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Statutory Construction Textbook by Rolando A. Suarez
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROLANDO A. SUAREZ LL.B., SAN BEDA COLLEGE Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Review, and Political Law Review Former Professor of different law subjects in several colleges (i.e., San Beda College of Law, Adamson University, MLQU, Lyceum, University of Perpetual Help, PUP and University of Manila); Lecturer; Powerhouse Law Review Center; Center for Global Best Practices; IBP-MCLE; UM Review; Perpetual Help, Las Piñas and Biñan, MLQ Pre-week, Knowledge Providers Law Review Center, Suarez, Zamora, Suarez and Suarez Author: Political Law Reviewer, Constitutional Law Reviewer; Six Months Before the Bar Outline/Reviewer; Three Months Before The Bar Outline Reviewer Principles; Comments and Cases in Constitutional Law, Volume I, First Edition and Second Edition; Principles, Comments and Cases in Constitutional Law, Volume II, First Edition and Second Edition; Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation; Comparative Study; Roman Law and Philippine Law, First and Second Edition; Introduction to Law, First, Second, Third and Fourth Editions; Notes and Comments, Proclamation No. 3 and The Provisional Constitution of the Philippines; Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Taxation; A Mile to Go for Genuine Land Reform in the Philippines; Statutory Constitution, First and Second Edition; Torts and Damages First and Second Edition; Legal Forms; The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Made Easy Professor of * Published & Distributed by REX Book Store 856 Nicanor Reyes, Sr. St. Tel. Nos. 736-0547 -735-13-64 1977 C.M.Recto Avenue Tel. Nos. 735-56-27' 735-55-34 Manila, Philippines www.rexpublishlng.com.ph DEDICATION To my wife, Nora, and children, Revelyn, Rhonnel, Reinna Ricci, and Rizza; to my beloved and .deceased parents, Marcelo A. Suarez and Elena Arevalo Suarez, my first teachers, who taught me the rudiments of writing and the value of hard work; to my thoughtful and loving aunt, Cornelia Arevalo Vda. De Capul; to my kind and equally thoughtful mother-in-law, Niflea Lautchang Vda. De Manalese, who just passed away; to my deceased brothers and sisters, Buendegardo, Proserfina, Elvira, Manolo, and Rodolfo with whom I have shared the blessings of a modest home and hardworking parents; to all my former teachers who cared to enlighten me with their knowledge; to my town mates and friends who share my thoughts and aspirations for a better society; and above all, to my dear God who is always generous to help me in any of my endeavors, I dedicate this humble work. iu ACKNOWLEDGMENT I acknowledge the assistance rendered by the members of my present staff, Hanna Marie M. Manila, and Augusto C. Lusung, Jr., my former student who found interest to learn how to write a law book and even a non-law book. I thank the proofreaders, including my children, Roland Rhonnel M. Suarez, a lawyer, and Rhina Rizza M. Suarez, for encoding some commentaries which I write from time to time. I also wish to thank the whole Editorial Production Department of Rex Book Store for helping me throughout the entire printing process. Above all, I am immensely grateful to God for all the blessings, guidance and fortune that I have received and those still to come. V PREFACE I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007. Last year, I was reminded by a concerned staff of REX Book Store that I am not able to revise the second edition of Statutory Construction, and I was requested to do so as soon as possible, in response to numerous requests of students and professors. I was about to start the revision last year, but I was saddled by my busy schedule in bar review classes until the first week of August 2013. After the end of the bar examinations last year, I was all set to start the revision, but again, and to my dismay, I suffered a stroke last October 2013, and I was advised to take a rest. After my recovery, I started reading new cases and jurisprudence about the subject. I gathered the important ones and they are now included in this edition. They are the cases in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Like what I have done in all the books I wrote in different subjects, I have tried to have a simplified presentation and discussion of the various principles and cases covering the subject matter. I hope that this new edition, like any other book or books I wrote, will be of valuable help to all students and professors throughout the country. December 18, 2014, Paranaque City ROLANDO A. SUAREZ vii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT Statutory construction, defined ................................................ 1 Construction distinguished from interpretation .....................1 The most basic rules to remember ........................................... 2 Decisions of the Supreme Court that clarify the rule on 2 the issue of when to apply and interpret the law Three (3) cardinal rules when the wordings of the Constitution are subject to interpretation ......................3 3 Who interprets the law? ............................................................ Purpose of interpretation and construction ............................. .4 When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret and construct? ...................................................................4 New Case Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .................................5 Old Case Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004 Ambiguitydefined ...................................................................... The present structure of government, and how this affects interpretation and construction of statutes Legislative power ... . ................................................................... 7 9 9 10 Case Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997...........10 ix Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power 13 What is the traditional concept of judicial power? ......... 13 What is the new definition of judicial power? ................13 New Case Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 ...............................14 Old Case Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 122156, February3, 1997...............................................................18 The Court or the judicial arm of the government shall be governed by rules..............................................................22 Executive Department...............................................................23 The three (3) principal branches of government.....................24 CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Use intrinsic aids before resorting to extrinsic aids...............27 What are the intrinsic aids? ......................................................27 New Case Spouses Pascual, et al., Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano, Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano v. Spouses Ballesteros, et al., G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012 ..............................29 Old Case LandBank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 .........................................31 New Case South Pacific Sugar Corporation and South East Asia Sugar Mill Corporation v. Court Of Appeals and x Sugar Regulatory Administration G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 ................................. 32 Old Case Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Herminigildo Pascual, G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997 ............................... 35 Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, June 14, 1996 En Banc, Per Curiam............................... 39 New Case Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Hon. Court Of Appeals and Asia United Bank G.R. No. 187919, April 25, 2012......................................43 Old Cases People v. Hon. A. Purisima, et al., G.R. Nos. L.420050-66, November 20, 1978 ................... 46 U.S. v. Hart, et al., 26 Phil. 149........................................................................ 47 General Milling Corporation v. Torres, G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 ........................................ 48 Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996 ............................................................. 50 ExtrinsicAids ............................................................................. 53 Contemporaneous circumstances ..................................... Policy .................................................................................. Legislative history of the statute ..................................... Contemporaneous and practical construction ................. Executive construction ...................................................... Legislative construction .................................................... Judicial construction ......................................................... Construction by the bar and legal commentators .......... 53 53 54 .54 54 54 55 55 Simplifications of the rule regarding the use of extrinsic aids ................................................................. 55 1. 2 3. 4. 5. 6 7. 8. . . Cases Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 ............................. ............. . 55 Bonifacio v. Judge Dizon, G.R. No. 79416, September5, 1989.................................................................. 57 Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 [1959] and Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 [1992].......................................................... 58 Garcia-Padilla v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and General Fidel V. Ramos & Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel G.R. No. 61388, April20, 1983.................................................................... 61 Attendant circumstances considered ........................................ Comments on this part of the decision ............................... ......... Contemporaneous circumstances and what was actually being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield The historical basis of the President's Power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus ........................... Reasons and evils sought to be remedied by LOl 1211.......... Opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court ............................................... 63 64 64 65 65 66 Cases CelsO Halili and Arthur Haul v. C.A. and Helen Meyers Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 113539, March12, 1998.........................................................................73 Emilio M.R. Osmefla and Pablo Garcia v. Comelec, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998.....................................78 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Merida Ruth Romero..............82 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban..........85 Cases Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose de Venecia, et al., G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998........................................87 Joseph Estrada V. Aniàno Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2. 2001 .............. .................. xli .90 New Case Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danio B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong v. Commission On Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009..............................99 Old Case Socrates v. COMELEC & Hagedorn, G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002 ........................... 101 Background of rules and jurisprudence in case of termination of employment 103 Cases Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989 .................................... 105 Ruben Serrano v National Labor Relations Commission and Isetann Department Store, G R No 117040, January 27, 2000 107 Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004) 109 Presumptions in aids of construction ................ ........................ Presumption of validity .................................................... Presumption of constitutionality ............... ....................... Presumption of good faith ......................... ....................... Presumption agamst injustice Presumption against inconsistency Presumption against absurdity Presumption against ineffectiveness Presumption against irrepealable laws 110 111 111 112 112 112 113 113 113 Case De Guia v. Guingona, et al., G R No 119525, April 18, 1995 Presumption against implied repeals Presumption against violation of public policy Presumption of knowledge of existing, laws Presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction 114 115 115 115 116 Presumption of jurisdiction Presumption of acting within the scope of authority Presumption against violation of international law . 116 116 116 ....... CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION Definition of law Classification of law Sources of law Statutes ...................................................................................... Kinds of statutes ........................................................................ 117 118 119 121 121 ......................................................................... ................................................................... ............................................................................ As to nature Penal statutes ........................................................... Remedial statutes ...................................................... ... Substantive statutes ................................................. Labor statutes ........................................................... Tax statutes .............................................................. As to application Mandatory Directory .................................................................... As to performance Permanent Temporary ................................................................. As to scope General Special Local .......................................................................... Other classifications A statute could either be prospective orretroactive A statute could either be a repealing act or an amendatory act A statute could either be a reference statute or a declaratory statute 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 ................................................................. 121 121 ................................................................. ...................................................................... ....................................................................... . 121 121 121 ...................................................... 121 ......................................... 121 ..................................... 121 Identification of statutes 122 How are statutes identified? 122 Partsof statutes 122 Seven parts of a statute 122 Title...........................................................................122 Preamble 124 Enacting Clause 125 ........................................................... ............................................ ......................................................................... ................................................... ................................................................... ..... . ...................... xiv ............................ . 125 Body Proviso.......................................................................127 Interpretative clause ........... ...................................... 128 Repealing clause.......................................................128 Savingclause ............................................................129 Separability clause...................................................129 Otherlaws ................................................................. 130 1. Presidential issuances........................................130 130 Background......................................................... 130 Examples............................................................. 2. Ordinances..........................................................136 Effectivityof laws ...................................................................... 140 When shall a law take effect? .......................................... 140 Scope of Tañada v. Tuvera............................................... Effectivity of presidential issuances................................ Effectivity of ordinance..................................................... Who are subject to Philippine laws? ........................................ 140 140 140 141 CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES Validity and constitutionality of statutes................................ Actual case or controversy ......................................................... Properparty............................................................................... Earliest opportunity .................................................................. Decision of the constitutional question is necessary to determine the case itself ......................... Effect of unconstitutional statute............................................. If totally declared unconstitutional.......................................... If partially declared unconstitutional ...................................... What is the effect of a statute which is declared unconstitutional? ............................................................... What is the extent of judicial power to declare the unconstitutionality of assailed legislative and executive acts? ............................................................. Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality........ 142 143 143 143 144 144 144 144 145 146 147 CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES Statutes must be read and construed as a whole ................... xv 148 Legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole ............................................................. 148 New Case Lorenzo T. Tangga-an v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013....................................149 Old Case Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit G.R. No. L-59154, April 3, 1990 ....................................... 152 Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different provisions of the statute including the conflicting provisions thereof As a rule, the statute of later date prevails ............................................ ............................ Generalia specialibus non derogant ......................................... A special law prevails over a general law Exceptions to this rule Parimatenia rule In interpreting reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which such statute received when previously in force In the case of adopted statute, the interpretation of the courts of the State from which it is adopted should be considered In case of conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails Implied repeals are not legally presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions ............................... .............................................................. ....................................................................... ............................................................. ..................................................................... ........................... ........ ................................................................... 153 153 154 154 155 155 156 157 158 159 Case Batangas CATV, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004 ............................. 159 CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES Specific Statutes Rules of construction of the following statutes ......................................................................... xw ........................ 161 161 Construction of each statute..................................................... PenalStatutes............................................................................ How are penal statutes interpreted? RemedialStatutes ..................................................................... How are remedial statutes construed? ............................ Substantive Statutes ................................................................. LaborStatutes ........................................................................... How are labor laws interpreted? ...................................... TaxStatutes............................................................................... How are tax statutes interpreted? ................................... MandatoryStatutes................................................................... DirectoryStatutes ...................................................................... PermanentStatute .................................................................... TemporaryStatute .................................................................... GeneralStatute.......................................................................... SpecialStatute........................................................................... LocalStatute.............................................................................. OtherStatutes ........................................................................... Statutes in derogation of rights....................................... Statutes granting privileges............................................. Naturalization laws .......................................................... Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties ................... Statute authorizing suits against the government ........ Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing power of local government units ............................. Statute imposing penalties for non-payment of tax Electionlaws ..................................................................... Adoptionstatutes.............................................................. Amnesty proclamations .................................................... Veteran and pension laws................................................ General welfare legislations............................................. Probationlaw .................................................................... Laws on attachment ......................................................... Rulesof court..................................................................... Statutes prescribing qualifications for an office ............. Election laws on qualification and disqualification........ Other classifications .................................................................. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive............... Prospective statute............................................................ Retroactivestatute............................................................ A statute could either be a repealing act or an Amendatoryact................................................................. Repealingact ..................................................................... ................................ 162 162 162 162 162 162 163 163 164 164 165 165 168 168 168 168 168 169 169 169 169 169 169 170 170 170 170 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 172 172 172 172 173 173 172 174 174 175 Repeal The repeal of a statute is either total or partial..................... Amendatoryact .......................................................................... A Statute could either be a reference statute, a supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an adopted Statute ................................................................. Reference statute .............................................................. Supplemental statutes...................................................... Reenacted statutes ................................................ . ............ Adopted statutes ............................................................... 176 176 176 176 177 CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE Importance of Latin Maxims .................................................... Latin maxims applicable to statutory construction ................ On the principle that laws should be prospective, not retroactive ........................................................... On the principle that when the law is clear, what the courts should do is to apply it, not to interpretit................................................................. On the principle that it is not the letter of the law that killeth, it is the spirit of the law that givethlife .................................................................. On the principle that what is not included in those enumerated are deemed excluded........................... On the principle that special provisions prevail over general provisions ............................................ . 178 179 179 180 181 182 183 New Case Maria Virginia V. Remo v. The Honorable Secretary Of Foreign Affairs G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010......................................183 On the principle that while the law may be hard, it is the law that will be followed ...........................186 New Case Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. People Of The Philippines G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012..............................186 On the general principle that without intent, there can be no crime ......................................................... xvrn 188 On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one but ignorance of fact may be an excuse .....188 On the principle that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish........................................189 Latin Maxims and phrases related to the subject of statutory construction................................................... Mens legislatores............................................................... Reddendo singula singulis................................................ Cassus omissus pro omisso habbendus est...................... Noscitur a sociis ................................................................ Ejusdem generic ................................................................ 189 189 190 190 191 192 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE How are words and phrases in a statute interpreted? ............ Is the statutory definition conclusive to the courts?............... Rules that govern the following situations.............................. When the word used in a statute has a general meaning When the word used has a technical meaning ........................ 194 194 194 195 195 Case Macasaet v Commission On Audit G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989 .........................................196 When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the legislative intent ......................................................... When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in astatute ............................................................................. Particular words and phrases................................................... Theword "OR"................................................................... The word "AND .................................................................. The term "AND/OR ............................................................ 198 199 199 199 201 201 New Case Antonio D. Dayao, et al., v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 193643 and Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013.................................201 kAm Old Case Civil Service Commission v. Saturnino Dela Cruz G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 ..................................205 The words "SHALL" ..................................................................206 208 The word "MAY" ........................................................................ 208 The word "ALL," "EVERY," and "ANY .................................... The words "AND SO FORTH," and "AND THE LIKE ........................................................ 208 Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT," 209 and"NO .............................................................................. Due process of law..................................................................... Requirements of due process .................................................... Substantive due process............................................................ Procedural due process............................................................... Two aspects of procedural due process .................................... Court's power to construe statutes arises only if the statute is not clear............................................................ In the process of construing a statute, what are those that the court can do and what are those that the court cannot do........................................................... What happens if the statute is not capable of interpretation or construction' ........................................ Can the supreme court abandon or overrule its earlier decision?................................................................. If the decision of the supreme court in a particular case is not correct, should it be followed by the inferior courts? .................................................................. 209 210 210 210 210 212 212 213 213 215 CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS Can the contracting parties enter into any kind of agreement and establish such terms and conditions 216 that they may deem proper? ............................................ 217 Who are bound by the terms of the contract 9 ......................... When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret the 217 terms of the contract? ....................................................... In case of conflict between the words of the contract and evident intention of the parties, which prevails? ............................................. .....................219 219 How to judge the intention of the parties? .............................. xx Rules governing the following: Effect of the use of several terms.................................... 220 Effect of stipulations that admit of several meanings................................................................... 220 Effect of words which may have different significations ............................................................. 220 Effect of usage or custom of the place ............................. .220 Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract 220 Use of general terms ................................................................. 220 Stipulations that admit general meanings.............................. 220 Usage or custom of the place .................................................... 220 Obscure words or stipulation.................................................... 220 Rule in case of doubt as to the principal object and as to the incidental circumstances ............................................. 221 Other rules of interpretation.................................................... 221 New Case Salun-At Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz v. Eloisa Espejo, et al., G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010 . ...................................223 CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cases Emeteria Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012 ........................................227 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission On Audit G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010 .....................................227 Batangas Power Corporation v. Batangas City and National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 152675; and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 152771, April28, 2004....................................................................228 Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004.................................231 Mel United Harbor Pilots' Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v. Assn. of Int'l. Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002 234 People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., G.R. No. 101724, SupremeCourt 235 Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571, February6, 1991 238 ........................................................... .................................................................... ............................................................... Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor And Employment Accreditation Committee For Medical Clinics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 724, April Z, 1931 ............................................... Maceda v. Macaraig G.R. No. 88291, May31, 1991 ..................................................................... 240 Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, G.R No. 90776, June 3, 1991 241 Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991 241 .......................... ........... Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991 ......... 241 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 44007, March 20, 1991 242 De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, April8, 1991 242 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 242 People of the Philippines v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June5, 1991 244 Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa, G.R. No. 95122; Board of Commissioners v. Judge Capulong, G.R. No. 95123;Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May31, 1991 244 Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990 245 ................................................................... ....................................................................... .................................. .................................... ........ .. ........................ ............... ...... ........................... .................... ... ..................................... xxil Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 . ......................................... 245 Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 23, 1990 247 Fiestan v Court of Appeals, G R No 81552, May28, 1990..................................................................... 247 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G R No 54470, May 8, 1990 248 Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Zamora, et al., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990.................................... 248 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al, G R No 54305, February 14, 1990 249 Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989 ..................................................................... 250 Jandusay, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989......................................... 252 Manila Resource Development v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80586, May 3, 1989 ........................................... 252 Regidor v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 85815, May 19, 1989 253 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 ............................................ 253 Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 810061, May12, 1989..................................................................... 253 Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989 254 SM Agri/and General Machineries v NLRC, G.R.No 748061, January 9 1989 254 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 ........................................... 254 People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989 ....................................................................... xon 255 xxiv CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided in the law. II. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERPRETATION Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. A distinction, however, has been drawn between construction and interpretation. One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself, while one who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written language of the law (Caltex [Philippines], Inc. v. Palomar, L-19650, September 29, 1966). Hence, when the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and when there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227). When the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids (People v. Amigo, 67 SCAD 28). When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language (Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Manila, 75 SCAD 519). STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS: Apply the Law When the law speaks in clear and categorical language Interpret the Law Construct the Law When there is ambiguity in the language of the statute, ascertain legislative intent by making use of intrinsic aids, or those found in the law itself, When the intent of the legislature cannot be ascertained by merely making use of intrinsic aids, the court should resort to extrinsic aids, or those found outside the language of the law. lv. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT CLARIFY THE RULE ON THE ISSUE OF WHEN TO APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAW The decision of the Supreme Court on the issue of when to apply and interpret the law has not changed. 1. In Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court said: "When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or construction. There is only room for application. A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity." (G.R. Nos. 50999-5100, March 23, 1990) 2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J., the Supreme Court made the same ruling, but explained further when an interpretation can be resorted to, thus: "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to it express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." (248 SCRA 590) 3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the 3 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on Audit, 297 SCRA 168). 4. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199). 5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No. 9227. - It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under RA No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, could not be any clearer. (Re: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J.) V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE WORDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION FIRST: VERBA LEGIS, which means that whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, which means that in case of ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. THIRD: UTMAGIS VALEATOUAMPEREAT, which means that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. (Francisco v. HRET, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003) VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW? Anyone can interpret the law. Lawyers, policemen, arbiters, administrative boards and agencies, government as well as private executives are involved from time to time in the interpretation of laws. Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily conclusive nor can they bind the courts. Hence, in many occasions, the decisions of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and appealed to the Supreme Court in cases where there is abuse of discretion and authority or when there is a violation of due process or denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law (MantradeFMMC Division Employee and Workers Union v. Bacungan, G.R. No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J.). The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the significance of a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural or a municipal ordinance. It discharges a role no crucial than the roles played by the two other departments in maintaining the rules of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with finality through the highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What it says is definite and authoritative, binding on those who occupy the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy (Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70443, September 15, 1986, Second Division, Gutierez, Jr., J.). VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. VIII. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT? It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the following reasons exists: 1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or obscure, when taken in relation to a set of facts; 2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the language used in the statute. IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT? It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in clear and categorical language. The duty of the court, in such a case, is to APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT (Go Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice & Corn Board, G.R. No. L-23607, May 23, CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT 5 1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969). New Case: CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 FACTS: Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely filed the Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for his failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC and prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and explained that a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between the parties was solemnized before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia sought reconsideration by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court's Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and the motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled 'Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. HELD: The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the mmm verbs legis ,ion et recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT 7 Old Case: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J. Facts: Judge Tito G. Gustilo, then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 requested that the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under RA No. 9227 be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. He claimed that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3, 2004, the first tranche of the Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was implemented starting on November 11, 2003. The next 25% (second tranche) will be implemented on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustio appealed to the Chief Justice that, in the computation of his retirement benefits, the second tranche of the Special Allowance be included since his retirement was only one (1) month and twelve (12) days before its implementation on November 11, 2004. The Office of the Court Administrator (0 CA) recommended that the request be granted, citing Judge Gustio's service record in the judiciary, which started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of disposing cases at an average of 2.25 cases each month. Judge Gustio's letter and the 0 CA's memorandum were referred to the Court's Chief Attorney, who recommended the denial of the request for not being in accord with RA No. 9227 and the Guidelines promulgated by the Court. Held: (1) It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. - With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under HA No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be any clearer: Section 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. - For purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually received and tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included in the computation of their respective retirement benefits. A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement, only the allowances "actually received" and the tranche or tranches "already received and implemented," upon the date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it should have been "actually received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should have been "already implemented and received" at the date of retirement. (2) Accrued; Meaning of. - The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to RA No. 9227 is even more definite as it used the term "accrued" in this wise: "only the special allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the time of retirement shall be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney: Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in the Guidelines instead of "the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received" which is used in Section 5 of IRA No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is conveyed. The word "accrue" means "to come into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right" or "to come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or result" or "to be periodically accumulated in the process of time whether as an increase or a decrease." Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the recipient judge as a matter of right cannot be considered in the computation of retirement benefits. Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and demandable; vested." In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the second tranche of the Special Allowance has not accrued as yet; hence, it cannot be said that the same is due and demandable or that it has vested insofar as he is concerned. (3) Interpretation of retirement laws generally favors the retiree, except when the law is clear and unambiguous. - The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section 5 of RA No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section 3 thereof, the source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) established under PD No. 1949, which basically comes from the docket fees paid by litigants: 9 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in amount, as its amount depends on the amount collected by the courts and the amount of increase in docket fees that the Court would impose. The fact of the JDF becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the first tranche of the Special Allowance has been received only for the months of November 11, 2003 until February 2004. The delay in receipt thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under the JDF account for the Special Allowance tally in accordance with accounting and auditing rules. While th[eJ Court had, in certain cases, adopted a liberal stance in interpreting retirement laws in favor of the retiree, it cannot do so in this case because, as earlier stated. Section 5 of RA No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous. In other words, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application of the law." (underlining and emphasis supplied) X. AMBIGUITY DEFINED Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 105) It has been held, however, that ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning of the particular words but also from the general scope and meaning of the statute when all its provisions are examined. There is also an ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or where a statute is in conflict with the Constitution, or where the statute would defeat the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac Development Corporation v. CA, L-41012, September 30, 1976) M. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOW THIS AFFECTS INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES The present government is a presidential form with the executive power being vested in the President of the Philippines, 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and the judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. This structure upholds the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. There is, however, a more precise and specific meaning attached to each of the said powers. XII. LEGISLATIVE POWER It is the authority of Congress to make laws and to alter or repeal them. There are two kinds of legislative powers namely: 1. Original Legislative Power— This is a power belonging to the sovereign people and this is supreme. 2. Derivative Legislative Power - This is delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and it is subordinate to the original power of the people. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 164 WAS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER AND RULED THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 164 ISSUED BY PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO WAS NULL AND VOID MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997 FACTS: On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on the subject land. CHAPPER I 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building. On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164. On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent. The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992. Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidationsubdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164. To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of 12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation? HELD: Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation —Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution on February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely vested in Congress. The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID - There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch. For th[e] Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court's usual practice of not entertaining constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. 13 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT XIII. JUDICIAL POWER TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER What is the traditional concept of judicial power? The traditional concept of judicial power refers only to the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the court of justice or the redress of wrongs for the violation of such rights (Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, by Jose Agaton R. Sibal, citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17SCRA 756). What is the new definition of judicial power? The traditional concept of judicial power, as above-mentioned, including now the duty of the courts of justice "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," constitutes the totality of the judicial power which is now vested by our Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." This is what is known and referred to as the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The significance of the additional sentence "and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government"? (Last paragraph Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution) This sentence has, in effect, expanded the power, authority, and jurisdiction of our courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to determine whether any branch or instrumentality of our government has committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In fact, this power, authority and jurisdiction goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or of any official or branch of our government. The question of whether the said abuse of discretion is grave or not is ultimately determined, not by the officials whose acts are in question, but by our courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, and it is in this sense that the new provision grants unto the Supreme Court "an expanded jurisdiction and authority" to look into what it considers as a proper subject of its final disposition. In so doing, the 14 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, enjoys a wide latitude of power and discretion using, as it may, its honest evaluation of facts, laws, jurisprudence and any and all materials, books and points of reference which may be valuable to support its analysis and conclusion. The wisdom and propriety, for instance, which may be invoked by the executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the justices. In the end, the Supreme Court may find itself intervening in matters which should better be left to the wisdom of the leaders of the nation who are directly responsible to the sovereign electorate. In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, et al. (G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of 51% of the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel Corporation, pursuant to the privatization program of the government, cannot contravene the Filipino First Policy. In this case, the petitioner invoked Article XII, Section 10(2) of the 1987 Constitution and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer of Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED BYTHE PRESIDENT WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION LOUIS "BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 and REP. EDCEL C. bAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY ELORENCIO B. ABAD G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010 . 15 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. bagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) an "adventure in partisan hostility." The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahi rap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION HELD: Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any persom be denied the equal protection of the laws. The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the CHAPTERI 17 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are: WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; Section 1. Creation of a Commission. - There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. Section 2. Powers and Functions. - The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter 18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. (Emphases supplied) In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Executive Order No. 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY (THE POLICY OBSERVED AND MADE POPULAR BY PAST PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA), TO THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MANILA HOTEL, AND TO THE LATIN MAXIM OF UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the shares of GSIS, owner of 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), was sold by GSIS through public bidding. Manila Prince Hotel and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, participated in the bidding, and both of them offered to buy 51% of MHC shares. Renong Berhad offered a higher bid. MHC sent a check to match the bid of the foreign firm. To prevent the consummation of the bid of Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner's arguments are as follows: 1. Petitioner invokes Article XII, Section 10(2) of the Constitution and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture. 2. Manila Hotel has become a national patrimony. CHAPTER I 19 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT 3. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer of the Malaysian firm. Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation. Respondents added that even if the provision is self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the term "national patrimony." ISSUE; Does MHC fall under the term "national patrimony"? Is Section 10(2) of Article XII self-executing? HELD: Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words, the provision does not require any legislation to put in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concession covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events, which have shaped Philippine history. It was 20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the required approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Reluctantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. (Emphasis supplied) The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so it must be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values- A commercial, nay enen a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. 21 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly is the effect of the Supreme Court's "expanded jurisdiction and authority?" The power, authority and discretion to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or any official or branch of our government. The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the justices. Example: The privatization of business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary objective, should not be pursued at the expense of national will and dignity. Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and that it requires an implementing legislation. Respondents also argued that even if the said provision is selfexecuting, the hotel does not fall under the term "national patrimony." In sum, the privatization of business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. Giving emphasis to what it considers to be more deserving of preference, the Supreme Court added that there is nothing so STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 22 sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. XIV. IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWER AND AUTHORITY HOWEVER, THE COURT OR THE JUDICIAL ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING RULES 1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it; (Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326, 33 SCRA 105; Quijano p. DBP, 35 SCRA 220, L-26419, October 16, 1970) 2. It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail; (Article 10, New Civil Code) 3. When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court should interpret the law according to the meaning the legislature intended to give it; 4. If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which will achieve the ends desired by Congress should be adopted; 5. Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding; 6. A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (Article 9, New Civil Code) In other words, he must decide the case assigned to him whether or not he knows what law shall be applied. In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, a judge may still be guided by the following: a. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or public policy; b Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases, C. Legal opinions of qualified writers and professors; d. General principles of justice and equity; and e. Rules of statutory construction. CHAPTER I 23 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE. If there is no law therefore which punishes an act complained of, the judge must dismiss the case (Suarez, Introduction to Law, p. 4). XV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." Who shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices? The President of the Republic of the Philippines shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices (Section 17, Article VII) and shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines. Under and by virtue of all the powers vested in him by the Constitution, the President is regarded as the most powerful and the most influential person in the country subject to no other restraint than to comply with the law and the Constitution. What does this mean? This means that he is the "Chief Executive." More specifically, he is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and the heads of the different executive departments who are popularly known and called as Cabinet Members, are, in effect, merely his advisers, hence, they are subject to his control and supervision. Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are expressly enumerated in the Constitution? No. The President has residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President as steward of the people (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66811989]). What is the so-called residual power of the President? In the said case (Marcos v. Manglapus ibid.), the Supreme Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, said that "it is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It may be viewed also as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed (see Hyman, the 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION American President, where the author advanced the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President). Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, on the other hand, made this explanation: "Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are, however, too valuable and precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order, and safety be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily, in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines." What is the executive power of the President? It is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (Section 1 and 17, Article VII) The President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Section 17, Article VII). Is he still required to determine the validity of a law? No, this being a question that should be properly resolved by the judicial department of government. Hence, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, it is not unlawful for the President to perform his duty of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed. XVI. THE THREE PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT HELP ONE ANOTHER IN THE ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS Each Department is Given Certain Powers by which each may Restrain the others from Exceeding their Constitutional Authority. Hence, A System of Checks and Balances Provides an Equilibrium of Governmental Powers. The following are actual examples: FIRST: THE LAWS EMANATE FROM THE LEGISLATURE The legislature enacts laws but these laws have to be presented to the executive department for its approval. The latter may veto or 25 CHAPTER I STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT disapprove the acts of the legislative if in its judgment they are not in conformity with the Constitution or if they will cause hardship to the people. Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play yet. It is only called upon to interfere and to exercise its authority when an action is brought to it for decision, and only upon reaching this stage when the courts should apply, among others, these basic rules, to wit: When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it. In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and the purpose of the legislature. If that intent and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is the duty of the court to carry out that intention. If that intent and purpose cannot be found within the law, the court should resort to extrinsic aids. 3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended, right and justice to prevail. When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determination, it is authorized to determine the validity of the said legislative measures or executive acts. SECOND: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY MODIFY OR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT The executive department, through the pardoning power, may also modify or set aside the judgment of the courts. The executive department is not in any way interpreting or constructing the law in its favor. It is a plain exercise of pardoning power, which is expressly granted by the Constitution to the President. THIRD: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY AMEND OR REVOKE THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT The legislature may amend or revoke decisions of the courts when in its judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general policy of the State. It may do this by enacting a new law or by amending the old law, THEREBY 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ATTAINING AN INTERPRETATION THAT WILL WIPE OUT THE DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. In this example, the legislature is not interpreting or constructing the law but attains the interpretation it desires by enacting a new law or by amending the old law. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION L USE INTRINSIC AIDS BEFORE RESORTING TO EXTRINSIC AIDS In determining the intention of the legislature, the courts may use any of the following: 1. 2. INTRINSIC AIDS - Elements found in the law itself EXTRINSIC AIDS - Facts or matters not found in the law 3. PRESUMPTIONS - Based on logic or established provision of law The established practice is to resort first to intrinsic aids before resolving to extrinsic aids and before indulging in presumptions. H. WHAT ARE THE INTRINSIC AIDS? Intrinsic aids are any of the following: Title, preamble, words, phrases and sentences; context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; legislative definition and interpretation clauses. 1. TITLE. - That which expresses the subject matter of the law. It can help in the construction of statutes but it is not controlling and not entitled to much weight. 2. PREAMBLE. - That part of the statute following the title and preceding the enacting clause which states the reasons or the objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute. 3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT. - The intention of the legislature must primarily be 27 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 28 determined from the language of the statute and such language consists of the words, phrases and sentences used therein. The meaning of the law should, however, be taken from the general consideration of the act as a whole and not from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences used. 4. PUNCTUATION. - It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written word. However, if the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctuated. 5. HEADINGS AND MARGINAL NOTES. - If the meaning of the statute is clear or if the text of the statute is clear, they will prevail as against the headings, especially if the headings have been prepared by compilers and not by the legislature. 6. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION. - If the legislature has defined the words used in the statute and has declared the construction to be placed thereon, such definition or construction should be followed by the courts. The rules are as follows: (a) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be construed or interpreted in a certain manner, the courts should follow such instruction; (b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail; (c) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in which it is first defined; (d) Legislative definition of similar terms in other statute may be resorted to except where a particular law expressly declares that its definition therein is limited in application to the statutes in which they appear. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 29 EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE AND THERE IS THEREFORE NO REASON FOR INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION, BUT ONLY FOR APPLICATION New Case: SPOUSES PASCUAL, et al., FRANCISCO A. PASCUAL, MARGARITA CORAZON D. MARIANO, EDWIN D. MARIANO arid DANNY R. MARIANO V. SPOUSES BALLESTEROS, et al., G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012 PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which is co-owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano, the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor, and Angela Melchor. Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was inherited by their daughter Lorenza. Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros acquired the share of Angela. In 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her children, sold their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco. The old TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor. Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemption, claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale and argued that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as co-owners of the same. RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack of a written notice since they had actual notice of the said sale. CA granted the appeal of the respondents. The petitioners sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 30 ISSUE: Whether the respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale. HELD: Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption. The Supreme Court held that no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the absence of a written notice. Despite the respondents' actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the right of redemption. Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that: Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. The indispensability of the "written notice requirement" for purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption was explained in Barcellano v. Bañas, thus: The written notice of sale is mandatory. The Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. xxx Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 31 categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. x x x (Citations omitted) Old Case: LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 "When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible." FACTS: Petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAB) and the Land Bank of The Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties. The Supreme Court denied their motions for reconsideration. HELD: The Court rejects the said contention. Sec. 16(e) of RA No. 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds," to wit: Section 16(e) Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands - 32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION xxx xxx xxx "Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. xxx" The said provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of the term "deposit." When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA No. 