POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
College of Law
Sta. Mesa, Manila
Principles
in
Public Corporation
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the subject
Public Corporation
JDPC 311
ALCANAR, Bernalyn D.
ALOTENCIO, Agatha Paula
AZUL, Dario T.
CANTILLON, Lissy Ann H.
CAYABAN, Charmaine V.
INGENTE, Mark Phillip M.
LLARENAS, Carmel
PAYUMO, Jefry S.
SANTIAGO, Mikaila Ma. A
JD 3-2
Atty. Eric C. Opriasa
March 2020
PART 1
Local Governments (Nature, types, and creation of local governments)
1. Crisostomo B. Aquino vs Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29,
2014;
● Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se.
-
Under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It
bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power
to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such.
Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question
cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Despite [the hotel’s] classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still
find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. One
such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and
to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and
demolition.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to
secure the necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –x
xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to
obtain the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed
by law or ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same
when said construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition
or removal of said house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law
or ordinance.
Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
whether the building constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens
becomes immaterial. The hotel was demolished not exactly because it is a
nuisance but because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to
construction. It just so happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that
qualified it as a nuisance per accidens––its being constructed within the no build
zone––further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary permits and
clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises,
a court order that is required under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed
with.
2. Capitol Wireless Inc vs. Provincial Government of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110, May 30,
2016;
● Real property tax exemption claim shall be filed with the local government where the
property is situated
-
Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission
lines which this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City
Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer exempted from real
property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under
the Local Government Code. To the extent that the equipment's location is
determinable to be within the taxing authority's jurisdiction, the Court sees no
reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communications and
aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both
pieces of property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property
taxation. Both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are
not directly adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations,
but both may be classified under the term "machinery" as real property under
Article 415(5) of the Civil Code for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment
serve the owner's business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that
are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as such,
as "waters" is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8) of the Code. A classic
example is a boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal
property but, if it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it floats
on waters which is immovable, is considered real property. Besides, the Court has
already held that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property.
In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to require the
taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under protest
before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the assessment itself
is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority. For example, prior resort
to administrative action is required when among the issues raised is an allegedly
erroneous assessment, like when the reasonableness of the amount is challenged,
while direct court action is permitted when only the legality, power, validity or
authority of the assessment itself is in question. Stated differently, the general
rule of a prerequisite recourse to administrative remedies applies when questions
of fact are raised, but the exception of direct court action is allowed when purely
questions of law are involved.
Under the Local Government Code, every person by or for whom real property is
declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property from real property
taxation "shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty (30)
days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary
evidence in support of such claim." Capwire omitted to do so. And even under
Capwire's legislative franchise, RA 4387, which amended RA 2037, where it may
be derived that there was a grant of real property tax exemption for properties
that are part of its franchise, or directly meet the needs of its business, such had
been expressly withdrawn by the Local Government Code, which took effect on
January 1, 1992, Sections 193 and 234 of which provide:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. - Unless otherwise provided
in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
No. 6938, nonstock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. Section 234. Exemptions from
Real Property Tax. - The following arc exempted from payment of the real property
tax: x x x
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations arc hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
3. Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. 155650, July 20,
2006;
● MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
-
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87
of the Corporation Code defines a non-stock corporation as "one where no part of
its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." A nonstock corporation must have members. Even if we assume that the Government
is considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock
corporation. Non-stock corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to
their members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit 20% of
its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents MIAA
from qualifying as a non-stock corporation.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,
police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA
exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA
Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous
body" will make its operation more "financially viable."
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, which states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities and local government units.
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the
national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments
the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the
powers of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power
"subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local
governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax
government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for
sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in
the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local
governments.
●
Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
-
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax any
"[r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines." Section 234(a)
provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; x x x
This exemption should be read in relation with Section 133(o) of the same Code,
which prohibits local governments from imposing "[t]axes, fees or charges of any
kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities x x x." The
real properties owned by the Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic
itself or in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the National Government.
The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or
instrumentality of the national government. This happens when title of the real
property is transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the Republic
remains the owner of the real property. Such arrangement does not result in the
loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states
that real property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the
"beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person." MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable person
under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that
the Republic has granted to MIAA the beneficial use of the Airport Lands and
Buildings, such fact does not make these real properties subject to real estate tax.
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code, which governs the legal relation and status ofgovernment units, agencies
and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government
instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or
charges of any kind" by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA
leases its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Section 234(a) of the
Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased becomes
subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the
City of Parañaque.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being
devoted to public use, are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420 specifically mentions "ports x
x x constructed by the State," which includes public airports and seaports, as
properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of public
dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that
properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
4. Dennis A.B. Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office and the Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
● MECO is a non-governmental entity
-
Three attributes [thus] make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock or
non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third,
government ownership over the same.
In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and
second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.
The accounts of MECO pertaining to the verification fees and consular fees may
be audited by the COA.
Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit
accounts of non-governmental entities “required to pay xxx or have government
share” but only with respect to “funds xxx coming from or through the
government.” This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO:
First. The MECO receives the “verification fees” by reason of being the collection
agent of the DOLE — a government agency. Second. Like the “verification fees,”
the “consular fees” are also received by the MECO through the government, having
been derived from the exercise of consular functions entrusted to the MECO by the
government.
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its nongovernmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it
collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and
“consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
5. City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989;
● Governmental powers and municipal powers
-
Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial,
public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule
is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has . . . a public character as
regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so
called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own
community.
In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property
in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The
New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and
patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for
public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for
by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
The Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex
delicto.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North
Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by
resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor
and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual
provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract.
6. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, et al G.R. No. L52179, April 8, 1991
● Doctrine of non-suability of the State
-
We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m)
of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at
the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its
consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except
when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied
consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when
the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of
the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit
even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that
they can sue and be sued.
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,
it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or thatthe case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
7. Hon. Jose D. Lina, Jr., et al vs. Hon. Francisco Dizon Paño, et al G.R. No. 129093, August 30,
2001;
● Local Government Units cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to
prohibit permits.
-
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government
through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate
the lotteries.
Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot
issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated
otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and
enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress. Ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate
of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation
on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power
to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain
notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form
of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined
within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does
not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio"
When Prior Consultation is Required: the projects and programs mentioned in
Section 27 (Prior consultation required) should be interpreted to mean projects
and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27,
to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change;
(3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of
crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant
species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by
the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
8. Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties and PAGCOR, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994;
● Test of a valid ordinance
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporation owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
in the State, the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no concerned. They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power
to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain
notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
9. Atty. Humberto Basco, et. al. vs PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991;
● The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes
-
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which has
the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or
permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or
collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits"
is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter
role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over
local governments.
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments. "As gambling is usually an offense
against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary
to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject . . . In the absence of
express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are
inconsistent with the state laws are void."
10. GSIS vs Province of Tarlac, G.R. No. 157860, December 1, 2003;
● When there is a perfected contract executed by the former Governor, the succeeding
Governor cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other party
11. Atienza vs. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005;
 While the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose
salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials
and employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan because such authority is
lodged with the Vice-Governor (Atienza vs. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10,
2005).
The authority to appoint casual and job order employees of the sangguniang
panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor. The authority of the Vice-Governor to
appoint the officials and employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan is anchored
on the fact that the salaries of these employees are derived from the
appropriation specifically for said local legislative body. Accordingly, the
appointing power of the Vice-Governor is limited to those employees of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, as well as those of the Office of the Vice-Governor,
whose salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for the sangguniang
panlalawigan.
In allocating local powers, Congress may provide for a system of checks and
balances.
a. The system of checks and balances under the current system is statutorily, not
constitutionally (unlike the three branches of National Government), prescribed.
b. Under the 1983 Local Government Code, the local chief executive performed
dual functions – executive and legislative, he/she being the presiding officer of the
sanggunian. Under the 1991 LGC, the union of legislative and executive powers in
the office of the local chief executive has been disbanded, so that either
department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities
with the end in view of ensuring better delivery of public service and providing a
system of check and balance between the two.
12. Umali vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014;
 With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs
of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has
become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
powers. The source of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the
LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution. Conversion to a highly-urbanized city is substantial
alteration of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision
applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
A Highly Urbanized City is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex
and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic
activity require greater autonomy. The provincial government stands to lose the
power to ensure that the local government officials act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by the city
mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The
province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the
elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative
case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be modified
accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to
vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials.
13. Abbas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989;
 Republic Act No. 6734 or the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) is constitutional and is not violative of the Tripoli Agreement
since the former is a later enactment. Further, the Tripoli Agreement must
conform with national laws such as the Organic Act.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will be
determinative of: (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao; and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall comprise it.
14. Disomangcop vs. Secretary of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 149848, November 25,
2004;
● The Constitution identifies two Autonomous Regions, i.e., Muslim Mindanao and
Cordilleras that Congress may incorporate. While they are classified as statutes, the
Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a
plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute
without being approved in a plebiscite.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right
against the central government.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the LGU vis-à-vis
the central government. Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal
government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and
supervision from the central government.
The aim of the 1987 Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people
of Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to self-determination, i.e., a right to choose
their own path of development; the right to determine the political, cultural and
economic content of their development path within the framework of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.
There are two levels of decentralization, i.e., administrative decentralization or
deconcentration, and political decentralization or devolution (Disomangcop vs.
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004;
Sections 17 and 528, 1991 LGC).
Administrative Decentralization
Deconcentration
Powers to be transferred not specified
Transfer is from national government
agencies to its field offices
Transfer is mandatory
Administrative in character
6-month deadline from January 1,
1992
Political Decentralization
Devolution
Powers to be transferred are specified
Transfer is from national government
agencies to local governments
Transfer is mandatory on the
devolving national government agency
and the receiving local government
Powers, responsibilities, personnel
and resources
6-month deadline from January 1,
1992
15. Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014;
● Exempt from devolution, even to the ARMM, are nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services.
On local autonomy, the essence of the express reservation of power by the national
government in Sec. 17 of the LGC is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still
has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government
is called upon to implement. There is no undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments if the wording of
the law is not mandatory upon LGUs.
On Legislative Control, Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has the power to
provide for exemption to devolution such as nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services since the power of Congress to legislate on all matters of
common interest is plenary.
16. Pandi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116850, April 11, 2002;
● An act of the Regional Assembly of ARMM cannot amend the Organic Act nor can it
amend the 1991 LGC. The 1991 LGC and the 1987 Administrative Code cannot amend
the Organic Act (Pandi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116850, April 11, 2002).
17. Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration, G.R. No. 92649, February 14, 1991;
● The Autonomous Region of the Cordilleras has not been incorporated since in the
plebiscite held, the creation has been rejected by all the covered provinces and city,
save one province. There can be no autonomous region consisting of only one
province
18. Ordillos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990;
● The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region as explicitly provided under Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used
in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common
use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this
case.
19. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA, G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990;

