I.CRIMINAL LAW: INTRODUCTION
A. DEFINITION
Criminal law is that branch of municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their
nature and provides for their punishment. It is that branch of public substantive law
which defines offenses and prescribes their penalties. It is substantive because it
defines the state’s right to inflict punishment and the liability of the offenders. It is a
public law because it deals with the relation of the individual with the state.
B. STATE AUTHORITY TO PUNISH CRIMES
1. Sources of State Authority
a. Constitution
i.
Section 5, Art. 2, 1987 Constitution
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
ii.
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 1, Art. 6, 1987 Constitution
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
b. Revised Penal Code (RPC)
c. Special Criminal Laws
d. Penal Provisions in Other Laws
e. Local Ordinances
f. Jurisprudence
2. Limitations to State Authority
a. Due Process and Equal Protection – Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535
Facts
The accused, a Japanese spy, guided the Japanese military police to the
houses of Martin Mateo and Fermin Javier. The Japanese soldier then
broke into the said houses and seized Martin Mateo, Ladulao Mateo and
Fermin Javier. They were sent to Fort Santiago where they were tortured
and released 6 days later.
Contention of the state: the accused is guilty of treason
Contention of the accused: they cannot be convicted of the crime of treason
because it is a settled principle of international law that once the territory is
occupied by an enemy, the allegiance is a legal obligation distinguishable
by the inhabitants therein, the government is temporarily suspended. The
people’s court violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
laws.
Ruling:
The people’s court was not meant to last forever and so that all cases
within 6 months and where deemed enough to occupy the attention of the
people’s court within its limited to life should be cognizable by it and the rest
should be instilled in the people’s court doesn’t violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of laws and due process because the
constitution does not present a state from adjusting its legislative to
difference in situations and making a distinction in its legislation provided
that the distinction has reasonable foundation on national basis and is not
purely and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
b. Freedom of Expression – Section 4, Article III, Constitution - a.
No law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
Barnes vs. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
Facts
An Indiana statute made it a misdemeanor to appear in a public place in a
state of nudity within a statutory definition of nudity, such as the female
genitalia, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering part
of the nipple. Two entertainment establishments in south bend Indiana
wished to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment, which brought suit
in the US courts for the northern district of Indiana against the city of South
Bend.
Contention of the state: the prohibition against nude dancing or
entertainment did violate the constitution; first amendment of freedom of
expression.
Contention of the accused: the statute prohibition violated the freedom of
expression, first amendment.
Ruling
The prohibition of nude dancing or entertainment does not violate the first
amendment because the statute was a general law regulating conduct and
was specifically directed at expression.
c. Freedom of Religion – Section 5, Article III, Constitution –
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
1. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon vs.
Smith 494 U.S. 872
Facts
Two Native Americans were fired by a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they used drugs for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of their Native American church. Their application for
employment compensation was denied by the state of Oregon due to a
state law disqualifying employees discharge for work related to misconduct.
The two Native American filed a complaint in court to determine if their right
was violated, in case of the free exercise of religion.
Contention of the state: there was no violation of freedom of religion
Contention of the accused: there was a violation of freedom of religion
Ruling
Religious belief of individual does not excuse him from compliance
with a valid law. An individual does not excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the government is free to
regulate allowing exemptions to every state law on regulation affecting
religion would lead to confusion and chaos.
2. Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1
Facts
Complainant Alejandro Estrada is a concerned citizen who wrote a
request to Judge Jose Caoibes to investigate rumors surrounding court
interpreter, Soledad Escritor, who allegedly has been living with a man who
is not her husband. They purportedly have a child of eighteen to twenty
years old. Though unrelated to both respondent and her spouse,
complainant assails that he believes that she is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her
act.
Respondent Escritor started working in the judiciary one year after
following the death of her husband. In truth, respondent has been living with
a certain Luciano Qualipo for twenty years without the benefit of marriage
and they have a son. However, she avers that their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs as she and Luciano are devoted
members of Jehovah’s Witness. As a matter of fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness,” insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Contention of the state: it gives rise to the confusion of the separation of
state and church.
Contention of the accused: she was not violating any law; her relationship
with Qualipo was approved by the elders of Jehovah witnesses.
Ruling
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious
liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. The
Court distinguishes between religious practices, including the seemingly
bizarre, which may not be regulated, and unacceptable religious conduct
which should be prevented despite claims that it forms part of religious
freedom.
A clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public
morals, is a ground for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession. In addition to the destruction of public
morals, the substantive evil in this case is the tearing down of morality,
good order, and discipline in the judiciary. Jurisprudence on immoral
conduct of employees in the civil service has been consistent. There is
nothing in this case that warrants a departure from precedents. The court
cannot sanction or encourage illicit or adulterous relations among
government employees.
The court held that exemptions granted under our Muslim Laws to
legitimate followers of Islam do not apply to them. The Court has no
legislative power to place Jehovah’s Witness in the same legal category as
Muslims.
d. Section 14 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
e. Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
f.
Section 18 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution –
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
g. Section 18 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
h. No excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment – Sec. 19, Par.
(1), Article III, Constitution
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
Perpetua.
i.
Section 19 (2) Article III, 1987 Constitution
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906
Facts
The accused was found guilty and was sentenced to a 5 year
imprisonment and a fine of P5,000.00 plus costs for violating EO 331 of RA
509.
Contention of the state: violation of RA 509 justifies the ruling of the lower
court on the matter at hand.
Contention of the accused: there should be modification of the ruling as
provided in the provision of Section 19, Article 3 pertaining to no excessive
fines nor cruel degrading or inhuman punishment.
Held
Judgment was modified. They reduced the penalty to 6 months
imprisonment and that the fines to be paid for the reason that SC can
exercise such considering also the right of the accused.
People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682
Facts
Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape for raping the 10
year old daughter of his common spouse with death penalty.
Contention of the state: the crimes punishable by death under RA 1659 are
heinous crimes for being grave and hateful offenses and which by reason of
their inherent and manifest wickedness and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just civilized and ordered society.
Contention of the accused: the accused argues that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,
violation of our international treaty obligation, being an undue delegation of
legislative power and being discriminatory.
Held
The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental
motion for reconsideration with a finding that congress duly complied with
requirements for the reimposition of death penalty and therefore the death
penalty law is not unconstitutional.
j.
Hayden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741
Section 20, Article III, 1987 Constitution
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
k. Bill of Attainder – Section 22, Article III, Constitution
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
a. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
Facts
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co
in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act.
He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the government of the Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that the AntiSubversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five
others were also charged in the same court with subversion. Tayag copied
Co’s attack on the law. The court ruled the statute void on the grounds that
it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed
to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.
Contention of the state: the court holds the validity of the anti-subversion
act of 1957
Contention of the accused: it is the bill of attainder because it has expressly
created the presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can
never hope to be overthrown even if the only issue is whether or not the
accused is a knowing and voluntary member.
Held
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused
under the act. The SC set aside the resolution of the trial court and leaves
this matter to future determination and government is still proving such
circumstances.
l.
Ex post facto law – Section 22, Article III, Constitution
a. U.S. vs. Diaz-Conde, 42 Phil. 766
Facts
Complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered
into a contract with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros
and co. were obligated to pay five percent interest per month within the
first ten days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and
Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty,
sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law. They
took it to SC to plead.
Contention of the state: the defendants violated the Act 2655 and they
were not guilty on the court of first instance. Bartolome Oliveros and
Engracia Liancoborrowed p300 and had to pay 50% interest monthly.
Contention of the accused: the contract upon the alleged interest
collected was executed before act 2655,when the contract was made
there was no usury law and act 2655could have no retroactive effect.
Held
The SC decided that the acts complained of by the defender did
not constitute a crime at the time they were committed and therefore the
sentence of the lower court should be revoked and that the complaint
be dismissed and the defendants be discharged from the custody of the
law.
m. Rule 115, Rules on Civil Procedure
Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused
may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set
forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for
purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause
at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be
present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed
to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody
over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses
and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)
n. Article 2, New Civil Code
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
o. Pesigan vs. Angeles (129 SCRA 174)
Facts
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982
twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their
destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate
from the provincial veterinarian,2) permit to transfer/transport from the
provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the
papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the
town’s police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte.
Confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of
carabaos & carabeef from one province to another.
Issues: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the
government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated
October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on
June 14, 1982.
Held
No. The said order isn’t enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because it’s a penal regulation published more than 2mos. later in the OG. It
became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & §11
of the Revised Administrative Code. The word “laws” in article 2 includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
appraise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638requires
that all Presidential EOs having general applicability should be published in the
OG. It provides that “every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty
shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a
violation of EO No.626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or
sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for
the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasn’t in order. The
recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they
cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the
said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda &
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the
carabaos.
p. Tanada vs. Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)
Facts
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding
the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court
ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a
comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was
a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the
clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that
the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication
when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement
for the effectively of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs,etc. where laws
themselves provide for their own effectively dates.
Held
Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern &
corollary access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be before the citizens subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law (§6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to
be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectively does not
preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative
acts. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
q. Article V, Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel
with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under
the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the
Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the
laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not
under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an
offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following
rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases
provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the
United States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or
offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official
duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular
case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities
will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular
importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States
authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the
United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises
out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the
commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This
certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine
authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military
authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate,
United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against
offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of
the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each
other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines
and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States
personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities
of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject to
Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly
notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall,
upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its
position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United
States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial
proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not
include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include
any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange
for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine
authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance
of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure
and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and
are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted
or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the
same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall
prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel
for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which
constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or
prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural
safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United
States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made
against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the
same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States
authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings.
These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with
Philippine law, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine
and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
military or religious courts.
C. PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Identify Wrongful Behavior –
Defines with crimes under the Philippine law has been committed
2. Prescribe Punishment
It provides the punishment or penalties for the crime committed
De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City, 417 SCRA 636
Facts
The petitioner was charged and convicted separately with violation of BP
22 before the MTC of Batangas. After 5 years, petitioner was arrested while
applying for NBI clearance. She was detained at Batangas city jail. She filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court after her motion to
MTC was denied.
Contention of the state: judgment of conviction against the petitioner had long
attained finality and could no longer be modified.
Contention of the accused: her detention was illegal. SC administrative circular
12-2000 deleted the imprisonment of violation of BP 22 and allows only the
imposition of fines.
Held
SC administrative circular 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence Article 22 of
RPC is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as to
the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
a. Retribution
- Exact justice for the victims’ family, intended to punish bad conduct in the
past. Penalty should communicate with the act.
b. Prevention
i.
Deterrence
Specific- exist to affect behavior of individual
General- relies on cost benefit analysis to stop people from committing
crimes. Most effective in deterring well planned crimes. It includes
ii.
iii.
evaluation of social stigma and it requires the public to be educated
Incapacitation - cannot stop individual in committing crimes
Rehabilitation - it modifies the undesirable behavior of an individual
D. CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
1. Liberality in Favor of the Accused
People vs. Gatchalian (104 Phil. 664)
Facts
On August 4, 1951 to December 31, 1953, Alfonso Gatchalian, owner of
New Life Drugstore in Zamboanga City, employed Expedito Fernandez as
sales man, did then and there willfully and feloniously, pays and cause to be
paid in his employees a monthly salary of P60-P90which is less than that
provided by law. The appellee was charged before the court of the first instance
with a violation of section 3 of RA 602.
Contention of the state: the city atty. Of Zamboanga filed his answer to the
motion to dismiss contending that the law which was violated by the accused
that carries with it both civil and criminal liability the latter being covered by
section 5 which provide for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the
provisions of the minimum wage law.
Contention of the accused: the accused pleaded guilty. His counsel filed a
written motion to dismiss based on two grounds; that the violation charged
does not constitute a crime offense but carries only civil liability and even if it
does this section because of the alleged to have been violated does not carry
any penalty penalizing it.
Held:
According to the court of first instance of Zamboanga , sustained the view
that section 5 is not applicable to violations of section 3 of the minimum wage
law. We have the well settled principle in the interpretation of penal laws that in
case of doubt, he interpretation available to the accused is adopted.
People vs. Sultan, 331 SCRA 216
The victim was abducted by the appellant, who brought her to his house. When they
arrived at
the appellant’s house the victim was divested of her jewelry and other valuables,
after which she
was raped several times. The appellant was convicted of the special complex crime
of robbery
with homicide. Whether multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
HELD:
No. In several cases the Court realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s
or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It
further observed
that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is
exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating
circumstances
where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the
legislature.
Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s
or homicide/s
may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of
the offender
as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute. Under
this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an
aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "(i)n all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither
mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be
applied," the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accusedappellant.
2. Retroactive Application if Favorable to the Accused
People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611, 616-620 and 630-631
Facts: On 7 June 1977, Eleno Maquiling was shot while at the yard
of their house. Esmenia, the victim’s mother, and Dionisio, the
victim’s brother, saw Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio running
down the hill away from the bamboo groves. The lower court decided
that the accused are guilty of murder, imposing upon each them the
capital penalty of death, damages and costs.
Issue: WON there was a conspiracy between the accused in killing
Maquiling.
Held: Yes. Judgment AFFIRMED. But under the 1987 Constitution, in
view of the abolition of capital punishment, the applicable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The evidence of the prosecution is more than
adequate to sustain the finding of conspiracy between the two
accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show
who was between the two who actually pulled the trigger that
consequently killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since
any act of a co-conspirator become the act of the other regardless of
the precise degree of participation in the act.
Also, there was presence of treachery, because of the
circumstances that the crime was done at night time and that the
accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is
also an aggravating circumstance (the accused had planned to kill the victims
some days before).
Go vs. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451
Facts: The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando Dimagiba
issued to petitioner Susan Go 13 checks which, when presented to the drawee
bank for encashment or payment on the due dates were dishonoured for the
reason “account closed”. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts
of violation of BP 22 under separate complaints filed with the Municipal Trial
Courts in the cities in Baguio City.
Ruling: Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an
order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and
requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the
civil aspect of the decision of the MTC was not touched upon. A subsequent
order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus was issued on October 11, 2001.
3. Equipoise Doctrine
People vs. Dindo, 349 SCRA 492
Facts: On July 26, 1996, the accused, with 3 unknown persons, shot Crestita
Lao which caused the death of the latter.
Ruling: In the absence of any evidence that accused-appellant conspired with
the assailants, conspiracy cannot be attributed against him for, in criminal
cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with the
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, with
evidence which stands or falss on its merits, and which cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Unless it
discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt , the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. Thus, when the
guilt of the accused has not been proven with the moral certainty, such as the
case at bar, it is the policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence
of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of
right.
People vs. Sayana, 405 SCRA 451
Facts: The accused raped an 11 year old girl, Cheska Angelika de Dios.
Ruling: The lone uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is sufficient to
warrant a conviction provided that such is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. However, the
said requisites were not satisfied by the victim’s testimonies, and that it seems
that the victim’s relatives has a motive for filing charges against the
complainant.
4. Void for Vagueness or Over breadth (Doctrine of Pro Reo)
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 394, 426-445
Facts
During the period from June 1998 to January 2001, Joseph
Estrada unlawfully and criminally amass and accumulate indirectly or
directly, ill gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,163.17,
unjustly enriching himself at the expense damage of people of the
Philippines, any or combination or a series or overt or criminal acts,
similar schemes or means.
Contention of the accused: plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum
prohibition and thus, Estrada should not be punished for the crime of
plunder as one since the accumulation of his ill-gotten wealth was done
in a series of acts, he should be punished for one act not including the
other with no criminal intent.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because it is a heinous offense. For
when the acts are inherently immoral or wrong, they are mala in se and
it does not matter that such acts are punished under special laws
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mala in
se.
II.
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
A. GENERALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Section 11, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
2. Article 14, New Civil Code of the Philippines
Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
3. Republic Act 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER
OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a
diplomatic, consular, or any other official of a foreign government duly accredited
as such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud
such foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in
such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person
or from said foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or from any
officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be fined
not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, who
shall act in the Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government
without prior notification to, and registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction
of the Republic, wear any naval, military, police, or other official uniform,
decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or government with which the
Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so
nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing
thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon conviction,
be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of
the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of
any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as
such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are
distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom
the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every
officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two
hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where
the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the
Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a public minister,
and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such
service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person against
whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public
minister, unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon receipt
thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have
resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take
copies without fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other
manner offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in
violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years, and
fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to
the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the
country of the diplomatic or consular representative adversely affected has
provided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular
representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or similar
penalties for like or similar offenses herein contained.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4. Article V, VFA
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law
of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of
the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the
laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense
relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules
shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in
paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United
States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses
solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will,
upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction
except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of
the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20)
days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises out
of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will
issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2)
of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States
military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine
authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary
or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government
of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall
notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other
of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in
the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of
the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject to Philippine
primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United
States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities,
if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one
year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period
will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities
to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities
shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into
offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in
the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases,
the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are
serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United
States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for
which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel
shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made
against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same
basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States
authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These
proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law,
excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and
United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military
or religious courts.
5. US vs. Sweet (1 Phil. 18)
Facts
Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense
against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now
contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was “acting in the
line of duty”.
Issues:
1.WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of
war is not an offence under the penal code?
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
Held
Judgment thereby affirmed “An offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face,
where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Civil Government.” Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission,
the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more
than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100may be imposed.
Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the
Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the
accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because
he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty. Yes. Though assault
by military officer against a POW isn’t in the RPC, physical assault charges may be
pressed under the RPC. No. The application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055).Appellant claims that the act
was service connected. If this were true, it may be used as a defense but this
cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.”
6. Schneckenburger vs. Moran (63 Phil. 249)
Facts
Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, was
subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private
document. He objected to this saying that under the US and Philippine
Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his objection was
overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended
that original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred
exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Issues:
1.WONthe US SC has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et. Al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Philippines.
2.WON original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines
Held
Has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be
denied. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A
consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where here sides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on
November 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and
effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It also provides that the
original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls’ et.al.” “The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdictions
may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.” According to Section 17 of Act Number
136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFI’s. As a
result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The original jurisdiction conferred to SC by the
Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
7. Liang vs. People (232 SCRA 652)
Facts
Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the Metropolitan TC of
Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her fellow
worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MTC judge then received an office of
protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs, stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the agreement between ADB
and the government. MTC judge, without notice, dismissed the two criminal cases.
Prosecution filed writ of mandamus & certiorari and ordered the MTC to enforce
the warrant of arrest.
Issues: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
Held
He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is part of the
performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity. That a
person is covered by immunity is preliminary. Due process is right of the accused
as much as the prosecution. Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in
the name of official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations,
commission of a crime is not part of official duty. On the contention that there was
no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation isn’t a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MTC such as the one
at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within in the jurisdiction of the
MTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesn’t affect the court’s
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
B. PROSPECTIVITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Articles 21 and 22, RPC
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.chanrobles virtual law library.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
2. Article 4, New Civil Code - Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
3. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons (37 SCRA 420)
Facts
Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion
perpetual for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the
first two petitioners’ was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955.
The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan.12,
1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by
virtue of their convictions. They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v.
Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed
down until after their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the
SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their
conviction shave become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum
penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and
thus, his continued detention is illegal.
Issue: WON Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment are proactive effect
is
applicable
in
this
case
(WON
judicial
decisions
favorable
to
the
accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied retroactively.
Held
Yes. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively.
Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual criminal.
CC also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to
equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same
offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the
only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable
decision.
4. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami (35 SCRA 429)
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit
corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process
rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law
Issues:
1.WON it violates three rights? No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral
process and equal protection of laws.2.WON it is an ex post facto law? No. Ex post
facto law defined: a. makes criminal an act done before law was passed and
punishes act innocent when done. b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it
was c. inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committed alters
legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different tests e.
assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was lawful f. deprives a person accused of a
crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.
Held
Petition denied. Constitutional act, Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal
laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law.
5. People vs. Ringor (320 SCRA 342)
Facts
The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering People’s
Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the
victim was sitting, pulled his hair, & poked a knife at the latter’s throat. After, leaving
the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the
restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind & shot him 6 times
successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his possession
was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out that
Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder & that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put
up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful aggression. He was found
guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found
guilty of a separate charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence
of 17 to 20 yrs.
Issues
1. WON the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in1997: crime occurred in
1994) is applicable. No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an
unlicensed firearm was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to
homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase his penalty from reclusion perpetual
to death. Hence, RA 8294cannot retroact as it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it
becomes an ex post facto law.
2.WON RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years. Yes. In
cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866. It is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance,
no longer as a separate offence. According to theA22 of RPC, retroactivity of the
law must be applied if it is favorable to the accused. Thus, insofar as it spares
accused-appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, RA 8294
has to be given retroactive application.
3.WON trial court erred in convicting accused of murder. No. For self-defense to
prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said aggression,
and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case,
defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim
approached him with a bolo was inconsistent to the witness’ statement of the victim
being in a prone position in the table. This does not constitute the requisite
quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the first requirement missing, the
last two requisites have no basis.
4.WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for murder which wasn’t
proven & that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate
penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetual due to the absence of an aggravating
circumstance.Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a
crime of murder as described by A248 RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion Perpetua
has to be imposed in according to A63(2) RPC.
6. People vs. Lacson (G.R. No. 149453, October 7, 2003)
C. TERRITORIALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW
1. Article 2, RPC
Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only
within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; chan
robles virtual law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
2. Article 1, 1987 Constitution
NATIONAL TERRITORY -The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
3. Article V, VFA
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law
of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of
the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the
laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense
relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules
shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in
paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United
States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses
solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will,
upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction
except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the Government of
the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20)
days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States personnel arises out
of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will
issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2)
of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the
circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States
military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine
authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary
or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government
of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall
notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other
of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in
the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of
the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject to Philippine
primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United
States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities,
if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one
year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period
will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities
to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities
shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into
offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in
the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases,
the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are
serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United
States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an offense for
which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel
shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made
against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same
basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States
authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These
proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law,
excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and
United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military
or religious courts.
4. US vs. Ah Sing (36 Phil. 978)
Facts
The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The
steamship is a foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917,
after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought 8 cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship and had them in his
possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the
port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium hidden
in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer’s engine. The defendant confessed
that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did
not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it
was his intention to import the prohibited drug.
Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has
been proven?
Held
Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug
discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on
board. In this case, it is to be noted that §4 of Act No. 2381 begins, “Any person
who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands…” Import and bring should be construed as synonymous terms. The mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse,
but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before
the entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely,
judging from the size of the amount brought.
5. People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
Facts
Wong Cheng smoked opium while aboard merchant vessel
Changsa , anchored in Manila Bay 2.5 miles from shore.
Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships in its territory?
Held
Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce pernicious effects, which
is against public order. It is also an act of defiance of authority.
6. US vs. Look Chow, 18 Phil. 573
Facts: Mrs. Jacks and Milliron found sacks of contraband substance opium on
steamshipErrol on 18 August 1910 in, around 11-12 am. 3 sacks were found
containing 49, 80 packs, (4) packs each; total = 129 packs to be sold, 4 for
personal consumption. The 129 were supposedly going to be sold in Mexico and
Vera Cruz.
Issue: Was Look Chaw accountable, as he didn‘t bring down the opium from the
ship and did not intend to sell within Philippines
Held: Yes; investigation showed that he did sell to a secret service agent while in
the port.
7. Miquiabas vs. Commanding General (80 Phil. 267)
Facts
Miquiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian employee of the US army in the
Philippines who had been charged of disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things
belonging to the US army in violation of the 94th article of War of the US. He was
arrested and a General Court-Martial was appointed. He was found guilty. As a
rule, the Philippines being a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over all offenses
committed within its territory but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the
US shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within said portions
of territory.
Issues:
1.
WON the offense has been committed within a US base thus giving the
US jurisdiction over the case. No. The Port of Manila Area where the
offense was committed is not w/in a US base for it is not names in Annex A
or B of AXXVI of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) & is merely part of
the temporary quarters located w/in presented limits of the city of Manila.
Moreover, extended installations & temporary quarters aren’t considered
to have the same jurisdictional capacity as permanent bases & are
governed by AXIII pars. 2 & 4. The offence at bar, therefore is in the
2.
beyond the jurisdiction of military courts.
WON the offender is a member of the US armed forces. No. Under the
MBA, a civilian employee is not considered as a member of the US armed
forces. Even under the articles of war, the mere fact that a civilian
employee is in the service of the US Army does not make him a member
of the armed forces.
8. Extraterritorial Application
a. Article 2, RPC
Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code on crime committed on
board Philippine ship or airship refers only to a situation where the Philippine
ship or airship is not within the territorial waters or atmosphere of a foreign
country. Otherwise, it is the foreign country’s criminal law that will apply.
However, there are two situations where the foreign country may not apply its
criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel within its
territorial waters and these are:
(1)
When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign country,
because war vessels are part of the sovereignty of the country to whose naval
force they belong;
(2)
When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was
committed adopts the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels,
except when the crime committed affects the national security or public order of
such foreign country.
b. Forgery: Articles 163, 166 and 169, RPC
Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins. — Any person who
makes, imports, or utters, false coins, in connivance with counterfeiters, or
importers, shall suffer:
1. Prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not to exceed
P10,000 pesos, if the counterfeited coin be silver coin of the Philippines or coin
of the Central Bank of the Philippines of ten centavo denomination or above.
2. Prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not to
exceed P2,000 pesos, if the counterfeited coins be any of the minor coinage of
the Philippines or of the Central Bank of the Philippines below ten-centavo
denomination.
3. Prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P1,000
pesos, if the counterfeited coin be currency of a foreign country.
Art. 166.Forging treasury or bank notes on other documents payable to bearer;
importing, and uttering such false or forged notes and documents. — The
forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or other
obligations and securities payable to bearer and the importation and uttering in
connivance with forgers or importers of such false or forged obligations or
notes, shall be punished as follows:
1.
By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
P10,000 pesos, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or
altered, is an obligations or security of the United States or of the Philippines
Islands.
2.
The word "obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands" shall be held to mean all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national
bank notes, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for
money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United States or of the
Philippine
Islands,
and
other
representatives
of
value,
of
whatever
denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of the
Congress of the United States or of the Philippine Legislature.
3.
By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos, if the falsified or altered document is a circulating note issued by any
banking association duly authorized by law to issue the same.
4.
By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos, if the falsified or counterfeited document was issued by a foreign
government.
5.
By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P2,000
pesos, when the forged or altered document is a circulating note or bill issued
by a foreign bank duly authorized therefore.
Art. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section
may be committed by any of the following means:
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument, payable to bearer or
order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures,
letters, words or signs contained therein.
c. Public Officers: Articles 171, 210-213, 216-221, RPC
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them; 4. Making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall
commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
Art. 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than
the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in
addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same
shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall
suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act
shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of
prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the
value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public
officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of
not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of
such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit
shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable
to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any
other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be
imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given
the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.
Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing
supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts
relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement with any
interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the
Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts
shall be guilty or any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly, or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or
larger than those authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of
money collected by him officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or
otherwise things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law.
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or
the Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be
applied.
Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. — The penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon a public officer who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provisions is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants
who, in like manner, shall take part in any contract or transaction connected
with the estate or property in appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which
they shall have acted, and to the guardians and executors with respect to the
property belonging to their wards or estate.
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
— Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable
for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but
is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twentytwo thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer,
whether in the service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other
cause, who is required by law or regulation to render account to the Insular
Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both.
Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country. — Any public officer who unlawfully leaves or attempts to
leave the Philippine Islands without securing a certificate from the Insular
Auditor showing that his accounts have been finally settled, shall be punished
by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos or both.
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall
apply any public fund or property under his administration to any public use
other than for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or
ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason
of such misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to
the public service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of
temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty
shall be a fine from 5 to 50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. — Any public
officer under obligation to make payment from Government funds in his
possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent
authority to deliver any property in his custody or under his administration, shall
refuse to make such delivery. The fine shall be graduated in such case by the
value of the thing, provided that it shall not less than 50 pesos.
d. National Security: 114-122, RPC
e. RA 9372
III.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FELONIES AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. DEFINITION OF FELONY – ART.3
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Felony
A crime under the Revised Penal Code is referred to as a felony. Do not use this term
in reference to a violation of special law.
Offense
A crimes punished under a special law is called as statutory offense.
Misdemeanor
A minor infraction of the law, such as a violation of an ordinance, is referred to as a
misdemeanor.
Crime
Whether the wrongdoing is punished under the Revised Penal Code or under a special
law, the generic word crime can be used.
HOW A FELONY MAY ARISE
The term felony is limited only to violations of the Revised Penal Code. When the
crime is punishable under a special law you do not refer to this as a felony. So
whenever you encounter the term felony, it is to be understood as referring to crimes
under the Revised Penal Code
.
This is important because there are certain provisions in the Revised Penal Code
where the term “felony” is used, which means that the provision is not extended to
crimes under special laws.
A specific instance is found in Article 160 – Quasi-
Recidivism, which reads:
A person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished under
the maximum period of the penalty.
Note that the word "felony" is used.
Dolo or culpa
However, It does not mean that if an act or omission is punished under the Revised
Penal Code, a felony is already committed. To be considered a felony, it must also be
done with dolo or culpa.
Under Article 3, there is dolo when there is deceit. This is no longer true. At the time
the Revised Penal Code was codified, the term nearest to dolo was deceit. However,
deceit means fraud, and this is not the meaning of dolo.
Dolo is deliberate intent otherwise referred to as criminal intent, and must be coupled
with freedom of action and intelligence on the part of the offender as to the act done by
him.
The term, therefore, has three requisites on the part of the offender:
(1)
Criminal intent;
(2)
Freedom of action; and
(3)
Intelligence.
If any of these is absent, there is no dolo. If there is no dolo, there could be no
intentional felony.
B. ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY – ART. 3
1. Physical Element (Actus Reus)
a. Act
•
An act refers to any kind of body movement that produces change in the
outside world.
•
Any body movement tending to produce an effect must be overt or
external
Powell vs. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 1254
Facts
Powell was arrested and charged with being found in a state on
intoxication in a public place, in violation of Texas Penal Code, Article 477
which says, “Whoever shall get drunk or found in a state of intoxication in any
public place, or at any private house expect his own shall be fined not
exceeding 100USD.
Contention of the state: chronic intoxication was not a defense to be charged.
The appellant has no defense because he is legally sane and know the
difference between right and wrong.
Contention of the accused: he was afflicted with the disease of chronic
alcoholism that his appearance in public while drunk is not in violation and
therefore to punish him criminally for that conduct would be cruel and unusual,
in violation of the 8th and 14th amendments of the US constitution.
Held
Ruled as a matter of law that chronic alcoholism was not a defense to the
charge. The court found that Powell was guilty and fined him.
Concurring opinion of Justice Black
Criminal law serves to punish a person who, in fact, committed prescribed
act, without regard to whether his action was compelled by some irresponsible
aspect of his personality. The punishment can be clearly justified in term of
deterrence, isolation and treatment.
b. Omission
•
In action, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to do.
There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act.
•
Must be punishable by law.
a. Articles 4, 116, 137, 208, 223, 234 and 275 (2), RPC
• Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to (the
United States) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a
foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals
or does not disclose and make known the same, as soon as possible to the
governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which
he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the
crime of treason.
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or
employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their
power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the
control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be
imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of
the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution
for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission
of offenses.
Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any public officer who
shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be
punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final
judgment to any penalty.ch
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but
only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance.
Art. 232. Disobedience to order of superior officers, when said order was
suspended by inferior officer. — Any public officer who, having for any
reason suspended the execution of the orders of his superiors, shall
disobey such superiors after the latter have disapproved the suspension,
shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and perpetual special disqualification.
Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own
victim. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall
find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission
shall constitute a more serious offense.ch
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he
has accidentally wounded or injured.
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of
age, shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall
fail to take him to a safe place.
b. PD 953 and 1153
• PD 953- requiring the planting of trees in certain places and penalizing
unauthorized cutting, destruction, damaging, and injuring of certain trees,
plants and vegetation.
• PD 1153- requiring the planting of one tree every month for 5 consecutive
years by every citizen of the Philippines.
1. People vs. Sylvestre, 56 Phil. 353
Facts
While Nicolas Dela cruz and his wife, Antonia de la cruz, were
gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin
Atienza told the couple to take their furniture out the house because he
is going to set it on fire. Upon asked why, he answered that it was the
only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he
said, had instigated the charge of adultery against his co-defendant
Sylvestre. No one dare to say anything because he was armed with a
pistol, not even Romana Sylvestre. Alarmed of what Atienza said, the
couple left the house to communicate with the barrio lieutenants, but
they had hardly gone a hundred arm’s length, turned back and saw their
house on fire. The fire destroyed 28 other houses.
Contention of the state: Romana Sylvestre is an accomplice because
she cooperated.
Contention of the accused: Romana’s mere presence and silence while
they simultaneously act do not constitute cooperation fir it does not
appear that she encouraged or nerved Atienza to commit the crime of
arson and as for her failure to give alarm that being a subsequent act it
does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Held
Mere passive presence at the scene of another crime, mere
silence and failure to give alarm without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy is not punishable. Only omissions in the revised penal code
are punishable.
2. People vs. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19
Facts
Bernardo Bagabog was murdered in his own house by Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras, Bides, and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife (whome
cannot be charged of parricide because no certificate or proof of marriage
could could be presented by the prosecution).
Contention of the state: the worn statement of a 13 year old Corazon was
true. She knew the accused because they live nearby their place. Besides
the accused-appellants testimonies are indefensible and futile. Moreover
her claimed that she had no suspect in mind during the investigation in their
house although she was in conspiracy with the other.
Contention of the accused: there’s no law which punishes someone by
saying you can call for help and I will kill you.
Held
In these premise, the crime committed by the appellant, that is
murder, qualified by treachery and attended by aggravating circumstances,
the court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the
capital penalty. Teresa was found guilty as an accessory to the same
murder by concealing the escape of the principal in the scene, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 5 years prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum with
accessory penalty of the law.
2. Mental Element (Mens Rea)
Mens rea
The technical term mens rea is sometimes referred to in common parlance as the
gravamen of the offense. To a layman, that is what you call the “bullseye” of the
crime. This term is used synonymously with criminal or deliberate intent, but that is
not exactly correct.
Mens rea of the crime depends upon the elements of the crime. You can only
detect the mens rea of a crime by knowing the particular crime committed. Without
reference to a particular crime, this term is meaningless. For example, in theft, the
mens rea is the taking of the property of another with intent to gain. In falsification,
the mens rea is the effecting of the forgery with intent to pervert the truth. It is not
merely writing something that is not true; the intent to pervert the truth must follow
the performance of the act.
In criminal law, we sometimes have to consider the crime on the basis of intent.
For example, attempted or frustrated homicide is distinguished from physical
injuries only by the intent to kill. Attempted rape is distinguished from acts of
lasciviousness by the intent to have sexual intercourse. In robbery, the mens rea is
the taking of the property of another coupled with the employment of intimidation or
violence upon persons or things; remove the employment of force or intimidation
and it is not robbery anymore.
a. Deliberate Intent (Dolo)
Deliberate Intent is not deceit. Do not use deceit in translating dolo, because
the nearest translation is deliberate intent.
i.
Elements
• Freedom- voluntariness on the part of a person it commit an act or
omission.
• Intelligence-the capacity to know and understand the consequence of the
ii.
act.
• Intent- the purpose to use a particular means to achieve an objective.
General and Specific Intent
i. In criminal law, intent is categorized into two:
(1)
General criminal intent; and
(2)
Specific criminal intent.
General intent is presumed from the mere doing of a wrong act. This does
not require proof. The burden is upon the wrong doer to prove that he
acted without such criminal intent.
Specific intent is not presumed because it is an ingredient or element of a
crime, like intent to kill in the crimes of attempted or frustrated
homicide/parricide/murder. The prosecution has the burden of proving the
same.
Distinction between intent and discernment
Intent is the determination to do a certain thing, an aim or purpose of the
mind. It is the design to resolve or determination by which a person acts.
On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to tell right from
wrong. It relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to his act
and relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo, distinct from intent.
Distinction between negligence and imprudence
(1)
In negligence, there is deficiency of action;
(2)
in imprudence, there is deficiency of perception.
a. People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85
Facts
8 Sep. 1970 – around 2pm Ernesto Puno entered the bedroom of
72 y.o. Francisca Col also known as Aling Kikay, in Little Bagio, barrio
Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling Kikay was on the bed, when Puno
entered & insulted her by saying “Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang,
mayroon kang bubuyog.” Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck
her on the head several times with a hammer until she was dead. The
assault was witnessed by Hilaria dela Cruz who was present in the
room during the attack, and by Lina Pajes, a tenant in the next room.
After killing the old lady Puno went into the next room, where the girls
had taken refuge & made the following confession & threat “Huag
kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin nunyo na umalis
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda.”
Or according to Lina “pinatay ko na ang iyong matanda. Huag kayong
tumawag
ng
pulis.
Pag
tumawag
kayo
ng
pulis,
kayo
ang
pahihigantihan ko.” After Puno left, Lina called the police. Puno fled to
his parents’ house then later on to his second cousin, Teotimo’s house.
10 Sep. 1970 – Puno’s father surrendered him to the police. He was
brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal. He was
charged with murder in the municipal court.
Puno’s wife, his sister in law and his 2nd cousin all testified in
court describing his appearance [bloodshot eyes] and his behavior
immediately before and after them murder, [boxing the dog, having an
imaginary bumble bee flying around him, singing, etc..]
The defense presented 3 doctors to prove insanity but the doctors
instead proved that Puno had acted with discernment when he killed
Aling Kikay.
Dr. Araceli Maravilla of Dr. Jose Reyes Memorial hospital said
Puno was an outpatient who could very well live with society even if he
was afflicted with schizophrenic reaction.
Dr. Reynaldo Robles stated that Puno had schizophrenic reaction
but that this condition was “not socially incapacitating”. Dr. Carlso
Vicente of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno acted w/
discernment & could distinguish right from wrong.
21 October 1970 – Puno was indicted for the murder in the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating
circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard for sex. Puno was sentenced to death and ordered to pay
P22K to the heirs of the victim
Issue: WON Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay.
Held
No. Record from Puno’s stay at the National Mental Hospital
stated that he had been an outpatient for schizophrenia in 1962,
recovered, had a relapse in 1964, improved and in 1966 his sickness
remained
UNIMPROVED.
Treatment
continued
in
San
Lazaro
Compound up to 1970 where he was relieved of symptoms and did not
come back for medication. It cited that he was quiet and as usual
manageable. The report stated that he “is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms”, but persons suffering from
schizophrenia may retain some of the residual symptoms but it wouldn’t
affect their discernment of right and wrong.
The court says: “in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstance surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that
Puno was not legally insane when he killed, the victim” The court cited
that had he been a homicidal maniac he would have killed Lina and
Hilaria too. The evidence should prove clearly that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or total deprivation of freedom of wilt. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
Two aggravating circumstances, dwelling and disregard of the
respect due to the age of the victim are offset by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and the offender’s mental illness
(mild schizophrenic reaction) which diminished him of his will power but
did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts.
iii.
Mistake of Fact
When an offender acted out of a misapprehension of fact, it cannot be
said that he acted with criminal intent. Thus, in criminal law, there is a
“mistake of fact”. When the offender acted out of a mistake of fact, criminal
intent is negated, so do not presume that the act was done with criminal
intent. This is absolutory if crime involved dolo.
Mistake of fact would be relevant only when the felony would have
been intentional or through dolo, but not when the felony is a result of
culpa. When the felony is a product of culpa, do not discuss mistake of
fact. When the felonious act is the product of dolo and the accused claimed
to have acted out of mistake of fact, there should be no culpa in
determining the real facts, otherwise, he is still criminally liable, although he
acted out of a mistake of fact.
Mistake of fact is only a defense in
intentional felony but never in culpable felony.
a. U.S. s. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488
Facts
Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad
elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his
room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice,
“Who is there,” but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, “If you enter the
room I will kill you.” But at that precise moment, he was struck by the
chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was
being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate. He was found guilty and
sentenced to 6 years and 1 day.
Contention of the accused: he admitted that he killed his roommate but
admitted that he struck the fatal blow without intent to do a wrongful act
in the exercise of hid lawful right to self-defense. There is an innocent
mistake of fact..
Held
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would
have been justified in killing the intruder under A11, par. 1, of the RPC,
which requires, to justify the act, that there be:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, & lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself If the
intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong,
there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder.
There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend
himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable
means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no
provocation at all. Under A11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in
the intention as well as in the act of the person making the defense.
Thus, he must be acquitted.
b. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
Facts
Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were
under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and
escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on
seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door, simultaneously
fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man,
Tecson, and not the wanted criminal.
Held
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was
sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law
does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from
justice is determined to fight the officers of law who are trying to capture
him that killing him would be justified. Thus, both accused are guilty of
murder
iv.
Malum Prohibitum – exception to the requirement of mens rea, criminal
intent is not important. These are wrong crimes because they prohibited by
special laws and are punished by it.
DISTINCTION OF MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in se, which
literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or per se wrongful. On
the other hand, violations of special laws are generally referred to as malum
prohibitum.
Note, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita.
While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does not follow that
prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are always mala prohibita.
Even if the crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one
which is inherently wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good
faith and the lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless it is the
product of criminal negligence or culpa.
Likewise when the special laws requires that the punished act be
committed knowingly and willfully, criminal intent is required to be proved
before criminal liability may arise.
When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, it is wrong only because a
law punishes the same.
For example, Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes piracy in Philippine
waters and the special law punishing brigandage in the highways. These
acts are inherently wrong and although they are punished under special
law, the acts themselves are mala in se; thus, good faith or lack of criminal
intent is a defense.
Distinction between crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code and
crimes punished under special laws
1.
As to moral trait of the offender
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the moral trait of the
offender is considered. This is why liability would only arise when there is
dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable act.
In crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the offender is not
considered; it is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily done.
2.
As to use of good faith as defense
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, good faith or lack of
criminal intent is a valid defense; unless the crime is the result of culpa
In crimes punished under special laws, good faith is not a defense
3.
As to degree of accomplishment of the crime
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the degree of
accomplishment of the crime is taken into account in punishing the
offender; thus, there are attempted, frustrated, and consummated stages in
the commission of the crime.
In crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a crime only
when it is consummated; there are no attempted or frustrated stages,
unless the special law expressly penalize the mere attempt or frustration of
the crime.
4.
As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are taken into account in imposing the penalty
since the moral trait of the offender is considered.
In crimes punished under special laws, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are not taken into account in imposing the penalty.
5.
As to degree of participation
In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, when there is more
than one offender, the degree of participation of each in the commission of
the crime is taken into account in imposing the penalty; thus, offenders are
classified as principal, accomplice and accessory.
In crimes punished under special laws, the degree of participation of the
offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are
penalized to the same extent.
There is no principal or accomplice or
accessory to consider.
Test to determine if violation of special law is malum prohibitum or malum in
se
Analyze the violation: Is it wrong because there is a law prohibiting it or
punishing it as such? If you remove the law, will the act still be wrong?
If the wording of the law punishing the crime uses the word “willfully”, then
malice must be proven. Where malice is a factor, good faith is a defense.
In violation of special law, the act constituting the crime is a prohibited act.
Therefore culpa is not a basis of liability, unless the special law punishes an
omission.
When given a problem, take note if the crime is a violation of the Revised
Penal Code or a special law.
a. Padilla vs. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127
Facts
On August 6, 1987, commissioner of custom, Alexander Padilla
filed a complaint against Baltazar Dizon, RTC Judge rendered a
manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross
incomplete and gross ignorance of the law in criminal case. Lo Chi Fai
was caught by the custom guard at the NAI while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
He was apprehended by the guard on July 1996.
Contention of the accused: he is not liable for violation of BC 960 which
is a special law for lack of intention. Accused Lo Chi Fai had no willful
intention to violate the law. A Judge cannot be held to account or
answer criminally, civilly, administratively for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith.
Held
Proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws which are mala prohibita. In requiring
proof of malice, the judge has by his gross ignorance allowed the
accused to go free. Added to this, he directed in his decision to release
to the accused of at least the amount of USD 3000 allowed according to
him under CBC 965.
The SC found Judge Dizon guilty of gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and efficiency. He was ordered to be dismissed from the
service.
b. Magno vs. CA, 210 SCRA 475
Facts
Oriel Magno was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of BP 22 and was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment in each crime
case.
Contention of the accused: he questioned mala prohibita which the RTC
relied their ruling without regard to the circumstance.
Contention of the state: there was a violation of BP 22 for mere
issuance of bouncing checks.
Held
Even if mere issuance of a bouncing check does not constitutes
violation of BP 22, Magno is not liable for in the first place, he informed
the spouse that the check were not funded.
c. Griffith vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 94
Facts
Griffith was convicted for the violation of BP 22 and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment for a period 6 counts in each count.
Contention of the accused: he relied on the ruling of magno vs. ca
where the court laid the doctrine that a conviction under BP22 cannot
be based on an irreversible application of the elements of knowledge.
He points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note
that the checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance that good
faith in his part negate any intent to put worthless checks.
Held
While we agree with the private respondent that the violation of
BP22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically.
We must find if the applicable of the law is consistent with the purpose
and reason for the law “ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex”. It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is so in this
case where a debtor criminalization would not serve the ends for justice
but subvert it.
d. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394
Facts
During the period from June 1998 to January 2001, Joseph
Estrada unlawfully and criminally amass and accumulate indirectly or
directly, ill gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,163.17,
unjustly enriching himself at the expense damage of people of the
Philippines, any or combination or a series or overt or criminal acts,
similar schemes or means.
Contention of the accused: plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum
prohibition and thus, Estrada should not be punished for the crime of
plunder as one since the accumulation of his ill-gotten wealth was done
in a series of acts, he should be punished for one act not including the
other with no criminal intent.
Held
Plunder is a malum in se because it is a heinous offense. For
when the acts are inherently immoral or wrong, they are mala in se and
it does not matter that such acts are punished under special laws
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mala in
se.
v.
Distinguished from Motive
Intent is demonstrated by the use of a particular means to bring
about a desired result – it is not a state of mind or a reason for committing a
crime.
On the other hand, motive implies motion. It is the moving power
which impels one to do an act. When there is motive in the commission of
a crime, it always comes before the intent. But a crime may be committed
without motive.
If the crime is intentional, it cannot be committed without intent.
Intent is manifested by the instrument used by the offender. The specific
criminal intent becomes material if the crime is to be distinguished from the
attempted or frustrated stage. For example, a husband came home and
found his wife in a pleasant conversation with a former suitor. Thereupon,
he got a knife. The moving force is jealousy. The intent is the resort to the
knife, so that means he is desirous to kill the former suitor. Even if the
offender states that he had no reason to kill the victim, this is not criminal
intent. Criminal intent is the means resorted to by him that brought about
the killing. If we equate intent as a state of mind, many would escape
criminal liability.
In a case where mother and son were living in the same house, and
the son got angry and strangled his mother, the son, when prosecuted for
parricide, raised the defense that he had no intent to kill his mother. It was
held that criminal intent applies on the strangulation of the vital part of the
body. Criminal intent is on the basis of the act, not on the basis if what the
offender says.
Look into motive to determine the proper crime which can be
imputed to the accused. If a judge was killed, determine if the killing has
any relation to the official functions of the judge in which case the crime
would be direct assault complexed with murder/homicide, not the other way
around. If it has no relation, the crime is simply homicide or murder.
Omission is the inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which
he is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performing of
an act.
People vs. Temblor (161 SCRA 623)
Facts
On 30 December 1980, Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald” went to Julius
Cagampang’s house to buy cigarettes. Cagampang, while opening a pack
of cigarettes, was shot. The accused (and another person, Anecito
Ellevera) demanded Victorina Cagampang (Julius’ wife) that she brings out
her husband’s firearms. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen
victim. Victorina gave a suitcase to Temblor, who then took the .38 caliber
which was inside, and fled.
In August 1981, Temblor, an NPA, surrendered (it was actually a mass
surrender of NPA’s) after hiding in the mountains. In 26 November 1981, he
was arrested by Buenavista police at the public market and then detained
at municipal jail. Regarding the murder of Cagampang, Temblor’s alibi was
that day until the next; he was with his father for drinking and pulutan. On 8
June 1982, the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpertua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim P12, 000. He appealed.
Contention of the accused: In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the
court a quo erred: (1) in finding that he was positively identified by the
prosecution witness as the killer, and (2) in rejecting his defense of alibi.
Held
The accused is guilty of murder. Judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in all respects and civil indemnity increased to P30K. It was
proven that he had motive in killing Cagampang: he had knowledge that
Cagampang possessed a firearm; this was motive enough to kill him, as
part of NPA’s “agaw armas” campaign or killings perpetrated by NPA for the
purpose of acquiring more firearms. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been positively identified. Also, his flight
implies guilt.
The prosecution witness, Victorina Cagampang, may have minor
inconsistencies in her testimony but this does not diminish her credibility –
that is part of being human? What is important is that she had positively
identified the accused as the assailant and that her testimony is
corroborated by other witnesses.
Furthermore, the accused’s alibi was unacceptable because it was selfserving and uncorroborated. It cannot overrule positive identification, it was
merely 15-20 minutes away from crime scene and Perol was at work.
People vs. Hassan (157 SCRA 261)
Facts
Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old was convicted of murder of Pichel. Pichel
was stabbed to death while waiting his friend Jose Samson who was buying
fruits.
Contention of the accused: the ruling was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he must, therefore, be set free. The prosecution’s evidence was
weak and unconvincing that he is not of legal age on that time of
commission of crime. There was a total absence of motive.
Held
Lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal note toward
his acquittal. This is especially true when there is doubt as to identity of
culprit as when the identification is extremely denvous in this case.
People vs. Delim (January 29, 2003)
Facts
Marlon, Leon & Ronald Delim were convicted for murder of Modesto
Delim. Modesto is the adopted child of Marlon’s Dad. Marlon, Manuel and
Robert are brothers and Leon and Ronald are their nephews. Around 6:30
pm, January 23, 1999, Modesto and family were preparing to eat dinner
when Marlon, Robert and Ronald arrived. Marlon poked gun, other two
grabbed, hog tied and gagged Modesto. They herded him out of the hose
and went to the direction of Paldit. Leon and Manual guarded Rita & Randy
until 7 am and told them to stay put. They searched for him for 3 days and
reported to police three days after the incident. Randy with relatives found
Modesto in the housing project in Paldit under bushes. He was dead due to
gunshot wound on head.
Contention of the accused: no motive since the prosecution failed to prove
motive on the part of the accused to kill Modesto. They are not criminally
liable for the death of the victim but not kidnapping.
Contention of the state: the sudden disappearance of the accused from
their house is a strong circumstantial of their guilt, admissible evidence
against them if it tends to show that they in fact killed the victim.
Held
The accused were found guilty. He was identified therefore, motive is
not important. They were sentenced from 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
b. Constructive Intent (Culpa) – Art. 3 and Art. 365
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished
by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three
times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or
falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the
danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided
for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
i.
Elements
• Freedom
• Intelligence
• Negligence- deficiency of perception to avoid a foreseeable damage
• Imprudence- lack of foresight, failure to take necessary precaution.
People vs. Carmen (355 SCRA 267)
Facts
The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were
all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder after having
performed a cultic healing pray-over which resulted to the death of Randy
Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
Contention of the accused: the accused has no intention to cause an evil
but rather a remedy on the victim’s illness. She was just performing her
duty as faith healer. The court should not convict them of murder rather it
must be reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Held
Intent is not important. The strange procedure resulted to the death of
the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill Randy. Their
liability arises from their reckless imprudence resulting to homicide not
murder.
Accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide & are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of 4 mos. of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years & 2 mos. of
prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are
ORDERED jointly & severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity
in the amount of P50K, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P30K.
Madeja vs. Caro (126 SCRA 293)
Facts
Dr. Eva Japson is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence
for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
Contention of the accused: no motive and intent. The instant civil action
may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered.
Contention of the state: Carmen Maceja, wife of the deceased alleged that
her husband died because of group negligence of Dr. Japso. She filed a
separate civil action for damages.
Held
The petition is granted. It is apparent that the civil action against Dr.
Japson may proceed independently to the criminal suit against her. Death
due to negligent act may be delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action
based on Article 100 of RPC, “criminal liability of a person guilty of felonyevery person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable”, also as stated
in Article 2176 of the civil code.
ii.
iii.
Imprudence or Lack of Skill – a deficiency of action
Negligence or Lack of Foresight – indicates a deficiency of perception
People vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439
Facts
May 19,1982, after midnight during the town fiesta in the public plaza,
pugay, Samson, and several companions and they appeared to be drunk.
As the group saw Miranda (25 years old retardate), they started making fun
of him. They made him dance by buckling him a piece of wood. Not
contented in what they are doing, Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline
from under the ferries wheel and poured it on the body of Miranda. Then
Samson set Miranda on fire which caused his death.
Contention of the state: gabions straight forward, positive, and convincing
testimonies remain unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unreliable testimonies of Pugay and Samson.
Contention of the accused: Pugay poured a can of gasoline believing that
the content was water and doesn’t have intention to kill Miranda. Samson
merely intended to burn the victim’s clothes that it was not his intention to
kill him.
Held
A criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act had done be different from what was intended.
Pugay can only be convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence
because of his failure to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that maybe committed by his
companion at the time they were making fun at Miranda.
iv.
Distinguished from Dolo - the requisites of criminal intent, which is required
in dolo replaced the requisites of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill committed by means of culpa.
People vs. Buan (22 SCRA 1383)
Facts: Charges moved to quash on the ground that he had already
been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace
Court
Issue: WON second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
Held: Yes. Order appealed from is reversed and the CFI of Bulacan
is
directed to quash & dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No.
5243,
no costs. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that
same
act. The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under
RPC A365 lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine
the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. As
the
carelessness of the act is single, whether the injurious result
should
affect one person or several persons, the offense remains one and
the same. It cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
The exoneration of appellant by the Municipal Court of the
charged of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of the province where both charges are
derived from the consequence of one and the same vehicular
accident. The second accusation places the appellant in the
second
jeopardy for the same offense.
c. Transferred Intent – Art. 4, Par. 1 (“El que de la cause del mal causado”)
By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
•
Criminal liability
Since in Article 3, a felony is an act or omission punishable by law, particularly
the Revised Penal Code, it follows that whoever commits a felony incurs
criminal liability. In paragraph 1 of Article 4, the law uses the word “felony”, that
whoever commits a felony incurs criminal liability. A felony may arise not only
when it is intended, but also when it is the product of criminal negligence.
What makes paragraph 1 of Article 4 confusing is the addition of the qualifier
“although the wrongful act be different from what he intended.”
•
Proximate cause
Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of
the resulting felony. It must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the felonious act.
Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion other causes and
which unbroken by any efficient supervening cause produces a felony without
which such felony could not have resulted. He who is the cause of the cause is
the evil of the cause. As a general rule, the offender is criminally liable for all
the consequences of his felonious act, although not intended, if the felonious
act is the proximate cause of the felony or resulting felony. A proximate cause
is not necessarily the immediate cause. This may be a cause which is far and
remote from the consequence which sets into motion other causes which
resulted in the felony.
•
Wrongful act done be different from what was intended
What makes the first paragraph of Article 4 confusing is the qualification
“although the wrongful act done be different from what was intended”. There
are three situations contemplated under paragraph 1 of Article 4:
(1)
(2)
(3)
i.
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow;
Error in personae or mistake in identity; and
Praeter intentionem or where the consequence exceeded the intention.
Aberratio ictus
In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim,
but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio
ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual victim is both at the scene of
the crime.
Distinguish this from error in personae, where the victim actually
received the blow, but he was mistaken for another who was not at the
scene of the crime. The distinction is important because the legal effects
are not the same.
In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon the intended
victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed on somebody else. You
have a complex crime, unless the resulting consequence is not a grave or
less grave felony. You have a single act as against the intended victim and
also giving rise to another felony as against the actual victim. To be more
specific, let us take for example A and B. A and B are enemies. As soon as
A saw B at a distance, A shot at B. However, because of poor aim, it was
not B who was hit but C. You can readily see that there is only one single
act – the act of firing at B. In so far as B is concerned, the crime at least is
attempted homicide or attempted murder, as the case may be, if there is
any qualifying circumstance. As far as the third party C is concerned, if C
were killed, crime is homicide. If C was only wounded, the crime is only
physical injuries.
You cannot have attempted or frustrated homicide or
murder as far as C is concerned, because as far as C is concern, there is
no intent to kill. As far as that other victim is concerned, only physical
injuries – serious or less serious or slight.
If the resulting physical injuries were only slight, then you cannot
complex; you will have one prosecution for the attempted homicide or
murder, and another prosecution for slight physical injuries for the innocent
party.
But if the innocent party was seriously injured or less seriously
injured, then you have another grave or less grave felony resulting from the
same act which gave rise to attempted homicide or murder against B;
hence, a complex crime.
In other words, aberratio ictus, generally gives rise to a complex
crime. This being so, the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in
the maximum period.
This is the legal effect.
The only time when a
complex crime may not result in aberratio ictus is when one of the resulting
felonies is a light felony.
People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)
and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, as
the information filed against him provided. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged against him, but was later found after duly admitting his
intention to kill the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and was sentenced with the highest capital punishment,
for the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated
murder of President Roxas and company.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said
crime.
Ruling
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the
crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was not
fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing him
from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen is
not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of
multiple attempted murder.
ii.
Error in personae
In error in personae, the intended victim was not at the scene of the
crime. It was the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he
was not really the intended victim. There was really a mistake in identity.
This is very important because Article 49 applies only in a case of
error in personae and not in a case of abberatio ictus.
In Article 49, when the crime intended is more serious than the
crime actually committed or vice-versa, whichever crime carries the lesser
penalty, that penalty will be the one imposed. But it will be imposed in the
maximum period. For instance, the offender intended to commit homicide,
but what was actually committed with parricide because the person he
killed by mistake was somebody related to him within the degree of
relationship in parricide. In such a case, the offender will be charged with
parricide, but the penalty that would be imposed will be that of homicide.
This is because under Article 49, the penalty for the lesser crime will be the
one imposed, whatever crime the offender is prosecuted under. In any
event, the offender is prosecuted for the crime committed not for the crime
intended.
• How does error in personae affect criminal liability of the offender?
Error in personae is mitigating if the crime committed is different
from that which was intended. If the crime committed is the same as that
which was intended, error in personae does not affect the criminal liability of
the offender.
In mistake of identity, if the crime committed was the same as the
crime intended, but on a different victim, error in persona does not affect
the criminal liability of the offender. But if the crime committed was different
from the crime intended, Article 49 will apply and the penalty for the lesser
crime will be applied.
In a way, mistake in identity is a mitigating
circumstance where Article 49 applies. Where the crime intended is more
serious than the crime committed, the error in persona is not a mitigating
circumstance
People vs. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751
The Case: Beronga, Sabalones, cabanero and Alegarbe were
convicted of 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated murder of
Glenn tiempo, Alfred nardo, rey bolo, reogelio presores and nelson
tiempo. A shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Manuela Comp,
Talisay Cebu led to these deaths.
Issues:
1. WON prosecution witnesses and evidence are credible
Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated
testimonies of two witnesses. There was positive identification
by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in
gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s
headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because
the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding,
though, to the co-accused because it is used as circumstancial
evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconsistencies are
minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of
testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus (mistake in blow),
mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity applies,
more proper to use error in personae
2. WON alibi’s acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by
positive identification. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt
3. WON correct penalty imposed?
No. Under RPC A248, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal, in its maximum period to death. There being no
aggravating/mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed
reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA however erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated
murder. Under RPC A50, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony xxx.” Because there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance as the CA itself held, the penalty
prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period.
iii.
Praeter intentionem – Art. 13, Par. 3
A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has
acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the
court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding
paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall
be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be
committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art.
80.
Praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularly covered by paragraph
3 of Article 13. In order however, that the situation may qualify as praeter
intentionem, there must be a notable disparity between the means
employed and the resulting felony. If there is no disparity between the
means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, this circumstance
cannot be availed of. It cannot be a case of praeter intentionem because
the intention of a person is determined from the means resorted to by him
in committing the crime.
People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150
Facts
Albuquerque is a 55 year old, widower with children. He, together with his
unmarried children lived with the family of her daughter, Maria. He has been
suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging from partial
paralysis with one leg and has controlled the movement of his right arm.
When one of his child Pillar got pregnant, he confronted the father of the
child Mr. Manuel Obma to marry Pillar. Upon the latter’s refusal,
Albuquerque brought out a knife intending only to wound Obma on the face
that would leave a permanent scar. Since he had no control on his right
hand, the knife landed on the base of the neck inflicting a fatal wound
causing his death.
Held
Albuquerque is criminally liable because according to article 49 of RPC,
“liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done was different from that which intended.
C. LIABILITY FOR INCOMPLETE ELEMENTS
1. Impossible Crime – Art. 4, Par. 2
By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Paragraph 2 refers to a situation where the wrongful act done did not
constitute any felony, but because the act would have given rise to a crime against
persons or against property, the same is penalized to repress criminal tendencies
to curtail their frequency.
Because criminal liability for impossible crime
presupposes that no felony resulted from the wrongful act done, the penalty is
fixed at arresto mayor or a fine from P200.00 to P500.00, depending on the “social
danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender” (Article 59), regardless of
whether the wrongful act was an impossible crime against persons or against
property.
An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person
or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Under Article 4, paragraph 2, impossible crime is true only when the crime
committed would have been against person or against property. It is, therefore,
important to know what are the crimes under Title VIII, against persons and those
against property under Title X. An impossible crime is true only to any of those
crimes.
a. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
Facts
Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land
dispute. They fired at her room. However, she was in another city then thus
they hit no one.
Contention of the accused: they should only be liable for impossible crime and
not attempted murder. Bernardines absence from her room made the crime
inherently impossible for its accomplishment.
Held
In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime—an
act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or
family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1)
legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:
(1)
The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law;
(2)
There is no intention to perform the physical act;
(3)
There is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4)
The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor
or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was
impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense
which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
******In the Intod case, the wrongful acts of the culprits caused destruction to
the house of the intended victim; this felonious act negates the idea of an
impossible crime.
But whether we agree or not, the Supreme Court has
spoken, we have to respect its ruling.
b. People vs. Saladino, 89 Phil. 807
Facts
Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his 13-yr old
niece. Taking into account the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the
victim and her relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted three
(3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court also found accusedappellant guilty of attempted rape, and sentenced him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
minimum asminimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
Contention of the state: Saladino committed the crime of rape that is now
against a person under RA8353.
Contention of the accused: he claimed that on the alleged rape, he was drunk.
Held
The court found Saladino guilty of 3 counts of simple rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetual for each count.
2. Uncompleted Crimes
a. Attempted Felonies - when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident, other
than his own spontaneous acts.
i.
Article 6, RPC
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when
the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
ii.
People vs. Campuhan (March 30, 2000)
Facts
Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan.
Campuhan was caught by child’s mother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm
in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazon’s brother was allegedly
kneeling in front of the child with both their pants downa dn child was crying
“ayoko, ayoko” while Primo forced his penis into child’s vagina.
Held: Modified to attempted rape
1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration
is equivalent to rape. Mere touching of external genitalia considered when
its an essential part of penetration not just touching in ordinary sense
(People v. Orita). Labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated (People v. Escober)
2. Attempted – no penetration or didn’t reach labia/mere grazing of surface
3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mother’s testimony
questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo and child. They
failed to establish how she could have seen actual contact in her position
4. Man’s instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have stayed or to
satisfy his lust even when he saw the victim’s mother.
5. Child denied penetration occurred
iii.
People vs. Lopez (312 SCRA 684; 1999)
Facts
Federico Lopez was accused of killing Rogelio Saldera & Rodolfo Padapat
& frustrated murder of Mario Seldera. They work in a farmland in
Nancalabaasan, Umingan, Pangasinan. On their way home on Nov. 15,
1991 at around 9 pm they were met by Lopez & another guy. There were in
trail beside Banila river. Lopez had a shot gun & shot 3. Thinking they were
dead, he left. Mario survived and identified Lopez.
