ATTY. ALEXIS MEDINA
CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
NATIONAL TERRITORY
(1) MAGALLONA V. ERMITA, G.R NO. 187167,
AUGUST 16, 2011
FACTS:
In order to comply with UNCLOS III, Congress amended RA
3046 by enacting RA 9522.
UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf.
RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of
islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
The Case: This original action for the writs of certiorari and
prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.
Petitioners: Professors of law, law students and a
legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators,"
In order to comply with UNCLOS III, Congress amended RA
3046 by enacting RA 9522.
RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around
the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
2019-2020
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Arguments for the action for the writs of certiorari and
prohibition: TERRITORIAL DIMUNITION
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in
violation
of
Article
1
of
the
1987
Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12; and
(2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.13
Arguments of the respondents:
(1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’
alleged lack of locus standi; and
(2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this
suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the
proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522.
3. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
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1.
On
the
Threshold
Issues
Petitioners
Possess
Locus
Standi as Citizens
The case undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Owing to the peculiar nature
of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other
litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for
granting citizenship standing.17
2.
The
Writs
of
Certiorari
and
Prohibition
Are
Proper
Remedies
to
Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In ordinary civil proceedings writs cannot issue absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.
However when Supreme Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, they have viewed the writs of
certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test
the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of
other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional
import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while
having no bearing on the personal interests of the
petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that
the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance
with
the
letter
of
procedural
rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.
3.1
RA
RA
9522
9522
is
is
Not
a
to
Demarcate
the
Maritime
Zones
and
Shelf
Under
UNCLOS
III,
Delineate Philippine Territory
2019-2020
Country’s
Continental
not
to
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss)
of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in
the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to
land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.
RA 9522 mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like
ours could not be any clearer:
Unconstitutional
Statutory
Tool
Page 2 of 112
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental
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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shall be measured
from
archipelagic
baselines drawn
in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
2019-2020
the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago.
This gives notice to the rest of the international community
of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other
portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of
the archipelago."
3.2
RA
9522’s
Use
of
the
Framework
of
Regime
of
Islands
to
Determine
the
Maritime
Zones
of
the
KIG
and
the
Scarborough
Shoal,
not
Inconsistent
with
the
Philippines’
Claim
of
Sovereignty
Over these Areas
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and
RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that
RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and
adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with
UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of
baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and
RA
9522,
by
optimizing
the
location
of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
Note: Where there are overlapping exclusive economic
zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.
As to KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Section 2 of the law
commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over both:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over
which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty
and
jurisdiction shall
be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted
under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough
Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III:
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Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of
such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three
per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under
Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine
areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of
the air space over archipelagic waters and of
their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State
extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space
over the archipelagic waters, as well as to
their bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other
respects
affect
the
status
of
the
archipelagic
waters, including
the
sea
lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters
and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein. (Emphasis
supplied)
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of
its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under
Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.
3.3
Statutory
Claim
Over
Sabah
under
RA 5446 Retained
Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial
sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines
of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the
Philippines
has
acquired
dominion
and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
3.4
UNCLOS
III
and
RA
Incompatible
with
the
Delineation of Internal Waters
9522
not
Constitution’s
2019-2020
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
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maintaining
unimpeded,
expeditious
international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political
branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills
drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law
norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine
law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic
waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and
sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser
footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights
through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right
to
claim
all
the
waters
landward
of
their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
2019-2020
archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than
24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under
UNCLOS III.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the
Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously
part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to
coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III,
however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial
sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text
of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS
III55 and
we
find
petitioners’
reading
plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury
of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic
State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth
of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This
is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit
the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in
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any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(1) IMBONG V. OCHOA, G.R. NO. 204819, APRIL 8,
2014
CITIZENSHIP
(1) DAVID V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R.
NO. 221538, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner. He prays for the nullification of the assailed
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in
SET. In this Petition for Quo Warranto, Petitioner David
questioned the qualifications of sitting Senator Mary Grace
Poe-Llamanzares on two grounds, namely: that being a
foundling whose parents are unknown, she is not a natural
born Filipino citizen; and that she lacks the residency
requirement provided by law.
After the issues had been joined, the Tribunal called the
parties and their respective counsel to a Preliminary
Conference. During the Preliminary Conference, Petitioner
David agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground
of prescription.
Thereafter, the Tribunal heard the parties in Oral Argument.
On 17 November 2015, the Tribunal promulgated its
Decision, dismissing the petition for quo warranto. The
Tribunal ruled that Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is
a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and
continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the
2019-2020
1987 Constitution. The Tribunal further ruled that she validly
reacquired her natural-born citizen under R.A. 9225 and
validly renounced her American citizenship.
The decision of the Tribunal was upheld by the Supreme
Court in its decision rendered on 20 September 2016 in G.R.
No. 221538 (David vs. SET and Mary Grace PoeLlamanzares).
ISSUES:
Whether or not the SET acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in its
Resolution holding Grace Poe a natural-born Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No.
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission),
have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral
tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope
of any review.
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial
review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained
that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction,
. . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
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jurisdiction, or
paraphrasing
with
grave
CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
abuse
of
discretion
or
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
in judgment.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in
its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation,
are ignored or not accounted for
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law
while needfully considering the established personal
circumstances of private respondent.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both
of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.
2019-2020
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement
in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but
the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text.
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is
necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the
whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'
commencement from birth means that private respondent
never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.
Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born
citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything
to perfect her citizenship.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent
went through the actual naturalization process.
Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of
natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and
proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.
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It should be with the actual process of naturalization that
natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other
procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may
be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of
citizens
existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath."
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise.
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired
natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of
the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office,
as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings
cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden
them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is
not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition
as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen,
re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following
her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she
complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
(2) POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC, G.R. NO.
221697, MARCH 8, 2016
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
(Emiliano) and his wife. When petitioner was five (5) years
old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. Having reached the age
of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a
voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 4
April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the
U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,[251] Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other
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candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004,
petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of
her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of
her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate. The couple began preparing for
their resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for
the next semester. coordination with property movers for
the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars
from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in
bringing their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the
petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. In late March 2006,
petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their
address in the U.S. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Again, petitioner registered
as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new
Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. On 6
October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB). On 12 July 2011, the
petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States.". On 9 December 2011, the
U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
2019-2020
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. Petitioner's filing of
her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.Petitioner's claim
that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections.
ISSUE:
1) WON GRACE POE IS A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES
2) WON GRACE POE SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENTS
AS
MANDATED
CONSTITUTION
RESIDENCY
BY
THE
HELD:
(THE 4 REASON WHY THE SC RULED IN FAVOR OF
GPOE ON CITIZENSHIP)
1-A) At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is
more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. The Solicitor
General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the
total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the
nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height,
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2019-2020
flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes
and an oval face.
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted.
1-B) As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, naturalborn citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an
intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
1-D) Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation
1-C) Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
D.1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.
D.2) The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
D.3) n 1986, the country also ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old. That the Philippines is not a party
to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party
to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. this Court noted
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that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally
accepted principle of international law." Another case where
the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is
Mijares v. Ranada, where only four countries had "either
ratified or acceded to" the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in
2005. In sum, all of the international law conventions and
instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which
suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations
2) (RESIDENCY) The Constitution requires presidential
candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. When petitioner
immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. Petitioner presented
voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the
Philippines for good. The foregoing evidence were
undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and
Valdez cases. the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a
permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her
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U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from
U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their
address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation
Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on
24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in
Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed,
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good. It was grave abuse
of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could
be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no
means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC
was overcome by evidence. For another, it could not be said
that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against
her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from
which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A.
No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of
her senatorial candidacy. In sum, the COMELEC, with the
same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the
United States of America. In light of all these, it was
arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the
case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation,
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to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner
in her COC for Senator.
POWERS AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
(1) IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
MOVEMENTS V. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY, JANUARY 15, 2015
FACTS:
This case involves proposed bills abolishing the judiciary
Development Fund and replacing it with the “Judiciary
Support Fund.” Funds collected from proposed Judiciary
Support Fund shall be remitted to the national treasury and
congress shall determine how the funds will be used.
Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinas filed house bill
No. 4690, which would require the Supreme Court to remit
its judiciary development Fund Collection to the National
Treasury.
A week later, Iloilo representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed
House bill No. 4738 entitled “The Act Creating the Judicial
Support Fund (JSF) under national treasury, repealing for
the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949”
The petitioner Rolly Mijares filed a petition arguing that
congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of
the Supreme Court.”
In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino
citizen, and a concerned taxpayer." He filed this petition as
part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the
Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is
concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this
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court promulgated Priority Development Assistance
Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement
Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014.
With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress should not act as
"wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of
the High Tribunal Congress committed a "blunder of
monumental proportions" when it reduced the judiciary's
2015 budget.
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable
contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution to better serve public interest and general
welfare of the people."
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown
grounds for the Supreme Court to grant the petition and
issue a writ of mandamus.
HELD:
The court denied the petition. Petitioner must comply with
all the requisites for judicial review before the Supreme
Court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power;
2. The person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement;
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3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
In the case at bar, however, there was no actual
Controversy. As emphasized in Information Technology
Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on Elections:
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court
to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be
an actual case or controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution”.
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not
before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain
Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion
the legislative mill according to its internal rules. A proposed
bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under
the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws.
It
cannot
speculate
on
the
constitutionality
or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not
pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are
not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore,
does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe
for this court's determination.
THE PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL STANDING
Direct Injury Test- person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
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case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result."
By applying the test, Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is
passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence
is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the
requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a
proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.
Transcendental importance principle as an exception
to the requisites of locus standi not applicable.
to invoke aforesaid doctrine the following must be
present: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.
In this case, None of the determinants in Francisco are
present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are
merely speculative and conjectural.
(2) LIBERTY BROADCASTING V. ATLOCOM WIRELESS
SYSTEM, G.R. NO. 205875, JUNE 30, 2015
(3) SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE V. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL, G.R. NO. 178552, OCTOBER 5, 2010
FACTS:
Following its effectivity on July 15, 2007, petitioners (nongovernmental organizations, partylists, concern citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers) filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act
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No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect
our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and
PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have
been subjected to "close security surveillance by state
security forces," their members followed by "suspicious
persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their
offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise
claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the
[S]tate."
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their
claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the
Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing
of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo,
Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP,
also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief
of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
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National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau
of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil
Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money
Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review. NO
RULING:
The petitions fail.
1. Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who
do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any
modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or
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in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
1.2. Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of
the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only
that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also
that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
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illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner
has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and
personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal
interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later
be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus
standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge
under RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD
and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581,
would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The
tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under
the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461
pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging"
of petitioners.
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Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3)
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the
course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true
and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications,
are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
2019-2020
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared
terrorist organization, the United States of America (US) and
the European Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA
and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The
Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US
and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet
to be filed before the courts an application to declare the
CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully
and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
The dismissed rebellion charges, do not save the day for
petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior
to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court.
For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made
more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the
enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with
rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their
claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law
does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its
members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently
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demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover,
both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single
arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and
Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also
conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, "which must be settled early"
and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of
any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have
been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human
rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe
litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual,
or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result
of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy
cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is
proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must
rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for
any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged
any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the
law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.
2019-2020
1.3. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or
controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when
there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court ruled
that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance"
and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no
way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From
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these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372
does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm
of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted
by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
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becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation
is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully
mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable
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to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in
terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In
fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it
refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on
free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would,
essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
not before it.
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
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overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claim
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties. (Emphasis in the original omitted;
underscoring supplied.)
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against
them
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There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier
cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be
culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under
any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or
under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the
commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the
desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the
law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element
of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,
there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into
a protected speech.
Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
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element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a
victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions,
or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the
doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the
law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of
the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a
fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only
as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here
were as in most instances brought about through speaking
or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal
merely
because
the conduct
was, in
part,
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,
either spoken, written, or printed.
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected
conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct. Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot
heed the call for a facial analysis.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
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used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.
4. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED
SEASCAPE OF TAÑON STRAIT V. SECRETARY REYES,
G.R. NO. 180771, APRIL 21, 2015
5. BAGUILAT V. ALVAREZ, JULY 25, 2017, G.R. NO.
227757
FACTS:
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th
Congress, several news articles surfaced about Rep.
Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or
appointment
of
President
Rodrigo
Roa
Duterte's
Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or
the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in
Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the
endorsement of President Duterte and the majority
partisans.
Prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Fariñas and
Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before
the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the
former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker
shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for
the other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b)
those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority
Leader shall be elected by the members of the
Minority. Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were
held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez,
eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for
Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(1)] registering a no
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vote," thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly
elected Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the
House – where the candidate who garnered the second
(2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be
declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However,
despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep.
Baguilat was never recognized as such.
One of the "abstentionists," Representative, manifested
before the Plenary that those who did not vote for Speaker
Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and
elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
Thereafter, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Fariñas moved for
the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. This
was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that
various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as
Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a
member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez,
and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b)
that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes
in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are
supposed to be considered independent members of the
House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the
Minority. However,
Rep.
Lagman's
opposition
was
overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially
recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus,
insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the
Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition"
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in the House where the candidate who garnered the second
(2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader
position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ
of mandamus to recognize:
(a)
Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House
of Representatives; and
(b)
petitioners as the only legitimate members of the
House Minority.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
The petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought.
The election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without
objection from any member of Congress, including herein
petitioners.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its
entire membership. Said provision also states that the
House of Representatives may decide to have officers other
than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to
how these officers are chosen is something within its sole
control. In
the
case
of Defensor-Santiago
v.
Guingona, which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate
Minority Leader during the 11thCongress, this Court
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observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the
manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner
of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that
the Charter says is that '[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court."
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body
at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of the House of
Representatives]." Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that
exclusive
realm,
without
running
afoul
of
[C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the
Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House
of Representatives].”
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception.
While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning an act of the political departments of
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government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety
of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion. This stems from the expanded
concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing
text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power
to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed
by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government."
PRINCIPLE: This case concerns an internal matter of a
coequal, political branch of government which, absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially
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interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this
Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach
of the separation of powers doctrine. Verily, "[i]t would be
an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself.
6. ARAULLO V. AQUINO, G.R. NO. 209287, 01 JULY
2014
FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada
delivered a privileged speech in the Senate of the Philippines
to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been
allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato
Corona.
Responding to Senator Estrada's revelation, Secretary
Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled
Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program, explaining that the funds released to the Senators
had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He
clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators
based on their letter of request for funding; and that it was
not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made
because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to
ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused
the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow
down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were
usually from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
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Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4)
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been
realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the
savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations,
like
unreleased
Personnel
Services
appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings;
and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for
slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier
released to the agencies of the National Government.
ISSUE:
Whether the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
National Circular Budget (NBC) No. 541, and all other
executive issuances implementing the DAP are valid and
constitutional.
RULING:
No.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section
25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is
a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are
savings generated from the appropriations for their
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respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize
the transfers of funds under the DAP, hence, transfers under
the DAP are unconstitutional. A reading of the provisions
shows that the provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012
were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying
the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section
25 (5). The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices"
was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices
(i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item
of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase ("to augment any item of this
Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings
to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged
to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the
2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution.