Creation of administrative regions
-
Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision.
It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated
earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery
of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was
made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1,
established eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite
regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch
of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the
regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to
implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the
department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient
and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional
offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate
with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions
as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of
the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies
of the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired
objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
20. Camid vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 161414, January 17, 2005;

De jure character of municipality
-
Since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this
Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a
municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by
executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General:
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality
had never been challenged;
(2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to
question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and
(3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality,
organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure
character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities."
21. Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996;

De jure status
- Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended
to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,
which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.
Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez,
Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured
any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue
to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
22. Padilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992;

Plebiscite requirement
-
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units
directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said
plebiscite. What is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected,"
is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically,
those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the the parent Municipality
of Labo, Camarines Norte.
23. Miranda vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999;

When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.
24. City of Pasig vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999;

Limits of territorial jurisdiction
-
The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to
the creation of the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay
is properly identified territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the
exercise of the governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are
ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the expenses
entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance
the conduct of the same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the
Municipality of Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the
plebiscite was already held. The issues raised are still pending and must first be
resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held
in abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of
Barangay Napico should be annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is
hold in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute.
25. Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City vs. Antipolo City, G.R. No. 187349, August 17, 2016;

According to Secs. 118 and 119 of the LGC, boundary disputes between barangays in
the same city ormunicipality must first be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. In case of failure of amicable
settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned. The
sanggunian’s decision may then be appealed to the RTC. Thus, the RTC only exercises
appellate, not original, jurisdiction over the case at bar.
26. Buac vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004;

COMELEC Jurisdiction
-
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of
plebiscites. One must first look at the nature of the case. Such controversy could
not be attended by the judiciary because it is not within its jurisdiction to settle
such type of controversy – it does not fit the usage of judicial power.
If the RTC would be given jurisdiction over such case, there would be a
confusion regarding the settlement of justice. The judiciary, based on the
Constitution, has jurisdiction only on elections, returns and qualifications of
elected officials.
27. Republic vs. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013;

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government
branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. In this case, the judiciary cannot infringe on the right
of the executive to promulgate acts pursuant to its constitutional mandate.
28. League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056, April
12, 2011;
● The criteria for the creation of local government units must be followed
-
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law.
There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to
stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a
city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation
of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The
clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the
Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in
the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is
thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
29. Navarro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011;
● The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must
be followed in the creation of a province
-
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications
not contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of
expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax noncompliance therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no room for interpretation, but only for application.
Moreover, the OSG contends that since the power to create a local government unit
is vested with the Legislature, the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in
enacting into law R.A. No. 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome
the presumption of validity or constitutionality.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution States:
SEC. 10.No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that
imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code.No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the
Local Government Code, so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the
creation of a province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local
Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
30. Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos, G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008;
● Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
-
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication
be excluded from its operation and effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human
mind.
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of
Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms
are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction
be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not
to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be
held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
31. Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994;
● RA 7675 is not unconstitutional.
-
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not
less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one
representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequence of the proposed law and its operation.
● The number of the members of the House of Representatives may increase.
-
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The
present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment.
● The subject law did not result to gerrymandering.
-
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed
law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly
be considered as favorable to him.
32. Samson vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, September 22, 1999;
● All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality
-
RA 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City. The Constitutionality of RA 8535 was challenged and was sought to
enjoin its implementation. The RA allegedly failed to conform to the criteria
established by the Local Government Code, as to the requirements of income,
population, land area, seat of government, and no adverse effect to being a city of
Quezon City. The RA is also alleged to in effect amend the Constitution.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it
provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or
appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.
Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A.
No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court with substantial and persuasive
legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that
the law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all
the requisites therefor.
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that
a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the
challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of
the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through
regular congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of
proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed
to examine whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the
presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.
33. Alvarez vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996;
● The Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of the LGUs
-
The Internal Revenue Allotments are to be included in the computation of the average
annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent
component city.
Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring
item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or
transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national
government,
its
instrumentalities
and
government-owned-or-controlled
corporations".
34. Latasa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003
● When is an elective official barred from running again in for the same government post
-
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to
choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an
exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again for the same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that
of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of
the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are
also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City
of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the
same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by
it.
PART 2
Local Autonomy
35. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties and PAGCOR, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994;
● Tests of a valid ordinance
-
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
o It must not contravene the constitution or any statute;
o It must not be unfair or oppressive;
o It must not be partial or discriminatory;
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
o It must be general and consistent with public policy; and
o It must not be unreasonable.
36. Lina, Jr. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001;
● The local government cannot deny the operation of lotto
-
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government
through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the
lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the
national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an
ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national
legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow
by ordinance or resolution.
37. Ganzon vs. CA, G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991;
● Decentralization of administration or decentralization of power
-
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive
the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding
star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under
the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local
government units from over-dependence on the central government.
Under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income
distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to
realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy,
the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the
Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of
partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not
taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress."
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event,
the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but
to its constituency.
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority
over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence.
38. Philippine Gamefowl Commission and Hee Acusar vs. IAC, G.R. No. 72969-70, December
17, 1986;
● Supervision and Control
-
Supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties." Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power
of the officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter." Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or reexamination for
purposes of correction.
The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the
municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in Article
II, Section 10, and Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. It is also a recognition, as the
Court of Appeals correctly points out, of the superior competence of the municipal
officials in dealing with this local matter with which they can be expected to be more
knowledgeable than the national officials.
The power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the
authority to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in
the exercise of its sound discretion.
39. Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008;
● The UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated
state.
● The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP)
through General Assembly Resolution 61/295 clearly recognized the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or selfgovernment, to wit:Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining
to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal selfdetermination."
● Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
40. Disomangcop vs. Secretary of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 149848, November 25,
2004;
● The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the
separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures,
as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
● Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society
of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from
the legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for
minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group.
● Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government
unit vis-à-vis the central government.
● In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to
political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a
certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary
level of autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the
establishment of priorities by the community's internal decision-making processes and
the management of collective matters by themselves.
● Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the
people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central
government.
● The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common
tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and
heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved
through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member
communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise
the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.
● Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates,
whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It
involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein
a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against
the central government.
● Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration
is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of
authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This
mode of decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
● Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the
central government to local government units. This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to
grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to selfgovernment, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
41. Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014;
● Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.
● To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of
the President over LGUs to mere supervision. "The President exercises ‘general
supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own."
● Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of
existing laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires."
● It is well to remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion
in the disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to their constituency. For,
public office was created for the benefit of the people and not the person who holds
office.
42. City of General Santos vs. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014;
● Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize.
● In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient services, the law allows local
government units the power to reorganize. In doing so, they should be given leeway to
entice their employees to avail of severance benefits that the local government can
afford. However, local government units may not provide such when it amounts to a
supplementary retirement benefit scheme.
43. Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013;
● The commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to
provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The
vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their
resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue
interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by
the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms
not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.
44. Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80931, February 28, 1989;
● Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable”, "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
● Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
● An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987),
art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).
45. League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013;
● The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units
or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does
not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may
involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or
standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local
governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution
in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
46. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956