Held
Lopez was guilty of double murder and 1 count of attempted murder. Under
article 48, a complex crime is committed only when a single act constitute 2
or more grave or less grave felony. In this case, the victims were
successively shot by the accused, each shot necessarily constitute only
one act. The accused Lopez, thus, be held liable for 3 separate crimes.
iv.
People vs. Lizada (G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003)
Facts
Freedie Lizada was accused of raping his step daughter Analia Orilloso in
four instances in their house in Tondo, Manila, sometime in August 1998, on
or about Nov. 5, 1998, on or about Oct. 22, 1998 and on or about
September 15, 1998. Physical examination showed no extragenital physical
injuries. Hymen intact.
Held
Attempted rape only:
1. No proof of introduction of penis into pudendum of child’s vagina
2. Not act of lasciviousness,
3. RPC Art. 6 attempted is based on 4 elements (reyes)
4. Not preparatory (devise means or measure to accomplish desired end).
Attempt should be equivocal. No need to complete all acts, just needs to
start act w/ causal relation to intended crime.
5. Acts must be directly related to consummation of act and ascertainable
from facts.
6. Accused had intended to have carnal knowledge of complainant. Acts
not preparatory, he commenced execution but failed to finish due to
presence of 3rd party, not spontaneous desistance.
v.
People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424
Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the
judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricide
—she allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a
hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a
daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's
gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated
and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco
abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with
her friends and when she was on her way home she met her
husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused her
of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held
her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her
towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and
proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife
tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so
she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and
thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above
the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab
wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next
day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn
dress that she wore the night before.
Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in
legitimate self-defense
Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted
Ratio:
1.Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this
case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that
the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor.
With her husband kneeling over her and choking her,
accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in
his belt line and thrust it into his side.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife
was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the
testimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of the
incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge
the knife into husband's left side.
2.Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present
Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing
her to the ground then choking her just because she was
out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There
was imminent danger of injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being
choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold
of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to
protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not depend
upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such
injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient
when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there
was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
(Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that
she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in
the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night.
b. Frustrated Felonies
a.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
(Article 6, Revised Penal Code)
•
i)
ii)
iii)
Elements
Offender performs all the acts of execution
All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence
The felony is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.
People vs. Mison, 194 SCRA 432
Facts
Mison stabbed Lelith Dagohoy and her niece Luciana at the formers store
which resulted to Luciana’s death after 24 hours in the hospital due to blood
inspection while Lileth was released 5 days after being treated.
Held
Lileth was in fact released in the hospital after 5 days. Even so, the
assaults upon her constituted frustrated murder, her relative quick recovery
being the result of prompt medical attention which prevented the infection in the
wound from reaching fatal proportions which would otherwise has ensued.
People vs. Erina, 50 Phil. 998
Facts
Julian Eriña charged of raping 3 yrs & 11 mo. old child. Doubt on whether
actual penetration occurred. Physical exam showed slight inflammation of
exterior parts of organ indicating effort to enter vagina. Mom found child’s organ
covered with sticky substance
Held
Frustrated only
1.
Possible for man’s organ to enter labia of a 3 years and 8 months old
child.
2.
No conclusive evidence of penetration so give accused benefit of the
doubt. Frustrated only.
D. LIABILITY FOR CRIMES WITH COMPLETE ELEMENTS
1. Article 6, RPC
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.
2. Relate to Articles 134 and 134-A, RPC
3. People vs. Orita, 184 SCRA 105
Facts
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina arrived at her boarding
house from a party. She knocked at a door, then all of a sudden, somebody held
her, and poked a knife at her neck. She then recognized Orita who was a frequent
visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded to release her but he ordered her to go upstairs with him.
With his left arm wrapped around her neck, he dragged her upstairs. He
commanded her to look for a room, still the knife poked around her neck. Then
they entered Cristina’s room. With one hand holding the knife, Orita undressed
himself and ordered her to undress too. Scared, she did undress. He ordered her
to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
inserted in her vagina. In his position, Orita cannot fully penetrate her as she keeps
on moving. Then he again ordered her to lie down as he mounted on her back, with
this, only a small part of his penis was inserted in her vagina. However, Cristine
escaped and dashed out to the next room. Orita pursued her so she ran again to
the nest room and jumped out through a window. Still naked, she went to the
municipal building and a policeman rescued her.
Contention of the accused: He should only be guilty of frustrated rape since no
penetration happened. Since only a small part of his penis was inserted into the
victim’s vagina.
Contention of the state: Perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ is sufficient to charge the accused of consummated rape.
Held
The rape was consummated from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim, since by it, he attained his objectives. All elements of the
offense to do so, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and
accomplish it.
The entry of the penis to the labia of the vagina, even without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina was sufficient to warrant conviction of
consummated rape.
4. People vs. Sanchez (250 SCRA 14)
Facts
On the evening of December 14, 1989, Gladys was left alone in their
apartment. While she was lying in bed, Sanchez entered the room. He grabbed her
and covered her mouth. Then and there, he succeeded in inserting his penis into
Gladys’ vagina. She didn’t tell anyone about the incident, afraid that her mother
would get angry and hit her.
On December 21, 1989, while Gladys was again alone watching TV,
Sanchez forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. As before, she didn’t
report the incident. On January 2, 1990,while Gladys was inside the toilet, Sanchez
entered, pinned her against the wall and he satisfied his sexual desire again.
Again, Gladys did not report it to anyone. But on May 22, 1990, her sister Marites
saw her slap Sanchez and asked her why she did that. Then that was the time he
told her about her ordeal.
Contention of the accused: He capitalizes on the fact that the medico legal report
by Dr. Cenido showed no laceration of the hymen of Gladys. He contends that the
three incidents of penetration, if true, could not have failed to produce lacerations
of the hymen.
Contention of the state: Sanchez committed three counts of rape. The victim even
saw Sanchez penis and thought that it was “big” and it was inserted into her private
part and felt pain. The pain could be nothing but the penetration to sufficient to
contribute the crime.
Held
Even if there was no laceration of the hymen, this fact doesn’t necessarily
mean that there was no rape because lacerations heal within ten days. A broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape. The mere introduction of the penis into
the labia of the vagina is sufficient for the crime to be consummated. And the
credibility of Gladys was proven. She described in detail how she had been
sexually abused and is accorded with high respect.
5. People vs. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671
Facts
On April 12, 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused Bienvenido Salvilla,
Reynaldo Canasares, Ronaldo canasares and Simplido Canasares conspiring and
confederating among them, working together and helping one another, armed with
guns and hand grenade, entered the compound of New Iloilo Lumber Company.
With the use of violence and intimidation to Severino Choco, owner, Mary Choco
and Minnie, Rodita Gablero (employee). The accused took and carried away, with
intent to gain cash, in the amount of P200,000.00, two men’s wrist watch, one lady
Seiko quartz wrist watch and one lady wrist watch and assorted jewelries. All
valued P50,000.00 on that occasion. Then his two daughters and Rodita were
hostaged for claim of P100,000.00 but they could not release money because
banks were closed. The manyor offered P 50,000.00 and the accused agreed to
receive and release Rodita. Ultimatum was given. Finally, the police and military
decided to break the offensive assault. This resulted to injuries of Mary Choco and
Minnie.
Contention of the state: the crime was consummated when they acquired robberies
of the properties, the moment they possession of the things, unlawful taking is
complete. While it is claimed that they intended to surrender, they did not, despite
several opportunities to speak out. The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of “robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention.”
And sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Contention of the accused: The crime should be consummated because having the
same was only attempted. They claim that the voluntary surrender is a mitigating
circumstance. The crime of robbery has 3 stages: 1. Giving, 2. Taking, 3. Carrying
away or asportation. And without asportation, thje crime committed is only
attempted
Held
The elements of the offense of serious illegal detention were present in the case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. It follows that as the detention in
this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but necessary means employed
to facilitate it. the penalty imposed by the TC is proper.
6. People vs. Dalisay, 408 SCRA 375
Facts
On about Sept. 26, 1996 at Batangas, Ruben Dalisay, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay and had
carnal knowledge with Lanie, below 12 years old, against her will and consent.
Lanie furthermore testified that Ruben had sexually abused her since she was in
grade 3, or in 1994. Seventeen times in estimation.
Contention of the state: a rape victim’s testimony is entitled to great weight
especially when she accuses her own father or a close relative for having ravished
her. Rupture of hymen or laceration of the vagina is not essential. Entrance or
mere penetration of the male organ within the labia of the female organ is
sufficient. Dalisay is guilty of statutory rape, and imposing upon him death penalty.
Contention of the accused: Dalisay claimed that the TC erred: 1. In giving full
weight and credibility oto the compliant’s testimony. 2. In failing to appreciate the
expert testimony of the medico legal in favour of the appellant finding out that the
victim’s hymen is intact
Held
Among other contentions, such findings as to Lanie’s age is erroneous since it is
based solely on Lanie’s testimony that she was 11y/o when her father raped her on
9/26/96. Nonetheless, Dalisay, should be convicted of simple rape under Article
335 (1) of the RPC, pay the victim with P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages and P25,000 for exemplary damages.
7. People vs. Nequia, 412 SCR 628
Facts
At 7am of 1/23/99, in Oton, Iloilo, Helena, mistress of Nequia, left their
house to collect to customer’s accounts. Nequia and his mother Linda, and John
Gil (son of Helena), were left in the house. At about 9 am, Mary Ghel (daughter of
Helena), who was 12 arrived at the house and asked Nequia to make a flower
vase for her project and the latter agreed.
At noontime, he ordered them to sleep at the second floor. Momentarily,
Nequia went to the 2nd floor, forcibly held Mary Ghel’s hands and placed them
behind her. Nequia hit her at her buttocks with his hands and placed a pillow on
her face to prevent her from shouting or making any noise. Rape was
consummated. The pain Mary Ghel felt in her vagina made her loud cry. Alarmed,
the accused dressed up Mary Ghel and hurriedly went down. Lola Linda went up
and inquired but Mary Ghel was afraid to tell.
Contention of the accused: the accused contends that the TC gravely erred in
convicting the accused of the crime of consummated rape despite of certainty of
commission. Accused also contends that the insertion of his 4th finger to the
private complainant’s vagina does not constitute rape under the anti-rape law. He
agrees that the insertion of the human finger into the victim’s vagina is excluded in
Senate Bill No 950 and House Bill No. 6265. He also contends that there was no
evidence proving that he threatened the victim with physical harm.
Contention of the state: the state contends that mere insertion of an object to the
vagina against her will consummates the crime of rape. The state also contends
that the threats of physical harm on the part of the victim is not indispensible
element in the crime of rape. For rape to be consummated, it is enough that the
victim is intimidated or forced into submitting into the beastial lust of the accused
Held
The accused is guilty of consummated rape because all the elements were
present: a. to force, threat of intimidation; b. when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority.
In the light of all the foregoing, the decision of the RTC is affirmed with
modifications and that the accused is ordered to pay Mary Ghel the amount of
P75,000 for moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
8. Light Felonies Punishable Only When Consummated – Art. 7 and Art. 9, par.
3
• Article 7. When light felonies are punishable – Light felonies are punishable only
when they have been consummated, with the exemption of those committed
against persons or property.
• Article 9 (3). Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of
which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 or both, is
provided.
E. COMMON LIABILITY FOR CONSPIRATORS – ART. 8
1. Implied Conspiracy:
• Art 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. Conspiracy and proposal to
commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides
a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exist when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person
who has decided to commit the crime.
Implied Conspiracy – “act of one is the act of all”
Holds two or more persons participating in the commission of the crime
collectively liable as conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect,
when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common
purpose of objective.
Two ways for conspiracy to exist:
(1)
There is an agreement.
(2)
The participants acted in concert or simultaneously which is indicative of
a meeting of the minds towards a common criminal goal or criminal objective.
When several offenders act in a synchronized, coordinated manner, the fact that
their acts complimented each other is indicative of the meeting of the minds. There
is an implied agreement.
Two kinds of conspiracy:
(1)
Conspiracy as a crime; and
(2)
Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability
When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary to bring about the
criminal liability. The mere conspiracy is the crime itself. This is only true when the
law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy does not
bring about the commission of the crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but
a mere preparatory act. Treason, rebellion, sedition, and coup d’etat are the only
crimes where the conspiracy and proposal to commit to them are punishable.
People vs. Liad, 355 SCRA 11
Facts
Lydia Cuenca was driving her tamaraw FX when 3 men flagged down her
vehicle but when the former refused to open the car; they fired 2 successive shots
at the windshield. Hitting Lydia Cuenca which caused her death. Her husband
Manuel Cuenca with his employee Lary Buseron were following Lydia when this
incident happened so they saw the faces of the 3 men accosted his wife. The 3
men were later identified as Edgardo Valderama and Liberato Quintoa also known
as Baeng.When the policemen were on the act to arrest them they exchanged fire
with the policemen and Baeng was killed.After which Edgardo liad and Jun
Villarama were apprehended.
Contention of the accused: They tried to established that the crime was committed
only by the deceased, Liberato Quintoa, Edgardo Liad denied that have conspired
with Liberato Quintoa in committing the crime. Jun villarama also claimed that there
is no evidence that will prove that they planned the execution of the crime together.
He just banged the door, and not involved in the killing he is guilty of conspiracy of
robbery, not in killing.
Held
Supreme court ruled that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated from the acts of the accused themselves
without such point to a joint purpose and designed concerted actions and
community interest. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during or after.
2. People vs. Gonzales-Flores, 356 SCRA 460
Facts
Gonzales-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment as seamen three
different people at the same time and collecting money from them without the
necessary license. The complainants filed a complaint after they tried to follow-up
their applications and nothing happened for three months and they found out from
the POEA that the accused wasn’t licensed. The evidence consisted of the
complainant’s testimonies and testimonies of other witnesses. Accused now
argues that the Court didn’t have enough evidence to convict her.
ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the accused.
HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegal recruitment in large
scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers; (2) the accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts
against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All the conditions are
present. The evidence shows that she could do something to get their applications
approved. Accused contends that all she did was to refer the complaints but the
Labor Code, recruitment includes “referral” which is defined as the act of passing
along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected
application for employment or a selected employer, placement after initial interview
of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer,
or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she actively and directly
enlisted complainants for employment aboard, when promising jobs as seamen,
and collected money.
3. People vs. De Leon, 350 SCRA 460
Facts
Accused-appellant was charge and convicted of several counts of the crime
of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Held
Guilty. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not necessary for the information
to allege the exact date and the time of the commission of the crime is such is not
an essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of the
commission is not an essential element. The delay in reporting the crime
committed can also be attributed to the tender age of the victim and the moral
ascendancy of the accused over the victim. Oftentimes, a rape victim’s actions are
moved by fear rather than by reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to
report the crime immediately is not indicative of fabrication. Also, victims are not
expected to recall the exact and accurate account of their traumatic experiences.
However, accused cannot be sentenced to death because the information against
him failed to allege victim¹s minority and her relationship to the accused. RA 7659
enumerates the circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Consistent with the accused¹s right to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him, these circumstances must be specifically pleaded or
alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Accused is
guilty only of simple rape and sentenced only to reclusion perpetua on each count
of rape.
4. People vs. Elijorde (306 SCRA 188)
Facts
Elijorde and Punzalan charged with murder of Eric Hierro. Altercation began
when Hierro told Meneses not to touch him cause his clothes will get dirty. Fist fight
occurred. Hierro hid. After 30 mins he went out to go home but was attacked again
& stabbed to death.
Held
No. Punzalan acquitted. Elijorde guilty. In People v. Lug-aw, conspiracy
should be proven through clear and convincing evidence. In People v. De Roxas, it
is established that it must be proven that he performed overt act to pursue
completely. Visbal testified that only Elijorde chased Hierro. Punzalan’s only
participation was kicking which does not prove that he might have known Elijorde’s
evil design or intent to kill. In People v. Agapinay, there was no proof that the
accused knew about the deadly weapon and that it was to be used to stab victim.
In the case at bar, Punzalan desisted from acts of aggression and did nothing to
assist Elijorde in committing murder.
5. People vs. Sanchez , 308 SCRA 264
Facts
Appellants Antonio Sanchez, the mayor of Calauan, Laguna, Averion, Peradillas
and Corcolon were found guilty of the complex crime of double murder for the
killing of Nelson Peñalosa and his son, Rickson. The aggravating circumstances of
conspiracy, evident premeditation, and conspiracy were appreciated. The shooting
was carried out upon the order of former Mayor Sanchez, using armalites in
automatic firing mode. Witnesses say that three bursts of gunfire were heard.
Issue: Whether the court was correct in convicting the accused of the complex
crime of double murder.
Held: Three bursts of gunfire were heard. Although each burst of shots was caused
by one single act of pressing the trigger, in view of its specialmechanism, the
person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire
continuously. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them. Thus the accused are liable for as many offenses resulting
from pressing the trigger. They are liable for two counts of murder and not the
complex crime of double murder.
6. People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640
Facts
Arthur Pangilian, Arnolf Lopez and Reynalso Yambot were found guilty of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms and imposing
upon each of them the supreme penalty of death and a prison term of 6 yrs and 1
day to 8 yrs. On the other hand, Antonio Hamton was found guilty of robbery and
sentenced to an “indeterminate penalty of from 4 yrs of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor.
Held
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention (Art. 267, RPC). The court agreed with the TC
that they were guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
However, they cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms since
there was another crime—kidnapping for ransom—which they were committing at
the same time.
Interpreting Sec. 1, P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the SC has
consistenly ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms.
Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. Since the plain
meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant, no
other interpretation is justified. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of 2
separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide.
Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide
or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.” The law does not distinguish or refer only to homicide and murder.
Hence, the Court set aside judgment convicting them of illegal possession
of firearms.
7. People vs. Asuela (376 SCRA 51)
8. People vs. Hamton (395 SCRA 156)
9. People vs. Baldogo (396 SCRA 31)
Facts: Baldogo was convicted for the death of Jorge and for kidnapping the later’s
sister Julie.
Held
There is conspiracy. The prosecution adduced that Baldogo conspired with Bernas
not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie. As long as all
conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate common purpose or design in bringing about the death of
the victim, all conspirators are criminally liable for the death of the victim.
10. People vs. Abut (401 SCRA 498)
Facts
In the evening of September 19, 1997, Winchester, Richie and Gregmar
went into the store of Rudy Galarpe and had a drinking spree. In the store were
Rudy’s employees:
Maricar Perez and her boyfriend Edgar Galarpe, Rosie Pabela and her
boyfriend Al Cailing. Rosie had been Winchester’s boyfriend before Al Cailing.
2:00 a.m. the following day, the employees decided to have a stroll in the
park and thereby seated at the benches. After a few minutes, the three accused
arrived at the park. Wiznchester told Maricar that he wanted to be acquainted with
Edgar. After the handshake, Winchester boxed Edgar who eventually fell to the
ground. The accused ganged up on Edgar and Ritchie struck him with broken
bottles of red horse beer. The three continued the assault on the victim and
stabbed him. Afraid that he would be the next victim, Al fled from the park towards
the nationalhighway. When he heard the girls’ shout, he returned to the park and
together flaggeddown a truck which transported Edgar to the hospital.
Unfortunately, Edgar was already dead on arrival at the hospital.
Held
Treachery was not alleged in the information; hence, it should not be
considered as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order that treachery may be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that: a.) the malefactor employed
means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b.) the means, method or manner
of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The second
is the subjective element of treachery. Treachery must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. In the absence of any
convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means
by which they committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must
resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the mode or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the appellants when they
stabbed the victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the victim. The appellants and
Ritchie then mauled and kicked the victim. There is no evidence that at the outset,
they had decided to stab and kill the victim. It was only at the late stage of the
assault that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the victim. The Court believes that
after ganging up on and mauling the victim, the appellants, at the spur-of-the
moment, decided to stab the victim. Thus, the subjective element of treachery was
not present.
11. People vs. Pagalasan, 404 SCRA 275
Facts
The residence of George and Desiree Lim was ransacked by 4 unknown
men. They overpowered Ferdinand Cortez, the security guard, and housemaid
Julita Sarno and got their cash and valuables then kidnapped George and son
Christopher.
Held
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that Michael, in
conspiracy with 3 others, kidnapped George and son for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Conspiracy maybe inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime showing that they have acted the common
purpose and design. He is found guilty of kidnapping under article 267(4) of RPC.
12. People vs. Tilos, 349 SCRA
Facts
Tilos and Mahinay simultaneously attacked and assaulted Narciso, a sickly
60 years old man who suffered stroke. The act was witnessed by the victims’
daughter, geralyn. Tolentino died 2 days later from hematoma.
Held
There was no conspiracy.
Conspiracy needs not be proven by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime. The accused were guilty of murder, however it was
reserved and only guilty of slight physical injuries.
13. People vs. Hilario, 354 SCR 354
Facts
One quiet evening, Carlos Reyes, while relaxing with hisfriend Berong in
front of a store, he was subjected to a treacherous assault by Rodolfo and Rodrigo
Hilario and their cumpadre. Rodrigo was the one who furnished the weapons and
acted as a look-out; their cumpadre suddenly stabbed Carlos with the ice pick,
simultaneously saying, ‘Ito ba?. Rodolfo standing one-arm length from the victim
acted as a “back-up” man, and uttered, ‘Walang makikialam!’ After the stabbing, all
of them ran away together. It turned out the three mistakenly bent their terror on
Carlos —the one they really planned to kill was Berong. Together, they were
indicted for the crime of murder. Their cumpadre, however, remains unidentified.
Defense:
Rodlofo Hillarion contends that they have no intention to kill Carlos.
Moreover, it was only Rodrigo and their cumpadre who stabbed Carlos, and he
only acted as a look out/ back up man, thus, he is not liable for the crime charged.
State:
The evidence sufficiently demonstrates the existence of conspiracy in the
execution of the crime. Thus, all their acts tend to manifest a common purpose and
devise. The familiar rule in conspiracy is that “when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the conspiracy is proven,
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a conspiracy,
every act of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose, is in
contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, all the three
accused are liable as principals for the death of the victim Carlos Reyes.
Ruling:
The accused is found GUILTY of MURDER qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
14. People vs. Biong, 372 SCRA 34
Facts
April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija: Armed men entered
the house of spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 &
jewelry. Subsequently, they also took the spouses’ car and forcibly boarded
Priscilla along with them. They headed towards Manila, and along the way Priscilla
recognized the one of the kidnappers, who then was driving the car. They told her
that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later on left her at Paxton
Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers having convinced themselves that the
kidnapping did not materialize.
On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which led the police
authorities to the detention and investigation of accused Vergel Bustamante at the
WPD in Manila. He was later identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when
they kidnapped her.
HELD
1) Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and include the correct
name of “Dan Saksak” as Vergel Bustamante is not without basis. Records of the
criminal case forwarded by the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the judge of the
latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan Saksak was one & the same person (di
sinabi sa case kung bakit kasali yung MTC dito. Apparently, it conducted a
preliminary examination):
a) A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in Crim Case Nos.
186-80 & 192-80 was directed to one Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak.”
b) In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of the City Jail of Manila
informed the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @
Dan Saksak said to be one of the accused is not included in the list of present
Inmates of said Jail
c) The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a prima facie case against
the accused therein also stated that one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias
Dan Saksak
d) The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of NE stated
that one of the accused therein, Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak is detained at
the Mla. City Jail
2) In any event, THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL .
THE ISSUE IS ONE AFFECTING JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE RTC IN A MOTION
TO QUAH THE INFORMATION. SINCE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED
TO DO SO, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE
INFORMATION.
15. People vs. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321
Facts
While Lorna, Vanely and others walking going home from a pre-nuptial
dance, when they were escorted and forced to follow by Caraang and Canlas who
were armed and wear bonnets. They sexually abused them but threatened to kill
them if they will inform anyone about the incident after they are released.
Held
The act of one is the act of all and each of them will thereby be deemed
guilty of all the crimes committed. All of them performed special acts with such
closeness and coordination as to include common purpose or design to commit the
crime.
16. Liability:
Once crime was established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as
principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in the
contemplation of the law. “the act of one is the act of all”.
a. People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424
Facts: Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the
judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricide
—she allegedly killed her husband, Francisco Caballero, using a
hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a
daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's
gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated
and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco
abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with
her friends and when she was on her way home she met her
husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused her
of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held
her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her
towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and
proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife
tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so
she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting knife and
thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above
the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab
wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next
day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn
dress that she wore the night before.
Issue: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in
legitimate self-defense
Held: Yes, she did. Acquitted
Ratio:
1.Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this
case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that
the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor.
With her husband kneeling over her and choking her,
accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in
his belt line and thrust it into his side.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife
was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the
testimony of the accused. Based on the re-enactment of the
incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge
the knife into husband's left side.
2.Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present
Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing
her to the ground then choking her just because she was
out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There
was imminent danger of injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being
choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold
of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to
protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not depend
upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such
injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient
when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there
was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
(Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that
she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in
the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night.
b. People vs. Givera, 349 SCRA 513
Facts
Givera was sentenced to death for stabbing Eusebio Gordon.
Contention of the accused: givera claimed that he was merely trying to pacify
the victim and Maximo and ran away because the victim’s son, armed with
bolo, and charged at him.
Held
In conspiracy, it is necessary that all participants performed specific acts
designed to bring about the death of the victim. Givera is guilty of the crime
murder as he himself dealt the death blow that sent Eusebio to his grave.
c. People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528
Facts
In a chapel located at Barrio Macalong, La Paz, Tarlac, a pabasa was
being held. It was held on the evening of April 10l 1933, between 11 and 12
o’clock. Procopio Reyes, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castro Alipio,
and Rufino Matias arrived at the place.They were carrying bolos and crowbars
and started to construct barbed wire fence in front of the chapelAlfonso
Castillo, chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to stop them
from carrying out their plan and reminded them that it was holy week.The
people attending the pabasa noticed the verbal altercation, and they became
curious and excited of what’s happening that they left the place hurriedly to
have a look.Dishes and saucers and benches that were used in the pabasa
were toppled over.The pabasa was discontinued and was not resumed until
after an investigation condceted by the chief of police on the following
morning.The accused persons are partisans of the Clemente Family.
Apparently, the land on which the old chapel was erected was informally
donated by the Clemente Family. When it was destroyed, the present chapel
was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is
impinging the land that belongs to the Clemente Family. Appellants were
convicted of a violation of Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code: Offending the
religious feelings.
Held
They are guilty of violating article 287 of the RPC: “unjust vexation”.It is to
be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful."The construction of a fence, even
though irritating and vexatious under thecircumstances to those present, is not
such an act as can be designated as"notoriously offensive to the faithful". The
act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter
how religious a turn of mind they might be.The fence was constructed late at
night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to
celebrate the pabasa.Therefore, the court ruled that the appellants are
therefore acquitted of aviolation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but
found guilty of aviolation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
d. People vs. Almazan, 349 SCRA 281
Facts
Artemio was struck on the head with a bolo by his wife, Amparo’s nephew,
Jerito Almazan. Artemio then turned around and was stabbed by Jaime
Almazan, the younger brother which caused his death. Antonio was trying to
help his father but he was struck with a bolo on the face and left hand by Danilo
Villegas.
Held
There was no aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Indeed,
there is no evidence showing the time when accused appellants determined to
commit the crime, acts manifestly indicating that they had clung to their
determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow them opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of their
acts and to allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will.
e. People vs. Patano, 399 SCRA 90
Facts
The accused kidnapped Vicente Uy for ransom worth 10 million first but
the final bidding was at 5 million.
Contention of the accused: the RTC erred grossly in convicting the accused
without being identified as the abductions. The RTC erred in convicted them
solely on the basis of the tone and uncorroborated testimony of the coconspirators.
Held
James Patano was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There was never any positive identification
made. No conspiracy because mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as party to a conspiracy. The
mere presence of Patano at the resort after the commission of the crime does
not comply conspiracy.
f.
People vs. Gonzales, 357 SCRA 460
Facts
Inside the publishing house, Joselito saw Teodoro Gonzales and Enrico
Soriano. They were known to Joselito for Enrico was a former classmate. At
around 1 am Joselito noticed that they were no longer around.
while Joselito, Froilan and Rolando were walking home, Teodoro
suddenly appeared from the direction of Bibig ng kabataan St. armed with a
pen of knife. teodoro attacked Rolando hitting him at the middle portion of the
chest. teodoro made a second attackon Rolando which eroded by the later.
Joselito and Rolando survived the fatal wounds.
Held
Teodoro Gonzales was convicted of murder and 2 counts of frustrated
murder. Enrico Soriano was acquitted because mere knowledge or approval of
the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute one party to conspiracy.
g. People vs. Natividad, 411 SCRA 587
17. Extent of Liability:
a. People vs. Escote, 400 SCRA 603
Facts: On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular
driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus
from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on
board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some
passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus,
including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing
maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets.2 Juan seated himself on the
third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers' seats, while
Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another
passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at
the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his
waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then,
Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center
mirrors installed atop the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking
vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the
commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger
to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six
wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder,
another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and
one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns.
They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for
dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family
after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his
family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter
inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
b. People vs. Binarao, 414 SCRA 177
c. People vs. Vicente, 372 SCRA 765
Crime: Muder
Held: after the commission of the crime, Vicente immediately placed himself to
the police station. Under Sec 388 of Local govt. code for posses of the RPC,
kagawad is a person in authority Art 63 provides that the lesser of the 2
indivisible penalties shall be imposed there being a mC attending the
commission of the crime.
d. People vs. Pabillare, 418 SCRA 104
e. People vs. Bisda, 406 SCRA 454
Held: The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William
and Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim. The trial court did not award
any moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court
has to be modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In
this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the
school. The appellants also tied her hands, and placed scotch tape on her
mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF
barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that she
cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and psychological
ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in the
amount of P300,000.[104] Since there were demands for ransom, not to
mention the use by the appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim from the
school to the Jollibee Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda, the victim
is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.[105] Although the
victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the prosecution failed to
prove the value of the same.
F. LIABILITY FOR MULTIPLE, COMPLEX, AND CONTINUING CRIMES
1. Art. 9, pars. 1 &2 and Art. 48
2. People vs. Sanchez, 313 SCRA 254
Facts: M14 rifle. Mayor Jorge Areda of Bugney, Cagayan arrived at Octagon
Cockpit Arena for a sponsored cock derby. He was assisted by peace officers and
the cockpit was assigned with guards to maintain peace and order. At around
10pm, Mario Tabaco seated at the lower portion of the arena, without warning and
provocation shot the mayor followed the successive burst of gunfire resulting to the
death of the mayor and the two other seated with him.
Mario rushed of the cockpit arena meeting Sgt. Raquepo and Pat. Retreta and
the former pointed the gun to Raquepo prompting Retreta to grapple fo the
possession of the gun. In the process, the gun went of hitting Raquepoon his leg
and Jorge Siriban who died on the spot.
Contention of the state: There should be 4 penalties of R.P. as there were 4 victims
killed.
Contention of the accused: It is a complex, crime, hence, there should be only one
penalty. Only one criminal impulse by pressing the trigger once.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the state.
The court declared that it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
produce the several felonies, but the no. of bullets which actually produced them.
Hence, where the accused pressed the trigger of a submachine gun and the gun
fired continually and several persons were killed or injured, there are as many
crimes as persons killed or injured.
3. People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Facts: Amado Hernandez, bung the founder and President of Congress of Labor
Organization (CLO) and a communist by principle was charged with the crime of
REBELLION. The information alleged that on several speeches conducted by him,
Hernandez expressed his strong discontent with the gout and his support for the
fight of communist party of the Phil. The trial court found him guilty as principal of
the charges and sentenced him to a penalty of Reclusion perpetua with its
accessories provided by law and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Contention of the State: He was guilty of rebellion because he was a member f the
communist party that through his speeches he aroused the labor class to rebel
against the gout and providing the needed supply and clothes.
Contention of the accused: He was a mere communist by ideology and was not
part
of the conspiracy to overthrow Zuirino government. He did not actually
participated in the rebellion or any act of conspiracy to commit or faster the cause
of the rebellion.
He merely plays the role of propagation by lecture, meetings and organizations of
committees of education by communists.
Ruling: Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion,
as a means necessary for the perpetration of the offense. Such offenses are
absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. In as much as the act specified in
art. 135 constitute one single crime, it follows that said acts offer no occasion for
the application of act. 48, which requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.
4. People vs. Ducay, 225 Phil. 1
G. LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL LAWS
1. Article 10, RPC
a. Padilla vs. Dizon (158 SCRA 127; 1988)
b. Padilla vs. CA (269 SCRA 402)
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on
apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high
powered firearms were found in his possession:
1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident
modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no
papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of
Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of
reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum.
The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration
was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a
sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed
“Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
Issues:
1.
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There
is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per
se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless
arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in
flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo,
petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing
another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening
event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are
admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
- Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid
intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in
pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who
had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo:
objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
- Search of moving vehicle
- Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12,
Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of
incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be
searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and
search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and
run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains
more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea.
2.
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute
as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence
during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by
the
prosecution.
Indeed,
petitioner’s
purported
Mission
Order
and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence
for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived
and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum
Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988
Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of
Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP,
which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the
M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a
civilian.
3.
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes
excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D.
1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context” and adds
that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to
21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of
appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be
faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted
to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The severity of
a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant
which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification
of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently,
the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are
not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on
the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question
falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts,
we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining
petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8
months & 1 day, as maximum.
People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties
therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating
by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied.
c. People vs. Simon (234 SCRA 555; 1994)
Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the
RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the
proper period should be applied.
IV.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 11)
1. SELF-DEFENSE; DEFENSE OF RELATIVES AND STRANGERS; DEFENSE OF
-
PROPERTY; DEFENSE OF REPUTATION
a. Elements
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of
David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot
Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that
would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant
was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and askedthem to stop destroying his house
and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot
Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and
Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At
the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment(settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case
pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He
was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1.WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but
rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err.
However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred
to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence
their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to
subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by
the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It
is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2.WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
- Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and
he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides
that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art.
539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
- Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
- Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there
was no provocation atall since he was asleep Since not all requisites present,
defendant is credited withthe special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are:
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. Crime is homicide (2 counts)
not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by
the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3.WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and
not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damagesand costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to theaccused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be givenretroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the
RPC.
Held:
Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating
circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor
and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and
w/oaward for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained14 years so
his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting.
Defense of property can only beinvoked when coupled with form of attack on
person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should
then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than
-
that, he should be released.
People vs. Geneblazo (371 SCRA 573)
HELD: 1. Assuming that geneblazo version that the aggression emanated from
opalsa and obien, the aggression ceased to exist when the 2 ran away so
when geneblazo pursued them it was then that he became the aggressor. 2.
Geneblazo still continued to stab opalsa in the neck even in the presence of
SPO1 quique. 3. Geneblazo admitted that he recognized SPO1 quique after he
had stabbed the victim for the second time. His taking flight instead of
surrendering to the latter was evidentiary of guilt and negates self-defense.
-
People vs. Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267
Held: The prosecution was able to establish that appellant suddenly and
unexpectedly shot the victim at the back without any provocation on his part. In
fact the trial court found that “Bullet wounds Nos. 3 and 4 on the thoraco
abdominal region were inflicted while the assailant was at the back of the
victim.” The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring without risk to the aggressor the commission
of the crime. There being treachery, appellant must be convicted of murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
imposable when the crime was committed in 1972 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death which has a duration of 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to death.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which is reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the trial court imposed the correct penalty upon appellant.
On the civil aspect of the case, we affirm the trial court’s award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. By way of exemplary damages
based on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, an amount
of P25,000.00 should be awarded to the said heirs.
As to actual damages, Serafin Hubines, Sr. presented the receipts showing that
he spent P106,288.85 as hospital and medical expenses; P13,000.00 as
funeral expenses, or a total of P119,288.85.
-
People vs. Bates, 400 SCRA 95
Facts: On or about the 28th day of November 1995, at around 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon, in Brgy. Esperanza, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused MARCELO BATES and
MARCELO BATES, JR., conspiring together and confederating with and
mutually helping and aiding one another, with treachery, evident premeditation
and intent to kill, being then armed with long bolos, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hack to death the person of the victim
herein, JOSE BOHOLST without giving the latter sufficient time to defend
himself, thereby inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his
instantaneous death. Death Certificate and Autopsy Report are hereto
attached. In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
Held: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which is not offset by any
aggravating circumstance, the maximum period of the penalty to be imposed
shall be taken from the minimum of reclusion temporal which is 12 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months; while the minimum period shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to
12 years.For the guidance of both the bench and bar, it must be mentioned that
the trial court committed an error in imposing the penalty of "forty (40) years of
reclusion perpetua". We reiterate our earlier pronouncements in a number of
cases that while Section 21 of RA No. 7659 amended Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code by fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1
day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty in the
absence of a clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty.25 Hence, in applicable cases such as the present case,
"reclusion perpetua" should simply be imposed without specifying its duration.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch
35, is MODIFIED. Appellant Marcelo Bates is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the
maximum; and is ordered to pay the Heirs of Jose Boholst the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death, P50,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
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People vs. Caratao, 403 SCRA 482
Held: Bulawin was found to be the unlawful aggression. In Caratao being made
to wait and make update pleas for his rice vale must have have moved him to
be the unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting stab wounds to Bulawin. The
decision was modified, Caratao was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide.
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People vs. Vicente, 405 SCRA 40
Held: But above all, what convinces us to affirm the trial court’s finding is the
presence of badges of guilt that renders appellant’s claim of self-defense
dubious and unworthy of belief. First, the victim suffered a fatal wound at the
chest. It lacerated his vital organs. The location of the wound belies and
negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to
end the life of the victim. Second, appellant failed to inform the authorities that
he acted in self-defense. And third, he failed to surrender the knife to the
authorities. We have ruled that failure to inform the authorities of the unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing
him militates against the claim of self-defense. In People vs. Mier, we also held
that the non-presentation of the weapon which was allegedly used by the victim
in attacking the accused and the failure of the defense to account for its nonpresentation are fatal to the accused’s plea of self-defense.
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to
establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Here, appellant
miserably failed to discharge such burden.
The trial court also held that the crime committed by appellant is qualified by
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery is present in this case. The fact that the attack is frontal does not
negate the finding of treachery. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous if
sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. Here, the victim was
suddenly stabbed when he was extending his hand to the appellant. With his
mindset, the victim could not have any inkling that there was danger to his life
when he approached appellant.
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People vs. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463
Held: The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of selfdefense has the onus probandi of proving the elements thereof. The essential
requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense. Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. Under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the appropriate
penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Appellant is
likewise entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to
award P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim. Moral damages
cannot be granted in the absence of proof therefor. Unlike in rape cases, this
type of award is not automatically given in murder or homicide.
The
prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of
P28,650. The award of exemplary damages should be omitted considering that
no aggravating circumstance was duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of
homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor
medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual
damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. The grant of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED.
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Cano vs. People, 413 SCRA 92
Facts:
On the morning of May 31, 1993 Orlando Cano (victim) arrived at the RUSH ID
booth of his brother Conrado Cano (petitioner). That happens to be his’
competition on the aforementioned business. He said to the employee“P*****
ina nya! Why did he Xerox our permit”. Since Conrado wasn’t around, he
returned to his’ own booth which was a few meters away. The r eason the
Orlando was furious, earlier Conrado photocopied his’ businesspermit without
his permission. When the Conrado arrived on his’ booth, Orlando arrived. He
held the Conrado by the shoulders and turned him around. "Anong gusto mong
mangyari?" the Orlando said and there was no responsefrom the Conrado.
Conrad noticed that Orlando was holding a butterfly knife/balisong, Conrado
found refuge on the dark room of the studio. Orlando was forcing himself to
open the door, as he was shouting “Get out of the re pakialamero ka! Get out of
there and I will kill you”. When the door suddenly gave way, Orlando charged
Conradoand Conrado deflected the attack. Conrado picked up a pair of
scissors. After they grappled Orlando collapsed andfell bloodied on the floor.
Conrado picked his brother up to bring to the hospital but the wife of Orlando
had hit him with a chair and shouted “Holdupper!”. Conrado was forced to leave
the vicinity in the fear of being lynched by the public. When he was pursued,
the saw a policeman and surrendered.
Contention of the State:
Conrado has intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack,assault and use personal violence upon Orlando by then stabbing the
latter on different parts of the body, therebyinf
licting mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his’ death.
Contention of the Accused:
Conrado had pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, during the pendency of
theappeal the, Gloria the widow of Orlando executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
where she said that it was merely self defense. And she withdraws the charges
against Conrado.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of
killingthe victim was attended by a justifying circumstance, for which no criminal
and civil liability can attach. Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur anycriminal
liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for his lawful act. The only
instance when a person whocommits a crime with the attendance of a justifying
circumstance incurs civil liability is when he, in order to avoidan evil or injury,
does an act which causes damage to another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of
Article 11 of theRevised Penal Code. Otherwise stated, if a person charged
with homicide successfully pleads self-defense, hisacquittal by reason thereof
will extinguish his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgmentappealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Conrado Cano is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged againsthim and his immediate release from custody is ordered
unless there is another cause for his continued detention.
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Santos vs. CA, 415 SCRA 384
FACTS:
At 7:00 p.m. on May 15, 1990, Loreto Hernandez, a resident of Brgy. Sto.
Rosario, Paombong, then employed with the Manila Hotel as a security guard
and his companion Roy de Borja, were walking along a narrow footpath on
their way home from a visit to a mutual friend, Fely Jumaquio. Upon reaching
that portion of the footpath in front of the house of Rufino Panganiban (a
maternal uncle of petitioner Oscar P. Santos), the petitioner and his brother
Pedro Santos, Jr. suddenly emerged into view and effectively blocked their
way. Hernandez greeted the petitioner by his name “Ka Oscar” but, without
much ado, Pedro, Jr. aimed a .45 calibre automatic pistol at the face of
Hernandez, and squeezed the trigger of the gun which, fortunately, did not fire.
Forthwith, the petitioner hacked Hernandez twice with a jungle bolo. Hernandez
was struck; first, at the right forearm which he defensively raised to parry the
blow and, second, at the right side of the head. Hernandez fell to the ground
semi-unconscious, blood oozing from his wounds. The petitioner then turned to
De Borja who attempted to flee. The petitioner stabbed De Borja at the back,
near the waistline. De Borja fell to the ground, and saw the petitioner hack
another person whom he could not identify. The petitioner even told his brother,
“Utol, Jr. alis na tayo; patay na ang mga iyan.”
As soon as Santos and his brother left the premises, De Borja, although
himself already injured, endeavored to help Hernandez to his feet. The two
crossed a river and proceeded to the barangay road where, at the foot of a
bridge, Hernandez was left behind, as De Borja went to look for any available
vehicle that would take them to the hospital. While Hernandez was waiting for
De Borja, a tricycle appeared. Hernandez boarded the same and proceeded to
the De Leon Clinic in Paombong, where he was refused admission for
undisclosed reasons. Thereafter, Hernandez boarded another tricycle which
brought him to the provincial hospital at Malolos where he was administered
blood transfusion and extended first-aid treatment.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
Santos testified that when Hernandez aimed his gun at his head, the petitioner
raised his right hand, and holding his bolo, swung it downwards. Hernandez
then raised his right hand to parry the thrust of the petitioner. In the process,
the petitioner’s bolo hit Hernandez’ right forearm and the right side of his head
above the right ear. Santos interposed self-defense. He claimed that he hacked
Hernandez and De Borja only as an act of self-defense.
RULING:
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has
demonstrated, can easily be fabricated. To merit approbation, the accused is
burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the
following essential requisites for self-defense: (a) there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that the means employed to prove or
repel such aggression was reasonable; and (c) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a
person or an imminent anger thereof; and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
where there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for even if the evidence of the prosecution
were weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted killing or injuring the victim.
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People vs. Retubado, 417 SCRA 384
Held: Retubado is guilty of homicide. He is the unlawful aggressor provocation
and the author of the deliberate and malicious act of showing Canon Sr. at a
close range on the forehead.
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Rugas vs. People, January 14, 2004
Fact: At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto
(or Gerberto) Rafol was conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the
house of Anda Romano in barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when
the accused Alexander P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He
faced him to know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his
stomach. He ran and shouted for help. Somebody helped him in boarding him
to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan where Dr. Fermin
M. Fatalla operated on him and issued the medico-legal certificate, dated
September 25, 1977 (Exh. F) and he drew a sketch (Exh. G). Dr. Fatalla found
a stab wound on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, 3 cms. in length and
about 4 to 5 cms. in depth penetrating the abdominal cavity as well as the right
lobe of the liver. This was a fatal wound, involving as it did the liver, one of the
vital organs of the body. The patient could die of severe hemorrhage if no
surgical operation was done. And he immediately operated the patient upon
arrival at the hospital. The second stab wound was 7.5 cms. in length located at
the lower left quadrant or at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh. This was
not a fatal wound. Both could have been caused by any sharp pointed or
bladed instrument like a knife. The first stab wound could have been inflicted
with the assailant in front of the victim or at the right side of the victim or
somewhere obliquely to the right of the patient, using his right or left hand. The
second stab wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front or could
be on the left side of the victim, obliquely to the side of the victim, which he
could inflict if he comes from the rear or from the back of the victim using his
right hand.
Held: Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily
fabricated. When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits
having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him
to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential
requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or
repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the prosecution’s, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the killing. In People v. Alfaro, and People v.
Camacho, we held that the failure of the accused to account for the
presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his
plea of self-defense. In this case, the appellant failed to account for the knife
supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which the victim allegedly handed
over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used in stabbing the
victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to the police authorities and
to admit having stabbed the victim in self-defense. Such failure rejects
appellant’s claim of self-defense. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide defined and penalized under Article
247 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
The petitioner is hereby directed to pay to the victim Herberto D. Rafol
P25,000.00, as moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages.
Costs against the petitioner.
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b. Burden of Proof
Unidad vs. CA, 399 SCRA 27
Held: To start with, petitioner claimed self-defense, thereby shifting upon him
the burden of the evidence to prove that: (1) the victim unlawfully attacked him;
(2) he took the necessary means to repel the attack; and (3) he did not provoke
said attack. Petitioner had to prove these by clear and convincing evidence. As
to the award of damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim in homicide is correct.[46] The grant of P192,000.00 for unearned
income of the victim is also supported by the evidence, according to the
formula set forth in People v. Silvestre, The record shows that the victim was 32
years old and was earning at least P1,120.00 a month. Finally, the actual
damages for funeral expenses should be reduced from P131,000.00 to
P54,500.00, as only the latter amount is supported by receipts.
The crime of homicide is punished by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). With the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum, which is, 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
Thus, petitioner should serve an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which
is anywhere within one degree lower than the above prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal; hence, anywhere within prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to
12 years).
The maximum of the indeterminate sentence can be anywhere
within the properly imposable penalty abovementioned, reclusion temporal in
its minimum period (12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). The
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED, so as to reduce
the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is AFFIRMED except that of
actual damages for funeral expenses, which is hereby reduced to P54,500.00.
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People vs. Areo, 404 SCRA 30
Held: When Areo admitted committing the crime and invokes self-defense is
escape criminal liability the burden of proof shift to him. He must prove the 3
requisite be present. But having no scratch or bruise in the alleged attack show
that unlawful aggression was not found in the case.
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People vs. Annibong, 403 SCRA 92
Facts: Appellant, a kitchen aide serving at the camp, testified that on February
13, 1998, while he and Tallong were in their camp at Barangay Doña Loreta,
Pudtol, Apayao, the victim arrived coming from Centro, Pudtol, Apayao. When
Obngayan went to the kitchen to get a drink, he was irritated to discover the
water container empty. Hopping mad, Obngayan rushed to appellant and boxed
him three times in the stomach and uttered: “Vulva of your mother, it is better
that I will kill you.” Obngayan proceeded to his bunker, got his M-16 rifle and
aimed it at appellant, prompting the latter to shoot the victim once. After the first
shot, the victim managed to stand and aim his gun at appellant prompting the
latter to fire his M-16. But since the M-16 malfunctioned, appellant grabbed the
garand rifle of Artemio Tallong and shot the victim once more. Immediately
after the shooting, appellant escaped with Tallong and proceeded to Suan,
Pudtol, Apayao. Two days later, both surrendered to Governor Batara P. Laoat,
who advised them to surrender to the police.
ARTEMIO TALLONG was presented by the defense to show unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. As one of the CAFGU’s on duty at the
time of the incident, he said he witnessed the incident from the time Cpl.
Obngayan arrived at the detachment until he was shot.
Tallong narrated that on February 13, 1998, around 2:00 P.M., Cpl. Obngayan
arrived at the Philippine Army detachment in Brgy.
Doña Loreta, Pudtol,
Apayao where he was then the commanding officer. Still perspiring and thirsty
from an operation in Centro, Pudtol, Apayao, Cpl. Obngayan hurriedly
proceeded to the camp’s kitchen for a drink. Incensed that all of the water
containers were empty, Obngayan confronted appellant whose duty it was to
maintain the camp’s kitchen. He gave appellant a jab in the abdomen, then
slowly walked away towards his bunker.
Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14 armalite rifle and
strafed the former on the back. Obngayan sprawled bloodied on the ground.
Shortly after, appellant took the garand rifle of Artemio Tallong, and unleashed
another barrage of gunshots. Obngayan died instantaneously with his brain
splattered and an eye fallen on the ground.
The prosecutor adopted the testimony of defense witness Artemio Tallong for
purposes of the prosecution. Other prosecution witnesses were Dr. Dan Redel
Edroso, the Municipal Health Officer of Pudtol, Apayao, who conducted a postmortem examination on the victim’s body; Lt. Walfrido Felix Querubin of the
Philippine Army; Cpl. Robert Salarzon, from the Philippine Army assigned at
Nararragan, Ballesteros, Cagayan; Capt. Efren Paulino, from the Philippine
Army assigned at the Headquarters Service Battalion, Camp Upi, Gamu,
Isabela; and Mrs. Agnes Obngayan, the victim’s widow.
Held: In his Brief, appellant offers no substantial reason, however, why we
should overturn the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence presented against
him. Instead, he merely reiterates in this appeal his claim of self-defense. In
cases where the accused admits committing the crime but invokes selfdefense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
on the prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the
accused to prove the elements of his defense.[16] In our view, the defense has
not discharged its burden successfully.
The elements of self-defense are (1) that the victim has committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense; (2) that there is reasonable necessity in the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there
is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense
or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense
be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.
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People vs. Gonza, 415 SCRA 507
Held: Gonza is guilty of murder. When the accused invokes self-defense, the
burden of evidence is shift to him to prove that he killed the victim to the save
his life. He must rely on his own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence
of the prosecution. He must prove w/ clean and convincing evidence all the
requisites of self defense.
2. STATE OF NECESSITY (AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL)
Elements:
1. Evil sought to be avoided actually exist
2. Injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. There is no other practical & less harmful means of preventing it
Ø The evil or injury sought to be avoided must not have been created by the one
invoking the justifying circumstances.
Ø General rule: No liability in justifying circumstances because there is no crime.
Ø Exception: There is CIVIL LIABILITY under this paragraph. They shall be liable
in proportion to the benefit which they may have been received.
People vs. Ricohermoso, 56 SCRA 431 (1974)
Facts: On the morning of January 30, 1965, Geminiano met Pio and asked him
if he could have his share of the palay that Pio harvested from tilling
Geminiano’s land. Pio told him to drop by his house anytime to get it so
Geminiano said he will drop by in the afternoon with his son Marianito. That
afternoon, Geminiano sat outside Pio’s house to wait for the promised palay.
Pio was standing by the door of his house with Severo also standing by.
Marianito was standing a few feet behind his father with a gun slung in his
shoulder. Hostile, Pio told Geminiano that he was not going to give him palay
thus Geminiano remonstrated. Pio then unsheathed his bolo and approached
Geminiano from the left. Severo took an axe and approached from the right. At
this, Geminiano held up his hands and told Severo not to fight. Pio then
stabbed Geminiano’s neck with the bolo. With Geminiano faced down on the
ground, Severo hacked his back with the axe. While this was going on, Juan
suddenly embraced Marianito from behind. They grappled and rolled downhill
where Marianito passed out. When he came to, he saw his mortally wounded
father and carried him a short distance. Geminiano died at approximately 2pm.
Pio is a fugitive from justice in this case. Severo and Juan were
convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The two were also
convicted of lesions leves (for Marianito). Other three were acquitted. Severo
and Juan appealed for the murder conviction. They contend that Geminiano
unsheathed his bolo first so Pio met him and struck. As Geminiano turned to
flee, Pio struck again on the left side and thus Geminiano fell to the ground and
died due to the bleeding. Marianito was embraced by Juan because he
allegedly reached for his gun and tried to shoot Pio. With this argument, they
shift the responsibility of the killing to Pio (who was not there and not tried–a
fugitive) and that Pio was only acting in self-defense. Juan contends he was
just protecting Pio and Severo when he prevented Mariano from firing his gun.
A few days after filing this appeal however, Severo withdrew and in effect
accepted prosecution’s version. So, this appeal concerns Juan only.
Issue: WON Juan conspired with Pio and Severe in the killing of Geminiano
and is he deserving of reclusion perpetua?
Held: Yes, judgment affirmed. Considering the trio’s orchestrated behavior and
Juan’s close relationship to Pio and Severo, conclusion is that he acted in
conspiracy with them, planning the whole thing, from the time after Pio met
Geminiano in the morning to the event in the afternoon. He cannot invoke
Article 11, par 4 (justifying circumstances) in explaining his act of preventing
Marianito from shooting Pio and Severo as evidence shows he did this to
ensure that the killing of Geminiano happened without any risk to Pio and
Severo. His malicious intention was not to avoid any evil from Marianito but to
forestall any interference in the assault done by Pio and Severo. Even though
he did not take direct part in the killing, his conspiracy with the others made him
a principal too. Moreover, treachery was involved. Juan weakened the victim’s
defense by disabling Marianito and ensured the killing without any risk to
themselves. Thus, the act of one is the act of all, and Juan is also guilty of
murder.
3. FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR LAWFUL EXISTENCE OF RIGHT
Elements:
1. Offender acted in performance of duty or lawful exercise of a right/office
2. The resulting felony is the unavoidable consequence of the due fulfillment of the
duty or the lawful exercise of the right or office.
Ø If first condition is present,
Ø but the second is not because the offender acted with culpa,
• the offender will be entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• the penalty would be reduced by one or two degrees.
People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738 (1922)
Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe Delima found
him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the
shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but Napoleon answered with a
stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didn’t hit
Napoleon. The criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his weapon; the
policeman shot him dead. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide; he
appealed.
Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the
killing was done in performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to
surrender and his disobedience with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him.
The action was justified by the circumstances.
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943)
Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under
instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict,
and if overpowered, to get hi dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house,
they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the
door, simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any
reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent
man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal..
Held: Both accused are guilty of murder
Ratio: Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In
apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the
captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight
the officers of law who are trying to capture him that killing him would be
justified.
People vs. Lagata, 83 Phil. 150
FACTS:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar,
was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong &
Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not
long afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing
so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3
shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by the
1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away
because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions
were also probably scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not
answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain.
He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found footprints and
called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of
the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata
fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded
and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata
cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw
Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from
Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales,
Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death of
Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the
prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He
said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody.
Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others.
hopeless already.
prisoner’s work.
He was
Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the
HELD: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious
physical injuries. Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating
circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC)
RATIO:
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The
record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of
aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around
him. How could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the very
guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of
his duties, the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire
directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of
them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only
ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.
4. OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDER
Elements:
1. Order must have been issued by a superior
2. The order is for some lawful purpose
3. The means used to carry it out must be lawful
Ø A subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior,
• if he is not aware of the illegality of the order and
• he is not negligent.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Facts
1. Pres. Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the Office of
the President in cash what MIAA owes PNCC which later was reiterated in writing.
2. The Marcos’ memo indicated the amount of P55m for partial payment of the
obligation to PNCC.
3. In obedience to Marcos’ instruction, the accused withdrew the amount by means
of 3 separate issuances of manager’s check and encashment in 3 separate dates
as well.
4. The money withdrawn were placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags and
delivered to the private secretary of Marcos also in 3 separate days. According to
the accused, the disbursement was not in the normal procedure since there were
no vouchers supporting it and no receipt from PNCC.
5. Tabuena and Peralta were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation.
Held: The accused were acquitted. They’re entitled to the justifying circumstance of
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Sandiganbayan claimed that Marcos’ memo was unlawful because it orders
disbursement of P55M when the Ongpin memo reveals that the liability is only
34.5M. Granting this to be true, it will not affect Tabuena’s good faith as to make
him criminally liable. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and
subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there
would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
People vs. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10
Ruling: Under the present law (Article 122 as amended by R.A. 7659 and P.D. 532)
piracy may be committed in the Philippine waters or in the high seas by any person
(outsider, passenger, or member of the complement of the vessel)
5. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Battered woman syndrome is a criminal defense involving a pattern of
psychological dependency among women caught in long-term relationships with
abusive male partners. Over time, abuse produces an irrational mental state of
"learned helplessness," limiting free choice and placing victims of abuse in a spiral
of conflict that occasionally results in a violent and sometimes fatal response over
which they have no rational control.
The traditional legal concept of self-defense is based on a contest of equals
more typical of fights between males. The proponents of the defense argue
criminal intent issues in the conventional standards of self-defense is inadequate to
explain male-female conflicts. While the battered women syndrome defense has
been argued successfully in many cases, it has been contested by forensic
psychologists and legal scholars.
People vs. Genosa, 419 SCRA 357
Held: one who resorts to self –defense must fact a real the of one’s. The was no
more unlawful aggression when Marivic killed Ben, it was not completely justified.
RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004)
RA 9262 (ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINTS WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004)
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children,
under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or
consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the
penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be
punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries
shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees
lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the
preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision
mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the
presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three
hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
B. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 12)
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt
from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as
a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably
with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care
and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in
said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful insuperable cause.
1. INSANITY AND IMBECILITY
IMBECILE
one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of
children between 2 and 7 years of age. Exempt in all cases from criminal liability
INSANE
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act but capable of
having lucid intervals. During a lucid interval, the insane acts with intelligence and
thus, not exempt from criminal liability.
Ø Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance and must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt
Ø Evidence of insanity must refer to
• the time preceding the act under prosecution or
• at the very moment of its execution.
Ø Insanity subsequent to commission of crime is not exempting
Ø Feeblemindedness is not imbecility
a. People vs. Florendo, 413 SCRA 132
Held: he was apparent well until 3-4 prior to his admission the hospital. He
claimed that he suspected his wife of having a extramarital affair. There should
be complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, absence and freedom.
Florendo is guilty of parricide.
b. People vs. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699 (2000)
Facts: December 27, 1994, at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the
sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the
crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair.
Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant saw this. He requested the accused to
vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated
request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with
his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed
Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one
can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red stains on his shirt and
a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife.
Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” where he claims that:
prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the
victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail
warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be treated at the
Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be
transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was
pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for
Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel informed
the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the
past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The trial
court denied reconsideration of the order denying the “Demurrer to Evidence.”
Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of
Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the accused being
confined and diagnosed with “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.”
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue: WON he was indeed insane
Held: When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have
been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. An
insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a
lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor
of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it
by clear and positive evidence. There are certain circumstances that should
have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full
possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went
up the microphone. Accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought
to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct
matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent person
on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights
to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing
should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case
at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on
the ground of accused’s mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after
finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered
by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions
asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent
enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely
upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt
in the judge’s mind of accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution
rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be confined in
hospital, as well as the counsel’s filing of motion. And despite all the
overwhelming indications of accused-appellant’s state of mind, the judge
persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting
accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found
appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Judgment: At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it
impossible for us to evaluate appellant’s mental condition at the time of the
crime’s commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
Nonetheless,
under
the
present
circumstances,
accused-appellant’s
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to
participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination
of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
c. People vs. Villa Jr., 331 SCRA 142 (2000)
Facts: Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass when his neighbor Rodolfo Villa,
Jr., a member of the CAFGU came out with his M-1 Garand rifle and shot
Dionito killing him instantly (discovered later that Dionito accused him of
stealing chickens). Ronald and Sheila, children of Dionito, rushed out and were
also shot. Sheila was only shot in the thigh and tummy. Samuel Eclevia,
attempted to wrestle the rifle but was also gunned down. Villa Jr. surrendered
and was charged with multiple murder. He pleaded not guilty and invoked self
defense (says that Dionito was charging at him with a bolo). His new lawyer (he
changed lawyers in the middle) moved for a psychiatric examination and it was
granted. He was confined in the Mental Hospital for evaluation (for insanity) for
a month which resulted in the finding of Insanity or Psychosis classified as
Schizophrenia. He was found to be incompetent to stand trial. After 6 months,
the doctors found him fit to stand trial. After his release, he pleaded insanity as
a defense, which was disregarded. The only issue to be resolved is whether
accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crimes as would
exempt him from criminal liability.
Held: Court was not convinced that he was insane during the commission of
the crime since the evaluation did not say so in unequivocal terms. Dr. Zalsos
was unsure when she testified. In order that insanity can be considered as an
exempting circumstance, it must be shown to exist just before or during the
commission of the offense. It must be shown beyond doubt that there was
complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the
time of the commission of the crime, which the accused failed to prove.
- Insanity is evidenced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has
no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his acts. We
are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time he perpetrated the
killings. The following circumstances clearly point to saneness. (a) Immediately
surrendering to the Police; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement; (c)
Gave a sworn statement before the Prosecutor’s Office after the crimes
narrating the incident (admit that he was of sound mind). These are hardly the
acts of a person with a sick mind.
- The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Thus, a person accused of
a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of
proving it.
- The defense banks heavily on the findings of the psychiatrists. Doctors did not
say that he was totally insane to warrant conclusion that he was insane enough
to kill all those people. We agree with the trial court that the results of the
examinations conducted by the psychiatrists on accused-appellant appear to
be based on incomplete or insufficient facts. Records show that the
psychiatrists relied mainly on the data supplied by accused-appellant and his
police escort. It could be that he was insane while being evaluated and was
contacted during his detention prior trial, maybe due to guilt or realizations. To
be a defense it has to be there when crime was commissioned.
d. People vs. Madarang, 332 SCRA 99 (2000)
Nature: Appeal to decision of RTC that convicted him of 4 murders.
There should be no aggravating circumstance just because he was from
CAFGU and had an M-1 Grand Rifle.
e. People vs. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168 (1999)
1. Fernando and his wife quarreled. In the heat of the fight, the accused
stabbed his wife causing her death.
2. The accused declared that he had no recollection of the stabbing incident.
3. Court ordered the accused’s confinement in a mental institution where it was
found that he was inflicted with schizophrenia. He was submitted to treatment
for 2 years, after which, he faced the charges against him.
Held: The accused failed to prove that he was completely deprived of
intelligence in committing the act. He did not show any signs of insanity prior to
and immediately after the act. He was only diagnosed of schizophrenia months
after the incident.
Held: The court found out that Diaz while he was committed to the Natl Center
for mental health was not diagnosed as insofar but was suffering from
pedophilia. Thus there is no doubt in mind that he was sane during his 2 year
confinement in the center, pedophilia being similar to insanity.
f.
People vs. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 (1998)
Facts: Tabugoca in two criminal cases guilty of 2 counts of rape committed
against his own daughters sentenced him to reclusion perpetue for the first &
death for the second.
Facts: Jacqueline & her 3 younger sisters Janet, Jinky & jewel lived under the
sole care of their father after their mother died August 28, 1991.
March 28, 1992, around 10pm, Jacqueline (12yrs 3mos at the time, b.
December 27, 1979)
- Tabugoca woke up Jacqueline to scratch his back.
- Tabugoca removed her shorts and underwear and made her lie beside him,
then inserted his penis in her vagina.
- Tabugoca told her not to tell anyone if she did not want to be harmed.
December 9, 1994, early morning – Jinky (12yrs 9mos at the time, b. March 5,
1982)
- Jinky was cleaning some articles in their house when Tabugoca aproached
her and took off his clothes.
- Tabugoca ordered her to lie down and removed her shorts and underwear
then inserted his penis into her vagina.
- Jinky cried out & complained to Tabugoca that she was in pain.
- Tabugoca explained that it is ordinary to feel pain because it was her first time
to do it.
- After a while, he did not continue, and told Jinky that they would continue the
following day.
December 10, 1994, dawn – Jinky
- Tabugoca made another attempt to molest Jinky.