There were no savings from which funds could be sourced
for the DAP. The DBM declares that part of the savings
brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services
appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year,
unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear
legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unallotted
appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the
appropriations are unreleased or unallotted is a mere
description of the status of the items as unallotted or
unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of
items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations
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have been considered "released" if there has already been
an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority.
No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP
to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA. Under
careful review of the documents contained in the seven
evidence packets, the Court concludes that the "savings"
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not
covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
The failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an
expense category sufficiently indicated that Congress
purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the
PAP concerned. This indicated becomes clearer when even
the President himself did not recommend in the NEP to fund
the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring
expenditure that did not receive any appropriation under the
GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would
go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in enacting
the GAAs. That happened in some instances under the
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DAP.
Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited
by the Constitution. By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their
respective offices," Section 25 (5) had delineated borders
between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one
office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or
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items. Thus, the Court calls the transfers of funds crossborder transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section
25 (5) refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the
President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President;
the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker;
the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective
Chairpersons.
7. BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO.
208566, NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS:
This case involves consolidated petitions taken under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
RULING:
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law
states that the first two are the most important and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
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The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund— are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents [lineitem budgeting scheme and the President’s declaration that
he had already “abolished the PDAF]. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits. However, even on the assumption of mootness,
jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that “the “moot and
academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners — they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter
alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
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of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and
local autonomy. The applicability of the second exception is
also apparent from the nature of the interests involved —
the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue
to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. The Court also finds the third
exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for
by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of
annual occurrence.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies
when there is found, among others, “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or
“the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.”
The issues raised before the Court do not present political
but legal questions which are within its province to resolve.
A political question refers to “those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
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authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
act upon.
C. Locus Standi.
“The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.”
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel
System” under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
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Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised
may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.”
Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void
Violation of separation of powers: The PDAF/”Pork
Barrel System” violates the principle of separation of
powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the postenactment phases of project implementation, such as
project identification, fund release and fund realignment,
thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Violation of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates
the principle of non-delegation of legislative power
considering that an individual legislator is given the
authority to dictate (a) how much fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that he himself also
determines, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress.
Undermining the system of checks and balance: The
PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines the system of
checks and balance by impairing the President’s item veto
power. For the President to exercise his item-veto power,
there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of
the veto. Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. The legislator’s
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identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.
Undermining public accountability: The PDAF/”Pork
Barrel System” undermines public accountability by
impairing Congress’ oversight functions considering that
legislators would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate. It also violates the
constitutional prohibition on legislators’ intervention on
matters where he may be called upon to act.
Violation of local autonomy: The PDAF/”Pork Barrel
System” violates the constitutional principles on local
autonomy as it allows district representatives who are
national officers to substitute the judgement of local officials
on use of public funds for local development. A Congressman
can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own.
8. NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, 25 MARCH 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with
ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The Project was to be
financed by the People's Republic of China.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by
sending invitations those involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October
25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26
hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other
dates.
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On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before
respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed
that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and
testify on November 20, 2007. However, in a letter,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Thus, on
November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. Petitioner replied to respondent Committees,
manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions
were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his
counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others
that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the
order of the President; and (2) his conversation with
President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders
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in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
petitioner's request that he "be furnished in advance" as to
what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately
prepare for the hearing.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter. Respondent
Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory.
Without responding to his request for advance notice of the
matters that he should still clarify, they issued
the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt
of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:
1) The communications between petitioner and the
President are covered by the principle of
"executive privilege."
2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent
Senate Committees in accordance with the lawmaking body's power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.
3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused
its discretion for alleged non-compliance with
the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.
As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired. On
March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the
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Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
ISSUES:
1. Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege? YES
2. did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt Order? YES
RULING:
The subject Order citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in
contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his
arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
The Communications Elicited by the Three
Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege
(3)
A- There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege
Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464
•
The cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed
Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements
of presidential
communications
privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
- the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to
enter
into executive
agreements without
the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
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2) The communication must be authored or "solicited
and received" by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the
President.
- Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet.
3)
The presidential
communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that
the information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
- there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
- Here, the record is bereft of any categorical
explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the
three (3) questions in the enactment of a law.
Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the
same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the
oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw
the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an
inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of
Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the
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content of the questions and the manner the inquiry
is conducted.
-"demonstrated,
specific
need
for
evidence
in pending criminal trial" outweighs the President's
"generalized
interest
in
confidentiality."
The
information in the case at bar is elicited, not in a
criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In
this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity
of the claim of executive privilege depends not only
on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural
setting or the context in which the claim is made.
- The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need
has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether
the subpoenaed materials are critical to the
performance of its legislative functions. There is a
clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks
and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any
institution engaged in like functions. While factfinding by a legislative committee is undeniably
a part of its task, legislative judgments normally
depend more on the predicted consequences of
proposed legislative actions and their political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the
basis of conflicting information provided in its
hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand
jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that certain named
individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. We
see no comparable need in the legislative
process, at least not in the circumstances of this
case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have
been in the Committee's argument that the
subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative
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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
judgments has been substantially undermined by
subsequent events.
•
Respondent Committees further contend that the
grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern.
- We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours.
-The right to public information, like any other right,
is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation,
i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws
are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, Article
229 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k) of R.A.
No. 3019, and Section 24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. These are in addition to what our body of
jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger
concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a
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recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
certain information. We find the information subject
of this case belonging to such kind.
-The right of Congress or any of its Committees to
obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be
equated with the people's right to public information.
The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry
is an exercise of the people's right to information.
Clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and
the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force
as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen
the power to exact testimony from government
officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not
to an individual citizen.
Thus,
while
Congress
is
composed
of
representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense,
that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not
invoke as justification in their exercise of power a
right properly belonging to the people in general. This
is because when they discharge their power, they do
so as public officials and members of Congress. Be
that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in appropriate
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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those
pertaining to delicate interplay of executivelegislative powers and privileges which is the subject
of careful review by numerous decided cases.
•
privileged. The following
satisfies the requirement:
In the case of Executive Secretary Ermita premised
his claim of executive privilege on of presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege
on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be
properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which
has control over the matter." A formal and proper
claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and
certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves
as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly
states that "this Office is constrained to invoke
the settled doctrine of executive privilege as
refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly."
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain
reason," we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave
respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as
statement
of
grounds
The context in which executive privilege is
being invoked is that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature
in which these information were conveyed to
the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect.
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly
Invoked
•
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Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law."
1. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
2. Respondent Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the
invitations should contain the "possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry," along with "the
usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof."
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Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under
Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This
must be so to ensure that the rights of both
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are
respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of
the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite
petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did
not send him an advance list of questions.
3. a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees'
January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of
the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was
present during the deliberation.
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its
members, may punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or
refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of its members."
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the
members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did
not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign
the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to
the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
4.We find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with
the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the
OSG's explanation:
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure'
requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
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rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are
held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's
membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem
fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure,
the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
5. Respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order
is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that
respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling.
Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
"unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the Order citing
him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and
detention. A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not
an unwilling witness.
9. NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE, 04 SEPTEMBER 2008
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, Neri appeared before the
respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on
the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a
project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner
therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe
of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed
PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when he was probed further on PGMA’s
and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The
questions that he refused to answer were:
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1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project;
2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it; and
3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s
answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear
and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November
15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense
with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.
The petitioner did not appear before the respondent
committees upon orders of the President invoking exec
privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are
covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal
system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold
that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown
that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions; and
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(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
RULING:
1. There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential
Communications Privilege
The Court articulated in these cases that, “”the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings.”
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a
specific matter involving an executive agreement between
the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three
(3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of
the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual
setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon
in Senate v. Ermita.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution
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2. There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the
Communications Elicited by the three (3) Questions
Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to
secure a foreign loan does not relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power,” because the Constitution
does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the
Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of
another entity does not make such power less executive.
The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President
has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its
decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power. In the
same way that certain legislative acts require action from
the President for their validity does not render such acts less
legislative in nature.
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity” was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
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Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration
of the application of the “doctrine of operational proximity”
for the reason that “it maybe misconstrued to expand the
scope of the presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are ‘operationally
proximate’ to the President but who may have “no direct
communications with her.”
It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational
proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed Case precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to
a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter
ego and a member of her official family.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency,
accountability and disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in
relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate
v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the
Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect
for a coordinate and co-equal department.
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Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
In PMPF v. Manglapus, .” The Resolution went on to state,
thus:The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of
authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature.
With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of
constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people
to information and public accountability and transparency,
the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support
respondent Committees’ case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional
right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are
the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government. In the case at bar, this Court, in
upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3)
specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right
to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could
continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to
testify again.
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3. Respondent Committees Failed to Show that the
Communications Elicited by the Three Questions are
Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past
decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling
need for disclosure of the information covered by executive
privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees
argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions
are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions,
among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate
Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees,
since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of
the President in order to gather information which, according
to said respondents, would “aid” them in crafting legislation.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot
be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical
and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial
power to adjudicate actual controversies.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not
critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by
courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before
this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly
admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions.
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In other words, the information being elicited is not so
critical after all.
therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations
of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
Oversight Function of the Congress
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected
such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information
in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in
instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress.44 And if this is
the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking
the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even
contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in
nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not
investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight
function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation
cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the Ombudsman is
the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws
to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of
anomaly are true and who are liable therefor.
4. Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the
“Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true
that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal
processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government,
however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the
Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance
its
of
of
by
We do not believe that respondent Committees have the
discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt
power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not
promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is
the witness who has the highest stake in the proper
observance of the Rules.
Congress as a “continuing body”
On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this
Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing”, as
it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it.
Ruling: Motion for Reconsideration Denied.
NOTES:
“Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment
of something, the concentrated essence of substance.
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“non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility
remains with the obligor.
Restrictions on the right to information: (1) national security
matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3)
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
National security matters include state secrets regarding
military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on
inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that
even where there is no need to protect such state secrets,
they must be “examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection.”
10. LAGMAN V. MEDIALDEA, JULY 4, 2017, G.R. NO.
231658
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao, which was allegedly due to the the series
of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
On June 5, 2017, Lagman, et. al. filed a petition under the
third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which asks the Court to: (1) exercise its
specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and (2) render a
Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216 for lack
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of sufficient factual basis. They argued that the declaration
of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there
is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of
Mindanao and that:
the acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not
constitute rebellion since there is no proof that
its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part
thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its
laws, or its territory;
the
President’s
Report
contained
false,
inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts;
the President acted alone and did not consult the
military establishment or any ranking official
before making the proclamation;
The Cullamat Petition, anchored on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, likewise seeks the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it
lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in
Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. In
particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in
Proclamation No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi
City only and not in the entire region of Mindanao.
According to the Mohamad Petition (filed under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution), on the other hand, the
factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the
imposition of martial law. It asserts that the Marawi
incidents “do not equate to the existence of a public
necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would
compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”
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The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution vests the Court with the authority or power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
of martial law. The OSG, however, posits that although
Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed
to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the
“appropriate proceeding” mentioned therein may be
resorted to. The OSG suggests that the “appropriate
proceeding” referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be
availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari
petition, either under Sections 1 or 5, of Article VIII.
The OSG contends the following:
the burden lies not with the respondents but with
the petitioners to prove that Proclamation No.
216 is bereft of factual basis;
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specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
A plain reading of the Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas.
The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether
the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18,
Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the
provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial
Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department.
the sufficiency of the factual basis must be
assessed from the trajectory or point of view of
the President and based on the facts available to
him at the time the decision was made; and
the President could validly rely on intelligence
reports coming from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
ISSUE(s) & RULING(s):
Whether or not the present petitions are the “appropriate
proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution?
The jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and
The following reasons make the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII sui generis:
any citizen may file it;
the issue is limited to the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the exercise by the Chief
Executive of his emergency powers;
the usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for
Certiorari is likewise not applicable
President’s power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and/or to declare martial law
vis-à-vis
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Court’s power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
for such suspension/declaration
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and
public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the
following limits in the exercise of these powers:
a time limit of sixty days;
review and possible revocation by Congress; and
review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court.
Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must
be based only on facts or information known by or available
to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him
to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing
at the time the declaration was made or past events.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of
all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require precision in the President’s appreciation of facts
would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process
of his decision-making.
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Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated
in the proclamation and the written report are not enough
reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or
suspension as long as there are other facts in the
proclamation and the written Report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and
that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension.
The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual
basis are as follows:
actual rebellion or invasion;
public safety requires it; (the first two requirements must
concur) and
there is probable cause for the President to believe that
there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in
Marawi City. However, they insist that the armed hostilities
do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of
culpable political purpose.
A review of the aforesaid facts stated in the President’s
Report similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists.
The President’s conclusion, that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal
from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion
of its territory and the deprivation of the President from
performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after
a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
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The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated
in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false,
inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not
persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about
absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts
because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President
in responding to an urgent situation.
Petitioners also argue that there is no sufficient basis to
declare
that
public
interest
requires
such
suspension/declaration.
In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed
not only against government forces or establishments but
likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition
and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools
and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken and
killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male
Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services
and delivery of basic services were hampered;
reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement
were hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao
Island was compromised.
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully
complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual
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basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion
exists and that public safety requires the martial law
declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Petitioners also aver that the territorial scope of
Proclamation No. 216 should on be Marawi City only and not
in the entire region of Mindanao, because the related events
are only happening in Marawi City.
Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the
discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part
thereof under martial law x x x In fine, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the “range” of actual rebellion and public
safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no
fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract
nature defies precise measurements; hence, the
determination of the territorial scope of martial law could
only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables.
FINAL RULING: The SC found sufficient factual bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and declared it as
constitutional.
11. PADILLA V. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. NO. 231671, JULY 25, 2017
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group
of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public
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safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a
continuing injury to their rights.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation, or on
May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the
Senate.
Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they
all have locus standi in their "assertion of a public right"
which they have been deprived of when the Congress
refused and/or failed to convene in joint session to
deliberate on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and
his Report to the Congress, the declaration of a state of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the
series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed
against civilians and government authorities, institutions,
and establishments perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and
Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and
foreign armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to sow lawless
violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region
for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or
Islamic Province in Mindanao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to
convene jointly upon the President's proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
Petitioners raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is
required to convene in joint session, deliberate, and vote
jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the Constitution".
Petitioners claim that there is an actual case or controversy
in this instance and that their case is ripe for adjudication.
According to petitioners, the resolutions separately passed
by the Senate and the House of Representatives, which
express support as well as the intent not to revoke President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, injure their rights "to a
proper [and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration
of martial law" and that the continuing failure of the
HELD:
The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not
constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except
to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or
suspension.
By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to
revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually
refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, subject
to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly"
shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting
will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence
of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement
that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x
x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress
revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
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suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to
vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it
is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, under all circumstances.
12. SAGUISAG V. OCHOA, G.R. NO. 212426, JANUARY
12, 2016
FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et.
al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between
the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection
to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of
a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction
under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on
foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally,
they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is
evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that
EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT).