The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision.
-

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the
delivery of services is nothing new.1âwphi1 The Integrated Reorganization
Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased to
twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field
offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant
to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people
in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments,
bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government
units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided
by law.
The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras.
-
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates
the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and
a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
47. Reynaldo R. San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92299, April 19, 1991

Construction
-
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
48. Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

LGUs have no power to deliver basic services and facilities for which funding has
been provided by the national government.
-
Unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor" in Section 17 of the Local
Government Code, the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making
the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs.
49. Rodolfo Navarro vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

Exceptions to the territorial contiguity requirement does not apply to the land
area requirement
-
The exemption under Paragraph (b) of Section 461 pertains only to the
requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of
territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province
comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when
a province is composed of two or more islands, or when the territory of a
province is separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not
comply with the land area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or
the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government
Code.
50. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016

Exception to LGUs’ residual power to tax
-
Respondents cannot claim that Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax
Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on golf courses, was
enacted pursuant to the residual power to tax of respondent Cebu City. A local
government unit may exercise its residual power to tax when there is neither
a grant nor a prohibition by statute; or when such taxes, fees, or charges are
not otherwise specifically enumerated in the Local Government Code,
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws. In the
present case, Section 140, in relation to Section 131 (c), of the Local
Government Code already explicitly and clearly cover amusement tax and
respondent Cebu City must exercise its authority to impose amusement tax
within the limitations and guidelines as set forth in said statutory provisions.
51. AC Enterprises vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation, G.R. NO. 166744, November 02, 2006

LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such as thing
is a nuisance per se.
-
The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable times, without doing
damage, after due notice to the owners of buildings to ascertain compliance
with the noise standards under the law; and to order them to comply
therewith if they fail to do so; or suspend or cancel any building permits or
clearance certificates issued by it for said units/buildings after due hearing as
required by P.D. No. 984.
However, the LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance
unless such as thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they effect the extrajudicial
abatement of that as a nuisance which in its nature or use is not such. Those
things must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course of law.
52. Iloilo City Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals vs. Gegato-Abecia Funeral Homes, Inc.,
G.R. No. 157118, December 8, 2003

Power to issue permits and locational clearances for locally significant projects is
with the LGUS, not the HLURB.
-
The HLURB correctly indorsed the application to the zoning administrator of
the city because the power to issue permits and locational clearances for
locally significant projects is now lodged with the city/municipality with a
comprehensive land use plan. This is in accordance with Executive Order No.
72, which was issued to delineate the powers and responsibilities of local
government units and the HLURB in the preparation and implementation of
comprehensive land use plans under a decentralized framework of local
governance.
The power of the HLURB to issue locational clearance is now limited to projects
considered to be of vital and national or regional economic or environmental
significance.
53. Land Transportation Office vs. City of Butuan, G.R. No. 131512, January 20, 2000