- Jinky resisted, causing Tabugoca to just lie down & leave her alone.
December 10, 1994, later on
- Jacqueline and Jinky were watching TV in their grandmother’s (Perlita
Alejandro).
- Jinky told their lola about the sexual abuses of their father. This prompted
Jacqueline to reveal her similar experience 2 yrs past.
December 12, 1994
- Their grandmother brought them to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian
for physical examination.
- Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares’ findings suggested that in Jacqueline’s case, she
was forcibly abused & the incident, the first 1 happened long ago, based on the
healed scars of the hymen, & in Jinky’s case that full penetration was
unsuccessful although attempts were done based on the swollen vulva of the
victim.
Tabugoca tried to claim exemption from criminal liability on the ground of
insanity brought about by intoxication
- Jacqueline: Tabugoca allegedly only came to know of what happened to
Jacqueline when the police arrested him on December 10, 1994. Jacqueline
allegedly informed him on the date of his arrest that he was drunk on March 28,
1992, Tabugoca surmised that he was based on Jacqueline’s supposed
statement. Jacqueline testified that Tabugoca did smell of liquor and may have
had had a few drinks then
- Jinky: Tabugoca said that he had also been drinking then and could not recall
what had happened after he had finished drinking. Jinky testified that Tabugoca
had been drunk on the night of December 9, 1994.
Tabugoca claimed that he started drinking after his wife died, resorting to drink
when he remembered his wife and that before her death, he did not drink. He
also claims that his children filed the complaints in revenge for his “castigating
or whipping” them whenever they committed mistakes.
Issues, Held, Ratio
1.
WON Tabugoca is guilty of rape
- Yes. Tabugoca’s guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
- Tabugoca neither denied the charges against him nor raised any absolutory
cause in his defense.
- The categorical and untraversed testimonies of Jacqueline and Jinky as to
how Tabugoca committed the bestial outrage, and their identification of the
accused as their defiler remain uncontroverted and fully establish the charges.
Jacqueline’s failure to immediately report the crime does not necessarily cast
doubt on the credibility of her charge. We cannot expect young Jacqueline to
disregard the threat on her life and immediately cry rape in the face of her
father’s threats and his constant presence in her home.
- It is highly inconceivable that Jacqueline would invent a charge that would
only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their family and be the object
of gossip among their classmates and friends in order to get even with their
father or to empathize with her sister, especially given our culture.
- It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full
penetration is not required.
- 2 forms of intimidation under Art. 335 RPC (Matrimonio): (1) threats, (2)
overpowering moral influence.
- Tabugoca exercised overpowering moral influence over the victims, being
their father. This is sufficient to intimidate and force them to submit to his
desires
- For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the intimidation employed be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary is that
the intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose the accused had in
mind.
- In the case at bar, with the previous beatings Jinky had gotten from Tabugoca,
resistance could not have been expected from her.
- Tabugoca’s contention of consensual sex is ridiculous! No showing that Jinky
is a sexual pervert or a woman of loose morals.
- Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is not consent!
- Therefore, Tabugoca is guilty of two (2) counts of rape.
2.
WON the RTC had jurisdiction
- Yes. Tabugoca’s position that the the RTC’s jurisdiction to punish him is
limited only to the Jinky’s criminal complaint of frustrated rape & cannot cover
consummated rape is a meritless argument.
- When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended party in cases of
rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding, but it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on
the court to try the case.
- The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. (People v.
Leoparte)
- Since the penalty for rape in the complaint filed by Jacqueline is properly
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the lower court involved in this case may hear
and try the offense charged in the information and may impose the punishment
for it.
- The right and power of a court to try the accused for the crime of rape
attaches upon the fifing of the complaint, and a charge in the allegations
thereof as to the manner of committing the crime should not operate to divest
the court of jurisdiction already acquired. (People v. Bangalao, et.al.)
- Therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction.
3.
WON the death penalty should be imposed
- Yes. The only possible basis of the penalty under the rules of graduating
penalties under the RPC is the presence of a privileged mitigating
circumstance. There was none shown to exist.
- Therefore, the death penalty should be imposed.
4.
WON drunkenness in this case is a valid defense
- No. Tabugoca’s feeble excuse of having been under the influence of liquor in
order to disclaim knowledge of his actions is unbelievable.
- He did not comply with the evidentiary requirements whereby he could claim
intoxication as a mitigating circumstance.
- The attendance of intoxication is affirmed as an aggravating circumstance on
the additional finding that it was habitual.
- Therefore, drunkenness was not a valid defense. It was an aggravating
circumstance!
5.
WON Tabugoca was sane when he committed the crime
- Yes. Tabugoca failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The law
presumes every man to be sane. The person accused of a crime who pleads
the exempting circumstance of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden
of proving it. (People v. Catanyag)
- In order for insanity to be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the
accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not preclude imputability. (People v. So)
- The defense did not present any expert witness, psychiatric evaluation report,
psychological findings or evidence regarding Tabugoca’s mental condition at
the time of commission of the offenses.
- His charade of amnesia is a desperate ploy for exculpation. In any case,
amnesia is not, in and of itself, a defense to a criminal charge unless it is
shown by competent proof that the accused did not know of the nature and
quality of his action and that it was wrong.
- Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused
when the crime was committed. (Thomas v. State)
- Therefore, Tabugoca was sane at the time of commission of the crimes.
Judgment: Affirmed with modification.
In accordance with Art. 83 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 25 of RA 7659
(reimposing the death penalty), upon finality of this decision, the records will be
forwarded immediately to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of
the pardoning power.
2. MINORITY
a. RA 9344 (Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice System)
1) 15 yrs old or below at the time of commission of offense: absolutely exempt
from criminal liability but subject to intervention program
2) Over 15 yrs old but below 18:
exempt from criminal liability & subject to intervention program
• If acted w/ discernment: subject to diversion program
3) Below 18 yrs are exempt from:
a) Status offense
b) Vagrancy and Prostitution
c) Mendicancy (PD1563)
d) Snuffing of Rugby (PD 1619)
b. People vs. Estepano, 307 SCRA 707 (1999)
Facts: Enrique Balinas was stabbed & hacked to death for w/c Dominador,
Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney, Dante & Rene, all surnamed Estepano were charged
w/ murder. Rodrigo died during the trial & before judgment could be rendered.
Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case was never
archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only
Ruben, Rodney & Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the 3 were sentenced to
reclusion perpetua & ordered to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the
amount of P100K for moral damages & P9.5K for actual damages w/o
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
As to the crime: The case was woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio
Tayco, that on April 16, 1991 at around 10 pm, he was on his way home in
Barangay IV Himamaylan with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. En route,
they met Dominador at the BM Trucking compound. Lopito than talked to
Dominador while he and Estepano stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared
without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a guinunting
(fighting bolo). Ruben armed with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene,
each armed with a bolo followed suit in hacking Enrique. While this was
happening, Dominador told his companions “You better kill him!” Lopito
confirmed the testimony of Florencio.
Dominador’s version: That on April 16 1991 at 10pm, he was at home w/ his
wife & son Roberto. They were about to eat supper when he heard Enrique
Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the
window & saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground,
Rodrigo fled. Robert Hautea & Luz Cuepas, both residents of Barangay IV
corroborated the testimony of Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene & Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that he was at
the provincial hospital attending to his wife who earlier underwent a caesarian
operation. Rene & Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were at home
sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only 13 then, testified that
he came to know about the incident that same night when his mother
awakened him. Rodney on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that his
father killed Enrique Balinas.
Issues
1.
WON the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Tayco
Findings of the TC is binding & conclusive on the appellate court unless some
facts or circumstances of weight & substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted, w/c isn’t true in the present case.
Florencio’s testimony is clear & convincing, as he was only 2 arms length away
from the victim as well as from the assailants. Alibi of appellants were not
supported by any pieces of evidence & thus were not sufficient to outweigh
their positive identification by 1 of the prosecution witnesses.
2.
WON conspiracy had taken place
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in w/c the offense was
committed and concerted acts of the accused to obtain a common criminal
objective signifies conspiracy.
3.
WON the appellants are guilty of murder (particularly Rene, who was
13)
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he
was only 13 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under
A12. par. 3 of the RPC, a person over 9 years of age & under 15 is exempt
from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with DISCERNMENT.
Scrutiny of records show that prosecution failed to prove that Rene acted w/
discernment, what was only established was his presence & his supposed
participation in the killing.
* Damages of P100K were also modified and reduced to P50,000, considering
that the purpose of such award is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate
them for the injuries to their feelings. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
modified and accused-appellants Ruben and Rodney are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, Rene Estepano is ACQUITTED.
c. People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 (1939)
Facts:
Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos andEpifanio Rarang
were playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin
Doquena, the accused,intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit
in thestomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catchinghim,
slapped Doquena on the nape, and punched him in theface. After doing this,
Ragojos went back to Rarang to resumeplaying volleyball. Insulted, Doquena
looked for something tothrow at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's
(RomualdoCocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's deniedDoquena's
request for a fight and resumed playing. Doquenastabbed the unaware
Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing thelatter. The court held that in committing
the act, the accusedacted with discernment and was conscious of the nature
andconsequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was aminor was
untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th gradepupil, one of the brightest in
his class, and was an officer in theCAT program), and thus convicted him of the
crime of homicide.The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for
Boysuntil he reaches the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by theaccused,
stating that to determine whether or not there wasdiscernment on the part of
the minor, the following must betaken into consideration:a)The facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the actcommitted.b)The state of mind at the
time the crime was committedc)The time he had at his disposald)The degree of
reasoning of the minor
Issue:
WON the accused acted with discernment
Held:
Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted withdiscernment. Accused
mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as
a mitigatingcircumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes
anexception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years
but over nine, who commits an act prohibited bylaw, is his MENTAL CAPACITY
to understand the differencebetween right and wrong, and such capacity may
be known andshould be determined by taking into consideration all the
factsand circumstances afforded by the records in each case, thevery
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment andbehavior of said
minor, not only before and during thecommission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial.
3. ACCIDENT
Elements:
1. A person performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
ACCIDENT
Ø something that happen outside the sway of our will and although it comes about
through some act of our will,
Ø lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
Ø Under Article 12, paragraph 4, the offender is exempt not only from criminal but
also from civil liability
a. People vs. Agliday, 367 SCRA 273 (2001)
Facts:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damageresults by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on thepart of the person performing or failing to perform such
act.Once malice is proven, recklessness disappears. On Feb. 25,1999 in the
evening Agliday shot his son Richard Agliday withan unlicensed shotgun,
causing his death. Prosecution witnessConchita Agliday, wife of appellant
testified that while she waswashing the dishes in the kitchen when her husband
shot her son; shortly after appellant ran away while she brought her sonfirst to
the Sto. Niño Hospital, then to the San Carlos Hospital,then finally to the
Region I General Hospital where he died.Before shooting, she and appellant
quarreled over her being alaundry woman. Richard was only 19 years old and
in 4th year college. Another witness Rey Agliday, brother of Richard saidthat he
was in the house resting on a wooden bed when he sawappellant shoot his
brother. He said that while his parents werequarrelling he did not interfere, but
his brother did that is why hewas shot by appellant. Appellant claims, on the
other hand thathe was in the house cleaning a homemade gun to be used for
evening patrol (he was a barangay tanod) when the gunaccidentally went off,
fatally hitting his son (in the gluteusmaximus!!!) after which he went to his son
and embraced him.Afterwards he surrendered. The ruling of trial court
gavecredence to prosecution witnesses; disbelieved that appellant'sshooting
was an accident.
Issue, Held and Ratio:
1.WON witnesses are credible
Conchita and Rey Agliday are credible witnesses. Appellant claims court should
have believed him since he does not have any reason to kill his son who has a
bright future, and that his witnesses (Jose Matabang and SPO1 Opina)
aremore credible. Court disagrees. When the issue is one of credibility, an
appellate court will normally not disturb thefindings of the trial court.
Matabang's testimony wasbasically what appellant told him - biased and
limited; whileOpina's claim that Conchita told him that shooting wasaccidental
is not accurate, since she was still in a state of shock
2.WON appellant's shooting was an accident which maybe used as an
exempting circumstance
No, it cannot. Apellant contends that since his gunaccidentally went off while he
was cleaning it, he should beacquitted on the basis of the exempting
circumstance of accident under Art. 12(4) of the RPC. The court is
notpersuaded. In Art. 12(4), criminal liability does not arise in acase where a
crime is committed by any person who, whileperforming a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury bymere accident without fault or intention of causing
it.Exemption is based on the lack of criminal intent.Declarations of innocence of
appellant contradicted bytestimonies of wife and surviving son. Before accused
canbe exempted from criminal liability under Art 12 (4), there should be:
- A person performing a lawful act
- Due care
- Causes an injury to another by mere accident
- Without any fault and intention of causing itAct of firing a shotgun (and an
unlicensed one at that) is notlawful. Accident is an occurrence that "happens
outside thesway of our will, and although it comes about through someact of
our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanlyforeseeable consequences” –
connotes absence of criminalintent. Firearm was a shotgun that needs to be
cocked firstbefore it can be fired.Appellant contends that he is only guilty of
recklessimprudence. But the court disagrees. Reckless imprudenceconsists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice,an act from which material
damage results by reason of aninexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the personperforming or failing to perform such act. Intent is notlacking in the
instant case. Appellant's external acts provemalice or criminal intent.
b. U.S. vs. Tanedo, 15 Phil. 196 (1910)
Facts:
On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, wentwith some
workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying withhim his shotgun and a
few shells. Upon reaching the dam, theaccused went on his way to hunt for
wild chickens, meeting thevictim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother and
Uncle. Theaccused went into the forest upon the recommendation of
thedeceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens.Upon seeing
one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, heheard a human cry out in pain.
After seeing that Sanchez waswounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and
asked one,Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they didby
putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, and later burying in anold well. Only one
shot was heard that morning and a chickenwas killed by a gunshot wound.
Chicken feathers were found atthe scene of the crime. There was no enmity
between theaccused and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accuseddenied all
knowledge of the crime, but later confessed duringthe trial. The lower court
found the accused guilty of homicide,having invited the deceased into the
forest and intentionallyshooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14
years,8
months
and
one
day
of
reclusion
temporal,
accessories,indemnifications and costs. The accused appealed.
Issue: WON the accused is guilty
Held:
No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez isnegated by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at thesame time, there having only one shot
fired. Also, according to:
- Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors arevoluntary acts and
omissions punished by law…
- Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with duecare, causes some
injury by mere accident without liabilityor intention of causing it.
- Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in acriminal action
shall be presumed to be innocent until thecontrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt thathis guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to
anacquittal.In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of
theaccused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in alegal act, nor
is there evidence that the accused intended to killthe deceased. The only thing
suspicious is his denial of the actand his concealment of the body.The court
quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing isrelied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to provesuch a defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, becausethere is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon
thestate to show that it was intentional, and if, from a considerationof all the
evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, thereis a reasonable doubt
as to whether or not the killing wasaccidental or intentional, the jury should
acquit."Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of
conviction.
4. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE/UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR “Actus Me Invito Factus
Non Est Meus Factus”
Elements:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
3. That the physical force must come from a third person
a. People vs. Baldogo, 396 SCRA 31
Gonzalo Baldogo alias “Baguio” & Edgar Bermas alias “Bunso” were serving
sentence in the Penal Colony of Palawan.
They were also serving the
Camacho family who resides w/in the Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) & abducted Julie (12
y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their clothing &
belongings from a trunk which was located under a Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 – Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for herself.
Julie
went to the lowlands & there she asked for help from Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Baguio contends
that while he was preparing for sleep he was approached by Bunso who was
armed with a bloodied bolo. Bunso warned him not to shout, otherwise he will
also be killed.
- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive
her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and Julie
were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from
Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her
parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was
afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder – appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, w/o any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, & pursuant to the provisions of the
2nd par., No. 1, of A63 of the RPC, he is hereby sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping – no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to
the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of the RPC, & not being entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, w/ the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, & of
perpetual absolute disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping. YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by
Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. He claims
that he was even protective of Julie. He insists that Julie was not a credible
witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was
merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping
and detention by Bermas.Julie’s testimony is credible – findings of facts of the
TC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of
the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties & its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if
not conclusive effect. The raison d’etre of this principle is that this Court has to
contend itself w/ the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues
posed by the parties; The TC has the unique advantage of monitoring &
observing at close range the attitude, conduct & deportment of witnesses as
they narrate their respective testimonies before said court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter
the outcome of the case
It’s incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically,
that the crimes charged had been committed & that accused-appellant
precisely committed the same. Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence & not on the weakness of accused’s evidence. The prosecution
adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired w/ Bermas not
only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping & detaining Julie. There is
conspiracy if 2 or more persons agree to commit a felony & decide to commit it.
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during & after
the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose & design & community of
intent.
As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts w/ such
closeness & coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or
design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are
criminally liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish
the confluence of the ff. requisites
a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination;
and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor
has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit
the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law
doesn’t prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has
decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their
clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr.
does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping
from the colony. – insufficient evidence for evident premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, there’s no evidence that they took
advantage of their numerical superiority & weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse
of superior strength can’t be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in
their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery – Court has previously held that the killing of
minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put
up a defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing,
abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
b. People vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740
FACTS:
Joselito del Rosario and three other accused were charged
with robbery with homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas of P200,
000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and
killed her. Thereafter, the court found accused Joselito del Rosario
guilty as charged and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
WON del Rosario's arrest was unlawful since there was no
warrant therefore.
HELD:
Yes, Sec. 5 par, Rule 113, requires that the accused be
caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is outside of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the
commission of the robbery with homicide.
c. People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 (1998)
1. Manalili asked Garcia to find someone who could arrest of Herrera the
suspect of the killing of his brother.
2. Garcia introduced Lising and they had an agreement. Lising’s surveillance
group was at the Castanos’ residence in the hope of spotting Herrera. The
group saw a man and a woman (the victims) leave the residence and followed
them and were accosted. Later, the bodies of the 2 were found.
3. Lower court found that since there was an agreement among Manalili,
Garcia and Lising, they were all coconspirators. Garcia claimed that he acted
under compulsion of irresistible force.
Held: To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force
must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. Garcia’s
participation from when the abduction was hatched to the killing of the victims
is undisputed.
d. People vs. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71 (1993)
Facts: Brothers, Edwin & Esminio Balaan were taken by 7 armed men in
fatigue uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA members,
accompanied by the accused Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua from the
house of Ferminio Balaan. The armed men tied the hands of the deceased at
their back lying down face downward, in front of the house of Ferminio. They all
proceeded towards Sitio Tulong passing through the rice fields. Three years
later, the bodies or remains of the Balaan brothers were exhumed. Afterwhich,
the remains, were brought to the house of Freddie Arevalo, a reltive of the
deceased where they were laid in state for the wake. The RTC declared Fronda
guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The appellant says he was
only taken by the armed men as a pointer & interposes the exempting
circumstance under RPC A12(6) claiming that all his acts were performed
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear and to save his life.
Issue: WON Fronda can claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear.
Held: No. Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. (People vs. Abanes) In the case at bar,
the records indicate that appellant was seen being handed by and receiving
from one of the armed men a hunting knife. Also, as aforesaid, appellant was
not able to explain his failure to report the incident to the authorities for more
than three years. These circumstances, among others, establish the fact that
the appellant consciously concurred with the acts of the assailants. In order
that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or selfdefense in equal combat. (People v. Loreno) Appellant had the opportunity to
escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go home after bringing the
victims to the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed men when
required to bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the grave. Appellant
also chose to remain silent for more than three years before reporting the killing
to the authorities. Based on these circumstances, We hold that the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as
having been done under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.
5. INSUPERABLE OR LAWFUL CAUSE
Elements:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable
cause
a. U.S. vs. Vincentillo, 19 Phil. 118 (1911)
Crime: illegal and arbitrary detention
Held: Vicentillo was excempt from criminal, he was acquitted from the offense
w/c was charged
b. People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530 (1936)
Facts:
One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, JosefinaBandian, got to
a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature.Few minutes later, Bandian
emerged from the thicket with herclothes stained with blood both in the front
and back, staggering andvisibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. Rushing toher aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the
bed. Hecalled on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of
anewborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellanthad gone
a few moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. EmilioNepomuceno
declared that the appellant gave birth in her own houseand three her child into
the thicket to kill it. The trial court gavecredit to this opinion.
Issue:
WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,must be
committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be theresult of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Theevidence does not show that the
appellant, in causing her child’sdeath in one way or another, or in abandoning it
in the thicket, did sowillfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to
kill orabandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a formerlover,
which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took placethree years before
the incident; her married life with Kirol—sheconsiders him her husband as he
considers him his wife—began ayear ago; as he so testified at the trial, he
knew of the pregnancyand that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly
awaiting the birthof the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed
o herpregnancy to Kirol.Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if
she was, it didnot occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or
dizziness,which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitutethe
7th exempting circumstance, to take her child from the thicketwhere she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned andexposed to the danger of
losing its life. If by going into the thicket topee, she caused a wrong as that of
giving birth to her child in thatsame place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence orany other reason than that she was overcome by strong
dizzinessand extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it allhappened
by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part.The law exempts from
liability any person who so acts and behavesunder such circumstances (RPC
A12(4)). Thus, having the fourth andseventh exempting circumstances in her
favor, she is acquitted of thecrime that she had been accused of.
C. OTHER EXCULPATORY CAUSES
1. INSTIGATION
- the criminal plan or design exists in the mind of the law enforcer with whom the
person instigated cooperated so it is said that the person instigated is acting
only as a mere instrument or tool of the law enforcer in the performance of his
duties.
a. People vs. Lua Chu, 56 Phil. 44 (1931)
Facts: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of
Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of
Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson &
Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for the opium to be
released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of
Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former
consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6K & will come
over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners.
On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain
Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the
conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17, 1929,
Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and
hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the
conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain
Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important facts:
1.Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the
Opium.
2.Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners
namedTan and another located in Amoy.
3.Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the
warehouse of Uy Se Tieng.
4.A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on
vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the
Opium. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented
papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act
& arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu &
confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins).
Crime: illegal importation of opium
Held: It is true that Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the
prohibition drug, but that was open the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered for said drug. Samson neither nor instigated Chu to
import the opium but pretended to have an understanding with the Collector of
Asom, who promised them to removed all the difficulties in the enterprises. This
is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime to
prosecute him, but it is simply a trap to catch a criminal.
b. Araneta vs. CA, 142 SCRA 532 (1986)
FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco,
an employee of NIA. She approached the appellant, Atty Aquilina Araneta, a
hearing officer of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to
inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning
the reqirements, Yoyongco prepared the forms and filed them at the Unit.
When she went again to follow up on the status of the application, she was told
by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100 so that her claim would be acted
upon. She told the officer that she had no money then but if she would process
her claim, Yoyongco would give her the PhP100 upon approval. To this, Atty
Araneta refused and said that on previous occasions certain claimants made
similar promises but they failed to live up to them.
Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco (hala ka), the Chief
of Criminal Investigation Service, Phil Constabulary, and informed him the
demand of the appellant. The Col then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and instructed
her to go to Col Laureaga. The latter concocted a plan to entrap the appellant.
The 2 PhP50 bills were marked w/ notations “CC-NE-1” and “CC-NE-2”,
photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder. The complainant went to the
officer along w/ CIC Balcos who pretended to be her nephew.
She again
requested the officer to process her claim but was again asked if she already
had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out the 2 P50 bills & handed them to
the appellant. As she took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand &
arrested her. In the PC headquarters, Atty Araneta’s hands were examined for
the presence of UV powder & result was positive. Appellant contends that the
bills, w/c she never accepted, were rubbed against her hand and dress.
CRIME: Bribery
HELD: There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to
ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the
crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime.
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the crim intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused
who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of bribery, a violation of Sec 3
RA No 3019 known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” Considering
though that this case was pending since 1971 and she is a mother of four and
the amount involved is only PhP100, it is recommended that petitioner be
granted either executive clemency or the privilege of probation if she is
qualified. Decision affirmed.
c. Cabrera vs. Pajares, 142 SCRA 127 (1986)
Facts: On Jan. 16, 1965, enrico Cabrera statement to the Nat’l Bureau of Naga
denouncing that Judge James Pajares asked money from him in connection
with his case. Cabrera gave P1000 to judge Pajares bec. The latter had been
under strict, preventing him from making statement during the trial of his case.
After 2 mo. Judge told him again that he needed most was then that he asked
the assistance of the NBI in entrapping them. Cabrera accompanied by NBI
agent Angelica Somera when he introduced as his wife got the envelop
containing the marked money and handed it to Judge Pajares and rushed out
of the chamber and gave signal to the waiting nbi agent. Thr Jugde was
arrested. The envelop was found inserted to a diary on the judge’s table.
Crime: indirect bribery
Issue WON Pajares is guilty of acts unbecoming of a judge.
Held: NO. GUILTY ONLY OF INDIRECT BRIBERY. Evidence only shows that
he accepted the money & that he knew it was being given to him by reason of
his office as per the investigation conducted by Investigating Justice Mendoza.
Unfortunate since the Court has always stressed that members of the judiciary
should display not only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct
themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach & suspicion. For the
judge to return the people’s regard of him as an intermediary of justice between
2 conflicting parties, he must be the first to abide by the law & weave an
example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even
the slightest infraction of law. But Mendoza’s recommendation of merely
suspending the judge for 2 yrs & 4 mos as the proper administrative penalty by
virtue of Pajares’ serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary & public interest
cannot be upheld. Court approves Mendoza’s recommendation to acquit
Pajares for lack of evidence of the 2nd charge of having committed acts
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary. Pajares dismissed from the service
w/forfeiture of all retirement benefits & pay & w/prejudice to reinstatement in
any branch of the gov’t or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. Clerk of
Court ordered to return the ten marked P100.00 bills to Cabrera.
d. People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668
FACTS
- Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command(Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in
illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a
buy-bust operation.-The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600pesos as
marked money for the entrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun
upon transaction. Jun returned an hour later bringing marijuana where he and
his associates subsequently arrested Jun but
did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the bills to his associate
“Neneth”. Jun led the police to Neneth’s house.- The police went to Neneth’s
house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box
was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He
peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They
arrested Jun and Neneth and brought them to headquarters. It was only then
that the policelearned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while"Neneth" is
Violeta Gaddao y Catama.- The trial court found them guilty.
ISSUES
1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao,the search of the latter’s
person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained
therefrom is valid 2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being inplain
view of the police officers
HELD
1. YES- We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is
not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
- Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person maybe arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense."- In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even
without a warrant.- However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure of
Gaddao is invalid- Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a)
of Rule113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the
trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about
her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.- Neither could the arrest
of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113."Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5
(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."In case, there was no reasonable
suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused- Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao
as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom
agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing.- As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to
the arrest2. NO- The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and
its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and
the Constitution as the contents of the box where the marijuana was partially
hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.
As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting officers may be seized
without a search warrant but must follow these requisites: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.- However, if it is not plain view of
the police officers,it may not be seized without a warrant except if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then thecontents are in plain view
and may be seized.- The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of
marijuana 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not
justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
Dispositive
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a
Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as
follows:1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine of five hundred thousand
pesos(P500,000.00).2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is
acquitted.
2. EFFECT OF PARDON
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A pardon of the offended party
does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code;
but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.
ARTICLE 266-C. EFFECT OF PARDON.
-Subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the offended party
extinguishes the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
- A Husband may be guilty of raping his wife.
- When the legal husband is the offender, subsequent forgiveness of the wife
extinguishes the criminal action or penalty. This does not follow if the marriage is
void ab initio.
a. RPC, Arts. 23, 266-C
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A pardon of the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of
this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is
extinguished by his express waiver.
ARTICLE 266-C. EFFECT OF PARDON.
-Subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the offended party
extinguishes the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
- A Husband may be guilty of raping his wife.
- When the legal husband is the offender, subsequent forgiveness of the wife
extinguishes the criminal action or penalty. This does not follow if the marriage
is void ab initio.
3. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
a. RPC, Arts. 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344 - are those where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy the accused is exempt
from criminal liability.
A. RPC, Arts 6(3), 7, 20, 16, 247, 280, 332, 344
Art 6(3) - There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
Art 7 - When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable
only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those
committed against person or property.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable
for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
Article
247.
Death
or
physical
injuries
inflicted
under
exceptional
circumstances. - Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while
the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse
shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any private person who shall enter
the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty
shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall
enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to
himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be
applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter
cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open.
Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil
liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage
of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
b. People vs. Oyanib, 354 SCRA 196 (2001)
Facts: Manolito Oyanib & Tita Oyanib were legally married. Years thereafter
they separated. Tita had affairs w/ other men. Manolito reminded her that they
were still legally married, but Tita still continued with her affairs. One day,
Manolito came to see Tita to inform her of a meeting w/ their son’s school
regarding their son’s failed subject. He then came upon Tita and his paramour,
Jesus Esquierdo, having sex w/ the latter on top of the other w/ his pants down
to his knees. Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the check and
Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Tita left the room, got a Tanduay bottle
and hit Manolita with it in the head. Tital then stabbed Manolito in the arm with
the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita as
well.Thereupon, Edgardo, owner of the house where Tita was staying entered
the room. Manolito hid but later gave himself up.He was found guilty of
homicide and parricide and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6
month, 1 day to 6 yrs of prision correccional as minimum to 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs
of prision mayor as maximum and to pay P50K civil indemnity and costs for the
death of Jesus and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50K and costs for the death
of his wife Tita. He appealed, admitting the killings but arguing that he killed
them both under the exceptional circumstance provided in A247 RPC.
Issue: WON he’s entitled to the exceptional privilege under RPC A247
HELD:YES. He invoked Art. 247, RPC as an absolutory and an exempting
cause. “An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but
for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.” Having
admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relived of any
criminal liability.RPC A247 prescribes the ff essential elements for such
defense:
- That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person;
- That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter;
and
- That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or
daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence,
otherwise, his defense would be untenable. The death caused must be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing of the husband of his ide
must concur with her flagrant adultery. The Court finds the accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Art. 247, RPC. The law
imposes very stringent requirements before affording offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of RPC A247. The vindication of a Man’s honor is
justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on
this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing
the errant spouse as a purification is so severe that it can only be justified when
the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto, & it must be resorted to only
w/ great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during
the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter (People v. Wagas). Court thus
sentenced Manolito to 2 yrs & 4 mos of destierro and shall not be permitted to
enter or be w/in a 100 km radius from Iligan City.
4. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
a. RPC, Art. 5
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision,
and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense.
b. People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995)
Facts: On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by
Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose
the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua
to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The
respondent judge refused to act.
Crimes: grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that
prescribed by law.
HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused
regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent
judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in
the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
D. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 13)
Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to
justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of
the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned.
1. INCOMPLETE JUSTIFICATION/EXEMPTION
those circumstances has reference be (1) justifying circumstance. Not all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or except from from criminal liability in the
respective are attendant.
a. People vs. Jaurigue, supra
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue
was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months
and one day of prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of
reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay
one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of
preventive imprisonment suffered by her. From said judgment of conviction,
defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8o’clock in the evening, Nicolas
Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious
services. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her
father, also for the purpose of attend in greligious services, Upon observing the
presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which
Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word,
Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of
her right thigh. Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor,
pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized
Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him
a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Fearing that
Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas
Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close
their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless
accompanied by him. Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10
o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and
appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed
said policemen briefly of what had actually happened.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had acted
in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional
mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense attended by aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the
circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in
her favor. Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric
lights and there were several people inside; under the circumstances, there
was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed
by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. The facts that the defendant and appellant (1)
immediately, voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered and admitted having
stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against her, (3) had not intended to kill the deceased but
merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be considered as mitigating
circumstances. Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and
to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the
principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and
appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated.
b. People vs. Narvaez, supra
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery)
of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot
Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that
would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant
was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and askedthem to stop destroying his house
and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,
gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot
Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and
Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At
the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment(settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case
pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He
was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1.WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but
rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err.
However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred
to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence
their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to
subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by
the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It
is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2.WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
- Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and
he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides
that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art.
539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession
- Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
- Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there
was no provocation atall since he was asleep Since not all requisites present,
defendant is credited withthe special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are:
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. Crime is homicide (2 counts)
not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by
the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3.WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and
not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damagesand costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to theaccused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be givenretroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the
RPC.
Held:
Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months
arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary
imprisonment and w/oaward for moral damages. Appellant has already been
detained14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting.
Defense of property can only beinvoked when coupled with form of attack
on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant
should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.
2. UNDER 18 OR OVER 70 YEARS OF AGE
a. RA 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
b. People vs. Cortezano, 411 SCRA 431
Facts: Leah, 8 years old, was raped of about thirty-six times by her uncles,
Joel, 13 years old, and Bernardo, 12 years old. The two wetted her vagina with
saliva, acted in conspiracy by acting as a lookout for each other, threatened to
kill her and her family if such case be divulged, forced Boyet to rape her,
laughed at him while he was raping her, and ordered Leah Lou and Lionel, the
victim’s siblings to see her naked and did the same threat.
Contention: They should be exempted because they are minors when they
committed the acts.
Held: The contention is wrong. A minor who is over nine years old and under
fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from
criminal liability only when the said minor acted without discernment.
In this case, the evidence on record show beyond cavil that the appellants
acted with discernment when they raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the
victims vagina before they raped hey; (b) one of them acted as a lookout while
the other was raping the victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she
divulged to her parents what they did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the
victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the victim; (f) they ordered Leah
Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.
However, though they are not exempted, their charges are mitigated. Where
the accused are minors at the time they committed the offenses, they are
entitled to benefits of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, as
provided in Art 68 of the RPC, par 1.
Discernment: The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption
from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances, afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the
very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of the said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial.
3. NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG
a. People vs. Regato, 127 SCRA 287 (1984)
Facts: Regato, Salceda, & Ramirez arrived together at the residence of Victor
Flores and pretended to buy cigarettes. When Felicisima Flores opened the
door, they went inside the house and demanded of Victo to bring out their
money. When he refused, Ramirez and Regato maltreated him, while Salceda
went inside the bedroom and ransacked the trunk where the money was kept.
Ramirez then inquired whether he found the money and Salceda answered in
the affirmative. Ramirez called Victor a liar and the latter called them robbers to
which Ramirez responded by shooting Victor. The two (Ramirez remained at
large) were convicted and found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide.
Held: There is no merit in the contention that there was lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed. Intention is a mental process & is an
internal state of mind. The intention must be judged by the action, conduct and
external acts of the accused. What men do is the best index of their intention.
In the case at bar, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated
considering that the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient
to produce the result that they actually made—the death of the victim.
With respect to nighttime and craft, it is obvious that the crime was committed
at night. Craft involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the
accused. Shouting from the outside that they wanted to buy cigs, they induced
the inmates to open the door for them.
For lack of necessary votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed, thus
the penalty is modified to reclusion perpetua.
b. People vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439
Facts:
Miranda, deceased, is a 25-year old retardate and the accused Pugay were
friends.
Miranda used to fun errands for Pugay and at times, they slep together.
•On May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza and there were
different kinds of rides including the ferris wheel.
•Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion who was sitting at the ferris wheel
reading a comic book with a friend. Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived and were drunk as they were noisy and happy. As they
saw Miranda walking nearby, they started making fun of him and tickled him
with a piece of wood to dance.
•Pugay took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and
poured its contents on Miranda.
•Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was in the process of pouring
the gasoline. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of
him.
•Body of deceased was still aflame when the police arrived at the scene. Upon
inquiring among the people, they spontaneously pointed to Pugay and
Samson.
•Miranda was rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment while the two accused
and other five persons were took for interrogation.
•A few hours after the incident, the accused gave their written statements to the
police. Pugay admitted that he poured gasoline and accused Samson alleged
in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline but did not see who set
Miranda on fire. They both did not impute any participation of eyewitness
Gabion in the commission.
•The accused repudiated their written statements and claim that they were
extracted by force into admitting the crime. They also blamed Gabion for the
crime
•Although there were written statements, these were not the sole basis forthe
findings of facts. Even without these, Gabion’s straightforward testimonywhich
remains unaffected by the uncorroborated testimony of the accused.
•Accused asserted that prosecution suppressed other witnesses and
onlyGabion was presented. There is no dispute that there were other witnesses
In crime but their non-presence doesn’t give rise to the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption
doesn’t apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence. The matter
as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
• They also alleged that the mother of Miranda asked Gabion to testify
buteveidence shows that this is not the case. The uncle was the one who
talkedto him. And even so, Gabion has no reason to testify falsely against
them.
•They also alleged that his testimony is incredible bec of the absurdity of
reading a comic book while in the Ferris wheel. However, during crossexamination, Gabion clearly stated that after he told Pugay not to pour
gasoline, he resumed reading the comics, and that when the victim’s body ison
fire, that is only when he noticed a commotion.
SC held: The judgment is affirmed with modifications.
•There is nothing in the records that shows that there was a precious
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention bet the two accused
immediately before the crime. There was no animosity and their meeting atthe
scene of the crime was accidental. They only want to make fun of the
deceased.
•The respective criminal resp of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts
directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them
is liable only for the act committed by him.
•Pugay’s criminal responsibility: he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary
to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the victim.
SC agrees with SOL gen that Pugay is only guilt of HOMICIDE
THRURECKLESS IMPRUDENCE under 365 of RPC.
•Proper penalty for Pugay: Indeterminate from 4 months of Am as minimum to4
years and 2 months of PC as max.
•Samson’s criminal responsibility: SOL Gen contends murder is proper
considering setting victim on fire knowing that gasoline has been poured
onhim, characterized by treachery. SC do not agree.
•There is an absence of intent to kill and that his act was just part of their funmaking that evening. Treachery-deliberate attack and employing means to
insure its execution removing any form of defense from the offended party.
•His act however doesn’t relieve him of crim resp. Burning the clothes of victim
would cause at the very least some kind of physical injury.
• ART 4, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from what is intended.
•Guilty of HOMICIDE under 249 with mitigating circ of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong. They were actually stunned to see the victim burning.
•Indemnity for death=P30K, with moral and exemplary damages.
c. People vs. Gonzales, 359 SCRA 352
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein
accused-appellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial
Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later
on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from
his car and went over to Gonzales’. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino
Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing
that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which was already in his
car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter, Trisha, hugged
her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried
to free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him
the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres,
Noel’s wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were
wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two
counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused
were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the
parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found
treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense
of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as
mitigating circumstances.
RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse
killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by
heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of
attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by
reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden
attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or
acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior
of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently
forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack
must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and
without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of
the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide
and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and
none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining.
Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong
committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime
committed.
The
sufficiency
of
provocation
varies
according
to
the
circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards
the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not
sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing
and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful
aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and
the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably
placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use
of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
d. People vs. Canete, 410 SCRA 544
Facts: leonaldo Tumaya, Joel quimod, and litio Tundag were on their way home
after attending a wedding party. Tumaya was walking ahead of Tundag and
Quimod. As they passed by the houses of canetes, quimod and tundag heard
succession gunshots and when they looked in the direction where where the
bursts of gunfire were coming from, they saw Ruben, Alfred Sergio, Sotero and
Trinidad all surnamed Canete shooting Tamayso who stumped to the ground.
Apperently not satisfied are the accused approach the falten Tumayao and
continued shooting him.
Held: No MC, they are liable. It is their intention to commit the act done bec.
The time elapsed bet. The incident the crime is sufficient to plan the intended
act and the use “pugakhang” a kind of gun, is sufficient to produce the intent
act to kill tumayao. To shoot tumayao’s head is also an evidence of the
intention to commit a grave offense against the victim.
4. SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT
This is mitigating only if the crime was committed on the very person who
made the threat or provocation. The common set-up given in a bar problem is that
of provocation was given by somebody. The person provoked cannot retaliate
against him; thus, the person provoked retaliated on a younger brother or on an
elder father. Although in fact, there is sufficient provocation, it is not mitigating
because the one who gives the provocation is not the one against whom the crime
was committed.
a. People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 (1977)
Facts: Pagal and Torcelino were convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide. They invoke the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
and passion or obfuscation.
Held: First, provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause
should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance. Since the alleged
provocation which caused the obfuscation of the appellants arose from the
same incident, that is, the al¬leged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the
appellants by the deceased, those two mitigating circumstances cannot be
consid¬ered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should be treated
as one.
Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be miti¬gating
in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its execution, as in the
case at bar.
Third, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed
against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the
crime. Provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act.
Thus, where the accused killed his wife during a quarrel, because he, who had
no work, resented her suggestion to join her brother in the business of cutting
logs, the 2 mitigating circumstances of provo¬cation & obfuscation cannot be
considering in favor of the accused.
b. US vs. Malabanan, Phil .262
Facts: Before 6 o’clock on the morning of the 8th of November, 1906, Felino
Malaran, a prisoner and assistant jailer, reported to the foreman Pedro
Pimentel that Esteban Malabanan had taken some bread out of a tin can that
was in the jail; Malabanan being resentful at this and also because he had
received a severe blow with a cane from the said assistant jailer, attacked the
latter after breakfast with a small knife, and wounded him in the chest, the right
arm, and in the back. Raymundo Enriquez, another assistant jailer, upon
seeing what was taking place, tried to separate them and prevent the accused
from further attacking Malaran, but he did so with such bad luck that he also
was wounded with the knife in the right side near the abdomen, and in
consequence of said wound Raymundo Enriquez died of peritonitis and
hemorrhage of the spleen eleven days thereafter. Quintin de Lemos, another
assistant jailer, who also tried to stop Malabanan, was wounded in the chin.
Foreman Paulino Canlas, upon becoming aware of what was going on, ordered
the opening of the door of the department where detachment No. 6 of the
prisoners was confined, and Malabanan upon seeing him come in tried to
attack him; thereupon Canlas took hold of a stick to defend himself and to take
away from Malabanan the knife he held, which, like the hand and the clothes of
the accused, was covered with blood. As soon as the accused was disarmed
Canlas blew his whistle to call the inspector, who on his arrival at the place
where the fight had taken place ordered the three wounded men to the hospital
and the aggressor locked up in the cell. It was ascertained from the accused
that the knife had been found by him among the bamboo kept within the
department of the detachment, and it was recognized by him when the same
was exhibited.
Held: in the commission of the homicide there is no MC/ AC to be considered
and as to WON Malabanan was ill-treated or provoked prior to his assult to
Malabanan such a circumstance cannot be dealt within the present proceeding
instituted by reason of the violent death of Enriquez.
5. IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
~ allows a lapse of time as long as the offense is still suffering from the mental
anguish and wounded feelings brought about by the offense by him.
Elements:
1. That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree.
2. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse of
time is allowed between the vindication andthe doing of the grave offense.
Ø The vindication need not be done by the person upon whom the grave offense
was committed
Ø Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication
• The question whether or not a certain personal offense is grave must be decided
by the court, having in mind
◦ the social standing of the person,
◦ the place and
◦ the time when the insult was made.
Ø Vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be counted
separately and independently.
a. People vs. Espina, 361 SCRA 701
Facts: Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina, Samson Abuloc who were having a
drinking spree and playing cards during an association meeting, when
accused-appellant RomeoEspina arrived, Bulicatin asked three (3) bottles of
“kulafu” wine from him and he acceded by buying three (3) bottles of “kulafu”
wine from the store of EufroniaPagas. Later on that afternoon, Bulicatin again
demanded another bottle of “kulafu” wine from accused- appellant but this time,
the latter refused to give in tothe demand. Bulicatin then proceeded to where
accused-appellant was playingcards and without any warning, urinated on the
latter and clipped him under hisarms. Accused-appellant got angry. He however
did not engage Romeo in anyaltercation but instead went home.Later on in the
evening, while the trio were still having a drinking spree, they heardaccusedappellant calling Bulicatin from outside, saying, “Borgs, get out because Ihave
something to say.” The trio came down from the house. Rogelio and
Samsonwere ordered to lie on the ground, Bulicatin was still at the stairway
and when heturned his back towards accused-appellant, the latter shot him,
hitting him at theback. Bulicatin ran away but he was chased by accusedappellant who fired two (2)more shots at him.On appeal he alleged that the
court erred by overlooking and misinterpreting somesignificant facts in
convicting him.
Issues:1.Are appellants’ contentions tenable?2.Is appellant entitled to any
mitigating circumstance?
Ruling: The court held that, contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, the trial
court didnot overlook his contention that he could not have committed the
offenses chargedbecause at the time of the incedent, he was unconscious due
to a stab wound. Infact, the trial court treated the same as a defense of denial
and alibi. Indeed, thesedefenses cannot prevail over the categorical and
positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Abuloc who
was not shown to have any ill motiveto testify falsely against him.Moreover, it is
doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnessesand their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of itsunique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their
demeanor,conduct and attitude under grilling examination. In the case at bar,
the trial courtdid not err in giving credence to the version of the prosecution.
The facts andcircumstances alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court
are not material tothe case and will not affect the disposition thereof. The trial
court however correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of havingacted
in immediate vindication of a grave offense. As the evidence on record
show,accused-appellant was urinated on by the victim in front of the guests.
The act of the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated accusedappellant, camewithin the purview of a “grave offense” under Article 13,
paragraph 5, of theRevised Penal Code. Thus, this mitigating circumstance
should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant. Nevertheless the decision
of the lower court wasaffirmed with modifications, his sentenced was reduced
to prision mayor.
b. People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271
Facts: Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila after he pleaded guilty to the charge of murder for having shot with a .22
caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969. The killing was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank.
It was mitigated by plea of guilty.
Held: No MC of vindication of grave offense can be appreciated where a 6hr
interval transpired bet the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against
Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his
composure he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hrs. Benito
literally ambushed moncayo first a few mins after after the victim had left the
office He acted w/ treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the coldslooded murder.
c. People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331
Facts: Parana was convicted of the crime of murder with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The aggravating
circumstances that the appellant is a recidivist and that there was treachery
must be taken into consideration. Are mitigating circumstances attendant?
Held: The fact that the accused was slapped by the deceased in the presence
of many persons a few hours before the former killed the latter, was considered
a mitigating circumstance that the act was committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense. Although the grave offense (slapping of the
accused by the deceased), which engendered perturbation of mind, was not so
immediate, it was held that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and
the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the
crime was committed. The other mitigating circumstance that the appellant had
voluntarily surrendered himself to the agents of the authorities must be
considered.
Cases of voluntary surrender. Surrender is not mitigating when defendant was
in fact arrested. But where a person, after committing the offense and having
opportunity to escape, voluntarily waited for the agents of the authorities and
voluntarily gave himself up, he is entitled to the benefit of this circumstance,
even if he was placed under arrest by a policeman then and there.
6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Elements:
1. The accused acted upon an impulse.
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce passion or
obfuscation in him.
Ø Passion or obfuscation not applicable when:
• The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS.
• The act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.
Ø The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy cannot be
invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with the woman was
illegitimate.
Ø Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the
honest belief of the offender.
a. People vs. Rabanillo, 307 SCRA 613
Facts: Rabanillo & the deceased Morales were drinking w/ their friends. One
friend started a water fight game & Rabanillo joined the fun, accidentally
dousing Morales w/ water. Morales reprimanded him because water got into his
ear & they argued which led into a fistfight. They were pacified & ushered to
their respective houses. The prosecution’s version of the events was given
credit by the court which claimed that after 30 minutes after, while Morales &
some friends were having a conversation in the terrace of the house of
Morales, Rabanillo went out his house w/ a 1-meter samurai & hacked Morales
who died that same day. Rabanillo offered his testimony to prove the mitigating
circumstances of passion & obfuscation, drunkenness, & voluntary surrender
thereby admitting having killed Morales.
Held: For passion & obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from
lawful feelings. From the version of the facts by the prosecution, clearly the
assault was made in a fit of anger. The turmoil & unreason that would naturally
result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or
excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement w/c is inherent in all
persons who quarrel & come to blows doesn’t constitute obfuscation.
Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might have regained his normal equanimity. In this case, 30 minutes
intervened between the fight and the killing. Having been actuated more by the
spirit of revenge or anger than of a sudden impulse of natural or uncontrollable
fury, passion and obfuscation cannot be appreciated.
To be mitigating, the accused’s state of intoxication should be proved or
established by sufficient evidence. It should be such an intoxication that would
diminish or impair the exercise of his willpower or the capacity to know the
injustice of his act. The accused must then show that (1) at the time of the
commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks
as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of self-control; and (2)
such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
The accused merely testified that he joined his friends de Guzman and Soriano
in a drinking session, but only for a short time. The fact that he was able to
resume his routine work thereafter, belie his claim that he was heavily drunk at
the time he attacked the victim. The regularity of Rabanillo’s alcohol intake
could even have increased his tolerance for alcohol to such an extent that he
could not easily get drunk.
For voluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites must concur:
1.
the offender was not actually arrested;
2.
he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in
authority; and
3.
his surrender was voluntary
A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a)
he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
In the case, the baranggay captain had to go to the house of Rabanillo to take
the latter to the police station. The latter did not present himself voluntarily to
the former, who is a person in authority pursuant to Art. 152 of the RPC, as
amended; neither did he ask the former to fetch him at his house so he could
surrender. The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the
baranggay captain does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered. Besides,
voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
Judgment: There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance the penalty
is the medium period of that prescribed by law for that offense. Accused is
found guilty of homicide, and not murder, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
rangin from 10 yrs of prision mayor as minimum to 17 yrs and 4 mos of
reclusion temporal as maximum with all accessories thereof, and to indemnify
the heirs.
b. People vs. Germina, 290 SCRA 146
Facts: The appellant went to the house of the victim. A heated conversation
took place between victim’s relatives and appellant concerning a quarrel
between the accused’s brother and victim. When the victim arrived, appellant
drew his gun. Victim’s relatives scampered to safety and victim tries to run but
tripped. When the appellant caught up with him, the appellant shot him at the
nape. Appellant was convicted of murder because of the presence of treachery,
the victim, having been shot at the back.
Held: The mere fact that the victim was shot at the back while attempting to run
away from his assailant would not per se qualify the crime to murder. If murder
was his bent, he wouldn’t have gone to the house of the victim not would he
engage the victim’s relatives to a heated argument. Thus, the crime is not
attended by treachery (aleviosa). Moreover, passion cannot co-exist with
treachery because in passion, the offender loses his control and reason while
in treachery, the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses his
reason and self-control could not deliberately employ a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. Thus, without treachery,
the mitigating circumstance of passion as well as voluntary surrender may be
appreciated.
c. People vs. Gelaver, 223 SCRA 310
Facts: Eduardo Gelaver and his wife Victoria had a heated argument.
Thereafter, Eduardo held Victoria’s neck dragged her with a knife on his right
hand stabbed her 3 times on her breast Eduardo then went out of the gate and
fled in the direction of public market
Held: Before this circumstance may be taken into consideration it produce such
a condition of mind The act producing the obfuscation must not be for removed
from the commission of the crime by considerable length of time during w/c the
accused might have recover his equanimity. The crime almost after Victoria
abandoned the conjugal dwelling.
d. People vs. Ignas, 412 SCRA 311
Facts: Herein appellant was charged with information of murder aggravated by
the use of unlicensed firearm, to which he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Apellant was married to a certain Wilma Grace Ignas, who is having
extramarital affairs with the victim Nemesio Lopate, who was the brother of a
certain Pauline Gumpic, owner of Windfield Enterprise, where Wilma Grace
used to work as a cashier.Appellant came to know about the affairs of his wife
and the victim through Romenda Foyagao, Wilma Grace’s close friend. She
was instructed by Wilma Grace to disclose her affairs to the appellant, in which
upon the disclosure, she also showed Wilma Grace’s letters, addressed to her,
but intended for her paramour. It was only sometime late in February 1996 that
Romenda, following her bosom friend’s written instructions, informed appellant
about the extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Romenda
informed him that the two had spent a day and a night together in a room at
Dangwa Inn in Manila. Appellant became furious. He declared “Addan to aldaw
na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio” (There will be a day for
that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio). Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma
Grace from Romenda. That same week Alfred Mayamnes, elder of the
Kankanaey tribe to which appellant belonged, talked to the appellant.
He
wanted to confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise from the same
tribe, was having an affair with appellant’s spouse. Talk apparently had reached
the tribal elders and they wanted the problem resolved as soon as possible. A
visibly angry appellant confirmed the gossip. Shortly after their talk, appellant
closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale. Among the
potential buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the
offer. Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load
his bakery equipment on board a hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya. At
around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution
witness, Annie Bayanes, a trader, testified that she saw a person falling to the
ground. Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away, was
another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked
away.She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said
she was familiar with him as he was her townmate and had known him for
several years. Witness Bayanes was five or six meters away from the scene,
and the taillight of a parked jeepney, which was being loaded with vegetables,
plus the lights from the roof of the bagsakan, aided her recognition of appellant.
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis.
He testified that on hearing gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he
immediately looked at the place where the gunfire came from. He saw people
converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground. Witness
Manis saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had
known since Grade 2 in elementary school. Manis then saw another person,
some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see
the person’s face very well, but from his gait and build, he identified the latter
as his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas. Manis said that the scene was
very dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing vehicles,
but he was familiar with appellant’s build, hairstyle, and manner of walking.
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew
appellant. She said they were co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery at
Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. Barredo declared that at around 10:30
p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad.
After being served refreshments, appellant took out a handgun from his jacket
and removed the empty shells from the chamber. Appellant then told her to
throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she
complied. She also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot
his wife’s paramour. Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9 hours; he left
only in the morning of March 11, 1996. Police investigators later recovered the
spent gun shells from witness Barredo’s sweet potato garden.
According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought
the victim, Nemesio Lopate, to the Benguet General Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet,
testified during that trial that she conducted the post-mortem examination of the
victim’s cadaver. Dr. Jovellanos determined the cause of death to be
“Hypovolemia due to gunshot wound, back, right, (Point of Entry – fifth
intercostal space subscapular area).” She further stated on the witness stand
that she recovered a bullet from the victim’s left shoulder, which she turned
over to the police investigators. According to her, given the blackened edges of
the gunshot wound at the victim’s back, Nemesio was shot from a distance of
less than three (3) feet.
Among others, several witness were presented by the prosecution whose
testimonies lead to the identification that herein appellant was the actor of the
offense. Apellant interposed a defense of alibi which was corroborated by Ben
Anoma. Anoma declared that during the last week of February 1996, he met
with appellant in La Trinidad.
There, the witness said, he proposed a
partnership with appellant in the baking business to be based in Kayapa to
which appellant agreed. The trial court disbelieved appellant’s defense and
sustained the prosecution’s version. Initially, the court sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Both the prosecution and the defense filed
their respective motions for reconsideration.
The prosecution sought the
imposition of the death penalty. The defense prayed for acquittal on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion, sentencing
the appellant to suffer death through lethal injection. Hence ,this automatic
review.
Issues:
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding that the killing of the victim
amounts to murder.
2. WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
be taken against the appellant.
3. WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction of death penalty.
Held:
On the issue WON the trial court was correct in finding that the killing of the
victim amounts to murder.
NO. The trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of murder. The
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only on
December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a
procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective
application. Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information,
it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty
of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which
appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of
homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. As for the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm, we agree with the trial court’s order to dismiss the
information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case
No. 97-CR-2753. Under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 8, 1997,
where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be
imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. This
Court has held in a number of cases that there can be no separate conviction
of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated
by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect over a year
after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to the appellant
insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of
firearms and thus should be given retroactive application.
On the issue WON the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm be taken against the appellant.
No. It is not enough that the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter must be proven
with the same quantum of proof as the killing itself. Thus, the prosecution must
prove: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit
to own or possess the same.[108]
The records do not show that the
prosecution presented any evidence to prove that appellant is not a duly
licensed holder of a caliber .38 firearm. The prosecution failed to offer in
evidence a certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Division to show that appellant had no permit or license to own or
possess a .38 caliber handgun. Nor did it present the responsible police officer
on the matter of licensing as a prosecution witness.
Absent the proper
evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution.
Hence such special circumstance cannot be considered for
purposes of imposing the penalty in its maximum period.
On the issue WON the lower court correctly imposed the sanction of death
penalty.
No. As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot,
under the provisions of RA No. 7659, be sentenced to suffer the death penalty.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the
offense of homicide the penalty imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on appellant is an
indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Decision: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED
as follows:
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
e. People vs. Bates, 400 SCRA 95
1. While Edgar, Simon, and Jose are along a trail leading to the house of
Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation
surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose who was then walking ahead of
his companions.
2. Jose tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the 2 were grappling for
possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito.
3. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr., brother and
nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana plantation and
attacked Jose hacking him several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but
Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him.
Held: Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated in favor of the
appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or
obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case,
clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo
hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When
Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if
appellant refrained from doing anything else fter that, he could have validly
invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when,
upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then
was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again
was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.
f.
Donofrate vs. People, 412 SCRA 357
FACTS: Miguel donofrate was engaged in a slugging matchwife Leonor one
evening. She struck Miguel w/ a plastic chair he punch her to retaliate. Miguel
then ran home but short he rushed outside again and kicked the neighbors
encounter turns 3 neighbors whom he uncivilly treated garged up and maltreat
him causing Miguel to run home again. Miguel then armed Gonzales house the
father of alfredo Miguel challenged
mang Mario to fight then he spotted
alfredo who was on his way home w/ warning Miguel stabbed alfredo in the
chest fatally.
Held: This is P and O when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or due to legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In this case it was establish that
Donofrate and wife had a violent alternation and that his neighbor mauled his
after he kicked some of them for laughing at him. These event and
circumstances prior to the killing of Gonzales could had caused outburst of
passion and emotion or Donofrate’s part is entitled to MC analogous to P and
O.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Elements:
1. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
2. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s
agent.
3. That the surrender was voluntary.
a. People vs. Mallari, 404 SCRA 170
Facts:
Based on the accusatory portion of the Information filed against Rufino Mallari,
he was accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph Galang with an Isuzu
Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996. The evidence for the prosecution
showed that the said incident was preceded by an altercation between
RufinoMallari and Joseph Galang when the latter admonished the former not to
drive fast while passing by the latter's house. To end the situation Joseph,
together with his brothers, who were also present at that time, asked for
apology from Rufino. However, the conflict did not end there because when
dusk came and while Joseph was watching basketball game with his wife,
Rufino arrived with some companions and attacked Joseph with bladed
weapons. They chased him and when Joseph was able to run away, Rufino
pursued him with the use of theIsuzu Canter Elf truck. When he caught up with
him, he bumped him which resulted in his instant death. The doctor who
conducted the medico-legal inspection of the cadaver testified that Joseph's
cause of death was ³crushinginjury on the head secondary to vehicular
accident´. The trial court found Rufino liable with murder and sentenced with
the penalty of death after considering the qualifying circumstance of use of
motor vehicle in committing the crime. The case was brought to the Supreme
Court pursuant to the requirement of automatic review of cases penalized with
death penalty based on Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. Rufino argued
that the use of a motor vehicle was only incidental, considering that he resorted
to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch up with the
latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle wascorrectly
appreciated by the trial court in imposing the death penalty?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuingJoseph.
Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which
Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the meansused by
Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.The case of People v. Muñoz cited by
Rufino finds no application to thepresent case. In the said case, the police
patrol jeep was merely used by theaccused therein in looking for the victim and
in carrying the body of the victim tothe place where it was dumped. The
accused therein shot the victim, whichcaused the latter¶s death. In the present
case, the truck itself was used to kill thevictim by running over him.Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another ³by means of
a motor vehicle´ is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehiclequalifies the
killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua todeath. Since
the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3)
of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:3. When the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigatingcircumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.In the present case, the
aggravating circumstances of evidentpremeditation and treachery, which were
alleged in the information, were notproved. What was proved was the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of
Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by theprosecution.In view of the
absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presenceof one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be
imposed on Rufino.
b. People vs. Vicente, 405 SCRA 40
Crime: Muder
Held: after the commission of the crime, Vicente immediately placed himself to
the police station. Under Sec 388 of Local govt. code for posses of the RPC,
kagawad is a person in authority Art 63 provides that the lesser of the 2
indivisible penalties shall be imposed there being a mC attending the
commission of the crime.
c. People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 311
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about 9:30 o’clock
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, riding on two motorcycles, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, together with Peter
Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as
soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest was issued
on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and w/o having been served
on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano & communicated his desire to surrender.
Lozano contracted CD Psupt Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco
could have opted to go on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the
authorities & face the allegations leveled against him. For this he should be
credited with the MC of voluntary surrender.
d. People vs. Magallanes, July 9, 1997
Facts: On September 29, 1991, at around three o’clock in the afternoon, the
appellant, GREGORIO MAGALLANES, who was a “mananari” or gaffer of
fighting cocks, trekked the road to the cockpit of Poblacion Sagbayan, Bohol.
The appellant was in the company of several other cockfighting afficionados,
among whom were Romualdo Cempron and Danilo Salpucial. While on their
way, they passed by Virgilio Tapales who was drinking in the store of Umping
Amores which was located on the elevated side of the road. Tapales hailed
Cempron and invited him for a drink but the latter courteously refused as he
was going to the cockpit. Tapales approached Cempron and conversed with
him briefly. For some unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to
the appellant who was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales held the
appellant by his shirt, slapped him and strangled his neck. But seeing a knife
tucked in Tapales’ waist, the appellant pulled out the knife and slashed at
Tapales to loosen his grip. The appellant succeeded in wounding the face and
neck of Tapales who let go of the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the
appellant pursued Tapales and when the latter fell, the appellant stabbed him
several more times before uttering the following words: “you are already dead
in that case”.[1] With that, the appellant stood up and rode on the motorcycle
being driven by Danilo Salpucial. Later, the appellant surrendered to the police
authorities of the town of Inabanga, Bohol.
Crime: Murder to Homicide
Held: Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence
became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendant’s guilt and,
what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant’s fault
that aggravating circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information
and mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom.
If such qualification could
deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could
nullify this
mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded
allegations of aggravating circumstances. The judgment appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED by convicting the appellant Gregorio Magallanes of the
crime of homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty in his favor, and imposing upon him an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. In all
other respects, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
e. People vs. Pinca, 31 SCRA 270
Facts: The accused alleged that the victim doused him w/ alcohol. While
aboard a tricycle w/ a friend, the accused spotted the victim. He got off the
tricycle & got a piece of wood, waited for the victim & once near, he suddenly
struck the victim on the head. He was found guilty of murder. On issue is the
attendance of modifying circumstances.
Held: For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions
must concur: (1) offender employed such means, method or manner of
execution as to ensure his safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the
victim; and (2) the said means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately adopted. The essence of treachery is the deliberateness and
unexpected of the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape. In the case at bar, the appellant struck
the drunk victim from behind. The attack, being sudden and deliberate and the
victim being utterly unsuspecting and thus unable to put up any resistance, was
treacherous indeed.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
there must be clear & convincing proof of: (1) time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung
to his determination, & (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination & the execution that allowed the criminal to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. These were not established by the evidence in the
case at bar.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested, (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority, and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to
ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not
spontaneous and hence not voluntary. Appellant’s actions after the incident are
not marks of voluntary surrender. Denying to the police any personal
knowledge of the crime, he even tried to distance himself from the place of the
incident by going to Tagbilaran. He only went to the police station to “clear his
name.” Such acts do not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities.
Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending
upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication
has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the
plant to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual
or intentional, it is considered aggravating. A person pleading intoxication to
mitigate penalty must present proof to the commission of the crime, sufficient to
produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must
show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink
with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. Appellant
belatedly pleads that intoxication should mitigate his penalty and relied merely
on the prosecution’s narrated facts which supposedly showed that he was
intoxicated at the time of attack and that no evidence was presented to show
that his state of intoxication was habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit
said felony. Appellant cannot simply rely on these statements of the
prosecution. He must himself present convincing proof of the nature and effects
of his intoxication. It was not proven that alcohol had blurred his reason—an
element essential for intoxication to be considered mitigating.
f.
People vs. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166
Facts:
Celso and Gildo Amaguin, together with others, attacked Pacifico and
Diosdado Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armedwith a knife and an “Indian
target.” And just as they were aboutto finish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the
eldest of the Amaguin’s,appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de
grace. Theyinvoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Held:
While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a weekbefore turning themselves
in, the fact it, they voluntarilysurrendered to the police before arrest could be
effected. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following must
bepresent: (a) offender has not been actually arrested; (b) offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
g. Luces vs. People, 395 SCRA 524
FACTS: one evening dante reginio, nelson magbanua and dela gracia were on
their way to Didoy Elican house in met jose Luces. Jose collared Clemente and
said Thereafter Luces immediate stabbed Clemente on the chest w/ a balisong.