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. As [the Court] ha[s] previously declared, the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE COURT APPLIED THE LAW ACCORDING TO ITS PLAIN AND OBVIOUS MEANING New Case: SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 FACTS: In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La Nina CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 33 phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999, facilitating sugar importation by the private sector. Section 2 of Executive Order No. 87 created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction (Committee) to determine procedures for sugar importation as well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee. Under Section 3, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to conversion fee to be remitted by Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to the Bureau of Treasury. The Committee issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for sugar importation. Under the rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar. The rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the SRA, to wit: G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the importation or for the imported sugar to arrive in the Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of Conversion Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and the imported sugar shall not be classified as "B" (domestic sugar) unless, upon application with the SRA and without objection of the Committee, the SRA allows such conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee applicable to the shipment. (Emphasis supplied) The Sugar Mill submitted the winning bid for 10,000 metric tons while Pacific Sugar submitted the winning bid for 20,000 metric tons, for a combined total volume of 30,000 metric tons of sugar. Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fees. Aa it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar delivered only 10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric 34 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric tons blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. They sought immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00. The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee would be forfeited pursuant to paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules and notified them that the authority to reconsider their request for reimbursement was vested with the Committee. The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the SRA to pay plaintiffs the amount of P38,637,000 as reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee they had paid and held that paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation. Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the RTC's Orders as well as the Writ of Execution and the Amended Writ of Execution. The CA ruled to annul and set-aside all the orders of the RTC and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Dissatisfied, the sugar corporations filed in this Court a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee. HELD: The RTC gravely erred in ordering the SRAto return the forfeited conversion fee to the sugar corporations. Its strained interpretation of paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates cases of delay in the arrival of imported sugar but not cases of cancellation of sugar importation defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G. 1. If delay in the arrival of imported sugar is subject to forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee, with more reason is outright failure to import sugar, by cancelling the sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of the 25% of the conversion fee. Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which would bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversion CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 35 fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the importation or (2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or before the set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way departing from its plain and express language. Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. Old Case: CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997 FRANCISCO, J. The Supreme Court applied the law, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. This Court should not deviate therefrom. FACTS: In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the President of petitioner Cecileville Realty and Service Corporation, in the latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by operation of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a house on the landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by her son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the landholding distinct from that occupied by his mother. Petitioner Cecifieville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he is entitled to occupancy since he is helping his mother in the cultivation of the land, refused to vacate. Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION against Hermigildo before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo, the MTC ordered the latter to vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint. On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the case be remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication. The court was of the opinion that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the cultivation, consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected without circumventing the law. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC's decision on the basis of Section 5, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, governing the relations of landlords and tenants, which provides that a tenant is entitled to the aid and assistance of the immediate members of his family and other persons who, though not tenants themselves, are afforded the protection of the law and the security of tenure accorded the tenant. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hermigildo's having a house on the landholding is but an incident of the tenancy. In this petition for review on certiorari Cecileville contends that the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for residential purposes. HELD: As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263. This section provides in full as follows: "Section 22.x x x (3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent, of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 37 products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in Section 26 unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under Section 9, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five (45) days following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause." The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied according to its plaini arid ob-vious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule otherwise is to make a mockery of the purpose of the tenancy relations between a bona fide tenant and the landholder as envisioned by the very law, i.e., RA No. 1199, as amended, upon which private respondent relies, to wit: Section 2. Purpose. - It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principles of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders: to issue the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production, to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argument and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted th[e] Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses. How then can there be "equitable division of the produce and 38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION income derived from the land" and "more efficient agricultural production" if the land's productivity and use for growing crops is lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its unceremonious conversion into residential use? It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Th[e] Court should not deviate therefrom. The landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private respondent's mother, has an existing home lot and a house on the subject property in which private respondent may take refuge while attending to his work. Curiously, despite its availability, private respondent chose to construct, without petitioner's permission, a concrete house of his own thereby saving him the trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the courts were to abide by the respondent court's inordinate pronouncement that private respondent is entitled to maintain his own house then we will be condoning the deprivation of a landholder's property without even a fraction of compensation. It taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that private respondent's having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the "tenancy" and to afford him the convenience of attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the first place, he is not the tenant as he himself admits. Besides, the "incidental" use of his own house can very well be provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her "old and infirm" condition, surely needs the attention and care of her children, one of whom is herein private respondent. Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law, as one of the purposes of the "Act" is "to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and landholders." The policy of social justice, the Court reiterates, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 39 it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as [the Court] said in Galay, et al. v. CA,, et al., is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege." EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED RESPONDENT'S PLEA THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER INTERPRETATION. INSTEAD, THECOURTFIRMLYRULEDTHATRESPONDENTJUDGE MISERABLY FAILED TO EXHIBIT THE OBJECTIVITY REQUIRED OF MEMBERS OF THE BENCH WHICH IS NECESSARY, EVEN INDISPENSABLE, TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURT. TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, 14 June 1996 EN BANG, PER CURIAM The respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. FACTS: First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. Tabao, accused Judge Pedro S. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of Authority, and (c) Bias in favor of the accused. In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before the CA an order issued by respondent granting bail to the accused without giving the prosecution a chance to present evidence to oppose the grant of bail. The Court of Appeals annulled respondent's orders, granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the order that granted bail. Respondent failed to comment on this aspect of the complaint against him. 40 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulgation of judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Phils. v. Salvador Padernal, "a case for violation of RA No. 6425 for drug pushing and had promulgated his decision thereon despite the defense's manifestation for time to allow it to submit other documentary evidence, make its formal offer of exhibits, and to rest its case. Judgment was promulgated and the prosecution was not given a chance to adduce rebuttal evidence. Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints, arguing that he proceeded to decide the case without the documentary evidence of the defense because they were not submitted on time; that the evidence to be submitted, consisting of business licenses and permits, was immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused; that official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown; that his grant of bail to the accused is now allowed in view of the ruling in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555). HELD: The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's acts constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dacudao (170 SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime where the imposable CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 41 penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Section 6, Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea for bail. The hearing for bail though summary in nature is necessary to afford both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to prove their respective contentions on the matter of bail for the accused. The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges who had granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime punishable with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required hearing. In Santos v. Ofilada (245 SCRA 56), the Court expressing almost exasperation over repeated violations by judges in this regard stated that "it is indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same administrative office, th[e] Court still has to contend with the same problem all over again and to impose once more the same sanction. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and substantially. Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555), since the issue in the present complaints is his having granted bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable with life imprisonment; without giving the prosecution the opportunity to show that evidence of guilt is strong and that as a consequence, the accused is not entitled to bail. Under the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail is mandatory to afford the State its right to oppose the granting of bail. The ruling in Simon did not alter much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail. Neither did the ruling in Simon cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. On the issue regarding the manner of promulgating the decision in a criminal case, respondent judge digressed from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense has rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense had yet to rest its case when respondent rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not difficult to imagine the grave injustice which 42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before the defense had rested its case. Of course, respondent judge acquitted the accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate haste to acquit the accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence? And why was the prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it manifested its intention to present rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation of judgment? Judges should be reminded that in each step in the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense; so, with the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be yielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness. Respondent judge's conduct in the disposition of the criminal case subject of the present complaints leaves much to be desired. He miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the bench that is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the public's trust and confidence in the courts. In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, where the imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He should also be accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense had rested and without according the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. NOTE: In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court made reference to and answered the respondent's contention and citation of the 1946 case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons (76 Phil. 756) to support his theory that where the prosecution recommends bail, it is to be understood as being equivalent to an admission that evidence of guilt is not strong or a non opposition or a virtual agreement to the bail application which in effect does away with the need for a bail hearing. Unfortunately, nowhere in said case may such conclusion be inferred. Besides, in Ocampo v. Bernabe (77 Phil. 55), the Court said: [The Court] ha[s] held in Herras CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 43 Teehankee v. Director of Prisons that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule therefore is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged are before their conviction entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. RESPONDENT. THUS, CANNOT PLEAD THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION AND THAT THEREFORE HIS ACT TO GRANTING BAIL WITHOUT HEARING IS BUT A CASE OF INNOCENT ERROR OR MISTAKE NOT TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. ABD USUKUR M. TANv. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS. G.R. NO. 119892, FEBRUARY 13, 1996, EN BANC, MINUTE RESOLUTION. (Underscoring and Emphasis Supplied) EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE PREAMBLE AND TO THE WHEREAS CLAUSES TO DISCOVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE New Case: RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and KATHERINE L. GUY v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No. 187919 ASIA UNITED BANK v. GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG, KATHERINE L. GUY, RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR. G.R. No. 187979 GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR. v. ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No. 188030 April 25, 2012 In this case, the Court holds that AUB, being a commercial bank, is not beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court asserts that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from 44 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the general public and PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This was highlighted by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public." FACTS: In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and officers, presented its Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom franchise. Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted a P250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet Philippines, RMSI's Division. Later, it was increased to P452 minion after a third-party real estate mortgage by an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the bank. Simultaneous to the increase, RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al., represented as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the financial audit made by SGV & Co. Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary's Certificate of SPI authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only P62,500.00. Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines AUB granted it, among others, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover this liability Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note (PN) in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This PN was renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI, and last, in the name of Smartnet Philippines, bolstering CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 45 AUB's belief that RMSI's directors and officers consistently treated this letter of credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI. When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent demand letters. RMSI denied liability contending that the transaction was incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies, which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI. It further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division, SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity. Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689 against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Accordingly, an Information was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al., with the RTC of Pasig City. Both parties filed their respective Petitions for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution and ordered the dismissal of the estafa charges against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency of evidence. The AUB's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. AUB then assailed the DOd Resolution before the CA. The CA partially granted AUB's petition. Hence, these consolidated petitions. ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al., for the crime of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689. HELD: Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al., should be charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which states that: Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be 46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by corporationsl associations from the general public. The Court holds that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar. Gilbert Guy et al. want the Court to believe that AUB, being a commercial bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court holds, however, that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. PD No. 189 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This is bolstered by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public." This is precisely the very same scheme that PD No. 1689 contemplates to "be checked or at least be minimized by imposing capital punishment involving funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public" because "this erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes public interest and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation." Old Cases: PEOPLE v. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al., G.R. Nos. 1-420050-66, November 20, 1978 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the intent and spirit of Presidential Decree No. 9 can be found in the preamble or "whereas" clauses, which enumerate the facts, or events that justify the promulgation of the decrees and the stiff sanctions stated therein. FACTS: Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by Judge Purisima. The latter reasoned out that the information failed to allege an essential element of the offense; thus: That the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 47 weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversion activities and that the preamble of the statute or that expressed in the "whereas" clauses is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute. It was also argued that the explanatory note merely explains the reasons for issuing the decree and this cannot prevail over the text itself. HELD: The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanction stated therein. U.S. v. HART, et al., 26 PHIL. 149 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that construction should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation found in the printed act. Argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the act the effect intended by the legislature. FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA No. 519. This section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be considered as vagrants such as those "found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support." Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for "loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses" the first part of Section 1. The second part, it will be noticed is worded as follows: "or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support." 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION It turned out, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had visible means of support. The Attorney General argued that "without visible means of support" as used in the second part, does not apply to "every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but only to tramping or straying through the country." It was contended that if "without visible means of support" is intended for the first part, either the comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the comma after country would have been inserted. HELD: When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect. The construction should be based upon something more substantial that the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary. The accused-appellants were acquitted. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. TORRES G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 Private Parties cannot Constitutionally contract away the Applicable Provision of Law. FACTS: An alien employment permit was issued by DOLE to Earl Timothy Cone, as sports consultant and coach of General Milling Corporation. The change of admission of status of said Earl Timothy Cone was approved to a pre-arranged employee. Months later, CMC requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full pledged coach. The request was granted. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 49 The Secretary of labor cancelled Cone's permit because General Milling Corporation failed to submit evidence that there is no person in the Philippines that is competent and willing to do the services that could be rendered by Cone, and likewise, there is no proof that Cone's employment will redound to national interest. ISSUE: Was there a grave abuse of discretion in revoking the alien employment permit of Cone? Is the contention of General Milling Corporation (that it is an employer's prerogative to hire a foreign coach) valid and tenable? HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion. It is not true that the hiring of foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. The law is clear on this point. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. General Milling Corporation's right to choose who to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. GMC will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. No comparison can be made between Cone and Norman Black as the latter is "a long-time resident" of the country and thus, not subject to Article 40 of the Labor Code which applies only to "non-resident aliens." Neither will obligation of contract be impaired by the implementation of the Secretary's decision. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before GMC and Cone entered into their contract of employment. Provisions of applicable laws especially those relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally contract away the applicable provision of law. GMC's contention that the Labor Secretary should have deferred to the Immigration Commission's finding as for the need to employ Cone is again bereft of legal basis. EXAMPLE OFACASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT RULED, AMONG OTHERS, THAT EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT, i.e., THAT EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTS, AND KEPT SUBSERVIENT TO THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE WHOLE ENACTMENT. THE COURTALSO RULED THAT THE SPIRIT RATHER THAN THE LETTER OF A LAW DETERMINES ITS CONSTRUCTION; HENCE, A STATUTE, AS IN THIS CASE, MUST BE READ ACCORDING TO ITS SPIRIT AND INTENT. PARAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996 It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. An interpretation should, ifpossible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. FACTS: Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City, who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. COMELEC scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1996. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Due to Paras' opposition, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, Paras filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 51 petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. The petition was later on dismissed and the TRO was lifted. In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction was filed. HELD: The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: "Section 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the • statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464) The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such election shall take place. Thus, subscribing to Paras' interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by RA No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election," as erroneously insisted by Paras, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. (Asturias 52 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617) An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, informative or nugatory. (PLDT v. Collector of International Revenue, 90 Phil. 674) It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x Moreover, Paras' too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity, which we cannot countenance. The spirit rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. 1. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence, the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election that certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. (Paras v. Commission on Election,, G.R. 123169, November 4, 1996, En Banc, Francisco, J. [Resolution]) CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 53 III. EXTRINSIC AIDS Extrinsic aids are any of the following: Contemporaneous circumstances, policy, legislative history of the statute, contemporaneous or practical construction, executive construction, legislative construction, judicial construction, and construction by the bar and legal commentators. Extrinsic aids can be resorted to only after the intrinsic aids have been used and exhausted. 1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. - These are the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted such as the following: (a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law was enacted; (b) Previous state of the law; (c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and (d) The customs usages of the people. The above-mentioned circumstances constitute the reasons why the law was enacted. Hence, the one interpreting the law should place himself in the position and circumstances of those who used the words in question and be able to feel the atmosphere, the conditions, and the reasons why the law was enacted. 2. POLICY. - The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the State may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the intention of the legislature in enacting the same. Hence, if a new agrarian law is enacted today and few years from now, there will arise the need to find out why such a law is enacted, the conditions, the prevailing sentiment of the people, the policy of the State, and the executive order issued by the Office of the President preceding the legislative enactment will throw light upon the intention of the legislature in enacting said law. The same thing is true if death sentence is imposed for drug pushers and for those currently involved in the so-called "satanismo" offenses. The conditions of the times and the very destructive and heinous crimes committed even in broad daylight, whether in the city or in the provinces, will convince future interpreters of the law that such a penalty is needed to protect society. 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE. - Such history may be found in reports of legislative committees, in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during a hearing, legislative investigation, or legislative debates. Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of construction? As a general rule, they are not appropriate aids of construction. However, if there is unanimity among the supporters and oppositors to a bill with respect to the objective sought to be accomplished, the debates may then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act. 4. CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION. - Those who lived at or near the time when the law was passed were more acquainted of the conditions and the reasons why that law was enacted Their understandmg and application of the law, especially if the same has been continued and acquiesced by the judicial tribunals and the legal profession, deserve to be considered by the courts. 5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. - The construction given by the executive department deserves great weight and should be respected if said construction has been formed and observed for a long period of time. The rules to remember are as follow: (a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contemporaneous and practical construction made by the officers charged with the administration and enforcement of the law; (b) The courts should respect that contemporaneous construction except if it is clearly erroneous; (c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the Chief Legal adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist various departments of the government charged with the duty to administer the law; (d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal adviser is subservient to the ruling of the judiciary, which is in charge of applying and mterpretmg laws 6 LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION - Legislative construction is entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot control as against the court's prerogative to decide on what is the right or wrong interpretation. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 55 7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION. - It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction of former statutes on the subject. It is also presumed that the statute was enacted in the light of the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received. With respect to a statute adopted from another state, it is presumed that it was adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that State. Should this construction be followed? It should be followed only if it is reasonable, in harmony with justice and public policy and consistent with the local law. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COM8. MENTATORS. - It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a statute by the members of the legal profession is a true one and regarded as one that should not be lightly changed. The opinion and commentaries of text writers and legal commentators, whether they are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited or made as references in court decisions. SIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE RULE REGARDING THE USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS Extrinsic aids, such as those mentioned above, are entitled to respect, consideration and weight, but the courts are at liberty to decide whether they are applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision. EXAMPLE OFA CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AS WELL AS THE POLICY AND OBJECTIVE SOUGHT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 FACTS: PD No. 27, EO Nos. 228 and 229, and RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) were assailed as violative of due process and therefore unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is RA No. 6657 constitutional? 56 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION HELD: The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the land and the physical possession of the land in excess of the retention limit and all the beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the former beneficiary. This is within the power of the State to take and regulate private property for which payment of just compensation is provided. Although the proceedings in Section 16 of CARL are described as summary, the landowners and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. DAR's determination of just compensation is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested party. DAR's determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the court of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the owners of expropriated properties to accept just compensation in less than money, the Supreme Court said: "This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. WHAT WE DEAL WITH HERE IS A REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION." Such program will involve not merely millions but billions of pesos. "[The Court] assume[s] that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top project of the government. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitation of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers." "[The Court] may assume their intention was to allow such manner of payment as provided by the CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAB of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, the title remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated." CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 57 EXAMPLE OF CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DELVED INTO THE INTENTION OF THE LAW AND WHY THE RIGHT OF CULTIVATION WAS EXTENDED TO THE LANDOWNER'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS BONIFACIO v. JUDGE DIZON G.R. No. 79416, September 5, 1989 The question (involving the interpretation of Section 36(1) of BA No. 3844 is this: Is the ejectment of the agricultural lessee valid when the landowner-lessor desires to cultivate the landholding? Section 36 (1) of RA No. 3844 provides as follows: "Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that; The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes." Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. The right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 58 lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in personal cultivation. Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION, AND RULED THAT THE INTERPRETATION MADE BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CANNOT BE APPLIED PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, 106 PHIL. 466 (1959) AND AGUINALDO v. SANTOS 212 SCRA 768 (1992) An official's re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. The Court may add that sound public policy dictates it. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. FACTS: Mayor Demetriou of Tabaco, Albay charged that Governor Salalima violated Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the Local Government Code, Section 3, par. (G) of RA No. 3019, and the provisions of PD No 1594, as amended Mayor Demetriou alleged that despite the delay in the completion of work under contracts entered into by the Provincial Government for the construction of Tabaco Public Market, liquidated damages were not imposed, nor collected from the contractor by the provinces. In another case, Governor Salalima and the members of the Sanggumang Panlalawigan were charged with having retained CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 59 the legal services of a private lawyer and disbursing public fund in payment thereof amounting to P7,380,410.00 in connection with a case filed by the province against the National Power Corporation. It is alleged that this violates Section 481 of the Local Government Code that requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province. The President found Governor Salalima guilty of the charges and suspended the latter from office. In the meantime Governor Salalima was re-elected. ISSUE: Salalima contends that the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending him after he was re elected, since the administrative offense were allegedly committed during his first term. HELD: The Court agrees with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in 0.P. Case No 5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on March 6, 1992 with RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (106 Phil. 466 [1959]) and Aguinaldo v. Sdntos (212 SCRA 768 [1992]). In Pascual, th[e] Court ruled: The Court comes to one main issue of the controversy - the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office. In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, [the Court] ha[s] resorted to American authorities. The Court found that cases on the matter are confficting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe. 60 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. The Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein: "Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioners for acts he may have committed during the failed coup." However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the official therein was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his re-election bid. It is of the view that an official's re-election renders moot and academic an administrative complaint against him for acts done during his previous term only if the complaint was filed before his re-election. The fine distinction does not impress us. The rule makes no distinction. As a matter of fact, in Pascual, the administrative complaint against Pascual for acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year after he was re-elected. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 61 The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official's re-election expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. [The Court] may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the re-elected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. Thus, any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract and incidents related therewith and in the execution of a contract for additional repair for the Tabaco Public Market are deemed extinguished by his re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. So are the liabilities, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Paulalawigan ng Albay, who signed a resolution authorizing Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question who were re-elected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstance. CELEBRATED CASE IN 1983 GARCIA-PADILLA v. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER AND GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS & LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983 In this case, the principal issue is whether the courts can inquire on the Presidential suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and whether there is right to bail during the suspension of the privilege of the said writ. This case is an example where the Supreme Court took cognizance of contemporaneous circumstances and what was actually being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield; of the historical 62 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION basis of the President's power to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus; of the policy, reasons and evils sought to be remedied by LOl 1211 authorizing the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order; and of the reasons why it reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro Rule. This case is also an example where the Supreme Court made a lot of references to opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and to the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. There were also some interpretations mentioned in the decision which vested absolute power to the president on the matter of suspending the privilege of Habeas Corpus. (The Author disagreed with the ruling of the Supreme Court in this case.) FACTS: Nine of the fourteen detainees in this case were arrested on July, 1982 at about 1:45 P.M., when three teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, etc., after securing a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portugese and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been going on since 10:00 A.M. of that same day. The other four detainees were arrested on the following day. The detainees, herein petitioners, were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6, 1982, until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982, to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Josefina Garcia-Padilla, a mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr., filed a petition for. habeas corpus on August 13, 1982. It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners were patently unlawful since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were armed only with a search warrant issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and no where in said warrant was authority given to make arrest, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 63 other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized; that no criminal charges have been filed against any of the detainees; that there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its contents, raising doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been issued. In an en banc resolution, the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus and respondents were required to make a return of the writ. In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982, respondents, through the Solicitor General, alleged; The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOT No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of PD No. 885; 2. The privilege of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by petitioners. The courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention. Upon hearing, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: HELD: ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED "x x x At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 A.M. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Parong as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delieto, the nine (9) detainees scampered towards different directions leaving on top of 64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector. Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) Eve bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, P18,650.00 cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed and actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence." From the facts above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in fact and in law. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from fact that they essentially involve a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. COMMENTS ON THIS PART OF THE DECISION Besides the attendant circumstances aforementioned, the Supreme Court maintained the position that the arrest of the said detainees fall under the specific provision of Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. The law being clear and specific, it concluded that the claim of petitioners was without basis in fact and in law. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHAT WAS ACTUALLY BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE SOLDIERS IN THE BATTLEFIELD x x It i6, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture government troopers or kidnap private individuals, CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 65 they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded by the herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the filling of bail. As a matter of common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are not only denied the right to be released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even be liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is among others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy x x x." THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS "Accordingly, [the Court] holds that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the United States for which reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the Constitution." (The Court citing Exparts Merryman, Federal Case No. 9487 [18611) REASONS AND EVILS SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED BY LOl 1211 AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF PCO; REASONS WHY IT ABANDONED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE AND WHY IT REVERTED TO BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO RULE "The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, 66 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection." "Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested or captured, cease to be as committed to the cause against the government. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound together by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the criminal act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of the movement of which he is an ardent adherent and ally x x x." What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87), a 1905 decision, and Montenegro v. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882 [1952]), that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was held as permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if we consider that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check, reverse or supplant the presidential actions. OPINIONS, COMMENTARIES OF LEGAL LUMINARIES AND RULING OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in his concurring opinion said: "x x x It cannot be overemphasized that the writ of habeas corpus, as a constitutional right, is, for eminent commentators, protean in scope. A reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons may not be amiss. Thus: "The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 67 any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease." It continues: Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whosoever detention may be exercised." Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty!' Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras, Bengson and Chief Justice Concepcion. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however, to emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach." He also said: "there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired (citing Bowen v. Johnston, 306 US 19, 26, 83 L. ed 2d 455, 595 Ct. 422 [19391) and unsuspended, save only in the case specified in the constitution (citing Smith v. Bennett, 365 US 708, 713, 6 L ed 39, 43, 81 S Ct. 895). ON THE MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT LOI 1211 SHOULD BE VIEWED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT RELY ENTIRELY ON PARAGRAPHS I AND 2 OF LOl 1211 Petitioners relied on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOT 1211, which contemplate of the first two situations when an arrest can be made, to wit: 1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge; 2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the person or persons to be arrested would probably escape for safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall be immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal, or to the municipality, circuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the evidence warrants, shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, secure a warrant of arrest; 68 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The Supreme Court ruled, thus: "The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOT 1211 as to the alleged necessity of judicial warrant before a person may be arrested and detained is not well founded. Neither is the contention that paragraph 3 of LOT 1211 applies only when judicial process is not possible. This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOT 1211 when viewed in its entirety. Even in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the judgment of the President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would endanger the public order or safety, a P00 is justified. So, too, when release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger." By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOT 1211 is a mere directive of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to insure protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible overthrow of the government and duly constituted authorities." LOT 1211 does not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that the (President) would subject himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal judicial processes in the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an intention on the part of the President in issuing LOT 1211 seems to do so in their view that LOT forms of the law of the land under the 1976 amendment of the Constitution (citing Section 6, l976Amendment to the Constitution). They would then contend that a PCO issued not in compliance with the provisions of the LOl would be an illegality and of no effect. BRIEF COMMENTS OF THE AUTHOR With all due respect to the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, the Author cannot subscribes to the reasoning that it is "impractical" or a "useless and futile exercise" for our courts to determine whether the President acted with arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The judicial machinery is embedded in our system of government, or in any CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 69 democratic system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into the validity and legality of the acts perpetrated by any of its citizens and which are being complained of as illegal. The President, I honestly believe, is not an exception. On the contrary, the courts particularly the Supreme Court, should use all available means and facilities to inquire whether there is arbitrariness in the President's decision to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus and whether the detention of any of its citizens is arbitrary. If the Supreme Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic can effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all know, that he wields extraordinary powers, especially under the present set-up? To agree that the President is answerable to his conscience, to the people and to God is, in effect, to agree that the doctrine of separation of powers and the democratic processes we are supposed to uphold should be disregarded. The decision apparently gives more strength, power, and protection to the President and to his government machinery instead of affording the individual citizens of a valid and reasonable recourse that they can make use of and when they are detained without a warrant of arrest. As between the government and individual citizens, the government enjoys a tremendous advantage in any respect. To lessen further the rights of the citizens just so that the President can effectively meet or quell an alleged invasion of rebellion, or in order that the detention of any person can be validated by and through a Presidential Commitment Order, is by any measure a deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law. The underlying reason why the powers of government are allocated to the different departments is precisely to avoid arbitrary rule and abuse of authority. It is believed that concentration of the three powers of government in the same person or body of persons, or in one department, would lead to abuse. On this point, Justice Brandeis said: "The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the government powers, among the three departments, to save the people from autocracy." (Myers u. United, 272 U.S. 52, 293) (Underscoring supplied) 70 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Let each department of the government act within its own sphere of jurisdiction. And let the system of checks and balances scrutinize the action of the other to the end that public good may be served. This is the system and tradition we have been taught to embrace and it is found out to be more democratic and more in keeping with our culture and tradition as peace loving people. I submit that there is indeed no justification to abandon the doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. On the issue of bail, the two reasons given by Associate Justice Pacifico P. de Castro and which are quoted above, are not, in my honest opinion, sufficient justification to deny the right to bail for the following reasons: FIRST: In G.R. No. 61388 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora Parong, et al., Josefina Garcia-Padilla, petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel, respondents," records show that Dr. Aurora Parong is charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms. This is clearly a bailable offense. The same thing is true with respect to the other detainees. No amount of legal nicety nor the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order can prevail over a clear constitutional guarantee expressed in Section 13, Article III of the New Constitution which reads: xxx "SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required." (Underscoring supplied) Since it is clear that the said detainee is charged with a bailable offense and since it is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that she is qualified to bail, there should be no reason nor any barrier to deny the petition for bail. SECOND: While the President has the power to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus under and by virtue of the exceptions in Section 15, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is, on the other hand, the power of the courts to grant bail to qualified persons not falling under the exceptions mentioned in Section 13, Article III. I see no justification to the statement that "The duty of the judiciary CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 71 to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the executive to protect the State x x x" Ten or one hundred detention prisoners, or even more, even granting that they are rebels, cannot overwhelm the vast powers of the government. It will make a serious difference if they are granted the right to bail. Besides, why should the judiciary yield a power and a duty which is appropriately its own? Moreover, it is not the particular right of the individual that is protected or being protected. Rather, it is the doctrine of separation of powers itself and the system of checks and balances as well as the very Constitution itself that guarantees all of these that the judiciary protects. If in the exercise of this duty, an individual or group of individuals are directly or indirectly benefited, it is because they are part and parcel of the State and of the government that they have chosen. After all, the government may come and go at anytime but the people who compose the State remains. They are actually the ones who work to no end just so that the nation and the State can survive. THIRD: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf, x x x" (Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring supplied). If one's right to bail is denied, the above-quoted constitutional right will be defeated and rendered useless. The detainee, for as long as he is detained, cannot effectively prepare his case and his defense. Added to this is the fact that during the entire period of his detention and until the case is finally decided, he is, in the eyes of the law, still presumed innocent. The contrary has yet to be proven and yet during the interregnum between the inquiry and the final judgment, he has already lost the battle. Even before the trial starts, he is already in a very disadvantageous position. While the government, with all the powers and facilities in its command, is thoroughly preparing its case and its evidence the detainee suffers the physical and mental burden of being kept inside the prison cell. Even granting for the sake of argument that he is given a chance to confer with his counsel, the disadvantage in any respect still works against the detainee. This is very evident and clear and any contradiction of reality will only make the truth very obvious. 72 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NOTE: THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THIS QUESTION ARE NOW LAID TO REST BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on this question are now laid to rest by Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, thus: "The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. and must promulgate its decision thereon x x x." (Third paragraph, Article VII. Section 18. of the 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring Supplied) The inclusion of the said constitutional provision was made possible by the approval of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The latter is apparently guided by the past cases and decision on this matter. It will be recalled that when Lansarig v. Garcia was decided, the Supreme Court was then presided by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a delegate to the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Then and now, the author's position on this subject remains the same. He cannot subscribe to the reasoning that it is "impractical" or a "useless and futile exercise" for our courts to determine whether or not the President acted with arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The judicial machinery is embedded in our system of government, or in any democratic system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into the validity and legality of the acts perpetrated by any of its citizens and which are being complained of as illegal. The President, the author honestly believes, is not an exception. On the contrary, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, should use all available means and facilities to inquire whether the privilege of habeas corpus and whether or not the detention of any of its citizens is arbitrary. If the Supreme Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic can effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all know, that he wields extraordinary powers, especially when CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 73 the country is under martial law? To agree that "the President is answerable to his conscience, the people, and to God" is, in effect, to agree that the doctrine of separation of powers and the democratic processes we are supposed to uphold should be disregarded. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT ARTICLE 1621 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS CLEARLY WORDED AND ADMITS NO AMBIGUITY OF CONSTRUCTION. THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CITED THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE XIII OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, AND THE INTENTION BEHIND SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIII THEREOF. IN RELATION TO THIS, THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE OLD LANDMARK CASE OF KR! VENKO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (79 PHIL. 461) CELSO HALILI AND ARTHUR HALILI v. CA AND HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, et al., G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998 In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The Provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction. Undoubtedly, Section 5 (now Section 7) is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in Section 1 (now Section 2). Both sections therefore must be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "Agricultural Land" to aliens. FACTS: Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, private respondent Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed 74 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of quitclaim, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of lands that is now in litigation, situated in Bagbagum, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of David Rey Guzman. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to private respondent Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT NO. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721 (M) was issued in the latter's name. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances - and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil Code. In its decision dated March 10, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under. Article 1621 of the Civil Code The Hahlis sought a reversal from the CA which, however, denied their appeal. The CA affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban citing Tejido v. Zamacoma and Yap v. Grageda (121 SCRA 244). It further held that although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person. Hence, the present petition for review. Petitioners submitted that the CA erred: (1) in affirming the conclusion of trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural; CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 75 (2) in denying petitioner's right of redemption under Article 1621 of the Civil Code; and (b) having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers to her son David illegal, in not declaring the same null and void. PIWTOALTO (1) The land is urban; thus, no right of redemption. Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by th[e] Court. Basic and longsettled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only few exceptions, such as when the finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record. The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial court - that the subject property is urban land - is based on clear and convincing evidence xxx In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed, is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction. "Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land. xxx" Under this article, both lands - that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption - must be rural. If one or both 76 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION are urban, the right cannot be invoked. The purpose of this provision, which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is to favor agricultural development. The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right of redemption under Article 1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it. (2) Sale to Cataniag valid. - Neither do[es] [the Court] find[s] any reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey. True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim - in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband - collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which provides: "Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The landmark case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds (79 Phil. 461) settled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long discourse maintaining that the "public agricultural lands" mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then state: "Under Section 1 of Article XIII (now Section 2, Article XII) of the Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: 'Section 6. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 77 or assigned except to individual, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.' This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizen. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, Section 5 [now Section 71 is intended to insure the policy of nationalism contained in Section 1 [now Section 21. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in Section 5 [now Section 7] are the very same persons who under Section 1 [now Section 21 are disqualified 'to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.' And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the nontransferability of 'agricultural land' to aliens. x x x" In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." The present case is similar to De Castro v. Tan. In that case, a residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land. 78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision - to keep our land in Filipino hands - has been served. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CITED AND MADE REFERENCE TO (A) A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PACKAGE OF ELECTORAL REFORMS SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED SINCE 1970; (B) THE REALITIES THAT CONFRONT POOR CANDIDATES AND THE REASON WHY THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL OR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST JUSTIFYING EXERCISE OF THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE COMELEC UNDER ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION. IN THIS CASE, SOME JUSTICES MADE EXTENSIVE CITATION AND REFERENCES TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, AMERICAN LEGAL LITERATURE, AND TO U.S. CASES ACTUALLY DECIDED (i.e., BUCKLEY v. VALEO; AUSTIN v. MICHIGAN STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) EMILIO M.R. OSMEA AND PABLO GARCIA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998 Political equality and ban on political advertising There is no suppression of political ads, but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. There is a substantial or legitimate government interest justifying the exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC. COMELEC take-over of the advertising page of newspapers on the commercial time of radio and tv stations, and allocating those to the candidates, is valid. Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only constitutional provision that mandates political equal- ity. Article XIII, Section 1, requires congress to give CHAPTER 11 AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 79 the "highest priority" to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities. Article II, Sec. 26, declares as a fundamental principle of our government "equal opportunities for public service." FACTS: Petitioners Emilio M.R. Osmeña, candidate for President of the Philippines, and Petitioner Pablo Garcia, candidate for governor of Cebu, urged the re-examination of the ruling in NPC v. COMELEC upholding the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. They contend that the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their most affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching votes like airplanes, boats, raffles, parades and handbills. Petitioners claim that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because it rests on the misconception that Article TX-C, Section 4, mandates the absolute equality of all candidates regardless of financial status, when what this provision speaks of is "equality of opportunity-" For the foregoing reasons, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646, the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and sustained its ruling in NPC v. COMELEC on the following grounds: 1. There is no suppression of political ads, but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. The term political "ad ban," when used to describe Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646, is misleading, for even as Section 11 (b)prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. 2. The law's concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media equality between candidates 80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION with "deep pockets," as Justice Feliciano called them in his opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with less resources. The law is part of a package of electoral reforms adopted in 1987. Actually, similar effort was made in 1970 to equalize the opportunity of candidates to advertise themselves and their programs of government by requiring the COMELEC to have a COMELEC space in newspapers, magazines, and periodicals and prohibiting candidates to advertise outside such space, unless the names of all the other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are mentioned "with equal prominence." The validity of the law was challenged in Badoy, Jr. v. COMELEC. The voting was equally divided (55), however, with that result the validity of the law was deemed upheld. 3. There is a substantial or legitimate government interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC - There is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Article TX-C, Section 4, of the Constitution. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 81 of print space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates. The validity of the COMELEC take over for such temporary period cannot be doubted. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, it was held that a court order compelling a private shopping center to permit use of a corner of its courtyard for the purpose of distributing pamphlets or soliciting signatures for a petition opposing a UN resolution was valid. The order either unreasonably impaired the value or use of private property nor violated the owner's right not to be compelled to express support for any viewpoint since it can always disavow any connection with the message. 4. The validity of regulation of time, place, and manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond question. - What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest and peaceful, and credible elections." 5. Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only constitutional provision that mandates political equality. - Article XIII, Section 1, requires Congress to give the "highest priority" to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities. Article II, Section 26, declares as a fundamental principle of our government "equal opportunities for public service." Access to public office will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. 6. The Court cannot grant to petitioners what the legislature denied them. - The fact is that efforts have been made to secure the amendment or even repeal of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. No less than five bills were filed in the Senate in the last session 82 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of Congress for this purpose, but they all failed to pass. Petitioners claim it was because Congress adjourned without acting on them. But that is just the point. Congress obviously did not see it fit to act on the bills before it adjourned NOTE JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO AND JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN DISSENTED. THEIR DISSENTING OPINIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO 1. A COMELEC study disclosed that newspapers showed - Not to be biases for or against certain candidates overlooked is the stark truth that the media itself is partisan In a study commissioned by the COMELEC itself to determine whether a certain newspaper adhered to the principles of fairness and impartiality in their reportage of the presidential candidates in the 1992 election, the results disclosed that newspapers showed biases for or against certain candidates. Hence, the contention that "Section 11(b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises" simply is illusory. Editorial policy will always ensure that the unfavored ones will get minimal exposure, if at all. This underscores the need to give candidates the freedom to advertise, if only to counteract negative reporting with paid advertisements which they cannot have recourse to with the present prohibition Worse, the ban even encourages corruption of the mass media by candidates who procure paid hacks, masquerading as legitimate journalist, to sing them paeans to the high heavens. Wittingly or unwittingly, the mass media, to the detriment of poor candidates, occasionally lend themselves to the manipulative devices of the rich and influential candidates 2 The prohibition actually gives an unfair advantage to those who have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. - While there can be no gainsaying the laudable intent behind such an objective, the State being mandated to guarantee equal. access to opportunities for public service, the prohibition has the opposite effect instead of "equalizing" the position of candidates who offer themselves for public office the prohibition actually give an unfair advantage CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 83 to those who have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. Instead of promoting the interest of the public in general, the ban promotes the interest of a particular class or candidates, the prominent and popular candidates for public office. What is in store for the relatively obscure candidate who wants to pursue is candidacy? Eager to trumpet his credentials and program of government, he finds himself barred from using the facilities of mass media on his own. While incumbent government officials, show business personalities, athletes and prominent media men enjoy the advantage of name recall due to past public exposure, the unknown political neophyte has to content himself with other for which, given the limited campaign period, cannot reach the electorate as effectively as it would through the mass media. To be sure, the candidate may avail himself of "COMELEC Time," but the sheer number of candidates does not make the same an effective vehicle of communication. Not surprisingly, COMELEC Chairman Pardo, at the Oral Argument held by the Court en banc, admitted that no candidate has as yet applied for COMELEC air time and space. More telling, the celebrities are lavished with broader coverage from newspaper, radio and television stations, as well as via the commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists, as they are deemed more newsworthy by media, thus generating a self-perpetuating cycle wherein political unknowns, who may be more deserving of public office, campaign in relative obscurity compared to their more popular rivals. Instead of equalizing opportunities for public service, the prohibition not only perpetuates political inequality, but also invidiously discriminates against lesser-known candidates. 3. The use of modern media gives the poor candidate the opportunity to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. - Experience shows that the ban on political advertisement has not been reasonably necessary to accomplish its desired end. First, there are more than 70 provinces, more than 60 cities and more than a thousand municipalities spread all over the archipelago. Previous elections have shown that the ban on political advertising forces a candidate to conduct a nationwide whistle-stop campaign to attain maximum exposure of his credentials and his program of government. Obviously, this necessitates tremendous resources for sundry expenses 84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION indispensable for political campaigns, all within a limited period of 90 days. Given the enormous logistics needed for such a massive effort, what are the chances for an impecunious candidate who sincerely aspires for national office? On the other hand, radio and television reach out to a great majority of the populace more than other instruments of information dissemination, being the most pervasive, effective and inexpensive. A 30-second television advertisement, costing around p35,000.00 at present rates, would, in an instant, reach millions of viewers around the country in the comfort of their homes. Indeed, the use of modern mass media gives the poor candidate the opportunity to make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. Yet, these means of communication are denied such candidates due to the imagined apprehension that more affluent candidates may monopolize the airwaves. 4. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits. - To be realistic, judicial notice must be taken on the fact that COMELEC, in narrowing down its list of "serious" candidates, considers in effect a candidate's capability to wage an effective nationwide campaign which necessarily entails possession and/or availability of substantial financial resources. Given this requirement, the objective of equalizing rich and poor candidates may no longer find relevance, the candidates ultimately allowed to run being relatively equal, as far as resources are concerned. Additionally, the disqualification of nuisance candidates allegedly due to their inability to launch serious campaigns, itself casts doubt on the validity of the prohibition as a means to achieve the state policy of equalizing access to opportunities for public service. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits. 5. If it is difficult to show the number of candidates that can be adequately accommodated by "COMELEC Space" Past experience shows that the and 'COMELEC Time" COMELEC find problem in effectively informing the voting - CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 85 populace of the credentials, accomplishments, and platforms of government of the candidates. There are 17,396 national and local elective public positions which will be contested by an estimated 100,000 candidates on May 11, 1998. For national positions the list has been trimmed down to 11 candidates for president, 9 candidates for vice-president, and 40 candidates for senator. It is difficult to see how the number of candidates can be adequately accommodated by "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time." Resolution No. 2983 of the COMELEC, issued in compliance with Section 92 of B.P. 881, mandates that at least thirty minutes of prime time be granted to the Commission, free of charge, from February 10, 1998, until May 9, 1998. Thirty-minutes of prime time for eighty-nine (89) days is scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the voters, much less to properly inform the electorate of the credentials and platforms of all candidates running for national office. Let us be reminded that those running for local elective positions will also need to use the same space of time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that the COMELEC itself is authorized to use the space and time to disseminate vital election information clearly, "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time" sacrifices the right of the citizenry to be sufficiently informed regarding the qualifications and programs of the candidates. The net effect of Section 11(b) is, thus, a violation of the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and makes it a palpably unreasonable restriction on the people's right to freedom of expression. Not only this, the failure of "COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time" to adequately inform the electorate, only highlights the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the objective of equalizing opportunities for public service between rich and poor candidates. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 1. Actual peso calculations show that Section 11(b), RA No. 6646, is anti-poor. The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it prevents the rich from buying media time and space that the poor cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that media advertising is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor. - I respectfully submit that, such argument is bereft of factual basis. True, a full-page ad in a major broadsheet may 86 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION be priced at about P100,000, a 30-second commercial in a major television, anywhere from P15,000 to P90,000 depending on the time and the program; while airtime of an equal duration in a radio station, anywhere from P300 to P4,500. But even with such price tags, media ads are necessarily expensive, considering their nationwide reach, audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value. Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a National Office like the Presidency, the Vice-Presidency, and the Senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited cam- paign expenditures to ten pesos (PlO) for every voter in the case of candidates for president and vice-president, and three pesos (P3) per voter in their constituencies, for other candidates. Anyone - whether rich or poor - who aspires for such national elective office must expect to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable donations, to make himself and his platform of program of government known to the voting public. 2. The prohibition is not limited in duration but is, in fact and in truth, total, complete and exhaustive. The ad ban is constitutional because, according to the majority, it is limited in duration for the reason that it is enforced only during the election period. In my humble view and with all due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political advertisement is relevant only during the campaign period not before and not after. As petitioners put it, a ban on mountain skiing during the Winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in only when the mountain slopes are covered with snow. To add a further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice during the rainy season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After all, nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In the same manner, campaign ads are not resorted to except during the campaign period. And their prohibition does not become any less odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies only during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to advertise their qualifications and platforms only during such period. Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not limited in duration but, is in fact and in truth, complete and exhaustive. - CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 3. 87 The best testament to the utter inutility and ineffectivity of the COMELEC Chairman that no candidate had applied for COMELEC Time. - Finally, the majority opines that the grant of free of "COMELEC Time," is the statement COMELEC media time and space to candidates more than makes up for the abridgement of the latter's right to buy political ads. With due respect, I believe this is hollow and shallow. Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major candidate using this so-culled free COMJLDC broadcast time. In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998, COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no candidate had applied for an allocation of COMELEC Time. Not even petitioners. This is the best statement to the utter inutility and ineffectivity of COMELEC Time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute, much less a viable alternative, to freely chosen but paid for media ads. It cannot compensate for the violation of the candidates' right to free speech and media access, or for the electorate's right to information EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE JOURNAL AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOKER ARROYO, et al. v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al., G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998 There is no need for petitioners to invoke the power of the Court under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting RA No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that it is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of RA No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with internal rules. 88 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Majority Floor Leader Representative Rodolfo Albano was then moving for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that became RA No. 8240, which led the Chair, then Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Representative Joker P. Arroyo asked: "What is that Mr. Speaker?" The Chair allegedly ignored him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question "What is that Mr. Speaker" was a privileged question or a point of order that, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters, with the exception to motion to adjourn. ISSUE: Is the said contention of Rep. Arroyo valid and meritorious? HELD: The contention has no merit. Representative Arroyo did not have the floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leader's motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved. Rule XVI, Section 96 of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: "Section 96. Manner of Addressing the Chair. - When a member desires to speak, he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker." Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996 shows that after complaining that he was being "hurried" by the Majority Leader to finish his interpellation of the sponsor (Rep. Javier) of the conference committee report, Representative Arroyo concluded and then sat down. However, when the Majority Leader moved for the approval of the conference committee report and the Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and, without requesting to be recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?" Apparently, the Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any objection and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought down the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, "No, no, no, wait a minute," and asked what the question CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 89 was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had called for objection to the motion for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo register his objection. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the Chair. Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?") he was raising was a question of privilege or a point of order. At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the ruling of the Chair declaring the conference committee report approved. It is not true that he was prevented from doing so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the matter amicably. From all appearances, the misunderstanding was patched up during the nearly hour-long suspension because, after the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. As the Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows, the session was thereafter adjourned. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both houses of Congress as having been finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by the President of the Philippines. Petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision that "The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House." They contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of the House remain in the session hall because the others have gone home, the quorum may not be questioned. That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in the decision, at 11:48 A.M. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum, but after the roll call, it was found that there was none. After that, he announced he would again, question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the conference report. Hence, the statement in the decision that the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the conference committee report on what later became RA No. 8240 was railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is there any 90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting RA No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that it is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the validity of RA No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules. EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RESORTED TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION NOTABLY SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE II AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE VII, AND THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS UNDER SECTION 11 OF ARTICLE VII. THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CONSIDERED THE CONTEMPORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND INTERPRETED THE SAME AS A JUSTIFICATION TO THE TOTALITY TEST PRINCIPLE. THE SUPREME COURT SAID: "AS EARLYAS THE 1803 CASE OF MARBURY v. MADISON, THE DOCTRINE HAS BEEN LAID DOWN THAT "IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS. . - THUS. RESPONDENT'S INVOCATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTION IS BUT A FORAY IN THE DARK." (Underscoring supplied) CELEBRATED CASE IN 2001 JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 FACTS: On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The next day, then Senate Minority Leader Teofisto CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 91 Guingona delivered a fiery privilege speech. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The House of Representatives conducted its own investigation. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Goilez, decided to investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Hererra and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. On October 12, then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and later asked for petitioner's resignation. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. On November 13, House Speaker Vifiar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On December 7, 2000, the impeachment trial started. Several witnesses were presented by the prosecution, but it was Clarissa Ocampo and Secretary Edgardo Espiritu who delivered the most serious accusations Clarissa Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on account documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000 Secretary Espiritu alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. On January 16, 2001, on a vote of 11-10 (Those who voted 'yes" to open the envelope were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Blazon, Osmeña III. Those who voted "no" were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmefla, Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revilla, Sotto III, and Tatad) the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde' The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. 92 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On January 18, 2001, a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. This attracted more and more people. Thereafter, there was a resignation by some cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope. There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami. On January 20, at about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 P.M., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. He issued the following press statement: "20 January 2001 Statement from President Joseph Ejercito Estrada At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines, while along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 93 It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: "Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, lam hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRAJJA" On the same day, January 20, he signed the following letter and sent the same to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 A.M. Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 P.M. On January 22, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-105 SC, to wit: 'A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC - In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before Chief Justice - Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001. This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party." From day to day after this, respondent Arroyo attended official functions. 94 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court isfunctus officio and has been terminated. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with th[e] Court G.R. No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757, and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. 2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. 