LGUs’ power to regulate the operation of tricycles does not cover registration.
-
The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local
Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to
grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained
in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code must not
be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to
cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the
driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,
exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives
are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not
insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but
must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricyclesfor-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue
registration.
54. Leonardo Paar vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 2997
● It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim
that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to
recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.
● To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody," and it has been held that
there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an
exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.
● Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must
show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the
property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that
the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of
the property.
55. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Leonardo Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 2995
● And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
● Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic
(in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No.
115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business
or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect
public morals and promote the general welfare.
● Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by
Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers
under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these
powers are basically regulatory in nature.5 The regulatory nature of these powers finds
support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under Section 28 but also in this
Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
● The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the
State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law.)
56. City Government of Davao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 189305, August 16, 2016
● To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged
test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of
the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity
of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
● The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 101 and Section
54102 of The Local Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be passed
by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be presented to the
mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having been
raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no
reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the formal
requisites under the Local Government Code.
● The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from
the delegation thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a
special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government
Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and
maintain local autonomy.
● Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the
power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City,105 to enable the local legislative body to enact
ordinances and make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances
must not be repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and
discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police
power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local government unit to enact
ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its constituents,
and for the protection of their property.
● Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with
the authority to enact legislation aimed at promoting the general welfare, viz.:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. x x x
● In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
local government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives
of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the
corporate powers vested in the local government unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks
to protect the health and well-being of its constituents.
● A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.In order to declare
it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it
must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
● In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local
government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it
satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
● Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification
for the Government's action.113 This means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance
regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive
a due process challenge.
● In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property, viz.
● An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals. The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section
9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This
is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay.
The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole. There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
"possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property. In the landmark case
of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if government
regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. No formula or rule can be
devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter
of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government
and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated
on those few persons subject to the public action. What is crucial in judicial
consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a
"taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner
acquired the land make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. A regulation
which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land
that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may
have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries
are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole. A restriction on use of property may also
constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed
expectations of the owner.
● The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly
constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the
State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
● Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other word, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.
● The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the
Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This test requires
analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as
distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. To determine the propriety of the classification, courts
resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational
relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to
the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics
or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
When the
classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under
intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy
receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only
further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest,
but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.
● The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of
a suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest.
● An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject, and necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people.
● Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general
welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local
autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion to
accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
● Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions. In so
doing, it has accorded liberality to the general welfare provisions of the Local Government
Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for the common good. For
instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., the Court validated a zoning
ordinance that reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial to
commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property of the inhabitants residing
within the periphery of the oil depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government
of Quezon City, where the Court declared as valid a city ordinance ordering the
construction of arcades that would ensure the health and safety of the city and its
inhabitants, improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience,
as well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even in its early years, the Court already
extended liberality towards the exercise by the local government units; of their legislative
powers in order to promote the general welfare of their communities. This was
exemplified in United States v. Salaveria, wherein gambling was characterized as "an act
beyond the pale of good morals" that the local legislative council could validly suppress
to protect the well-being of its constituents; and in United States v.
Abendan,170 whereby the right of the then Municipality of Cebu to enact an ordinance
relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.
● The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible
authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and
consistency of the exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the
State. More importantly, because the police power of the local government units flows
from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the
power should be construed against the local legislative units. Judicial scrutiny comes into
play whenever the exercise of police power affects life, liberty or property. The
presumption of validity and the policy of liberality are not restraints on the power of
judicial review in the face of questions about whether an ordinance conforms with the
Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
● Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with sufficient
power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they definitely have
no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and policy. The Local
Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and
limitations to guide each local government unit in exercising its delegated powers with
the view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State
within the constitutional and statutory restraints. The Local Government Code is not
intended to vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any
subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.
● In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so,
the City of Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of
Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to
and reflect the will of its principal.180 As clarified in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:
● [W]here the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has
manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and
that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller
vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a
municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are
specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to
regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature,
may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the
legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding
throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in
excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation. Since E.O. No. 205, a general
law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an
LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. It is
a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate
to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and
statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently
expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power,
cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the
general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality,
there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general
law.
57. Hon. Franklin Drilon vs. Alfredo Lim, et al., G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
● We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187 [of the Local Government Code], this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically,
BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged
with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene
the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in
all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
● Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted
to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
● An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion
of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
● Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which
provided in its Section 2 as follows:
● A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall
have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty
days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied
or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to
declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority
the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a
period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the
tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent
jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended,
shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose
the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have
ceased to exist.
● That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance
if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and
not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law
had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That
power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is
not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his
opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds,
to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
58. Social Justice Society, et al., vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13,
2008
● Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to
do the act required to be done.
● Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which
is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ
of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that
which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
xxx We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty,
the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties
in interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent
never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
● On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as
city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty
to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
59. Judge Tomas C. Leynes vs. Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 143596, December 11,
2003
● It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot
supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an administrative
circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it. In the present case, NCC No. 67, being
a mere administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
● It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction that repeal of statutes by
implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The
legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and cannot be presumed
to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Respondent COA alleges that Section
36 of RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160 (the LGC of
1991). A review of the two laws, however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of RA
7645 merely provided for the different rates of RATA payable to national government
officials or employees, depending on their position, and stated that these amounts were
payable from the programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which the
concerned national officials or employees belonged. Furthermore, there was no other
provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be
implied. In the absence, therefore, of any clear repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160,
we cannot presume such intention on the part of the legislature.
● Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when, as in this
case, one law is special and the other is general.The principle is expressed in the
maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, a general law does not nullify a specific or
special law. The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character,
considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the
special law. This being so, the legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions
repugnant to those of the special law and without making any mention of its intention to
amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have intended an amendment,
repeal or modification of the latter.
● Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of
evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law. Respondent COA had the
burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan did not
comply with the condition provided in Section 447 of the Code, the budgetary
requirements and general limitations on the use of municipal funds provided in Sections
324 and 325 of the Code and the implementing guidelines issued by the DBM, i.e.,
paragraphs (a) to (d), Section 3 of LBC No. 53. Respondent COA also had the burden of
showing that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro erroneously approved
said resolution despite its non-compliance with the requirements of the law. It failed to
discharge such burden. On the contrary, we find that the resolution of the Municipality
of Naujan granting the ₱1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with
the law. Thus, we uphold its validity.
60. The Province of Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al.,
G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010
● Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision pursuant to
Section 4, Article X of the Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.
● The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to
see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished
from the President’s power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control
gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate
officer involving the exercise of discretion.
● Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed
but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify
or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the
President to be valid.
● The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through AO 402, recognized
the deficiency of the state of health care and medical services implemented at the time.
Republic Act No. 7875 or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995 instituting a National
Health Insurance Program (NHIP) for all Filipinos was only approved on 14 February 1995
or about two months after petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No.
720-A. Even with the establishment of the NHIP, AO 402 was still issued three years later
addressing a primary concern that basic health services under the NHIP either are still
inadequate or have not reached geographic areas like that of petitioner.
● Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution, under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local
Government Code of 1991, we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization
and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were
validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
61. Atty. Rudy M. Villareña vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 145383-84, August 6, 2003
● Implied repeals are not lightly presumed. The rule is that instead of placing one law
against another, in a destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
the statutes. Accordingly, in case of a conflict between Republic Act No. 6758 and the
Local Government Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other, but,
if possible, to give effect to both by harmonizing the two.
● In Magtajas v. Pryce, a conflict arose between the Local Government Code and
Presidential Decree No. 1869, the charter of PAGCOR. In that case, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro passed an ordinance revoking the business permits of
establishments engaged in casino operations in its jurisdiction. It claimed that although
PAGCOR is empowered by its charter to establish and operate casinos, local councils are
permitted by the Local Government Code to prohibit all forms of gambling within their
territories. Its main argument was that the Local Government Code, which is a later
enactment, had the effect of modifying the charter of PAGCOR. The Court, instead of
annulling one law and upholding the other, harmonized both laws by declaring
Presidential Decree No. 1869 as an exception to the Local Government Code.
● Indeed, there are valid reasons to treat COA officials differently from other national
government officials. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of government funds. To be able
properly to perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials need to be insulated from
unwarranted influences, so that they can act with independence and integrity. As
extensively discussed in Tejada v. Domingo, the prohibition under Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 6758 was designed precisely to serve this purpose. The removal of the temptation
and enticement the extra emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective way of
vigorously and aggressively enforcing the Constitutional provision mandating the COA to
prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
● Stated otherwise, the COA personnel who have nothing to look forward to or expect from
their assigned offices in terms of extra benefits, would have no reason to accord special
treatment to the latter by closing their eyes to irregular or unlawful expenditures or use
of funds or property, or conducting a perfunctory audit. The law realizes that such extra
benefits could diminish the personnel’s seriousness and dedication in the pursuit of their
assigned tasks, affect their impartiality and provide a continuing temptation to ingratiate
themselves to the government entity, local government unit, government-owned and
controlled corporations and government financial institutions, as the case may be. In the
end then, they would become ineffective auditors.
62. Camarines Sur vs. CA, G.R. No. 175604, September 18, 2009;
● Administrative control and supervision of Plaza Rizal
-
Municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan v. Morfe, the Court recognized that a public
plaza is a public land belonging to, and, subject to the administration and control of,
the Republic of the Philippines. Absent an express grant by the Spanish Government
or that of the Philippines, the local government unit where the plaza was situated,
which in that case was the Municipality of San Carlos, had no right to claim it as its
patrimonial property. The Court further held that whatever right of administration the
Municipality of San Carlos may have exercised over said plaza was not proprietary,
but governmental in nature. The same did not exclude the national government. On
the contrary, it was possessed on behalf and in representation thereof, the municipal
government of San Carlos being -- in the performance of its political functions -- a
mere agency of the Republic, acting for its benefit.
Applying the above pronouncements to the instant case, Camarines Sur had the right
to administer and possess Plaza Rizal prior to the conversion of the then Municipality
of Naga into the independent City of Naga, as the plaza was then part of the territorial
jurisdiction of the said province. Said right of administration by Camarines Sur was
governmental in nature, and its possession was on behalf of and in representation of
the Republic of the Philippines, in the performance of its political functions.
Thereafter, by virtue of the enactment of Republic Act No. 305 and as specified in
Section 2, Article I thereof, the City of Naga was created out of the territory of the old
Municipality of Naga. Plaza Rizal, which was located in the said municipality, thereby
ceased to be part of the territorial jurisdiction of Camarines Sur and was, instead
transferred to the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Naga. Theretofore, the local
government unit that is the proper agent of the Republic of the Philippines that should
administer and possess Plaza Rizal is the City of Naga.
63. Pasong Bayabas Farmer’s Association vs. CA, G.R. No. 142359;
● Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government Code, specifically
empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance
prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as
present and future projection of needs. The power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied
upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for
the conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse
of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already converted as
residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.
64. National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, G.R. Nos. 130775/131939, September 27,
2004;
● The ultimate goal is to be a self-reliant community
-
Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political subdivisions
should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals.63 In the case of De Leon v. Esguerra,64 the Court
ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine and meaningful local
autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-reliant communities.
In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga
barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or
union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or
elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga
barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining
the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether
from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of
barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong
barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal,
city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all
the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board
members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay
participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the
legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving
as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG's
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace
them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of
the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they
committed any violation of the Liga's Constitution and By-laws and its implementing
rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG
should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with
the Liga's own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the
DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them,
even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
65. Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp., G.R. No. 169588,
October 7, 2013;
● Classification of cities
-
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized:
Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are
those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities
or component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by
Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, this
Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909,
otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
66. City of Gen. Santos vs. Antonino-Custodio, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014;
● Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize.
-
This power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the
general welfare clause:
Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every local government
unit shall design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern
taking into consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to
the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that "any provision on
a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor or devolution of powers
x x x."
Section 5, paragraph (c) also provides that "the general welfare provisions in this Code
shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people
in the community." These rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of local
autonomy and the devolution of powers to the local government units.
Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational structure
and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such
power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents.
Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level
require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time
to time.
67. Tan vs. Perena, G.R. No. 149743, February 18, 2005;
● Licensing power
-
In connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan
may now regulate not only businesses but also occupations, professions or callings
that do not require government examinations within its jurisdiction. It may also
authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits,
regulate cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights
however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license cockpits and permits for
cockfighting has been removed completely from the Gamefowl Commission.
However, While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that
it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities
or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two
cockpits may be established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially
of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit
operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on
how such power may be exercised. In short, there is no dichotomy between affirming
the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time.
The Court recognizes that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid
exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments
are similarly empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code. The
national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive
to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the
general welfare of their constituents.
A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise
it is void. Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing
three cockpits in Daanbantayan.
68. Alangdeo vs. City Mayor of Baguio, G.R. No. 206423, July 1, 2015;
● It bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority
to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP.
-
[T]he Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the
Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:
SECTION 205. Building Officials. - Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building
Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as
well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.
SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. - In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the
Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of
this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefore. He is
the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its
premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the
requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building
permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the
Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or
conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is
authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or
structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions
of this Code.
In this case, none of the foregoing requisites were shown to concur. Plainly, records
are bereft of any declaration coming from the Building Official, and it is undisputed
that the demolition order was issued by the City Mayor.
69. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144159, September 29, 2004;
● Nowhere in the National Building Code or in the DILG law could we find a provision "which
empower the local chief executive to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of
the local building officials relative to the non-issuance, suspension or revocation of
building permits. x x x Absent any clear provision of law we cannot conclude that the
appellate jurisdiction vested in the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section
307 of the National Building Code has been transferred to the city or municipal mayor.
70. Batangas CATV vs. CA, G.R. No. 138810, October 20, 2004;
● LGUs does not have the authority to grant franchises to operate Community Antenna
Television (CATV). Pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations,
partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate
of Authority by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) may install, operate
and maintain a cable system or render cable television service within a service area. It is
clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have
no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision
as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises
and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
71. Zoomzat vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135535, February 14, 2005;
● It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities
have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional
provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges,
franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
72. Joson vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20, 1998;
● The respondent has the right to a formal investigation under Administrative Order No. 23
which includes:
1. Right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel
2. Right to confront the witnesses against him; and
3. Right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses and the production
of documents.
Thus, in this case, where the Secretary denied the petitioner’s motion for a formal
investigation and decided the case on the basis of position papers, the right of the
petitioner was violated.
73. Ganzon vs. CA, G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991;
● Under LGC, preventive suspension cannot exceed 60 days, which is to say that it need not
be exactly 60 days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say
that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused(respondent)
enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. Suspension finally is
temporary and as LGC provides, it may be imposed for no more than 60 days. A longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
74. LLDA vs. CA, G.R. No. 120865-71, December 7, 1995;
● Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared
towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of
the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the
inhabitants in this part of the earth. The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the Authority to
grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose
of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake
quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police power which is
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers
including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies
a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991
on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
75. Rural Bank of Anda vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan, G.R. No. 155051,
May 21, 2007;
● This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands
and waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the state. Municipal corporations cannot appropriate
to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government.
Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its
authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are
void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and
the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
76. Figuracion vs. libi, G.R. No. 155688, November 28, 2007;
● Prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are
vague or uncertain.
77. Land Bank of the Philippines vs Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667
● While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions
are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a law-making body on a specific
matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that
the SB violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the
Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure
to submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its
review contrary to Section 56 of the LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in
contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.
78. Pimentel vs Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
● The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials
execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their
cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing
their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or
alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of
internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.
● Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. x x x"
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If
these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone
by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision
does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done
or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner
of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
● Extent of Local Autonomy
Local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization."
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to