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Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the
allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it
provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military
bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment
of U.S. military bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way
to their original petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did
not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty
despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature of
EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably
categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of
agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section
25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the
Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense
with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal
mandate with which they are concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of
noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve
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arrangements on the implementation of existing policies,
rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
a) to adjust the details of a treaty;
b) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or
c) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers
under the Constitution.
The raison
d’etre of
executive
agreements
on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
hinges
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a
domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms
and designations of international agreements, ranging from
the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal,
solemn instrument – to engagements concluded in modern,
simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms:
treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum
of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction
between a treaty and an international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties,
international
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agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a
mere variation in form, or that the constitutional
requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an
optional constitutional directive. There remain two very
important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into terms of art in the
domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an
express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts
the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create
new international obligations that are not expressly allowed
or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered
superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive
agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of
legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is
an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes
precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement
is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to
illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA
and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole web of
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Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It
suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that
EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.
We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional.
It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the
MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the
face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise.
13. BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
07 DECEMBER 2010
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of GR No. 192935 and 193036,
both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of EO No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
"Creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010."
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. He assails EO No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Sec. 1, Art. VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.
The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.
Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
During the May 2010 election Pres. Aquino declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." To
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transform his campaign slogan into reality, he found a need
for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration. Thus, the President signed EO No. 1 on July
30, 2010.
The PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has
been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper
and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public
office, as an ad hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Sec. 37, Chap. 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUES:
The following are the principal issues to be resolved:
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1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the
powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; and
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
equal protection clause.
RULING:
1. No, the Court stated that while the power to create a
truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the
creation of the PTC finds justification under Sec. 17,
Art. VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
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mean that he is bereft of such authority. As explained
in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back
the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that
"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inherit in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent
in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.
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Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
stated above, the powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed.
On the charge that EO No. 1 transgresses the power
of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of
a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly,
there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further,
there is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General,
"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission." Moreover, since the
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations,
there is no impropriety in the funding.
2. No, contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will
not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to
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conduct a fact-finding investigation." The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them, is certainly not a function given to the
commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its
investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact
and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from
that of the petitioners. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman.
The Court emphasized that the power of investigation
granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution
and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges against public employees and officials is
likewise concurrently shared with the DOJ. Despite
the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991,
the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with
the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians
to investigate complaints against local elective
officials.
Also, EO No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
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unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases.
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out
of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s
primordial duties.
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aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws.
3. Yes, although the purpose of the Truth Commission
falls within the investigative power of the President,
the Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of EO No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Sec. 1, Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its
authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III,
Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no
means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of
crimes.
Finally, nowhere in EO No. 1 can it be inferred that
the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of
latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
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"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the
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classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
Applying these precepts to this case, EO No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration"
only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
14. AGUINALDO V. AQUINO, G.R. NO. 224302,
NOVEMBER 29, 2016
FACTS:
In 2015, JBC called for applications/recommendations for
the 6 newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. After screening and selection of applicants,
JBC submitted to PNoy 6 shortlists contained in 6 separate
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letters. PNoy issued the appointment papers for Musngi,
Cruz, Econg, Mendoza-Arcega, Miranda and Trespeses, who
took their oaths of office before CJ Sereno and Assoc Justice
Jardeleza.
Petitioners were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. They contended that only
nominees for the position of the 16th Associate Justice may
be appointed as the 16th Associate Justice, and the same
goes for the nominees for each vacancies for the 17th, 18th,
19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices. They insisted that
PNoy could only choose 1 nominee from each of the 6
separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific
vacancy, and no other; and any appointment made in
deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution.
Musngi - nominated for the vacancy of 21st Associate Justice
but was appointed as the 16th Associate Justice
Cruz - nominated for the vacancy of the 19th Associate
justice but was appointed as the 17th Associate Justice
Econg - nominated for the 21st but was appointed as 18th
Mendoza-Arcega - nominated for the 17th but was appointed
as 19th
Trespeses - nominated for the 18th but was appointed as
21st
According to the OSG, Section 9, Article VIII neither
requires nor allows JBC to cluster nominees for every
vacancy in the Judiciary; it only mandates that for every
vacancy, the JBC shall present at least 3 nominees, among
whom the President shall appoint a member of the Judiciary.
PNoy may disregard the clustering of nominees by the JBC
into 6 separate shortlists and collectively consider all 37
nominees named in the shortlists for the 6 vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
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ISSUE:
Did President Aquino violate the Constitution or commit
grave buse of discretion in disregarding the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice?
RULING:
NO. President Aquino did NOT violate the Constitution when
he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate
shortlists for six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the Petition for Quo
Warranto, Certiorari and Prohibition.
It declared the
clustering of nominees by the JBC UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
the appointments of Respondents as Associate Justices of
Sandiganbayan VALID.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the
JBC cannot be used to restrict/limit the President’s power to
appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom
he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the
Presiden appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.
Clustering impinges upon the
President’s power of appointment and restricts the chances
for appointment of the qualified nominees.
PNoy validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint
members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the
clustering of nominees into 6 separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. He merely maintained
the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount
2019-2020
Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the 6 new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not
violate Article VIII, Section 9 which requires the President to
appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by
the JBC for every vacancy.
15. VINUYA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO.
162230, APRIL 28, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsiderationand a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the
Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their
petition for certiorari.
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010
decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery,
torture and other forms of sexual violence committed
against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against
humanity and war crimes under customary international
law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of
Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the
Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse
the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the
claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal
compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the conduct of foreign relation is a political
question
RULING:
YES. Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department.
The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of
the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
16. OCAMPO V. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. NO. 225973,
NOVEMBER 08, 2016
17. VELICARIA-GARAFIL V. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 203372, JUNE 16, 2015
18. GENUINO V. DE LIMA, G.R. NO. 197930, APRIL
17, 2018
FACTS:
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent election as
Pampanga representative, criminal complaints for plunder,
malversation, and/or illegal use of public funds, graft and
corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
qualified theft were filed against her before the DOJ.
In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, then Sec. De
Lima issued DOJ Watchlist Order against GMA pursuant to
De Lima’s authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also
ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist. Thereafter, the BI issued WLO
No.
ASM-11-237, implementing
2019-2020
De
Lima's
order.
Meanwhile, on October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints
for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC were filed
against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo (Miguel
Arroyo), among others, with the DOJ-Commission on
Elections (DOJ-COMELEC) Joint Investigation Committee on
2004
and
2007
Election
Fraud, specifically:
Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued
DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo on
October 27, 2011, with a validity period of 60 days, or until
December 26, 2011, unless sooner terminated or otherwise
extended.
In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October
21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA requested for the
issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention
from medical specialists abroad
On November 8, 2011, before the resolution of GMA’s
application for ADO, GMA filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 199034, to
annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued
against her for allegedly being unconstitutional.
A few hours thereafter, Miguel Arroyo filed a separate
Petition for Certiorari, and Prohibition under the same rule,
with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or a Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction,
likewise
assailing
the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLO No. 2011573. His petition was docketed as G.R. No. 199046.
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The Court issued a TRO in the consolidated petitions,
enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing
DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLO.
At around 8:00 p.m. on the same day, the petitioners
proceeded to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
with an aide-de-camp and a private nurse, to take their
flights to Singapore. However, the BI officials at NAIA
refused to process their travel documents which ultimately
resulted to them not being able to join their flights.
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 dated July
22, 2011 was issued against Genuinos, among others, after
criminal complaints for Malversation, as defined under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Violation
of Sections 3(e), (g), (h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER THE COURT MAY EXERCISE ITS POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (Yes);
B. WHETHER THE DOJ HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
DOJ
CIRCULAR
NO.
41
(No,
Cir
41
is
unconstitutional); and
C. WHETHER THERE IS GROUND TO HOLD THE FORMER
DOJ SECRETARY GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.
RULING:
A. The power of judicial review is articulated in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
2019-2020
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality
of
the
Government.[62]
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power;
(2)
the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;
(3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and
(4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of
the
case.
Except for the first requisite, there is no question with
respect to the existence of the three (3) other requisites.
Petitioners have the locus standi to initiate the petition as
they claimed to have been unlawfully subjected to restraint
on their right to travel owing to the issuance of WLOs against
them by authority of DOJ Circular No. 41. Also, they have
contested the constitutionality of the questioned issuances
at
the
most
opportune
time.
The respondents, however, claim that the instant petitions
have become moot and academic since there is no longer
any actual case or controversy to resolve following the
subsequent filing of an information for election sabotage
against GMA on November 18, 2011 and the lifting of WLO
No. 2011-573 against Miguel Arroyo and the deletion of his
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name from the BI watchlist after the dismissal of the
complaint
for
electoral
sabotage
against
him.
To be clear, "an actual case or controversy involves a conflict
of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief."[64] When
the issues have been resolved or when the circumstances
from which the legal controversy arose no longer exist, the
case is rendered moot and academic. "A moot and academic
case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value."
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation
and
the
paramount
public
interest
is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, there are exceptional circumstances that
warrant the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review.
The petitioners impute the respondents of violating their
constitutional right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ
Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance unnecessarily
places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence
of
the
grounds
provided
in
the
Constitution.
2019-2020
There is also no question that the instant petitions involved
a matter of public interest as the petitioners are not alone in
this predicament and there can be several more in the future
who may be similarly situated. It is not farfetched that a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No.
41 will recur considering the thousands of names listed in
the watch list of the DOJ, who may brave to question the
supposed illegality of the issuance. Thus, it is in the interest
of the public, as well as for the education of the members of
the bench and the bar, that this Court takes up the instant
petitions and resolves the question on the constitutionality
of
DOJ
Circular
No.
41.
It must be underscored that in a constitutional government
like ours, liberty is the rule and restraint the
exception. Thus, restrictions in the exercise of fundamental
liberties are heavily guarded against so that they may not
unreasonably interfere with the free exercise of
constitutional
guarantees.
Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as
maybe provided by law.
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to
choose one's residence, to leave it whenever he pleases and
to travel wherever he wills.
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2019-2020
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three
considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to
travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a
further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the
impairment. The requirement for a legislative enactment
was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the
person's right to travel by administrative officials who may
be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national
security, public safety or public health.
DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987."
The liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order
of the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may
only be impaired by a law that concerns national security,
public safety or public health. Therefore, when the
exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel,
the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly
providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to
the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionallyprotected right and not simply a statutory right, that it can
only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.
In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to
issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to
travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in
the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The
provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the
commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not
carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means
it deems proper in performing its functions without regard
to constitutionally-protected rights.
B. The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal
basis
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect
to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields
are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
1. There is no law particularly providing for the authority of
the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health.
DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative
enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of
lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It
is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to
carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the former
2. Adminsitrative Code vest no power to the DOJ Secretary
to issue Cir. 41.
The DOJ cannot rely on Section 1 of EO 292 for it is simply
a declaration of policy, the essence of the law, which
provides for the statement of the guiding principle, the
purpose
and
the
necessity
for
the
enactment.
The DOJ cannot also rely on Section 50, Chapter 11, Book
IV of E.O. No. 292, which simply provides for the types of
issuances that administrative agencies, in general, may
issue.
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Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling
law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities
relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test
and sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to
establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify
the
issuance
of
the
questioned
circular.
3. In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the
presence of the accused is not necessary for the prosecutor
to discharge his investigatory duties.
The DOJ also cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground
that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in
the preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is also
no authority of law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation,
pursuant to its investigatory powers under E.O. No. 292. Its
investigatory
power
is
simply
inquisitorial
and,
unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition
of
restraint
on
the
liberty
of
movement.
Next in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes
precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and
when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt
towards the former.
The Court, in Paderanga vs. Drilon, made a clarification on
the nature of a preliminary investigation, thus:
A preliminary investigation is x x x an inquiry or proceeding
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
2019-2020
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. x x x A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the accused is not necessary
for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If
the accused chooses to waive his presence or fails to submit
countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately,
he shall be bound by the determination of the prosecutor on
the presence of probable cause and he cannot claim denial
of
due
process.
4. The DOJ cannot issue DOJ Circular No. 41 under the guise
of
police
power
The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot
also be countenanced. Police power pertains to the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." "It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." Verily,
the exercise of this power is primarily lodged with the
legislature but may be wielded by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on
all municipal levels, including the barangay, by virtue of a
valid
delegation
of
power.
It bears noting, however, that police power may only be
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally,
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as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the
authority pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be
exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must
first establish the presence of a definite legislative
enactment evidencing the delegation of power from its
principal. This, the DOJ failed to do. There is likewise no
showing that the curtailment of the right to travel imposed
by DOJ Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in order
for
it
to
perform
its
investigatory
duties.
5. DOJ Circular No. 41 transcends constitutional limitations
Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No. 41 also
suffers from other serious infirmities that render it invalid.
The apparent vagueness of the circular as to the distinction
between a HDO and WLO is violative of the due process
clause. An act that is vague "violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.”
The constitutional violations of DOJ Circular No. 41 are too
gross to brush aside particularly its assumption that the DOJ
Secretary's determination of the necessity of the issuance of
HDO or WLO can take the place of a law that authorizes the
restraint in the right to travel only in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. The DOJ Secretary
has recognized himself as the sole authority in the issuance
2019-2020
and cancellation of HDO or WLO and in the determination of
the sufficiency of the grounds for an ADO. The consequence
is that the exercise of the right to travel of persons subject
of preliminary investigation or criminal cases in court is
indiscriminately subjected to the discretion of the DOJ
Secretary.
This is precisely the situation that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to avoid—for an executive officer to impose restriction
or exercise discretion that unreasonably impair an
individual's right to travel- thus, the addition of the phrase,
"as maybe provided by law" in Section 6, Article III thereof.
In Silverio, the Court underscored that this phraseology in
the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party.[126] The qualifying phrase is not a mere
innocuous appendage. It secures the individual the absolute
and free exercise of his right to travel at all times unless the
more paramount considerations of national security, public
safety and public health call for a temporary interference,
but always under the authority of a law.
The exceptions to the right to travel are limited to
those stated in Section 6, Article III of the
Constitution
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent
to the courts. The courts may issue a HDO against an
accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law.[135] It does not require legislative
conferment or constitutional recognition; it co-exists with
the grant of judicial power.
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The point is that the DOJ may not justify its imposition of
restriction on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ
Circular No. 41 by resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its
claim, it does not have inherent power to issue HDO, unlike
the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in anyway. It is
limited to the powers expressly granted to it by law and may
not extend the same on its own accord or by any skewed
interpretation
of
its
authority.
The
key
is
legislative
enactment
That the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 are individuals who
may have committed a wrong against the state does not
warrant the intrusion in the enjoyment of their basic rights.
They are nonetheless innocent individuals and suspicions on
their guilt do not confer them lesser privileges to enjoy. As
emphatically pronounced in Secretary of National Defense
vs. Manalo, et al.,[143] the constitution is an overarching sky
that covers all in its protection. It affords protection to
citizens without distinction. Even the most despicable person
deserves the same respect in the enjoyment of his rights as
the upright and abiding.
Contempt
charge
against
respondent
De
Lima
In view, however, of the complexity of the facts and
corresponding full discussion that it rightfully deserves, the
Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate
proceeding.
19. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, 17
MARCH 2010
20. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA V.