Held: Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance Luces surrendered the
responsibility for the killing of the victim. This hardly shows any repentance on
acknowledgement of crime on Luces part. At the time of the surrender there to
be ceased.
h. People vs. Basite, 412 SCRA 558
Facts: On 1 September 1996 at around 10:30 in the morning, Sonia was in
Natuel, Buguias, Benguet, on her way to her parents’ home in Tinoc, Ifugao, to
get her allowance. As she was walking, she met Eddie Basite who was headed
towards the opposite direction. They passed by each other. A few seconds
later, Sonia heard footsteps behind her. When she looked back she saw Eddie
Basite following her. He reached her, held her by both hands and told her to go
down with him. Sonia resisted. But the accused Eddie Basite pulled out a
knife from his waistband, thrust it at her neck and threatened to stab her if she
continued to resist. He ordered her to lie down on the ground and out of fear
she obeyed.
The accused undressed himself and forcibly removed Sonia’s pants and
underwear. He placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina
and made a push and pull movement. Sonia felt pain in her vagina. She
resisted but the accused threatened to stab her. When he was through with the
sexual assault, he warned her not to relate the incident to anyone or else he
would stab her.
Sonia pleaded with the accused to allow her to go home.
Upon seeing that the accused had laid down his knife beside her head while he
was putting on his clothes, Sonia grabbed the knife and stabbed him on the left
shoulder. Wounded, the accused ran away.
Sonia tried to put on her clothes, but losing her balance she rolled down the cliff
and lost consciousness. When she recovered, she felt pain all over her body
and could not find her bearings in her weakened state. She fell asleep and
woke up at around midnight. She made her way up the mountain by the light of
the moon. She reached the place where she was raped and rested for a while
until she decided to continue on her way to her parents’ house in Tinoc, Ifugao.
Held: For voluntary surrender be qualified, it must be spent indicative of
acknowledgement of guilt of guilt and for convenience nor constitutional. If
none of these impelled the accused to surrender the it is not spontaneous.
8. PLEA OF GUILT
Elements:
1. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
Ø Plea of guilty on appeal is not mitigating.
2. That the confession of guilty was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case;
Ø The extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not voluntary confession
because it was made outside the court.
3. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution.
Ø The change of plea should be made at the first opportunity when his arraignment
was first set.
Ø A conditional plea of guilty is not mitigating
a. People vs. Almendras, 372 SCRA 737
Facts: That on or about June 4, 1996, in the Municipality of Samal, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to
kill and armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one Criselda Manidlangan thereby
inflicting upon her wounds which caused her death and further causing actual,
moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.
Held: The belated plead of guilt cannot be appreciated favor. TO effectively
alleviate the criminal liability of a plead of guilt must be made at the first
opportunity, in repentance on the almendras to such plea considered
almendras pleaded guilty only after the prosecution presented by two
witnesses.
b. People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47
Facts: While Crisostomo was passing near the house of Geronimo, he met the
latter & invited him to have a drink in the place of a friend. Geronimo declined
the offer. Suddenly Crisostomo rushed towards Romeo who was then standing
near a store facing the street w/ his back towards Crisostomo & shot him at a
distance of 1 meter.
Held: Under RPC A15 of the RPC, intoxication of the offender shall be taken
into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender committed a
felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit said felony. Otherwise when habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he committed the
offense is self-serving and uncorroborated. Besides, appellant admitted that at
that time he was only dizzy, and that he was on the way to another drinking
spree. Obviously he had not drunk enough. He remembers the details of the
shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed and the
persons who were with him. He realized the gravity of the offense he committed
so he fled and hid from the authorities. He sought sanctuary in the chapel of
Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca
bus to Manila. All these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been
impaired.
As the fifth assigned error appellant argues that he should be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender stating that although he hid
himself from the authorities for 10 days, he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities thereafter upon the advice of his parents.
The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the offender had not actually
been arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
or the latter’s agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary.
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in
hiding, upon the advise of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4,
1968, so he was detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. The Court agrees
that the appellant is entitled to this mitigating circumstance.
However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide as invoked under the sixth
assigned error. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty are:
1.
that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2.
that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case; and
3.
that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution had been
presented. He reiterated his offer after the prosecution rested its case. This is
certainly not mitigating.
c. People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519
FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came tothe house of Ronito and his
common-law wife, Maria Fe toborrow money. Manuel, Jose, and Ronito then
had adrinking spree. Later, Manuel armed with a .38 caliber gun,entered the
bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe and poked thesaid gun on Maria Fe. Jose,
armed with a knife followedManuel to the bedroom. Upon Manuel’s order Jose
tied thehands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on hermouth. Jose
also tied the hands of Marife’s cousin, Leo.Jose and Manuel then divested
Maria Fe of her necklace,rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give
themher money but Maria Fe told them that she had used hermoney to pay her
partners in the fish vending business.Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe
and ransackedthe room but failed to find money. Manuel then threatenedto
explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill MariaFe, her family and
their househelps if she refused tosurrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took
the moneyfrom her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel andJose.
Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronitowith it. Jose went to the
kitchen, got a knife, coveredRonito with the blanket and sat on top of him then
stabbedthe latter several times. Manuel also stabbed Ronito ondifferent parts of
his body. Manuel hit Ronito with the buttof his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito
and took thelatter's wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, ahousehelp
of Marife.
HELD: The law does not require that the solemotive of the malefactor is
robbery and commits homicideby reason or on the occasion thereof. In People
vs. Tidula,et al., this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intendsto kill and
rob another, it does not preclude his convictionfor the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held that the fact that
theintent of the felons was tempered with a desire also toavenge grievances
against the victim killed, does notnegate the conviction of the accused and
punishment forrobbery with homicide.A conviction for robbery with homicide is
propereven if the homicide is committed before, during or afterthe commission
of the robbery. The homicide may becommitted by the actor at the spur of the
moment or bymere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and
awoman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted onanother, on the occasion
or by reason of robbery, there isonly one special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.What is primordial is the result obtained without referenceor
distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim
of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is not even
necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the male factor
intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery
itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. It
maybe true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again
money from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed
the couple of their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof,
killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide.
d. People vs. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, at 3:00 o’clock in the
morning, more or less, at Poblacion West, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and while armed with a
deadly weapon (bolo) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and hack FELIX AYROSO OLANDA with a bolo while victim was
asleep in the master’s bedroom, inflicting upon him serious hackwounds in his
face and other parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, that is, the timely medical attendance extended to the victim which
prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Held: There is MC of plea of guilt. He pleaded guilty upon being arraign and
before the prosecution presented their witness. A plea of guilt be made at the
first opportunity indicating repentance on the part of Ibanez.
9. PHYSICAL DEFECTS AND ILLNESS
Ø This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deafmute or blind persons.
Ø Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple,
or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his
fellow beings are limited.
Ø The physical defect that a person may have must have a relation to the
commission of the crime.
Elements of Illness:
1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power.
2.That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.
- When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an
exempting circumstance.
Ø It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of pathological state that
trouble the conscience or will.
a. People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 576
Dec 1954: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier was married to Florentina
Laceste. They begot 10 children. On June ’96, after 41 yrs of marriage, Javier
admitted killing his wife. Testimonies of SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, a desk
investigator, and Consolacion Javier Panit & Alma Javier, daughters of the sps:
o
Between 2–3am, Consolacion, who lived 10-15m. away, heard her mom
shouting, “your father is going to kill me!” (translated from local dialect). She
ran outside & met her sister Alma who was weeping & informed her of their
parents’ quarrel. Together, they went to their brother Manuel’s house, about
70-80m. away from their parents’ house.
o
Upon reaching the latter, Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless
body of his mother in their bedroom and his father, wounded in the abdomen.
o
Their father, Eduardo, confessed to son Manuel that he killed his wife
and thereafter stabbed himself. April 1997: RTC held Javier guilty of the crime
of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of PhP50K as moral damages and
PhP21,730 as actual expenses.In his appeal, Javier claims he killed his wife
because he was suffering from insomnia for a month and at the time of the
killing, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was doing. He
claims that he was insane then.
Issues and Ratio:
1.
WON accused-appellant Javier can claim mitigating circumstances of
illness and of passion and obfuscation
No to both. On illness, since Javier has already admitted to the killing, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance. OSG found
no sufficient evidence or medical finding to support his claim. For the mitigating
circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the ff requisites:
Illness must diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender, and Such
illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.
For the circumstance of passion and obfuscation of the offender to be
appreciated, the law requires the presence of the ff requisites:
There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition
of mind, and Such act w/c produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during w/c the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.
The defense never presented any medical record of the accused nor was a
psychiatrist presented to validate the defense of insanity. None of the elementsrequisites were proved to be present & in his testimony, Javier even stated that
he was not jealous of his wife. Equally important, the defense, during the trial,
never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness & passion
& obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant. The alleged
mitigating circumstances are mere afterthought to whittle (to shape) down his
criminal liability.
2.
WON he should be sentence to suffer a lower penalty
Yes. The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se is not punishable
by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, two indivisible penalties. The application of the lesser of greater penalty
depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Thus,
in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the accused,
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
Holding: Appealed decision affirmed w/ modification. Javier to suffer reclusion
perpetua and PhP50K imposed as civil indemnity instead of moral damages.
b. People vs. Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999
Facts: Marlon Parazo was convicted for rape and frustrated homicide. On May
29, 1997, Parazo filed a motion for reconsideration which alleged that Parazo
was not provided with a sign language expert.
If the allegation should be
proven the judgement of conviction should be set aside. On February 10, 1998
the court resolved to grant the urgent omnibus motion
-To hold in abeyance consideration of his motion pending his medical
examination
-To allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical
examination
-To submit the appellant for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the judgment of conviction should be set aside
Held: Yes. Appellant was examined by Beatriz O. Cruz (SC Medical Services
Psychologist). The result of her examination was that Mr. Parazo’s intelligence
function based on the Goodenough is gauged on the mild to moderate degree
of mental retardation with an estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the other
hand, is equivalent to 7 yrs & 9 months.
July 29, 1998 Memorandum report – Problem of Marlon Parazo is the severe
defect or deafness. The presence of an organic disorder cannot be determined
because of the latter’s inability to communicate. However, some degree of
mental retardation was gathered with the use of ‘Paper & Pencil Test.’ His
mental age is seven years and nine months. His IQ is 60.
Memorandum report of Dr. Rosa Mendoza of PGH – Mr. Marlon Parazo is
indeed hearing impaired and suffers from mental retardation.
Testimonies of the people who have known Marlon Parazo since childhood
corroborated the testimonies of the medical experts. The mother of Parazo,
barangay chairman, school teacher stated that the appellant was deaf and
mute.
Based on the collateral information gathered from persons who have known the
patient since childhood, together with the result of the diagnostic test at UPPGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that
Marlon Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe
Hearing Loss, right ear (3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
Records show that Parazo was tried without the benefit of a sign language
expert and he was only assisted by a person who has been known to him since
1983.
People v. Crisologo – absence of an interpreter in sign language who could
have conveyed to the accused, a deaf mute, the full facts of the offense with
which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused’s
version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived
the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these
inherently unjust circumstances. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign
language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the
accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right
of due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by
which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at
stake.
c. People vs. Formigones, supra
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines
Sur w/ his wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From there they transferred in
the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same municipality to
find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the
head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house & stabbed his
wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung & causing a severe
hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her
on the floor of the living room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he
was found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his
eldest daughter, Irene Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement,
he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the
company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were maintaining
illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him.
During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in
the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His counsel presented the
testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the
effect that his conduct was rather strange & that he behaved like an insane
person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to
take a bath & wash his clothes etc… The appeal is based merely on the theory
that the appellant is an IMBECILE & therefore exempt from criminal liability
under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime,
thus exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he
was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguish between
right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that a person could be regarded as
an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal
liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment & freedom of
will at the time of committing the crime. (Note that definition is same as
insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it
was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy &
take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were
justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife,
& at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written statements,
thus saving the government all the trouble & expense of catching him &
securing his conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having
killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower
court’s judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be
credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone (because
of the 2 mitigating circumstances)
10. OTHER RELATED CIRCUMSTANCES
a. People vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436
Facts: Appellant pleaded guilty for information of theft of 2 sacks of paper
amounting to Php 10. He was convicted and sentenced for penalties prescribed
for theft and that for habitual delinquency. This is because he has been
convicted of the same crime twice, in 1928 and in 1942. The trial court also
took into consideration 2 mitigating circumstances which a re voluntary
surrender and extreme poverty. However, the trial court also took into account
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
Issue: Whether or not recidivism should have been taken into account, when in
fact it is inherent in habitual delinquency
Held: That issue raised by appellant is not to be considered at all since what
should be considered is whether he actually falls under habitual delinquent. It is
to be noted that the crimes were committed 14 years apart. This is beyond the
10 year limit. This means that it is only the 1942 crime which should be
considered. Thus, he is not to be considered as a habitual delinquent. The
Court affirmed the consideration of the mitigating circumstance of extreme
poverty as it is obvious that the appellant committed the crime by reason of
necessity having several minor children to feed and selling the paper for 2.50.
The Court still recognizes the importance of life over property. The court
affirmed the principal penalty and removed the additional penalty.
b. People vs. Velasquez, 72 Phil. 98
Facts: Santiago velasques was an assistant cashier at the Pang. Prov.
Treasury. He received from different municipalities various amount of money to
the sum of P1701. 26 w/c receipt issued. Auditors Delegate book the test and
caution of the funds in the custody of Velasquez and found deficit of P1701. 26
w/c could not explain.
Held: MC should be considered for Velazquez returned estimated amount
defrauded.
E. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Ø Those circumstances which raise the penalty for a crime in its maximum period
provided by law applicable to that crime or change the nature of the crime.
Ø The aggravating circumstances must be established with moral certainty, with the
same degree of proof required to establish the crime itself.
Ø
According to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, BOTH generic and
qualifying aggravating circumstances must be alleged in order to be appreciated.
Ø The list in this Article is exclusive – there are no analogous circumstances.
Ø Basis:
• the motivating power behind the act
• the place where the act was committed
• the means and ways used
• the time
• the personal circumstance of the offender and/or of the victim
Ø Kinds:
1) GENERIC – Those that can generally apply to all crimes. Nos. 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4,
5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, and 20 except “by means of motor vehicles”.
2) SPECIFIC – Those that apply only to particular crimes. Nos. 3 (except dwelling),
15, 16, 17 and 21.
3) QUALIFYING –Those that change the nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the
qualifying AC which qualify the killing of person to murder.
4) INHERENT – Those that must accompany the commission of the crime and is
therefore not considered in increasing the penalty to be imposed such as evident
premeditation in theft, robbery, estafa, adultery and concubinage.
5) SPECIAL – Those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty of
the offense and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances such as:
• quasi-recidivism (Art. 160)
• complex crimes (Art. 48)
• error in personae (Art. 49)
• taking advantage of public position and membership in an organized/syndicated
crime group (Art. 62)
Ø When there are several applicable qualifying aggravating circumstances, only one
will be deemed as such and the others will be deemed as generic.
1. PLACE OF COMMISSION
a. Palace of the Chief Executive, etc., or in a Place of Religious Worship
People vs. Jaurigue, supra
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was
acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months
and one day of prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of
reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay
one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of
preventive imprisonment suffered by her. From said judgment of conviction,
defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8o’clock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue
went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services.
Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also
for the purpose of attend in greligious services, Upon observing the presence
of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was
sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the
greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the
intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right
hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado
once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about
4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Fearing that Amado's
relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and
herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors
and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by
him. Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night,
and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly
of what had actually happened.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had acted
in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional
mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense attended by aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the
circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in
her favor. Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric
lights and there were several people inside; under the circumstances, there
was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The means employed
by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. The facts that the defendant and appellant (1)
immediately, voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered and admitted having
stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against her, (3) had not intended to kill the deceased but
merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be considered as mitigating
circumstances. Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and
to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the
principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and
appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated.
b. Uninhabited Place
People vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370
Facts: Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were
residents of Barrio Bangar, municipality of Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about
9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959, Donata and Victoriano heard
the barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with guns,
entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano,
covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her
daughter Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the
door leading to her daughter's room but was promptly pushed aside. Donata
was then ordered to open an "aparador" from which the two men took
valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and cutting instruments. All the
while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and voices of some
three to four other persons beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina
Sabado down from the house and then asked where they could find Susana
Sabado, Donata's other daughter who was then in her store located about five
meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata heard the men opening
the door to Susana's store. After several minutes, feeling that the intruders had
left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to
see if her daughters were there. When the two women could not be found,
Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report the incident.
Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later went to
town to inform the police of the occurrence. On the same night, Chief of Police
Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a handful of civilians went
out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was only the following morning when the
two women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their
bodies. They were found in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros,
located about one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.
Crime: robbery w/ Double Homicide
Held: The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the
field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there
was no reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the
accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the
fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field although they could
have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were
found. Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having
been committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a
secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited. The penalty is to
be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of three
aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, to wit: that the robbery was
committed by a band, with treachery, and in an uninhabited place. There is
likewise the additional aggravating circumstance that the robbery was
committed in the dwelling of the victim. Donata Rebolledo which although not
alleged in the Information is however established by the evidence.
People vs. Coderes, 130 SCRA 134
FACTS: Complainant Elsa, 17 years old, declared on the witness stand that
she had been repeatedly raped by her father since she was eight years old, the
first sexual molestation having been committed on November 23, 1988 and the
latest on November 16, 1996 when she was already sixteen years old. Around
8:00 in the evening of November 16, 1996, Elsa testified that she was sleeping
together with her two sisters in one of the rooms of their house located at
Subaan, Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. She woke up finding appellant lying beside
her. He undressed her and, thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. Elsa
knew that her sisters were aware of the various times that their father raped her
but they did not inform anybody about these incidents. Complainant herself did
not tell their mother that their own father was raping her. However, after she
was raped on November 16, 1996, she was prompted by her conscience and
her fear that her sisters might suffer the same fate in the hands of their father to
reveal her ordeal to her Lola Mercedes who in turn informed her Lola Leonor.
Both grandmothers brought her to the Municipal Health Officer in Socorro and
had her examined.
HELD: The failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42,
Pinarnalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case No. P-5586 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza is ACQUITTED and his
immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered, unless some other lawful
cause warrants his further detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
inform this Court immediately of the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
c. Dwelling
Ø Building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
Ø This is considered an AC because in certain cases, there is an abuse of
confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the
door to him.
Ø Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party.
• It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest, comfort and
privacy.
Ø Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile.
• A person has more than one dwelling.
◦ So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them places of their own, each
one is his own dwelling.
◦ If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he also stays
there once in a while.
Ø The crime of adultery was committed.
• Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour.
• However, if the paramour was also residing in the same dwelling, it will not be
aggravating.
Ø The offended party must not give provocation.
Ø It is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the
dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
• it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
• although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault.
Ø Dwelling includes dependencies,
• the foot of the staircase
• and the enclosure under the house.
-
People vs. Torre, 373 SCRA 104
Facts: Anthony Inocencio testified that around 7:00 to 8:00 P.M. of November 5,
1989, Paulino Cordova went to see him at his farm, also located in Barrio
Pantay, Teresa, Rizal, near the La Fiesta Farm.
Paulino asked for his
assistance because the accused, then armed with a knife and bolo, was
causing trouble and commotion at the La Fiesta Farm of Mr. Alindada.
Anthony responded to Paulino's call for help.
Upon arriving at the La Fiesta
Farm, he learned that the accused forcibly took the shoes and money of Mr.
Alindada’s workers.
Marita and her children asked Anthony whether they
could stay in his farm.
He obliged and they all proceeded there.
Upon
reaching the farm, Marita told Anthony that she was raped by the accused that
night.
Thereupon, he immediately fetched policemen from Teresa, Rizal and
accompanied them to the La Fiesta Farm where the accused was accosted.
As to how the rape was committed, Marita, the principal witness for the
prosecution, recounted her harrowing experience at the hands of the accused.
She testified that around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of November 5, 1989, she
was cooking at the kitchen of the La Fiesta Farm.
She was with her five (5)
children then, namely: Merly, 13 years old; Melanie, 10; Lyndon, 7; Fullimer, 4;
and Johnny Boy, 1. Suddenly, the accused, holding a knife and a bolo,
appeared in the kitchen and dragged her outside and brought her towards a
house under construction about 200 meters away. Marita’s children tried to
follow but they desisted when the accused threatened (tinakot) them. So they
just stayed at the kitchen. While going to the said house, Marita and the
accused met Joel Villasis and Johnny Dizon, also workers in the farm. They
saw the accused poking a knife and a bolo at her. Marita asked for their help
but they did nothing because they were afraid of the accused.
Held: The kitchen at the La Fiesta Farm where Marita was dragged by
appellant is her “dwelling,” albeit the same does not belong to her. The Court
stressed that the “dwelling” contemplated in Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal
Code does not necessarily mean that the victim owns the place where he lives
or dwells.
Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home,
the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect.
The fact that the crime was
consummated in the nearby house is also immaterial. Marita was forcibly taken
by appellant from her dwelling house (kitchen) and then raped her. Dwelling is
aggravating if the victim was taken from his house although the offense was not
completed therein.
Nonetheless, the trial court’s imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
At that time, the penalty for rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[46] when committed with the use
of a deadly weapon, such as the knife,is reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties.
People vs. Almoguerra, 415 SCRA 647
Facts: On or about May 9, 1994, in the morning thereof, at Sitio Nabarira,
Barangay Piña, Municipality of San Jacinto, Province of Masbate, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain by
means of violence and/or intimidation of person, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob the residence of spouses FLORENTINO
JULATON and LILY AMOR located at the above-mentioned address by then
and there taking away the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(p15,000.00) in different denominations and coins without the consent of said
spouses, to their damage and prejudice in the amount aforementioned and that
on the occasion of said Robbery and pursuant to the same conspiracy, herein
accused, with intent to kill, by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the persons of GINA JULATON Y AMOR, 14 years old, LYN JULATON, 8 years
old, and REY JULATON Y AMOR, 7 years old, by then and there stabbing them
with a bladed weapon (machete), hitting them on different parts of their bodies,
thereby inflicting upon them serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of their untimely deaths.
Held: There is Ac of Dwelling. Appellants deliberated instruments in the privacy
of Julator’s domicile shows perversity. Dwelling is considered aggravating in
robbery with homicide bec. this kind of robbery cannot be committed w/o the
necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the house.
People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCR 607
Facts: That on or about February 17, 1991 in the evening thereof at Barangay
Asid, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring together
and confederating with another whose true name and identity is still unknown,
with intent to gain, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Robbery directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there demanding money
from the spouses RODRIGO and FELICIDAD REJUSO but the said accused
were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of Robbery as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their
own spontaneous desistance, that is the said spouses refused and/or denied
having money, and pursuant to the same conspiracy, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery, said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help each other attack, assault and hack, with a bolo, RODRIGO his
wife FELICIDAD and their children, SHEILA and REBECCA, all surnamed
REJUSO, inflicting upon them several wounds in different parts of the body
which caused their instantaneous death; that before killing their victims, the
said accused gained entrance into the victims' dwelling by pretending to ask for
a glass of water but once inside, they tied the hands of the victims and raped
REBECCA REJUSO before killing her.
crime: ATTEMPTED ROBBERY with MULTIPLE HOMICIDE with the
aggravating circumstances of rape, dwelling, band, treachery and craft
Held:Dwelling or morada was present bec. the principal crime took place in the
house of the victims, although the killings were committed outside. The
accused showed greater perversity in the deliberate invasion of the tranquility
of the domicile. Dwelling includes inclusion of the house.
People vs. Arizobal, 341 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24 March
1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband Jimmy with one
Francisco Gimenez arrived.
Jimmy informed Erlinda that they had already
bought a carabao. After he handed her the certificate of large cattle, and while
he was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, three (3) men
suddenly appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed
her to the ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a mask,
another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter helplessness of
their victims, the robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes
Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their
snack, two (2) of the intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the
neighboring store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers proceeded
to ransack the household in search for valuables. They took around P1,000.00
from her sari-sari store and told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange for
Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not produce such a big amount in so short
a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large cattle.
The culprits
however would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her. Three
(3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together with
Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away while leaving behind
Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son.
Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which reverberated through the
stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519
FACTS: Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis came tothe house of Ronito and his
common-law wife, Maria Fe toborrow money. Manuel, Jose, and Ronito then
had adrinking spree. Later, Manuel armed with a .38 caliber gun,entered the
bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe and poked thesaid gun on Maria Fe. Jose,
armed with a knife followedManuel to the bedroom. Upon Manuel’s order Jose
tied thehands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on hermouth. Jose
also tied the hands of Marife’s cousin, Leo.Jose and Manuel then divested
Maria Fe of her necklace,rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give
themher money but Maria Fe told them that she had used hermoney to pay her
partners in the fish vending business.Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe
and ransackedthe room but failed to find money. Manuel then threatenedto
explode the grenade tucked under his shirt and kill MariaFe, her family and
their househelps if she refused tosurrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took
the moneyfrom her waist pouch and gave the same to Manuel andJose.
Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose to kill Ronitowith it. Jose went to the
kitchen, got a knife, coveredRonito with the blanket and sat on top of him then
stabbedthe latter several times. Manuel also stabbed Ronito ondifferent parts of
his body. Manuel hit Ronito with the buttof his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito
and took thelatter's wristwatch and ring. Manuel then raped Julifer, ahousehelp
of Marife.
HELD: The law does not require that the solemotive of the malefactor is
robbery and commits homicideby reason or on the occasion thereof. In People
vs. Tidula,et al., this Court ruled that even if the malefactor intendsto kill and
rob another, it does not preclude his convictionfor the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. In People v. Damaso, the Court held that the fact that
theintent of the felons was tempered with a desire also toavenge grievances
against the victim killed, does notnegate the conviction of the accused and
punishment forrobbery with homicide.A conviction for robbery with homicide is
propereven if the homicide is committed before, during or afterthe commission
of the robbery. The homicide may becommitted by the actor at the spur of the
moment or bymere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and
awoman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted onanother, on the occasion
or by reason of robbery, there isonly one special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.What is primordial is the result obtained without referenceor
distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime. Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim
of the robbery is different from the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide
is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is not even
necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the male factor
intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery
itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. It
maybe true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again
money from Ronito and Maria Fe but later on conspired with Jose and robbed
the couple of their money and pieces of jewelry, and on the occasion thereof,
killed Ronito. Nonetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide.
People vs. Delos Santos, 398 SCRA 436
Facts: Accused-appellant was sentenced to death after he was convicted of
raping his stepdaughter. He argues that the Information filed against him failed
to state that he is the stepfather of the victim, hence, his relationship with the
victim may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance to justify the
imposition of the death penalty.
Held: The circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659 the attendance of any which mandates the single indivisible
penalty of death, instead of the standard penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
prescribed in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances.” Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the indictment.
People vs. Bagsit, 409 SCRA 350
FACTS:
On September 12, 1999 at around 8:20 pm, Richard Sison and his younger
sister Heidi werewatching television inside their house at Bgy. Soro-soro, Ilaya,
Batangas City. When Richard looked out of thewindow, he saw Angelito Bagsit
pointing a gun at his father, Pepito Sison, who was then closing the front doorof
their house. The barrel of the gun held by Angelito protruded thru their grilled
window. Not for long,Richard heard a gunshot and almost simultaneously saw
his father falling to the cement floor. With the helpof his mother Teodora who
came from his grandfather’s house next door, Richard rushed his father to
thehospital where he died shortly after.Richard Sison further testified that
Angelito Bagsit, a second cousin of his mother, used to frequent theirhouse. He
could not say what motivated Angelito to kill his father but as far as he knew,
his father had noquarrel with the appellant before the shooting incident.Zenaida
Bagsit Aguilar, daughter-in-law of the deceased, also testified that at around
8:20 pm of the killingshe was inside her house which was about 10 meters
away from that of the Sisons. As she was preparingcoffee in the kitchen,
Angelito, who was toting a gun, passed by. Moments later, she heard Angelito
cock hisgun. Worried that something untoward would happen, she hurried
towards her father’s house nearby. Butbefore she could even talk to her father,
a shot rang out. From her father’s house she looked out of thewindow and saw
Pepito, awash in his own blood, being carried by his wife.
CONTENTION OF STATE:
Angelito Bagsit is found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
CONTENTION OF ACCUSED:
Angelito Bagsit denied having anything to do with the death of Pepito Sison.He
averred that in the evening of 12 September 1999 he became drunk after a
drinking bout with DanteBagsit and a certain Marcos Barte who hired him
earlier that morning to take care of his piggery. Heremembered having left the
house of Marcos Barte at around eleven o’clock in the evening. He
recountedthat he failed to reach his house, a mere 10-minute walk, because it
was already very dark. Instead, he spentthe night leaning on a fence by the
house of one Felix Agdon. When he finally arrived home at around fiveo’clock
the following morning his wife told him about the shooting of Pepito and that
some police officerswere looking for him.
RULING:
It is dogmatic that the positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent andwithout any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibiand denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and selfservingevidence undeserving of weight in law. Richard Sison and Angelito
Bagsit were no strangers to each other.Richard Sison would not have imputed
a crime as serious as murder if he were not truly convinced that in thehands of
that person dripped the blood of his father.
Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise aggravating. The
triggermanshowed greater perversity when, although outside the house, he
attacked his victim inside thelatter’s own house when he could have very well
committed the crime without necessarilytransgressing the sanctity of the
victim’s home. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him ordo him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of
dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have
actually entered thedwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough
that the victim was attacked inside hisown abode, although the assailant might
have devised means to perpetrate the assault from theoutside.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Art. 248 of
The Revised Penal Code asamended by RA 7659. There being two (2)
aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance tooffset the
same, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Angelito Bagsit y
Bagsit guilty of murderqualified by treachery, with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm and
thegeneric aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and imposing on him the
supreme penalty of DEATH, isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 asmoral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and, in lieu of actual damages,
temperate damages of P25,000.00 shall be awarded to the heirs of the victim
Pepito Sison.
2. TIME OF COMMISSION
Ø These 3 circumstances may be considered separately
• when their elements are distinctly perceived and
• can subsist independently,
• revealing a greater degree of perversity.
Ø Aggravating:
• When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or
• When especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime
or for the purpose of impunity; or
• When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity.
a. Nighttime
1) NIGHTTIME
Ø The commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished in the
nighttime.
Ø The offense must be actually committed in the darkness of the night.
• When the place is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating.
Ø It must be shown that the
• offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness and t
•
he offender purposely took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35
FACTS: Emmanuel Desalisa, a 22-yr old farmer, lived w/ his 18-yr old legal
wife, Norma, who was then 5 mos pregnant and their 2-yr old daughter in a
small nipa hse on a hill at Pinaductan, Sorsogon. The whole neighborhood
consists of 3 houses. The other 2 houses are about 150 meters away: the
house of his parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso. The view of the
houses is obstructed by the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
On Oct 9, 1983, Vicente Dioneda, the father-in-law of the accused, testified that
the latter went to their house and left his 2 yr-old. The next day, at about 6 or
7AM, Vicente went to the house of the accused only to find plates scattered on
the floor, the kettle w/ cooked rice untouched, and the other rope holding the
hammock missing. He went out of the house and noticed the couple’s pig to be
hungry. He thought of feeding it w/ coconut meat from the tree w/c was nearby.
He saw the back of the body of his daughter. He called her and touched her
back. However, her body swayed. It was only then that he realized that she
was hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was suspended
about 4 inches above the ground. Her neck was tied w/ the missing rope of the
hammock. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident.
Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her
of having a paramour and that the baby in her womb was not his. He believed
that one Ariate was courting his wife.
Desalisa invokes the defense of denial. He speculates that it was his wife who
was jealous. She suspected him of having an affair w/ the daughter of Manoy
Charito.
HELD: The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime.
The house
where they lived is up a hill and isolated. The whole neighborhood consists
only of 3 houses. No one can go up the hill to visit w/o being known to the
neighbor. Moreover, the motive of jealousy is evident for what can be more
humiliating to a man aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to
one’s very home? Although the accused did not flee after the crime, there is no
case law holding that non-flight is conclusive of proof of innocence.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated
against accused-appellant absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Neither may the
aggr circumstance of nighttime be appreciated against him because there is no
proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of or that it facilitated the
commission of the crime.
However, the aggr circumstance of uninhabited place is present.
The
uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but WON there was reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help in the place of commission. Considering that
the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs
obstructed the view of the neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable
possibility for the victim to receive any assistance.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of parricide w/ unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of PhP50K. Being a single
indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances.
People vs. Avendano, 396 SCRA 309
Facts: The principal witness for the prosecution was JEFFRE CASTILLO, an
eight-year-old son of the victim Remedios Castillo and brother of the victim
Melvin Castillo.
In his testimony, he stated that his parents were named
Remedios and Boyet; that they were six children in the family, namely, Michael,
Dikong, Ape, Manolito, the victim Melvin and himself; and that he was a Grade I
pupil at the Aguas Elementary School. He testified that he knows appellant,
having known him for about three or four years before the incident of July 29,
1997. On said date, at around 6:00 P.M., ;he saw appellant in their house,
looking for his plow and asking if he knew who got it, to which he replied that
he did not. While appellant was in their house, his mother was upstairs and his
Kuya Melvin was also inside the house. His father and the rest of his brothers
and sisters were in Cabanatuan City. He recalled that appellant was then
wearing a green t-shirt and shorts, the color of which he could not remember.
Thereafter, appellant left. After dinner, he, his mother and brother went to
sleep.
Before they slept, he recalled they had a pangmagdamagan or
overnight lamp which was turned on.
That night, according to Jeffre, they slept in the same room. He was suddenly
awakened when he heard a commotion (kalambugan). However, by the time
he woke up, the room was very dark because the lamp was already turned off.
He heard his mother shout, “Dikong, tulungan mo kami.” When he heard the
kalambugan he immediately eased his way to where they kept their pillows and
tried to hide.
Then, there was silence.
Then he heard somebody going
downstairs. His brother Melvin lit the lamp, while Jeffre stayed where he was.
He then heard the person downstairs going up again. He saw through his
blanket that the person had come up: “Naaninag ko po sa kumot yung tao.”
That was when he distinctly heard his Kuya Melvin say, “Kuya Willie, tama na,
tama na!” That was just before Melvin was killed.
Held: As to nighttime, this circumstance is considered aggravating only when
(1) it was especially sought by the offender; or (2) the offender took advantage
of it; or (3) it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s
immunity from identification or capture. In this case, the prosecution did not
adduce evidence that the appellant deliberately sought the cover of the night to
commit the offense. The mere fact that the killing was committed at night
would not suffice to sustain nocturnity for, by, and of itself. Aggravating
circumstances must be established with the same quantum of proof as fully as
the crime itself, and any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in favor of
appellant.
People vs. Caloza, 396 SCRA 329
Dionisio Bulaclac was a tenant of a farm lot located in Bakod Bayan,
Cabanatuan City. He and his 16-year-old wife, Edna, and their infant son, Mark
Joseph Anthony, lived in a hut situated near the farmstead Dionisio was tilling.
Allan Bulaclac, the younger brother of Dionisio, used to frequent the latter’s
place whenever Dionisio requested help to farm the field.
On July 5, 1997, Dionisio asked Allan to come to his farm the following day to
help him till the land. Allan agreed. At about 5:00 a.m. on July 6, 1997, Allan
left their place in Liway, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and proceeded to Dionisio’s
farm. Allan had a “lente” placed on his forehead to illumine his path as it was
still dark. When Allan was about a hundred meters away from Dionisio’s hut,
he noticed Rafael at a distance of ten meters coming from the direction of the
hut of Dionisio. Rafael was no stranger to Allan because the latter used to help
Dionisio till the field. Allan readily recognized Rafael from the illumination
coming from the “lente” on his forehead. Allan noticed bloodstains on the
clothes of Rafael. Allan was perplexed when Rafael tried to evade him as they
met. Allan then entered Dionisio’s hut which at that time was lighted by a
kerosene lamp called “kingke.” Allan called but nobody answered. He peeped
through the window and was horrified to see his brother’s feet as well as blood
under the bed. Allan immediately rushed home and reported the incident to his
parents. Allan and his parents proceeded posthaste to Dionisio’s hut. They
saw several persons near the hut of Dionisio including some policemen who
prevented Allan and his parents from entering the hut.
It turned out that
Dionisio, his wife Edna and their young son Mark Joseph Anthony were already
dead.
Held: There is AC of nighttime. Rafael took advantage of the night darkness to
successfully consummate his dastardly acts. Not proven that nighttime is
sought.
People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 190
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about 9:30 o’clock
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, riding on two motorcycles, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, together with Peter
Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as
soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest was issued
on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and w/o having been served
on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano & communicated his desire to surrender.
Lozano contracted CD Psupt Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco
could have opted to go on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the
authorities & face the allegations leveled against him. For this he should be
credited with the MC of voluntary surrender.
People vs. Mactal, 401 SCRA 612
Facts: Appellant and the deceased were married by a Catholic priest in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, on March 23, 1985. However, their union was not a happy one,
beset by frequent violent quarrels due to appellant’s drinking, gambling and
womanizing. The couple separated a number of times but deceased Evelyn
always came back to her husband inspite of the physical abuse because she
loved him. As appellant failed to earn a living for his family, Evelyn ran a small
sari-sari store located in front of their house. On the night of the incident, July
14, 1995, at around 7:00 p.m., appellant’s brother-in-law, Romeo Rivera, whose
house was right beside the couple’s, heard the couple arguing but he did not
mind them as he was used to their arguments. At around 8:00 p.m., Liwayway
Rillon, the deceased’s good friend, went to the store to buy something but did
not stay long as Evelyn seemed to be in a bad mood and was getting ready to
close the store. Through the door of the store, Rillon saw appellant inside the
store and the couple’s children sleeping in bed; their living quarters were
adjacent to the store.
At around midnight, appellant went to Rivera’s house to check whether his wife
Evelyn was there. Rivera did not reply but instead asked if the two had a
quarrel. The appellant answered in the negative. Rivera, his wife and appellant
conversed in the former’s garage for about 30 minutes, with the Rivera couple
suggesting places where appellant should look for his wife. Then appellant’s
sister-in-law went to appellant’s house and peeped inside the unlighted room of
the couple but did not find her sister, the deceased. After this, the Rivera couple
returned to their house and went to sleep.
At around 1:00 a.m., Alfred Young, on board a tricycle, was passing by
appellant’s house. From a distance of 15 meters, he saw Evelyn seated on a
wooden chair in front of the window of the house.
She appeared lifeless
because her head was “hanging.” Appellant was about an arm’s length away
from Evelyn and, when he saw the tricycle, he disappeared into a unlighted
part of the house. At about the same time, Romeo Adayo, who was walking
home, saw appellant. The latter was about 20 steps away from him, carrying
the body of his wife Evelyn over his right shoulder, face up, with the head at
appellant’s back and the legs in front. Appellant was walking very fast towards
a dark street. As Adayo was very tired after his trip from Manila, he did not call
appellant and just continued walking. The body of Evelyn was discovered by a
neighbor at around 5:00 a.m., 15 meters away from her house.
State: Mactal committed parricide w/ AC of nighttime.
Ruling: Nighttime could not be appreciated as an AC where no evidence is
presented showing that nocturnity was specially by the accused nor taken acts.
Facilitate the commission of the crime or insure his immunity from captive.
b. On the Occasion of Calamity
3. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER
a. Recidivism
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of this Code.
People vs. Baldera, 86 Phil. 189
Facts: 1947, Casa manila bus was loaded w/ passengers left Batangas and
bound for Manila. On the highway, the bus way up by pedro Balidina’s group.
Baldera, armed w/ .45 caliber pistol hail of bullets and several passengers were
wounded. Baldera then the bus and took the money of the passengers. He
then alighted and ordered the bus to proceed.
Held: There is AC of recidivism by reason of his previous convict for theft it
appearing that crime was committed on or about 1947 while this offense now
charge took place 7 place before the date.
b. Reiteration or Habituality
1. That the accused is on trial for an offense;
2. That he previously served sentence for another offense to which the law
attaches:
a. an equal or
b. greater penalty, or
c. for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty than that for the new
offense;
and
3. That he is convicted of the new offense.
Ø Reiteracion or Habituality
• it is essential that the offender be previously punished;
• that is, he has served sentence.
Ø Par. 10 speaks of
• penalty attached to the offense,
• not the penalty actually imposed
-
RPC, Arts. 62 (5), 160
Habitual delinquency under Article 62 (5)—The offender within a period of 10
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, is found guilty
of any of the said crimes a third time or another.
Quasi-recidivism under Article 160—Any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment before beginning to serve such
sentence or while serving such sentence shall be punished by the maximum
period prescribed by law for the new felony.
People vs. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 652 (1998)
Facts: Marivel Fuentes, complainant, went to Rowena Sanchez’s house upon
the latter’s instruction. When Marivel got there, Rowena went to the bathroom.
Then, Alberto, Rowena’s common law husband and appellant herein,
approached Marivel, covered her mouth and pointed a hunting knife to her
neck. He told her that he’d kill her if she’d tell her mother.Marivel fought but
Alberto got her inside a room and had intercourse with her. All the while, private
complainant’s mouth was covered with a handkerchief.After about 5 minutes,
Rowena came back and saw Alberto still on top of Marivel. Alberto instructed
Rowena to step out of the room. After a while, he got up, put on his briefs and
called his wife inside the room.The second incident of rape happened while
Marivel was sleeping but then awakened by the Alberto’s kisses. He had a knife
which scared Marivel and he again had sex with her. She did not shout
because she was afraid of Alberto who was a prisoner and had already killed
somebody.Marivel reported the incidences eventually and after a due trial, RTC
convicted Alberto with 2 counts of rape and sentencing him to 2 terms of
reclusion perpetua.
Issue: WON Quasi-Recidivism was established
NO. Appeal denied.The two Informations alleged that both instances of rape
were attended by the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The trial
court made no express ruling that appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and rightly
so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been
convicted by the RTC of Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental in Crim. Case No.
013 and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide. However, the
prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellant’s
previous
conviction.Quasi-recidivism,
like
recidivism
and
reiteracion,
necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an
accused. The fact that appellant was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove
that final judgment had been rendered against him.
People vs. Baldogo, G.R. No. 129106-07, January 24, 2003
of Palawan. They were also serving the Camacho family who resides w/in the
Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) & abducted Julie (12
y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their clothing &
belongings from a trunk which was located under a Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 – Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for herself.
Julie
went to the lowlands & there she asked for help from Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Baguio contends
that while he was preparing for sleep he was approached by Bunso who was
armed with a bloodied bolo. Bunso warned him not to shout, otherwise he will
also be killed.
- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive
her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and Julie
were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from
Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her
parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was
afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder – appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, w/o any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, & pursuant to the provisions of the
2nd par., No. 1, of A63 of the RPC, he is hereby sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping – no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to
the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of the RPC, & not being entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, w/ the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, & of
perpetual absolute disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping. YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by
Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. He claims
that he was even protective of Julie. He insists that Julie was not a credible
witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was
merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping
and detention by Bermas.Julie’s testimony is credible – findings of facts of the
TC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of
the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties & its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if
not conclusive effect. The raison d’etre of this principle is that this Court has to
contend itself w/ the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues
posed by the parties; The TC has the unique advantage of monitoring &
observing at close range the attitude, conduct & deportment of witnesses as
they narrate their respective testimonies before said court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter
the outcome of the case
It’s incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically,
that the crimes charged had been committed & that accused-appellant
precisely committed the same. Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence & not on the weakness of accused’s evidence. The prosecution
adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired w/ Bermas not
only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping & detaining Julie. There is
conspiracy if 2 or more persons agree to commit a felony & decide to commit it.
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during & after
the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose & design & community of
intent.
As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts w/ such
closeness & coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or
design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are
criminally liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish
the confluence of the ff. requisites
a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination;
and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor
has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit
the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law
doesn’t prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has
decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their
clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr.
does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping
from the colony. – insufficient evidence for evident premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, there’s no evidence that they took
advantage of their numerical superiority & weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse
of superior strength can’t be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in
their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery – Court has previously held that the killing of
minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put
up a defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing,
abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
4. PRICE, PROMISE, OR REWARD
5. MEANS OF COMMISSION
a. Taking Advantage of Public Office
RPC, Art. 19 (3)
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty
of some other crime.
People vs. Sumaoy, Oct. 22, 1996
Facts: Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy in a billiard hall
on Roxas Street, Tagum, Davao. At 5:45 p.m. of July 9, 1988, he left the
billiard hall to have some beer at the Pacing’s Carinderia on Sobrecary Street.
Afterward, he went back to the billiard hall, passing by the J Spot Carinderia at
the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the deceased
Zandro Vargas talking to accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. Three other men
were with them but Jacobe did not recognize the three. Upon reaching the
billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled some billiard balls, then went out and
stood on the sidewalk. He was startled by the sound of a gunshot. When he
turned to find out where the sound came from, he saw Zandro Vargas running
towards Roxas Street with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas tried to seek
refuge at the Try Me beauty parlor, but he was overtaken by accused-appellant
who dragged him towards a waiting tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun.
The accused-appellant and three other men then boarded the tricycle taking
Zandro Vargas with them. Jacobe allegedly heard one of accused-appellant’s
companion say that they were taking Zandro to the hospital. Later that evening
Jacobe learned that Zandro was found dead in a kangkong field near the
Davao Visayan Village.
Held: The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position in the commission of the offense.
This
circumstance requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the influence
or reputation of his position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then
there is no abuse of public position. In the case before us, no evidence was
adduced to show that the killing of Zandro vargas was in any way facilitated by
the accused-appellant’s public position. It was not even shown whether the
accused-appellant wore his uniform or used his service firearm when he
committed the crime. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of homicide, and
SENTENCING him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro Vargas in the increased sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
People vs. Capalac, 117 SCRA 874
Facts: September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at a
licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor(Jimmy Magaso), attempting
to escape, was confronted by two brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally
included in the information but now deceased, and appellant Mario Capalac.
The attempt of Magaso to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted
after two shots were fired in succession. Knowing that he was completely at the
mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of surrender, but they
were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario Capalac,
being dealt several blows on the head and the face. After he had fallen to the
ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased on the chest three or tour times.
He was brought to the hospital where he died, the cause, according to the
coroner’s report, being “hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the heart.”
Mario Capalac was convicted of murder. The lower court found that the crime
was committed w/ evident premeditation & treachery. The lower court also held
that appellant took advantage of his position as a police officer & employed
means or brought about circumstances w/c added ignominy to the natural
effects of his act. It sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.
Issues:
1.
WON Conspiracy was proved.
Yes. The brothers apparently had one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing
of Moises Capalac. In their actions they were impelled by a common purpose &
the acted in concert.
US v. Magcamot – Justice Mapa stressed as the essential element for
conspiracy to exist the “concurrence of wills” and “unity of action and purpose
2.
WON there was treachery involved
Yes. RPC provides: There is treachery when offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof w/c tend directly & specially to insure its execution, w/o risk to
himself arising from the defense w/c the offended party might make
Magaso’s situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be
futile and unavailing. Even when his hands were raised in surrender he was still
pistol-whipped. When he was lying on the ground he was still stabbed. In the
testimony it was also stated that there were two other people who were
assisting the brothers. There was no risk, therefore, to the aggressors, no hope
for the victim
3.
WON there was evident premeditation, of means being employed or
circumstances brought about to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act,
and of the crime being committed w/ the offender taking advantage of his
official position as having attended the commission of the crime.
No. United States v. Alvares – Justice Mapa ruled that: an aggravating
circumstance must be “as fully proven as the crime itself”. He added: “Without
clear and evident proof of their presence, the penalty fixed by the law for the
punishment of the crime cannot be increased. Moreover, insofar as evident
premeditation is concerned, the record contains no evidence showing that the
defendant had, prior to the moment of its execution, resolved to commit the
crime, nor is there proof that this resolution was the result of meditation,
calculation and persistence.
People v. Mendova – it should not be “premeditation” merely; it is “evident”
premeditation
People v. Anin, ruled that the perpetration of a criminal act “evidently made in
the heat of anger” didn’t call for a finding that there was evident premeditation.
What’s required is that the offense was “the result of cool & serene reflection.”
What was done by the brothers of Capala, can’t be categorized as falling w/in
the norm of means being employed or circumstances being brought about to
add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is well to stress that they were
prompted by their desire to avenge their brother, They went after Magaso, the
victim. They assaulted him, relying on the weapons they carried w/ them. Jesus
stabbed him & appellant Mario pistol-whipped him. They did what they felt they
had to do to redress a grievance. It cannot be said, therefore, that they
deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It
is quite apparent that all they were interested in was to assure that there be
retribution for what was done to their brother. The mere fact that appellant
Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself justify
that the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of
his public position be considered as present. He acted like a brother,
instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that
could cause the death of a loved 1. It would be an affront to reason to state that
at a time like that & reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a
policeman to commit the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had
his pistol w/ him. It came in handy & he acted accordingly. That he was a
policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.
4.
WON the brothers can avail of the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense
Yes. RPC: That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degree.
What was done was an immediate vindication of the stabbing perpetrated by
Magaso on appellant’s brother Moises.
The brothers Capalac reacted in a manner w/c for them was necessary under
the circumstances. That was a fulfillment of what family honor & affection
require. The aggressor who did them wrong shouldn’t go unpunished. This isn’t
to justify what was done.
PEOPLE VS GAPASIN 231 SCRA 728 (1994)
Facts: According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and Rodrigo Ballad
left the house of Enteng Teppang at about 2 PM of Oct 6 ’79 after a “pamisa”
for Teppang’s deceased father.
- Jerry Calpito followed them. When they reached the point of the road facing
the house of Nick Saludares, Calpito was shot by appellant C1C Loreto
Gapasin with an armalite rifle.
- When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him.
Thereafter, accused Amor Saludares planted a .22 caliber revolver on the left
hand of Calpito. Faustina Calpito ran to help her fallen husband. Calpito died
due to 4 bullet wounds, w/c as his body was autopsied by Dr Layugan, were on
his right arm, right front portion of the head, right and left rib.
- Appellant invoked self-defense saying that he was issued a mission order to
investigate a report re the presence of unidentified armed men in Barrio San
Jose, Isabela. He was informed that Jerry Calpito had an unlicensed firearm.
- He positioned himself in the yard of Nicanor Saludares at the night of the
“pamisa” only to see Calpito.
- However, when Calpito was about 3 meters away from him, Gapasin asked
what was bulging in his waist. Calpito took a step backward, drew his firearm
from the waist and fired twice at appellant.
He missed because appellant
dropped to the ground simultaneously firing his armalite.
HELD: TC correctly ruled that the crime of murder under A248 RPC was
committed. Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The 2 conditions
to constitute treachery were present, to wit: (1) employment of the means of
execution that gives the person who is attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; & (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. Appellant deliberately executed the act in such a way
that Calpito was unaware & helpless. This can be gathered from his act of
waiting for the victim behind the hollow-block fence of Saludares & shooting the
victim from his right side. Evident premeditation, as a generic aggravating
circumstance, was proven by the act was preceded by his cool thought &
reflection.
3 other generic aggravating circumstances: (1) ignominy, ruled out because
autopsy indicated no other injuries w/c could show that the victim was kicked
by assailants, (2) abuse of superior strength, w/c was absorbed by treachery,
and (3) taking advantage of public position. As a member of the Philippine
Constabulary, appellant committed the crime w/ an armalite w/c was issued to
him when he received the mission order.
Voluntary surrender may be
considered but this is offset by the aggravating circumstance of taking adv of
public position. Thus, only the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation may be appreciated against the appellant.
The correct penalty would have been death acdg to A248 & 64 RPC were it not
for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally abhorrent. The proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua.
b. Insult to Public Authority
Elements:
1) That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions.
2) That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of his functions is not the
person against whom the crime is committed.
3) The offender knows him to be a public authority.
4) His presence has not prevented the offender from committing the criminal
act.
Ø Public Authority / Person in Authority
• directly vested with jurisdiction, that is, a public officer who has the power to
govern and execute the laws.
• The councilor, mayor, governor, barangay captain, barangay chairman etc.
are persons in authority.
• A school teacher, town municipal health officer, agent of the BIR, chief of
police, etc. are now considered a person in authority.
Ø Par. 2 is not applicable if committed in the presence of an agent only such
as a police officer.
Ø Agent
• A subordinate public officer charged
• with the maintenance of public order and
• the protection and security of life and property,
• such as barrio policemen, councilmen, and any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority.
Ø Knowledge that a public authority is present is essential. Lack of such
knowledge indicates lack of intention to insult public authority.
Ø If crime is committed
• against the public authority
• while in the performance of his duty,
◦ the offender commits direct assault
◦ without this aggravating circumstance.
People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614
FACTS
- Tiongson escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro,
together with de la Cruzand Santiago, where they were
detained under thecharge of Attempted Homicide
. While in the act of escaping, Tiongson killed a member of the policeforce who
was guarding them and a PC Constablewho went in pursuit.- By reason
thereof, Tiongson was then charged withMurder, in two separate informations,
alleging thatthe commission of the offense was qualified by thecircumstance of
treachery, and aggravated by thecircumstances of evident premeditation, in
contemptof or with insult to the public authorities, nocturnity,committed in an
uninhabited place and with abuse of superior strength.- Upon arraignment, the
said accused, assisted bycounsel
de oficio, pleaded guilty to bothinformations. The trial court did not render
judgmentoutright, but ordered the prosecution to present itsevidence, after
which, it sentenced the said accusedto suffer the death penalty in each case,
and toindemnify the heirs of the victims.
ISSUES
1. WON a plea of guilt is always binding upon theaccused for all the contents of
the information2. WON the killing was qualified by treachery3. WON there were
aggravating circumstancespresent
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: It may be true that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material
facts alleged in theinformation, including the aggravating circumstanceslisted
therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet wherethere has been a hearing and
such circumstancesare disproven by the evidence, they should bedisallowed in
the judgment.
Reasoning: The norm that should be followed wherea plea of guilty is entered
by the defendant,especially in cases where the capital penalty may beimposed,
is that the court should be sure thatdefendant fully understands the nature of
thecharges preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided
by law before it is imposed.For this reason, the Court requires that in every
caseunder a plea of guilty, where the penalty may bedeath, the trial court
should call witnesses for thepurpose of establishing the guilt and degree of
culpability of the defendant and not only to satisfythe trial judge but to aid the
Supreme Court indetermining whether accuse understood andcomprehended
the meaning, full significance andconsequences of his plea. In the instant case,
the
trial judge required the taking of testimony as to thecircumstances under which
the crime was committed before passing judgment
so that the resulting verdictcannot in any way be branded as deficient.2. NO.
Reasoning: The circumstances qualifying oraggravating the act of killing a
human being must beproved in an evident and incontestable manner,mere
presumptions or deductions from hypotheticalfacts not being sufficient to
consider them justified.- According to the RPC, "there is treachery when
theoffender commits any of the crimes against theperson, employing means,
methods, or forms in theexecution thereof which tend directly and specially
toinsure its execution, without risk to himself arisingfrom the defense which the
offended party mightmake."- It does not appear how and in what position
thevictim was when he was killed so that it cannot besaid for certain that the
accused had adopted amode or means of attack tending directly to insure
orfacilitate the commission of the offense without riskto himself arising from the
defense or retaliationwhich the victim might put up.- Pat. Garcia of the
Bulalacao police force merelydeclared that he was in his house, about 15
metersaway from the municipal building when the accusedRudy Tiongson and
his companions escaped fromprison, and he did not see the accused shoot
Pat.Gelera. Pat. Gelera was already dead when the otherwitness saw him.Treachery is also not present in the killing of PCConstable since the deceased
was actually warnedby another PC not to remain standing but seek
coverbecause of the known presence of the accused in thevicinity, but that the
said deceased disregarded thewarning.
- Since treachery, which would qualify the killing of Pat. Gelera and PC
Constable Canela to Murder, wasnot present,
the crimes may only be punished asHomicide
.3. NO.
Reasoning: (a) Evident premeditation must be ruledout in view of the absence
of sufficient proof that aplan to kill the victims existed, the execution of which
was preceded by deliberate thought andreflection. (b) That the crimes were
committed incontempt of or with insult to the public authoritiescannot be
appreciated since they are not persons inauthority, but merely agents of a
person in authority.(c) In order that commission of a crime in anuninhabited
place may be considered, it is necessarythat the place of occurrence be where
there are nohouses at all, a considerable distance from thevillage or town, or
where the houses are a greatdistance apart. (d) Abuse of superior strength
mustalso be ruled out since there is no direct evidencethat the accused
employed it.
Dispositive Petition isaffirmed with the modification that the accused Rudy
Tiongson should be sentenced to sufferimprisonment of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) yearsand eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each homicide committed by
him. Theindemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victims ishereby increased to
P30,000.00 in each case.
People vs. Magdueno, 144 SCRA 210
Facts: A few minutes part 8:00 am City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa Fernando M
Dilig placed himself at the drivers seat in his jeep parked near his houses.
Suddenly, 2 sucessive gunshots burst into air. The gunman coming from his left
side aimed and poured shots into Dilig’s body that cause his death
Held: The AC of insult to public authority does not seem to be borne by the
records . For this circumstance to be considered, it must not only be shown
that the time crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority
but also that crime was not committed against the public authority himself.
c. Disregard of Rank, Age, or Sex
Ø Four circumstances are enumerated in this paragraph,
• which can be considered singly or together.
•
If all the 4 circumstances are present, they have the weight of one
aggravating circumstance only.
Ø There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime,
• the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the
offended party.
1) RANK OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Ø Designation or title used to fix the relative position of the offended party in
reference to others.
Ø There must be a difference in the social condition of the offender and the
offended party.
2) AGE OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Ø May refer to old age or tender age of the victim.
3) SEX OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Ø This refers to the female sex, not to the male sex.
4) DWELLING
Ø Building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
Ø This is considered an AC because in certain cases, there is an abuse of
confidence which the offended party reposed in the offender by opening the
door to him.
Ø Dwelling need not be owned by the offended party.
• It is enough that he used the place for his peace of mind, rest, comfort and
privacy.
Ø Dwelling should not be understood in the concept of a domicile.
• A person has more than one dwelling.
◦ So, if a man has so many wives and he gave them places of their own, each
one is his own dwelling.
◦ If he is killed there, dwelling will be aggravating, provided that he also stays
there once in a while.
Ø The crime of adultery was committed.
• Dwelling was considered aggravating on the part of the paramour.
• However, if the paramour was also residing in the same dwelling, it will not be
aggravating.
Ø The offended party must not give provocation.
Ø It is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the
dwelling of the victim to commit the offense;
• it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
• although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault.
Ø Dwelling includes dependencies,
• the foot of the staircase
• and the enclosure under the house.
People vs. Lapaz, March 31, 1989
Facts: In the evening of April 14, 1984, Eulalia Cabunag, a 70-year old woman
who was living alone, was beaten to death by three men at Barangay
Katipunan, Carmen, Bohol. One of them was discharged as a state witness;
the second pleaded guilty and the third pleaded not guilty so he underwent a
trial. Thereafter, both were found guilty and sentenced to death. Said verdict is
now before this Court on appeal.Appellant Johnson Barleso used to stay in the
house of said victim, Eulalia Cabunag, as his common-law wife was the niece
of the latter. They transferred to the house of Aurelio Gaudicos, son-in-law of
Eulalia, when Eulalia called Barleso a thief in the presence of many people.
Apparently, Barleso resented the remark. Paulino Lapaz, Jr. was then in his
parent's house in the same barangay when he was fetched by his uncle, herein
appellant Cristoto Lapaz, to go to the house of Barleso. Thereat, Barleso
proposed to Cristoto in the presence of Paulino that they kill Eulalia. Cristoto
agreed. He asked Paulino to buy a bottle of "kulafu" wine which be drank to
embolden himself. Thereafter the three proceeded to the house of the victim
who was living alone. Cristoto carried a rounded piece of wood 1 which was
given to him by Barleso, while Barleso also carried another piece of wood 2
and a bolo.
Held: The AC of disregard of sex cannot be similarly absorbed. Disregard of
sex and age pertains to the relationship of the victim who is 70 yrs old woman
and the appellant is young man 27 yrs old at the time of the commission of the
offense.
People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCRA 607
Facts: That on or about February 17, 1991 in the evening thereof at Barangay
Asid, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring together
and confederating with another whose true name and identity is still unknown,
with intent to gain, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Robbery directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there demanding money
from the spouses RODRIGO and FELICIDAD REJUSO but the said accused
were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of Robbery as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their
own spontaneous desistance, that is the said spouses refused and/or denied
having money, and pursuant to the same conspiracy, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery, said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help each other attack, assault and hack, with a bolo, RODRIGO his
wife FELICIDAD and their children, SHEILA and REBECCA, all surnamed
REJUSO, inflicting upon them several wounds in different parts of the body
which caused their instantaneous death; that before killing their victims, the
said accused gained entrance into the victims' dwelling by pretending to ask for
a glass of water but once inside, they tied the hands of the victims and raped
REBECCA REJUSO before killing her.
crime: ATTEMPTED ROBBERY with MULTIPLE HOMICIDE with the
aggravating circumstances of rape, dwelling, band, treachery and craft
Held:Dwelling or morada was present bec. the principal crime took place in the
house of the victims, although the killings were committed outside. The
accused showed greater perversity in the deliberate invasion of the tranquility
of the domicile. Dwelling includes inclusion of the house.
People vs. Banez, 301 SCRA 248
Facts:
Wilfredo Bañez was found by the RTC to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide for the killing of his father, Bernardo, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death.
Accused was living in his parents’ house. One day, his sisters, Elvira BañezBustamante and Emelinda Bañez-Antiado came to the house because their
father complained that the accused made trouble whenever drunk.
They were discussing the plan for putting up the accused in another house or
sleeping quarters. Afterwards, the accused, who looked drunk because he was
red in the face, ran into the kitchen, got 2 knives, went into his father’s room &
stabbed him. Elvira tried to take away the knives but he lunged at her &
stabbed her. Emelinda also tried to stop him. He chased her while Elvira locked
herself in their father’s room. After the accused had left, she rushed their father
to the hospital but he was already dead.
The accused entered a plea of insanity.
Elvira testified that the accused had been staying in their father’s house for 4
years after the accused separated from his wife; that he was confined at the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center for addiction to gasoline and was discharged;
that he was also treated at the Baguio General Hospital for addiction to
gasoline, and; that he had not shown any indication that he was crazy. Dr.
Gerona III of the NCMH (National Center for Mental Health) testified that
accused was admitted to the NCMH 20 days after the crime; that the accused
was suffering from schizophrenia, described as a mental disorder characterized
by thought disturbances, hallucination, suspiciousness, and deterioration in
areas of work, social relations and self-care; that schizophrenia can be caused
by use of substances (inhaling gasoline and alcoholism); that he could not say
whether the accused was insane at the time he committed the crime.
Marina Gabel-Banez, mother of the accused, testified that he had been
confined for more than a year at the Bicutan Rehab Center; that he was also
treated at the Baguio General Hospital; that after killing his father, he was
confined at the Mandaluyong Mental Hospital for treatment; that his wife left
him and he blamed his in-laws for his marital troubles; that he resorted to
gasoline to forget his problems, &; that he was not a drunkard.
The trial court found him guilty of parricide with the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling and habitual intoxication and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death
Issues:
1.
WON he was insane at time of commission of crime and thus exempt
from criminal liability under Art. 12, RPC
No. Accused must prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he
killed his father in order to be considered exempt from criminal liability
In People vs. Formigones: “it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act; that the accused be deprived of reason;
that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be a complete absence of power to discern…insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not exclude imputability.”
People vs. Rafanan, Jr: “Formigones established 2 distinguishable tests: (a)
the test of cognition…& (b) the test of volition..But our caselaw shows common
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to ‘freedom of the
will.’” Burden to prove his insanity at the time of the commission of the act rests
on the defense. But he was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt his
insanity at the time immediately preceding the killing or at the very moment of
the killing. Evidence merely consisted of the testimony of his mother regarding
his treatments. The testimony of Dr. Gerona III is inconclusive as to whether the
accused was insane at the time immediately preceding the killing or at the very
moment of the killing. He could not have testified to this effect, considering that
he treated the accused after the accused was confine at the NCMH.