local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the
law may provide.
● Decentralization of administration v. Decentralization of power
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and
accountable, and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.
‘At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress.
● Local Fiscal Autonomy
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and
imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources
or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of
proposals from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners in the
attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,
primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies,
various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the Presiding Officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the Presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the Secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
79. San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92299, April 19, 1991
● Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and
circumscribed by statute. As was pointed out, the presidential competence is not even
supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not
thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion
on the matter. Supervision goes no further than `overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.' Control, on the other hand, 'means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the
Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor
explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who
have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
80. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008
● The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr., we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity
of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
81. Javier vs CA, G.R. No. L-49065, June 1, 1994
● Undoubtedly, Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to
carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government, 9 recalling to
mind General Order No. 3 issued on 22 September 1972, but this general provision could
not have meant or envisioned an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when
minded, from themselves creating or abolishing positions, an authority that they
theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such law was Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which empowered provincial
governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While
the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that office,
absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by
implication from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an
"implied power of a province . . . (should) be liberally construed in its favor" and "(a)ny
fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor
of local government and it (should) be presumed to exist."
We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in
question did exist at the time.
82. Buendia vs City of Iligan, G.R. No. 132209, April 29, 2005
● Articles 16 and 17 of the Water Code of the Philippines provide:
Art. 16. Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an application with the
Council [now Board] who shall make known said application to the public for any protests.
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council [now Board] shall
consider the following: protests filed, if any; prior permits granted; the availability of
water; the water supply needed for beneficial use; possible adverse effects; land-use
economics; and other relevant factors.
Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and recorded.
Art. 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the
application for a water permit in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual use
in a case where no permit is required.
From a reading of the above provisions, it is evident that after an application to obtain a
water permit has been made known to the public, any interested party must file his
protest thereto, in order that the application may be properly evaluated. Otherwise, after
the application for a water permit has been approved, the grantee of the permit now
acquires an exclusive right to use the water source, reckoned from the date of the filing
of the applications. Thus, after petitioner's right to the water permit has been properly
adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly question said grant. By virtue of
respondent's failure to lodge a timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the right to
appropriate the water from the spring inside the latter's property.
"The failure to file the certiorari petition within a reasonable time renders the petitioner
[respondent in this case] susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches." The
essence of laches is the failure, or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
83. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, G.R. No. 175604, September 18, 2009
● Neither the LGC nor the CARL requires a lgu to secure approval of the DAR as a condition
precedent to institute the necessary expropriation proceedings.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public
purpose” or “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of “public use”. Under the new concept, “public use” means
public advantage, convenience for benefit, which tends to contribute the general welfare
and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing
project. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for
a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the
direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once
operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information
and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood
of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the consti. The LGC does not require that local
government units must first secure the approval of the DAR for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
84. City of General Santos vs. Antonino-Custodio, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
● A Local Government Unit can grant and release hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits to its officials and employees who were sickly and unproductive due to health
reasons. This criteria negates the position that the benefits provide for supplementary
retirement benefits that augment existing retirement laws. Local autonomy allows an
interpretation of Sections 76 and 16 as granting petitioner city the authority to create its
organization development program.
● The liberal interpretation of the general welfare clause supports the stance that a city can
grant early retirement benefits to its employees since such benefit does not violate the
rule against the proliferation of retirement benefits.
85. San Pablo City vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, March 25, 1999
● On powers of LGU’s, The liberal interpretation of the general welfare clause supports the
stance that a city can grant early retirement benefits to its employees since such benefit
does not violate the rule against the proliferation of retirement benefits.
86. Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013
● Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to LGUs, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power
is embodied in Section 16 of the 1991 LGC, known as the General Welfare Clause.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have
been used: (1) the rational relationship test, and (2) the strict scrutiny test.
The rational basis test has been applied mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.
Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered.
a) Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. Lacking a
concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure.
Thus, this test is not complied with when an ordinance requires that a private owner
demolish a wall or build a fence with a setback for the purpose of allowing the
general public to use the property of the private owner for free depriving the owner
of exclusive use. Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance
with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property,
which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property.
An LGU may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
87. Manila vs Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
● Police power of LGs is a statutory delegated power under Section 16 of the 1991 LGC. The
general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State
to LGs.
To justify the payment of just compensation, there must be compensable taking. Ordering
a particular type of business to wind up, transfer, relocate or convert to an allowable type
of business in effect permanently restricts the use of property and thus goes beyond
regulation. Just compensation is therefore required.
● Local legislation is referred to as subordinate legislation.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself. They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of Congress, LGUs cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
An enactment local in origin cannot prevail against a decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute
88. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. vs Mayor of Manila, G.R. No.
L-24693, July 31, 1967
● There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments
of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase
"the income of the city government."
● Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
89. City Government of Davao vs CA, G.R. No. 189305, August 16, 2016
● An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject, and necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people.
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general
welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local
autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion to
accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions. In so
doing, it has accorded liberality to the general welfare provisions of the Local Government
Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for the common good. For
instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.,167 the Court validated a zoning
ordinance that reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial to
commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property of the inhabitants residing
within the periphery of the oil depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government
of Quezon City,168 where the Court declared as valid a city ordinance ordering the
construction of arcades that would ensure the health and safety of the city and its
inhabitants, improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience,
as well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even in its early years, the Court already
extended liberality towards the exercise by the local government units; of their legislative
powers in order to promote the general welfare of their communities. This was
exemplified in United States v. Salaveria,169 wherein gambling was characterized as "an
act beyond the pale of good morals" that the local legislative council could validly
suppress to protect the well-being of its constituents; and in United States v.
Abendan,170 whereby the right of the then Municipality of Cebu to enact an ordinance
relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.
90. Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs. JAC Liner, G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005
● The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
● The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference
of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized
by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner
would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was
to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
● The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which
bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be
effective.
91. Parayno vs Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006
● Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer
of petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions
and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it
should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to the equal
protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed
Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was
less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show
that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was
crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different
local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never
conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance
per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of
persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to
another location.
● As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower
courts. We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which
petitioner submitted as evidence during the proceedings before the trial court, if only to
underscore petitioner's compliance with the requirements of law before she put up her
gasoline station.
92. Aquino vs Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
● Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se.16 So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:
We agree with petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms
of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of
that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance
due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (emphasis supplied)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this
case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because,
in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,18 property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare.
● One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing
laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the
executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered
the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for
failing to secure the necessary permits, to wit:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. –
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same
to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues
programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain
the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or
ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said
construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said
house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance.
93. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
● Demolitions and evictions by the local government units may be validly carried out even
without a judicial order in the following instances:
a. When the property involved is an expropriated property pursuant to P.D. No.
1315;
b. When there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal
occupants in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit owned or administered by
the NHA pursuant to P.D. No. 1472;
c. When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds, pursuant to R.A. No. 7279; and
d. When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to R.A. 7279.
● In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
• Notice upon the effected persons at least 30 days prior to the eviction or
demolition;
• Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement;
• Presence of local government officials or their representatives;
• Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
• Execution of evacuation or demolition only during regular office hours from
Monday to Friday and during good weather, unless the affected families consent
otherwise;
• No use of heavy equipment;
• Proper uniforms for members of the PNP; and
• Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent.
94. Vargas vs Cajucom, G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015
● The enforcement of the subject decision through the writ issued by the trial court is
presently limited to just one of the three alternatives, i.e., a demolition of the structures.
The said limitation is not because the writ "altered" the judgment; it is because the
situation of the parties and the practicalities of such enforcement require it. In addition,
the decision subject of the execution itself noted that it was the "failure of the public
defendants to act on (Cajucom's) letter-complaint to cause the removal of the structures
located on the shoulder of the road" that "constrained (him) to file the instant case."
Removal or demolition of the structures was likewise what was prayed for by Cajucom in
the complaint.
● Thus, the trial court recognizes that a removal of the structures is what is called for in this
case. Such is expressed in the decision and the dispositive portion thereof must be
understood in this context. When interpreting the dispositive portion of the judgment,
the findings of the court as found in the whole decision must be considered; a decision
must be considered in its entirety, not just its specific portions, to grasp its true intent and
meaning.
But even if the decision was entirely silent on the matter, this Court has held that a
judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but extends to
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the case at bar, the dispositive
part of the trial court's decision did not specify which of the alternative duties the public
officers were to perform, but since the decision itself factually states that the plaintiff
sues for the removal of the subject structures, and that the structures are built on a public
highway, then it follows that only one of the alternative duties - that of demolition - is
capable of enforcement. As demolition stands as the only and necessary way to effectuate
the judgment, then it is what the execution of the judgment should consist of. The writ of
execution and a companion writ of demolition, if later prayed for and issued by the trial
court, are just a natural consequence of and a necessary means to enforce the said
decision.
95. Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763, July 2, 2004
● Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 4106, approved on July 19, 1964, had
exempted rural banks with net assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from
the payment of all taxes, charges and fees. The records show that as of December 29,
1986, petitioner bank’s net assets amounted only to P745,432.29. Hence, petitioner bank
could claim to be exempt from payment of all taxes, charges and fees under the
aforementioned provision. However, EO 93 was issued by then President Aquino,
withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain exceptions. Notably, not included
among the exceptions were those granted to rural banks under Rep. Act No. 720. With
the passage of said law, petitioner could no longer claim any exemption from payment of
business taxes and permit fees.
Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality
ordered petitioner bank’s closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause
invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even
under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which was then in
effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. The authority of a local