MARCO, G.R. NO. 202331, APRIL 22, 2015
2019-2020
FACTS:
Five days before the end of her term as Governor, Governor
Ong appointed Hilario Marco as Cooperative Development
Specialist II, along with 25 other appointments. These were
later disapproved due to lack of funds. Marco successfully
challenged the disapproval. However, the Province then
argued that Marco was a midnight appointee. The CA ruled
that Marco’s case was an exception to the prohibition of
midnight appointees as he was fully qualified for the position
and underwent a screening process long before the election
ban. The Province then claimed that Marco failed to present
convincing evidence showing that he underwent a regular
screening process.
ISSUE:
Whether the prohibition against midnight appointments
applies
RULING:
No. A midnight appointment, prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15
of the Constitution, is one made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election. The
constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only
applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to
those made by local chief executives. The CSC may establish
rules and regulations to promote efficiency and
professionalism in civil service, including prohibition against
local official making appointments during the last days of
their tenure. In Nazareno, the Court upheld a CSC Resolution
prohibiting local electives from making appointments
immediately before and after elections, and against mass
appointments. However, Nazareno is inapplicable as the
Resolution effective during the appointments made in
Nazareno was superseded by another Resolution which
permits appointments made after elections up to June 30 if
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the appointee is fully qualified and had undergone regular
screening processes before the Election Ban. Marco fell
under this category.
21. RISOS-VIDAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. NO. 206666, JANUARY 21, 2015
FACTS:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period
of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On
October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that
he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC),
in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
2019-2020
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he
be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office?
RULING:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms
to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of
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suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be
limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
2019-2020
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations
in
which
there
was
no
favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it
can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included
in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions
that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12
of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
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offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not
operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not
explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon,
and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor
to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law.
It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation
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much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.
22. REPUBLIC V. SERENO, G.R. NO. 237428, JUNE 19,
2018
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor
General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void
Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her
therefrom.
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP
College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as
legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several
agencies from 1994 until 2009. On July 2010, Respondent
submitted her application for the position of Associate
Justice of the SC.
Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from
1986 to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal
counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009,
records from the UP Human Resources Development Office,
Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination
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(ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the
only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
available on record and filed by Respondent were those for
the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, and 2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that
ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to
2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the
Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned from
U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when she
supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August
2010.
Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010
by President Benigno Aquino III.
When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in
2012, the JBC announced the opening for applications and
nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous
SALNs up to 31 December 2011 (instead of the usual last
two years of public service) and stating that, “applicants
with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements
will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”
Respondent accepted several nominations for the position of
Chief Justice, and submitted requirements in support
thereof.
On 20 July 2012, the JBC in a special meeting en banc
deliberated on nominees with incomplete documentary
requirements. The minutes of the deliberation show that
Respondent has not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten
years, from 1986 to 2006, the duration for which, according
to Senator Escudero (ex officio member of the JBC), she was
a professor in UP and was therefore required to submit
SALNs.
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Apart from Respondent, several other candidates had
incomplete documents such that the JBC En Banc agreed to
extend the deadline for submission. It also delegated to the
Execom the determination of whether or not the candidate
has substantially complied, failure to do so resulting in the
exclusion from the list of candidates to be interviewed and
considered for nomination.
Pursuant to this, the OSRN required Respondent to submit
her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the period within which
she was employed by UP. Respondent replied through a
letter that considering that such government records in UP
are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured OSRN
that UP has cleared her of all responsibilities,
accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly,
she emphasized that her service in the government was not
continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her
service in UP ended) and 2010 (when she was appointed to
the SC).
Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the
JBC. Neither can the JBC Execom produce minutes of the
deliberations to consider the issue of substantial compliance
with documentary requirements. However, despite having
submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report
regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of
candidates shows that her name was annotated with
“COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was
infeasible to retrieve all files. The same annotation was
found in another list regarding SALN submissions of 20
candidates, including Respondent.
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Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III
on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House
Committee of Justice. Included in the complaint was the
allegation that Respondent failed to make a truthful
statement of her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House
spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio
Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo
warranto proceeding against Respondent.
Case for the Petitioner:
The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an
available remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s
appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply
against the State. It also argues that the SC has jurisdiction
over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of
Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC
disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the
position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of
SALNs, Respondent has not proven her integrity, which is a
requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus
concludes that since Respondent is ineligible for the position
of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right
to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
Case for the Respondent:
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice
may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis
of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence.
Alternatively, she argues that the present petition is timebarred, as it should have been filed within one year from the
cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the
disqualification.
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It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public
officers without pay or those who do not receive
compensation are not required to file a SALN. Thus,
Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official
leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any
SALN. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as
an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications
provided by the Constitution.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case
of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as
sufficient and acceptable her statement that she “maintains
that she consistently filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues
that the Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily
conclude failure to file SALNs simply because these
documents are missing in the Office of the Court
Administrator's files should likewise be made applicable to
her case.
In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forumshopping against Petitioner.
Motions for Inhibition:
Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices
(Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardode
Castro), imputing actual bias for having testified in the
House Committee for Justice on the impeachment complaint
and on Justice Tijam for allegedly stating, in a Manila Times
article, that Respondent is in culpable violation of the
Constitution if she continues to ignore the impeachment
process. She alleged that their testimonies show that they
harbored personal resentment and ill feelings towards her,
and that she has already been pre-judged by some as having
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committed a culpable violation of the Constitution for having
failed to submit her SALNs, among others. She also sought
to disqualify Justice Martires for his insinuations during the
Oral Arguments questioning her mental and psychological
fitness.
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by
the law and its implementing rules and
regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file
SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of
Respondent as Chief Justice;
ISSUES:
A. Preliminary Issues
1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is
proper.
2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition
against the Associate Justices on the basis of actual
bias is proper.
B.
Substantive Issues
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give
due course to the instant petition for quo warranto
against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and
against whom an impeachment complaint has already
been filed with the House of Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the
ground of prescription;
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of
Chief Justice:
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s
eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC, and whether such
determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory
and review powers;
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c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and
if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of
Respondent as Chief Justice; and
d. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible
to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the
appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
Ruling on the Preliminary Issues:
1. Motions for Intervention
The Court noted the IBP’s
intervention and resolved to deny the motions for
intervention filed by several other groups. It observed that
intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion; that movantintervenors have no legal interest in
the case, as required in order to qualify a person to
intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in
the people, and not in a particular group. Lastly, such
individuals do not claim a right to the questioned position,
which is the only time when an individual himself/herself
may commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the
movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be
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entitled to the questioned position nor are they the ones
charged with the usurpation thereof.
2. Motions for Inhibition
There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant
must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement,
taken as a whole, was only to prod the Respondent to
observe and respect the constitutional process of
impeachment. It does not appear that there are grounds for
compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere
fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the
hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable
cause for the impeachment of Respondent does not
disqualify them to hear the instant petition. Their
appearance was in deference to the House of
Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not
be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of
the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the
parameters that the Court set for the purpose. Their
statements in the hearing should be carefully viewed within
this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an
adverse attack against Respondent.
Ruling on the Substantive Issues:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the instant petition for quo warranto against
Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom
an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the
House of Representatives. YES
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a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo
warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7,
Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an
action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC
when commenced by the Solicitor General.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original
jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the
qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the
issue is of public concern.
The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental
importance. The instant petition is one of first impression
and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that
the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent
Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being
scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.
b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable
officer such that a quo warranto petition cannot prosper, the
Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of
impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.
While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the
ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially
differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are
political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial
or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.
Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the
Respondent, because quo warranto and impeachment can
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proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as
to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations. The causes of action in the two proceedings are
unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action
lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or
exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the
commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in
a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding
a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the
other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the
removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she
is legally holding. Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet
to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings
in the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary
investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be
determined.
c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an
invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official
may be removed from office. Even the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of
either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to
question the eligibility of the President and the VicePresident, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact,
this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al.
and Estrada v. Macapagal Arroyo where SC took cognizance
of a quo warranto petition against former President
Macapagal Arroyo considering whether former President
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Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as
President).
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. An option
to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode
of effecting the removal.
That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made
absolute such that only those enumerated offenses are
treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it
is to be taken as a complete statement of the causes of
removal from office. The word “may” cannot also be
understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because
it would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties
may be imposed — a situation not contemplated in the
language of the Constitutional provision.
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of
appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned, on the basis of citizenship or membership in the
Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the
grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can
continue discharging the functions of his office even when
he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result
in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to
continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive
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sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from
office through impeachment.
d. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a
quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto
conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings
does not preclude the House of Representatives from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause
for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also
formed part of the allegations in the Articles of
Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional
requirement, the violation of which constitutes culpable
violation of the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable
officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance
with the qualifications of having to be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence — and the
failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of
integrity.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obviate
confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy
to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in
keeping with the Court’s function of harmonizing the laws
and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein
demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
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qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment
or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto
petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement
thereof are present. On the contrary, acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during
the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of something else, which may either be impeachment if
the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
e. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus
misplaced. An outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Respondent will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to
settle an actual controversy squarely presented before it.
There is also no possibility of a constitutional crisis upon
which an abdication of such duty is to be premised because,
as discussed, it is within the Court’s judicial power to settle
justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights,
which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is not
arrogating upon itself the power to impeach, which is a
political exercise.
f. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to
voluntary appearance. Respondent cannot now be heard to
deny the Court’s jurisdiction over her person even as she
claims to be an impeachable official because Respondent in
fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court by
praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court
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and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments,
albeit ad cautelam.
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground
of prescription. NO
a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year
limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere
private individual pursuing a private interest, but the
government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing
for public interest. In the three instances enumerated by
Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the
Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as
seen in the use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v. Suguitan,
“As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary
statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to
quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.”
In effect, when the government is the real party in interest,
and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be
no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.
Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not
lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Article
1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the
application of the prescriptive period. That prescription does
not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very
purpose of an action for quo warranto, which is to prevent a
continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. The
Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning
Respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of
the cause of ouster.
Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that
she should not be required to submit the said documents as
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she was considered to be coming from private practice; that
it was not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the
academe considering that the same are more than fifteen
years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of “all
academic/administrative
responsibilities,
money
and
property accountabilities and from administrative charges”.
She has never been clear on whether she had filed the
required SALNs or not. Given the foregoing, there can be no
acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the part of the
Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to
seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public
interest.
c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the
merits of the novel issues imbued with public interest
presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely
on technicality.
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief
Justice. NO
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for
nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and
whether such determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review
powers. NO
The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes
ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. In
interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of
the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court’s supervisory
power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its
own rules and procedures. Furthermore, while a certain
leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
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discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements.
The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the
requisite qualifications is determined based on facts and
therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of
discretion on the part of the nominating body. Proceeding
from this, qualifications under the Constitution cannot be
waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such
qualification is the requirement of possession of proven
integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also
mentioned in administrative cases, in the Canons of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the
Code of Professional Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules.
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated
by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the
failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment
of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES
i. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory
requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s
integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation that the
filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of
integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and
statutory requirement, under Section 17, Article XI of the
Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful
compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is
rendered even more exacting when the public official
concerned is a member of the Judiciary.
ii. Compliance with the SALN
reflects on a person’s integrity. To
required by qualifications under
that the applicant must have
requirement indubitably
be of proven integrity, as
the Constitution, means
established a steadfast
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adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line, failure
to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense
is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. It
disregards the requirement of transparency as a deterrent
to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official
who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the
SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court
may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office.
Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not
negate integrity does not persuade. Whether or not
Respondent accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue
at this time, but whether she, in the first place, complied
with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs.
iii. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus
violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such
violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven
integrity. Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as
to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no
clear reason. Her defenses do not lie: 1) The Doblada
doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada
was able to present contrary proof that the missing SALNs
were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus rendering
inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a
number of years, as opposed to the present case where no
proof of existence and filing were presented; 2) Being on
leave from government service is not equivalent to
separation from service such that she was still required to
submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While Respondent is not
required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates
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that she should have obtained a certification to attest to the
fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to
comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to
comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and
because there was no duty for the UP HRDO to order
compliance under the rules implemented at that time; 5)
That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement
was reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist
prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the
appointment goes into her qualifications which were
mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should have
been disqualified at the outset.
iv. Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her
SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent covering her
years of government service in U.P. appear to have been
executed and filed under suspicious circumstances; her
SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were either belatedly filed or
belatedly notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief Justice were
also attended by irregularities. This puts in question the
truthfulness of such SALNs, and would amount to dishonesty
if attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements.
c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission
of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the
failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES
i. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs
from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices,
absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. The
established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to
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submit the required number of SALNs in violation of the rules
set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The
JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from
1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero,
the filing thereof during those years was already required.
There was no indication that the JBC deemed the three
SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by
Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P.
College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial
compliance. Respondent was specifically singled out from
the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single
piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of
Law.
In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to
require only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or
from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position.
It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the
requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial
compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for
the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs,
was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only
remaining applicant-incumbent Justice who was not
determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially
complied was Respondent, who submitted only three SALNs,
i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the
deadline for the submission to do so. Her justifications do
not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are
old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to
retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as
having complied with the submission of the SALN by
submitting a Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P.
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HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as a
substitute for SALNs.
Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did
not fill several SALNs during the course of her employment
in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the
concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.
For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered
Respondent for interview as it already required the
submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the
immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.
ii. Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for
several years means that her integrity was not established
at the time of her application. Contrary to Respondent’s
argument that failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC is not
cause for disqualification, the requirement to submit the
SALNs, along with the waiver of bank deposits, is not an
empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but
was placed by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow
the JBC to carry on its mandate of recommending only
applicants of high standards and who would be
unsusceptible to impeachment attacks due to inaccuracies
in SALNs. Without submission of such requirement, the JBC
and the public are without opportunity to measure the
candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs to the
JBC means that she was not able to prove her integrity at
the time of her application as Chief Justice.
d. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the
appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
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i. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent
appointment as Chief Justice. As the qualification of proven
integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the
Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the
subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will
not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words,
the inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees
submitted to the President cannot override the minimum
Constitutional qualifications.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can
take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO), as
regards the circumstances relative to the selection and
nomination of Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither
will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify
Respondent. The action of the JBC, particularly that of the
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member, is reflective of the
action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or
wrongfully accepted and nominated Respondent, the
President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the
same mistake and the President’s subsequent act of
appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect.
While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power
to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is
qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.
ii. The Court also took into account, while conceding that the
petition is not an administrative case nor an inquiry into tax
evasion against her, that Respondent’s disposition to
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commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating
dishonesty and lack of forthrightness are discordant with
any claim of integrity. In addition to the suspicious and
highly questionable circumstances surrounding the
execution of her SALNs, the following untruthful statements
and dishonest acts ultimately negate Respondent's claim
that she is a person of proven integrity:
a. She engaged in private practice even if she had no permit
from U.P. to do so while she was in government service. b.
She represented that after her resignation from U.P. in
2006, she was engaged, full time, in private practice.
However, in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS), it was stated
that she was engaged as counsel by the government in the
PIATCO cases from 1994 up to 2009. c. She claims that it is
the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that
the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and
accomplished. However, U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Respondent because such rule was not
yet in existence at that time. d. Her PDS shows that she was
Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights
only later to be disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument
stating that it was only a functional title. e. In her Letter
dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent represented that
her SALNs were infeasible to retrieve when the SALNs that
she selectively filed were available all along in U.P. and in
fact the OSG was able to get copies of the same. f. In the
Letter, the Respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to
retrieve" all her SALNs because of the age of said
documents, i.e., that they are more than fifteen years old.
