc, It was shown that appellant knowingly carried with him the plastic
sachet of shabu without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust
operation
Sec. 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165. Limited Applicability of the Revised
Penal Code. Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of
this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty
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for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be applied. Under this article, in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser
penalty shall be applied when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word shall, the non-applicability of the
Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject to exception only in case the offender
is a minor.
In this case, it was seen that neither Santos or Catoc are minors the penalties as provided
by RA 9165 should be followed hence the penalties are indeed proper and appropriate.
113
ONG, ROBERTO RUIZ B.
164002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNARDO F. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J
FACTS:
In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas,
a.k.a. Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
on August 7, 2002 for the sale of one heat- sealed sachet containing .42 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to PO2 Damasco
The accused clamed that during the so called buy bust operation there was an absence of
any surveillance before the said arrest and that there was no actual signal used by the
poseur- buyer to the back up officers to constitute a proper buy- bust operation.
The RTC found the accused guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos which was affirmed by the CA. Hence this case.
Issue: Whether the penalties imposed upon the accused are proper and appropriate?
Held: Yes, they were proper and appropriate
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.
the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation. In this case, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior
surveillance for the reason that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person
who is peddling the dangerous drugs.
As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution. The employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of it, is not indispensable
in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. So long as the elements as
provided by section 5, article II is seen the arrest is valid
Sec. 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165. Limited Applicability of the Revised
Penal Code. Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of
this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty
for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
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The provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer apply to the provisions of the
Drugs law except when the offender is a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the
accused. Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word shall, the non-applicability
of the Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exception in case
the offender is a minor.
The courts, taking into account the circumstances attendant in the commission of the
offense, are given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and the fine
as provided for by law. The effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be meted on
appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine. Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of P500,000.00 were properly imposed on the accused-appellant.
115
MANOTOK, MA. THELMA FRANCESCA T.
17-4146
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3,
LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017
Peralta, J.;
Facts:
One (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.084 [gram] of
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, was in the possession of
petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) in violation of (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs) Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002." Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty
for violation of Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court denied Estipona's
motion, stating section 23 of R.A. No. 9165:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on pleabargaining.3
Estipona files a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether Section 23 of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, which prohibits
plea bargaining in all violations of the said law, is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
116
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
exclusive domain of the Judicial Branch and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998") was enacted, Section 2, Rule
118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea
bargaining and other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are considered
during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval." Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
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TITLE VI: Crimes against Public Morals: Immoral Doctrines and
Obscene Publications and Exhibitions
LAVIÑA, ALYSSA
16-4078
PEOPLE VS. KOTTINGER
No. 20569. October 29, 1923
Facts: Kottinger, manager of Camera Supply Co., was charged with having kept for sale in
the store of Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures, in violation of sec. 12 of
Act No. 277 (now Art. 201). These pictures were postcards of six different non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether the postcards constitute obscene publications and exhibitions.
Ruling: No. The test in determining whether something is obscene within the meaning of
the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is
that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. That pictures
which depict the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as they actually. live,
without attempted presentation of them in unusual posture or dress, are not offensive to
chastity, or foul, or filthy.
118
LEGASPI, KAYE ANN
11-1802
PEOPLE VS. APARICI
Facts: In a dimly lit stage, Virginia Aparici was “dancing with her hips swaying” with
nothing except on nylon patches over her breasts and a “too abbreviated pair of nylon
panties to interrupt her stark nakedness” and around her waist was a furry white girdle with
a middle piece punctuating attention to which she was supposed to hide.
She avers that she was performing to the lower class and to portray a widow who lost her
husband after being killed by a Japanese. However, the crowd watching were howling and
cheering to continue her performance because they were sexually aroused.
Issue: Whether or not Aparici’s dancing was indecent or immoral in violation of Art. 201
of the RPC?
Ruling: Yes. The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The test
therefore was satisfied with the crowds reaction. Her defense that the crowd was of lower
class# was not supported by any proof. Moreover, it doesn’t matter what class the crowd
belonged to. &hat is important is Aparici while performing the hula-hula dance was able
to induced or encourage the crowd to think
of immoral acts.
119
LIRIOS, LADY MAY S.
16-4032
PEOPLE VS PADAN
G.R. No. L-7295 June 28, 1957
Montemayor, J.
Facts:
• The accused exhibited immoral scenes and acts in one of the Manila nightclubs.
Moreover, the manager and ticket collector were also part of the accused for hiring
the women to perform sexual intercourse in the presence of many spectators.
•
They were charged with a violation of the RPC Article 201 in the trial court. All
pleaded not guilty. One of the accused however, changed her mind and pleaded
guilty. All were convicted. The evidence of the lewd show was confiscated.
•
The accused filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. 2 of the appellants, manager
Fajardo and ticket collector Yabut, failed to file their briefs within the period
prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by resolution of this Court of
November 25, 1955, and the decision as to them became final and executory on
January 7, 1956.