government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent
development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917.
Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general
welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law
governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the
validity of respondent municipality’s exercise of police power for the general welfare is
concerned.
● The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative
power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police
power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and
proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their
property.
● In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any
business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of
Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover,
the ordinance of the municipality imposing the annual business tax is part of the power
of taxation vested upon local governments as provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg.
337.
Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to
create a Special Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and
implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file appropriate charges and prosecute
violators.
96. Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 142359/142980, May 25, 2004
● The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to
non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies
only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands
previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its
award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior
to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.
● When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the
property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land when he
approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for the
conversion of 35.80 hectares of the property covered by TCT No. 62972 into nonagricultural land, he did so pursuant to his authority under Rep. Act No. 3844, as
amended, by P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 946.
● It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the
property was not tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, and
that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the
Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and
executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property subject of
the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB thereby reversed the Order of
Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified
Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years
earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the
Ministry of Local Government and the National Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner
DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
97. Delfino vs. st. james Hospital, Inc., G.R. No. 166735, November 23, 2007
● Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any
building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may
be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a
greater area or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the
adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot
parcel of land where such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance.
● It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that
the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical
institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
● From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is erroneous. As
stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both zoning ordinances will disclose
that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance
such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have
been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly
indicates that the allowable uses in the residential zone have been delimited only to those
expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no
longer includes hospitals.
With respect to respondent’s claim that the controversy must now be decided in light of
latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance, it must be
stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994 when respondent St. James
Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution,
at which time, the zoning ordinance in effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a wellsettled rule that the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is
the applicable law notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal.
● Hence, in resolving the instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the
legality or illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time
of the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of its
subsequent amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance.
98. United BF Homes vs City Mayor of Paranaque, G.R. No. 41010, February 7, 2007
● Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the
legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. Among the functions of the Sangguniang
Bayan enumerated under Section 447 of RA 7160 are:
(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the
development plans, program objectives and priorities of the municipality as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to agroindustrial development and countryside growth and progress, and relative
thereto, shall:
xxxx
(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality:
Provided, That the formulation, adoption, or modification of said plan
shall be in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive
land use plan;
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality subject
to the pertinent provision of this Code;
(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulate the construction, repair or modification of
buildings within aid fire limits or zones in accordance with the
provisions of the Fire Code;
● The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the nonimpairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
morals and general welfare.
● While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee.
99. Tatel vs Municipality of Virac, G.R. 40243, March 11, 1992
● It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the
police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the
Administrative Code, which reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
● For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
100. Technology Developers, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 94759, January 21, 1991
● The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is
concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
Economy. It is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives
of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
101. Smart Communications vs. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas, G.R. No. 204429, February
18, 2014
● Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local government unit
shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government." Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC
grants the taxing powers to each local government unit.
Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees,
and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for the
scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities while Section 147 of the
same law provides for the fees and charges that may be imposed by municipalities on
business and occupation.
The LGC defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees
against persons or property, while the term "fee" means "a charge fixed by law or
ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity."
● The designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the
imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the
purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the
ordinance. Thus, "[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor
any standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but
any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without qualification or
hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do
business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but
according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the
presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being
exercised.
● An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness
though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal
authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the
amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry
are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made subject to
imposition.
102. Ferrer vs Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
● An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is void.
● Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. As to
conformity with existing statutes, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
● "[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units
of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by
establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty;
absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or
divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the
charter was granted."
● Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy
taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide."
● Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might
be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. "Under the now prevailing
Constitution , where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute , the tax power
must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and
guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and selfsufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax
powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute
and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local
government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous , the legislature
must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple
and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of
available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly
disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just."
● Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local
government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their governmental
or proprietary powers and functions.
● Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment
of their property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient
● The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the right of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise
is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill
of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.
● To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due
process clause.
● As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the mean s employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
● The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs. The provisions related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more
powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in the best position
to determine the needs of its constituents.
● One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the
LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall share with the national government the
responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their
territorial jurisdiction. In this regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management
system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation.
103. City of Davao vs. Intestate of Dalisay, G.R. No. 207791, July 15, 2015
● The owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his
representative, has the right to redeem the property within one (1) year from the date of
sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and other fees. Verily, the period of
redemption of tax delinquent properties should be counted not from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale, as previously provided by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464,
but rather on the date of sale of the tax delinquent property, as explicitly provided by
Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160.
It is worthy to note, however, that City Mayor was ultimately resolved in favor of
respondent bank because it turned out that petitioner city government enacted an
ordinance, which provided for the procedure in the collection of delinquent taxes on real
properties within its territorial jurisdiction. Section 14 (a) Paragraph 7 of the said
ordinance expressly set the redemption period within one (1) year from the date of
the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. Being a special law with
limited territorial application, the city ordinance prevailed over that of the LGC which was,
and still is, the general law on the matter. Consequently, the respondent bank had until
February 10, 2005 to redeem the subject properties counted from the date of registration
of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property on February 10, 2004. Its tender of
payment of the subject properties' tax delinquencies and other fees on June 10, 2004,
was then well within the redemption period.
● It is now apparent that the previous rule enunciating the reckoning period of redemption
for tax delinquent properties from the date of the registration of sale of the property is
no longer controlling. Section 261 now mandates that the owner of the delinquent real
property or person having legal interest therein, or his representative, has the right to
redeem the property within one (1) year from the date of sale upon payment of the
delinquent tax and other fees.
104. Fua vs. Mangrobang, 714 SCRA 428
● In the exercise of their Police Power, the Local Government can issue Protection Orders
under the Anti-Violance Against Women and their Children Act.
● The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government
Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay.
105. City of Iloilo vs. Judge Honrado, G.R. No. 160399, Dec. 9, 2015
● In the exercise of police power, an LGU can substantiate its defense of the power to
regulate businesses within its territorial jurisdiction.
106. Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
● LGU’s can exercise Police Power, however, an LGU cannot, impose an absolute ban on
public assemblies. A mayor, however, can deny the issuance of a rally permit on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
107. Telmo vs. Bustamante, G.R. No. 182567, July 13, 2009
● The desistance of the complainant does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the
administrative complaint because the Court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought. It should be remembered that the issue in
an administrative case is not whether the complaint states a cause of action against the
respondent, but whether the public officials have breached the norms and standards of
the public service. Considering that petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he summarily
removed the concrete posts erected by respondent, allegedly within the parameters of
his authority as Municipal Engineer of Naic, Cavite, it is only proper that this case be
decided on its merits rather than on the basis of the desistance of respondent.
108. Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association vs. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30,
2006
● Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi defines "taking" under the concept of eminent domain as
entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
● The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the
state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general
welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter
being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between
the two.
● Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance
prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would
result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would
promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers. In U.S. v. Toribio, the
court upheld the provisions of Act No. 1147, a statute regulating the slaughter of carabao
for the purpose of conserving an adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid exercise of
police power, notwithstanding the property rights impairment that the ordinance
imposed on cattle owners. A zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard
within certain areas was assailed as unconstitutional in that it was an invasion of the
property rights of the lumber yard owners in People v. de Guzman. The Court nonetheless
ruled that the regulation was a valid exercise of police power. A similar ruling was arrived
at in Seng Kee S Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt where an ordinance divided the City of Manila
into industrial and residential areas.
● A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where
a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued
existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However,
when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is
compensable taking.
● According to noted constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in the exercise of its police
power regulation, the state restricts the use of private property, but none of the property
interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or
for the benefit of the public. Use of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect
of the property is used by or for the public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and
it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or
any interest therein.
● If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use
or interest thereof, such restriction constitutes compensable taking. Thus, in City
Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, it was argued by the local government that an
ordinance requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of their total areas for the burial of
paupers was a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause. This
court did not agree in the contention, ruling that property taken under the police power
is sought to be destroyed and not, as in this case, to be devoted to a public use. It further
declared that the ordinance in question was actually a taking of private property without
just compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the local government. Being an exercise of eminent domain without provision
for the payment of just compensation, the same was rendered invalid as it violated the
principles governing eminent domain.
● While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or
possession of property, it need not always be the case. Taking may include trespass
without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or
prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the
establishment of an easement. In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the
imposition of burden over a private property through easement was considered taking;
hence, payment of just compensation is required.
● The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as "actual use by the
public" has already been abandoned.
109. Municipality of Cordova vs. Pathfinder Development Corporation, G.R. No. 205544,