However, during her Oral Arguments, she explained that it
was "infeasible" to retrieve them only because of time
constraints. g. She claims that the other candidates for the
Chief Justice position did not comply with the SALN
2019-2020
requirement for the application, when it was only she who
did not comply. h. She committed tax fraud when she failed
to truthfully declare her income in her income tax returns
for the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT)
returns for the years 2005-2009.
iii. Further, Respondent's disposition and propensity to
commit dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested
through her subsequent acts committed during her
incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of
public record and also determined to be constituting
probable cause for impeachment:
a. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land
Cruiser worth at least Php5,000,000.00; b. Caused the
hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public
bidding and who received excessive compensation
amounting to more than Php 11,000,000.00; c. Misused at
least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the
3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting; d. Created the Judiciary
Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the
Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) without being
sanctioned by the Court En Banc; e. Issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the
Supreme Court's internal rules misrepresented that the TRO
was issued upon the recommendation of the Memberincharge; f. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request
to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of
Mindanao; g. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with
respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused
undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to
spouses of deceased judges and Justices; h. Appointed
Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay
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Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center
Office (PMCO) without the approval of the Court En Banc;
impeachment proceedings conducted by the House of
Representatives against her.
i. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to
several high-ranking positions in the Supreme Court; j.
Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what
transpired during the Supreme Court En Banc deliberations
in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged involvement of four
(4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs and undermined the
co-equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the
Executive Secretary himself to file cases against the judges;
k. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then
Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza,
by using highly confidential document involving national
security against the latter; l. Clustered the nominees for the
six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in the
Sandiganbayan without legal basis and in so doing, impaired
the power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary; m. Misrepresented to the members of the
Supreme Court En Banc that there were Justices who
requested to do away with the voting of recommended
applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court; n.
Manipulated the processes .of the JBC to exclude Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the
shortlist of nominees for the position of Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals; o. Interfered with the investigation
conducted by the House of Representatives on the alleged
misuse of the tobacco funds in the Province ofllocos Norte
by unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement, asking the
House of Representatives to reconsider its show cause order
against the Justices of the Court of Appeals, and then
pressuring then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals,
now Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to likewise sign
the same; and p. Undermined and disrespected the
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer. DE
FACTO
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office
is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him
the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional
qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title
thereto. As such, Respondent has never attained the status
of an impeachable official and her removal from the office,
other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy,
therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is
proper to oust Respondent from the appointive position of
Chief Justice.
Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully
holding and exercising such public office, the consequent
judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is
the ouster and exclusion of Respondent from holding and
exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of
the Chief Justice.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance of the Sub Judice Rule:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice.
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate
branches of the Government and even men and women
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learned in law had succumbed to the tempting affray that
tends to divert the instant quo warranto action from its
primary purpose. Even worse, Respondent and her
spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's case, apart
from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before
several media-covered engagements. Through her
actuations, Respondent appears to have forgotten that this
is a court action for quo warranto, and as such, the
concomitant rule on sub judice applies.
Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the
issues on hand, camouflaging the charges against her with
assaults to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning
the public's mind that this is a fight for democracy. Once
and for all, it should be stated that this is not a fight for
democracy nor for judicial independence.
This is an
undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the
Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty
in the qualification, or otherwise, of Respondent to occupy
the highest position in the Judiciary.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found
DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes
P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is
declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed
to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of
further action from the Court.
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Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW
CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she
should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct
for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting
aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
23. METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
[MMDA] V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY,
G.R. NOS. 171947-48, FEBRUARY 15, 2011
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the
primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the
DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for
the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular
coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance
with its indicated completion schedules.
Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the
President’s power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management
programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code
(PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
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Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect
all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes
along the banks of the major river systems in their
respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (ParañaqueZapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros
Rivers,
the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and waterways that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found,
these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain
of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
The government agencies did not file any motion for
reconsideration and the Decision became final in January
2009. The case is now in the execution phase of the final
and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay
Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by
the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor
the execution phase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an encroachment over the powers
and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the
President of the Philippines when the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to
2019-2020
perform their assigned tasks in the absence of specific
completion periods.
RULING:
No, this view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is
simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the
Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None
of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to
implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of
them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like
submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of
a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section
47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.–
–The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties of their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
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It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also
those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to
fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed
by said judgment.
in the list of considered applicants and protesting the
inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC
Executive Officer, through a letter dated February 3, 2014,
that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the
JBC en banc.
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of
continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until
petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the
Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction
over them until full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to
speak of, we shall now proceed to the recommendation of
the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
However, its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy
of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts
to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in
their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he
was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take
recourse to this Court
24. VILLANUEVA V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. NO. 211833, APRIL 7, 2015
FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On
September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and
Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of
Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates
for the said stations.
On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through
electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion
RULING:
Yes.
The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the
petitioner is constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5),
Art. VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to
the judiciary. Consequently, it was also stated in the said
provision that only the persons nominated by the JBC is
transmitted to the president that will choose whom to
nominate as judge in the judiciary.
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is
mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and
only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
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transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter
as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is
burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with
public interest as it determines the men and women who will
sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this
does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules
and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure
its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are
necessary and incidental to the JBC’s principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process
that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has
the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its
nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to
the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and
law for every position. The search for these long-held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order
to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus,
the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not
simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an
effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this
pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform
criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the
qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption
of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the
2019-2020
petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function
conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of
searching for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the
authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates
rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are
updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion
is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to
ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure
and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this
case to those judges with five years of experience was an
exercise of discretion by the JBC.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in
order that all statutes, including administrative rules that
are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, which regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
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Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the
administrative rules and regulations exempted from the
publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect
only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the
selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is
but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants
be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so
that they would be able to prepare for and comply with
them.
Decision: Petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however,
DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the
publication requirement
25. SEGOVIA V. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION,
G.R. NO. 211010, MARCH 7, 2017
FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171
which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change
(PTFCC). It was reorganized through EO 774, which
designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet
secretaries as members of the Task Force. Sec. 9 of EO 774
provides the “Road Sharing Principle” which reads as: “To
reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the DOTC shall lead
a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. x x x
“Those who have less in wheels must have more in road.”
For this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized
locomotion and collective transportation system.”
2019-2020
In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead
agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to
formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport
Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing
Principle is similarly mentioned.
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change
Act. It created the Climate Change Commission (CCC) which
absorbed the functions of the PTFCC.
Petitioners wrote CCC et. al., regarding their pleas for
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Claiming to
have not received a response, they filed this petition.
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents,
representing their children, who in turn represent “Children
of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have
cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient,
accessible, available, and reliable.” They claim that they are
entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the
alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act
mandated by environmental laws, and violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property
of all Filipinos.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file
the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for
failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing
Mandamus should issue.
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RULING:
Petitioners have standing to file the petition.
The Court agrees with the petitioners’ position. The RPEC did
liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing
of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations
under environmental laws. However, it bears noting that
there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental
damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance
of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to
one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or
omission.
Direct resort to the SC is justified.
Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary
remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude
that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow
but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a
speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the
violation of one’s constitutional right to a healthful and
balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial
boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential
nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least,
the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated
under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to
the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is
allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.
A writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus will not
(cannot) be issued.
2019-2020
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must
concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule
or regulation was violated or would be violated.
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the
constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated,
the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are
guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a
violation of the petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful
ecology (any violation or neglect of environmental laws that
causes or contributes to bad air quality).
Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements
for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows:
“When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station in connection with the
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enforcement or violation of an environmental
law, rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the
petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an
act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to
perform the duties of the respondent, under the
law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.”
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issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically
enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road
Sharing Principle. At its core, what the petitioners are
seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial
act, but a discretionary act — the manner of implementation
of the Road Sharing Principle.
Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the
executive in implementing or actualizing any stated
legislative or executive policy relating to the environment
requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the
executive is guilty of “gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority,” the general rule
applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for
continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus
cannot issue.
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury
arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be
entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had
been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of
real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing
mandamus.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is
denominated — a principle. It cannot be considered an
absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle
is applied or considered in their policy decisions. In this case,
there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the
respondents to perform any act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty — there being nothing in the executive
26. PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION OF
GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, 11
FEBRUARY 2010, A.M. NO. 08-2-01-0
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations
under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
are exempt from paying the legal fees provided
in this Rule. Local government corporations
and government-owned
or
controlled
corporations with or without independent charter
are not exempt from paying such fees.
The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter,
RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and
Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds
of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at
all times and that contribution rates necessary to
sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept
as low as possible in order not to burden the
members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes
imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial
solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding
any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits
paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.
These exemptions shall continue
unless
expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval
of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations,
issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to
or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered
ineffective and without legal force and effect.
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The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal
fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS
notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments,
fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For
this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its
exemption from payment of legal fees.
According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to
preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds and
to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the
benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as possible.
The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of
legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the
Rules of Court. It would merely show "deference" by the
Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch. This deference
will recognize the "compelling and overriding" State interest
in the preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for
the benefit of its members.
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG
maintains that the petition should be denied.
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by
subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is
expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed
by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace
the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to
maintain and protect the solvency of the fund,
notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the
national government to secure such solvency or liability.
The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA
8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the Court
in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of
the GSIS from "taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties
of all kinds" is necessarily confined to those that do not
involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been
promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rulemaking power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by
Congress.
On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney
(OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the
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petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon.
According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption
from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
May the legislature exempt the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by the
Court on government-owned and controlled corporations
and local government units?
HELD:
Petition of GSIS was DENIED.
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and
enforcement
of
constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
xxx
xxx
xxx
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The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this
Court. It necessarily includes the power to address all
questions arising from or connected to the implementation
of the said rules.
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In
particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or
docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature
of the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees are
required to be paid within the same period for taking an
appeal. Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without
such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the
decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory.
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social
security of government employees in support of its petition.
It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and
distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its
members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions
pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its
capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA
8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that
it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members.
Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming
exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking
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that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of
its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right
of the GSIS "to seek relief from the courts of justice sans
payment of legal fees."
However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The
payment of legal fees does not take away the capacity of the
GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that
capacity may be implemented.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards
of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
27. FUNA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO.
192791
28. IDEALS, INC. V. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT, G.R. NO. 192088,
OCTOBER 9, 2012
FACTS:
This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
to permanently enjoin the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric
Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources
Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding
conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM).
Respondent PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of RA No.
9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry
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Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA). The EPIRA provided a
framework for the restructuring of the electric power
industry, including the privatization of the assets of the NPC.
Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale,
disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real
estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power
Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all
NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an
optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within
PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the
privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in
San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. On December 15, 2009,
PSALM’s BOD approved the Bidding Procedures for the
privatization of the AHEPP. An Invitation to Bid was
published on January 11, 12 and 13, 2010 in three major
national newspapers. Subject of the bid was the AHEPP
consisting of 4 main units and 3 auxiliary units with an
aggregate installed capacity of 218 MW. The two auxiliary
units owned by MWSS were excluded from the bid.
PSALM received the bids from six competing firms, wherein
after a post-bid evaluation, PSALM’s Board of Directors
approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award
to the highest bidder, K-Water.
On May 19, 2010, the present petition with prayer for
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS), Freedom from
Debt Coalition (FDC), AKBAYAN Citizen’s Action Party
(AKBAYAN) and Alliance of Progressive Labor.
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On May 24, 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante
Order directing the respondents to maintain the status quo
prevailing before the filing of the petition and to file their
respective Comments on the petition.
Basically, petitioners argue that the protection of their
right to water and of public interest requires that the bidding
process initiated by PSALM be declared null and void for
violating such right, as defined by international law and by
domestic law establishing the State’s obligation to ensure
water security for its people.
ISSUES:
The present controversy raised the following issues:
2) Legal standing of petitioners;
3) Mootness of the petition;
4) Violation of the right to information;
5) Ownership of the AHEPP;
6) Violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution;
7) Violation of the Water Code provisions on the grant
of water rights; and
8) Failure of PSALM to comply with Sec. 47 (e) of
EPIRA.
RULING:
1-2: No, PSALM’s contention that the present petition had
already been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of
Award to K-Water is misplaced. Though petitioners had
sought the immediate issuance of injunction against the
bidding commenced by PSALM -- specifically enjoining it
from proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of
award to any of the bidders -- they further prayed that
PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of the
AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed
not only as a means of enforcing the State’s obligation to
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protect the citizens’ "right to water" that is recognized
under international law and legally enforceable under our
Constitution, but also to bar a foreign corporation from
exploiting our water resources in violation of Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court also rules that petitioners possess the requisite
legal standing in filing this suit as citizens and taxpayers.
3:
Yes, PSALM violates petitioners’ right to information.
The people’s constitutional right to information under Sec.
7, Art. III of the Constitution is intertwined with the
government’s constitutional duty of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art
II.
The foregoing constitutional provisions seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. They are also essential to hold public officials "at all
times x xx accountable to the people," for unless citizens
have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy.
Consistent with this policy, the EPIRA was enacted to
provide for "an orderly and transparent privatization" of
NPC’s assets and liabilities. Specifically, said law mandated
that "all assets of NPC shall be sold in an open and
transparent manner through public bidding."
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In this case, petitioners’ first letter dated April 20, 2010
requested for documents such as Terms of Reference and
proposed bids submitted by the bidders. At that time, the
bids were yet to be submitted at the bidding scheduled on
April 28, 2010. It is also to be noted that PSALM’s website
carried news and updates on the sale of AHEPP, providing
important information on bidding activities and clarifications
regarding the terms and conditions of the Asset Purchase
Agreement (APA) to be signed by PSALM and the winning
bidder (Buyer).
The Court, however, distinguished the duty to disclose
information from the duty to permit access to information
on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is
mandatory under the Constitution, the other aspect of the
people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one
to gain access to documents and paper of the particular
agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow
access has a broader scope of information which embraces
not only transactions involving public interest, but any
matter contained in official communications and public
documents of the government agency. Such relief must be
granted to the party requesting access to official records,
documents and papers relating to official acts, transactions,
and decisions that are relevant to a government contract.
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that their letter-request was referred to the counsel of KWater. We find such action insufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy
under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in
an "open and transparent" manner. PSALM’s evasive
response to the request for information was unjustified
because all bidders were required to deliver documents such
as
company
profile,
names
of
authorized
officers/representatives, financial and technical experience.
4:
The Court stated that there is no dispute as to the
complete jurisdiction of NPC over the government-owned
Angat Dam and AHEPP.
NAPOCOR or NPC is also a government-owned corporation
created under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 120, which,
among others, was vested with the following powers under
Sec. 2, paragraph (g):
Here, petitioners’ second letter dated May 14, 2010
specifically requested for detailed information regarding the
winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or
responsible
officer,
office
address
and
Philippine
registration. But before PSALM could respond to the said
letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19, 2010.