2.
WON there exists the aggravating circumstances of intoxication and
dwelling in the commission of crime
No. Dwelling cannot be considered aggravating because accused and his
father were living in the same house where the crime was committed. The
rationale for considering dwelling as an aggravating circumstance is the
violation by the offender of the sanctity of the home of the victim by trespassing
therein to commit the crime. The reason is entirely absent in this case.
Regarding the aggravating circumstance of intoxication, it has not been shown
that it is habitual or intentional as required by RPC A15. Even assuming that
the accused was drunk at the time he committed the crime, it wasn’t shown that
he is a habitual and excessive drinker or that he intentionally got drunk. Neither
can intoxication be mitigating because there is no showing that he accused
was so drunk that his will power was impaired or that he couldn’t comprehend
the wrongfulness of his acts.
3.
WON RTC gravely erred in imposing the death penalty upon the
accused instead of reclusion perpetua on the assumption that he was sane at
the time of the killing.
No. Under RA 7659, the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since in this case there was neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances,
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
Judgment: the decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Paraiso, 319 SCRA 422
Facts: Roland Paraiso was found guilty of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
Confederating with John Doe he entered the house of Lolita Alipio Tigley, and
stole several items and on the occasion thereof, with intent to kill, dragged
Tigley inside a room, and thereafter assaulted, attacked and stabbed the latter
on the different parts of the body which caused her death shortly thereafter.
Issues:
1.
WON Paraiso was guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
Yes. The essential elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide (Art. 249, RPC) are: (1) the taking of personal property with the use
of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property thus taken belongs
to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
and, (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. The
evidence for the prosecution showed that appellant and his companion, with a
gun and a knife, took possession of personal properties belonging to the victim,
with intent to gain, and on the occasion thereof, the victim was killed.
2.
WON aggravating circumstances were rightly appreciated
No. Dwelling and abuse of superior strength may be appreciated but not
disregard of respect due the offended party on account of her sex.
Dwelling. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation or if the
victim was killed inside his house. Here, robbery was committed in the house of
the victim without provocation on her part. In robbery with violence and
intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of
robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the offended party’s house. Dwelling is considered aggravating
primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.
He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty
than he who offends him elsewhere.
Abuse of superior strength. While abuse of superior strength may be
considered when there is an inequality of comparative force between the victim
and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless, be a situation of strength
notoriously selected and made use of by the latter in the commission of the
crime. What should be considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Abuse of strength
is present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor but also
when the offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the
defense available to the offended party. Here, the victim was totally helpless in
the face of two (2) perpetrators who were armed with a gun and a knife.
Disregard of respect due to sex. However, the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of her sex cannot be
appreciated. This aggravating circumstance can be considered only in crimes
against persons and honor. The special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide is a crime against property not against persons. Moreover, nothing
appears in the record that appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the
age or sex of the offended party. Moreover, such an aggravating circumstance
would be absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
Judgment: Penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is composed of 2 indivisible
penalties. Applying Art. 63, RPC, penalty that should be imposed is death
which is the maximum provided for by law in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of
superior strength. These aggravating circumstances need not be alleged in the
information since they are mere generic aggravating circumstances which have
the effect of increasing the penalty to the maximum period which is death. But
in accordance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the RPC, upon
finality of this decision, certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of
this case, are forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
People vs. Arizobal, 341 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24 March
1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband Jimmy with one
Francisco Gimenez arrived.
Jimmy informed Erlinda that they had already
bought a carabao. After he handed her the certificate of large cattle, and while
he was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, three (3) men
suddenly appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed
her to the ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a mask,
another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter helplessness of
their victims, the robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes
Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their
snack, two (2) of the intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the
neighboring store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers proceeded
to ransack the household in search for valuables. They took around P1,000.00
from her sari-sari store and told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange for
Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not produce such a big amount in so short
a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large cattle.
The culprits
however would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her. Three
(3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together with
Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away while leaving behind
Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son.
Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which reverberated through the
stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
People vs. Bajar, 414 SCRA 494
Facts: on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the
evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag,
Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed
with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85
year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by
law. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior
strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual
intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the crime.
Held: Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of age, it is considered present when the
offended person, by reason of his age, could be the father of the offender.[39
This is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age,
considered old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared
in open court that he was 58 years old),[40 he was also the latters father-in-law.
The presence of this aggravating circumstance by reason of their age
difference is, therefore, reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity.
Further, it is ingrained in Philippine culture that those advanced in age are
respected especially in the provinces.
d. Abuse of Confidence
Elements:
a. That the offended party had trusted the offender.
b. That the offender abused such trust by committing a crime against the
offended party.
c. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime.
Ø The confidence between the offender and the offended party must be
immediate and personal.
Ø It is inherent in malversation, qualified theft, estafa by conversion or
misappropriation and qualified seduction.
People vs. Mandolado, 123 SCRA 133
Julian Ortillano and Martin Mandolado, appellants, as well as Conrado Erinada
and Anacleto Simon, were on a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. All 4
were trainees/draftees of AFP. They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap.
Being all in uniform, armed & belonging to the same military outfit, they got
acquainted & decided to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus terminal. After drinking
for about an hour, Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market.
Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started
firing. His companions tried to dissuade him but he nonetheless continued firing
his gun. Sensing trouble, Conrado and Anacleto ran away, hailed and boarded
a passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and
boarded also the vehicle and forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them
to the Midsayap crossing. All the while, Mandolado was harassing the driver
and firing his gun. They for off at the Midsayap crossing and waited for a ride.
When Herminigildo Tenorio, driving a privately owned jeep where Nolasco
Mendoza was on board, passed by the 4 boarded the jeep. The whole time,
Mandolado was still causing trouble and firing his gun.
Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North
Cotabato, appellant Mandolado got angry, “cocked” his gun and ordered the
driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Conrado and Anacleto
immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp.
Appellants also got off the jeep but then Mandolado fired his .30 caliber
machine gun at and hit the occupants of the jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise,
fired his armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards hitting the
ground. Then they ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle and
went in so many places until they were apprehended. Mandolado was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength while Ortillano was penalized by
imprisonment for being an accessory
Issues:
1.
WON the abuse of superior strength may be appreciated.
NO. Although the SC appreciated the presence of treachery, it did not
appreciate aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and the use of
superior strength. While it may be true that a soldier in the AFP is deemed as
one who holds public position, there is no persuasive showing that herein
appellants being draftees of the Army, in full military uniform and carrying their
high-powered firearms, facilitated the commission of the crimes they were
charged.It may be conceded that as draftees, the accused could easily hitch
hike with private vehicles, as in the case of the deceased Tenorio’s owner-type
jeep, but there is no evidence that when they stopped the jeep the accused
already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle.
People v. Pantoja: There is nothing to show that the appellant took advantage
of his being a sergeant in the Philippine Army in order to commit the crimes.
The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time is
not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission
of the crimes …
There could be no abuse of confidence as evidence on record showed lack of
confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this confidence was abused,
and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated commission of crimes. In order
that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that “there
exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against
whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a
relationship to commit the crime.” It is also essential that the confidence
between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that
accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that
such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended party’s belief that the former would not
abuse said confidence. In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of
any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest
between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then.
Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the
crimes. Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the
commission of the crime for the simple reason that the requisite trust of the
victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach thereof as
contemplated under Art. 14(4) RPC are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all
likelihood, the accused Army men in their uniforms and holding their highpowered firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep for a ride at
machine gun point which certainly is no source of gratefulness or appreciation.
2.
WON Ortillano is an accessory
NO. Julian Ortillano should be convicted, not as an accessory, but as an
accomplice. An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct participation in its
execution or does not force or induce others to commit it, or his cooperation is
not indispensable to its accomplishment (Art. 18, RPC).
People vs. Silvestre: To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice,
it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which
contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or
moral
People vs. Tamayo: ‘It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity,
not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal
and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further
necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution
of the crime in an efficacious way.
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts, showed knowledge of the criminal
design of Mandolado. In other words, Ortillano’s simultaneous acts supplied, if
not material, moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
Ortillano’s presence served to encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to
increase the odds against the victims
Held: Mandolado is guilty of murder qualified by treachery while Ortillano is
convicted as an accomplice to the crime of murder.
e. Aid of Armed Men
ELEMENTS:
1. That the armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime,
directly or indirectly.
2. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the
crime was committed.
Exceptions:
1. When both the attacking party and the party attacked were equally armed.
2. When the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in the
commission of the crime acted under the same plan and for the same purpose.
3. Casual presence, or when the offender did not avail himself of any of their
aid nor did not knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the
crime.
Ø If there are more than 3 armed men, aid of armed men is absorbed in the
employment of a band.
f.
Inundation, Fire, Poison
Ø Unless used by the offender as a means to accomplish a criminal purpose,
• any of the circumstances in paragraph 12
• cannot be considered to increase the penalty or to change the nature of the
offense.
Ø When another AC already qualifies the crime,
• any of these AC’s shall be considered as generic aggravating circumstance
only.
Ø Fire is not aggravating in the crime of arson.
Ø Whenever a killing is done with the use of fire, as when you kill someone,
you burn down his house while the latter is inside, this is murder.
Ø There is no such crime as murder with arson or arson with homicide. The
crime is only murder.
Ø If the intent is to destroy property,
• the crime is arson even if someone dies as a consequence.
Ø If the intent is to kill,
• there is murder even if the house is burned in the process.
g. Evident Premeditation
Elements:
1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination;
and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow is conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.
Ø Evident premeditation implies
• a deliberate planning of the act
• before executing it.
Ø The essence of premeditation
• an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate
◦ on the meaning and
◦ consequences of what he planned to do,
• an interval long enough for his conscience and better
judgment
◦ to overcome his evil desire and scheme.
Ø The premeditation must be based upon external facts, and must be evident,
not merely suspected indicating deliberate planning
Ø
Evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, adultery, theft, estafa, and
falsification.
People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464
FACTS: On Jan 12, 1994, 8PM, Arola Dilangalen & Mohammad Managuili
escorted home their friend, Jukaris Buan, to Nayon Shariff Kabunsuan on a
service owned by 1 Nong Fred. After dropping off their friend. The 3 went on
their way home. Dilangalen & Managuili asked to be dropped off at 4J Pizza
House along Notre Dame Avenue to eat. After w/c, while waiting for a tricycle
to take them home, they saw 4 men near an electric post 5 meters away from
the 4J Pizza Hse entrance.
W/o warning, the 4 men suddenly &
simultaneously stabbed them.
Arola Dilangalen died of hemmorhage &
antecedent multiple wounds while Managuili, who sustained stab wounds on
his right anterior-axillary line, was still rushed to the ER. He was confined for
2nts.
On Jan 14 ’94, Police Officer Tayong brought before him 5 persons
including appellant Gerry Sumalpong for identification purposes.
He was
positively identified by Managuili as 1 of the assailants. Dilangalen’s mother
testified that they spent PhP70K for the burial of her son & for other Muslim
ceremonies for the dead.
Two of the 4 men remain at large. Only Sumalpong and Fernando were
convicted w/ the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. For their defense,
both gave their defense of alibi. Fernando said he was working then from 710pm at his employer’s shop, making balusters (railings), taking only 10 min
breaks for lunch and supper.
He denied previously knowing the accused.
However, his employer testified that in making balusters, they had to wait for 4
hrs from the time they poured mixed cement into the molding till it hardened.
During this wait, Fernando would usually go home to eat and sleep and one
would just wake him up when his services were again needed. Sumalpong, on
the other hand, claimed that he was a home reading in the evening of Jan 12.
This was attested to by his father.
The court held that their defenses were of no merit. The residence of Fernando
was just a few minutes ride from the scene of the crime. And it was unusual for
Sumalpong, a college student, to be at home and asleep at such an early time
in the evening. Moreover, both were positively identified by victim Managuili as
those who attacked them. The court found the presence of treachery in the
sudden and simultaneous attack against the victims who were unarmed and
unsuspecting. It also believed that there was conspiracy among the accused.
But w/o explanation, it found that evident premeditation aggravated the crime.
Thus, it imposed upon both the penalty of death for the fatal stabbing of
Dilangalen and reclusion temporal maximum for the wounding of Managuili, w/
damages.
Both appeal that in the clear absence of any generic aggravating circumstance
attending the murder, appellants may be sentenced only to reclusion perpetua,
not death.
HELD: Evident premeditation and even voluntary surrender were wrongly
appreciated by the trial court.
Appellant Fernando claim that he voluntary
surrendered to the brgy capt. However, it was shown that the police had tried
to arrest him prior but he implicitly allowed his father to conceal his presence.
When the brgy capt came, he submitted himself only w/ the assurance of his
safety.
His surrender then was not of his own knowing and unconditional
accord as required by law. It has been held that if the only reason for the
accused’s supposed surrender is to ensure his safety, his arrest being
inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and not voluntary.
The court re premeditacion conocida did not make any ratiocination or analysis
as to how or why it was appreciated. For evident premeditation to aggravate a
crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the ff
elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; & (3) sufficient
laps of time between determination & execution, to allow himself to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.
The SolGen correctly observed that these
requisites were not duly established by the prosecution.
Absent any clear and convincing evidence of evident premeditation or other
aggr/mit circumstances, the penalty imposable for the murder of Dilangalen is
reclusion perpetua (A63(2) RPC).
The penalty for the attempt on Managuili’s life is prision mayor in its medium
period.
However, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable against appellants is 4 yrs & 2 mos of prision correccional medium,
as minimum, to 10yrs of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
Both sentences shall be served successively. Assailed decision modified.
People vs. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27
Nature:
Appeal from RTC Manila decision
- Oct 14, 1992, 1:30 p.m.: Gari Bibat stabbed todeath Lloyd del Rosario along
G. Tuazon cor Ma. Cristina Sts.,Sampaloc, Manila. Del Rosario was then
waiting for a ride toschool.
- Witness: Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, wasthen at Funeraria Gloria
waiting for her bettor.1.She saw somebody talk to Bibat who told Bibat,
“Pareanduon na. Siguraduhin mo lang na itumba mo na.” Bibatthen
demonstrated how he was going to perform the act.2.After some time, she then
saw Bibat approach del Rosario& took a pointed object from a notebook, then
he stabbedvictim in the left chest twice. Bibat left but after hearing delRosario
shout for help, he returned & stabbed him again.Bibat ran away & Avila left too.
- Witness Florencio Castro testified that he saw Bibatw/4 others inside the
Gloria Memorial Homes. He saw one of them open a notebook where a
stainless knife was inserted.
- Witness Rogelio Robles testified that Bibat frequentedhis place in Sampaloc
because of Tonton Montero. Montero is thepresident of Samahang Ilocano
Fraternity, a frat Bibat was part of.Montero told Robles about a rumble in their
school whereinsomebody died & that Bibat’s group planned to take
revengeagainst del Rosario. He knew del Rosario by face & he furthertestified
that he knew Bibat’s group kept tusok & guns in hishouse.
- Bibat claimed that it was his mom’s birthday on thatday & that he was at home
during that time reviewing for his finalexams. He also testified that he went to
school for his finals wherehe stayed until 4:30 p.m. He denied all allegations &
he claimsthat he was merely implicated & he didn’t know anything aboutthe
incident.
- Witnesses Marte Soriano & Lino Asuncion III,classmates of Bibat,
corroborated his claims.
- RTC found Bibat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of murder.
ISSUES & RATIO:1.WON the prosecution witnesses are notcredible.
- NO. SC respects trial court findings unless there’s clearproof that it was
reached arbitrarily or it overlooked somesubstantial facts/value that might affect
result.
- Cinco’s failure to shout for help & delay in reporting incidentis acceptable
considering that she must have been scaredherself. It doesn’t affect her
credibility if it is sufficientlyreasoned out. Not impossible either for her to
rememberdetails of the incident. Bibat’s camp theorized that Cincocould’ve not
been taking bets for the PBA on the day of theincident w/c was a Wed because
PBA games were then heldon Tues, Thurs & Sat. But she could’ve done so to
maximizeprofit. Besides, such is immaterial in the case.
2.WON defense of alibi should be appreciated.
- NO. For alibi to be appreciated, there must be clear & satisfactory proof that it
was physically impossible foraccused to be at the crime scene at the time of
commission.
- Alibis of Bibat that he was at home & then in school atArellano University.
These places are actually near the crimescene. He could very well be present
in
the
crime
sceneduring
commission.
Besides,
this
claim
is
unsubstantiated.He should have presented a class card or grading sheet
toprove that he did take the exam.
- Positive identification of accused by witnesses is given moreweight than the
negative & self-serving denials & alibispresented by Bibat.
3.WON AC of evident premeditation should be appreciated.
- YES. Requisites: time when offender determined/conceivedto commit crime,
act manifestly indicating that culprit hasclung to his determination, & sufficient
lapse of time betdetermination & execution to allow him to reflect
uponconsequences of his act.
- Essence: execution of crim’l act is preceded by cool thought& reflection upon
resolution to carry out crim’l intent duringspace of time sufficient to arrive at
calm judgment.
- Witnesses Robles & Cinco have testified to prove that 3requisites were met.
Bibat tried to contest Robles’ testimony. Robles testified that he allowed Bibat’s
group tohide guns & tusok in his house. Bibat claims that it was notlogical for
someone in his rt frame of mind to allow anybodyto do that. But Robles
explained that he was scared of Bibat’s group & he wanted to protect his family
that’s whyhe allowed them to do so. Besides, evident premeditationwas clearly
proven by Cinco’s testimony. She heard Bibat’sgroup plan the killing at around
11:30 a.m. then theycommitted crime at around 1:30 a.m. Thus, there was
asufficient lapse of time for Bibat to reflect & such is proof that Bibat clung to
his resolution to kill del Rosario.
- People vs. Dumdum: one hour was considered a sufficientlapse of time.
HELD:Affirmed.
People vs. Julandia, 370 SCRA 448
~ The supreme court held that when it is not shown as to how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried oyt,
evident premeditation cannot be considered.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 398 SCRA 415
Gonzalo Baldogo alias “Baguio” & Edgar Bermas alias “Bunso” were serving
sentence in the Penal Colony of Palawan.
They were also serving the
Camacho family who resides w/in the Penal Colony
- On Feb 22, 1996 Baguio & Bunso killed Jorge (14 y.o.) & abducted Julie (12
y.o.). They brought Julie up to the mountains.
- During their trek Baguio & Bunso were able to retrieve their clothing &
belongings from a trunk which was located under a Tamarind tree.
- Feb. 28, 1996 – Baguio left Julie in the mountains to fend for herself.
Julie
went to the lowlands & there she asked for help from Nicodemus
- Baguio/Baldogo denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Baguio contends
that while he was preparing for sleep he was approached by Bunso who was
armed with a bloodied bolo. Bunso warned him not to shout, otherwise he will
also be killed.
- Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive
her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and Julie
were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from
Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her
parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was
afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
The trial court convicted Bunso of
o
Murder – appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, w/o any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, & pursuant to the provisions of the
2nd par., No. 1, of A63 of the RPC, he is hereby sentenced to death
o
Kidnapping – no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to
the provisions of the 2nd par., No. 2, of A63 of the RPC, & not being entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, w/ the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, & of
perpetual absolute disqualification;
Issues:
1.
WON the accused is guilty of murder and kidnapping. YES
Baldogo claims that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by
Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. He claims
that he was even protective of Julie. He insists that Julie was not a credible
witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was
merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping
and detention by Bermas.Julie’s testimony is credible – findings of facts of the
TC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of
the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties & its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if
not conclusive effect. The raison d’etre of this principle is that this Court has to
contend itself w/ the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues
posed by the parties; The TC has the unique advantage of monitoring &
observing at close range the attitude, conduct & deportment of witnesses as
they narrate their respective testimonies before said court
Exceptions:
a.
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
by the trial court;
b.
when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence;
c.
when the TC ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
misconstrued facts & circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter
the outcome of the case
It’s incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically,
that the crimes charged had been committed & that accused-appellant
precisely committed the same. Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence & not on the weakness of accused’s evidence. The prosecution
adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired w/ Bermas not
only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping & detaining Julie. There is
conspiracy if 2 or more persons agree to commit a felony & decide to commit it.
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during & after
the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose & design & community of
intent.
As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts w/ such
closeness & coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or
design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are
criminally liable for the death of said victim.
2.
WON the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
can be appreciated.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish
the confluence of the ff. requisites
a.
Time when offender determined to commit the crime;
b.
An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination;
and
c.
Sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Evident premeditation must be proved with certainty as the crime itself
It cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor
has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it.
The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit
the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law
doesn’t prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has
decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their
clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr.
does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping
from the colony. – insufficient evidence for evident premeditation.
Baldogo & Bermas were armed w/ bolos, there’s no evidence that they took
advantage of their numerical superiority & weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse
of superior strength can’t be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.
Dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in
their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house
Killing was qualified w/ treachery – Court has previously held that the killing of
minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put
up a defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing,
abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
People vs. Delada, 399 SCRA 538
Facts: That on or about July 7, 1997 in the afternoon at Pres. Sergio Osmeña
Street corner Lim Ket Kai Drive, Cagayan De Oro City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and armed with a knife which
he was then conveniently provided, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Danny Paredes towards the right side
of his body with said knife, thereby inflicting a fatal wound on the vital part of
the latter’s body resulting in his untimely death. Appellant interposed selfdefense to justify the killing of the victim, Paredes. He claimed that in the early
morning of July 7, 1997, Paredes entrusted the pedicab to him while the former
went inside the market to have breakfast. He knew the victim because his wife
is a cousin of the lattter’s wife. He asked for Paredes’ permission to use the
pedicab, which the latter gave. He was, therefore, surprised when the victim
confronted him at 12:00 noon for using the pedicab. He surmised that the latter
was intoxicated since he had engaged in a drinking spree with Quipanes. The
victim allegedly boxed him for no reason, hitting him on the right side of the
face. When he saw Paredes scrambling for an umbrella tube with which to
strike him, he then got a knife from inside the shoe repair shop. The victim
wrestled with him and kicked him on the back.
To defend himself against
Paredes, who was a man of robust build, he thrust the knife without even
knowing which part of the victim’s body was hit. Thereafter, he ran towards the
public market.
Held: On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation did not attend the killing. The prosecution was not able to show:
(a) the time when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused-appellant had clung to his determination;
and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and its execution
to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act.
People vs. Aposaga, 414 SCRA 69
Jeffrey Alipoon testified that on March 28, 1992, at around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening, he was with Marlon Tad-y, Wilbert Vasquez, and the deceased Medel
Sigueza drinking a small bottle of whiskey at the house of Friday Magalona in
Burgos Street, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental.
After an hour, the deceased
wanted to go home. The group went to accompany the deceased home when
they chanced upon two persons named Windy and Rey who invited them to
have another round of drinks. The group were already drinking beer at
Foodtastic restaurant near an emergency hospital when appellant happened to
pass by. The deceased invited him to join them but appellant angrily declined,
saying, “I will not drink, I will go home.” At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening,
the group started on their way home when appellant suddenly appeared from
behind a mango tree. Appellant, who was carrying an axe in his right hand and
a long pointed instrument in his left, shouted at the deceased to come near
him.
As appellant advanced towards the group, Alipoon tried to pacify
appellant and block his path. When Alipoon placed his hand on appellant’s
shoulder, appellant brushed away his hand. Undeterred, Alipoon again placed
his hand on appellant’s shoulder and placated him saying, “We were just
drinking on the same glass, let’s forget this and settle this tomorrow.” Appellant
answered “Yes,” but as soon as Jeffrey turned to leave, appellant rushed
towards the deceased shouting, “You son of a bitch!” Alipoon, who told the
deceased to run, noticed appellant raise his left hand which was holding a long
pointed instrument.
Moments later, Alipoon heard a thud as the two men
grappled with each other to wrest control of the weapons held by appellant.
Thereafter, the deceased ran towards the house of a certain Peleng Mugat at
Sitio Boling-Boling while appellant also ran in the same direction. Alipoon, on
the other hand, accompanied by Wilbert and Marlon, proceeded to the house of
the father of the deceased, Tio Manuel, located twenty meters away from the
place of the incident. After reporting the incident to Tio Manuel, Alipoon and his
companions, together with the father of the deceased, headed back to the
place of the incident, equipped with a flashlight. When they reached the place,
they found the deceased in a pool of blood, lying face up. They brought the
deceased to the emergency hospital in Hinigaran and later had him transferred
to the Riverside Hospital in Bacolod City where the deceased expired.
Held: Appellant’s contention has merit. It is the contention of the posecution
that the deceased and appellant had a misunderstanding a month before the
stabbing incident. At past 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the incident, he
declined, allegedly in anger, the invitation of the deceased to join them for a
drink. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the deceased should have been
sufficiently forewarned of the hostile attitude of appellant. Although the
deceased may have been taken by surprise since appellant stabbed him from
behind, just when appellant appears to have been placated by Alipoon,
treachery may not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Treachery
does not connote the element of surprise alone. The essence of treachery is
that the attack is deliberate and without warning – done in a swift and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape.[35] It must be shown that the offender employed
means, methods or forms which tended directly to ensure the execution of his
criminal objective without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
In the case at bar, when appellant stabbed the deceased at the back, the two
men fell to the ground and grappled for the possession of the deadly weapons
held by appellant. Said stab wound inflicted on the deceased could not have
rendered him defenseless since he was still able to run after he and appellant
fell to the ground grappling for the possession of the deadly weapons. It is
significant to note that apart from a bolo and an axe, a fan knife was also
recovered from the scene of the crime and appellant himself suffered a stab
wound. This indicates that the deceased was not completely helpless when he
was assaulted. While the medical examination shows that the deceased
suffered four stab wounds, it was not established, apart from the wound at his
back, how and when, during the scuffle, the other stab wounds were inflicted.
Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be appreciated
against appellant.
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance attending the killing of the
deceased, appellant may only be convicted of the crime of homicide which is
punishable under the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Considering
that no modifying circumstance attended the commission of the felony, the
minimum imposable penalty therefor, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree
lower than reclusion temporal, and the maximum period of the penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.
People vs. Gialolo, 414 SCRA 278
Facts:At around half past three in the early morning of April 13, 1994,
prosecution witness Desiderio Baculi was awakened by a call of nature. While
urinating, he heard a voice coming from the house of appellant Federico
Gialolo, saying, What is this? He peeped through the wall of his kitchen made
of hog wire towards the house of appellant Federico which was more or less,
twenty (20) meters from his house.[6] He saw the three appellants, together
with the victim Jose Platon. The place was illuminated by an incandescent lamp
situated near the door outside Federicos house. The victim was held close by
appellants Federico Gialolo and Oscar Makabenta. Federico embraced the
victims left side with both arms, while Oscar embraced the victims right side
below the waist also with both his arms. Appellant Marcos Gialolo was at the
back of Jose. He pulled Joses hair with his left hand and then slashed his neck
with a scythe. They then left Jose who zigzagged towards a nearby coconut
tree by the side of the road, where he eventually fell. The three appellants
proceeded to Federicos house, and switched off the light.
Contention of the Accused:
The appellants cite the allegedly contradictory and unnatural testimony of
eyewitness Baculi. They also contend that the trial court erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength
Ruling of the Court:
It is not unbelievable for Baculi to have heard a mans voice uttering, What is
this? coming from the scene of the crime. The scene was a mere twenty (20)
meters away from him. It was also 3 oclock in the morning when silence
reigned and hence where noises were magnified. The trial court, however,
erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
against the appellants. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the
following elements must be present: (a) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he has adhered to
such determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his
act.In the case at bar, no proof was presented to show any of these elements.
Nor can the aggravating circumstance of superior strength be appreciated
against the appellants. This circumstance was not alleged in the Information
and hence cannot be the subject of proof during the trial. Even disregarding
this bar, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.
h. Craft, Fraud, Disguise
Ø Involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the accused.
Ø It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime.
Fraud
Ø Insidious words or machinations used
• to induce the victim
• to act in a manner
• which would enable the offender to carry out his design.
Ø Craft and fraud may be
• absorbed in treachery if they have been deliberately adopted as the means,
methods or forms for the treacherous strategy, or
• they may co-exist independently where they are adopted for a different
purpose in the commission of the crime.
Disguise
Ø Resorting to any device to conceal identity.
Ø The test of disguise is
• whether the device or contrivance resorted to by the offender
• was intended to or did make identification more difficult, such as the use of a
mask, false hair or beard.
Ø But if in spite of the use of handkerchief to cover their faces, the culprits
were recognized by the victim, disguised is not considered aggravating.
People vs. Marquez, 117 SCRA 165
Nature: Appeal from the judgement of the CoFI of Quezon
- Lower court found Francisco Forneste & Samuel Jacobo guilty of the crime of
robbery w/ rape. Renato Marquez died during trial.
- Nov. 16, 1966 – accused pretended to be PC soldiers that were looking for
contraband. Francisca Marquez said that there was no contraband in their
house. The men ordered her to open up otherwise they’ll shoot. She opened
the window & Renato Marquez forced himself him. The door to the house was
then opened & his companions were able to enter the house.
- The accused demanded the money and other valuable items of the occupants
of the house. Leticia (daughter 13 year old) & Rufina (household help) was
also raped.
- During the initial investigation Rufina and Leticia did not name names of their
aggressors but instead they described them. Francisca pointed out secretly to
the PC that the accused were the perpetrators of the crime
Issues:
1.
WON the accused were identified beyond reasonable doubt that they
were the perpetrators of the robbery.
- YES. Silence of the complaining witnesses on the identity of the accused
immediately after the incident was explained by the ordeal that they just
suffered at the hands of the accused.
- The accused were positively identified by the victims and it was not shown
that witness have an improper motive or were biased against them,
- Experience has shown that witnesses are reluctant to divulge the identity of
their assailants except to propere authorities or until they feel safe enough from
any probable harm.
2.
WON the AC of nighttime, unlawful entry, dwelling of the offended
parties, disguise (pretending to be PC officers) & utter disregard due to victim’s
age & sex can be appreciated.
- YES. Properly alleged in the information and was proven by the prosecution.
People vs. Empacis, 222 SCRA 59
FACTS: At about 9PM of Sept 16, 1986, as vicitms Fidel Saromines and his W
Camila were about to close their small store in Cebu, 2 men, Romualdo
Langomez and Crisologo Empacis, came and asked to buy some sardines and
rice.
After they finished eating, Langomez told Fidel to sell him some
cigarettes. He then announced a hold-up and ordered Fidel to give up his
money. The latter started to hand him PhP12K but suddenly decided to fight to
keep it. A struggle followed in the course of w/c Langomez stabbed Fidel about
3x. Empacis joined in and w/ his own knife also stabbed Fidel. At this time,
gunshots were heard outside the house. It was only when Peter, Fidel’s 13-yr
old son, saw his father fighting for his life and rushed to his father’s defense w/
a pinuti (a long bolo) striking Empacis and inflicting 2 wounds on him did the 2
men flee. Fidel died from the fatal injuries, w/c penetrated his lungs and heart.
Empacis went to the clinic of Dr Eustaquio for the treatment of his wounds
inflicted by Peter. He told the doctor that he was assaulted w/o warning by a
young man near the Papan Market.
The next day, police officers went looking for a man who might have been
treated for wounds from a bladed weapon. They came to Dr Eustaquio’s clinic
who told them about Empacis.
He was found at the public market taking
breakfast & there they arrested him. He admitted going to the store of Fidel but
denied having joined Langomez in his attack. He asserts that he tried to stop
him but the latter succeeded in stabbing Fidel. He further alleges that he was
brought by his neighbors to the the clinic. The other 2 men, who were accused
of firing the gun from outside, denied any participation in the crime. They were
both absolved by the court. Langomez disappeared & could not be found.
HELD: Conspiracy was adequately proven by the evidence. Both acted in
concert, helping and cooperating w/ one another by simultaneous acts,
evidently in pursuit of a common objective.
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated
against Empacis.
Both men pretended to be bona fide customers of the
victim’s store and on this pretext gained entry into the latter’s store and later,
into another part of his dwelling.
In previous cases, the Court held the
presence of fraud or craft when one pretended to be constabulary soldiers to
gain entry into a residence to rob and kill the residents, pretended to be needful
of medical treatment only killing the owner of the house, and pretended to be
wayfarers who had lost their way to enter into a house.
Nighttime was also properly appreciated as an AC as nocturnity was
deliberately and purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime. For
superior strength to be deemed present, it doesn’t suffice to prove superiority in
number on the part of the malefactors but that they purposely employed
excessive force, force out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked w/c was present in this case. Empacis & his companion
took advantage of their combined strength & their bladed weapons to
overcome their unarmed victim & assure the success of their felonious design
to take the money. Dwelling was also correctly appreciated.
Indemnity for death payable is increased to PhP50K & restitution of PhP12K
shall be made by the accused. Decision affirmed w/ modification.
i.
Abuse of Superior Strength
Ø To TAKE ADVANTAGE of superior strength means
• to use purposely excessive force
• out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.
Ø Superiority may arise from
• aggressor’s sex, weapon or number
• as compared to that of the victim (e.g. accused attacked an unarmed girl with
a knife; 3 men stabbed to death the female victim).
Ø No advantage of superior strength when
• one who attacks is overcome with passion and obfuscation or
• when quarrel arose unexpectedly and the fatal blow was struck while victim
and accused were struggling.
People vs. Padilla, 233 SCRA 46
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CoFI of Catbalogan Samar
Sgt. Felix Padilla was a member of the Philippine Air Force. He was charge w/
a crime of murder qualified by treachery, evident premeditation & taking
advantage of his public position for fatal shooting on May 5, 1981 of his
comrade-in-arms Pfc. Ontunca.
2 AC were alleged to have attended the
commission of the offense: aid or armed men & abuse of superior strength.
TC convicted Padilla of murder qualified by treachery w/ the generic AC of
taking advantage of his public position but at the same time MC of sufficient
provocation in favour of the accused.
Prosecution Witness Pat. Omega – Together with Maj. De la Cruz they were
just across the street (15 meters) and from where they stood they could see
clearly the side view of the accused & the victim facing each other. Ontuca
begged for his life & said that he was not going to fight with him. The accused
showed no mercy and squeezed the trigger pumping a single bullet into the
head of his victim who was just some 3-4 meters from him. The accused
backtracked & then returned to the fallen policeman & tauntingly kicked him
saying, “Are You Still Alive?”
Version of Padilla – the victim was shot at the head by unidentified men. He
contends that he was at a distance struggling with a woman at the time that
Ontunca was hit.
Issues:
1.
WON the Padilla shot Ontunca.
YES. Improbability of the version of the defense lies principally on the medical
findings on the point of entry of the bullet, size of the gunshot wound and its
characteristics as well as the location of the slug taken from the head of the
victim ? all points towards the accused
Difficult to believe that the alleged gunman fired the shot that hit the victim at
the top of his head from his right side, while the latter was at a distance
struggling with a woman at the time he was hit.
The testimony was made in a straightforward manner.
2.
WON there is treachery.
NO. Accused did not deliberately employ means, methods or forms in the mode
of his attack which tended directly and specially to insure his safety from the
any offensive or retaliatory act the victim might make.
Appellant didn’t consciously adopt a particular method or manner of killing the
victim that would eliminate any risk to himself, for it wasn’t until Ontuca & the
woman he was holding hostage accidentally fell to the ground that appellant
was accorded the instant opportunity to kill his victim w/ facility.
People vs. Canete – circumstance that the deceased had fallen to the ground
gave the accused the opportunity of which he promptly availed of to come up
with the deceased and dispatch him at once. But the act of so doing cannot be
interpreted as envincing a design to employ a method indicative of alevosia.
Assault on the victim was not made in a sudden and unexpected manner.
Victim was forewarned of a graver evil when accused and his companions
mauled him.
3.
WON AC of abuse of superior strength can be appreciated
YES. Properly alleged.
Abuse of superior strength is present not only when the offenders enjoy
numerical superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, but also when the offender uses a powerful weapon
w/c is out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party.
Accused was armed w/ a powerful pistol w/c he purposely used, gaining him an
advantage to his victim who only had a piece of plywood to cover himself after
he was disarmed.
4.
WON the accused abused his public position.
NO. Public official must use his influence, prestige, & ascendancy w/c his office
gives him in realizing his purpose
Could not be said that the accused purposely used or took advantage of his
position or rank in killing the victim because he could have committed the crime
just the same by using another weapon not necessarily his service firearm.
People vs. Lobrigas, 394 SCRA 170
On or about the 19th day of February, 1996 in the municipality of Loon,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, with
treachery by attacking the victim without affording the latter an opportunity to
defend himself and with abuse or taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and box one
Felix Taylaran who was already 76 years old and could no longer put up an
effective defense, thereby inflicting injuries on the vital parts of the body of the
said victim which resulted in his death; to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.
Held: In the case at bar, not only did accused-appellant evade arrest when he
went to Cebu under the pretext that he was going to work at Southern Island
Hospital, but justice was further frustrated when he escaped from detention
with the flimsy excuse that no one was guarding them. These two instances of
flight by accused-appellant, taken together with the other circumstances
established by the prosecution, support the trial court’s finding of accusedappellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Courts go by the biblical truism that
“the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.”
However, we do not agree with the trial court that the crime committed was
murder qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on
the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They
must have notoriously selected and made use of superior strength in the
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength is to use
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for self-defense available
to the person attacked; thus, the prosecution must clearly show the offenders’
deliberate intent to do so. There was no clear indication in this case that the
accused-appellant and his companions purposely used their joint efforts to
consummate the crime.
Consequently, the crime committed by accused-
appellant was only homicide.
People vs. Casitas, 397 SCRA 382
“At around 7:30 o’clock in the morning of March 2[5], 1998, at Karangahan,
Bombon, Tabaco, Albay, appellant Jose Casitas, Jr., also known as Boboy, was
at the store of Romeo Briones. This store is located near the house of Mario
Chan, the house where Haide Marbella was working as caretaker. Appellant
and Romeo Briones were able to converse for about 20 minutes. During their
conversation, appellant showed Romeo the 3 25-centavo coins which he had
and said, ‘and lakaw kong ini sapalaran x x x (this venture of mine is being
taken on a chance). Thereafter, Romeo turned away and lay down on the table.
He never noticed when appellant left his store.Nearby, Corazon Goyena
passed by the store of Romeo Briones going towards the Jasmin Street for the
purpose of dumping the sand piled at the side of the road on the drainage.
This pile of sand was on the road beside the house of Mario Chan.
“While she was proceeding to the pile of sand, Corazon saw Haide standing in
the middle of the road near the steel gate of the house of Mario Chan talking
with Meriam Manzano. Seeing that Haide wanted to talk with her, Corazon went
to the store of Romeo and waited there for Haide. At the store, Haide asked
Corazon if the latter was willing to lend her P200.00 to which the latter agreed.
Before Haide left to go back to the house of Mario Chan, she looked at
appellant who was still at the store.Thereafter, Corazon followed Haide to
borrow the shovel which she would use for the pile of sand.
She then
proceeded towards the pile of sand and began to shovel sand to a pail and
dumped it on the drainage.After 3 trips, Corazon felt thirsty. As the house of
Mario Chan was the closest house, she went there to ask Haide for cold
drinking water.
“Calling out to Haide, Corazon decided to enter the compound as there was no
answer from inside the house. Since the gate and the door to the house were
not locked, Corazon entered the house to look for Haide. Again, she called for
Haide but still she did not get any response.Looking inside the room of Haide,
Corazon saw that there was nobody there. So, she proceeded towards the
kitchen of the house of Mario Chan.At the kitchen, she saw Haide sprawled on
the kitchen floor lying face down and bloodied. Surprised, Corazon ran outside
and asked for help from Romeo.On the other side of the house of Mario Chan,
Nemesio Capiz, the house boy of Gerardo Musa Jr., while bringing out a gas
tank to the car of latter, saw a man inside the compound of the residence of
Mario Chan.
“At a distance of about 25 meters, Nemesio saw the man looking from side to
side and then jumped over the fence. Then, this man casually walked away
from the house of Mario Chan tucking in his shirt inside his pants. Nemesio
noticed that the man’s shirt was bloodied and very red and the edge of his
pants [was] red.
Nemesio recognized this man to be appellant.However,
Nemesio did not mind appellant.
Instead, he went back to the house of
Gerardo Musa and informed the latter that he saw a man jumping from the
fence of the house of Mario Chan and that the man’s shirt and pants were very
red. Thereafter, he went to the pigsty and continued to work.Outside the house
of Mario Chan, Remegio Almonte, Jr. saw the commotion and entered the
house of Mario Chan. There, he saw the bloodied cadaver of Haide. He
suggested that the cadaver be brought to the hospital and one man lifted the
cadaver and brought it outside. Outside, people commented that there were
many stab wounds on the neck of Haide. Remegio tried to look for clues about
the murder but he found nothing. Then he decided to go home.
Held: A perusal of the Information filed against appellant clearly shows that
dwelling was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance. Even assuming that
this circumstance was subsequently proven during trial, the lower court was
precluded from appreciating it because of the new requirement under the rules.
Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period in accordance with Article 249 of the RPC, which
defines
and
penalizes
the
crime
of
homicide.
Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium
period, as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Although the trial court correctly awarded P50,000 to the heirs of the victim as
civil indemnity, it failed to grant actual and moral damages, which were prayed
for and proven during the trial. An examination of the records of the case will
show that the defense agreed to the stipulation of P39,000 as actual damages,
which the heirs had spent for the funeral of the victim.
Moreover, the
prosecution presented one of her children to prove the pain and the moral
anguish they had suffered by reason of her untimely demise. WHEREFORE,
the automatically appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum; to 14 years
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, he shall pay the heirs of the victim
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and
P39,000 as actual damages.
People vs. Aliben, 398 SCRA 255
~ the court ruled that taking avantage of superior strength which would present.
The 3 accused were all armed. Ronnie and Diosdado were armed w/ a piece of
wood while aliben was armed w/ a bolo and helped one another in assaulting
Borgn who was alone on Bongon’s time of death he was 25 yrs old while
Ronnie 23, Diosdado 29 Aliben 41 yrs old. There is a wide gap of age bet. The
victim and the accused showing that victim was much older than the 3 accused
who were younger and physically stronger.
People vs. Rollon, 410 SCRA 295
Facts: in the meantime, Felipe and his sons Errol and Ariel, with Eddie Lachica,
Salvador Romano, Danilo Perez and Francisco Rabino, all boarded the tricycle
and went after Tito. As they reached the gate of Tito’s house, they chanced
upon Alejandro and Melchor. The two were on their way home from the wake
and were just waiting for their younger brother Isidro who got separated from
them during the commotion.
Errol alighted from the tricycle and greeted
Alejandro and Melchor, waving his left hand. Alejandro likewise waved his hand
saying, “Pre, waya kita (Friend, there is nothing between us).” Errol curtly
retorted, “Waya ka diyan (You have nothing here).” Errol blocked Alejandro
and Melchor’s way. Ariel vented his ire on Alejandro and hacked the latter on
his left arm. Alejandro retaliated and boxed Ariel, who fell to the ground. Errol
then joined the fray, but was held at bay by Alejandro. Eddie suddenly shot
Alejandro, who fell prostrate to the ground. In the meantime, Melchor could not
help his brother because Francisco had his gun aimed at the latter. Errol then
shot Alejandro two more times on the head and on his body. Ariel, for his part,
then hacked the hapless Alejandro with his bolo. Melchor somehow managed
to sneak out without being noticed and ran for dear life to the house of Thomas
Rios. When Melchor was already inside the house, he heard someone shout,
“Patay na ina! (Kill him!).” Melchor heard another gunshot. He peeped through
a hole and saw the dead body of his brother, Alejandro, being run over by the
tricycle driven by Errol. Melchor could only watch in horror and grief. He could
not do anything more for his brother.
Held: The appellant’s use of a firearm to consummate the crime cannot,
however, be considered as a special aggravating circumstance because there
was no such allegation in the Information that the appellant had no license to
possess the firearm, as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The lack of a license to possess firearms is an essential
element of the crime of violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294, whether as an independent crime or as an aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide. Hence, such circumstance cannot aggravate the crime
of murder and the penalty therefor; otherwise, the appellant would be deprived
of his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Although the
crime was committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, the same should be
applied retroactively as it would be favorable to the appellant. Under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic or special
aggravating circumstances and one generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellant, in accordance with
Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which
is reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Hugo, 410 SCRA 62
Joel Talon testified that at 7:00 p.m. of 21 August 1997, he fetched his cousin
Remegio at the birthday party of Lolito Villamar at Barangay Narra, San
Manuel, Pangasinan. They left the party at around 7:00 p.m. On their way
home, they were met by Ernesto, Lorenzo, and Rudy. Ernesto was walking
along the left side of the road, while Rudy and Lorenzo took the right side.
Ernesto came face to face with Remegio. Suddenly, Ernesto hacked Remegio
twice with a bolo, first on the forearm and then on the right shoulder, causing
the latter to fall to the ground. Ernesto quickly ran away, and his bolo slipped
from his hand. Remegio then told Joel to run after Ernesto. Joel promptly
gave a chase. Though wounded, Remegio stood up to follow them. Lorenzo
and Rudy also chased Remegio and Joel.
Since Ernesto was already some distance away, Joel decided to turn back.
Standing approximately ten meters from Remegio, Joel saw Lorenzo and Rudy
overtake Remegio. Thereafter, Joel witnessed Lorenzo hack Remegio with a
bolo on the back of his head, causing Remegio to fall to the ground. Shocked
by what he saw, Joel could not move to help Remegio. From where he stood,
Joel witnessed Lorenzo deliver another blow at Remegio's neck. Afterwards,
Rudy hacked Remegio at the mouth and forehand.
Lorenzo and Rudy
forthwith fled. When the brothers had gone, Joel approached Remegio, who lay
prostrate on the ground, and then he shouted for help. Bobby Antimano, Joey
Villamar, Ben Gapisan, and Eniong Marcelo arrived and helped Joel carry
Remegio's lifeless body to the street pavement. Eventually, SPO3 Dominador
Urbiztondo Jr. and other policemen arrived at the crime scene and conducted
an investigation.
On 23 August 1997, Joel executed a sworn statement before SPO3
Urbiztondo. He declared that only Ernesto hacked Remegio. However, on 26
August 1997, Joel executed an addendum to his 23 August 1997 sworn
statement, adding that he saw Lorenzo and Rudy coming from a dimly-lit area
and walking towards the scene of the crime immediately after Ernesto hacked
Remegio. But, he could not tell what Lorenzo and Rudy did, as he was already
in pursuit of Ernesto.
Held: The records are bereft of any information with respect to the physical
condition of both Ernesto and Remegio. For the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, the age, size, and strength of the
parties must be considered. There must be a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, giving the latter a superiority of strength
which is taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[42] And
even assuming arguendo that it existed, abuse of superior strength should not
be appreciated separately, for it is absorbed in treachery.
PEOPLE VS ROXAS 410 SCRA 451
Joelyn B. Maceda, a security guard at the First Unity Textile Mills in Novaliches,
Quezon City, stayed with her sister, Lorna Maceda Puno, in San Roque,
Bagong Pag-asa, Quezon City, in a one-storey structure with the front door
leading to the kitchen and with two steps leading to the sala. Joelyn shared the
house with Lorna and her husband, the couple’s five-year-old son, Jonas, and
a niece. Lorna, like Joelyn, was a security guard at the Citibank in Makati City.
When on duty, the sisters were issued caliber .38 service firearms that they
were not, however, allowed to bring home and, instead, had to entrust each
time to a reliever. Although the sisters were trained to handle firearms, they,
upon the other hand, only had minimal instruction on self-defense.
Between nine o’clock and nine-thirty on the evening of 8 March 1996, Joelyn
was washing clothes in front of the door of their house, lighted by a fluorescent
lamp, when she saw Lorna coming home from work in her type B uniform and
carrying a brown bag. From a distance of barely four to five meters, Joelyn
could see Lorna running away from appellant. Appellant, apparently drunk, had
no clothes from waist up, was wearing shorts and carrying a gun. When Joelyn
asked the pale and trembling Lorna why she was running, the latter replied,
“Lyn, Lyn, enter, close the door, a man (is) following me!” (Lyn, Lyn, pasok,
sarado ang pinto, may sumusunod sa akin lalaki). Joelyn promptly closed the
door but appellant was able to kick it open. Joelyn, her forehead hit by the
door, was pushed aside.
Appellant grabbed Lorna’s bag, opened it and,
apparently not finding what he could have been looking for, hurled the bag to
the floor (binalibag po niya ang bag sa sahig). Appellant asked Lorna, “Why
did you run? Why did you not mind me?” (Bakit ka tumakbo? Bakit ‘di mo ‘ko
pinansin?). Lorna answered, “I did not hear you.” Joelyn tried to hold the hand
of appellant but he pushed her hand away. Appellant then shot Lorna with a
caliber .45 gun with its muzzle just two feet away from Lorna’s face. Lorna fell
on the floor with half of her body outside the door and the other half inside the
house. Joelyn held her sister. Lorna was still alive. A neighbor responded to
Joelyn’s cries for help. Lorna was brought to the hospital. At six o’clock the
following morning of 9 March 1996, Joelyn went to Camp Karingal to report the
incident. Later, Joelyn, accompanied by Randy who took down her statement
at the camp, went to the East Avenue Hospital where Lorna had been taken.
Held: Even beyond that, as so expressed above, is the overriding principle that
an accused has the unfettered right “to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.” The Court has no reason to doubt the fact that the
prosecutor and trial judge must have relied in “utmost good faith” on the old
rule (that a generic aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the
accused even if it is not alleged in the information), but it is not enough for this
Court to now take that belief into account against appellant and to abandon a
standing tenet that the law, as well as rules of procedure favorable to the
accused, must be given retroactive effect. The Court realizes that neither the
Solicitor General and the prosecutor nor the trial judge, are out of line; indeed,
in People v. Mitra the Court has virtually agreed to consider aggravating
circumstances not alleged in the information but proved during the trial and
appreciated in imposing the sentence, without necessarily impinging the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, starting with
People v. Salalima, the Court, taking a hard look on the issue has concluded
that the new rules must be given retroactive effect “in the light of the well
settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.”
People vs. Roxas, 410 SCRA 451
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with guns, with
intent to kill, and with abuse of superior strength and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
Juanito Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Appellants are entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In
accordance with prevailing judicial policy, the civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00. The award of moral damages has no factual basis. However, the
heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount thereof
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No. 113892-H, is
MODIFIED.
As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y Carpio a.k.a. “Jhun
Tayo” and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
People vs. Gregorio, 412 SCRA 90
On or about January 23, 1998, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with guns, with
intent to kill, and with abuse of superior strength and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
Juanito Regacho y Gamboa, thereby inflicting upon said Juanito Regacho y
Gamboa fatal shot wounds, which directly caused his death.
Held: The crime committed by appellants is homicide. Under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Appellants are entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and may thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum term of which shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
namely, prision mayor. Thus, appellants may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In
accordance with prevailing judicial policy, the civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00. The award of moral damages has no factual basis. However, the
heirs of the victim should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00, it
appearing that they are entitled to actual damages but the amount thereof
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 in Criminal Case No. 113892-H, is
MODIFIED.
As modified, appellants Mateo Gregorio y Carpio a.k.a. “Jhun
Tayo” and Juancho Osorio y Dela Paz are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of Homicide and are each sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
j.
Band
In the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is taken into account is
◦ not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed
◦ but their relative physical might vis-à-vis the offended party
Ø Means Employed to Weaken Defense
• This circumstance is applicable only
◦ to crimes against persons and
◦ sometimes against person and property, such as robbery with physical
injuries or homicide.
Ø The means used must not totally eliminate possible defense of the victim,
• otherwise it will fall under treachery
People vs. Polores, 230 SCRA 279
The SC held that in the AC the crime was committed by band under art 14 par.
6 of the PRC find no sufficient factual basis since the testimony of Malto does
not dispose at least 4 of the aggressors were armed.
People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48
Facts: Appellants Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano Toñacao,
Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache, all armed, entered the house of Dioscoro
Abonales, killed the latter by shooting him in the neck then forcibly took the
sum of P30,000 from the victim’s wife. They also got the wallet of Rolando
Verdida, the future son-in-law of the victim, containing P10,000 which was the
money prepared by Rolando for his wedding to the victim’s daughter. After the
robbery, they all fled. But, while escaping, they encountered Artemio Abonales,
the father of the victim, who was responding to investigate the gunshots he
heard. They all stopped momentarily and Paulino in fact tried but failed to shoot
Artemio. Thereafter, all the accused continued their escape.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with “robbery
in band with homicide.” There is no such crime in the Revised Penal Code. The
felony is properly called robbery with homicide. If robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as
“robbery with homicide” under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but
the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as an
ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of
the crime be appreciated when it is not properly alleged in the information?
Held: No. We cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band
because it was not alleged in the body of the information. Though it is an
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
Information. With regard to its Section 9, the use of the word ‘must’ indicates
that the requirement is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec.
9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at
the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are
not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure
are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
k. Treachery
People vs. Verchez, 233 SCRA 174
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bacoor
Accused were convicted of Murder, Frustrated Murder and violation of PD 1866
Version of the Prosecution:
Aug 15, 1985 – Raul Castaneda & Lt. Marcelo Garbo of the Special
Operations Groups (SOG) of the Central Organized Crime Task Force of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police led a team of gov’t agents in
conducting a surveillance operations on a house reported to be the hideout of a
gang of suspected bank robbers.
- They stopped a car the came out from the subdivision. The driver was Balane
and he was asked by the police officers to accompany them to where his
companions where staying.
- When the 1st car approached the house they were met w/ heavy volley of
gunfire. Norcio died while Noora & Pagsanjan were injured.
- Men inside the house eventually surrendered.
- Accused were assisted by Atty. De la Rosa when they executed their sworn
statements. Verchez, Aldave and Balane admitted being involved in several
bank heist and Verchez also admitted that he fired the first shot at the
policemen.
- The firearms of the accused were unregistered and unlicensed.
Version of the Defense:
- Verchez invited Balane on August 15, 1994 to visited his brother. They were
joined by Aldave, While they were waiting for the brother of Verchez, Balane
went out to buy cigarettes and pulutan. His car was blocked and the occupants
of the other car pointed their firearms at him. They dragged him out of the car,
handcuffed and blindfolded him.
- Verchez saw several cars stop outside the house and he heard a gunshot.
Verchez and Aldave got loaded firearms from the rooms and fired back.
- They contended that they were forced into signing a prepared statement
confessing their illegal activities, including having engaged the police officers in
a fire fight.
Issues:
1.
WON the extrajudicial statements are admissible.
- IMMATERIAL. There’s sufficient evidence, independent of their confessions to
hold them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
2.
WON treachery was sufficiently established.
- NO. Two conditions must concur
o
Employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
o
Said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted
- Lawmen were prepared for any resistance that may be possibly be put up
- Norcio was killed and Noora was wounded during and not before the gun
battle
- There is no showing that the appellants deliberately and consciously adopted
their mode of attack.
- No showing that they planned to ambush the lawmen, much less that they
knew the lawmen were coming.
Appellants were caught by surprise by
lawmen, hence, acting on the spur of the moment, they fired back.
3.
WON the AC of disregard of the respect due the offended party on the
account of his rank can be appreciated. YES
- No showing that the appellants deliberately intended to offend or insult the
rank of the victim.
- Raiding police officers were not even in uniform
4.
WON they are guilty of illegal possession of firearms YES
- Argument that they just used the firearms in self defense and that they didn’t
own the firearm cannot be accepted by the court. Law does not prescribe a
minimum period for the holding of the firearm.
Besides they retrieved the
firearms from the cabinet in their respective rooms.
5.
WON the qualifying circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm in
homicide or murder should be appreciated. NO
- For it to be considered as a qualifying circumstance it must be alleged in the
information.
People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC of Quezon City
Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, flr manager of Cola Pubhouse
along EDSA, was sitting outside the pub while talking w/ his co-worker. Soon,
their customer Tony Dometita came out of the pub and informed him that he’ll
be on his way home. However, when he was about an arm’s length from
Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from nowhere and suddenly and
w/o warning stabbed Tony w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for
help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand. Eulogio
placed a chair between the two to stop Castillo from further attacking Tony.
Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to know later that
Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo,
EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of Tony’s death
was the stab wound on his chest. Appellant Robert Castillo claims that
decedent Tony was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto
Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony by the compound
of Iglesia ni Cristo. TC did not appreciate Castillo’s defense of alibi and held
that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, the accused having
surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon.
And although treachery was
present, it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength.
Appellant contends that the TC showed its prejudice against him by asking
questions that were well w/in the prosecution to explore and ask.
HELD: Appellant Castillo is guilty of murder for the death of Antonio Dometita.
The allegation of bias & prejudice isn’t well-taken. It is a judge’s prerogative &
duty to ask clarificatory question to ferret out the truth. The propriety of a
judge’s queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their
quality & in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by
such questioning.
The prosecution was unable to prove the aggr circumstance of evident
premeditation. However, SC held that the killing was not qualified by abuse of
superior strength, contrary to TC’s ruling. The prosecution did not demonstrate
that there was a marked difference in the stature and build of the victim and the
appellant w/c would have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim.
However, the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is committed when 2
conditions concur: (1) means, methods and forms of execution employed left
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) that
such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused w/o danger to his person.
These
requisites were evidently present when the accused appeared from nowhere
and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding
goodbye to his friend. The action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend
himself.
The presence of “defense wounds” does not negate treachery
because the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest and hence,
rendered Tony defenseless.
Appeal denied, assailed decision affirmed. Award of indemnity to the heirs of
Castillo in the amount of PhP50K.
People vs. Dacibar, February 17, 2000
On appeal is the decision dated January 25, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder, imposing upon them the
amended penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, instead of
life imprisonment.
HELD:
While the principal witnesses for the prosecution did not actually see appellants
shoot and kill the victim, direct proof of their culpability is not necessary when
circumstantial evidence would suffice. The requisites thereof are: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have held that conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of
acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite
acts, conditions and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose
accomplished. Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by
direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself.
In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be
deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.
The trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his
victim was inside. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not
necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the
victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his
own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault from without.
People vs. Cando, 334 SCRA 331
Facts: At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando, armed with two
knives and carrying a shoulder bag, climbed the fence of the factory. They
walked on the galvanized iron roof towards the other building. One by one, they
slipped through a narrow window at the side of the building. The trio proceeded
to the victim’s room, which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Cando picked a
piece of lead pipe and told Vargas to pull open the door where the victim’s
mosquito net was attached. When Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito
net snapped and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead pipe. The
victim awakened and Cando demanded money from him. When the victim
replied that he had no money, Cando struck him again with the lead pipe. Blood
oozed from the victim’s head. Cando asked the victim if he recognized him. The
victim weakly replied “Yes, You are Roger (Cando).” Thereafter, Cando
repeatedly hit him with the lead pipe until he became unconscious. Cando
placed the victim’s radio cassette in his bag. He went upstairs to get more
items and the keys of the Cimarron van. Thereafter, the trio went downstairs to
where the van was parked. Vargas, the only one who knew how to drive, sat on
the driver’s seat. Cando and Rapcing opened the gate, then pushed the van
outside. Once they were out of hearing range, Vargas gunned the motor and
the two clambered into the van. Cando sat on the passenger side while
Rapcing sat at the back. Cando prevailed upon the group to proceed to Quiapo
to visit his girlfriend, but they could not locate her so they just drove around
until daybreak. When they reached Hemady Street in Quezon City, they
abandoned the van. The trio boarded a jeep going to Taft Avenue and went
their separate ways. It was then already early morning of May 14, 1995.
Held: As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply established the
following elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property
is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person, (b) the
property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed. It matters not
that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal properties of the
victim and the other occupants of the house. What is essential in robbery with
homicide is that there be a “direct relation, and intimate connection between
robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former
or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. The rule is wellestablished that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of
or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide,
unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. While
Cando was bashing the head of the victim, and placing the personal items in
his bag, nary a peep could be heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their act of
simply watching Cando shows their moral assent and complete acquiescence
to the commission of the crime.
People vs. Arizobal, 348 SCRA 143
Facts: Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24 March
1994, after she and her son had taken supper, her husband Jimmy with one
Francisco Gimenez arrived.
Jimmy informed Erlinda that they had already
bought a carabao. After he handed her the certificate of large cattle, and while
he was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, three (3) men
suddenly appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed
her to the ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped
the latter with an armalite rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a mask,
another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. Realizing the utter helplessness of
their victims, the robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes
Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari store. Finding no softdrinks to complete their
snack, two (2) of the intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the
neighboring store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert
the vendor. When they returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers proceeded
to ransack the household in search for valuables. They took around P1,000.00
from her sari-sari store and told them to produce P100,000.00 in exchange for
Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not produce such a big amount in so short
a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large cattle.
The culprits
however would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her. Three
(3) masked men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together with
Laurencio brought them some fifty (50) meters away while leaving behind
Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard Francisco and Erlinda's son.
Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which reverberated through the
stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed
Erlinda that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.
Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost
consciousness.
Crime: Robbery w/ homicide w/ AC of Dwelling
Held: Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors
thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile. In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in,
looted their houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission,
disabled Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of
the house to be killed.
People vs. Mazo, 367 SCRA 462
Held : For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3)
the surrender was voluntary. To be voluntary, the surrender must be
spontaneous and deliberate, that is, there must be an intent to submit oneself
unconditionally to the authorities. The surrender must be considered as an
acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that his search and capture would require.
The trial court held that there was no voluntary surrender, reasoning that the
surrender was worked out only because Senior Police Inspector Mazo
accidentally found appellant when he accompanied the latter’s relatives back to
their house. It did not occur to the trial court, though, that appellant could have
escaped right after that meeting but he did not. Instead, he submitted himself
unconditionally later that morning when Senior Police Insp. Mazo came for him.
By doing so, appellant manifested his intention to save the authorities the
trouble of conducting a manhunt for him. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon is MODIFIED insofar as it convicts appellant Dennis Mazo of
Murder and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Judgment is
hereby rendered finding appellant GUILTY of Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period as maximum.
People vs. Mantes, 368 SCRA 661
Held: Moreover, the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the latter. In the instant case, Elicazar was already alerted to the
fact that appellants meant him harm. According to his wife’s testimony, Elicazar
was already pleading for his life with appellants when they took him away.
They even hacked at his wife when the latter tried to follow them. All these
circumstances point to the fact that Elicazar was already forewarned of the
danger to his life. In People vs. Lopez (249 SCRA 610 [1995]), we declared
that “there is no treachery were the victim was aware of the danger on his life,
when he chose to be courageous instead of cautious, courting obvious danger
which, when it came, cannot be defined as sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen.” Violeta Latagan’s testimony is no less enlightening.
Violeta
testified that she heard appellants and Elicazar quarreling prior to the attack on
the latter, and that during the attack the latter even tried to escape. The fact
that there was a quarrel prior to the attack proves that there was no treachery,
and it is also all too obvious that Elicazar was well-aware of the danger to his
life as shown in his attempt to escape, albeit unsuccessfully, from his
assailants.
The killing not being attended by treachery or evident premeditation, appellants
can only be found guilty of homicide, the penalty for which, under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. Article 64(1), on the other
hand, provides that in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law should be
imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty
shall be an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be within the
range of prision mayor, and the maximum of which shall be reclusion temporal
in its medium period.
People vs. Costales, 373 SCRA 269
Facts: Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of 27
November 1997, she and her sisters Donabel and Erlinda together with their
parents Miguel and Crispina had taken their own corners of their small house to
prepare for the night.
Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while the
others occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of
available space settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and Erlinda had
just watched tv when two (2) persons suddenly barged into their house passing
through the door kept ajar by sacks of palay and strangled her father Miguel.
Jessie readily recognized the two (2) intruders because the entire room was
illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight. Jessie
narrated that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at
the head of her father and shot him once in cold blood.
Thereafter the other
assailant Fernando Ramirez sprayed on their faces what she described as
"something hot and pungent," and with his firearm pumped a bullet on her
mother's chest.
Held: Without doubt, treachery has been established by the prosecution
evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales and his
confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the
Marcelo residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as
well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance
which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house. The suddenness
of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry the
assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without
risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims was synchronal, sudden
and unexpected, treachery must be properly appreciated.