•
The defendant who pleaded guilty, Marina Padan, in her appeal did not question
her conviction; she merely urged the reduction of the penalty by eliminating the
prison sentence. The Supreme Court did not consider this because the trial court
judge reduced the fine from 600 to 200.
Issue:
Whether the acts of the accused were obscene and thereby punishable by Art 201
of the RPC?
Ruling: YES.
This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been called upon to
take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of this kind. The Supreme Court
has had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures of
women in the nude, which it condemned for obscenity and offensive to morals. In those
cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of
the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in
the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness as models in tableaux vivants.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have 110
redeeming features. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and
unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as
it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence especially on
the youth of the land. Considering the seriousness of the crime, the relatively severe penalty
imposed by the trial court is proper.
120
LOPEZ, JUNE KARLA P.
17-4067
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO AND RUDY ESTORNINOS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 159751. December 6, 2006
Quisumbing, J.;
Facts:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the
PNP CIDG conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). The police searched the premises and confiscated
twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed
pornographic.
All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to
present evidence. The trial court convicted the petitioners after finding the confiscated
materials obscene. The Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. The petitioners sought for
review in the SC on certiorari and assailed the CA decision.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioners.
Ruling: No.
Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate. One
such regulation is Article 201 of the RPC. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove
that the confiscated materials are obscene and that the offender sold, exhibited, published
or gave away such materials. There is no perfect definition of obscenity (but Miller v.
California established basic guidelines) what remains clear is that obscenity is an issue
proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judge’s sound discretion.
Mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give
them away, is not punishable under Article 201. The offense in any of the forms under
Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a
person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be
liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the
public.
In the present case, the SC found that petitioners are engaged in selling and
exhibiting obscene materials. The SC was also convinced that Fernando owned and
operated the establishment.
Hence, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial
court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as charged.
121
LOPEZ, MICHIKO S.
10-1927
FREDRIK FELIX NOGALES, ET. AL, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191080. November 21, 2011
Mendoza, J.;
Facts:
Special Investigator Garry Meñez (SI Meñez) of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Manila to authorize the search of the premises
of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize and
confiscate the articles enumerated in his application. The petitioners were alleged to possess
materials used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website, in violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Judge Tita Bughao Alisuag granted the search warrant.
The operatives of the Special Task Force of the NBI implemented the search warrant in an
in the presence of the occupants of Phil-Pacific and that the seized items were inventoried in the
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. The RTC issued an order providing SI Meñez to keep the
seized items in the NBI.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, herein petitioners, Jun Nicola, Loren Nuestra,
Fredrik Nogales and Melinda Nogales, filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized
Properties. The RTC denied the motion. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint for
violation of Article 201 of the RPC against petitioners be dismissed due to insufficiency of
evidence. The same was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Motion to Release Seized Properties manifesting that the complaint against them was dismissed,
and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of the seized properties.
The RTC granted partially the Supplemental Motion to Release Seized Properties. The
RTC retained the
Central Processing Units (CPUs) and all the rest of the softwares
containing obscene materials which were seized during the implementation of the valid Search
Warrant retained in the possession of the NBI.
Petitioners sought relief with the Court of Appeals. The CA, considering the dismissal of
the case as recommended by the City Prosecutor, required the release of the CPUs and softwares
with the condition that the hard disk be removed and destroyed. If the softwares are determined to
be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall also be destroyed. The CA explained that the seized
computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. The hard disk technically
contains them but these files are susceptible to modification; thus, can only be permanently deleted
from the storage disk. In this case, the obscene materials are stored in such a way that they can be
erased by formatting the hard disk. Nonetheless, with the advancement of technology, there are
means developed to retrieve files from a formatted hard disk, thus, the removal of the hard disk
from the CPU is the only reliable manner to permanently remove the pornographic files. With
regard to the softwares confiscated, nothing in the evidence presented by the respondents shows
that these softwares are tools or program customized just for creating obscene materials. Hence,
the CA ruled that the softwares will only be destroyed should they be unlicensed or pirated.
Disagreeing to this, petitioners moved for reconsideration to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the removal and destruction of the hard disks
containing the pornographic and obscene materials.
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Ruling: No. Considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer units contained obscene
materials or pornographic files, it is sufficient reason for destroying the hard disks of petitioners’
computer. Despite of the dismissal of criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the RPC, it cannot
be used as basis to recover the confiscated hard disks which contained obscene materials or
pornographic files. Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and
destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of Article 201 of the RPC, even if
the accused was acquitted.
The petition is denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed in that only the CPUs and
softwares determined to be licensed and used for legitimate purposes shall be returned in favor of
the petitioners. The hard disk drives containing the pornographic materials and the unlicensed
softwares used in any way in violation of Article 201 of the RPC shall be destroyed.
123