PSALM’s letter-reply dated May 21, 2010 advised petitioners
Page 84 of 112
(g) To construct, operate and maintain power
plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes,
mains, transmission lines, power stations and
substations, and other works for the purpose of
developing hydraulic power from any river,
creek, lake, spring and waterfall in the Philippines
and supplying such power to the inhabitants
thereof; to acquire, construct, install, maintain,
operate and improve gas, oil, or steam engines,
and/or other prime movers, generators and other
machinery in plants and/or auxiliary plants for
the production of electric power; to establish,
develop, operate, maintain and administer power
and lighting system for the use of the
Government and the general public; to sell
electric power and to fix the rates and provide for
ATTY. ALEXIS MEDINA
CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
the collection of the charges for any service
rendered: Provided, That the rates of charges
shall not be subject to revision by the Public
Service Commission;
On September 10, 1971, R.A. No. 6395 was enacted which
revised the charter of NPC, extending its corporate life to the
year 2036. NPC thereafter continued to exercise complete
jurisdiction over dams and power plants including the Angat
Dam, Angat Reservoir and AHEPP. While the NPC was
expressly granted authority to construct, operate and
maintain power plants, MWSS was not vested with similar
function.
5-7: Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not
prohibited under existing laws. The construction,
rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants are
among those infrastructure projects which even whollyowned foreign corporations are allowed to undertake under
the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law
(R.A. No. 7718).
Beginning 1987, the policy has been openness to foreign
investments as evident in the fiscal incentives provided for
the restructuring and privatization of the power industry in
the Philippines, under the Power Sector Restructuring
Program (PSRP) of the Asian Development Bank.
The establishment of institutional and legal framework for
the entry of private sector in the power industry began with
the issuance by President Corazon C. Aquino of EO No. 215
in 1987. Said order allowed the entry of private sector – the
IPPs –to participate in the power generation activities in the
country. The entry of IPPs was facilitated and made
attractive through the first BOT Law in 1990 (R.A. No. 6957)
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which aimed to "minimize the burden of infrastructure
projects on the national government budget, minimize
external borrowing for infrastructure projects, and use the
efficiency of the private sector in delivering a public good."
In 1993, the Electric Power Crisis Act was passed giving the
President emergency powers to urgently address the power
crisis in the country. The full implementation of the
restructuring and privatization of the power industry was
achieved when Congress passed the EPIRA in 2001.
With respect to foreign investors, the nationality issue had
been framed in terms of the character or nature of the power
generation process itself, i.e., whether the activity amounts
to utilization of natural resources within the meaning of Sec.
2, Art. XII of the Constitution. If so, then foreign companies
cannot engage in hydropower generation business; but if
not, then government may legally allow even foreign-owned
companies to operate hydropower facilities.
The DOJ has consistently regarded hydropower generation
by foreign entities as not constitutionally proscribed based
on the definition of water appropriation under the Water
Code
Then DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez stated that only the
power components shall be transferred to the foreign
bidders while the non-power components/structures (dam,
reservoir and appurtenant structures and watershed area)
shall be retained by state agencies concerned.
It would appear clear that while both waters and geothermal
steam are, undoubtedly "natural resources", within the
meaning of Section 2 Article XII of the present Constitution,
hence, their exploitation, development and utilization should
be limited to Filipino citizens or corporations or associations
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at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino
citizens, the utilization thereof can be opened even to
foreign nationals, after the same have been extracted from
the source by qualified persons or entities. The rationale is
because, since they no longer form part of the natural
resources of the country, they become subject to ordinary
commerce.
State is evident when PSALM was obligated to prescribe
safeguards to enable the national government to direct
water usage to domestic and other requirements "imbued
with public interest." There is no express requirement for
the transfer of water rights in all cases where the operation
of hydropower facilities in a multi-purpose dam complex is
turned over to the private sector.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign
company may not be said to be "appropriating" our natural
resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and
converts the same into electricity through artificial devices.
Since the NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam
by virtue of water rights granted to it, as determined under
DOJ Opinion No. 122, s. 1998, there is no legal impediment
to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of
electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC,
the holder of water permit. Such was the situation of
hydropower
projects
under
the
BOT
contractual
arrangements whereby foreign investors are allowed to
finance or undertake construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the facility
constructed. However, in case the facility requires a public
utility franchise, the facility operator must be a Filipino
corporation or at least 60% owned by Filipino.
As the new owner of the AHEPP, K-Water will have to utilize
the waters in the Angat Dam for hydropower generation.
Consistent with the goals of the EPIRA, private entities are
allowed to undertake power generation activities and
acquire NPC’s generation assets. But since only the
hydroelectric power plants and appurtenances are being
sold, the privatization scheme should enable the buyer of a
hydroelectric power plant in NPC’s multi-purpose dam
complex to have beneficial use of the waters diverted or
collected in the Angat Dam for its hydropower generation
activities, and at the same time ensure that the NPC retains
full supervision and control over the extraction and diversion
of waters from the Angat River.
To reiterate, there is nothing in the EPIRA which declares
that it is mandatory for PSALM or NPC to transfer or assign
NPC’s water rights to buyers of its multi-purpose
hydropower facilities as part of the privatization process.
While PSALM was mandated to transfer the ownership of all
hydropower plants except those mentioned in Sec. 47 (f),
any transfer of possession, operation and control of the
multi-purpose hydropower facilities, the intent to preserve
water resources under the full supervision and control of the
In fine, the Court rules that while the sale of AHEPP
to a foreign corporation pursuant to the privatization
mandated by the EPIRA did not violate Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution which limits the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources
under the full supervision and control of the State or
the State’s undertaking the same through joint
venture,
co-production
or
production
sharing
agreements with Filipino corporations 60% of the
capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens, the
stipulation in the Asset Purchase Agreement and
Operations and Maintenance Agreement whereby NPC
consents to the transfer of water rights to the foreign
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buyer,
K-Water,
contravenes
the
aforesaid
constitutional provision and the Water Code.
3) Section 6 (a), Rule 23, IRR of the EPIRA, is hereby
declared as merely DIRECTORY, and not an absolute
condition in all cases where NPC-owned hydropower
generation facilities are privatized;
Section 6, Rule 23 of the IRR of EPIRA, insofar as it
ordered NPC’s water rights in multi-purpose hydropower
facilities to be included in the sale thereof, is declared as
merely directory and not an absolute condition in the
privatization scheme. In this case, we hold that NPC shall
continue to be the holder of the water permit even as the
operational control and day-to-day management of the
AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under the terms and
conditions of their APA and O & M Agreement, whereby NPC
grants authority to K-Water to utilize the waters diverted or
collected in the Angat Dam for hydropower generation.
Further, NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with the
terms and conditions of the MOA on Water Protocol, as well
as with such other regulations and issuances of the NWRB
governing water rights and water usage.
4) NPC shall CONTINUE to be the HOLDER of Water
Permit No. 6512 issued by the National Water
Resources Board. NPC shall authorize K-Water to
utilize the waters in the Angat Dam for hydropower
generation, subject to the NWRB’s rules and
regulations governing water right and usage. The
Asset Purchase Agreement and Operation &
Management Agreement between NPC/PSALM and KWater are thus amended accordingly.
Except for the requirement of securing a water
permit, K-Water remains BOUND by its undertakings
and warranties under the APA and O & M Agreement;
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is PARTLY
GRANTED.
The following DISPOSITIONS are in ORDER:
1) The bidding conducted and the Notice of Award
issued by PSALM in favor of the winning bidder,
KOREA WATER RESOURCES CORPORATION (KWATER), are declared VALID and LEGAL;
2) PSALM is directed to FURNISH the petitioners with
copies of all documents and records in its files
pertaining to K-Water;
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5) NPC shall be a CO-PARTY with K-Water in the
Water Protocol Agreement with MWSS and NIA, and
not merely as a conforming authority or agency; and
6) The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on May
24, 2010 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
29. PROVINCE OF AKLAN V. JODY KING
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R.
NOS. 197592 & 20262, NOVEMBER 27, 2013
FACTS:
Jody King sued the Province of Aklan in RTC of Marikina City
to collect the total amount of P22, 419, 112.96 covering
items which the Province failed to settle, pursuant to the
contract for construction of Passenger Terminal Building at
Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan entered into by the
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parties. The Province denied any unpaid balance due to Jody
King.
RTC granted the claim. The trial court issued a writ of
execution ordering the sheriff to demand from the Province
the immediate payment of the sum of money. Notices of
garnishment were served on the banks but the banks
refused to give due course to the court order, citing laws on
the determination of government monetary liabilities, their
enforcement and satisfaction.
The Province of Aklan filed petition for Certiorari in the CA.
CA dismissed the petition. The Province is estopped from
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised
the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice of
appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued
against it.
ISSUE:
The applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the
case
RULING:
The Petitions are GRANTED.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the CA is
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case
is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by
the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
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regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may
suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would
not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without
prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine is to guide the court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; © where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complaint; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; € where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and (l)
in quo warranto proceedings.
In the case, Jody King seek to enforce a claim for sums of
money allegedly owed by the Province of Aklan, a local
government unit. Under CA No. 327, as amended by PD No.
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1445, it is the COA which has primary
money
claims
against
government
instrumentalities. Hence, the RTC should
the proceedings and refer the filing of the
COA.
jurisdiction over
agencies
and
have suspended
claim before the
30. GAMBOA V. TEVES, G.R. NO. 176579, OCTOBER 9,
2012
FACTS:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the
indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of
the Philippine Long-Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings
of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner
contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on
filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the
petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for
reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation
of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?
RULING:
under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, to
own and operate a public utility a corporation’s capital must
at least be 60 percent owned by Philippine nationals.
2019-2020
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the
development of an economy "effectively controlled" by
Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution
explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public
utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose
capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s
implementing rules explain that "[f]or stocks to be deemed
owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino
equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with
appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA
clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the
term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as
with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the
right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control
of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the letter and
intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term
"capital" openly invites alien domination of economic
activities reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals.
Therefore, respondents’ interpretation will ultimately result
in handing over effective control of our national economy to
foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making
Filipinos second-class citizens in their own country.
31. ROY V. HERBOSA, G.R. NO. 207246, NOVEMBER
22, 2016
FACTS:
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on June 28,2011, the SC issued the Gamboa decision,
through its dispositive portion, it defines the term “CAPITAL”
under section 11, article XII of the Philippine constitution as
“ refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election
of directors, and thus in present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock
(common and non-common shares), and directed the
chairperson of SEC to apply this definition in determining the
extent allowable foreign ownership in respondent PLDT co.
Section 11 article XII of 1987 constitution
"No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens."
On November 6, 2012, the SEC posted a Notice in its website
inviting the public to attend a public dialogue and to submit
comments on the draft memorandum circular (attached
thereto) on the guidelines to be followed in determining
compliance with the Filipino ownership requirement in public
utilities under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
pursuant to the Court's directive in the Gamboa Decision.
On April 22, 2013, petitioner Atty. Jose M. Roy III ("Roy")
submitted his written comments on the draft guidelines.
On May 20, 2013, the SEC, through respondent Chairperson
Teresita J. Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled
"Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign
Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities." It was
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published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Business
Mirror on May 22, 2013.
Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the
Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC No. 8 for not
conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision
and Resolution and for having been issued by the SEC with
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Roy seeks to apply the
60-40 Filipino ownership requirement separately to each
class of shares of a public utility corporation, whether
common, preferred nonvoting, preferred voting or any other
class of shares. Petitioner Roy also questions the ruling of
the SEC that respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the constitutional rule
on foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SECMC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct the SEC to issue new
guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in accordance
with Gamboa.
Respondent PLDT filed its Comment, PLDT posited that the
Petition should be dismissed because it violates the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts as there are no compelling reasons to
invoke the Court's original jurisdiction; it is prematurely filed
because petitioner Roy failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before the SEC; the principal actions/remedies
of mandamus and declaratory relief are not within the
exclusive and/or original jurisdiction of the Court; the
petition for certiorari is an inappropriate remedy since the
SEC issued SEC-MC No. 8 in the exercise of its quasilegislative power; it deprives the necessary and
indispensable parties of their constitutional right to due
process; and the SEC merely implemented the dispositive
portion of the Gamboa Decision.
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ISSUES
(1)
Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing
SEC-MC
No.
8
in
light
of
the Gamboa Decision and Gamboa Resolution, and
(2)
Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that PLDT is compliant with the constitutional
limitation on foreign ownership.
HELD
On the procedural issue.
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review and take
cognizance of a case when the following specific requisites
are met: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has
standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in
the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the
question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
very lis mota of the case.
The first two requisites of judicial review are not met.
No
actual
controversy.
Petitioners'
hypothetical
illustration as to how SEC-MC No. 8 "practically encourages
circumvention of the 60-40 ownership rule" is evidently
speculative and fraught with conjectures and assumptions.
There is clearly wanting specific facts against which the
veracity of the conclusions purportedly following from the
speculations and assumptions can be validated. The lack of
a specific factual milieu from which the petitions originated
renders any pronouncement from the Court as a purely
advisory opinion and not a decision binding on identified and
definite parties and on a known set of facts.
2019-2020
Firstly, unlike in Gamboa, the identity of the public utility
corporation, the capital of which is at issue, is unknown. Its
outstanding capital stock and the actual composition thereof
in terms of numbers, classes, preferences and features are
all theoretical. The description "preferred shares with rights
to elect directors but with much lesser entitlement to
dividends, and still another class of preferred shares with no
rights to elect the directors and even less dividends" is
ambiguous.
Secondly, preferred shares usually have preference over
the common shares in the payment of dividends. If most of
the "preferred shares with rights to elect directors but with
much lesser entitlement to dividends" and the other "class
of preferred shares with no rights to elect the directors and
even less dividends" are owned by Filipinos, they stand to
receive their dividend entitlement ahead of the foreigners,
who are common shareholders. For the common
shareholders to have "bigger dividends" as compared to the
dividends paid to the preferred shareholders, which are
supposedly predominantly owned by Filipinos, there must
still be unrestricted retained earnings of the fictional
corporation left after payment of the dividends declared in
favor of the preferred shareholders.
Thirdly, petitioners fail to allege or show how their
hypothetical illustration will directly and adversely affect
them. That is impossible since their relationship to the
fictional corporation
is a matter
of guesswork.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the Court can only
surmise or speculate on the situation or controversy that the
petitioners
contemplate
to
present
for
judicial
determination. Petitioners are likewise conspicuously silent
on the direct adverse impact to them of the implementation
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of SEC-MC No. 8. Thus, the petitions must fail because the
Court is barred from rendering a decision based on
assumptions, speculations, conjectures and hypothetical or
fictional illustrations, more so in the present case which is
not even ripe for decision.
No locus standi.
the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action. If the asserted injury is
more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and
insubstantial, an excursion into constitutional adjudication
by the courts is not warranted.
Petitioners have no legal standing
constitutionality of SEC-MC No. 8.
to
question
the
As often reiterated by the Court, a taxpayer's suit is allowed
only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct
correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of
public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution, or
has shown that the case involves the exercise of the
spending or taxing power of Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does
not involve an additional expenditure of public funds and the
taxing or spending power of Congress.
The allegation that petitioner Roy's law firm is a "subscriber
of PLDT" is ambiguous. It is unclear whether his law firm is
a "subscriber" of PLDT's shares of stock or of its various
telecommunication services. Petitioner Roy has not
identified the specific direct and substantial injury he or his
law firm stands to suffer as "subscriber of PLDT" as a result
of the issuance of SEC-MC No. 8 and its enforcement.
2019-2020
The substantive issue
The SEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
Pursuant to the Court's constitutional duty to exercise
judicial review, the Court has conclusively found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of SEC in issuing SEC-MC No.
8.