People vs. Lopez, 395 SCRA 64
Facts: Richard Lanzanas, 11-year-old son of the victim, Mauricio Lanzanas,
testified that, on August 22, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m. while he was standing
near the barangay hall of Barangay Sampiruhan, Calamba, Laguna, he heard
two gunshots. Turning his head, he saw his father inside the sash factory, lying
on the ground face up. The trigger man, Felix Lopez, shot his father twice more
and then got the latter’s two handheld radios. Richard remained motionless but,
after regaining his composure, rushed home and met his mother along the way.
He told his mother about his father’s fate. She tried to catch up with the
appellant but failed.
Held: Since the value of the personal property taken from the victim, as fixed by
the trial court, amounted to P18,000, the penalty imposable is the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309 which is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
imposable penalty for this particular theft is anywhere from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional medium period to 6 years of prision
correccional maximum period, as minimum, to anywhere from 8 years and 1
day to 10 years of prision mayor medium period. WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision dated July 20, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
in Criminal Case No.4668-96-C finding accused-appellant Felix J. Lopez guilty
of murder is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the moral damages of P50,000,
appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity. The award of actual damages is reduced to P1, 012.
People vs. Alfon, 399 SCRA 64
Held: The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the
victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. This criterion applies,
whether the attack is frontal or from behind. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it. The fact that the location of the fatal stab
wound is in front does not in itself negate treachery. In the case at bar, it was
established that appellant came from behind, went towards the right of the
victim, and suddenly stabbed the victim’s chest while holding the latter’s left
shoulder. Evidence shows that, first, at the time of attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself, as he was unarmed and totally unsuspecting when
appellant suddenly held and stabbed him; and second, appellant consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means of attack, as he was seen
surreptitiously following the victim with a balisong tucked under his waist.
Clearly therefore, treachery attended the crime.
People vs. Escote, 400 SCRA 603
Facts: On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular
driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus
from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on
board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some
passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus,
including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing
maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets.2 Juan seated himself on the
third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers' seats, while
Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another
passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at
the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his
waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then,
Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center
mirrors installed atop the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking
vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
Held: The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the
commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger
to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six
wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder,
another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and
one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns.
They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for
dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family
after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his
family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter
inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
People vs. Caraig, 400 SCRA 67
Facts: on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and confederating with and mutually helping each other,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one MELENCIO CASTRO Y PASCUA, JR., by then and
there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the different parts of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Melencio P. Castro, Jr., in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
held: The attack upon the victims in these cases was attended by treachery.
Per Danilo Javier’s testimony, the taxi on which the victims were riding was
moving slowly away from the beerhouse when Caraig and his co-assailants
pursued it and then blocked its path. The interception took place at less than
100 meters away from the beerhouse. Since the victims were inside the taxi,
they had no chance to fight back or defend themselves. The number of the
victims’ individual wounds and their relative positions when found dead by the
police emphasized further the essence of treachery. The means, method, and
form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously adopted and
effectively forestalled the victims from employing a defense against their
attackers.
People vs. Abut, 401 SCRA 498
Held: The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder with the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. However, the trial court
erred in appreciating treachery against the appellants. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that: a.) the malefactor employed
means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b.) the means, method or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
The second is the subjective element of treachery. Treachery must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. In the
absence of any convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the means by which they committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the Court must resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. In this
case, the prosecution failed to prove that the mode or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the appellants when they stabbed the
victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the victim. The appellants and Ritchie
then mauled and kicked the victim. There is no evidence that at the outset,
they had decided to stab and kill the victim. It was only at the late stage of the
assault that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the victim. The Court believes
that after ganging up on and mauling the victim, the appellants, at the spur-ofthe moment, decided to stab the victim.
Thus, the subjective element of
treachery was not present. However, the appellants and Ritchie abused their
superior strength. They boxed and kicked the victim without let up.
They
mauled and kicked the victim even as he was already sprawled on the ground.
The victim was outnumbered. As against the combined strength of the
appellants and Ritchie, the victim was helpless. There was indubitably
inequality of strength between the victim and the appellants and Ritchie.
People vs. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463
Held: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus
depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and thereby
ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor. Treachery
requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution.
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the
hostility of the assailant towards the former.
In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves
that there was no treachery, and that the victim was aware of the imminent
danger to his life. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant
had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn
into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows
were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the
impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.
Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover,
any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 416 SCRA 24
l.
Ignominy
It is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order,
Ø which adds disgrace to the material injury caused by the crime.
Ø The means employed or the circumstances brought about must tend to
make the effects of the crime
• MORE HUMILIATING or
• TO PUT THE OFFENDED PARTY TO SHAME.
Ø Applicable to crimes against chastity, rape, less serious physical injuries,
light or grave coercion and murder.
Ø Raping a woman from behind is ignominous because that is not the normal
form of intercourse, it is something which offends the morals of the offended
woman. This is how animals do it.
People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
Nature: Appeal from and automatic revue of a decision of Rizal CFI
June 26, 1967 – Magdalena de la Riva was abducted outside her own by
Jaime Jose, Edgardo Aquino, Basilio Pineda and Rogelio Canal. They brought
Maggie to Swanky Hotel. Jose, Aquino, Pineda and Canal took turns raping
Maggie.
They decided to leave her on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far
from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear,
according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio.
They threatened that she would be doused with acid if she would inform
anyone of the incident.
When she was inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she
broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them;
and each time the driver answered her in the negative
When she reached home she informed her mother of the incident
Appellant Canal and Pineda executed swore to separate statements on the day
of their arrest
1.
Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four
of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that
they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four
of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it
appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to
him on condition that he would release her
2.
Pineda executed a statement stating that he and his other three
companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva
was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that
his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel.
He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to
having sexual intercourse with him.
Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded guilty.
Issues
1.
WON the accused were motivated by lewd designs. YES
YES. Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the
abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of
guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to
him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant’s
subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance
which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design.
This testimony of Ms. De la Riva, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least
been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes
charged in the amended complaint. The claims of the accused that they were
not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual
basis.
2.
WON the accused rape Ms. de la Riva.
YES. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the
complainant’s vagina disproves the fact of rape.
Dr. Brion stated that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days
from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within
that period
The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration.
When the victim got home she immediately told her mother that the four raped
her. The statement was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases
of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide
the truth.
3.
WON the extrajudicial statements is admissible.
YES. The accused contends that secured from them by force and intimidation,
and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police
investigators. The statements were given in the presence of several people &
subscribed & sworn to before the City Fiscal of QC, to whom neither of the
aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.
They are replete w/ details which could hardly be known to the police; &
although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details
from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the
truth of such allegation. Even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose
and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will
suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
4.
WON there was a mistrial for Pineda.
NO. Pineda contends that there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of
justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants
is a capital offense & the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances,
which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to
insist on his presence during all stages of the trial.
The court held that plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the
admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime it was not incumbent
upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence
in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow
him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of
discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request.
5.
WON the enormous publicity of the case affected the decision of the
trial court.
NO. The appellants took notice of the enormous publicity that attended the
case from the start of investigation to the trial. Jose himself admits in his brief
that the Trial Judge “had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments
of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of
innocence and to fair trial.”
6.
WON aggravating circumstances were present.
- YES. Nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to
facilitate the commission of these crimes
- Abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four
appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al.,
51 Phil., 105, 113)
- Ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them
her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought
about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more
humiliating. use of a motor vehicle.
7.
WON the imposition of four death penalty is valid.
YES. The Supreme Court held that in view of the existence of conspiracy
among the accused and of its finding regards the nature and number of crimes
committed, as well as the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death
penalties can be imposed.
People vs. Butler, 120 SCRA 281
That on or about the 8th day of August, 1975, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and taking advantage o his superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniosly assault, attack and hit with
a statue of Jesus Christ oue Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios' and after said
Enriquita Alipo fell flat on her fare the above-named, accused again taking
advantage of superior strength then and there apply force and pressure on the
back of the head of said Enriquita Alipo thereby forcing and sinking the latter's
mouth and nose against the mattress of the bed, and as a result thereof, the
said Enriquita Alipo was not able to breathe and was choked, thus directly
causing the death of said Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios'.
Held: The dismissal of the case against the accussed Michael Butler is,
therefore, meritorious and justifiable. We hereby order his final discharge
therefrom. His final release, however, shall not obliterate his civil liability for
damages in the amount of P24.000.00 to the heirs of the victim which We
hereby affirm. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of
execution for the recovery of civil damages. (Article 198, P.D. 603).
People vs. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159
The victim was abducted by the appellant, who brought her to his house. When
they arrived at the appellant’s house the victim was divested of her jewelry and
other valuables, afterwhich she was raped several times. The appellant was
convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Whether
multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. In several cases the Court realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating
circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in
Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances
where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies
with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing
that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the
Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be
brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under this
view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an
aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that “(i)n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in
the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied,” the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on
accused-appellant.
People vs. Siao, 327 SCRA 231, 2000
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cebu (2000)
On May 27, 1994, at about 3PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao in his
residence ordered Reylan Gimena, his family’s 17yr old houseboy, to pull
Estrella Raymundo, their 14yr old housemaid, to the women’s quarters. Once
inside, appellant Siao pushed her to the wooden bed and asked her to choose
one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. Appellant lit the candle and
dropped the melting candle on her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her
back on the bed w/ her head hanging over one end. Appellant then poured
sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun pointed
to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and hands w/ an electric cord or
wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. As Siao pointed his pistol
at her, he ordered Estrella to undress and commanded her to take the initiative
on Gimena.
Not understanding what he meant, appellant motioned to her
poking the gun at her temple. Gimena was then ordered to remove his shorts.
He did not do so but only let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of
Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for
help twice.
Siao then ordered Gimena to rape Estrella.
At first, Gimena
refused because he has a sister. However, Siao said that if they would not
obey, he would kill both of them.
Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated at gunpoint by Siao to
have carnal knowledge of each other. They performed the sexual act because
they were afraid they would be killed.
Siao commanded Gimena to rape
Estrella in 3 diff positions (i.e. missionary position, side-by-side and dog
position as narrated vividly in the case), pointing the handgun at them the
whole time. Thereafter, Siao warned them, “If you will tell the police, I will kill
your mothers.” Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole event. He
asserts that she retaliated through this accusation because Estrella herself was
accused of stealing many of his family’s personal effects. TC held Rene Siao
guilty as principal by induction of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and indemnification of PhP50K. Gimena was acquitted for
having acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal, if not greater
injury.
HELD: SC respected TC’s finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in the
witnesses’ testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial
matters w/c have nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape,
that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was
pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of less than
30 mins, w/c does not conform to common experience, rape was still present
from the evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however
slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape.
Moreover, even if the
house was occupied by many people at the time of the crime, rape was still
committed because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrella’s and
Gimena’s decision not to flee proves only the fear and intimidation that they
were under because Siao was after all their “amo” or employer who threatened
to kill them or their family if they did not succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly
weapon.
The TC overlooked and did not take into account the aggr
circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It has been held that where the
accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male
superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from
behind, as was proven in the case, the aggr circumstance of ignominy attended
the commission thereof.
However, the use of a deadly weapon serves to increase the penalty as
opposed to a generic aggr circumstance w/c only affects the period of the
penalty. This nonetheless should be alleged in the information, because of the
accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Considering that the complaint failed to allege the use of a deadly
weapon, the penalty to be reckoned w/ in determining the penalty for rape
would be reclusion perpetua, as prescribed for simple rape. Simple rape is
punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, w/c must be
applied regardless of any mit/aggr circumstance w/c may have attended the
commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by
the TC is correct.
Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages, w/c is
automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the amount of
PhP50K.
Furthermore, the presence of the aggr circumstance of ignominy
justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment
affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.
m. Unlawful Entry
Ø There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended
for the purpose.
Ø Unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and not for escape.
Ø There is no unlawful entry when
• the door is broken
• hereafter the accused made an entry thru the broken door.
• The breaking of the door is covered by paragraph 19.
Ø Unlawful entry is
• inherent in the crime of trespass to dwelling and robbery with force upon
things
• but aggravating in the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons.
People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of RTC Pasig
Oct. 10, 1990, 5 a.m.: Brgy. Capt. Eustaquio Borja awoke to find out that the
front door of his house was open & that their TV set in the sala was missing. He
& his wife went to the 2nd floor & found their daughter, Veronica Baello dead.
She was stabbed to death. Borja reported the incident to the authorities & they
later on discovered that some more items were missing in their house. Lost
items amount to about P50k.
Suspects: John Baello, also known as Totong along with one Jerry who’s still at
large. Why? TV set discovered in the house of Baello’s bro-in-law, Eugenio
Tagifa. Tagifa executed a sworn statement testifying that it was Baello who
brought the TV to their house. Baello was captured later on & he admitted that
he took part in the commission of the crime. His testimony was taken in the
presence of PAO lawyer Atty. Generoso since he couldn’t afford his own
counsel. He admitted that they passed through the window of the house’s 2nd
floor however, he claimed that he only got the TV set & he didn’t know what
items Gerry took from the house. He further claimed that Gerry was
responsible for Veronica’s death since he was the one who stayed on the 2nd
floor of the house.
He later on claimed that he was mauled & that his lawyer (Atty. Generoso)
didn’t really help/defend him. According to him, Atty. Generoso simply stared at
him & that the lawyer asked Baello to sign a typewritten statement w/the
promise that he’ll be released later on. Baello’s mother attested to the fact that
her son had contusions caused allegedly by one Gabriel, Eustaquio’s nephew,
who was in jail too.
RTC found Baello guilty & sentenced him to RP (reclusion perpetua)
w/indemnity of P50k & ordered to pay P50k as repatriation for the stolen items.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1.
WON Baello’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even if he
allegedly was not fully & duly assisted by counsel when such was given
- YES. He voluntarily accepted Generoso’s services pursuant to Sec. 12(1), Art.
III of the Consti w/c provides that if a person can’t afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided w/one.
- Document was presented that the counsel duly informed Baello of his
constitutional rights as well as the consequences of his confession. He was
even advised not to make any but he insisted.
- If these were true, then he should have not signed the document or he should
have complained.
- Similar cases have upheld the admissibility of such extra-judicial confessions
such as People vs. Pinzon & People vs. Masongsong.
2.
WON there was conspiracy
- YES. He admitted in his sworn statement that he & Gerry had a prior
agreement to commit robbery. They met at 4 in the morning & they went in the
house together. Taken as a whole, these acts establish that there was common
design between the 2.
- Even if he only took part in the crime of robbery, since conspiracy was proven,
he shall likewise be liable for the homicide Gerry committed unless he can
prove that he prevented Gerry from committing such.
- Testimonies of witnesses are admissible. Respect is accorded to the findings
of the lower courts since it did not overlook or misappreciate any facts that may
change the result.
3.
WON the AC of unlawful entry should be appreciated.
- YES. They entered the Borja residence through the second floor window w/c
is not intended for ingress.
- NOCTURNITY also appreciated (AC) since the crime was committed in the
darkness & they took advantage of such circumstance to accomplish the crime.
HELD: Conviction affirmed.
People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 768
Held: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling also attended the commission
of the crime even if the victim was killed outside his residence. A person's
abode is regarded as a sanctuary which should be respected by everybody.
Here, while the victim was resting in the comfort of his home, accusedappellant and his cohort(s) forcibly led him (the victim) out of his house shortly
before he was shot to death. At that point, the aggression had begun, although
it ended outside the victim's house. An act performed cannot be divided or its
unity be broken up, when the offender began the aggression in the dwelling of
the offended party and ended it in the street or outside said dwelling. Dwelling
is aggravating if the victim was taken from his house and killed just beside his
abode although the offense was not completed therein. The penalty prescribed
for Murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was offset by the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, as correctly ruled by the trial court,
the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, that is, reclusion perpetua.
n. Breaking a Wall, Door, etc.
Ø To be considered as an AC,
• breaking the door must be utilized
• as a means to the commission of the crime.
Ø It is only aggravating in cases where
• the offender resorted to any of said means TO ENTER the house.
• If the wall, etc. is broken in order to get out of the place, it is not aggravating
People vs. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723
Facts: That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 o’clock in the
evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed
instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter, the
accused rode on an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal
Plate No. 7077, which they used in escaping from the crime scene.
Held: As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle,
the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution
failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to
facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime could not have been
committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the
use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and
his apprehension difficult.
The term “aggravating circumstances” used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.
People vs. Oco, 412 SCRA 190
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about 9:30 o’clock
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, riding on two motorcycles, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, together with Peter
Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as
soon as procedural requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Murder
Held: The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest was issued
on 1998. Immediately upon warning its issuance and w/o having been served
on him Oco contracted PO2 Lozano & communicated his desire to surrender.
Lozano contracted CD Psupt Lapinid and voluntary surrender himself. Oco
could have opted to go on hiding but he cross to surrender himself to the
authorities & face the allegations leveled against him. For this he should be
credited with the MC of voluntary surrender.
o. With the Aid of Persons Under 15, or With Motor Vehicles, etc.
With the aid of persons under 15 years of age
Ø To repress, so far as possible,
• the frequent practice resorted to by professional criminals
• to avail themselves of minors
◦ taking advantage of their responsibility
◦ (remember that minors are given leniency when they commit a crime)
By means of a motor vehicle
Ø To counteract the great facilities found by modern criminals in said means to
commit crime and flee and abscond once the same is committed.
Ø This circumstance is aggravating only when used in the commission of the
offense.
• If motor vehicles are used only in the escape of the offender, it is not
aggravating. It must have been used to facilitate the commission of the crime to
be aggravating.
Ø “or other similar means” – the expression should be understood as referring
to
• MOTORIZED vehicles or
• other efficient means of transportation similar to automobile or airplane.
People vs. Ong, January 30, 1975
Held: To find appellant Benjamin Ong guilty as principal of the crime of murder,
with the aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicle and evident
premeditation although these are offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea
of guilty, passion or obfuscation alternatively with vindication of a grave offense
and the disclosure of all the details of the offense that enabled the prosecution
to allege aggravating circumstances which otherwise could not have been
known, which in my opinion is analogous to the plea of guilty but separate and
distinct
therefrom.
In consequence,
said
appellant
should
suffer
an
indeterminate sentence of from 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law.
Likewise, the appellant Bienvenido Quintos guilty of murder, but only as an
accomplice, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
use of motor vehicle offset only by one mitigating circumstance similar to that in
the case of Ong which is analogous to the plea of guilty inasmuch as Quintos
also revealed details that the government would not have known otherwise.
Accordingly, he should be sentenced to 6 years of prision correccional as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties of the law.
People vs. Astudillo, 401 SCRA 723
Facts: That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 o’clock in the
evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed
instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR., thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter, the
accused rode on an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal
Plate No. 7077, which they used in escaping from the crime scene.
Held: As regards the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle,
the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution
failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to
facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime could not have been
committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the
use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and
his apprehension difficult.
The term “aggravating circumstances” used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.
p. Cruelty
Elements:
1. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other wrong;
2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the purpose of the
offender.
Cruelty
Ø For it to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted in
making his victim suffer.
Ø If the victim was already dead when the acts of mutilation were being
performed,
• this would also qualify the killing to murder due to
outraging of his corpse.
People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231
Facts:
A decapitated body of a man was found in a grassy portion at Tinio St., Angeles
City. He was later identified as Nestor de Loyola thru his voter’s identification.
Apart from the decapitation, the decease bore 43 stab wounds in the chest as
well as slight burns all over the body.
The head was found 2 feet away from the corpse (nice!yech!)
5 persons were charged for the crime although Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa were
the only ones who stood trial and the two were found guilty of murder attended
by evident premeditation, abuse of superios strength and cruelty.
Circumstancial evidence established that Nestor was drinking with the two, and
later Ruben and Nestor were engaged in an argument. Nestor was then kicked
and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel and Julius Eliginio and Edwin
Tapang. Thereafter he was dragged to Ruben’s apartment. Ruben and Julius
later borrowed the tricycle of a certain Alex Villamil. Ruben was seen driving the
tricycle with a sack in the sidecar that looked like it contained a human body.
Alex noted bloodstains on the tricycle’s floor. Blood was found in Ruben’s shirt
and shoes and hair near his right forehead was found partly burned. Susan
Ocampo, Ruben’s live-in partner was likewise seen sweeping what appeared to
be blood at the entrance of their apartment.
Issues:
1.
WON crime was attended with evident premeditation
NO. There is nothing in the records to show that appellants, prior to the night in
question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such
killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part.
On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances
which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no
interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation.
2.
WON crime was attended with cruelty
NO. The fact that Nestor’s decapitated body bearing 43 stab wounds, 24 of
which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of
cruelty where there is no showing that Ruben, for his pleasure and satisfaction,
cause Nestor to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary
physical and moral pain.
Number of wound alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an
aggravating circumstance
Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s body was
dismembered.
People vs. Allan, 245 SCRA 549
Held: The court is not convinced that cruelty had been sufficiently shown on the
basis of the finding alone. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in the absence of any
showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction caused the victim to
suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical & moral
pain. The mere fact that wound in excess of what was indispensably necessary
imply that such wound s were inflicted with cruelty & with the intention to
deliberately & inhumane intensifying or AC the suffering of the victim.
People vs. Sibonga, 404 SCRA 10
Held: The Court agrees with the appellants’ contention that the trial court erred
in ruling that cruelty attended the commission of the crime when the victim was
thrown into the precipice. The trial court premised its ruling on its finding that
when the appellants and their co-accused threw the victim into the precipice,
he was still alive.
Paragraph 21, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
cruelty in the commission of a felony when the wrong done in the commission
of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commission. There is no cruelty when the other wrong is done after the
victim is already dead. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented
the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or
inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person
or corpse. The Court agrees with the trial court that the accused and appellants
are guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The hands of the victim were tied
behind his back when he was stabbed.
The attack was sudden.
The
appellants, with their co-accused, stabbed the victim with their knives/bolos.
The commission of the crime was thus aggravated by abuse of superior
strength. However, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.
Dwelling aggravated the crime. However, it cannot be appreciated against the
appellants because it is not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section
8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crime
was committed before the said rule took effect, the new rule had been applied
retroactively since it is more favorable to the accused. No other modifying
circumstances attended the commission of the crime. At the time the crime
was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Notwithstanding the suspension of the imposition of the death
penalty at the time, the medium of the prescribed penalty remained reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court
is correct.
People vs. Salamillo, 404 SCRA 211
Held: The number of wounds is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty
as an AC, the mere fact that wounds in excess of what is necessary to cause
death were inflict upon the body of the victim does not necessarily imply that
such wound were inflicted with cruelty.It is necessary to show that the accused
intentionally & increased the victim’s suffering. In this case, there is no
evidence of showing appellants intent to commit such cruelty.
F. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (RPC, ART. 15)
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be
taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the
offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if
the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
1. RELATIONSHIP
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS EXEMPTING:
• In the case of an accessory who is related to the principal within the relationship
prescribed in Article 20;
• Also in Article 247, a spouse does not incur criminal liability for a crime of less
serious physical injuries or serious physical injuries if this was inflicted after having
surprised the offended spouse or paramour or mistress committing actual sexual
intercourse.
• Those commonly given in Article 332 when the crime of theft, malicious mischief
and swindling or estafa.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS AGGRAVATING:
• in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in cases where
o the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender (grandson
kills grandfather), or
o when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level, as
killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother or adopted brother.
• When CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the offended party is a descendant of the offender,
relationship is AGGRAVATING.
o But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by a parent upon his child
by excessive chastisement.
• When the crime is LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender
• When crime against persons is HOMICIDE OR MURDER,
o relationship is aggravating even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower
degree.
• In CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY,
o relationship is always aggravating
• In the CRIME OF QUALIFIED SEDUCTION,
o the offended woman must be a virgin and less than 18 years old.
o But if the offender is a brother of the offended woman or an ascendant of the
offended woman,
▪ regardless of whether the woman is of bad reputation,
▪ even if the woman is 60 years old or more,
o crime is qualified seduction. In such a case, relationship is qualifying.
WHERE RELATIONSHIP IS MITIGATING:
• When the CRIME IS LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES OR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES
o if the offended party is a relative of lower degree
• Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when relationship is an
element of the offense
People vs. Atop, 286 SCRA 157
1. 11-year-old Regina lives with her grandmother.
2. Atop is the common-law husband of her grandmother.
3. Atop was found guilty of 4 counts of rape which was committed in 1993 (2x),
1994 and 1995. The lower court took into account the Aggravating Circumstance of
relationship.
Held: The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law
relations. In this case, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links Atop to
his victim.
2. INTOXICATION
Ø It is only the circumstance of intoxication which
• if not mitigating,
• is automatically aggravating.
WHEN MITIGATING:
1. There must be an indication that
a. because of the alcoholic intake of the offender,
b. he is suffering from diminished self-control.
c. It is not the quantity of alcoholic drink.
d. Rather it is the effect of the alcohol upon the offender which shall be the basis
of the mitigating circumstance.
2. That offender is
a. not a habitual drinker and
b. did not take alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit
crime
WHEN AGGRAVATING:
1. If intoxication is habitual
2. If it is intentional to embolden offender to commit crime
People vs. Ibanez, 407 SCRA 406
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, at 3:00 o’clock in the
morning, more or less, at Poblacion West, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and while armed with a
deadly weapon (bolo) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and hack FELIX AYROSO OLANDA with a bolo while victim was
asleep in the master’s bedroom, inflicting upon him serious hackwounds in his
face and other parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, that is, the timely medical attendance extended to the victim which
prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Held: There is MC of plea of guilt. He pleaded guilty upon being arraign and
before the prosecution presented their witness. A plea of guilt be made at the
first opportunity indicating repentance on the part of Ibanez.
People vs. Bajar, 414 SCRA 494
Facts: on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the
evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag,
Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed
with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85
year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by
law. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior
strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual
intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the crime.
Held: Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of age, it is considered present when the
offended person, by reason of his age, could be the father of the offender.[39
This is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age,
considered old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared
in open court that he was 58 years old),[40 he was also the latters father-in-law.
The presence of this aggravating circumstance by reason of their age
difference is, therefore, reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity.
Further, it is ingrained in Philippine culture that those advanced in age are
respected especially in the provinces.
People vs. Mosende, 371 SCRA 446
Held: Not Aggravating. The court a quo, in considering the AC of Intoxication
gave much weight to the testimony that appellant was so identified as a
habitual drunkard. While Leticia testified to having seen Mosende drinking
alcoholic beverage at a store earlier the afternoon of the incident , nothing
would show that he was in any state of intoxication or in drunken condition
when the dastardly deed was being committed.
People vs. Renejane, 158 SCRA 258
FACTS: On Nov 1, 1981, at 11PM, Laborte and Maraasin were invited to the
house of Beniano to partake of some food and drinks. After a considerable
length of time, Paulino Laborte stabbed policeman Mario de Jesus. It was
followed by another stabbing done by Beniano Renejane. Likewise, the police
officer’s companion, Regino Maraasin was also stabbed by Rodolfo Ripdos.
It was alleged that previously, in Oct, the police officer apprehended Renejane
for illegal possession of marijuana and that Maraasin was suspected of having
been the informer. Renejane, as his motive, must have harbored a grudge
against the comrades.
HELD: Denials made and alibi advanced by the appellant cannot prevail over
their positive identification. Furthermore, Renejane had a motive in the killing.
Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual or intention. The fact that the accused
drank liquor prior to the commission of the crime did not necessarily qualify
such action as an aggr circumstance. The affair was an ordinary drinking party.
Neither can this be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the absence of
proof that the intake of alcoholic drinks was of such quantity as to blur the
appellant’s reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control. This has
been strengthened by the fact that treachery has been established. Therefore,
the means of execution employed were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Moreover, the aggr circumstance of the act being in disregard of rank is
appreciable in the case at bar.
People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688
1. After the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim
Pascua with a bolo while the latter was walking along the barrio street.
2. After hacking and stabbing to death the victim, the accused proceeded to the
seashore and on finding Buenaflor hacked the latter with the same bolo.
Held: Intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is,
no subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or
intentional. To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard
is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily
occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines willpower making its victim a potential evil doer. The intoxication of the appellant
not being habitual and considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative
circumstance of intoxication should be considered mitigating.
3. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION
Ø Refers to the
• lack of sufficient intelligence of and knowledge of the full significance of one’s act
Ø Being illiterate does not mitigate liability
• if crime committed is one which one inherently understands as wrong (eg.
parricide)
Ø To be considered,
• degree if instruction must have some reasonable relation to the offense.
People vs. Galigao, G.R. No. 140961-63, January 14, 2003
Held: The court hereto acknowledge that circumstance could exist to warrant an
exercise of such foreberance (death penalty). The SC in deciding this case can do
no less herein considering that accused is unletter fisherman. Because of thid,
there is sufficient justification in imposing on accused-appellant the reduced
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
V.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
A. PRINCIPALS – ART. 18
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art.
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.chanrobles virtual law library
-
1. By Direct Participation
People vs. Nunag, 173 SCRA 274
FACTS: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about 15.5 y.o., declared that in the
2nd wk of May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a TV program in the
house of her neighbor, Laxamana, she saw the accused Mario Nunag, 1 of her
neighbors, coming towards her. Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her &
asked her to go w/ him. Because she refused, Nunag held her by the hand &
poked a knife at her stomach & threatened to kill her. Nunag placed something
in her mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about 15m. away from Laxamana’s
house. Very soon thereafter, the accused was joined by 4 others, whom she
knew also. After conspiring in whispers, Mandap & Salangsang held her hands
while Carpio & Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on the ground. Nunag
undressed her & had sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap followed.
She lost consciousness & only regained it while Manalili was abusing her. The
5 accused left w/ a threat that they would kill her & her family.
After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation period whenit
became due and noticed that her stomach was getting bigger. Yet she didn’t
tell anybody until her family noticed. In Oct 1978, she gave birth prematurely to
female twins who died after baptism.
Accused Nunag admitted having sexual intercourse w/ Lopez but denied the
charge of rape. He asserted that it was while he was sleeping when she came
on to him and they went to the ricefield to relieve their lasciviousness. She
asked money after the act and he gave her PhP4.00 and went home.
Accused Salangsang offers the same testimony but asserts that he gave Lopez
P2 instead. Accused Manalili also contends that it was Lopez who came on to
her but he refused to give her money. It was only Carpio & Mandap who
denied having sexual intercourse w/ her.
RTC found them guilty of the charge & sentenced Nunag, Mandap &
Salangsang to suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio & Manalili, who were
both above 16 & below 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4
mos of reclusion temporal as max.
HELD: Finding that Lopez, a poor barrio girl who looked timid and
inexperienced in the ways of the world, had no motive whatsoever to testify
falsely against the appellants, each of the 5 accused must be found guilty of 3
distinct and separate crimes of rape, the first 3 men by direct act & participation
& the other 2 by indispensable cooperation. Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang
sentenced to suffer 3 penalties of reclusion perpetua while Manalili & Carpio
both being above 16 but below 18 yrs at that time, sentenced to suffer 3
indeterminate penalties of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min & 17 yrs 4 mos of
reclusion temporal as max. Judgment affirmed w/ modification.
-
People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668
- Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one “Jun was engaged
in illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrenst
“Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
- On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed “Jun” the marked bills and
“Jun” instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the marijuana from
his associate.
- When they met up, “Jun” gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic upon which
PO3 arrested “Jun”. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him.
“Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named
“neneth”
- They wen to Neneth’s house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
dinin table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the box.
- Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and found that it
ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
- Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth. The
policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun, together with the coz,
its contents and the marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters,
- Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is Violata Gaddao.
- They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to
another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A
6425, as amended by RA 7659
Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable
- Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an
accused & partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance.
- American federal courts and state courts usually use the “subjective” or “origin
of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused’s predisposition to
commit the offense is charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial
exposure to government agents.
- Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agenst was likely to induce a normally lawabiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense.
- The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly & adequately shown. Courts should look
at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validty of the defense of
inducement.
- In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion
at all for Gaddao to flee from the policement to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit”
- Neither could her arrest ne justified under second instance of “personal
knowledge” in Rule 113 as this must be based upon probable cause which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was
arrested solely on the basis of the alleged indentification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct examination that
appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his query as to where the
marked money was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If there is no showing that the person
who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of the acts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable.
- Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was
found in Gaddao’s house does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of
the crime charged.
- The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in
the sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted
-
People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528
FACTS: Cergontes forcibly took the wristwatch ofSolis while Reyes stabbed the
latter at the back resulting tohis death. The victim’s gold necklace, one gold
ring, all ofan undetermined value, and a wallet containingunspecified amount of
cash were also taken from him.Reyes was found guilty of Robbery with
Homicide.Appellant now contends that the animus lucrandi was notsufficiently
established as the taking of the watch couldhave been a mere afterthought and
the real intent of themalefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim.Moreover,
there was no evidence of ownership of thewristwatch, as it may have belonged
to the two personswho attacked the victim
HELD: The court held that appellants contentionis devoid of merit. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is aninternal act which can be established through the
overtacts of the offender. Although proof of motive for thecrime is essential
when the evidence of the robbery iscircumstantial, intent to gain or animus
lucrandi may bepresumed from the furtive taking of useful propertypertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveala different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. Theintent
to
gain
may
be
presumed
from
the
proven
unlawfultaking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim'swristwatch by
one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife
behind him sufficiently gaverise to the presumption.The detailed narration of
how the victim wasforcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused Cergontesand
stabbed at the back by accused-appellant cannot betaken lightly on the
argument that the attackers owned thewristwatch and they attacked the victim
solely on theirdesire to retrieve it. In any event, in robbery by the takingof
property through intimidation or violence, it is notnecessary that the person
unlawfully divested of thepersonal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of
theRevised Penal Code employs the phrase "belonging toanother" and this has
been interpreted to merely requirethat the property taken does not belong to
the offender.Actual possession of the property by the persondispossessed
thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held thatrobbery may be committed against
a bailee or a personwho himself has stolen it. So long as there
isapoderamiento of personal property from another againstthe latter's will
through violence or intimidation, withanimo de lucro, robbery is the offense
imputable to theoffender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reasonof
the robbery, the offense is converted into the compositecrime of robbery with
homicide.
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2. By Induction
People vs. Yamson-Dumancas, 320 SCRA 584
On February 20, 1992, Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake
gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar,
Jr. On Aug. 5, 1992 10:30 AM Mario Lamis, Dominador Geroche, Rolando
Fernandez, Jaime Gargallano, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Moises
Grandeza were planning to abduct Lumangyao & Gargar Jr. because they
swindled the Dumancas family. Col Nicolas Torres was also informed of the
plan of the group. On August 6, 1992, Jeannette investigated the two abducted
and told the group of Geroche to take care of the two.On Aug 7, 1992,
Gargallano shot Gargar while Geroche shot Lumangyao. Then the 2 bodies
were buried by Pecha & Hilado.
The RTC found the following guilty of:
o
Principals by Induction: Jeanette Yanson Dumancas
o
Principals by Induction and by Direct Participation and/or Indispensable
Cooperation: Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
o
Principals by Participation:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto
Police Officer Mario Lamis Y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche Y Mahusay,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado
o
Principals by Participation: Cesar Pecha & Edgar Hilado
Issues:
1.
WON Charles Dumancas and Jeannette Yanson Dumancas can be
considered principals by induction?
NO. Jeanette Yanson Dumancas is not guilty as principals by induction
because there are not other evidence that can prove the she’s guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Article 17. Principals – The following are considered principals:
1.
Those who take a direct part in the execution of the acts.
2.
Those who directly force or induce other to commit it;
3.
Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (1) by
using irresistible force or (2) by causing uncontrollable fear. Likewise there are
two ways of inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (1) by giving a price
or offering reward or promise and (2) by using works of command. All of the
factors aren’t admissible to Jeanette.
The only evidence that may be
considered is the word “to take care of the two” w/c may constitute words of
command. Evidenced should the Jeanette meant the “to take care of the two”
is to allow the law to its course upon cross examination of Moises Grandeza.
This also raises some doubt of what the interpretation of the phrase. Thus it
cannot be concluded since it cannot be concluded that there is command to kill
the victims beyond reasonable by the vague phase itself.
2.
WON Police Inspector Adonis Abeto can be considered principals by
participation?
NO. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto participation was to serve a search warrant
on Helen Tortocio’s residence (person which Gargar and Lumangyao told the
police officers where the money might have gone) and that subsequently
interrogated Gargar and Lumangyao.
3.
WON Police Col Nicolas M. Torres can be considered principals by
induction?
NO. Police Col Nicolas M. Torres should have been criminally liable but since
his death the criminal liability is extinguished but the civil liability still subsists.
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.”
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. CC A1157 enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law, (b)
Contracts, (c) Quasi-contracts, and (d) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to §1, 1985 RCP 111, as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon w/c the same is based as
explained above.Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file a separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action & prior to its extinction, the private-offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably w/ provisions of CC A1155, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.
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People vs. Bolivar, 317 SCRA 577
FACTS: On Feb 14, 1987, at around 9 PM, Damaso Suelan came home along
w/ Rolly Brendia aboard a tricycle from the town of Barotac to Brgy Vista
Alegre.
After they alighted from the vehicle, they passed by the store of
Rodney Balaito to buy some cigarettes.
They were then invited by the
storeowner to drink a bottle of beer to w/c the 2 obliged. After much drinking,
the moved out to drink beer at the small hut situated at the back of the store.
There they joined the group accused Renato Balbon, Gracian Bolivar, Joel
Soberano and Cresenciano Canaguran.
While the group inside the hut was still drinking, a certain Quirino arrived
carrying w/ him a .12 gauge pistolized firearm w/c he handed to Canaguran.
Then the group accused asked permission to go home.
At around 1130PM, while there was still a group drinking, a shot burst & a spray
of pellets hit Damaso, Jr. on the shoulder & on the right forearm, while 4 shots
were targeted to & hit Hugo Callao resulting to his death.
The injured Damaso, Jr. looked for a tricycle for Callao. He passed through the
main gate of the storeowner’s compound & saw 4 persons running away from
the place where the shot came from. He identified the 4 to be the group of
Bolivar that previously asked permission to go home.
RTC found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of murder w/ frustrated murder. The case of Graciano Bolivar who died
of cardio-respiratory arrest in 1993 is dismissed. Death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal and civil liability.
HELD: Witness Rodolfo Panaga testifies that he saw Barrion and Canaguran
talking but apparently, the subject of such discussion was not the killing of
Callao. Hence, the testimony of the witness is not conclusive to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Barrion was a principal by inducement of the crime. The
fact that he would “take care” of the problem, as overheard by the witness, is
ambiguous & doesn’t necessarily lead to the conclusion that he plotted to kill
Callao.
Principals are those who directly force or induce others to commit an offense.
One is induced to commit a crime either by a command (precepto) or for a
consideration (pacto), or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real and
moving cause of the crime and w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose.
The inducement exists
whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is determined
by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act
whatever the source of such influence.
In the case at bar, only the testimony of the witness is offered and no evidence
of force, fear, price, promise or reward exerted over or offered to Canaguran by
Barrion that impelled him to kill Callao was presented. Moreover, from the
examination of evidence, there is nothing to show that a conspiracy in fact
existed among the accused-appellants. The factors given (Such factors include
drinking together in the night of the crime, seen running away together from the
scene of the crime after the shots were fired) are circumstantial in nature, w/c
even taken collectively, do not reasonably lead to proof BRD that a conspiracy
existed.
Wherefore, RTC ruling reversed. The accused-appellants are acquitted based
on reasonable doubt.
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People vs. Dela Cruz, 97 SCRA 385
Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to death. The
facts are such that Agapito met up w/ Mohamad Sagap Salip, Alih Itum and a
certain Asmad and proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu & the kidnapping
of the Antonio’s younger bro Yu Chi Chong, for ransom. Agapito happened to
be the oversser of Antonio’s rubber & coconut land for no less than 10 yrs. He
gave them instructions as to how and where to locate the Yu brothers at a
given time and how they were to ambush the brothers. (But he didn’t directly
participate in actual crime).But Antonio had to go somewhere and so the
younger Yu went with Isabelo Mancenido to Isabela (Isabelo Isabela hehe..
funny..). The younger Yu was ambushed as instructed but when Yu Chi Chong
tried to escape by striking Angih with a piece of wood, Angih got so pissed he
shot Yu several times, killing him.The gun shots alerted the villagers so the
kidnappers fled. When the villagers left after seeing the body (they said they’ll
come back in the morning with police in tow), the kidnappers took the body and
threw it in the ocean. Antonio testified and provided the possible motive for
Agapito to commit such crime. Agapito was assigned manager and
administrator of the farm but when the younger Yu came back, Agapito was
demoted to overseer. Further, profits were higher with Yu as manager and
Antonio became stricter with Agapito. Agapito was convicted as mastermind or
principal by inducement
Issue: WON Agapito should be convicted as mastermind or principal by
inducement in the absence of the elements of conspiracy to the crime charged.
NO. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a
principal by inducement are:
o
That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime; and
o
That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of
the crime by the material executor
The foregoing requisites are indubitable present in this case. Jamas Jumaidi &
Oyong Asidin, 2 discharged witnesses, testified that Asmad & Amil contected
them to go to Basilan to do a job for Agapito. When the group was brought face
to face with him, he lost no time in lating down the strategy for the killing of
Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who
knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to Latawan to load the
copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route the truck would take & the
approximate time that it was to pass by. He even selected the ambush place.
Clearly, he had positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He,
too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form of
ransom, w/c was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his
co-accused. W/o him, the crime would not have been conceived, much less
committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal
responsibility with the material executors. One is induced to commit a crime
either by a commans (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any other
similar act w/c constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime & w/c was
done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that
purpose. The person who gives promises, or offers the consideration & the one
who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or
reward are both principals. The inducer need not take part in the commission of
the offense. 1 who induces another to commit a crime is guilty as principal even
though he might have taken no part in its material execution.
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3. By Indispensable Cooperation
People vs. Maluenda, 288 SCRA 225
On August 19, 1992 at around 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus
("Engr. Resus") and his wife, Dr. Bernardita B. Resus ("Dr. Resus"), arrived at
their residence/clinic at Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, from a novena they
attended. Waiting for the Resus spouses at the clinic which adjoins the Resus
spouses' residence were three men who identified themselves as Commander
Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Raul Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy (who
is actually Maluenda) and alias "Alex". Upon the arrival of the Resus spouses,
Mondaga declared that they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an
alleged NPA Commander, with his directive to solicit money and medicines
needed for the victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan
del Sur. The trio demanded from the couple medicines and money in the
amount of P20,000.00, but when the couple told them that they did not have
such an amount, they lowered their demand to P10,000.00, and reduced it still
to P5,000.00 when the couple still could not produce the said amount. Finally,
the demand was lowered to any amount the Resus couple could provide. The
latter gave the amount of P500.00 plus assorted medicines worth P800.00.
After they were given the money and medicines, the trio demanded that they
be driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, but the couple begged off reasoning that their car [did] have
any sufficient gasoline and that the car was not in good running condition to
travel that night. Mondaga then demanded that very early in the morning, the
couple should prepare the vehicle so Engr. Resus [could] drive them to San
Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. They left the clinic with [a] threat not to tell
anybody about their coming, otherwise they [would] kill all the members of their
family and blow-up the clinic.
Held: The appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED as regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards Legarto. Legarto
is hereby found GUILTY as an ACCESSORY only and is ORDERED to serve
the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. He is further ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr.
Miguel E. Resus the amount of thirty-six thousand pesos (P36,000)
corresponding to the amount he used to pay his loan arrears. The amount
which the trial court ordered to be restituted by Mondaga and Maluenda is
accordingly reduced by said amount.
-
People vs. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700
Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the smell of
marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato
Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they both smelled the
marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon
Montealegre.
Camantigue collared the 2 & said “Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?” He forced
them up, holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled out a knife & started
stabbing Camantigue at the back. Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get his
gun but Montealegre restrained Camantigue’s hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself.
They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him
firing some shots. Then he stopped and asked to be brought to a hospital.
Capalac was found slumped in the street, with a bullet to his chest. Both he
and Camantigue died the next day. Montealegre on the other hand, escaped
through the confusion. He was later apprehended.
Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered a co-principal for having
corroborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer.
YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7
times and Montealegre holding on to victim’s hands to prevent him from
drawing the pistol and defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified.
While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he
was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue for
resisting the attack against him.
Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC.
The requisites of this provision
o
Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., there’s either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose & intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; &
o
Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act
w/o w/c it would not have been accomplished.
But although there was no evidence of prior agreement between Capalad &
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such
conspiracy. The Court has consistently upheld such view in previous cases
(People v. Laganson, People v. Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay
v. People)
Montealegre was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, qualified
by treachery, w/ assault upon a person of authority.
B. ACCOMPLICES
a. RPC, Art. 18
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
b. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806
FACTS: Balo, an employee of Banco Filipino befriended businessman Abejuela.
One day, Balo went toAbejuela’s welding shop and asked him if he could borrow
his passbook so he could deposit a sum of money. Abejuela reluctantly agreed.
This practice lasted for quite some time. Abejuela decided to close hisaccount. The
bank noticed discrepancies in his account. As a result, it confronted Balo and the
latteradmitted the offense. An action for estafa was filed against the two. During the
trial, Balo was killed by theNPA. Abejuela was found guilty of the crime.
HELD: In a number of cases decided by the court, it has been held that knowledge
of the criminal intentionof the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person
liable as an accomplice. It has been satisfactorilyestablished that Banco Filipino
suffered damage. Although abejuela was unaware of the criminal workingsof Balo,
he nevertheless contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly
entrusting his passbookto Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. He failed to
exercise prudence and care. Therefore he must beheld civilly accountable.
c. People vs. Elijorde, 306 SCRA 188
Facts: Hierro and others were drinking. Together with Visbal, he went out to buy
mango at a sari-sari store. The accused and his companions were in front of the
store. One of them approached Hierro but the latterwarned not to touch him. They
eventually got into a fight. The deceased and Visbal ran for their lives. As Hierro
and his wife was on their way home, the accused and his companions assaulted
the deceased.Despite Hierro’s plea, Elijorde stabbed him with a knife on the chest
which caused his death.
Held: In the absence of a previous plan or agreement or agreement to commit a
crime, the criminalresponsibility arising from different acts directed against one and
the same person is individual and notcollective and that each of the participant is
liable only for his own acts. Consequently, accused Punzalanmust be absolved. It
may be emphasized that at the time accused Elijorde intervened in the
assault,Punzalan had already desisted from his own acts of aggression.
d. People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640
On June 8, 1992 12:00am Kenneth Florendo (Kenneth) together with Edwin De
Vera (Edwin), Roderick Garcia (Deo) and Elmer Castro (Elmer) drove to Filivenvest
QC to dropped by the house of Frederick Capulong (Frederick).
Kenneth & Elmer went to see Frederick while Deo & Edwin was left in the car.
Later Kenneth have a heated conversion with Frederick and later Kenneth shot
Frederick using a .32 cal. Bernardino Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street in
Filinvest Quezon was one of the witness in the murder of Frederick Capulong by
Kenneth Florendo, Roderick Garcia, Edwin De Vera & Elmer Castro. RTC found
Edwin De Vera & Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder &
sentencing them to rec. perpetua.
Issues: WON de Vera can be considered as an accomplice or as a conspirator in
the crime committed by Florendo & Castro?
Accomplice. RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when “two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: “(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the
agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the
felony [was] decided upon.”Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must
also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous
agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts
of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action & community of
interest
Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as “those persons who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.” The Court has held that an accomplice is “one who knows the
criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith
by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same.”To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1)
the “community” of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;” and (2)
the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the
commission of the crime
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices
come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then
do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
e. People vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624
Facts: On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for
bail,3 underscoring the weakness of the People’s evidence, there being no direct
evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his resolution4 for
their indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were conducted in the course of
which the prosecution, after presenting several witnesses, filed on October 18,
1994 a motion to discharge5 accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness,
averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with,
and submitting her sworn statement6 which detailed how her co-accused carried
out the crime. The respective counsels for the other accused opposed the motion,
insisting that it could only be filed during trial on the merits and that Locil’s
testimony was not absolutely necessary.7 By Order of October 20, 1994,8 the trial
court deferred the resolution of the bail petition until after the prosecution had
rested its case, but it granted the motion to discharge Locil.
Held: The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral
certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by
unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent
that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. For failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and
Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET
ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
f.
People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA 134
Held: When one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing an overt
act w/c by themselves a reacts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation.
In this case, Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant & Ronnie agreed to join
in, they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim w/ their respective knives.
The victim died bec. Of multiple stab wounds inflicted by 2 or more person. There
is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and Rene at the situs criminis , the
victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time Rene and
Ronnie joined Odilon in the stabbing the victim, the crime was already
consummated. Therefore, Ronnie and Rene conspired w/ Odilon to kill the victim;
hence all of them are criminally liable for the latter’s death. The appellant is not not
merely an accomplice but a principal by direct participation.
g. Comelec vs. Espanol, 417 SCRA 554
FACTS:
Bautista executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the Poblete, et.al. of vote buying
and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC which
recommended that the resolution of the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor
be nullified because the accused are exempt.
HELD:
The Court sustained the authority of the COMELEC to exempt from prosecution
persons charged with vote-buying, vote-selling, and conspiracy to bribe voters who
volunteer to give information and testify on any information under Section 28 of
R.A. No. 6648.The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands
of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify
against law violators. The statute operates as a complete pardon for the offenses
to which the information was given. Comelec won not only principal but also
accomplices & accessories are criminally liable for election offense. But under sec
68 or sec 265 of bp 381 those violators who testified against violators (vote buying/
selling) are exempt from prosecution. Therefore all the 13 are excempt from
prosecution & their criminal cases are dismissed.
C. ACCESSORIES
a. RCP, Arts. 19, 20
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever
the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article.
b. Pres. Dec. No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder
indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than
12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty
pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding
12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000
pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not
exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5)
pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
c. PD 1829
PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from
reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means
of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or
object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or
has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading
prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other
personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process
or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in
the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of
abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his
person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his
family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or
unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law
enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or
property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and
not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher
penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee,
he shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-one.
d. People vs. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19
Facts:
Bernardo and Teresa lived together but for quite some time their relationship has
gottenbitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had an illicit relationship with Talingdan.
Their child testified that on theday the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside
their house and Bernardo knew about it but continuedplowing his field. Later, when
Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired at Bernardoand the 4
climbed the stairs of the Batalan. Seeing that the victim was alive they fired at him
again.Teresa came out after from her room and pulled her child to question her.
Teresa threatened to kill her if she would reveal the incident.
Held:
One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the crime can be held
guilty asaccessory. There is morally convincing proof that Teresa is an accessory to
the offense. She was inside theroom when her husband was shot. As she came
out after the shooting, she inquired from the child if shewas able to recognize the
assailants and when the latter identified the 4 accused as the culprits, Teresadid
not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone but she went to
the extent of warning her not to tell anyone or else she would kill her. Later when
the police came, she claimed she hadno suspects in mind. She, thus, became
active in her cooperation with the 4 accused.
e. People vs. Cui, 314 SCRA 153
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1990, at about 9:00 P.M. more or less
and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accuse, all private individuals,
conniving and confederating together, and mutually helping with one another,
armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, enter the
dwelling house of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim and while inside therein with
violence and intimidation, take and carry away cash and jewelries in the amount of
P20,000.00 from the possession of and belonging to spouses Johnny and Rose
Lim and that on the occasion thereof, and in connection therewith and for the
purpose of extorting ransom from said spouses Johnny and Rose Lim, herein
accused, in pursuance of their superior strength did then and there kidnap and
detain Stephanie Lim 17 years old [sic] daughter of spouses Johnny and Rose Lim
and while Stephanie Lim was under detention in the place other than the latter's
dwelling place, the said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 for the
release of Stephanie Lim to which demands and for fear of the latter's life spouses
Johnny and Rose Lim delivered and caused to be delivered the amount of
P1,000,000.00 to said accused; and accused —
(1)
Leonilo Cui y Baladjay and
(2)
Beverly Cui y Cantuba
who are hereby charged for the same offense as accomplices cooperate in its
execution by previous acts and subsequently profiting in the effects of the crime by
receiving the amount of P10,000.00 from the principal accused as their share of
the loot, to the damage and prejudice of Johnny, Rose and Stephanie Lim in the
total amount of P1,020,000.00.
Held: They are accessories not accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an
accessory requires the following elements: a) that he has the knowledge of the
commission of the crime b) that he took part in the commission by any of the 3
modes enumerated in art.19. The twin elements are present in this case. It was
shown that Toto Garcia gave Cui P 10000 as their profit from the crime.
f.
People vs. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166
Facts :
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doewere
changed with murder for the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated bya
witness, the victim answered the called of nature and went to the back portionof
the house where they were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followedhim
and later they heard the victim shouting for help and when they ran towardsthe
scene he saw the accused on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with along
bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia brought the victim to a welland
dropped him and placed stones into the well. The trial court found theaccused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed averring thatthe trial court
erred in holding them criminally liable because at the time thevictim was dropped
into the well, he was still alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the
victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct naturaland logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime ismore serious
than that intended. The essential requisites for this criminal liabilityto attach are as
follows :
1. the intended act is felonious ;
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor'swrongful acts.
PENALTIES
I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PENALTIES
A. PURPOSE OF PENALTIES
B. THEORIES JUSTIFYING PENALTIES
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS
1. Constitution (1987), Art. 3 Secs. 18 (1) & (2), 19 (1), 20, 22
Section 18.
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
2. In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit
corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec.8 saying it violates due
process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto
law
Issues:1.WON it violates three rights?
No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral processand equal protection
of laws.
2.WON it is an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:a.makes criminal an act done before law was
passedand punishes act innocent when done.b.aggravates a crime, makes it
greater than it wasc.inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribedwhen
committedd.alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes convictionupon less
or different testse.assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only ineffect
imposes penalty or deprivation of right whichwhen done was lawful
Held:
Petition denied. Constitutional act.Constitutional inhibition refers only to
criminal laws. Penalty inlaw imposed to acts committed after approval of law.
3. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,
dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano
Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag
and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial
court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to
outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and
for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not
only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security
of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the
illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation
by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing
of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized
by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership
to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality
of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of
the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder,
the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons,
groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill
of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of
SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus
is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s
direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to
its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts
committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive
organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute
applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is
only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE
EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and
Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were
done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech
and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are
weak
considering
NATIONAL
SECURITY
and
PRESERVATION
of
DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under
RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the
following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the
organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership
is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.
Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the
Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
4. People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380
FACTS:
On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel
Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the
owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.
Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s
Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their
call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from
inside the house. The three men then dashed off.
Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the
Paranala’s housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were
also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.
Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and
Bracamonte were at large until the latter’s arrest in October of the same year.
Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of
alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that
will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit
identification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal
affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.
RULING:
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very
easy to concoct.
In order that this defense may prosper, it must be
established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at
the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case,
appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof,
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims’ house at the time
the crime was committed.
Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to
have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials
and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he
was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against
him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in
order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a
felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the
prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the
perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of
closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no
means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.
The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused,
were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge
and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide
only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty
prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the
number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims
slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
5. People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 (1999)
Held: From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleamed that when appellant
was asked to get off the bus and bring “his” bag, appellant brought with him
said bag. If, indeed, the bag was not his, he should not have taken it with him
in alighting from the bus. Besides, denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing
no weight in law.
Appellant further avers that the civilian “asset” should have been presented in
court to shed light on how he managed to get his information. This argument
is not tenable. The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant in
illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative
and cumulative.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the guilt of appellant has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
With the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposable
upon violators of Section 4 of Dangerous Drugs Act is reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to
ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750
grams or more. In this case, the quantity of marijuana involved weighs more
or less two kilograms, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties,
the rules for the application of indivisible penalties under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code should be applied.
This is pursuant to our
pronouncement in People vs. Simon[24] where we recognized the suppletory
application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code as well as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the
amendment of the latter by R.A. No. 7659.[25] Thus, as there is neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Finally,
considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be applied.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the lower
court finding appellant guilty of the crime illegal transport of marijuana and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay fine of P500,000.00 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
D. ART. 21. NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
E. ART. 22. RETROACTIVITY
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
1. Exceptions
2. RPC, Arts. 21, 22; Civil Code Art. 4
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by
any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
3. People vs. Patalin, 311 SCRA 18 (1999)
Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of
Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the evening of August 11, 1984
against the Aliman family. They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At
the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was
punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already
imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the present
case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659
which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court
erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively
applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any
future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?
Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the
present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that the framers intended the
provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of
death having been imposed yet. The retroactive effect may be given during
three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been
committed and the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed
but service has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being carried out.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22
of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual
criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to
impair a right that accrued under the old law.
4. People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 (1999)
Facts: In 1998, an RTC decision found Romeo Gallo guilty of the crime of
qualified rape with the penalty of death. In 1999- Gallo filed a Motion to ReOpen
the
Case
seeking
modification
of
the
death
sentence
to
reclusionperpetua in line with the new court rulings on the attendant
circumstances inSec 11 of RA 7659. According to People vs. Garcia: the
additional attendantcircumstances introduced in RA 7659 should be
considered as specialqualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the
crime of rape and if notpleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic
aggravatingcircumstances. The information filed against Gallo does not
allege hisrelationship with the victim Marites Gallo (his daughter), thus it
CANNOT beconsidered as a qualifying circumstance.
Ruling
Judicial decisions applyingor interpreting the law or the constitution form part
of the legal system of theland and so the doctrine forms part of the penal
statutes and therefore maybe applied retroactively being favorable to the
accused who is not a habitualcriminal, notwithstanding that final sentence has
already been pronouncedagainst him. The doctrine of People vs. Garcia may
be retroactively appliedas it is favorable to him. The case is reopened and the
judgment is modifiedfrom death to reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine:
Special qualifying circumstances have to be alleged in theinformation for it to
be appreciated.
5. People vs. Ramirez, 357 SCRA 222
Held: In line with current jurisprudence, we affirm the award of indemnity ex
delicto to the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000. This award needs no
proof other than the commission of the crime.
Likewise, we sustain the
award of P50,000 for moral damages, which has evidentiary basis.
The
victim’s father testified that as a result of the crime, he suffered “heaviness of
heart” as well as “mental anguish.”
We disagree with the trial court, however, in sentencing appellant “to suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.”
There was no
justification or need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment,
because reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this
fundamental principle was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit: “Since
reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or
maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for
life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing
the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some
other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as
unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code).”
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, except in regard to the
penalty, which is hereby MODIFIED; accordingly, appellant is sentenced to
the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
6. People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48
Facts: Appellants Paulino Buayaban, Pedro Tumulak, Marciano Toñacao,
Yoyong Buayaban and Larry Betache, all armed, entered the house of
Dioscoro Abonales, killed the latter by shooting him in the neck then forcibly
took the sum of P30,000 from the victim’s wife. They also got the wallet of
Rolando Verdida, the future son-in-law of the victim, containing P10,000
which was the money prepared by Rolando for his wedding to the victim’s
daughter. After the robbery, they all fled. But, while escaping, they
encountered Artemio Abonales, the father of the victim, who was responding
to investigate the gunshots he heard. They all stopped momentarily and
Paulino in fact tried but failed to shoot Artemio. Thereafter, all the accused
continued their escape.
In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with “robbery
in band with homicide.” There is no such crime in the Revised Penal Code.
The felony is properly called robbery with homicide. If robbery with homicide
is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as
“robbery with homicide” under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but
the circumstance that it was committed by a band would be appreciated as
an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Issue: Can the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band in the commission
of the crime be appreciated when it is not properly alleged in the information?
Held: No. We cannot treat the ordinary aggravating circumstance of band
because it was not alleged in the body of the information. Though it is an
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
Information. With regard to its Section 9, the use of the word ‘must’ indicates
that the requirement is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with
Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such
circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules
of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit
the accused.
7. Effect of Repeal of Penal Laws
a. With re-enactment
b. Without re-enactment
c. People vs. Pimentel, supra
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion
under R.A.1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC of
Manila, and a warrant ofarrest was issued on July 29, 1983, but was not
carried out due to his disappearance. After seven years, on June 5, 1990,
Antonio Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrestin the
subversion case, and was likewise found to possess an unlicensed .38
caliber specialrevolver and six rounds of live ammunition. Because of this,
Tujan was charged with IllegalPossession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 beforethe RTC in Makati.
Contention of the People:
Antonio Tujan filed the motion to quash the charge under PD No.1866 on
the ground that he has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted for
Subversion, based on Sections 3(H) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.Furthermore, Tujan contends that common crimes
such as illegal possession of firearms andammunition should be
absorbed in subversion. The present case is the twin prosecution ofthe
earlier subversion case, and therefore he is entitled to invoke the
constitutionalprotection against double jeopardy.
Contention of the State:
Tujan does not stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second
timebecause: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case,
and (b) the previousoffense charged against him is for Subversion,
punishable under RA 1700, while the presentcase is for Illegal
Possession
of
Firearm
and
Ammunition
in
Furtherance
of
Subversion,punishable under PD 1866, a different law.
Issue/s to be Solved:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in
view of the previous charge under RA 1700.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
While the SC holds that both the subversion charge under RA1700, as
amended, and the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
infurtherance of subversion under PD 1866, as amended, can co-exist,
the subsequentenactment of of RA 7636 on Sept. 22, 1992, totally
repealing RA 1700, as amended, hassubstantially changed the
complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said repealinglaw being
favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual
delinquent,should be given retroactive effect. With the enactment of RA
7636, the charge of subversionagainst the accused-private respondent
has no more legal basis, and should be dismissed. Itwould be illogical for
the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an
offense that no longer exists.Subversion charge against Tujan was
dismissed, illegal possession of firearm and ammunitionin furtherance of
subversion against the same accused is deemed amended. Accused
wasordered to be released immediately from detention, since he was
already detained for 7years, whereas the amended charge has a penalty
of 4 years, 2 mos. and 1 day to six years.
F. ART. 23. PARDON
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action except as
provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liabilities with regard to the interest
of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.
1. See also Art. 36, RPC
Article 36, RPC Pardon; its effect. – A pardon shall not work the restoration of
the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
2. RA 8353
Republic Act No. 8353
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,
RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of
1997."
Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall
hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act
No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a
new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or
any law enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or
calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the
time of the commission of the crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human ImmunoDeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any
other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to
the victim;
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or para-military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of
his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation or disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
prision mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the
ten aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the
offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid
consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts
punished under Article 266-A."
Section 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision of this Act is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not affected
thereby shall remain valid.
Section 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and
all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act
are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
3. People vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 350
Facts: Juan Luna was condemned to 1 year, 8 months and 20 days of prision
correccional due to abduction. While the appeal was pending, Tomasa
Rivera, mother of the minor, Juana Isidro granted the express pardon of the
offense committed. The attorney of the defendant moved the court to declare
that the
penal action
action brought
by the complaining witness was
established and asked the bail bond be cancelled.
The case deals with an offense which the penal action or liability to the
penalty fixed for its punishment may be extinguished by the expressed or
implied pardon in accordance with Art. 448 of the RPC. Motion was based
upon an express pardon recorded in a public instrument by the mother of the
injured party, who being a widow exercised the rights of parental authority.
Contention of the State: The penalty cannot be extinguished because the
pardon was not given by the offended party itself.
Contention of the Accused: The pardon is valid since it was the mother of the
injured party who gave it as she exercises parental authority over her
daughter.
Issue: WON the pardon made by the mother in behalf of a minor can be
considered.
Held: The SC said that granting a pardon in the name or in behalf of a minor
is not sufficient to extinguished penal action. The injured party must be done
to grant pardon or in case of minority, the guardians should take part only. As
the offense essentially and directly affects the injured party, she alone is
entitled to remit the offense and to authorize the extinction of the penal
action.
In the case at bar, it has been made to appear that the offended party has
expressly pardoned the injury alleged to have been by luna. The pardon of
her mother is not sufficient to authorize the dismissed of the case.
4. People vs. Sansano, 58 Phil 73
Facts: Ursula Sansano and Marcelo Ramos were convicted with adultery.
After completing their sentence, Sansano let her paramour and asked his
husband, Mariano Ventura to take her back. Mariano refused and said he had
nothing more to do with her and that she can do anything she wishes.
Sansano then went back to Ramos. Ventura did nothing after knowing that
his wife resumed living with Ramos. Ventura went to Hawaii and upon return,
he filed another charge of adultery.