June 29, 2016
● Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government. Its
exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be
just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, libe1iy or
property without due process of law.
● The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be validly
delegated to local government units. The basis for its exercise by the Municipality of
Cordova, being a local government unit, is granted under Section 19 of Republic Act 7160,
to wit:
● Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. -A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
● Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is limited to the following
areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking,
and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
● Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are comprised of two
stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding facts,
and (2) the determination of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for public use or purpose.
110. Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007
● In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to
take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s
consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation." It is acknowledged as "an
inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the
property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole
community."
● The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional
provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be
deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec.
1.
● However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of
myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to
"public use" is "use by the public" or "public employment," that "a duty must devolve on
the person or corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to
furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the
public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public,
to use the property after it is condemned." The more generally accepted view sees "public
use" as "public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to
enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive
power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which
leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of
capital and labor, [which] contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community." In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially
employed for the community."
● It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot
depend on the "numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of
the community to be benefited." The number of people is not determinative of whether
or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not
limited to particular individuals. Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid exercise
of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public
use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated that expropriation ends with
an order of condemnation declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation."
● Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to
the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court
of Appeals, just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation
is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must
be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly
determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing
Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a "reasonable time" from the
taking of the property. It succinctly explained that without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made
to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must
immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it
was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until
paid. Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest
per annum. However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule
that "where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property."
● Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the
expropriation authority should not further prejudice the owner’s rights by delaying
payment of just compensation. To obviate any possibility of delay in the payment, the
expropriator should already make available, at the time of the filing of the expropriation
complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal valuation or the fair market value of the
property per tax declaration whichever is higher.
● The delayed payment of just compensation in numerous cases results from lack of funds
or the time spent in the determination of the legality of the expropriation and/or the fair
valuation of the property, and could result in dismay, disappointment, bitterness, and
even rancor on the part of the lot owners. It is not uncommon for the expropriator to take
possession of the condemned property upon deposit of a small amount equal to the
assessed value of the land per tax declaration and then challenge the valuation fixed by
the trial court resulting in an "expropriate now, pay later" situation. In the event the
expropriating agency questions the reasonability of the compensation fixed by the trial
court before the appellate court, then the latter may, upon motion, use its sound
discretion to order the payment to the lot owner of the amount equal to the valuation of
the property, as proposed by the condemnor during the proceedings before the
commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, subject to the final valuation
of the land. This way, the damage and prejudice to the property owner would be
considerably pared down.
● On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property owner must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use and just
compensation and to present objections to and claims on them. It is settled that taking of
property for a private use or without just compensation is a deprivation of property
without due process of law. Moreover, it has to be emphasized that taking of private
property without filing any complaint before a court of law under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court or existing laws is patently felonious, confiscatory, and unconstitutional. Judicial
notice can be taken of some instances wherein some government agencies or
corporations peremptorily took possession of private properties and usurped the owner’s
real rights for their immediate use without first instituting the required court action.
Running roughshod over the property rights of individuals is a clear and gross breach of
the constitutional guarantee of due process, which should not be countenanced in a
society where the rule of law holds sway.
● The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is
clearly proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or
purpose. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on expropriation was
underscored, hence:
Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public as
well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has never been
understood, at least never in our republic, that the sovereign power can take the private
property of A and give it to B by the right of eminent domain; or that it can take it at all,
except for public purposes; or that it can take it for public purposes, without the duty and
responsibility of ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the private property of one, for
the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642).
● The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just
compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be
justified by a higher good—which is public use—and can only be counterbalanced by just
compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be
unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable
transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well.
111. Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay, G.R. No. 153974, August 7, 2006
● Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While
such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public
entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not
absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by
themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the
power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior"
since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a
share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the
latter cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same.
● The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right. It greatly affects a landowner’s right to private property which is a
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus,
whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the
exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
● Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still
the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
● Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain expressly
provides:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
● It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain, to wit:
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
● The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. A valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
● The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires
an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the
municipal council will not suffice.
● A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and the
reason for this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise
by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution,
it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19
of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance. x x x
112. Moday vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997
● Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be
valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
● The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be
taken.
113. Masikip vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
●
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and
lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. ' A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not
accepted.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from 'the
necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. In City of
Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that 'necessity within the rule that the particular
property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the
property owner consistent with such benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the
records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated
November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the
nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically
public.
114. Iloilo City vs. Legaspi, G.R. No. 154614, November 25, 2004
● The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial.
● In City of Manila v. Serrano, this Court ruled that "hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in Rep. Act
No. 7279 Urban Development and Housing Act. x x x The determination of this question
must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for
the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated." From the foregoing, it is
clear that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance with the requirements
for socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to
determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with
the requirements for socialized housing.
● For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in
form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no
hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and
substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination
of the allegations of the complaint. In this case, the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint
was further confirmed by public respondent when he set the case for pre-trial and
hearing.
115. Ortega vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 181562-63, October 2, 2009
● Expropriation proceedings speak of two (2) stages, i.e.:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation [or order of
expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint; and
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.
An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the
petitioner to condemn the respondents’ properties. Because an order of expropriation
merely determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just
compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just compensation if, in
the first place, the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the property was not first clearly
established.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing just
compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied to the case at bar,
Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its
complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.
● The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation.
116. Ros vs. DAR, G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
● Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current
use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure
for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the
tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.
● Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land.
● Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to the
conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the
authority of DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its
effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
● The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act
No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be
construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."
117. Manila vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
● The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise
is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill
of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
● To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
● The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social
and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives
of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
● It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all
reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the
community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of
the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private
rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed"
under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
118. Batangas CATV vs. CA, G.R. No. 138810, October 20, 2004
● Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national
legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test
its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
● Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan, Justice Moreland
said: "An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right." In De la Cruz v. Paraz, we laid the
general rule "that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."
● The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No.
436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the
matters within the NTC's exclusive domain.
119. City of Caloocan vs. CA, G.R. No. 145004, May 03, 2006
● The mayor has the authority to file suits for the recovery of funds and property on behalf
of the city even without the prior authorization from the Sanggunian.
120. Dynamic Builders and Construction Co., Inc. vs. Presbitero, G.R. No. 174201, April 7,
2015
● This is consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's policy that "the State shall ensure the
expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure
projects to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs
and to immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom. This policy
declaration does not distinguish between national and local government infrastructure
projects. Delay in the project will only mean additional costs for the government and
prejudice to the people of the Municipality of Valladolid who will directly benefit from the
Construction Shoreline Protection Project.
121. Zamora vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 147767, January 14, 2004
● Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : “A majority of all members of the Sanggunian who
have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business.”
Quorum is defined as the “number of members of a body which, when legally assembled,
will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful
body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act.” When
required to constitute a quorum, “majority” means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian. Quorum
should, thus, be based on the total number of members regardless of whether or not a
member is said to be abroad. Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during
sessions deemed to have not met the required quorum, such sessions and decisions shall
be considered void.
122. Liga ng mga barangay national vs. Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004
● First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated
unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked
only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
● Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority
to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The Court agreed that respondent's act was in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone,
certiorari will not lie.
● Second, the Court concludes that petitioners seek the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction. The Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction
over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Third, the Court stated that petitioner clearly disregarded the hierarchy of courts. There is
no reason or circumstance given by petition on why direct recourse to the Court be
allowed.
● The Court has decided that disregard to the hierarchy of courts can be allowed by two
reasons:
(1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and
(2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
123. Ferrer vs Roco, Jr., G.R. No. 174129, July 5, 2010
● Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may
be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of the provisions in
an instrument or statute.
124. Albon vs. Fernando, G.R. No. 148357, June 30, 2006
● Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set
forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers
delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs
may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Also, in the exercise of their inherent police power the cities and municipalities have the
power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may
be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the
needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure
facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the
nature of ownership of the sidewalks in question, there is also no hindrance in declaring
that the sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by PD1216, mandates
subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the
use of the general.