The Decision has painstakingly explained why it considered
as obiter dictum that pronouncement in the Gamboa
Resolution that the constitutional requirement on Filipino
ownership should "apply uniformly and across the board to
all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and
category, comprising the capital of a corporation." The Court
stated that:
The fallo or decretal/dispositive portions of both
the Gamboa Decision and Resolution are definite,
clear and unequivocal. While there is a passage
in the body of the Gamboa Resolution that might
have appeared contrary to the fallo of the
Gamboa Decision, the definiteness and clarity of
the fallo of the Gamboa Decision must control
over the obiter dictum in the Gamboa Resolution
regarding the application of the 60-40 Filipinoforeign ownership requirement to "each class of
shares, regardless of differences in voting rights,
privileges and restrictions."
To the Court's mind and, as exhaustively demonstrated in
the Decision, the dispositive portion of the Gamboa Decision
was in no way modified by the Gamboa Resolution.
The heart of the controversy is the interpretation of Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides: "No
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
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citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens."
The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms,
that what the Constitution requires is full and legal beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights must rest in the
hands of Filipino nationals. And, precisely that is what SECMC No. 8 provides; For purposes of determining compliance
with the constitutional or statutory ownership, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to both the
total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors; and (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote.
In conclusion, the basic issues raised in the Motion having
been duly considered and passed upon by the Court in the
Decision and no substantial argument having been adduced
to warrant the reconsideration sought, the Court resolves to
deny the Motion with finality.
(32) KNIGHTS OF RIZAL V. DMCI HOMES, G.R. NO.
213948, APRIL 18, 2017
(33) PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOLE, G.R. NO. 202275,
JULY 17, 2018
FACTS:
To ensure road safety and address the risk-taking behavior
of bus drivers as its declared objective, the LTFRB issued
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 requiring "all Public
Utility Bus (PUB) operators ... to secure Labor Standards
Compliance Certificates" under pain of revocation of their
2019-2020
existing certificates of public convenience or denial of an
application for a new certificate.
Five (5) days later or on January 9, 2012, the DOLE issued
Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating on the partfixed-part-performance-based
compensation
system
referred to in the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012001. Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides
for the rule for computing the fixed and the performancebased component of a public utility bus driver's or
conductor's wage.
On January 28, 2012, Atty. Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf
of the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines, Integrated Metro Manila Bus Operators
Association, Inter City Bus Operators Association, the City
of San Jose Del Monte Bus Operators Association, and ProBus, wrote DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL
LAW 63 to then Secretary of Labor and Employment
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, requesting to defer the
implementation of Department Order No. 118-12. The
request, however, was not acted upon.
Meanwhile, on February 27, 2012 and in compliance with
Rule III, Section 3 of Department Order No. 118-12, the
National Wages and Productivity Commission issued NWPC
Guidelines No. 1 to serve as Operational Guidelines on
Department Order No. 118-12. NWPC Guidelines No. 1
suggested formulae for computing the fixed-based and the
performance-based components of a bus driver's or
conductor's wage. On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before
this Court a Petition with Urgent Request for Immediate
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, impleading the DOLE and the LTFRB
as respondents.
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Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Department Order
No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.
arguing that these issuances violate petitioners' rights to
non-impairment of obligation of contracts, due process of
law, and equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner satisfied the requirements for a
judicial review.
2019-2020
There being no actual facts from which this Court could
conclude that Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are unconstitutional,
this case presents no actual controversy.
Not only is this Petition not justiciable for failing to present
an actual controversy. Petitioners do not possess the
requisite legal standing to file this suit.
In dismissing the petitions, this Court said that there were
no "sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues." Petitioners' allegations of "sporadic
'surveillance' and ... being tagged as 'communist fronts'"
were not enough to substantiate their claim of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of public respondents. Absent actual
facts,
this
Court
said
that
the Southern
Hemisphere petitions operated in the "realm of the surreal
and merely imagined." "Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."
Some of the petitioners here are not even persons or entitles
authorized by law or by the Rules allowed to file a suit in
court. As intervenor MMDA sufficiently demonstrated,
petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc.,
and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. had their
certificates of incorporation revoked by the Securities and
Exchange Commission for failure to submit the required
general information sheets and financial statements for the
years 1996 to 2003. With their certificates of incorporation
revoked, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of
the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association,
Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. have no
corporate existence. They have no capacity to exercise any
corporate power, specifically, the power to sue in their
respective corporate names.
According to petitioners, implementing Department Order
No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 "may
[result] in [the] diminution of the income of ... bus drivers
and conductors." The allegation is obviously based on
speculation with the use of the word "may." There was even
no showing of how granting bus drivers' and conductors'
minimum wage and social welfare benefits would result in
lower income for them.
Again, the reasons cited-the "far-reaching consequences"
and "wide area of coverage and extent of effect" of
Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2012-001-are reasons not transcendent considering
that most administrative issuances of the national
government are of wide coverage. These reasons are not
special reasons for this Court to brush aside the requirement
of legal standing.
RULING:
No.
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(34) PHILCONSA V. PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT G.R.
NO. 218406, NOVEMBER 29, 2016
FACTS:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions challenging the
constitutionality and validity of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered into between
the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) on 27 March 2014 and 12 October
2012, respectively.
Essentially, the petitions commonly seek to declare the CAB
and the FAB unconstitutional for being similar to the void
MOA-AD, which was struck down by the Court for violating,
among others, the constitutional provisions on constitutional
amendments.
On 15 September 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO
No. 125 creating the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process and calling for a "comprehensive, integrated
and holistic peace process with Muslim rebels" in Mindanao.
On 28 February 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued. EO.No. 3 which amended EO No. 125 to reaffirm the
government's commitment to achieve just and lasting peace
in the Philippines through a comprehensive peace process.
Pursuant to EO No. 3, the Government Peace Negotiating
Panel (GPNP) held negotiations with the MILF, an armed,
revolutionary Muslim separatist group based in Mindanao
seeking separation of the Muslim people from the central
government. The negotiations eventually led to the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) on 27 July 2008. However, on 14 October
2008, in the case of Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
2019-2020
on Ancestral Domain, the Court declared the MOA-AD
unconstitutional.
During the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino
III, the government resumed peace negotiations with the
MILF. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen headed the GPNP and became
the government's chief peace negotiator with the MILF in
July 2010. On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace
agreement called the FAB was signed between the
government and the MILF. The FAB called for the creation of
an autonomous political entity named Bangsamoro,
replacing the ARMM.
On 7 December 2012, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer succeeded
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen as GPNP Chairperson.
On 17 December 2012, President Benigno S. Aquino III
issued EO No. 120, constituting the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission, tasked, among others, to (1) draft the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law with provisions consistent
with the FAB, and (2) recommend to Congress or the people
proposed
amendments
to
the
1987
Philippine
Constitution. Under Section 5 of the same EO, the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission shall cease to operate
upon the enactment by Congress of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law.
On 27 March 2014, the Philippine Government, represented
by GPNP Chairperson Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, signed the
CAB, which was an integration of the FAB, the Annexes and
the other agreements19 previously executed by the
government and the MILF.
On 10 September 2014, a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law, referred to as House Bill (HB) No. 4994, was presented
by President Aquino to the 16th Congress. On 27 May 2015,
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in Committee Report No. 747, the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Basic Bangsamoro Law of the House of Representatives
substituted said bill and passed another version known as
House Bill No. 5811. In the Senate, a revised version of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, known as the Basic Law for the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or Senate Bill No.
2894, was presented on 10 August 2015. However, on 6
June 2016, the 16th Congress adjourned without passing the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
On 7 November 2016, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
EO No. 08 expanding the membership and functions of the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission. EO No. 08 expands the
number of members of the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission from 15 to 21. Section 3 of EO No. 120, as
amended by EO No. 08, provides for the functions of the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting
proposals for a Bangsamoro Basic Law, to be submitted to
the Office of the President for submission to Congress, and
recommending to Congress or the people proposed
amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the CAB, including the FAB, is constitutional.
RULING:
We dismiss the petitions on the ground of prematurity.
Not ripe for adjudication due to non-enactment of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
2019-2020
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Pursuant to this
constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's judicial
review power is limited to actual cases or controversies. The
Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to
actual cases and controversies assures that the courts will
not intrude into areas specifically confined to the other
branches of government.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or
Legislative, only when an actual case between opposing
parties is submitted for judicial determination.
Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch of government before a court
may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result
of the challenged action. Petitioner must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
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In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the
Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy
requiring a full-blown resolution of the principal issue
presented by petitioners.
Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD, the CAB, including the
FAB, mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law
in order for such peace agreements to be implemented. In
the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the MOA-AD which
required the passage of any statute to implement the
provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would have
resulted in dramatically dismembering the Philippines by
placing the provinces and areas covered by the MOA-AD
under the control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity.
Further, under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumed
the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to
conform to the MOAAD. The Executive branch guaranteed to
the MILF that the Constitution would be drastically
overhauled to conform to the MOA-AD. In effect, the
Executive branch usurped the sole discretionary power of
Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution as well
as the exclusive power of the sovereign people to approve·
or disapprove such proposed amendments. Thus, this Court
struck down the MOA-AD as unconstitutional since
such ultra vires commitment by the Executive branch
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, there is no such
guarantee when the CAB and the FAB were signed. The
government gives no commitment, express or implied, that
the Constitution will be amended or that a law will be passed
comprising all the provisions indicated in the CAB and the
FAB. Thus, contrary to the imagined fear of petitioners, the
2019-2020
CAB and the FAB are not mere reincarnations or disguises of
the infirm MOA-AD.
It is a fundamental constitutional principle that Congress has
full discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro Basic Law
that Congress, in its wisdom, deems necessary and proper
to promote peace and development in Muslim areas in
Mindanao. Congress is expected to seriously consider the
CAB and the FAB but Congress is not bound by the CAB and
the FAB. Congress is separate, independent, and co-equal
of the Executive branch that alone entered into the CAB and
the FAB. The Executive branch cannot compel Congress to
adopt the CAB and the FAB. Neither can Congress dictate on
Congress the contents of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, or the
proposed amendments to the Constitution that Congress
should submit to the people for ratification.
The CAB and the FAB cannot be implemented without the
passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB
remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be
enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro
Basic Law is duly passed by Congress and subsequently
ratified in accordance with the Constitution. The CAB and the
FAB are preparatory documents that can "trigger a series of
acts" that may lead to the exercise by Congress of its power
to enact an organic act for an autonomous region under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. The CAB and the
FAB do not purport to preempt this Congressional power.
It is a fundamental premise of the CAB that a law and a
ratification process are
required
for its "actual
implementation."
The functions of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission,
which explicitly include the drafting of proposals for a
Bangsamoro Basic Law, as required under the CAB and the
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FAB, highlight the fact that the CAB and the FAB are mere
preliminary framework agreements which will guide the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission in the formulation of the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law for submission to
Congress, which may adopt such proposed law in whole or
in part, amend or revise the same, or even reject it outright.
It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the
Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro Basic Law enacted by
Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the
Constitution. Congress must still enact a Bangsamoro Basic
Law. The requirement of a Bangsamoro Basic Law under the
CAB and the FAB ensures that the pitfalls under the invalid
MOA-AD will be avoided.
International Committee of the Red Cross] as a ground for
the said declaration x x x. In the same Proclamation,
respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the
proclamation states:
NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE
POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR
MAHAIL TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY
IN THE PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
POLICE
WITH
THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE
TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:
Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro
Basic Law, it would still not be subject to judicial review. The
Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power
to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional
because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory
opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo. As the Court
in Montesclaros noted, invoking Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, there can be no justiciable controversy
involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The power
of judicial review comes into play only after the passage of
a bill, and not before. Unless enacted into law, any proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not subject
to judicial review.
(35) KULAYAN V. TAN, G.R. NO. 187298, JULY 3,
2012
FACTS:
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-09,
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It
cited the kidnapping incident [of three members from the
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1. The setting-up of checkpoints and
chokepoints in the province;
2. The imposition of curfew for the entire
province subject to such Guidelines as may be
issued by proper authorities;
3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure
including arrests in the pursuit of the
kidnappers and their supporters; and
4. To conduct such other actions or police
operations as may be necessary to ensure
public safety. x x x
On 16 April 2009, [petitioners] filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental
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freedoms guaranteed
Constitution.
under
CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Article
III
of
the
2019-2020
1987
which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. x x x x
xx
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the
Local Government Code authorizes the respondent governor
to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers
enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the
conduct of general searches and seizures.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the
Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis
thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which
is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena,
"(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives
of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised
by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification
will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x. x x x
RULING:
No.
i. One executive, one commander - in - chief
[I]t has already been established that there is one
repository of executive powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of
the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to
the President and no one else. x x x
In the case of Integrated Ba r of the Philippines v. Zamora,
the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers
belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7,
Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander - in - Chief
powers dictate that they are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of
One President is the notion that there are certain acts which,
by their very nature, may only be performed by the
president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in Chief powers to
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When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute
its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
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CASES IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. x x x
In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, the
Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the
President, precisely because they are of exceptional import:
xxx
The declaration of martial law, the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the
pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise
by the President of the constitutionally vested power.
The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s
police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
xxxxxx xxx
ut as a civilian agency of the government, the police,
through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same
calling - out powers as the President
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Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not
endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is
the local chief executive, is ultra vires x x x.
Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered
commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings
m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its
Implementing Guidelines.
(36) CITY OF BATANGAS V. PHILIPPINE SHELL
PETROLEUM CORP., G.R. NO. 195003, JUNE 7, 2017
FACTS:
Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) owns and
operates a refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City
(Tabangao Refinery).
Shell Philippines Exploration (SPEX), by virtue of Service
Contract No. 38 executed by it and the Department of
Energy (DOE), discovered a source of natural gas from
Malampaya field (located in North Western Palawan). The
treatment of the natural gas, which will be done in the
Tabangao refinery, required the construction of a pipeline
from Malampaya Field to Tabangao, Batangas.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Batangas
enacted Ordinance No. 3, series of 2001, which requires
heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas
Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to
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construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater
as coolant for their industrial facilities.
PSPC filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of the Ordinance No. 3. SPEX filed a petition-in-intervention
(Intervention) praying for the same relief.
PSPC and SPEX averred that the Assailed Ordinance
constitutes an invalid exercise of police power as it failed to
meet the substantive requirements for validity. Particularly,
PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes the
Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and encroaches
upon the power of the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) to regulate and control the Philippines' water
resources. In addition, Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod failed to sufficiently show the factual or technical
basis for its enactment.
RTC declared the assailed ordinance as invalid. CA dismissed
petitioner’s appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed City Ordinance is valid?
RULING:
The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being
contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence showing
the existence of factual basis for its enactment.
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must
also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance:
2019-2020
(i) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(ii) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(iii) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
(v) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
(vi) must not be unreasonable.
Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed
Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its police power.
This claim is erroneous.
Police power primarily rests with the State. In furtherance
of the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of
the State.
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the
State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the
will of their principal, the State. Necessarily, therefore,
ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause
may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national
statutes.
The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and
protection of water resources x x x water resources are
placed under the control and regulation of the government
through the National Water Resources Council, now the
NWRB. In turn, the privilege to appropriate and use water is
one which is exclusively granted and regulated by the State
through water permits issued by the NWRB. Once granted,
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these water permits continue to be valid save only for
reasons spelled out under the Water Code itself. Conversely,
the power to modify, suspend, cancel or revoke water
permits already issued also rests with NWRB.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance
effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as
it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and
regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of the
provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB.