Contention of the State: 7 years of acquiscene on Ventura’s part in the
adultery of his wife is explained by his absence in the Phililippines.
Contention of the Accused: Pardon in adultery, whether express or implied
will bar a criminal action.
Held: The court held the contention of Sansano. It was not impossible for the
husband to take any action against Sansano during the 7 years. His conduct
of not instituting an action the moment he had know ledge that his wife
returned to Ramos warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
relations between his wife and Ramos.
5. People vs. Cornejo, 60 Phil 785
Treachery may exist even the attack is face to face as long as it is not
preceded by a dispute and the offended party is unprepared to defend himself.
6. People vs. Nery, 10 SCRA 244
Facts: This is an appeal from judgement of the CFI of Negros convicting
Soledad Nery of Estrada. Nery and Frederico Matillano entered
into
agreement that the former will deliver a sum of P230 on payment of the two
diamond rings given by the latter. However, Nery failed to comply with the
agreement which forced Federico to file a complaint.
Contention of the state: She is guilty of estafa
Contention of the Accused: The novation of the contrast of Nery and
Frederico avoided any criminal liability.
Held: The Sc rejected the theory of novation advanced by Nery
7. People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176
Facts: Ruben Lim asked his cousin Karen to let Delilah to stay in his house
so that he can attent the wake of their relative. At dawn, Ruben raped Delilah.
Ruling: Pardon must be made before the institution of the criminal action. The
present case was filed on Feb. 24, 1988 while the affidavit of desistance was
executed only on March 1, 1988.
8. People vs. Makilang, Oct. 23, 2005
Facts: Erlindo Makilang raped Evelyn Makilang on July 30, 1996.
Ruling: The pardon must be given both by the offended party and his/her
parents in case the latter is a minor.
G. ART. 24. MEASURES NOT CONSIDERED PENALTIES
Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. —
The following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their
detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement
in a hospital.chanrobles virtual law library
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80
and for the purposes specified therein.chanrobles virtual law library
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to
institute proceedings.chanrobles virtual law library
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their
administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their
subordinates.chanrobles virtual law library
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in
penal form.chanrobles virtual law library.
-
See also Family Code, Arts. 228-229
Art. 228 of the Family Code - Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. of the Family Code - Unless subsequently revived by a final
judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for
the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising
parental authority. (327a)
II.
IMPOSABLE PENALTIES AND THEIR GRADATION
A. PRINCIPAL PENALTIES
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be
imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in
the following:
Scale
Principal Penalties
Capital punishment:
Death.
B. Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
C. Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspension,
Destierro.
D. Light penalties:
Arrestomenor,
Public censure.
E. Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
F. Accessory Penalties
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or
calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.
1. Death/Capital Punishment
a. Sec. 19, Art. 3, Constitution
•
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
b. Related laws
i.
RA 7659, imposition of the death penalty
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN
HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE
REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1.Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority,
but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the
Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000
pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony
of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of
the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of
treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished
by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of
the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the
Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high
seas or in Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes
referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following
circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon
the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without
means of saving themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
physical injuries or rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the
same Code a new article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted
with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting
an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift
or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was
not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present,
he shall suffer the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of
the same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article
246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any
person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by
the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
- Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of
Article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been
carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the
crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall
have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission
any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single
act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed
on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the
public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for
a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental
function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient
dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane,
devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use,
entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse
installation
and
any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public
utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or
for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors
or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or
the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general
museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable
or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty
of death shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years
old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation."
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 2.Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3.Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into
the Philippines any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4.Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution
and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
"Sec. 5.Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug
Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in
any form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in
Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every
case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to
a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary.
"Sec. 7.Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 8.Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9.Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or
culture
any
medium
Indian
hemp,
opium
poppy
(papaversomniferum), or any other plant which is or may hereafter
be classified as dangerous drug or from which any dangerous
drug may be manufactured or derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of
said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that
he did not know such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of
due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of
the penalties herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14.Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring any
regulated drug in the Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusionperpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any regulated drug.
"Sec.
15.Sale,
Administration,
Dispensation,
Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug
users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used
in any form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified
in Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed
in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or
sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16.Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses
under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3.
200
grams
or
more
of
shabu
or
methylamphetaminehydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is
far
beyond
therapeutic
requirements,
as
determined
and
promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
administration,
delivery,
transportation
or
manufacture
of
dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which are sources of
dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the
confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the
proceeds of the crime including but not limited to money and other
obtained thereby and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable
for the offense, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall
be ordered destroyed without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant
sources of such drugs as well as the proceeds or instruments of
the crime so confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government
shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without delay.
Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or
misapplies or fails to account for seized or confiscated dangerous
drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or
instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after
conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged
under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is
reclusionperpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended
to read as follows :
"Sec. 24.Penalties for Government Official and Employees and
Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces,
'Planting' of Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided for
Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed,
if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government
officials, employees or officers, including members of police
agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is
found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs punished in
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the immediate
vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer
the same penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 14.Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty
of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act,
shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less
than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the
penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be
from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the
penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of
the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro
shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when
the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which
case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall
be from one month and one day to six months.
Arrestomenor. - The duration of the penalty of arrestomenorshall
be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be
required to cover such period of time as the court may determine."
Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed;
Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty
shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is
more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic
review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in
which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court,
the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20)
days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten
(10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."
Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows :
"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be
taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the
penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a
crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law
in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not
be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken
by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed
shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any group who belongs to an organized/syndicated
crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or
more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must
of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the
moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with
the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only
serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of
the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found
guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and
to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith,
shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of
his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is
found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The
death sentence shall be executed with preference to any other
and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible
to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.
If the person under sentence so desires,
he shall
be
anaesthetized at the moment of the execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the
method of carrying out the sentence shall be changed to gas
poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year
after the judgment has become final."
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person
over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence
shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the
records of the case shall be forwarded immediately by the
Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of the pardoning power."
Section 26.
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision
of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other
parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the
approval hereof.
ii.
RA 8177, implementing rules and regulations
Section 1. Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7659 is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. —
The death sentence shall be executed with preference to any
other penalty and shall consist in putting the person under the
sentence to death by lethal injection. The death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the
sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal
injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
chan robles virtual law library
"The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to
cause the instantaneous death of the convict.
"Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the administration of
lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such
task.
"The authorized physician of the Bureau of Corrections, after
thorough examination, shall officially make a pronouncement of
the convict's death and shall certify thereto in the records of the
Bureau of Corrections.
The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1)
year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has
become final and executory without prejudice to the exercise by
the President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
Sec. 2. Persons already sentenced by judgment, which has
become final and executory, who are waiting to undergo the death
penalty by electrocution or gas poisoning shall be under the
coverage of the provisions of this Act upon its effectivity. Their
sentences shall be automatically modified for this purpose.
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules. — The Secretary of Justice in
coordination with the Secretary of Health and the Bureau of
Corrections shall, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this
Act, promulgate the rules to implement its provisions.
Sec. 4. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees and
issuances, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 5. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes
earlier. Publication shall not be later than ten (10) days after the
approval thereof.
iii.
Arts. 40 and 47, 81-75, RPC
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty,
when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall
carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of
civil interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence,
unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in
the pardon.
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. —
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must
be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme
court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as
to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the
imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of
the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court
shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all
justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof
shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration
of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of
only the remaining justices shall be required.
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. —
The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other
and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible
to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution.
If the person under sentence so desires,
anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.
he shall
be
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance
to the culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the
execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not
be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and
the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at
least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset.
During the interval between the notification and the execution, the
culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as
he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by
priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult
lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with
members of his family or persons in charge of the management of
his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of
his descendants.
Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. —
The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this
last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article
40.
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness
thesame.chanrobles virtual law library— The execution shall take
place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public
view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the
offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding
six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary
personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the
Director of Prisons may authorize.
Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed
and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the
culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings
subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of
learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose
of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take
charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director
of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at
government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to
the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the
latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person
sentenced to death be held with pomp.
iv.
RA 9346 (2006) suspension
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act
Designating
Death
by
Lethal
Injection
is
hereby
repealed.Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred FiftyNine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does
not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the
publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or
recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That
nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant
executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication
in two national newspapers of general circulation.
c. Cases
i.
Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil 741
Facts: Fred Harden transferred over P1000 in drafts of cash to
Hong Kong, P20,196.80 to California and P50000 to an unknown
person, the said amounts are conjugal property. His wife
petitioned the court to order Harden to return all these amounts as
well as the P386,553 shares of Balatoc Mining Corporation
alleged to be in his possession. Because of civil disobedience or
civil contempt, the court ordered his arrest as well as his
confinement of the New Bilibid Prisons, this means an indefinite
time of imprisonment until he complies with the court orders.
Ruling: The punishment for contempt is neither cruel nor
excessive. The SC said that punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning as used in the Constitution. It implies
there something inhuman or barbarous, something more than
extinguishment of life. In this case, if the term of imprisonment is
indefinite and might last through the life of the petitioner, yet by the
terms of the sentence, the door is left open for him to avoid
serving any part of it by complying with the orders of hte court,
and in this manner put an end to his incarceration.
ii.
People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107
Facts: Feliciano Munoz, Tomas Taguba, Marvin Millora and other 7
unidentified men have complained of having been victimized by
castle rustlers, having found their supposed quarry, they
proceeded to execute each of them. Mauro Bulatao was shot in
the mouth and died instantly in front of his son and daughter,
Alejandro Bulatao was forced to lie down on hte ground and was
shot twice in the head until he bled before he was shot in the
head. Unfortunately, the victims were innocent farmers and not the
castle rustlers they were suspected to be.
Ruling: The penalty under the RPC is reclusion perpetua to death
but was modified by the 1987 Constitution. Conformably, the court
iii.
has not imposed hte death penalty whenever it was called for.
People vs. Empante, 1999
Facts: Pedro raped his own daughter, Elvie who was then under
18 yrs old. The first sexual abused happened on Nov 24, 1992
when she was only 12 yrs old. The second abuse was on
December 24, 1996, when the family moved to another place. The
third was on Jan 1997. In all those abuses Pedro always
threatened to kill Elvie if she would reveal the same to anyone.
Contention of the state: There are 3 counts of rapehave should be
sentenced to 3 counts of death.
Contention of the accused: There should only be one death
penalty since it was committed against one person. Intoxication
should mitigate.
Ruling: Qualified rape is punishable by death which must be
applied regardless of any mitigating or aggra. circumstances
which may have attended the commission of the crime.
In crimes against persons, each act constitutes a distinct
act of execurion and thus is distinct offense.
iv.
People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244
Facts: On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in
the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent
judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of
death and he rather imposed reclusion perpetua to each of the
accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
Crimes: grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty
lower than that prescribed by law.
HELD: The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of
guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by
the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral
beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death
penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code
Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
v.
People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682
Facts
Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape for raping the
10 year old daughter of his common spouse with death penalty.
Contention of the state: the crimes punishable by death under RA
1659 are heinous crimes for being grave and hateful offenses and
which by reason of their inherent and manifest wickedness and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just civilized
and ordered society.
Contention of the accused: the accused argues that RA 8177 and
its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, violation of our international treaty
obligation, being an undue delegation of legislative power and
being discriminatory.
Held
The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the
supplemental motion for reconsideration with a finding that
congress duly complied with requirements for the reimposition of
death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not
unconstitutional.
vi.
People vs. Galigao, 2003
Held: The court hereto acknowledge that circumstance could exist
to warrant an exercise of such foreberance (death penalty). The
SC in deciding this case can do no less herein considering that
accused is unletter fisherman. Because of thid, there is sufficient
justification in imposing on accused-appellant the reduced penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
vii.
People vs. Domantay, 1999
Facts: Bernardino Domantay was found guilty of raping his 6 year
old daughter, Jennifer. The body of the latter ws found sprawled
amidst a bamboo grave with several stab wounds.
Ruling: In the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from
which to infer that Domantay sexually abused Jennifer. The only
circumstance from which such inference might be made is that he
was seen with her walking towards the place where the body was
found.
Wherefore, Domantay is found guilty of homicide only since the
act of rape was not proven.
viii.
People vs. Empante, 1999
Facts: Pedro raped his own daughter, Elvie who was then under 18 yrs
old. The first sexual abused happened on Nov 24, 1992 when she was
only 12 yrs old. The second abuse was on December 24, 1996, when the
family moved to another place. The third was on Jan 1997. In all those
abuses Pedro always threatened to kill Elvie if she would reveal the same
to anyone.
Contention of the state: There are 3 counts of rapehave should be
sentenced to 3 counts of death.
Contention of the accused: There should only be one death penalty since
it was committed against one person. Intoxication should mitigate.
Ruling: Qualified rape is punishable by death which must be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggra. circumstances which may have
attended the commission of the crime.
In crimes against persons, each act constitutes a distinct act of
execurion and thus is distinct offense.
1.
Crime different from that intended- Art. 49
-cases of error in personae only
Rules:
1.
If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than
that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit
-the penalty corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit shall be imposed in its max.
2.
If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than
that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty prescribed for the felony shall be imposed in its max period.
3.
The rule established by the next preceding par. Shall not be
applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute
an attempted of frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher
penalty for either the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided
for the attempted of the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its max
period.
*Do not apply the Aberratio Letus because in this case, there is a complex
crime
*Does not apply to praeter intentionem because in this case, the crime
befalls the same person.
ix.
People vs. Mahinay, 1999
Facts: Larry Mahinay, who was a houseboy, was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. Mahinay raped and
killed Maria Victoria Chan. In the fulfillement of the crime, Mahinay
threw the body of Maria in a septic tank.
Ruling: The death penalty imposed is correct. Rape is an
ignominious crime, no rational justification can be made for it other
than lust. Rape is burdened with the penalty of death.
x.
People vs. Leonor, 1999
Facts: Christopher Leonor, armed with a fine knife, went to the
clinic of Dr. Maria Tarlengco for tooth extraction. While the doctor
was preparing her dental instruments, Christopher barged in,
demanded money, then stabbed the doctor. He also grabbed the
doctor’s wristwatch an dran away. The victim was able to shout for
help resulting to the arrest of the accused, but the former died
shortly after.
Ruling: The penalty of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua
to death. There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be
xi.
imposed, without the benefit of the indeterminate sentence law.
People vs. Paraiso, 1999
Facts: Roland Paraiso was found guilty of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death. Confederating with John Doe he entered the
house of Lolita Alipio Tigley, and stole several items and on the
occasion thereof, with intent to kill, dragged Tigley inside a room,
and thereafter assaulted, attacked and stabbed the latter on the
different parts of the body which caused her death shortly
thereafter.
Issues:
1.
WON Paraiso was guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
Yes. The essential elements of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide (Art. 249, RPC) are: (1) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (2) the property thus taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and,
(4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime
of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed. The evidence for the prosecution showed that
appellant and his companion, with a gun and a knife, took
possession of personal properties belonging to the victim, with
intent to gain, and on the occasion thereof, the victim was killed.
2.
WON aggravating circumstances were rightly appreciated
No. Dwelling and abuse of superior strength may be appreciated
but not disregard of respect due the offended party on account of
her sex.
Dwelling. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Here,
robbery was committed in the house of the victim without
provocation on her part. In robbery with violence and intimidation
against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of
robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended party’s house. Dwelling is
considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of
privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere.
Abuse of superior strength. While abuse of superior strength may
be considered when there is an inequality of comparative force
between the victim and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless,
be a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of by
the latter in the commission of the crime. What should be
considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Abuse of
strength is present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical
superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor but also when the offender uses a
powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the defense
available to the offended party. Here, the victim was totally
helpless in the face of two (2) perpetrators who were armed with a
gun and a knife.
Disregard of respect due to sex. However, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the victim by
reason of her sex cannot be appreciated. This aggravating
circumstance can be considered only in crimes against persons
and honor. The special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide
is a crime against property not against persons. Moreover, nothing
appears in the record that appellant deliberately intended to offend
or insult the age or sex of the offended party. Moreover, such an
aggravating circumstance would be absorbed by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Judgment: Penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is composed of
2 indivisible penalties. Applying Art. 63, RPC, penalty that should
be imposed is death which is the maximum provided for by law in
the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of superior
strength. These aggravating circumstances need not be alleged in
the information since they are mere generic aggravating
circumstances which have the effect of increasing the penalty to
the maximum period which is death. But in accordance with Sec.
25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the RPC, upon finality of this
decision, certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of
this case, are forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
d. Different from life imprisonment
- Differentiate Reclusion Perpetua from Life imprisonment
Life Imprisonment
Perpetua
Accessory
-Does not have any accessory penalties
penalty (example:
Perpetual special disqualification)
Nature
-A penalty under special laws
under the RCP
(example: firearms, carnapping)
Reclusion
-Has accessory
-A penalty
Duration
-Does not appear to have extent or duration
-has specified
duration (example: 20 yrs. 1 day- 40 yrs)
-intails on 30 years imprisonment after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon.
i.
People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380
Facts: at the evening of May 07, 1986, Carlos Catorse attended
the wake of Adronico Gregorio’s grandson. By 1 am of May 8,
1986, commotion took place between Adronico and his son, right
then: Carlos helped in pacifying but was hacked to death by
Recardo Gregorio and Adronico Gregorio.
Convention of the state: Two accused guilty of murder in crim.
Case 428 Sentenced…
Sentenced of the state: They are sentenced of life imprisonment
for the crime murder. The location, number and gravity of the
wounds inflicted to the victims’ belie. The appellant’s contention
that they acted in soft-defects.
Defense of the Accused: Adronico declared that he was in the
kitchen preparing for food for the people when Carlos was
attacking his brother and his son. While he was in the kitchen,
Marcelo attacked him causing him to defend himself to the attack.
They should not be sentenced by life imprisonment; they should
only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Ruling: Indeed the use of weapon (samurai and bolo) against
Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo are considered as deadly
weapons. The traitorous manner in which they were assault and
the number of wounds inflicted in them, all demonstrate a
deliberate assault with intent to kill. Appellant is guilty of murder.
The follo of the assaulted decision sentences the appellant to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The correct penalty
imprisonment
however
should
be
reclusion
perpetua
in
accordance with article 248. Life imprisonment and reclusion
perpetua are distinct from each other.
ii.
People vs. Ballabare, 265 SCRA 350
Facts: On September 16, 1990 Edito Ballabare and Moreto
Mioason had a fight. Jose Tacudao tried to stop the former but
Edito’s group ganged up on him. The latter and his brother,
Leonardo Juran to the house of Lessie Asenita. Gerry and Eder
Ballabare chased them. When hurled stones at Tessie’s house
and threatened to attack her with a bolo, the brothers Tacudao run
to the house. At this point, Eder shot Juan in the right ear and
forehead while Gerry shot Loenardo in the upper right chest.
Contention of the State: Gerry Ballabare is guilty of the two counts
murder of Juan and Leonardo Jr. sentenced to two penalties of
reclusion perpetua in criminal case 9067 ( for the murder of Juan
and Leonardo Tacudao) based on the testimony of Tessie Asenilla,
the victim’s sister. Moreover, he is sentenced to life imprisonment
for violation of PD 1866 in a separate information after a
certification from Camp crame showing that he is unauthorized to
carry a firearm.
Contention of the Accused: Pleaded guilty in both cases.
Contended alibi claiming he was playing basketball at that time of
the commission of the offense and it was brother Eder (at large)
who killed Juan tacudao and leonard tacudao Jr.
Held: The SC ruled that the RTC 50 Palawan and Puerto Princesa
erred in imposing life imprisonment on Gerry Ballabare for
violation of PD 1866. Illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form is punishable by the death penalty was since the
crime was committed on September 16. 1990, when the
imposition of the death penalty was prohibited, the next lower in
degree, reclusion perpetua, should be instead be imposed. This is
not the equivalent of life imprisonment, as the SC explained.
Wherefore the penalty is modified. He is guilty of PD 1866,
violation subjected to reclusion perpetua.
contention of the accused (People vs. Ballabare)… another
prosecution for parricide committed with the use of unlicensed
firearm under the rule on double jeopardy.
Ruling: In the case of people vs. Deunica, the court declared
Lazaro vs. People “No longer controlling”. Illegal possession of
firearms and
ammunition
does
not
assort
the
crime
of
homicide/murder under the RPC and therefore does not bar the
simulutaneous or subsequent prosecution for the latter crime.
iii.
People vs. Lucas, 288 SCRA 296
Facts: Michelle Lusa, 14, was abused, raped and impregnanted
by her own father, Bobley Lusa. This happened approximately 10
times. Michelle gave birth to a baby boy but gave him up for
adoption. Bobby Lusa was tried and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment for the crime of rape.
Contention of the State: He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
either life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua with damages.
Contention of the Accused: He should suffer the penalty imposed
in the RPC which is reclusion perpetua.
Held: The sentence imposed by lower coure is reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. This is erroneous as life imprisonment is not
the same as reclusion perpetua. Art. 335 of the RPC mentions
only imprisonment is imposed on as a penalty under special laws.
He should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
iv.
People vs. Saberola, 297 SCRA 733
Facts: Larry Saberola invited reῆalosa declined but latter acceded.
At 10, there was a commotion at Jaime Saberola’s yard which led
to the killing of Peῆalosa. Larry, Benjamin and Jaime Saberola.
Contention of the State: (continuation of CA’s ruling)
Is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Clearly,
therefore, the trial court erred in imposing an in determinants
penalty of imprisonment of 12 yrs. Of p. mayor as min. to 18 yrs of
r. temporal as maximum.
The crime was committed on June 14, 1993 prior to the
effectivity RA no. 7659 which improves the death penalty on
certain heinous crimes. The said statute took effect on December
31, 1993 and thus will not be applied. The penalty should be
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Were charged by RTC of murder sentencing then to suffer 12 yrs
prison mayor to 18 yrs reclusion temporal and to pay damages.
Contention of the State: The RTC is wrong in the imposition of
penalty. The CA increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is not entitled to indeterminate sentence law.
Defense of the Accused: He is entitled to the benefit of
indeterminate sentence law thus the Penalty should be Prision
Mayor to Reclusion Temporal.
Held: At the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty for
murder was reclusion temporal to death but death penalty was
suspended and we should follow art. 64 (mitigating- minimum
period, aggravating- maximum period,no more aggravating –
medium period).
In the case at the bar, there being mitigating or
aggravating, the medium period which is reclusion perpetua is
imposed.
He is not entitled to the benefit of indeterminate sentence
law because Sec. 2 provides that it is not applicable to offences
punishable by death or life imprisonment.
The term “Life Imprisonment” has been construed to
include reclusion perpetua.
2. Afflictive Penalties (Arts. 27, 41-42)
Death
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Treason
Qualified
Piracy
Qualified
Bribery
Parricide
Murder
Rape
with
homicide
Kidnapping and
illegal detention
with ransom
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reclusion
Perpetua
Homicide
Piracy
Rebellion
Qualified
Bribery
Mutilation
Rape
Failure to return
a minor
Other forms of
arson
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reclusion
Temporal
Inciting to war
Insurrection
merely
participating)
Forging
treasury/bank
notes
Homicide
Giving
assistance
to
suicide
Infanticide
Intentional
Abortion
Participant
in
duel
Slight
illegal
detention
Prission mayor
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Conspiracy
to
commit treason
Correspondence
to
hostile
country
Inciting
to
rebellion
or
insurrection
Sedition
Fraud
against
public treasury
Malversation
Removal/
concealment of
document
Open
disobedience
Death cause in
tumultuous
offices
Serious physical
injuries
a. Reclusion Perpetua
Article 27. Reclusion perpetua- The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal- The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification- The duration of the
penalties prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be six years
and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be
that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro- The duration of
the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be
from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that
of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor- The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall
be from one month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor-bThe duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall
be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace- The bond to keep the peace shall be
required to cover such period of time as the court may determine. (as
amended by RA no. 7659)
“In what cases is destierro imposed?”
•
Serious physical injury or death under exceptional circumstances
(Art. 247)
•
In case of failure to gave bond for good behavior (Art. 284).
•
As a penalty of the concubine concubinage (Art. 334).
•
In cases where, after reducing the penalty by one or more
degrees, destierro is the proper penalty.
•
•
Accessory Penalty vs. Embedded in the Principal Penalty
Art. 41. Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal- Their
accessory penalties- The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the
period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
•
Art. 42. Prision Mayor- Its accessory penalties- The penalty of
prision mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification
from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
•
Reclusion Perpetua- Rape, plunder, robbery with violence against
or intimidation of person, robbery with homicide, treason, qualified piracy,
parricide, murder infanticide, kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
i.
RA 7659
-Under RA 7659, the legal duration of reclusion perpetua is 20 and
1 day to 40 yrs. However, the SC ruled that it is still an indivisible.
Penalty and has no legal duration.
-This act restored the death penalty. It took effect on December
31, 1993. It will be applicable for some serious crimes.
ii.
As indivisible penalty
RA 7659 reclassified reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty. It
amended Art. 27 of the RPC by giving it a legal duration of 20 yrs
and 1 day to 40 yrs.
However, in its resolution promulgated on January 9, 1995, the
Supreme Court en bane held that it is still on indivisible penalty. In
the case people vs. Lucas, the Supreme court said that RA 7659
did not make explicit its intention to convert it into divisible penalty.
In people vs. Villanueva, the supreme Court reconsidered People
vs. Lucas and modified the decision deleting therefore disqualified
on whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and set aside
its division into three periods. The penalty shall be imposed
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the crime.
Reclusion Perpetua remains indivisible in the absence of clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty. In applicable cases, reclusion perpetua should be
imposed without specifying duration.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that
when there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint/ info and that proved/ established by the evidence, and
the offense as charged is included in a necessarily includes the
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged
or of the offense charged includes in that which is proved.
Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape is
prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that provided by
law for rape. The accused is entitled to the benefits of the
indeterminate sentence law, and for attempted rape he may be
sentenced to a penalty who’s minimum should be within the range
be within correctional & whose maximum should be within the
range
of
prision
mayor,
taking
into
account
modifying
circumstances.
iii.
People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 257
Facts: Chanda Lucas, 17, charged her father, Jose Lucas of
raping her. This incident started while she was still 9 and was
repeated. Her sister Cynthia witnessed it. He was found guilty of 2
counts of rape and sentenced him of reclusion perpetua.
Contention of the State: The accused should be convicted of a
rape and an attempted rape for the second case. Thus modifying
the penalty of 2 reclusion perpetua. Accused must be sentenced
to 40 yrs.
Contention of the Accused: He could not be validly convicted of
two counts of rape since the other case filed is only attempted
rape. He cites the rule that when the offense proved is more
serious than that charged, the accused can only be convicted of
the offense charged.
Held: He can only be charged for attempted rape for the second
case because the compliant for this incident charges the accused
only with the crime of attempted rape. he cannot led convicted of
consummated rape. He can only be sentenced to prision mayor.
For the first case, rape is consummated sentencing him to 34 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day of reclusion perpetua because:
-Pursuant to section 21 of RA 7659, reclusion perpetua
has now a duration of 20 yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs.
-Art. 76 still provides that it is divisible into medium,
minimum and maximum.
-But RA 7659 does not make explicit intention to convert it
divisible penalty.
-So Art. 65 should be applied (penalty cases not composed
of 3 periods can be divided into 3 equal time)
-Because ther is aggravating, the maximum period (34 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day to 40 yrs) should be applied: (minimum- 20 yrs, 1
day to 28 yrs and 8 mos) (medium- 26 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 33
yrs and 4 mos).
In reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty and can it be applied
in minimum, medium or maximum periods depending on the
presence of modifying circumstances. Prior to RA 7659, the
presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty
of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because
such penalty was then indivisible and under art. 63 of the RPC.
When the law prescribes a single penalty it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed. However,
pursuant to sec.21 of RA 7659 which amended art. 27 of the RPC,
reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration (20 yrs &1 day to
40 yrs).
There is however no corresponding amendment to Art.76
for the purpose of converting reclusion perpetua
a divisible
penalty with 3 specific period.
Art.65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of 3
periods. In cases which the penalty prescribed by law is not
composed of 3 periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained
in the forgoing articles, dividing into 3 equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed and forming one period of each
of the 3 portions may be applied:
-Minimum: 20 yrs and 1 day to 26 yrs and 8 mos.
-Medium: 26 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 33 yrs and 4 mos.
- Maximum: 34 yrs, 4 mos, 1 day to 40 yrs.
iv.
People vs. Lucas, 240 SCRA 66
Facts: Conrado Lucas was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 34
yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion perpetua for raping his daughter
chanda and from 4 yrs, 2 mos and 1 day of prision mayor
maximum as minimum and to pay the offended party at the sum
of 30k as civil indemnity for attempted rape against chanda as
well.
Contention of the State: Guilty of two crimes of rape and
sentenced Lucas to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus
all the accessory penalties provided by law. First division touched
on the light of section 21 of RA 7659 which amended Art. 27 of
RPC by specifically facing the duration of reclusion perpetua at 20
yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs.
Contention of the Accused: Applying Art.65 of the RCP, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua can be divided into 3 equal portion-min.,
med., and max. It then modified case no.-91-18465 from reclusion
perpetua , as imposed by the trial court to “imprisonment of 34 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day of reclusion perpetua”.
The appellee which was not opposed by the accusedappellant in his comment, then asks the court to correct the
duration of the max. period of reclusion perpetua from 34 yrs,
4mos and 1 day to 40 yrs as stated in the decision to 33 yrs, 4
mos and 1 day to 40 yrs.
Held: It is an indivisible penalty. The decision of the trial court is
hereby affirmed subject to modifications. The court resolved to
modify the decision of May 25, 1994 in this case by deleting
therefrom the disquisitions on whether recession perpetua is a
divisible penalty and setting aside the dispositive portion thereof:
In criminal case no. Q91-18465 in addition to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, accused Jose Lucas
is further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Chanda Lucas
in the sum of 50,000 pesos.
The court concludes that although sec.17 of RA 7659 has
fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 yrs and 1 day to
40 yrs, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as
indivisible penalty.
v.
People vs. Villanueva, 254 SCRA 202
Facts: Lea Villanueva, 14 yrs old, cried of repetitive incestuous
rape by her own father, Solomon Villanueva. After 2 yrs of sexually
abusing her, she found courage to reveal it and file the complaint
against her father. Solomon Villanueva was found guilty of two
counts of rape by the RTC Manila and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua in each count of rape.
Contention of the Accused: The accused invokes that reclusion
perpetua is a divisible period. In his case, there is no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances so he should suffer the medium period
of reclusion perpetua. Medium period of reclusion perpetua is 26
yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 33 yrs and 4 mos.
Ruling: The accused is not entitled to the medium period of
reclusion perpetua. People vs. Lucas case modified past
decisions “deleting there from the disquisitions on whether or not
reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and setting aside its
division into three. “It has no minimum, medium and maximum. It
is imposed in its inure regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.
vi.
People vs. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785
Facts: At about 3pm of August 30, 1994, accused Aung win who
was abroad from a flight that have just arrived from Bangkok,
Thailand was found with heroine weighing 5,579.80 in his luggage
by the customs. Examiner in NAIA and was likewise apprehended
on the same day when he tried
Lufthansa
Airlines.
Win
named Gatward and Zaw win Naing as the two drug couriers in
the Philippines who have contacts in Bangkok. On the following
day, win aided in the arrest of Gatward and found his Luggage
with drugs.
Contention of the State: Guilty of the violation. Dangerous drugs
act of 1972 was amended and with a penalty of reclusion perpetua
not death. Gatward should suffer 35 yrs of reclusion perpetua and
25 yrs of reclusion perpetua.
Contention of Accused: Reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty
and they should not suffer the whole duration.
Held: In Lucas it was decided that reclusion perpetua remains as
an indivisible penalty. Despite the amendment of putting the
duration of reclusion perpetua to 20 yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs, it
should remain as an indivisible penalty since there was never a
clear or explicit intention on the part of the Congress for it to be
reclassified to a divisible one. Congress to it to be reclassified to
be reclassified to a divisible one.
With this, both the accused should suffer the entire
duration and full extent of reclusion perpetua with costs.
vii.
People vs. Alvarado, 275 SCRA 727
Facts: At around 6:30 pm of May 26, 1991, Felicidad and Zosimo
were doing householdchores, when Alvarado and 4 others
challenged him “Lumabas ka diyan kalbo kung matapang ka”. As
soon as Zosimo has gotten out of the hose, the 4 held him on both
hands and Alvarado stabbed him to death. He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder.
Contention of the State: What qualified the killing of Zosimo to
murder is the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
Contention of the Accused: The penalty of reclusion perpetua
should not be imposed in tis entirety but with limit.
Held: As amended by sec. 24 RA 7659, the duration of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs.
A judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
should specify a straight penalty within the range of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.Given the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation, which serves to qualify murder, the penalty of 34
yrs of reclusion perpetua be meted out to the appellant.
viii.
People vs. Latupan, 360 SCRA 60
Facts: On April 1991, Gregorio Latupan killed Lilia and Jose
Asuncion and inflicted physical injurieson Jaime and Leo
Asuncion. He pleaded guilty of complex offense of double murder
and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment.
Contention of the State: Latupan was guilty of double murder. At
the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty of murder is
reclusion temporal to death. Since death penalty was suspended,
he should suffer life imprisonment.
Contention of the Accused: The accused contends that he should
suffer reclusion perpetua not life imprisonment because reclusion
perpetua is a penalty under the RPC for the crime of murder as
substitute of death penalty.
Held: The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua not life
imprisonment. They are the same – different in nature, duration
and accessory penalties.
ix.
People vs. Bates, 400 SCRA 95
Facts: On November 28, 1995 while Edgar Fuentes, Semon
Fuentes and Jose Boholst were on their way to Carlito Bates’
House, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana
plantation arming his firearm at Jose who was then walking
ahead. Marcelo Bates Sr. & Jr. emerged from the plantation and
hacked Jose to death. They were sentenced to imprisonment of
40 yrs of reclusion perpetua because of murder.
Contention of the State: Since the prosecution failed to prove
treachery, he is only liable to homicide with a penalty of 6 yrs and
1 day of prision mayor-12 yrs of reclusion temporal.
Contention of the accused: The trial court erred in appreciating
treachery so he is only liable of homicide not murder and a lower
penalty should be imposed.
Held: Penalty is wrong while section 21 of RA 7656 amended Art.
27 of the RPC by facing the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20
yrs and 1 day to 40 yrs, reclusion perpetua remains to be an
indivisible penalty in the absence of the clear legislative intent to
alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.
Hence, in the present case, reclusion perpetua should be
imposed without specifying its duration.
x.
People vs. Gamayao, 414 SCRA 539
Facts: Gamayao was changed with murder before the RTC of
Branch 8 of Madaluyong for killing Concordia Subogon. He
stabbed Concordia to death and left with the knife still embedded
in the victims’ body.
Contention of the State: The trail court found Gamayao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Gumayao commited murder.
Contention of the accused: Since he voluntarily surrendered, it
must be appreciated as mitigating circumstances in his favor thus
lower his sentence.
Held:: Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. As such, the
circumstances of voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty to
be meted out on the appellant since under Art. 63 of the applied
regardless of any mitigating circumstances.
b. Reclusion Temporal – Art.. 27
The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day
to twenty years.
c. Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification-Art. 30
Art. 30 Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification- The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1.
The deprivation of the public offices employments which the
offender majy have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2.
The deprivation of the right to votein any election for any popular
election office or to be elected to such office.
3.
The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for
the exercise of any the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the
sentence.
4.
The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any
office formerly held.
d. Perpetual or Temporary special disqualification, Arts. 31, 32
Art. 31 Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification- The penalties of perpetual or
temporary special
disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:
•
The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
affected.
•
The disqualification for holding similar offices or employment
either perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32 Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of the suffrage- The perpetual
or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of the said penalty of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification.
e. Prision mayor – Art. 27, 42
The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years,
except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of principal penalty.
Art. 42 Prision Mayor- Its accessory penalties- The penalty of prision
mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which
the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
3. Correctional Penalties – Arts. 27, 39, 43 &44
Art 27 (4) – The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension,
and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when
suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its du
ration shall that of principal penalty.
Art. 39 Subsidiary penalty- If the convict has no property with which to meet
the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day following rule:
•
If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arrest and fine,
he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding
paragraph in satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one
third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more
than one year and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
• When the principal penalty imposed the only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six month, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less than grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
days, if for a light felony.
• When the principal penalty is imposed is higher than prision correccional
no subsiudiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
• If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a
penal institution but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the
same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
• The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improved.
Prision Correccional (6mos 1 day to 6 mos)
a. Prision Correccional – Art. 43
The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension
from public office, the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration
of said imprisonment shall exceed 18 mos. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty.
b. Arresto mayor – art. 44
Its accessory penalties- the penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of
suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
c. Suspension - (6 mos and 1 day-6 yrs)
d. Destierro – see RA 6127 as amended by EO 214
- is a principal correccional and divisible penalty- (6 mos & 1 day – 6 yrs )
-The code does not provide for destierro (accessory penalty)
Prision Correcional- Article 43- Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of
prision correccional shall carri with it that of sus[ension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualofiaction from the right of suffrage, the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
RA 6127 (amended by EO 214)
•
An act amending Art. 29 of the RPC to give full time credit under
certain conditions to offenders who have undergone preventive
imprisonment (detention prisoner) in the service of their sentences (June
17, 1970)
Art. 29 Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from the term of
imprisonment. Offender who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting deprivation of
liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment if the detention prisoner agree voluntarily writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners except in
the following cases:
•
When they are recidivisible, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime.
•
When upon being summoned for the conclusion of their sentence
they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
Cases where destierro is imposed:
•
Serious physical injuries
or
death
under
exceptional
circumstances (Art 247)
•
In case of failure to give bond for good behavior (Art 284)
•
As a penalty for the concubine in concubinage (Art 334)
•
In cases where after reducing the penalty by one or more
degrees, destierro is the proper penalty.
•
Art. 87 Rule in the case the maximum penalty: the accused shall
be released from preventive imprisonment after 30 days.
•
Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter
the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the various
therein specified, which shall not be more than 250 not less than 25 km
from place designated.
•
If the detention does not agree to abide by the name disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with 4/5 of the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
4. Light Penalties – Art. 27, 39, &44
a. Arresto menor
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to 30
days .
b. Public censure
Public Censure- Censure being a penalty; not proper acquainted
reprimanded by the judge.
Art.88- Served in a municipal jail or in the house of the defendant himself
under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides
in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and
other reason which may seem satisfactory to it.
5. Penalties common to afflictive, correctional and light penalties
a. Fines – Art. 26, 39, 66
When afflictive, correctional or light penalty- a fine, whether imposed as a
single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive
penalty, if it does not exceeds 6,000 pesos, a correctional penalty, if it
does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos, and a light
penalty, if it be less than 200 pesos.
Art. 66 Imposition of fines- In imposing fines, the courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law, in fixing the amount in each
case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
b. Bond to keep the peace – Art. 27, 35
Art. 27 (6) Bond to keep the peace- The bond to keep the peace shall be
required to cover such period of time as the court may determine. (as
Amended by R.A No. 7659.)
Art. 35 Effects of bond to keep the peace- It shall be the duty of any
person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two
sufficient surities who shall undertake that such person will not commit
the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be
committed they will pay the amount in the office of the clerk of the court to
guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of
duration of the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he
shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if
if he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and
shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.
c. People vs. Pajotal – 368 SCRA 374
Facts: (Crime : robbery with homicide)
Espina was driving a passanger jeepney accompanied by his
nephew Pajotal, Randy Gabay and Lindo Gabay boarded the vehicle. On
the journey one of them ordered Espina to stop and the 3 men asked for
money but Espina refused to give it to them. Pajotal poked a knife to
Buyagon because Espina refused so he compelled. Although he get the
money, he still stabbed Espina. Espina fight back but he ganged up with
15 stabs with 6 of which on the face. Pajotal was sentenced for the death
os Espina.
Contention of the state:
Award for loss of earning capacity should be allowed.
Contention of the Accused:
Award for loss of earning capacity should be disallowed. First,
there are no documentary evidence stating that the victim was selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage.
Held:
In favor of the accused, the decision is modified. It was claimed by
the widow of the victim that Espina is earning substantially. Damage for
loss of earnings cannot be awarded in the absence of evidence
sufficiency income. The accused is guilty then of robbery with homicide
with moral and exemplary damages.
G. ACCESSORY PENALTIES
1. Perpetual or Temporary Absolute Disqualification
Art. 32 Effects of penalties of perpetual /temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of
the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty of the right to vote in
any public office or to be such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
elected to such office during the period of his disqualification.
2. Perpetual or Temporary Special Disqualification
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for the
profession or calling.
3. Suspension from Public Office, the Right to Vote and Be Voted for, the
Profession or Calling
The suspension from public office, profession or calling or right of suffrage
during the term of the sentence.
The persons suspended from holding public office shall not hold another
having similar functions during the period of his suspension.
4. Civil Interdiction
Art. 34 civil Interdiction-civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the parental authority, or property of any ward, of
marital authority, of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
*Civil Interdiction is imposable when penalty is:
1. Death when not executed
2. reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
A person civilly interdicted can’t appoint an agent to manage his property
because the act of the agent is also the act of the principal.
He can prepare a last will and testament because what the law prohibits
is the disposition of property (at the time of its making) by an act inter vivos.
5. Indemnification –
To pay offended party of consequential damages, those suffered by his family
and by a third person, by reason of the crime.
6. Bond – Art. 35
Art. 35 Effects of bond to keep the peace- It shall be the duty of any person
sentenced to give bond to keep peace, to present two sufficient surities who
shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be
prevented and that in case, such offense be committed.
7. Forfeiture or Confiscation of the Instruments and Proceeds of the Offense
Art. 45 Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with
it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are
not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
8. Payment of Costs – Art. 37, 38
Art. 37. Costs- What are included- cost shall include fees and indemnities in
the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable
amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not
subject to schedule.
Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities- Order of payment- In case the property of the
offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities,
the same shall be met in the following order:
• The reparation of the damage caused.
• Indemnification of the consequential damages
• The fine
• The costs of the proceedings
H. SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Art. 39. If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules:
•
If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and
fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third
of the term of the sentence, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted
against the prisoner.
•
When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceeds six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if
for a light felony.
•
When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
•
If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a
penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the
same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
•
The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve.
RA 5465: Eliminated the pecuniary liability of the accused, other than fine, in art
39 of the revised penal code.
-Since RA 5465 is favorable to the accused, it has retroactive application.
III.
GRADATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 9 Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies
Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with art. 25 of this
code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in
their maximum period are correccional, in accordance with which the above
mentioned article.
Light felonies are those inhfractions of law for the commission of which the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided.
a. Grave felonies- capital punishment or afflictive penalties
b. Less grave felonies- maximum period are correctional.
c. Light felonies
Art. 7.-When light felonies are punishable- light felonies are punishable only when
they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against person
or property.
A. GRAVE FELONIES
B. LESS GRAVE FELONIES
C. LIGHT FELONIES
IV.
APPLICATION AND COMPUTATION OF PENALTIES
A. GENERAL RULES
1. See Arts. 5, 21, 23, 28, 29, 46, 73-77
1. Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law and in cases of excessive
penalties.
Whenever a court has a knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision
and shall report to the chief executive, through the department of justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said acts should be made the
subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the chief executive, through the
department of justice, such statement as maybe deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
Art. 21 Penalties that may be imposed- No felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Art. 23 (refer to pp 15)
Art. 28 Computation of penalties- if the offender shall be in prison, the term of
the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed the day on which
the judgment of conviction shall have become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of penalty
consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the
offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be
computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his
sentence.
Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
Imprisonment- Offenders on accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
Art. 46 (see pp 88)
Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penaltieswhenever the court shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries
with it other penalties. According to the provisions of Art. 40, 41, 42, 43,44And
45 of this code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also
imposed upon the convict.
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases- In cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another than another given
penalty, without specification designating the name of the former, if such
higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory
penalty/ies of art.40, shall be considered as the higher penalty.
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees Whenever it would be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by
one or more degrees, it shall be increase or reduced, respectively for each
degree, by ¼ of the maximum amount prescribed by law without, however,
changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist
of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.
Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties- The legal period of
divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into 3 parts, forming 3
periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown
in the following table.
Art 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of 3 distinct penaltiesIn cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of 3 distinct
penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the
minimum, the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms
specially provided for in this code, the periods shall be distributed, applying
by analogy the prescribed rules.
a. EO 214, 1987
Art.29. Period of Preventive Imprisonment Deducted from term of
imprisonment – Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1.
When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice
or more times of anyc rime;
2.
When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence
they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoner, he shall be credited in the service
of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the
offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is
under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty days of preventive
imprisonment. (As amended by R.A. No. 6127, and further amended by
E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1987).
-Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment of the
offense charged to which he may be sentencedand his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof.
b. People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658
Facts: In November 1946, Abelardo Formigones together with his wife
Julia Agrcola and their 5 children went to live in the house of Abelardo's
half-brother Zacarias Formigones to find employment as palayharvesters
on December 28, 1946. Abelardo stabbed his wife at the back killing her
due to suspected illicit affairs with Zacarias as to Abelardo being
feebleminded. Abelardo then showed remove and admission.
Held: Art. 63 (3) of the RPC will be applied when the commission of the
act is attended by some MC and there is no AC, the lesser penalty shall
be applied: that the accused is suffering from illness which would
deminish the exercise of his will power.
The court finds the appellant guilty of parricide and hereby affirm
the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will
be credited with 1/2 of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
Art 17. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who took direct part in the execution of act.
2. Those who directly force/induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it wold not have been accomplished.
Art. 18. Accomplices:- Accomplices are the persons who, not being
included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previuos
or simultaniuos acts.
Art. 19. Accessories-Accessories are those who having knowledge of the
commision of the crime and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effect or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of
the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions
or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder
or an attempt to take the life of the Cheif Executive or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
2. Principals, Accomplices and Accessories in Consummated, Frustrated and
Attempted Felonies
a. RPC, Arts. 46, 50-57, 60-61
Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general-The penalty
prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general
terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consumated felony.
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frostrated crime- The
penalty next lower in degree tha that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in a frustrated
felony.
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposedupon principals of attempted crime-a
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to
commit a felony.
Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplicein a consummated crimethe penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consumated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the
commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to te commission of a
consummated felony- The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony.
Penalty prescribed for the crime
Penalty to be imposed upon
the principal in a frustrated crime and the accomplice in a consummated
crime Penalty to be imposed upon the principal in an attempted crime/
the accessory in the consummated crime and the accomplices in a
frustrated crime
frustrated
crime
Penalty to be imposed upon the accessory in
and
the
accomplices
in
an
attempted
crime
Penalty imposed upon the accessory in an attempted crime shall
be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated
felony.
Art. 54. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crimeThe penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law fpr the
frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplice in the commission
of a frustrated felony.
Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crimeThe penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
frustrated shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a
frustrated felony.
Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crimeThe penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an
attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an
attempt to commit the felony.
Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crimeThe penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
attempt shall be commit a felony.
Art. 60. Exceptions to the rules established in articles 50 to 57- The
provisions contained in articles 50 to 57, inclusive of this code shall not be
applicable to a case in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon
accomplices or accessories.
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties- for the purpose of graduating the
penalties which according to the provisions of article 50 to 57, inclusive of
this code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principal of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately that indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Art. 71 of this
code.
2. When the penalty prescribe for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale.
3. When the penalty precribed for the crime is composed of one or two
indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and
minimum period of that immediately following in said
respective
graduated scale.
4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several
periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next
lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following
the minimum prescribed and of the two next following which shall be
taken from the penalty prescribed kif posible, otherwise from the penalty
immediately following in the above-mentioned respective graduated
scale.
b. People vs. Campuhan, supra
Facts: On April 25, 1996- Primo Campuhan was caught by maria Corazon
Pamintuan kneeling before before her daughter Chrystel Pamintuan
whose pajamas and panty is removed while his short pants were down to
his knees. Corazon alleged that Primo Campuhan was found guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced by RTC of Malabon to the extreme penalty
of death hence the case was elevated to SC on automatic review.
Contention of the State: The rape was consummated as proven by the
testimony of corazon. The offense of statutory rape is CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE of a woman 12 and below as provided in art. 335(3) of
RPC. Chrystel was only 4 years old when sexually molested, thus raising
the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to the single indivisible
penalty of death (RA 7659, sec.11).
Contention of the Accused: primo assails that rape was not consummated
as proven by the absence of any sign of physical injuries or of penetration
of Crysthel's private parts.
3. Effects of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
a. RPC, Arts. 62-64, 67, 69
1. AC (generic and specific) have the effect of increasing the penalty with
out however exceeding the max provided by the law.
2. MC have the effects of deminishing the penalty.
3. Habitual delequency has the effect, not only at increasing the penalty
because of recidivision which is generally implied in habitual delequency,
but also imposing additional penalty.
Habitual Delinguent- within a period of 10 yrs from the date of his release
or conviction of the crimes:
1. S-erious/ less serious physical injuries
2. T-heft
3. R-obbery
4. E-stafa
5. F-falsification
is found guilty of any of the said crime for a 3rd time or oftener.
There was imposibility that Corazon winess whether there is a
penetration.
Ruling: The rape is on its attempted stage because the alleged touching
is merely a stroke on the external surface of the female organ and there
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labia or slid into the female organ for rape to be consummated.
The penalty for attempted rape is 2 degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory
rape of a minor below 7 yrs. 2 degree lower is reclusion temporal,
applying the indeterminate sentence law and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of penalty to be
imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period to
reclusion temporal, while the minimum shall be taken from the medium
period of the penalty next lower in degree which is prison mayor in any of
its period.
Campuhan is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 yrs 4
mos and 10 days of prision mayor medium as minimum to 14 yrs, 10mos
and 20 days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Art.63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties- In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:
1.When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggraating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periodsin case in which the penalties prescribed by law contain 3 periods,
whether it will be a single devisition penalty or composed of 3 different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of article 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they
shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of
the act, they shall impoe the penalty in its minimum periods.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission
of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum periods.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other
according to thier relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigation circumstancesand no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall imposethe penalty
next lower period tha it may deem applicable, according to the number.
Mitigating & aggravating circumstance are not considered in the
imposition of penalty when:
a. Penalty is single and indivisible
b. In felonies through negligence (the rules for the application of penalties
prescribed by art. 64 aren't applicable to a case of reckless imprudence
under art. 365.
c. Penalty imposed upon a more or no-christian inhabitants
d. Line imposed by an ordinance
Conditions necessary to excempt from liability under subsection 4 of
art.42 are four:
1.That the act causing the injury be lawfu; that is permitted not only by
law but also by regulations.
2. That it be performed with due care.
3. That the injury be caused by mere accident (unforeseen went).
4. That there be no fault or intention to cause the injury.
5. Whatever maybe the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the court shall not imposea greater penalty than that
prescribed by law in iyts maximum period.
6. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of
the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime.
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of
the fourth circumstanceof art.12 are present- When all the conditions
required in circumstance number 4 of art.12 of the code to exempt from
criminal liability are not present, the penalty of the arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
Art. 69 Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable- A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required to justify liability in the several
cases mentioned in art.II and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the
conditions of exemption present or lacking.
b. Lacanilao vs. CA, 162 SCRA 563, 1988
Facts: The CFI of Manila found the petitioner Bernardo Lacanilao of
policeman, guilty of homicide for the death of one Ceferino Crese.After
elevating it to the CA, the appellant is hereby sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of 6 yrs, 1 day of prison mayor as the minimum of
12 yrs and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with cost against
appellant.
Contention of the State: While appellant is to be commended for
responding to the call of duty when he tried to stop the victim and the
latter’s companions
from
their
drunken
and disorderly conduct,
nevertheless he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his fulfillment of
duty to the extent of admittedly shooting and thereby killing said victim.
Ruling: The present case would have fallen under no.5 of art. II if the two
conclusions therefore:
1.
That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office concurred.
2.
That the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or lawful exercise of
such right or office.
Art. 69 is applicable for the requirement that the majority of such condition
be present is IMMATERIAL since there are only 2 conditions in in no. 5 of
Art.II. Basic is the rule that penal laws in favor of the accused shows be
given liberal construction without going beyond the obvious intention of
the legislature. (Only the first is fulfillment and the other is wanting) Art. 69
is obviously in favor of the accused as it provides a penalty lower than
that prescribed by law when the crime committed is not wholly justifiable,
the intention of the legislature being to mitigate the penalty by reason of
the diminution of either or the lesser perversity of the offender.
Petition is granted. The petitioner is hereby sentenced to
interminate penalty of from 2 yrs. 4 mos. A day of prision correcional to 8
yrs. 1 day of prision mayor.
B. SPECIFIC RULES
1. Complex Crimes – Art. 48
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes- When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied In its
maximum period.
a. Kinds
1.
Compound Crime- when a single act constitutes 2/more grave or
less grave felonies (delito Compuesto)
Requisites:
a.
That only one single act is performed by the offender.
b.
That such single act produces two or more grave or less grave
felonies.
Examples:
•
Double homicide/ murder (2 deaths)
•
Multiple homicide (3 or more deaths)
•
Homicide with frustrated homicide
•
Homicide with attempted homicide
-a grave or less grave felony cannot be complexed with a light felony
(should be and not complexed).
Examples:
•
Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
•
Slight physical injuries
2.
Complex crime proper (Delito Complejo)- when the offense is
necessary in committing the other.
Requisites:
a.
That at least 2 offenses are committed.
b.
That one of the offenses is necessary means for committing the
other.
c.
That both of the offenses must be punished under the same
statute.
Examples:
•
Estafa through falsification of commercial documents
•
Malversation through falsification of public document
•
Seduction through usurpation of public functions
c.
Principles of Pro Reo in Criminal Law- Art. 48 is intended to favor
the accused. When 2 or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes
through separate and distinct acts.
d.
Rebellion
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection- How committed- The crime rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
government for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or
any part thereof , of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the chief executive or the legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their power or prerogatives (as amended by RA no. 6968, October 24,
1990).
b. Principle of Pro Reo in Criminal Law
c. Rebellion
i.
People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
Facts: Amado Hernandez, bung the founder and President of
Congress of Labor Organization (CLO) and a communist by
principle was charged with the crime of REBELLION. The
information alleged that on several speeches conducted by him,
Hernandez expressed his strong discontent with the gout and his
support for the fight of communist party of the Phil. The trial court
found him guilty as principal of the charges and sentenced him to
a penalty of Reclusion perpetua with its accessories provided by
law and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Contention of the State: He was guilty of rebellion because he was
a member f the communist party that through his speeches he
aroused the labor class to rebel against the gout and providing the
needed supply and clothes.
Contention of the accused: He was a mere communist by ideology
and was not part
of the conspiracy to overthrow Zuirino
government. He did not actually participated in the rebellion or any
act of conspiracy to commit or faster the cause of the rebellion.
He merely plays the role of propagation by lecture,
meetings and organizations of committees of education by
communists.
Ruling: Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the
crime of rebellion, as a means necessary for the perpetration of
the offense. Such offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime
of rebellion. In as much as the act specified in art. 135 constitute
one single crime, it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the
application of act. 48, which requires therefore the commission of
at least two crimes.
ii.
People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 99
Facts: Frederico Geronimo and other accused are ranking
officers/members of, or otherwise affiliated with the CPP and
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan. In the course of their rebellion,
they kidnapped, killed and wounded multiple soldiers and law
enforcers and robbed the provincial treasury. They were convicted
with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robbery and
kidnapping. Reclusion perpetua to death.
Ruling: All other crimes are absorbed in rebellion. The terms in the
first paragraph of Art. 135 to describe the component of violence
in the crime of rebellion are broad and general. The complexing of
rebellion with other felonies would result to the undesirable
results:
1. Makes the punishment of rebellion heavier than that of
treason.
2. To nullify the policy that rebel followers are imposed a lesser
penalty than that of the leaders.
iii.
Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
Facts: On February 27, 1990, senate minority floor Leader Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by director
Alfredo Lim of NBI on the strength of a warrant issued Hon. Jaime
Salazar of RTC Zuezon City. The warrant issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed a panel of prosecutor.
The spouses Rebeca and Erlinda Panlilio and Gregoeio
Honasa and Sen. Enrile charged.
Contention of the state: Enrile’s case does not fall within the
Hernandez riding because the information in Hernandez charged
murder & other common crimes committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion (delito complejo) whereas the the
information against Sen. Enrile et. al charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance of rebellion (delito compuesto, arising from a single
act constituting 2/ more grave/less grave offenses).
Contention of the accused: Going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-extent crime (sample rebellion) or
conuarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than
one offense. He is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute looks while technically correct so far as the as the court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion therof, must therefore be dismissed as
a mere flight of rhetoric.
Ruling: Enriles contention is not given merit. Based on the
doctrine in people vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against them (Enrile et. al) must be read as charging simple
rebellion only.
The Hernandez Doctrine remains binding operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion therof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
Stated that there is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty or delimit the offenses
absorbed so it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.
Congress took cognizance by enacting RA 6968.
iv.
RA 6968
-common crimes involving hillings, violence, robberies, etc… even
though committed by rebels in furtherance.
d. Related Cases
i.
Napolis vs. CA, 43 SCRA 301
Facts: Mrs. Peῇatla, after answering a call of
nature,heard the barking of dogs indicating the
presence of strangers. She wake up her husband,
Ignacio who took his flashlight and revolver to check
out on the commotion. As he approached the door of
the store I suddenly gave way having been pushed
by 4 armed men. Ignacio fired his gun but missed. He
tell to the ground after being hit in the head. The 4
men went upstairs and took money from Mrs. Peῇa
Flor and her two children. They were sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from 10 yrs and 1 day prision
mayor as min. to 17 yrs. 4 mos. And 1 day at R.T. as
max.
Contention
of
the
accused:
Error
in
the
characterization of the crime committed and sthe
proper penalty therefore.
Contention of the State: Robbery characterized by
violence and intimidation against persons is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by
force upon things because it result to a greater
disturbance of the order of society and the security
of the individual and the penalty should be R.T. in its
max.
Ruling: when the element of both provisions of Art.
294 and 299 are present, the crime is a complex one,
calling for the imposition as provided for in Art. 48,
for the most serious offense, in its max. period, which
in the case at bar, R.T. in its max. period 19 yrs 1 mo
11 days to 20 yrs.
In the case of robbery inside an uninhabited place
the thieves, in addition lays his hands upon any
person without committing any of the crimes a
inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in sub. Par. 14 of Art. 294, the imposable penalty decreed under
par. 5 thereof is much lighter deties logic and reason
and is now expressly abandoned.
It is more plausibly to believe that Art. 294
applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering
an uninhabited place, under the conditions set forth
in Art. 299.
ii.
People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17
Facts: Antonio and Jose toling (twins) were on their way home
riding the train after visiting their children in Manila. With suspicion
that co-passengers were to conduct hold –up and were talking
about them, Antonio stood-up and stabbed the man sitting directly
in front of him. Jose stabbed the woman seated opposite him.
Another woman tried to run but Jose stabbed her. The other
passenger scurried away from safety but the twins, who had run
amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered. There were
eight dead bodies inside the train and for along the rails. The
toling twins were convicted with the complex crime of multiple
murder and attempted murder sentencing them to death.
Contention of the accused: Should be guilty only with their own
separate acts and not the complex crime of multiple murder and
attempted murder as this was a result of their separate stabbing.
Contention of the state: The slaughter was a result of one act
which was the running amuck of the twins. Hence they are liable
for the complex crime murder and attempted murder.
Issue: WON the crime was a result of one distinct act making it a
complex crime.
Ruling: The SC held the contention of the accused. The 8 killings
and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different
acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex
crime under Art. 48 of the RPC which refers to cases where a
single act constitutes 2 or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the order.
The twins are liable for 8 separate murders and one
attempted murder. Each are sentenced with 8 RP for the 8
murders.
iii.
People vs. Bulaong, 106 SCRA 344
Facts: Delena Segapo (14) and her sister Nena (8) were waiting
for a ride in the public market of Gen. Santos City after asked by
their father to collect an account from Tamigo when Claudio
Bulaong alighted from his jeep and approached them. He pointed
a gun at them and were forced to board the jeep and were brought
to New Bay view Hotel. Balaong raped Delena 8 times. The next
day, Buaong took the two sisters to his parent’s bungalow in Bario
Landan, S. Cotabato. After 26 days of being detained, Nena was
able to escape through the ceiling and reported to her parents.
Bulaong was convicted with 8 complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape, sentenced with 8 R.P.
Contention of the state: The crime was a complex one of forcible
abduction with rape and the imposable penalty should be death 8
complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape aggravated by the
use of a motor vehicle and mitigated by voluntarily surrender.
Ruling: Bulaong committed the continuing complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. The RTC erred in imposing 8 R.P. As
the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon and the
crime is complex, the death penalty should be imposed. However,
for lack of necessary votes, the same is committed to R.P.
iv.
People vs. Escober, 157 SCRA 541
Facts: (Dec. 3, 1982) Escober was the guard on duty at Beng
Seng Electrical Supply Inc. owned by vicente Chua and his wife
lina. On dec 3, 1982, Vicente Chua and his 2 children Irvin and
Tiffany went to his office. Vicente went to the bathroom while the
two children watched tv.
Abuyin and his 3 companions rode a tricycle to the shop and
knocked. Escober peeped thru the hide and opned the door.
Punzalan was left waiting outside.
When Lina went to the office, she noticed the gate while
open. Thereupon, she heard a gunshot. She hurried to the
intercom to contact his husband but was not hit. But when Vicente
went out, he saw his children mortally wounded, everything in the
office was scattered and 5,000 pesos cash was lost. (robbery with
homicide-death).
Contention of the accused: should not be held liable for the
complex crime of robbery with death since he was just a lockout.
Contention of the state: When a hired security guard opens the
compound under his protection to 4 men who turned out to be
rubber and murders, then the burden of proof is shifted to him that
he is not a co-conspirator.
Ruling: As long as homicide resulted during or because of a
robbery, robbery with homicide is committed. All those who took
part as principal in the commission of the crime are also guilty as
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually took part in the homicide.
To free from such liability, the law requires some over acts
on the part
of the conspirator, to prevent commission of the
second or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy.
v.
People vs. Velasquez, 345 SCRA 728
Facts: (Jan 1, 1997) Reynaldo Velasquez abducted Karen
Campomanes (15) while the latter was about to go home.
Velasquez approached Karen, poked a gun at
her then they
boarded a taxi to the former’s lola’s house. At the house,
Velasquez raped Karen twice. Velasquez was convicted with two
counts of rape and was sentenced to suffer R.P. in each count.
Contention of the state: Velasquez should be convicted of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and forcible
abduction with simple rape.
Contention of the accused: Rape only
Ruling: Velasquez should be convicted of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape and the crime of simple rape. The
penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the more serious
crime which shall be imposed in its max. period. Rape is the more
serious crime punishable by R.P. and since R. P. in an indivisible
penalty, it shall be imposed as it is. The subsequent rape
committed by Velasquez can no longer be considered as a
separate act of rape punishable by R.P. because there is no
longer a forcible abduction during the 2nd rape. 2 counts of R.P.
vi.
People vs. Delos Santos, 355 SCRA 415
Facts: (Oct. 5, 1995) PNP members were having their endurance
run of 35 km’s coming from their camp. On the other hand, Glenn
Delos Santos was driving from his Isuzu elf truck. Glenn moved
his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers
in spite of the continuous warming signals made by six of the
joggers. Glenn failed and refused to heed, instead, he proceeded
on high speed directly towards the joggers, hitting, bumping or
ramming the joggers resulting to 13 deaths, 11 were seriously
wounded and 10 sustained minor injuries. Glenn escaped leaving
behind the helpless victims. He was charged with multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder. He was
convicted with the complex crime of m.m., m.F.m and m.a.m with
the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.
Contention of the accused: He don’t have any intention to kill the
PNP members.
Contention of the State: Glenn’s evil motive was brought by the
fact that he drunk 3 bottles of beer earlier before the incident. He
intentionally rammed the joggers because he continued to
accelerate despite the first bumping thuds.
Ruling: The product was a product of negligence.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious
intent but rather the result
of a single act of reckless driving,
Glenn should be guilty of the complex crime of R.I. resulting to
M.H. with S.P.I. and L.S.P.I.