By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in
excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the
Assailed Ordinance ultra vires.
In any case, it bears emphasizing that the measure of the
substantive validity of an ordinance is the underlying factual
basis for which it was enacted. Hence, without factual basis,
an ordinance will necessarily fail the substantive test for
validity. Batangas City failed to prove the existence of
factual basis to justify the enactment of the Assailed
Ordinance.
While the Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as
invalid, the pronouncements hereunder should not be
misconstrued by heavy industries to be carte blanche to
abuse their respective water rights at the expense of the
health and safety of the inhabitants of Batangas City, the
environment within which these inhabitants live, and the
resources upon which these inhabitants rely. The Court
recognizes fresh ground water as an invaluable natural
resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that
Batangas City is not precluded from exercising its right to
protect its inhabitants from injurious effects which may
result from the misuse of natural water resources within its
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territorial jurisdiction, should these effects later arise,
provided that such exercise is done within the framework of
applicable national law, particularly, the Water Code.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
(1) THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 182574,
SEPTEMBER 28, 2010
FACTS:
On 21 December 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Negros Occidental passed Resolution allocating ₱4,000,000
of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of
the province. After a public bidding, the Committee on
Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care
Health System Incorporated (Philam Care).
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its
then Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, and Philam Care
entered into a Group Health Care Agreement involving a
total payment of ₱3,760,000 representing the insurance
premiums of its officials and employees. The total premium
amount was paid on 25 January 1996.
After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued
Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment
because of lack of approval from the Office of the President
(OP) as provided under Administrative Order No. 103. The
Provincial Auditor explained that the premium payment for
health care benefits violated Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law.
Petitioner complied with the directive post-facto and sent a
letter-request to the OP. In a Memorandum, then President
Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but
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only in the amount of ₱100,000. The Provincial Auditor
ignored the directive of the President and instead issued
Notice of Disallowance stating similar grounds as mentioned
in Notice of Suspension.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA. The COA
affirmed the Provincial Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance.
The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity,
including a local government unit, is exempt from securing
prior approval from the President granting additional
benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy
of standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758.
The COA added that the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991 relied upon by petitioner does not stand on its
own but has to be harmonized with Section 12 of RA 6758.
Further, the COA stated that the insurance benefits from
Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a duplication
of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare
program which is mandated by law. Being merely a creation
of a local legislative body, the provincial health care program
should not contravene but instead be consistent with
national laws enacted by Congress from where local
legislative bodies draw their authority.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the COA
denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the disallowance of ₱3,760,000 for premium paid
for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
2019-2020
granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949
officials and employees.
HELD:
Yes.
AO 103 took effect on 14 January 1994 or eleven months
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A. The main
purpose of AO 103 is to prevent discontentment,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel, national or local, who do not receive, or who
receive less, productivity incentive benefits or other forms
of allowances or benefits.
It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President
authorized all agencies of the national government as well
as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of ₱2,000
productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has
rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December
1993. In Section 2, the President enjoined all heads of
government offices and agencies from granting productivity
incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances
and benefits without the President’s prior approval.
In
the
present
case,
petitioner,
through
an
approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted
and released the disbursement for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of the province’s officials and
employees without any prior approval from the President.
The COA disallowed the premium payment for such benefits
since petitioner disregarded AO 103 and RA 6758.
SC disagree with the COA. From a close reading of the
provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of
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prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that
the
prohibition
applies
only
to
"government
offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing
boards." Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the
prohibition also applies to LGUs. In other words, AO 103
must be observed by government offices under the
President’s control.
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s
general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution.
The President’s power of general supervision means the
power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law. This is
distinguished from the President’s power of control which is
the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the President over that of the
subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President
the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a
subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general
supervision of the President, the President’s authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits in the present case does not need the approval of
the President to be valid.
Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758,
the COA did not clearly establish that the medical care
benefits given by the government at the time under
2019-2020
Presidential Decree No. 1519 were sufficient to cover the
needs of government employees especially those employed
by LGUs.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, and the Local
Government Code of 1991, SC declare that the grant and
release of the hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were
validly enacted through an ordinance passed by
petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
In sum, since petitioner’s grant and release of the
questioned disbursement without the President’s approval
did not violate the President’s directive in AO 103, the COA
then gravely abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to
disallow the premium payment for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of petitioner’s officials and
employees.
(2) ABAD V. DELA CRUZ, G.R. NO. 207422,
MARCH 18, 2015
FACTS:
Mayor of Muntinlupa, upon the concurrence of the majority
of members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
Government of Muntinlupa, appointed the respondent (Dela
Cruz) on 2006 as City Assessor in a permanent capacity as
City Government Department Head III. Petitioner (Abad),
Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the
City Assessor, requested the disapproval of Dela Cruz’s
appointment, alleging that the position of City Government
Department Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, 9
salary grades higher than Dela Cruz’s former position as
Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade
18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz’s appointment violated
Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001,
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which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position
more than 3 salary grades above his or her former position.
Abad added that he and 3 other qualified applicants were
allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of
Item 10 of the same Memorandum Circular, which is the
automatic consideration of all the next-in-rank employees
for promotions to the next higher position.
On 2009, CSC-NCR invalidated the appointment of Dela Cruz
which the latter appealed to CSC which revered the CSCNCR’s decision stating that applicants for City Government
Department Head III based on the following criteria:
performance, work history, awards, education, training,
potential, and physical characteristics and personality traits.
Commission ruled that Dela Cruz’s appointment was an
exception to the three-salary-grade rule.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed
Abad’s petition ruling that the three-salary-grade rule only
gives preference to the person occupying the position next
in rank to a vacancy, but does not by any means give the
employee next in rank the exclusive right to be appointed to
the said vacancy. As long as the employee appointed to the
position possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position, the appointment is valid.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is void for the
violation of the next-in-rank rule; and
Whether or not Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to
the three-salary grade limitation.
RULING:
1. No, Dela Cruz’s appointment is valid in accordance with
the next-in-rank rule.
2019-2020
Under the Section 21(2)(3) of the Civil Service Law, the
appointing authority for promotion must automatically
consider the employees next-in-rank as candidates for
appointment.
The rationale of the next-in-line rule is for the maintenance
of the merit policy and rewards in the civil service. Since
appointments in the civil service are based on merit and
fitness, it is assumed that the appointments of employees
next in rank are equally meritorious. As long as the
appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the
appointment is valid.
2. Yes, Dela Cruz’s appointment is an exception to the threesalary grade limitation.
Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the
three-salary-grade rule states that “an employee may be
promoted or transferred to a position which is not more than
3 salary, pay or job grades higher than the employee’s
present position.” However, this rule is subject to the
exception of “very meritorious cases.” These “very
meritorious cases” are provided in CSC Resolution No. 030106 dated January 24, 2003:
Any or all of the following would constitute a meritorious
case exempted from the 3-salary grade limitation on
promotion:
1. The position occupied by the person is next-in- rank
to the vacant position, as identified in the Merit
Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Positions
(SRP) of the agency;
2. The position is a lone, or entrance position, as
indicated in the agency’s staffing pattern;
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3. The position belongs to the dearth category, such as
Medical Officer/Specialist positions and Attorney
positions;
4. The position is unique and/or highly specialized such
as Actuarial positions and Airways Communicator;
5. The candidates passed through a deep selection
process, taking into consideration the candidates’
superior qualifications in regard to:
-Educational
achievements
Highly
specialized
trainings Relevant work experience
-Consistent high-performance rating/ranking; and
5. The vacant position belongs to the closed career
system.
6. In the case at bar, Dela Cruz’s appointment falls
under the 5th exception. Contrary to petitioner’s
claim, the Personnel Selection Board conducted a
deep selection process, ranking the candidates for the
position of City Government Department Head III
based on approved criteria. Respondent’s case,
therefore, is a “very meritorious case” and is valid.
the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray
scanning machine for inspection the operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. The operatoron-duty, upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the
attention of port personnel Archie Igot who was the baggage
inspector then.
(3) DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 209387,
JANUARY 11, 2016
FACTS:
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision dated September 28, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the CA-Cebu City. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment finding petitioner
Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms under
COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Sec. 261 of BP
Blg. 881 during the 2007 election period.
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during
arraignment.
On May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu
Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. When he proceeded to
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag
was then inspected and the following items were found
inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book;
other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed
inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the
negative.
Dela Cruz was then arrested and was charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms.
Subsequently, another information was filed charging Dela
Cruz with the violation of COMELEC Res. No. 7764, in
relation to Sec. 261 of BP Blg. 881.
After trial, RTC - Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under COMELEC
Res. No. 7764, in relation to Sec. 261 of BP Blg. 881 in
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 1 year with disqualification from holding
public office and the right to suffrage.
According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela Cruz committed
illegal possession of firearms. It proved the following
elements: "(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b)
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the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the license or permit to possess the same." The
prosecution presented the firearms and live ammunitions
found in Dela Cruz’s possession. It also presented three (3)
prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms were
found inside Dela Cruz’s bag. The prosecution also
presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any
application for license to possess a firearm, and he was not
given authority to carry a firearm outside his residence.
The trial court also held that the search conducted by the
port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case for
violation of RA No. 8294. It held that "RA No. 8294 penalizes
simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the
person arrested committed ‘no other crime.’" Dela Cruz,
who had been charged with illegal possession of firearms,
was also charged with violating the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment.
Similarly, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Dela Cruz.
ISSUES:
The issues for resolution in this case are:
1. Whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in
possession of the illegal firearms within the meaning
of the COMELEC Res. No. 7764, in relation to Sec. 261
of BP Blg. 881;
2. Whether petitioner waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and
3. Assuming that there was no waiver, whether there
was a valid search and seizure in this case.
2019-2020
RULING:
1:
The Court stated that the prosecution was able to
establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did
not present any valid authorization to carry the firearms
outside his residence during the period designated by the
Commission on Elections. He was carrying the firearms in
the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.
Petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense:
(1)
that he was a frequent traveler and was, thus,
knowledgeable about the security measures at the
terminal;
(2)
that he left his bag with a porter for a certain
amount of time; and
(3)
that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray
machine for voluntary inspection. All these
circumstances were left uncontested by the
prosecution.
The Court emphasized that when petitioner claimed that
someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the burden
of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift
in the burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of
the presumption of innocence.
Accordingly, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the
onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the
commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the
same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to
the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the
trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence
sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations
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in the information or has established a prima facie case
against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence
in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima
facie case.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to negate the
prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the
intent to possess the illegal firearms.
The Court also stated that when the crime is punished by a
special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act
must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must
be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the
act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between
criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess
is, however, without regard to any other criminal or
felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use
of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting
a person under PD No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may
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be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient
that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if
such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
2-3: For a full understanding of the nature of the
constitutional rights involved, we will examine three (3)
points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of
petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray
scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the Port
Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened
the bag to search, retrieve, and seize the firearms and
ammunition.
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner
presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—the xray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the
x-ray machine station. With regard to searches and
seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is
different from that imposed on state agents or authorized
government authorities.
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or
seizure. The evidence obtained against the accused was not
procured by the state acting through its police officers or
authorized government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not
govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be
invoked against the acts of private individuals:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
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case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.
The Court emphasized that the reason behind the search is
that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy
when coming into airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage is routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
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against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions
when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of
passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan
revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port
authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of
petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.
The second point of intrusion—when the baggage inspector
opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port
police officer.
The Court ruled that there was no unreasonable search
during this time too. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by
placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The
presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was
voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present
the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not
want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning
and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that
a crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers
passing through ports or terminals.
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation
of person and effects for port security measures is a
permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the
possible harm to society caused by lawless persons.
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy
occurred during petitioner’s submission to port security
measures.
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After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning
machine and inspection by the baggage inspector, Officer
Abregana was called to inspect petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless search is
presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays
down the exceptions where warrantless searches are
deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a
moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that
to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
The court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of
the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto,
justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such
valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the]
accused.
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that
there was no valid consent to the search because his consent
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was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited
items in his bag. The defendant’s belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid
consent to the search when incriminating items are found.
His or her belief must be measured against the totality of
the circumstances. Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted
himself to port security measures and, as he claimed during
trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he
had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the
present petition falls under a valid consented search and
during routine port security procedures meritorious. The
search conducted on petitioner’s bag is valid.
Other Topic: The consented search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is different from a customs search.
To be a valid customs search, the requirements are:
(1)
the person/s conducting the search was/were
exercising police authority under customs law;
(2)
the search was for the enforcement of customs
law; and
(3)
the place searched is not a dwelling place or
house.
Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine
port security measures. The search was not conducted by
persons authorized under customs law. It was also not
motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code
or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually
occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the
search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.
(4) REMIGIO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 227038, JULY 31,
2017
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FACTS:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Jeffrey
Remegio of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
Prosecution alleged Bantay Bayan Bahoyo received a report
of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street, Brgy.
San Antonio Village in Makati City. BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez went to the said street and saw Remegio,
intoxicated, urinating and displaying his private parts while
standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. They
approached him and asked for his identification but Remegio
failed to produce one. Remegio emptied his pockets,
revealing a pack of cigarettes containing 1 stick of cigarette
and 2 pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana
leaves. The Bantay Bayan operatives seized the items, took
Remegio to the police station. The seized items were
inventoried, marked and photographed and Remegio
underwent drug testing. It was confirmed that the rolled
paper contained marijuana and that Remegio was positive
for the presence of methamphetamine.
ISSUES AND RULING:
Whether or not the Bill of Rights can be invoked against the
Bantay Bayan operatives
Remegio contended that he was just urinating in front of his
workplace when 2 BB operatives approached and asked him
where he lived. Upon answering, they frisked him, took
away his belongings, handcuffed him and brought him to the
barangay hall. He was detained for an hour and was taken
to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a police
officer questioned him.
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest and a valid search
were made by the Bantay Bayan operatives
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
BB
operatives conducted a valid warrantless arrest since
Remegio was scandalously showing his private parts at the
time of his arrest. The search incdental to such arrest which
yielded the seized marijuana in Remegio’s possession was
also lawful. CA affirmed his conviction.
SC- Yes, the Bill of Rights can be invoked against the Bantay
Bayan operatives. The Bill of Rights does NOT govern
relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals but the same may be
applicable if such individuals act under the color of a
state-related function.
In the present case, the Court held that the acts of the
Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or other volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective ares have
the color of a state-related function. As such, they should
be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose
of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution to them.
SC - There was no lawful warrantless arrest and valid search
made.
One of the exceptiong to the need of a search warrant is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
There are 3 instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are:
1. an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
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2. an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed (hot pursuit); and
3. an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In (a) and (b), the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is essential.
The Prosecution’s claim that Remegio was showing off his
private parts was belied by the testimonies of the BB
operatives. The circumstances do not justify the condut of
an in flagrante delicto arrest since there was no overt act
constituting a crime committed by Remegio in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. There was no hot
pursuit warrantless arrest since the BB operatives do not
have any personal knowledge of facts that Remegio had just
committed an offense. No proper charge on the alleged
public display of private parts was filed which strenghtened
the view that no prior arrest was made which led to a search
incidental thereto. All told, the BB operatives conducted an
illegal search.
Consequently, the marijuana seized is
rendered inadmissible in evidence. SC ACQUITTED Remegio
from criminal liability.
(5) G.R. NO. 199669
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