Since Art. 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through
negligence in view of the definition of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of the felonies
in Art. 3 as : acts of commissions punishable by law” committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
Glenn did not over the filing of multiple suits so the court may
convict the accused for as many offense as are charged and
proved.
vii.
People vs. Gonzales, 359 SCRA 362
Facts: When Gonzales family had an altercation with Noel Andres,
Innocencio Gonzales fired his gun, not aiming at anybody, hit the
mirror of the FX of Feliber Andres, which resulted to her death and
injured Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez with the metallic
fragments of the bullet.
Contention of the state: The act of shooting resulted to the death
of Feliber Andres and the serious and less serious physical
injuries of the other passengers.
Contention of the accused:
Ruling: SC ruled in favor of the accused.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under
Art. 48 are not applicable. The accused committed I gave offense
and 2 light felonies which is not covered by Art. 48. The accused is
guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber and 2 counts of slight
physical injuries.
Art. 48 not applicable because complex crimes requires 2 or more
grave or less grave felonies.
viii.
Ponteverda vs. People, 387 SCRA 196
Facts: Aurea R. Monteverde, brgy. Chairman, revd a donation of
44,800 from PAGCOR for brgy. Projects and programs sometime
in Jan. 1991. Sometime in Aug. 1991, Antonio Ataza, Salvaterra,
Lopez and cruz charged Monteverde with malversation of brgy of
brgy. Gen. Funds. Araza found out that the donation from
PAGCOR was not really liquidated in favor of the brgy; and that
Aurea falsified an o.r. with her appearing as buyer of the materials
she bought from Sandford Hardware. He discovered that there
was no delivery of hardware materials to the brgy as Aurea
claimed. Aurea was charged with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents but was convicted with falsification of
commercial documents.
Contention of the accused: Should be acquitted also of the
falsification since she was acquitted of the estafa. The crime being
a complex one estafa through falsification.
Contention of the state: The acquittal of the other component
crimes will not lead to the acquittal of the other crimes.
Ruling:
No
complex
crime.
The
falsification
of
the
public/commercial document was not necessary to commit estafa.
It happened only after the money was spent and to explain how it
was expended. If at all, it was intended to conceal the estafa.
Assuming that the information of a complex crime was correct, still
acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an
acquittal from the other. When a complex crime is charged, all the
elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime must
be proved. However, failure to prove one of the component crimes
will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other
crimes. Aurea can still be convicted of the other crime
(Falsification) because it was proven.
ix.
People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366
Facts: Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey
Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the
terrace of Robert’s father’s house, Jaime Agbanlog who was
seated
on the banister of the terrace. Robert and the others
noticed Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
walking then stopped in front of the house. Robert died and his
companions suffered shrapnel injuries. They were convicted with
the complex crime ofmurder with multiple attempted and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Issue: WON there is a complex crime.
Ruling: The single act of Comadre of detonating a hand grenade
may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and
distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal
impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
When a single act constitute two or more grave or less grave
felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its max. period irrespective of modifying
circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery as in this case. The penalty for the most serious crime in
this case is death.
e. Single Larceny Doctrine
It is a doctrine in theft or robbery cases where the taking of a property or
properties belonging to the same or different persons by a series of acts
arising from a single criminal intent or resolution constitute only one
crime.
i.
Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 219
The single larceny doctrine can be applied in other offense like
estafa, Violations of VP 22 or in Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-graft
and craft Practices Act). The SC consolidated the 32 separate
information charged against Santiago into one information.
Exception: Use of submachine gun: not a complex crime (Pp vs.
Mario Tabaco 270 S 32)
-it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
produce the several felonies, but the rumble of bullets which
actually produced them.
-there are as many crimes as are persons killed or injured.
Continuing Crime
-one where any of the elements of the offense is
committed in different localities skuch that the accused maybe
charged in any place where an essential element of the crime was
committed.
-not a complex crime because the offender does not
perform a single act but a series of acts and not offense is not a
necessary means of committing the other.
ii.
People vs. Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32
Facts: Miriam Defensor Santiago being the commissioner of the
Immigration and Deportation was charged by the SB by which
Justice Garchitorena was the presiding justice of violation of the
Anti-graft and corrupt Practices Act, For favoring unqualified aliens
with the benefit of the Alien legalization program causing undue
injury to the gov’t.
At first, only one amended information containing 32 cases
was filed against Santiago. However, upon motion filed and
admitted, such was replaced with 32 amended information.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of Santiago. The 32 violations is
known as delito continuation or continued crimes.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist
there should be a pelurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provisions violated and unity of criminal intent
which means that 2 or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and some instant or resolution leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose. The 32
information states that the offenses were committed on the same
period of time. The strong probability ever exists that the approval
of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens
was done by a single stroke of pen, as when the approval was
embodied in the same document. Thus, there is only one crime
committed.
iii.
People vs. Sanchez, 1999
Facts: M14 rifle. Mayor Jorge Areda of Bugney, Cagayan arrived
at Octagon Cockpit Arena for a sponsored cock derby. He was
assisted by peace officers and the cockpit was assigned with
guards
to maintain peace and order. At around 10pm, Mario
Tabaco seated at the lower portion of the arena, without warning
and provocation shot the mayor followed the successive burst of
gunfire resulting to the death of the mayor and the two other
seated with him.
Mario rushed of the cockpit arena meeting Sgt. Raquepo
and Pat. Retreta and the former pointed the gun to Raquepo
prompting Retreta to grapple fo the possession of the gun. In the
process, the gun went of hitting Raquepoon his leg and Jorge
Siriban who died on the spot.
Contention of the state: There should be 4 penalties of R.P. as
there were 4 victims killed.
Contention of the accused: It is a complex, crime, hence, there
should be only one penalty. Only one criminal impulse by pressing
the trigger once.
Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the state.
The court declared that it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the no. of
bullets which actually produced them. Hence, where the accused
pressed the trigger of a submachine gun and the gun fired
continually and several persons were killed or injured, there are as
many crimes as persons killed or injured.
f.
Reckless Imprudence
i.
Reodica vs. CA, 242 SCRA 87
Facts: Isabela Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad
avenue and allegedly because of her negligence, hit the car of
Norberto Bonsol. As a result Bonsol suffered slight physical
injuries while the damage to his car amounted to 8,542 pesos. The
trial court convicted her with the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries with damage of
property and was sentenced to suffer 6 mos. of arresto mayor.
Contention of the accused: The crime should not be complexed
since the resulting felonies are light. Hence, the penalty should not
be the imposable penalty in its max. because there were no
modifying circumstances.
Contention of the state: The crime is a complex one calling for the
imposition of the penalty in its max.
Ruling: Applying Art. 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there
is no complex crime. The resulting offense maybe treated as
separate of the light felony maybe absorbed by the grave felony.
Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical
injuries, both resulting from reckless imprudence, do not constitute
a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information.
The penalty of arresto menor in its max/ should be
imposed.
Two-tiered Penalties
-occurs when the law provides that a penalty to a particular
crime is in addition to the penalty imposable for another crime
which results from the commission of such particular crime.
Examples:
1.
Maltreatment of Prisoners (Art. 235)
-the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision
mayorin its min. period, in addition to his liability for the physical
injuries shall be imposed upon any public officer or e.e. who shall
overdo himself in the correction of handling of a prisoner or
detention officer under his charge.
2. Direct Bribery (Art. 210)
-Any public officer, who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime in correction with the performance of his
official duty in consideration of any offer promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of
another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its min. and
medium periods and a fine not less than 3 times the value of the
gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed
upon, if the same shall have been committed.
3. Occupation of property or usurpation of real rights in property
(Art.312)
-Any
person
who,
by
means
of
violence
against
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property
or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in
addition to the penalty incurred for the acts violence executed by
him, shall be punished by a fine from 50 to 100 per centum of the
gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
*Crimes committed by public servants.
No Complex crime in the ff:
1.
In continuing crimes
2.
One offense is committed to conceal the other
3.
The other crime is indispensable part of an element of
other offenses
4.
One of the offenses is penalized by a special law
5.
Cases of special complex crimes
6.
Where the law provides for a two-tiered penalty
2.
Special Complex Crimes/ Composite crimes
-crimes which in the eyes of the law are treated as single
individual offenses although in reality are made up of more than
one crime. They are also called single indivisible offenses.
Example:
-Robbery with homicide, rape, kidnapping with serious
physical injuries
-Not a complex crime but one crime made up to several
violations and is deemed a product of one criminal intent.
ii.
In re: Ivler Case
Facts
Following a vehicular collision in august 2004, petitioner
Jason ivler was charged before the metropolitan trial court of
pasig city MTC, with 2 separate offenses:
1.
Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
2.
Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property for the death of respondents husband Nestor c. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail
for temporary release in both cases.
On September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the
first delict and was meted out the penalty of public invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved quash the information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense.
Theyrefused quash finding no identity of offences in 2
cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC of Pasig City,
in a petitioner for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the
suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the
arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Ruling
The accused’s negative right not to be “twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that
the two cases concern the same offenses of reckless imprudence.
The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is an entirely separate offense
from reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property as the later requires proof of an additional fact which the
others does not.
The two charged against petitioner arising from the same
facts were prosecuted under the same provision of RPC, as
amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasioffenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi offenses, whether
reckless or simple are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws is nothing.
2. Special Complex Crimes
a. People vs. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302
Facts: Locsin Fabon in the house of his victim, Bonifacia Lasquite, Took
and carried away, a sum of P25K by reason of robbery. He also attacked,
raped, and killed Bonifacia (64 yrs. Old). The trail court convicted Fabon
of the crime of robbery with homicide and rape aggravated by dwelling
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.
Issue: WON the crime is correct as robbery with homicide and rape.
Held: In the case of Pp vs. Lascuna, It was held that when rape co-exist
with homicide in the commission of robbery, rape should be considered as
an aggravated circumstance.
When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is
accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such
additional offense is treated as an aggra. Circumstance which would
result in the imposition of the max. penalty of death.
The penalty for robbery with homicide is RP to death which is
composed of 2 indivisible penalties. The imposable penalty is death due
to the presence of the aggra. Circumstance of dwelling and absence of
any mit. circumstance.
In special crimes, only one crime is committed.
b. People vs. Empante, 306 SCRA 251
Facts: Pedro raped his own daughter, Elvie who was then under 18 yrs
old. The first sexual abused happened on Nov 24, 1992 when she was
only 12 yrs old. The second abuse was on December 24, 1996, when the
family moved to another place. The third was on Jan 1997. In all those
abuses Pedro always threatened to kill Elvie if she would reveal the same
to anyone.
Contention of the state: There are 3 counts of rapehave should be
sentenced to 3 counts of death.
Contention of the accused: There should only be one death penalty since
it was committed against one person. Intoxication should mitigate.
Ruling: Qualified rape is punishable by death which must be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggra. circumstances which may have
attended the commission of the crime.
In crimes against persons, each act constitutes a distinct act of
execurion and thus is distinct offense.
1.
Crime different from that intended- Art. 49
-cases of error in personae only
Rules:
1.
If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than
that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit
-the penalty corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit shall be imposed in its max.
2.
If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than
that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty prescribed for the felony shall be imposed in its max period.
3.
The rule established by the next preceding par. Shall not be
applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute
an attempted of frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher
penalty for either the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided
for the attempted of the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its max
period.
*Do not apply the Aberratio Letus because in this case, there is a complex
crime
*Does not apply to praeter intentionem because in this case, the crime
befalls the same person.
3. Crime Different from that intended – Art. 49
Rules:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than that
corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit
-the penalty corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit shall be imposed in its max.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
prescribed for the felony shall be imposed in its max period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding par. Shall not be applicable if
the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempted of
frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either
the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted of
the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its max period.
4. Degree of Participation and Stage of Commission – Arts. 50-57, 60-61
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime— The
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony.
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.
Art.
52.
Penalty
to
be
imposed
upon
accomplices
in
consummatedcrime.chanrobles virtual law library— The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed
upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a
consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime— The
penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony
shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated
felony.
Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime— The
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated
felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a
frustrated felony.
Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an
attemptedcrime.chanrobles virtual law library— The penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be
imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an
attemptedcrime.chanrobles virtual law library— The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be
imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.
Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The
provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be
applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty
provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon
accomplices or accessories.
Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of
this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of
this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two
indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum
periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper
divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said
respective graduated scale.
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods,
corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum
prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the
penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately
following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not
especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by
analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals
of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon
accomplices and accessories
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Principal – Frustrated (Art. 50)
Principal – Attempted (Art. 51)
Accomplices – Consummated (Art. 52)
Accessory – Consummated (Art. 53)
Accomplices – Frustrated (Art. 54)
Accessory – Frustrated ( Art. 55)
Accomplice – Attempted (Art. 56)
Accessory – Attempted (Art. 57)
Exemptions (Art. 60, 346)
Art. 364. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons
entrusted with the custody of the offended party.
The ascendants, guardians, teachers, and any person who, by
abuse the authority or confidential relationships, shall cooperate as
accomplices in the perpetration of the crimes embraced in chapters 2nd,
3rd and 4th of this title, shall be punished as principals.
Teachers or other persons in any other capacity entrusted with the
education and guidance of youth, shall also suffer the penalty of
temporary special disqualification in its max period to PSD.
Any person falling within the terms of this article, and any other
person guilty of corruption of minors for the benefit of another shall be
punished by special disqualification from filling the office of guardian.
Chapter 2-Rape and acts of Lasciviousness
Chapter 3-Seduction, corruption of minors, and white slave trade
Chapter 4-Abduction
5. Additional Penalty for Certain Accessories – Art. 58
-Those accessories falling within the terms of par. 3 of art. 19 who should act
with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of
absolute perpetual disqualification. If the principal offender shall have been
guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he
shall be guilty of a less grave felony-punishable with correccional penalties.
6. Impossible Crime – Art. 4, 59
-Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
Art. 59 Penalty for Impossible Crime
-the court having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality
shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of ARRESTO
MAYOR of a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
7. Degrees – Art. 61. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of
three periods
-In cases in which the penalty prescribed by the law is not composed of
three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contain in foregoing articles,
dividing into 3 equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the 3 portions.
8. Periods – Art. 64
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. —
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty
the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they
shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the
act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to
their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to
the number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that
prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
9. Where Penalty is not composed of 3 periods
10. Effect of mitigating, aggravating and qualifying circumstances – Arts. 62, 63,
65, 66 and 67
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of
diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a
crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for
the purpose of increasing the penalty.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance
inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany
the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral
attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party,
or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate
the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such
circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in
the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to
be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case
exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual
delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the
result of such compensation.
Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. —
In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods,
the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions.
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the
fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required
in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal
liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he
shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
11. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances – Arts. 67, 69
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable. – A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack
of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Articles 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
12. Minority – Art. 68
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 yrs old
-When the offender is 18 yrs old and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the par. Next to the last art.80 (repealed by PD603) of this code,
the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under 15 but over 9 yrs of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by
two degrees at least than that prescribed by for the crime which he
committed.
2. Upon a person over 15 and under 18 yrs of age the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
a. PD 603
*youthful offender- over 9 but under 18 at the time of commission of the
offense a youth offender held for examination or trial who cannot furnish
tail will be committed to the DSWD/ local rehabilitation center or detention
home.
Judgment of the court shall not be pronounced but suspended
except for the following cases:
1.
Those who previously enjoyed a suspension of sentence.
2.
Those convicted of death or L.I.
3.
Those convicted of an offense by the military tribunals
b. RA 9344
Below 1h5 yrs – exempt
15-18 yrs - exempt unless acted with discernment (one degree lower,
sentence suspended)
18-70yrs – full criminal responsibility
Discernment- the mental capacity of a minor between 15-18 yrs, to fully
appreciate
the consequences of his lawful act.
-shown by: the manner the crime was committed the
conduct of the
offender other its commission
Intervention Program- series of activities designed to address issues that
caused the
child to commit the offense.
Additional rights of a child- automatic suspension of sentence
-right not to be imposed the penalty of death, RP, or LI.
c. Declarador vs. Hon. Gubaton , 2006
Facts: Frank Bansales 17 yrs of age, stabbed Yvonne Declarador
resulting to the latter’s death. Bansales was convicted with the crime of
murderpunishable with RP to death. However, the TC sentenced him with
12 yrs 1 day to 17 yrs and 4 mos. in view of Bansales minority. The TC
suspended the sentence of Bansales and ordered his commitment to the
rehabilitation center pursuant and his commitment to the rehabilitation
center pursuant to PD 603. Rennie Declarador assaileds the suspension
of Bansale’s sentence and his commitment to the rehab center.
Contention of the state: Bansales is not entitle to the suspension of
sentence because he was convicted with murder punishable by RP death
which is a disqualification under Art. 192 of PD 603. The entitlement of a
juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence
actually imposed but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as
provided for by law He was already above 18 yrs at the time of the
pronouncement of his gult.
Contention of the accused: He is entitled to the automatic suspension of
sentence since he was not sentenced with RP to death but with 12 yrs 1
day to 17 yrs and 4 mos imprisonment only.
Issue: WON Bansales is disqualified to the suspension of his sentence on
the ground that:
a.
The crime committed is murder punishable with RP to death.
b.
He is over 18 yrs at the time of the pronouncement of sentence
Ruling: The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile
in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or
to one who is convicted to an offense punishable by death, RP or LI, or
when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already 18
yrs or over.
“Punishable is defined at Deserving of; capable; liable to
punishment; maybe punished”. Thus the term refers to the possible, not
the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and
not which is imposed. The disqualification is based on the penalty
imposed by the court. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible
one which determines the disqualification.
On the 2nd issue, the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by
the Jovenile even if he is already 18 yrs of age at the time of the
pronouncement of his guilt.
13. Service of Sentence
Even perpetual penalties are into account- indivisible penalties are given 30
years applied to the penalty actually Imposed not on the prescribed penalty
applied only if convict is to suffer 4 or more sentences successively.
a. The Three-Fold Rule – RPC, Art. 70
-If the convict were to suffer several penalties, the max duration of his
sentence shall not be more than three times the length at time
corresponding to the most severe penalty shall not exceed 40 yrs.
Art. 70 Successive Service of Sentence
-When the culprit has to serve 2 or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will no permit, otherwise, the
following rules shall be obsereved:
a. PAD
b. PSD
c. TAD
d. TSD
e. Suspension
f. destierro
g. public censure
h. fine and bond to keep the peace
i. civil interdiction
j. confiscation and payment of costs
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity
shall be followed so that they maybe executed successively or as nearly
as may be possible first imposed, or should they have been served out,
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next proceeding
par. The respect severity at the penalties shall be determined in
accordance with the following scale:
1.
Death
2.
RP
3.
RT
4.
Prision mayor
5.
Prision correccional
6.
Arresto mayor
7.
Arresto menor
8.
Destierro
9.
PAD
10.
TAD
11.
Suspension from public office, suffrage, prision
12.
Public censure
Not with standing the provisions of the next preceding, the max duration
of the convicts sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the
sum total of those imposed equals the same max period.
Such max period shall in no case exceed 40 yrs.
b. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 339
Facts: Arturo Mejorrada is right of way agent in the office of the highway
Distinct Engr. His main duty was to negotiate with property owners
affecting by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of
compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners. After
negotiating with 8 people whose properties were affected by the widening
of Pasig, Sta. Cruz, Calamba raod, Mejorada accompanied the 8
claimants for the payment of their claims. After receiving their money, they
were divested of their money by the group of Mejorada. 8 info were filed
against Mejorada for violation of the anti graft and corruption practices
act. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of a total of 56 yrs and 8
days (7 yrs and 1 day each).
Contention of the accused: The penalty of 56 yrs and 8 days of
imprisonment is contrary to the total rule pursuant to art. 70. The duration
of the total of the penalties should not exceed 40 yrs.
Contention of the state: The 3-fold rule does not concern the imposition of
penalties but to the successive service of sentence only.
Ruling: Imposition is different from service
Petetioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as
set forth in the art.70 of the RPC. This art. Is to be taken into account not
in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed. Art.70 speaks of service of sentence, duration of
penalty and penalty to be inflicted. Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the imposition of penalty. It merely provides that the
prisoner cannot be made to serve more than 3 times the most severe of
these penalties the max of which is 40 yrs.
The court can impose as many penalties as there are separate
and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime
committed a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single
crime is an outrage against the state for which the courts has the power
to impose penal sanctions.
c. Rigor vs. Superintendent, 411 SCRA 646
Facts: After serving 1 year and 5 mos of imprisonment, Rigor filed a
petition for hebeas corpus seeking that the penalty imposed on him be
reduced to 6 mos 1 day of correccional in each case and that he be set
free. He was convicted to illegal sale and possession of shabu. He was
sentenced to suffer 6 mos 1 day to 4 yrs and 4 mos. In the first crime
(sale) and 6 mos 1 day to 4 yrs in the second (possession)
Contention of the state: He must serve the two penalties successively
before he can be released. The two penalties cannot be served
simultaneously.
Ruling: Under art. 70 of the RPC when an offender has to serve two or
more penalties, he should serve them simultaneously it the nature of the
penalties will so permit. Otherwise said penalties shall be executed
successively, following the offender of their respective severity in such
case, the 2nd sentence will not commence to run until the expiration of
the first.
The nature of the two sentences does not allow its simultaneously
service, hence he must serve it successively. Not only that he must serve
it successively, he must also serve it up to its max term.
He must serve the penalty in the sale of shabu up to its max,
before service of the penalty in the possessions of shabu also up to its
max.
14. Graduated Scale – Arts. 71-76
- In cases which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or
more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in art. 61 shall
be observe in graduating such penalty.
- The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty.
- The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
Scale no. 1
1. Death
2. RP
3. RT
4. Prision Mayor
5. Prision Correccional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto Menor
9. Public Censure
10. Fine
Scale no.2
1. PAD
2. TAD
3. Suspension from public office, suffrage, profession or calling
4. Public censure
5. Fine
Art. 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities
-The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of 2 or more offenses shall be
satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the final
judgments rendered against him, beginning with the first in order of time.
V.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF LAW: ACT NO. 4103
A. ACT NO. 4103
The proper penalty is any range within prision correccional as minimum, to any
range within prision mayor maximum as maximum. For the purpose of
determining the penalty next lower in degree, the penalty that should be
considered as a starting point is the whole of prision mayor, it being the penalty
prescribed by law, and not prision mayor in its maximum period, which is only the
penalty actually applied because of Art. 48 of the RPC. The penalty next lower in
degree therefor is prision correccional and it is within the range of this penalty
that the minimum should be taken.
B. ART 64 & 77, RPC
•
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
— In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76
and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following
rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating
circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall
impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act,
they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their
relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances,
the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its
maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
•
Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three
distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the
minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially
provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy
the prescribed rules.
C. CASES
1. US vs. Formigones, 87 Phil 185
Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in
Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From there they
transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same
municipality to find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia
was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous
quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house &
stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung &
causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his
dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living room & then lay down beside
her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the
shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones.
The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his
statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw
her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were
maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become
indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded
guilty. At the case in the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His
counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange & that
he behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk
around stark naked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothes etc… The
appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE &
therefore exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12.
Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the
crime, thus exempted from criminal liability
Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he
was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguish between
right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that a person could be regarded
as an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from
criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment &
freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. (Note that definition is
same as insanity)
As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming
it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy
& take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were
justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his
wife, & at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written
statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense of catching
him & securing his conviction.
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having
killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.
Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower
court’s judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be
credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone
(because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)
2. People vs. Onate, 78 SCRA 43
Facts: Alfonso Onate stabbed Jose Ventosa after the latter did not pay the
“tuba” which they drunk. Onate was convicted with homicide and was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 12 years 1 day of reclusion temporal
as minimum to 18 years, 2 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Ruling: Penalty should be an indeterminate sentence of 10 years, 1 day of
prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months, and 2 days of reclusion temporal.
Considering the intent of the ISL which to uplift and redeem valuable human
material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness. The law grants the courts discretion to fix
the minimum of the penalty to be imposed, with the limitation that it must be
within the range of the penalty of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed by law for the offense committed.
3. People vs. Clareon, Nov. 29, 1982
Offender is not disqualified to avail of the
benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole.
4. People vs. Lope Viente, 225 SCRA 361
Facts: Lope Viente and two others carnapped the passenger jitney being
driven by Narciso Cabatas. The trial court found Vicente guilty for the crime of
carnapping and finding iolence and intimidation against persons. Lope Viente
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 30 years.
Ruling: The carnapping was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. The penalty prescribed therefor under Sec. 14 of RA
6539 is “imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years”. Under Sec. 1 of the ISL, if an offense is punished by a special
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said law and
the minimum shall not be less than minimum term prescribed by the same.
5. Bacar vs. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 197
Facts: Judge De Guzman convicted Gerardo Marcial for homicide for the
killing of Maximo Bacar and sentenced him to suffer 8 years 1 day of prision
mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Another for
slight physical injuries against Edgar Mabuyo sentencing him to 30 days of
arresto menor. Gerardo Marcial filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
the court erred in not considering that two mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation and no intention to commit so grave a wrong. After
reassessing the case, the judge considered the 2 mitigating circumstances
and decreased the penalty to 6 years of prision mayor in the homicide case.
Ruling: De Guzman is lizble for imposing as straight penalty of 6 years.
Homicide in which 2 mitigating circumstances and decreased the penalty is
the next lower in degree from reclusion temporal which is prision mayor. This
penalty should be imposed in its medium period considering that no other
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime because the 2
mitigating circumstance were already used in lowering the penalty by one
degree. Applying the ISL, the minimum of hte penalty shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional.
6. Dela Cruz vs. CA, 265 SCRA 299
Facts: Erlinda dela Cruz, represented herself as custom’s broker considering
that she has influence and connections in the Bureau of Customs having
been connected there as a representative of a broker convinced Victor
Bellosillo to pay the total sum of P715,000 for the demurrge and storage fees
of the five container vans of used engines and a Mercedez car. Erlinda,
however, failed to deliver what she committed despite Victor’s demand.
Erlinda was found guilty of estafa.
Ruling: Where the amount of the fraud is P715,000, the maximum period of 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor would be increased
by 69 years but the maximum penalty should not exceed 20 years of
reclusion temporal.
Inasmuch as the amount of P715,000 is P693,000 more than the
abovementioned benchmark of P22,000, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor would be increased to 69 years. But the law
categorically declares that the maximum penalty should not be more than 20
years.
7. Ladino vs. Garcia, 265 SCRA 299
Facts: Felix Ladino and Restituto Amistad were charged with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide presided by Judge Garcia. Both
pleaded not guilty when arraigned. At the hearing, both accused offered to
plead guilty to the lesser offense of simple homicide.
Ruling: As a matter of law, the penalty for homicide under Art. 249 is reclusion
temporal in its entire extent and in the absence of modifying circumstances,
the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.
8. People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715
Facts: Saley had been found guilty of 11 coutnrs of estafa and 6 counts of
illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale prescribed by the labor code.
Ruling: Under the ISL, whenever an offense is punishable by special law, the
court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, “the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the max. Fixed by the special law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same”.
9. People vs. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637
Facts: Acting on a report that there were missing carabaos, pigs, and goats,
Villamor Laderas, Ernesto Nagal, SPO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon
Navara went to investigate the house of Feliciano Narvasa. They were met by
a valley of gunfire. SPO3 Camba was hit and died at the scene. The court
convicted Narvasa with reclusion perpetua.
Ruling: The crime of homicide punishable with reclusion temporal since the
use of unlicensed firearm is only an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Illegal possession of firearms cannot be separated from the homicide
committed because illegal possession are mere ingredients of the crime.
10. People vs. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270, 287
Facts: Corazon Pamintuan heard her 4 yr old daughter, Crysthel, cry and
she rushed to the bedroom where she saw Primo Campuhan kneeling before
Crysthel whose jogging pants were already removed while his short pants
were already down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his
penis into Crysthel’s vagina. According to the physical exam, there was no
evident sign of extra-genital physical injury. Her hymen was intact and her
orifice was only .05 in diameter. Ruling: Mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act
of touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis
into the labias and not the mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for the accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.
Prosecution was not able to prove that any inter-genital contact was
achieved. All the elements for attempted rape are present; hence, the
accused should be punished only for it.
VI.
EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
A. EXECUTION OF PENALTIES
1. General Rules – Art. 70, 78, 86-88, 47
•
Art. 70. Successive service of sentence— When the culprit has to serve
two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall
be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may
be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph
the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance
with the following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arrestomenor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualifications
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right
to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure. Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding,
the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be
inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum
period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties
(penaperpetua) shall be computed at thirty years.
a. Execution of Principal Penalties – Art. 81
•
Article 78-When and how a penalty is to be executed — No
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by
law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby:
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed
for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be
suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected
therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other
persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in
different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the
correction and reform of the convicts.
•
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty
shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by
law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed
for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be
suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected
therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other
persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in
different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the
correction and reform of the convicts.
•
Article 86.Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor,
prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion
perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and
arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal
establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may
be provided by law in the future.
•
Article 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall
not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence,
nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250
and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.
•
Article 88. Arrestomenor. — The penalty of arrestomenor shall be
served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under
the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its
decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other
reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.
•
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. —
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
1. When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all
the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety
of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or
for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death
sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which
shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or
members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the
consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and
signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.
•
Article 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed —
The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and
shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority
of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the
sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the
moment of the electrocution.
b. Arts. 82-85, RPC
•
Article 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and
assistance to the culprit — The court shall designate a working day for the
execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be
communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the
execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight
hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval
between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as
possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be
attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he
professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and
confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the
management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of
the care of his descendants.
•
Article 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence —
The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three
years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death
sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
ary
•
Article 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness
thesame — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in
a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the
priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not
exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary
personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the
Director of Prisons may authorize.
•
Article 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed
and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit
shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the
execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research
first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided
that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains.
Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the
culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat
to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In
no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be
held with pomp.
2. Rules and Regulations to implement RA 8177
AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD
OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
Section 1 - Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 24
of Republic Act No. 7659 is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death
sentence shall be executed with preference to any other penalty and shall
consist in putting the person under the sentence to death by lethal injection.
The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the
sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
"The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the
lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous
death of the convict.
"Pursuant to this, all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task.
"The authorized physician of the Bureau of Corrections, after thorough
examination, shall officially make a pronouncement of the convict's death and
shall certify thereto in the records of the Bureau of Corrections.
The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later
than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and executor
without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency
powers at all times."
Section 2 - Persons already sentenced by judgment, which has become final
and executory, who are waiting to undergo the death penalty by electrocution
or gas poisoning shall be under the coverage of the provisions of this Act
upon its effectivity. Their sentences shall be automatically modified for this
purpose.
Section 3 - Implementing Rules — The Secretary of Justice in coordination
with the Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections shall, within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the rules to implement its
provisions.
Section 4 - Repealing Clause — All laws, presidential decrees and issuances,
executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.chan robles
virtual law library
Section 5 - Effectivity — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation, whichever comes earlier. Publication shall not be later
than ten (10) days after the approval thereof.
3. In the matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran, 363 SCRA
275
Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts of violation of BP22 and was
sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year for each count. He was detained on
Feb. 24, 1999. On March 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus
claiming he completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he
claimed that he shall serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no
more legal basis for his detention.
Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all
the terms simultaneously. The rule of successive service must be applied.
B. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE BASED ON INSANITY OR MINORITY
1. Insane Persons – Art. 79
• Article 79 - Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in
case of insanity. — When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after
final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the
second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being observed in
the corresponding cases.
If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be
executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity
or imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence.
2. Minors
a. Supreme Court A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, Sections 31-35
•
Supreme court am no. 02-1-18-SC, sections 31-35
•
Section 31.Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be
organized a Diversion Committee composed of its Branch Clerk of Court
as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office
assigned to the court, and the social worker assigned by the court to the
child, as members.
•
Section 32.Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion
Committee shall determine if the child can be diverted and referred to
alternative measures or services. Subject to pertinent provisions of this
Rule and pending determination of diversion by the Committee, the court
shall release the child on recognizance to the parents, guardian or
custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable, commit the child
to an appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center
which shall be responsible for the presence of the child during the
diversion proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or
when the child or the private complainant object to the diversion, or when
there is failure if the diversion program if undertaken by the child, it shall
submit a report to the court recommending that the case be subjected to
formal criminal proceedings. The court in turn shall direct the transmittal
of the records of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for the
assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the case as follows:
CICL Crim. Case No.___-___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall
thereafter return the case to the court for arraignment and formal
proceedings.
•
Section 33.Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon
receipt by the Committee of a case for diversion from the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to
the child, the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in
their absence, the nearest relative, the child's counsel, and the private
complainant and counsel to determine if the child can be diverted to the
community continuum instead of formal court proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the
Committee shall consider the following factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself
and the community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will
increase the possibility of delinquent behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of
the child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a
diversion program in accordance with Section 34 of this Rule for the
consideration and approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall
make the corresponding report and recommendation in accordance with
Section 31 of this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the
private complainant objects.
•
Section 34.Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a
diversion program talking into consideration the individual characteristics
and peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the law. The
program shall be for a specific and definite period and may include any or
a combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii)
problem-solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that
can lead to a repetition of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure
satisfaction of the civil liability of the child in accordance with Sec. 2180 of
the Civil Code. Inability to satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be
a ground to discontinue the diversion program of a child. On the other
hand, consent to diversion by the child or payment of civil indemnity shall
not in any way be construed as admission of guilt and used as evidence
against the child in the event that the case is later on returned to the court
for arraignment and conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the
termination of the hearing.
b. Presidential Decree No. 603, Arts. 189 – 204
•
Article 189.Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one
who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of his or
her father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of
the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a
child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which
case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed
modified by the provisions of this Chapter.
•
Article 190.Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty
of the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the youthful offender,
immediately after his apprehension, to the proper medical or health officer
for a thorough physical and mental examination. Whenever treatment for
any physical or mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately
undertaken to provide the same.
The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the record of the
case of the youthful offender.
•
Article 191.Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial.
- A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or
pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest
be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local
rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which
shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required:
Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency within a
reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and
municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from
other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of
the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized
by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody
of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his
appearance whenever required.
•
Article 192.Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful
Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the
court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts
charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of
pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by
the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible
person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a
shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the
reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a
representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed
agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such
conditions as it may prescribe.
•
Article 193.Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is
suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as
appeals in criminal cases.
•
Article 194.Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The
expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful offender whose
sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his parents or those
persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his parents or those
persons liable to support him can not pay all or part of said expenses, the
municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay one-third of
said expenses or part thereof; the province to which the municipality
belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by
the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said
expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of
the internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be
withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the immediate
establishment of local detention homes for youthful offenders.
•
Article 195.Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of
Social Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or individual
under whose care the youthful offender has been committed shall submit
to the court every four months or oftener as may be required in special
cases, a written report on the conduct of said youthful offender as well as
the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by
him.
•
Article 196.Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction
of the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has been
suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a
useful member of the community, even before reaching the age of
majority, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it
shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge.
•
Article 197.Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the
youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has wilfully failed to
comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should his
continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable, he shall be
returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in
commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in
accordance with the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment
of conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited
in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention effected under the provisions of this Chapter.
•
Article 198.Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall
not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such release shall be without
prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil
damages.
•
Article 199.Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. -
When a judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance with the
provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said pronouncement the
youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be committed to the
proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his sentence:
Provided, That penal institutions shall provide youthful offenders with
separate quarters and, as far as practicable, group them according to
appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their speedy
rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain
agricultural and forestry camps where youthful offenders may serve their
sentence in lieu of confinement in regular penitentiaries.
•
Article 200.Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender
has been charged before any city or provincial fiscal or before any
municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all the
records of the case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or
dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently
releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be
destroyed immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless
civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in which case
such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law,
to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may
be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police
department, or any other government agency which may have been
involved in the case.
•
Article 201.Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability
for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the
offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother,
or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may
also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender.
•
Article 202.Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social
Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for youthful
offenders. The local government and other non-governmental entities
shall collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and
maintenance of these facilities.
•
Article 203.Detention Homes. - The Department of Local
Government and Community Development shall establish detention
homes in cities and provinces distinct and separate from jails pending the
disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.
•
Article 204.Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the
Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. - A person
whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who knowingly or
wilfully,
1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child of a
delinquency, or
2. Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or
becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
five hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two
years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
c. Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, Sec. 32
•
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, Section 32
Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.– The
sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile
in conflict with the law.
The court shall set the case for disposition
conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence
which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the
juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue
any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to
the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:
1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;
2. Community service orders;
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other
centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of
the DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall
monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the
disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a
status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a
conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if
practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons
whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in
conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to
one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
d. RA 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
•
Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a specially trained
prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution
of cases involving a child in conflict with the law. If there is an allegation of
torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during arrest or
detention, it shall be the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
I.
TOTAL EXTINCTION
A.
Extinction in General
1. RPC, Articles 89-93, 36
Art. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this
Code.
********explanation
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
a.
Criminal liability whether before or after final judgment is extinguished
upon death because it is a personal penalty. (The penalty requires personal
service of sentence. If death occurs, there will be nobody to serve the penalty for
the crime.)
b.
Extinguishment of criminal liability is a ground of motion to quash
c.
If the offender dies before final judgment, pecuniary penalties are
extinguished.
d.
If the offender dies after final judgment, the pecuniary penalties are NOT
extinguished.
e.
Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment.
f.
A judgment in a criminal case becomes final:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
When the accused commences to serve the sentence;
When the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing;
When the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal.
g.
Extinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil
liability is also extinguished.
Effect of the death of the accused pending appeal on his criminal and civil
liability.
General rule: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely on the
offense committed.
Exception:
When the civil liability does not arise from a certain crime, and it
was predicated on a source of obligation other than delict (example on law,
contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict) the civil liability survives even with the
death of the accused.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore, may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1 Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the
accused, depending on the source obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Example: The claim of civil liability based on law may also be made – in the
offense of physical injuries, since Art. 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action (Belamala vs. Palomar).
2. Monsanto vs. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190
Facts
The Sandiganbayan convicted Salvacion Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three others, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period as the minimum to prision mayor in its
maximum period as the maximum.
President Marcos extended her absolute pardon which she eventually accepted.
Contention of the accused: The full pardon has wiped out the crime and thus:She
is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension and,she must be
reinstated to her former post as assistant city treasurer.
Contention of the state: Acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer
is the only ground for reinstatement to a former position and entitlement to
payment of salaries, benefits and emoluments due to during the period of her
suspension.
Held
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past.
1. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be
entitled to receive backpayfor lost earnings and benefits.
2. The absolute disqualification from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were wiped out by her pardon, this absolute disqualification from
public office was likewise removed.
Hence, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Delivery is an indispensable requisite. Once accepted by the grantee, the pardon
already delivered cannot be revoked by the authority which granted it.
But if absolute pardon is granted after the convict had served his sentence, his
rights to vote and hold public office are deemed restored. (Pelobello vs. Palatino)
That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Pardon becomes valid only when there is a final judgment. If given before this, it
is premature and hence void. There is no such thing as a premature amnesty,
because it does not require a final judgment; it may be given before final
judgment or after it.
3. People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464
Facts
RTC Branch 52 of Sorsogon convicted accused-appellant Jose Patriarca Jr., a
member of NPA, and others of the crime of murder for forcibly taking and then
shooting Alfredo Arevalo.
Moreover, Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with murder for the killing of one
Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag.
He was found guilty on the Arevalo Case, but was acquitted in the 2 murder
cases of Borja and Cadag. Patriarca then applied for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 724.
His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
Contention of the accused: Because of the amnesty, he should also be acquitted
in the murder of Arevalo.
Ruling
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself;
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
penalty and all its effects.
Hence, Patriarca is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder of Arevalo.
4. People vs. Abungan, 341 SCRA 258
Facts
RTC of VillasisPangasinan convicted Pedro “Pedring” Abungan and two of
murder for shooting CamiloDirilo. They were sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
Abungan filed a Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. He was
committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa on January 9, 1999.
However, while the case was on appeal, Abungan died on July 19, 2000
at the NBP Hospital.
Issue :Whether or not the death of the appellant extinguished his criminal and
civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime.
Held
Yes.
Art. 89.(RPC) provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished:
a.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
In the present case, it is clear that the death of appellant extinguished his
criminal liability.
Moreover, becauseAbungan died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or
delict was also extinguished.
It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of
obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil
action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
The lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes
ineffectual.
b.
The death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability of
the offender, because the offense is committed against the state. (People vs.
Misola)
c.
Where there are several accused, the death of one does not result to the
dismissal of the action because the liabilities, whether civil or criminal of said
accused are distinct and separate. (Problem 3)
d.
e.
f.
By service of sentence;
Crime is a debt, hence extinguished upon payment
Service of sentence does not extinguish the civil liability
g.
By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
Amnesty - is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or general pardon
for a past offense. It wipes all traces and vestiges of the crime but does not
extinguish civil liability.
5. Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881
Facts
On September 9, 1990, CaridadDorol went to the house of her cousin, petitioner
AnicetoRecebido to redeem her property, an agricultural land which CaridadDorol
mortgaged to the petitioner. Recebido refused to return the property claiming that
she had sold her property to him in 1979.
CaridadDorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon if there
was really a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979allegedly executed by her in
favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the AnicetoRecebido’s
name. It was found out that her signature in the questioned Deed of Sale was
falsified.
In 1991, Dorol filed then an information against Rebecido.
The Court of Appeals found petitioner AnicetoRecebido guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Public Document and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision
correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment.
Note: Art. 90 provided “Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall
prescribe in ten years”
Contention of the state: The crime has not yet prescribed.
Contention of the accused: The ten-year prescriptive period started at the time of
the commission of falsification (1979), thus it has prescribed in 1991.
Held
The petitioner’s contention is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription shall “commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
It was only in 1990 that Doral knew the falsification and the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet prescribed when the information was filed in 1991.
6. People vs. Desierto, 363 SCRA 585
Facts
Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangcoallegedly took advantage of his close relationship
with then President Marcos, that caused the Marcos to issue favorable decrees
to advance his personal and business interests and caused the government
through the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) to enter into a
contract with him under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
(Note: The birth of the allegedly illegal contract was in 1974.)
Cojuangco has also allegedly conspired with the members of the UCPB Board of
Directors, in open breach of the fiduciary duty as administrator-trustee of the
Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF), to manipulate the said fund
resulting in the transfer of (P840,789,855.53) of CIDF to his own corporation - the
Agricultural Investors, Inc.
In February 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initiated the
complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
The case was referred to Ombudsman AnianoDesierto.
Desierto dismissed it because the offense charged has already
prescribed when the complaint was filed.
Contention of the accused: The prescription period for violation of the Anti-Graft
Practices Act was ten (10) years. The complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019
was filed before the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or more than fifteen (15) years
after the birth of the allegedly illegal contract (1974). Thus, it has prescribed.
Contention of the accused: The prescription period in R.A. No. 3019 does not
apply to respondents. It should be imprescriptible. The prosecution is actually a
suit intended to recover ill-gotten wealth from public officials, and therefore Sec.
15, Art. XI of the 1987 should be followed:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or their nominees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Held
For a violation of a special law, Act No. 3326 shall be used. Since R.A. No. 3019
is a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for any act
violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
As a rule:
•
If the commission of the crime is known- the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
•
If the time of commission is unknown - prescription shall only run from its
discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
In the case at bar, it was impossible for the State to have known the violations at
the time the questioned transaction was made. Thus, the prescription shall be
computed from the discovery of the commission and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment (1990), and NOT from the day
of such commission.
Note: The institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment
starts in 1990, the crime will prescribe in 2000 (10 years after).
Thus, the prior decision of Desierto was reversed and set aside.
Ombudsman Desierto was directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation
7. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs.
Desierto, 363 SCRA 489
Facts
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman.
On March 2, 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG
consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn
complaint(OMB-0-96-0968 )against the Directors of PSI (Philippine Seeds, Inc. )
and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the
loans for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, Corrupt Practices of
Public Officers. The offenses are alleged to have arisen from the grant of the
assailed loans in 1969, 1975 and 1978.
OMBUDSMAN Desierto dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968on
the ground of prescription.
Contention of the state: The right of the Republic of the Philippines to recover
behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of
Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Contention of the accused: The prescriptive period commenced to run from the
time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof. As a matter
of fact it prescribed in ten years pursuant to the original provision of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019, which fixed the prescriptive period at ten years. Hence, the
offenses which might have arisen from the grant of the assailed loans in 1969,
1975 and 1978 prescribed in 1979, 1985 and 1988, respectively.
Held
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and
his cronies accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to
recover.
For a violation of a special law, Act No. 3326 shall be used.SinceR.A. No.
3019 is a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for
any act violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
In the present case, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or
conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
Thus, the Court agree with the Ad Hoc COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period
for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged
should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from
the day of such commission.
It was discovered in 1996, the prescriptive period shall commence from there.
The crime has not prescribed. The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed
with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-96-0968.
8. Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo, 394 SCRA 221
Facts
On June 14, 1986Jovendodel Castillo was convicted by a final judgment for
violation of Section 178 of the 1978 Election Code for striking the electric bulb
and two kerosene petromax lamps lighting in a voting center, interrupting and
disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.
He was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which eventually
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, during the execution of
judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue
an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. The petitioner
was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court
a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription
of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied.
Note: The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum. It is a correctional
penalty . Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.
Contention of the petitioner: Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The penalty
imposed upon him has already prescribed.
Contention of the accused: It has not prescribed.
Held
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978
Election Code.
This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did
not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or
committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of
the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed
because the second element is not present.
As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
Moreover, before the prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence
will commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even
before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding.
Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to
live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive.
The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the
wrong he committed. Petition dismissed.
If a convict can avail of mitigating circumstances and the penalty is
lowered, it is still the original penalty that is used as the basis for prescription.
However, if the convict already serves a portion of his sentence and
escapes after, the penalty that was imposed (not the original) shall be the basis
for prescription.
B.
Particular Rules
1. Article 89
a. Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34
Facts
Santos was guilty is guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced
him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On August 22, 1938,
Commonwealth Act No. 357 which disqualifies the respondent from voting
and have been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against
property.
Held
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case,
the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no
basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities.
b. Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441
Facts
Florencio was convicted by violating election law by final judgment
and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional and disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the
contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed
by plenary pardon.
Held
It is admitted that the respondent mayor elect committed the
offense more than 25 years ago, he had already merited conditional
pardon from the Governor General. In 1915, that he exercise the right of
suffrage,
was
elected
councilor
and
elected mayor, under
the
circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute
pardon was enable him to assume the position in difference to the popular
will, and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned.
c. People vs. Nery, 10 SCRA 244
Facts
Accused received from Federico Mantillano two diamond rings to
be sold by her on commission. The agreement was for the accused to
deliver on the following day the sum of P230 to her principal, SolidadNery
failed to show up after several days in a casual encounter with Matillano
she claimed that the buyer withdraw and that she was looking for another
buyer. When Solidad failed to comply with his promise, by then, the city
Attorney filled a complaint with the municipal court. The accused made
two payments P20 each to Federico anode failed to pay further. Hence,
the fiscal filed the corresponding case finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa.
Held
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filling of the
criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that
time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an
ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complaint in
estoppel. But after the justice authority have taken cognizance of the
crime the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its
power to exact the criminal liability. It may be observed in this regard that
novation is not one of the means recognized by penal code whereby
criminal liability can be extinguished.
d. Llamado vs. CA, 270 SCRA 423
Facts
Richard Llamado together with Pascual was charged with violation
of BP 22 or Bouncing check law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of 1 year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of
200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Held
Novation theory cannot apply in the case at bar, since what the
petitioner promise, turned out to be only an empty promise which
effectively delayed private complaints filling of case. Under Article 89 of
the RPC, are list of instances where criminal liability totally extinguish
since novation is not under the list it cannot be granted the same with the
one listed.
2. Prescription of Offenses – Arts. 90, 91
a. People vs. Buencamino, 122 SCRA 713
Facts
City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City Court for
slight physical injuries allegedly committed by Buencamino
against Mr. Ang Cho Ching. They move to quash the criminal
prosecution on the ground that the 60 days prescriptive prescribe
lapse.
Held
The contention
of
the respondent
deals
with
the
computation of time allowed to do a particular act does not apply
to lengthen the period fix by the state for it to prosecute those who
committed a crime against it.
Where the 60th day to file information falls on a Sunday or
legal holiday the 60th day period cannot be extended up to the
next working day. Prescription has automatically set it. The
remedy is to fiscal or prosecutor to file the information on the last
working day before the criminal offenses prescribe.
b. People vs. Puno, 70 SCRA 606
Facts
Cabral was accused of the crime of falsification of public
document for allegedly falsifying the signature of Silvino San
Deigo in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment,
petioner move to quash the information on the ground of
prescription.
Held
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under
Article 172 and the RPC which carries an impossible penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not more than P5,000. This crime prescribe in ten years
where San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the register
of deeds on August 26, 1948.
c. People vs. Carino,56 Phil. 109
Facts
The accused, being elected inspectors duly appointed in a
precinct that date did knowingly with the sole purpose of favoring
one Vicente Oliquinofalsily the copies of the election return on the
said precinct send to the provincial and municipal treasurer that
this frauds were discovered in connection with the election protest
filed against Oliquino on Oct.10, 1929 and that the trial court
conviction Carino and Obias of the said crimes.
Held
Prescription offenses resulting from the violation of this
article in new election code shall prescribe 1 year after the
commission; but if the discovery of such offenses in incidental to
judicial proceeding in any election contest the term of prescription
shall commence only when such proceeding it holds that the
discovery in question was not incidental to judicial proceeding in
the said election contest, but; even before the filling of the motion
of protest, the contestants and their election watchers with
knowledge of the falsification committed by the inspectors in
connection with the count of the votes and the preparation of
election return hence the general rule of one year for the
prescription of the crime charged in the information.
3. Prescription of Penalties – Art. 93
•
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period
of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should
go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition
treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period
of prescription.
a. People vs. Puntilos, June 15, 1938
Facts
Remegio was granted pardon by the Gov. Gen. Remitting
the unexecuted portion of this sentence of six years, one day of
prision correccional imposed upon him for the crime of bigamy
subject to the condition that he will not violate any of the penal
laws. He was release but he violated the condition of pardon by
committing a crime to damage to property through reckless
driving.
Held
The fact that when his conditional pardon was granted and
accepted by him, he had already extinguished 19 months of his
penalty of 6 years and 1day thus leaving only 4 years, 5 months
and 1 day to be served by him does not alter or change the nature
thereof from prision mayor to prision correccional. Besides period
of prescription of his penalty was interrupted by the mere facts of
his acceptance of his pardon, which he was able to avoid serving
his sentence.
b. Taneza vs. Masakayan, February 28, 1967
Facts
AdelaidaTanega was found guilty of the crime of slander by
the CFI of Quezon City and was sentenced to 20 days of
arrestomenor and to indemnify the offended party, Pilar Julio in the
sum of 100 pesos. The execution of the sentence was set on
January 27, 1965, however on Tanega’s motion, execution was
deferred to February 12, 1965 at 8:30 am at the appointed day
and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompt the Judge to
issue a warrant for arrest but petitioner was never arrested.
Petitioner move to quash the warrants of arrest on the ground
that said penalty has already prescribed.
Held
The SC ruled in negative. Under Article 93 of the RPC, for
prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final judgment
to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of
such imprisonment, prescription of penalty, then does not run in
her favor.
4. Sec. 1, Rule 119, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
SECTION 1, RULE 119, REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Time to prepare for trial.– After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused
shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
5. Act No. 3326 as Amended by 3763
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS
OF
PRESCRIPTION
FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL
BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for
not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime
of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Provided,
however,That all offenses against any law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. (As
amended by Act No. 3585 and by Act No. 3763, approved November 23,
1930.)
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining
and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
II.
PARTIAL EXTINCTION RPC
A.
Extinction Under Articles 94-99
Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability- Criminal liability is extinguished partially :
1.By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence;and
3. for good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his
sentence.
Article 95. Obligation incurred by a person granted conditional pardon.- Any person who
has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with
the conditions imposed therein otherwise his non-compliance with any of the conditions
specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of art.159 shall
be applied to him.
Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence.- The commutation of the original sentence
for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the
latter in the place of the former.
Article 97. Allowance for good conduct.- The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal
institution shall entitle him to the following deduction from the period of his sentence.
1.During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days
for each month of good behavior;
2. During the 3rd to the 5th year, inclusive of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior.
3. During the following yearuntil the 10th year,inclusive of his imprisonment he shall be
allowed of deduction for 10 days for each month of good behavior.
4. During the 11th and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of 15 days for each month of good behavior.
Article 98. Special time allowance for loyalty.- A deduction of 1/5 of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his
sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this code, gives himself
up to the authorities within 48 hrs following the issuance of a proclamation announcing
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.
Article 99. who grants time allowances.- when never lawfully justified, the Director of
prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not
be revoked.
1. Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden, 108 Phil. 353
Facts: Espuelas was charged of inciting to sedition and was sentenced to
Indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 5 years, 4 months and
20 days. Before serving, on March 17, 1954, he was granted conditional pardon
on the condition that he shall not again violate any of the Penal Laws. He was
again convicted of usurpation of authority and was ordered his arrest. He filed
habeas corpus and was granted. Provincial Warden appealed.
Contention of the accused: the president has no power to revoke the conditional
pardon, since there was not yet conviction.
RULING: In case the convict violates any of the conditions of the conditional
pardon, the president has the power to order his recommitment and the courts
will not inquire into the validity of such recommitment.
The acceptance thereof by the prisoner carries with it the power of the
executive to determine a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been
violated.
2. Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 15
FACTS: Tesoro was convicted by falsification of an official document and was
sentenced to indeterminate term from 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days
plus 200 fine. He was granted pardon by the Gov. General on 1935. He will not
do any crime again. On 1937 he violate this condition, he maintained an
adulterus relationship. He was arrested.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The period during which he was out on
parole should be counted as service of his original sentence.
RULING: The rule is that in requiring the convict to undergo such punishment
imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his
release, the court should not consider the time during which the conduct was at
large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.
The terms of the parole states that “should any of the conditions stated
be violated,the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect”.
The petitioner here should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty
originally imposed upon him.
The commission of an offense is a mere violation of the
condition,conviction is not necessary.
B.
The Probation Law
1. Presidential Decree No. 968
ESTABLISHING A PROBATION
SYSTEM,
APPROPRIATING
FUNDS
THEREFORE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Definition of terms
•
PROBATION- a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and
sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the
supervision of a probation officer.
•
PROBATIONER- a person placed on probation
•
PROBATION OFFICER- the one who investigates for the court a referral
for probation or supervises a probationer or both.
PURPOSES:
1.
Promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him
with individualized treatment.
2.
Provide opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might
be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
3.
Prevent the commission of the offense.
REQUISITES OF PROBATION:
1.
A past sentence investigation report by the probation officer.
2.
A determination by the court that the best interest of the public and the
offender and end of justice will be served.
CRITERIA for placing an offender for probation:
The court shall consider (1) all information relative to the character, antecedent,
environment, mental and physical condition of the offender. (2)available
institution and community resources.
WHEN PROBATION SHALL BE DENIED:
1.
Offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution.
2.
There is an undue risk that during the period of probation, the offender will
commit another crime.
3.
Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
WHO ARE NOT ENTITLED?
1.
Those sentenced to serve the maximum term of imprisonment of more
than 6 years.
2.
Those convicted of subversion and any crime against the national
security or public order.
3.
Those who were previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than 1month and 1day and or a fine of not
more thanP200.
4.
Those who has been once on probation under the probations of the
decree.
5.
Those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of the decree became applicable.
PROCEDURES:
1.
The convict must file before the TRIAL COURT an application for
probation after he has been sentenced but before serving.
2.
The court shall order the probation officer to conduct an investigation of
the offender if he is not disqualified.
3.
The probation officer shall submit his investigation report within 60 days
from the receipt of the court order.
4.
The court shall resolve the application within 15 days from receipt of the
report. It is discretionary with the court to grant or deny an application for
probation.
Probation may be GRANTED whether the sentence imposed a term of
imprisonment or fine only. AN ORDER GRANTING OR DENYING PROBATION
SHALL NOT BE APPEALABLE.
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
1.
Mandatory or general-(once violated, it is cancelled)
a.
Must present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his
supervision at such place within 72hours from receipt of order.
b.
He reports to the probation officer at least once a month.
2.
Discretionary or special- conditions which the court may additionally
impose to the probationer. Probation statutes are liberal in character and the
court may any term it chooses, as long as probationer’s constitutional rights are
not violated.
PERIOD OF PROBATION:
•
Sentenced for not more that 1year---------it shall not exceed 2years
•
Sentenced to more that 1year--------------it shall not exceed 6years
•
Sentenced of fine only and served subsidiary imprisonment-------twice the
total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment.
2. Cabatingan vs. Sandiganbayan, 102 SCRA 187
Facts
Mr and Mrs. Cabatingan as alleged by the probation officer, operated an illegal
jai-alai betting station and that Mrs.Cabatingan is facing again another
malversation before the tanodbayan. The sandiganbayan denied his application
for probation based merely on the report of the probation officer.
Held:
There is ample evidence showing that the petitioner is entitled to the
benefits of probation. She does not appear to be a hardened criminal who is
beyond correction or redemption. She has shown repentance for the offense she
had committed. The sandiganbayan merely relied on the report of the probation
officer which in itself is mostly hearsay and it is controverted. The case was
remanded to the sandiganbayan to conduct further hearings on application for
probation. Although probation is not a right but it is a privilege still if there is no
disqualification, it must be granted.
3. Tolentino vs. Judge Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92
Facts
Tolentino was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drug Act when he
was caught in possession of marijuana. He was sentenced to 6montha and 1day
to 2years and 4months of imprisonment. He applied for probation. The probation
officer recommended that he be placed on 2years probation but the judge
denied.
Contention of the State: Probation can’t be granted to Tolentino because it will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Held:
PD 968 states that probation shall be denied if Offender is 1. in need of
correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to
an institution. 2.There is an undue risk that during the period of probation, the
offender will commit another crime.3. Probation will depreciate the seriousness of
the offence committed.
Judge Alconcel concluded that it will depreciate the seriousness of the
offense based primarily on the admission of the petitioner himself that he was
actually caught in the act of selling marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to
justify his criminal act by explaining that he only needed money for the family
during the Christmas season.
Probation cannot be granted because it will depreciate the seriousness of
the crime.
4. Anandy vs. People, 161 SCRA 436
Facts
Juanita Anandy was found guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drug Act.
She was caught with dried leaves of marijuana and 60 pieces of cigarette
wrapper. He was sentenced to suffer 6 years and 1day with cost. He filed an
application for probation but was denied.
Contention of the state: it is the intention of the law to extend the beneficial effect
of the probation law only to correccional penalties which have 6years and
penalties afflictive are excluded.
Contention of the accused: PD 1990 was not intended to deny probation benefits
to those sentenced to 6years and 1day. Anandy is still a government subject for
probation and can still be reformed and rehabilitated as shown by
recommendation of the probation officer. His penalty exceeds only 1day.
Held:
Ruled in favor of the state. Probation law shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6years.
Grant of probation is not automatic but ministerial. Probation is a privilege and its
grant rest on upon the discretion of the court. If the judge imposed 6years and
1day, he doesn’t intend to the accused to be qualified for 1day, so 1day is
important and cannot be waived.
5. Llamado vs. CA, 174 SCRA 566
Facts
Llamado and Pascual, treasurer and president of
Pam Asia Finance
Corporation were charged with violation of BP 22. They co-signed a postdated
check on the amount of P186,500. Pascual fled out of the country. Llamado was
convicted on March 1987 and was sentenced to prision correccional of 1year
imprisonment. He orally notified the RTC that he will appeal. The RTC forwarded
the case to the Court of Appeals. CA notified him to file his statement but he filed
probation on the RTC which was then denied. He filed petition to the CA but the
latter denied it because appeal was already completed.
Contention of the state: the period for application for probation was after the trial
court shall have convicted and sentenced the defendant but before he begins to
serve his sentence.
Contention of the accused: penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of
the accused and to avoid two literal and strict applications of the provisions of PD
1990 which would defeat its purpose.
Held:
Probation law is not a penal law. Petitioner’s right to apply for probation
was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Once you
apply for an appeal, you cannot apply for probation. Once you have already
appealed and later withdraw it before the decision to grant or dismiss the
probation, you can no longer file for probation because the lower court has cost
its jurisdiction over the case.
6. Bala vs. Judge Martinez, 181 SCRA 459
Facts:
Manuel Bala was found guilty of the crime of falsification of public
document removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Diazon attached
to her US passport with that of FlorenciaNotarteBala.
Manuel was then placed under probation for 1year, subject to conditions
to give him a chance to change hope for self-respect and better life which should
have expired on August 10, 1983 but allegedly violated it. After a month,
obtaining a permission from the probation officer, he transfer residence thru
verbal agreement.
Contention of the state: the probation of the defendant is not a sentence but a
suspension.
Contention of the accused: he was no longer under probation because the period
terminated on August 10, 1983. Thus, no valid reason existed to revoke.
Held:
Expiration of period of probation alone does not automatically
terminateprobation. A final order of discharge from the court is required.
Probation is irrevocable before a final judgment or discharge by the court.
Probationer failed to reunite with responsible society, an order revoking probation
is unappealable. During the probation, the court may issue a warrant of arrest for
the probationer for violation of any of the conditions and to serve the sentence
originally imposed.
7. Salgado vs. CA, 189 SCRA 304
Facts:
Salgado was charged with physical injuries and to suffer imprisonment of
4months and 20days with accessories. He has civil liability of P176,333. He filed
an application for probation and one of the condition is that he should indemnify
Lukban a monthly installment of P2,000 during the entire period of his probation.
Salgado complied by issuing checks. Lukban filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution and it was granted.
Contention of the state: probation law provides only suspension of sentence
imposed on the convict that it has absolutely no beating on his civil liability and
that none of the conditions listed relates to civil liability.
Contention of the accused: modification of civil liability of Salgado is unauthorized
and not sanctioned by law.
Held:
The condition of the pardon of indemnifying the victim on an installment
basis did not decrease the civil liability adjudged against Salgado but merely
provided for the manner of payment of civil liability during the probation period.
Although execution of sentence is suspended, it does not mean that the
civil liability is extinguished. Article 113 provides that offender shall continue to
satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty or other rights.
Probation law does not carry the extinction of civil liability and does not
restore relinquishedrights.
8. Francisco vs. CA, April 6, 1995
Facts:
Pablo, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate information instituted by five of his
employees, each information charging him with gravely maligning them on four
(4) different days, i.e., from April 9-12 , 1980. January 2, 1990, after nearly 10
years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, found Francisco, guilty
of grave oral defamation, in four of the five cases filed against him, and
sentenced him to a prision term of 1year and 1day to 1year and 8months of
prision correccional “in each crime committed on each date of each case, as
alleged in the information”.
Issue: whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing
his conviction to he RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the
duration of the penalties imposed.
Held:
Fixing the cut-off point at maximum term of six(6) years imprisonment for
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties
pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability
for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and seriousness
consequences for the offences they might further commit. The probation law, as
amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted to grave felonies as
defined in article 9 in relation to article 25of the RPC, and not necessarily those
who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are
deemed to be less perverse.
The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected. Accordingly, considering that the jurisprudence treats appeal and
probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from is
conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, asserted only his innocence and did not even
raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, andfinally, he
filled an application of probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal
granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review is
hereby denied.
9. OCA vs. Librado, 260 SCRA 714
Facts
Vicente Librado is deputy sheriff of the MTCC of Iligan City. On
September 19, 1994, he was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 for selling
and having possession certain quantities of prohibited drugs known as
metamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” and marijuana. He was subsequently
found guilty and sentenced to 6years of imprisonment. Respondent admits that
he had been convicted of violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is in
probation.
Held:
This case involves a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a
ground for disciplinary action under Civil Service Law is considered as grave
offenses punishable, upon first commission, by dismissal.
The image of the
judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which involves moral turpitude. While indeed
the purpose of the probation law is to save valuable human material, it must not
be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which
the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of
the probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may
seek to reenter government service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to
serve once again.
10. Soriano vs. CA, GR No. 123938, 1999
Facts