4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 95 HELD: 1. WHETHER THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION - Petitioner's claim that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. All these, constitute "the political ticket which the Court cannot enter." This claim is not applicable and the Supreme Court said x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution reauire the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably Section 1 of Article II. and Section 8 of Article VII. and the allocation of governmental powers under Section 11 of Articile VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity." As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark. (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied) 2. WHETHER THE PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRESIDENT - Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the Office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and said: "x x x In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20 2001, or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using the totality test, [the Court] hold[s] that petitioner resigned as President." 96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION These contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence are as follows: The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. 2. The petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. 3. Again, [the Court] note [s] that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. 4. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. 5. In sum. [the Court] hold[s] that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaflang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 97 spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. The Supreme Court concluded: "Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity cannot be attained if he will not give up the presidency." 3. WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ONLY TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT - Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice-President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Section 11 of Article VTI." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and ruled: Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary. What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign. still? he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temnorarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de lure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by th[e] Court. 4. WHETHER THE PETITIONER ENJOYS IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: ASSUMING HE ENJOYS IMMUNITY, WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE IMMUNITY - (1) Petitioner makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted 98 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The Supreme Court held that "When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution." (2) [The Court] rejectis] his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Since the Imreachment Court is now functus officio. it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. What is the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President? The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery, and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder that carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of th[e] Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. Among others the issues related to the subject of statutory construction are the following: 1. The claim that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of Presidency and she has been recognized by foreign governments, are matters which, CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 99 according to the Supreme Court, "the political ticket which the court cannot enter." The Supreme Court said: "x x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution. notably Section 1 of Article IL, and Section 8 of Article VII. and the allocation of governmental powers under Section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is x x x Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark." (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied) This case is also an example where the Supreme Court took into consideration the contemporaneous circumstances that preceded before former President Joseph Estrada left Malacanang Palace on June 20, 2001, as well as the posterior facts and circumstantial evidence that led it to conclude that: President Joseph Estrada resigned; and 2. The national spirit of reconciliations and solidarity cannot be attained if he will not give up the presidency. SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009 Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. 100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. During his third term of office, on September 2005, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently lifted the suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CO C) for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to his COC or to cancel it on the ground that it would violate the threeterm limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of BA No. 7160. The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners. Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. ISSUE: Whether the preventive suspension of an elected public official is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160. HELD: No. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any differnnen in wording does not ssumo any significance in this case. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 101 As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years - during which an official has title to office and can serve. The second branch relates to the provision's express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asio. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. Old Case: SOCRATES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HAGEDORN G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002 The established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's term. Interpretation of the three-term limit. FACTS: Petitioner contested respondent's proclamation of private respondent's victory in the recall election and its discretion in upholding the latter's qualification to run for mayor in the said election on the ground that the same has served for three consecutive terms prior to the contested recall election, and as such, he is constitutionally and statutorily prohibited from running for the same office for the fourth time and consequently, cannot be proclaimed the winner and serve a fourth consecutive term for the same position he has held before. ISSUES: a) Whether private respondent's victory in the recall election constitutes a "fourth term" as contemplated by law. b) Whether private respondent was qualified to run for mayor in contested recall election. HELD: 1. No. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election. 2. From the end of his third term in June 30, 2001 until September 24, 2002, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. His new recall term from September 24, 2002 until June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002, which broke the continuity or consecutive character of his service as mayor. The established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official's term. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 103 In Lonzanida v. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602), the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner: "x x x the second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term of which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x" (Underscoring supplied) In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that the interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service. EXAMPLE OF CASES WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE; THE REASON BEHIND THE LABOR POLICY OF SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY OF THE DISMISSAL OF AN EMPLOYEE FOR JUST CAUSE BUT ORDERING THE EMPLOYER TO PAY DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS. BACKGROUND OF RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CASE OF TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT RULE PRIOR TO 1989 Dismissal or termination was illegal if the employee was not given any notice. 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The rule that was then consistently followed is the principle of "TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS" which refers to substantive and procedural due process. In accordance with this principle, two (2) requisites must concur namely: (1) Dismissal must be for any of the causes provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) The employee must be accorded due process, the elements of which are notice and the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. (Austria v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999; Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, et al., 252 SCRA 531 [19961) THIS RULE WAS REVERSED IN WENPHIL CORP. v. NLRC G.R. NO. 80587, FEBRUARY 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the notice or due process requirement, THE DISMISSAL MAY BE UPHELD BUT, THE EMPLOYER SHALL BE PENALIZED TO PAY AN INDEMNITY TO THE EMPLOYEE. THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE WAS CHANGED IN RUBEN SERRANO v. NLRC, etal., G.R. No. 117040, JANUARY 27, 2000 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that while the violation by the employer of the notice requirement in termination for just and authorized causes was not a denial of the due process that will nullify the termination. THE DISMISSAL IS INEFFECTUAL AND THE EMPLOYER MUST PAY FULL BACKWAGES FROM THE TIME OF TERMINATION UNTIL IT IS JUDICIALY DECLARED THAT THE DISMISSAL WAS NOT FOR JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSE. THE DOCTRINE IN SERRANO WAS REVISITED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 2004 IN THE CASE OF JENNY AGABON, et al., v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 158693, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 In this case, the Supreme Court, voting 8-6, came to the conclusion that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 105 holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer, which sanctions, however, must be stiffer than the P1,000.00 imposed on Wenphil. In the Agabon case, the Supreme Court held that the violation of the right of petitioners Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilio C. Agabon to statutory due process by the private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., as their employer, warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which, according to the Supreme Court, is addressed to the sound discretioii of the co1rt 7 takiriB into acconnit the relevant circiimstanices. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the Agabon case, the Supreme Court ordered private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., as employer, to pay each of the Agabon petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. The Agabon ruling has been cited with favor and applied in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Benedicto A. Cajucom, VII v. TPI Philippines Cement Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. 149090; Third Division) promulgated on February 11, 2005; in Bernardino A. Caingat v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 154308; First Division) promulgated on March 10, 2005; and in Dennis A. Chua u. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 146780; Second Division) promulgated on March 11, 2005. WENPHIL CORPORATION v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989 FACTS: A had an altercation with B, and for which they were suspended on the following day. In the afternoon of the same day, A was advised, through a memorandum issued by the Operations Manager, about his dismissal from the service in accordance with their personnel manual. The formal notice of dismissal was served to him four days later. A is an employee of the company for about one (1) year and five (5) months at the time of his dismissal. A filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the same was dismissed by the labor arbiter for lack of merit. The said decision, however, was set aside by the NLRC which ordered Xs reinstatement to his former position with one year back wages without qualification and deduction. The employer filed a petition for certiorari. 106 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION HELD: The failure of the petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. The standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was not necessary because the incident which gave rise to the termination of private respondent was witnessed by his co-employees and supervisors is without merit. The basic requirement of due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without the loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it appears that he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Department of Labor and Employment should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and ifie if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service. In the instant case, the private respondent appears to be of violent temper. He caused trouble during office hours and defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him. He should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages. Reason: It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his former employment. However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 107 it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. RUBEN SERRANO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was a contractual employee in 1984. He became a regular employee in 1985. He became head of the security checker of private respondent in 1988. Sometime on October 11, 1991, Isetann phased out its security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency. Consequently, Isetann wrote a memorandum to petitioner terminating his services on the very day that said paper was given to him. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter and ordered that petitioner be given separation pay, unpaid salary and proportionate 13th month pay. Subsequently, a petition was filed to raise the issue of the validity of the cause of petitioner's dismissal. HELD: It was part of management's prerogative to avoid redundancy. However, there was an extended discussion on the notice requirement. While the court has agreed that the Wenphil Doctrine ought to be abandoned, the members of the court are not unanimous on the issue of the applicability of the due process clause to the situation. Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case 108 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION may be) void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded. [The Court] hold[s], therefore, that, with respect to Article 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of say, theft, or even of an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust. It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force." But also does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment." The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection to labor." But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not economically in his interest to do so. In sum, [the Court] hold[s] that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Article 283, it is shown that the termination of employment was due to authorized cause, then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he must be granted separation pay in accordance with Article 283. If the employee's separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should be paid in full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Article 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Article 282, then, in accordance CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 109 with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time of decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary award to petitioner. The following justices have dissenting opinions: (1) (2) (3) Justice Puno; Justice Panganiban; and Justice Bellosillo AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 442 SCRA 573 (2004) FACTS: Petitioners Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were employed by respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. HELD: The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal illegal, ordered the payment of backwages, payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement, and payment of the monetary claims. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that petitioners abandoned their work and that they were not likewise entitled to any monetary award. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the petitioners, finding that they had abandoned their employment having already started working for another employer. The appellate court, however, ordered the STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 110 payment of petitioner's money claims. Before the Supreme Court, the sole issue presented is whether petitioners were illegally dismissed, an issue which in turn implicates the consequence of failure to comply with the notice requirement prior to the dismissal of employees who are terminated for cause. Petitioners claim that Riviera Home did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The latter argues, however, that sending notices to the last known addresses of the petitioners would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The violation of the petitioner's right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. [The Court] believe[s] this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. PRESUMPTIONS IN AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION While in the process of construing statutes, the court may indulge in presumptions which are justified by the rules of logic, human experience, good sense and by specific provision of law. However, there is no need to apply said presumption if the legislative intent is clear. What are these presumptions? They are the following: (1) Presumption of Validity (2) Presumption of Constitutionality CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION (3) Presumption of Good Faith (4) Presumption Against Injustice (5) Presumption Against Inconsistency (6) Presumption Against Absurdity (7) Presumption Against Ineffectiveness (8) Presumption Against Irrepealable Laws (9) Presumption Against Implied Repeals (10) Presumption Against Violation of Public Policy (11) Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws (12) Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction (13) Presumption of Jurisdiction (14) Presumption of Acting Within the Scope of Authority (15) Presumption Against Violation of International Law PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid because the legislature is supposed to have considered the question of its validity in approving it. The question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself, and the court should resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts are not justified in adjudging a statute invalid in the face of the conclusion of the legislature when the question of its validity is at all doubtful. The courts must assume the validity of the statute, and that it was fully considered by the legislature before it was adopted. Statutes should not be presumed to be invalid unless it clearly appears that they are within some of the inhibitions of the fundamental laws of the state. (U.S. v. Ten Yu; 24 Phil. 1; U.S. v. Joson, 28 Phil. 1) PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY Every statue passed by the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. (Yu Cong Rag u. Trinidad, 47Phil. 385) However, when the statute is really unconstitutional, the courts are authorized 112 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION to declare its invalidity. Again, this is the essence of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. In discharging that duty, the judicial arm of the government is merely complying with its assigned task of seeing to it that the other departments have not exceeded their constitutional authority. PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH In case of interpretation of a statute, it is presumed that the legislature had good motives in having considered and adopted a particular law. Presumptions also exist that the legislature acted in good faith; that it acted from patriotic and just motives; that it acted with a desire to promote an intention to disregard the civil and political liberties of the people. (p. 132, Statutory Construction, Ruperto G. Martin) PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (Article 10, New Civil Code of the Philippines) The reason for this is explained by the Code Commission in this vein: It is "necessary" so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice, which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. (Comment of the Code Commission, p. 78) PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY The mind of the lawmaking body is presumed to be consistent. In case of doubt therefore, such a construction should be adopted as will make all the provision of the statute consistent with one another and with the entire act. A word or phrase repeated in a statute will have the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. (Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461) "Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemos" - when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. (Ltbuoan V. Gil, G.R. No. L-21163, May 171, 1972) CHAPTER H AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 113 PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY It is presumed that the legislature does not intend that absurdity will flow from its enactment. The courts therefore have the duty to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd result. (People v. Malabanan, G.R. No. L-1 64 78, Aug. 31, 1961) Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be construed to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. (Uytengsu v Republic, 95 Phil 990) PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend to adopt laws, which are unnecessary and ineffective. It is presumed that it intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and effective. There are therefore two important rules of statutory construction on this point, thus: Where a law is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it unconstitutional and the other upholds its validity, the latter must be adopted. (U.S. v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1) 2. Where the language of the statute is susceptible of two or more constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective or inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature, that construction which tends to give effect to the object for which the law was adopted shall prevail. (Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. DENR, G.R. No. L-29534, February 23, 1977) PRESUMPTION AGAINST IRREPEALABLE LAWS It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that its law shall be irrepealable. The legislature cannot enact irrepealable laws or limit its future legislative acts. (Duarte v. David, 32 Phil. 36) The reason is obvious, The need of today and the situation obtaining now win not most likely be the same in the years to come. Coup d'etat is new to the Philippine government. Drug addiction became a serious menace 114 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION in the 60's and the 70's. It is but proper that those issues should be left to the better judgment of a new legislature. In the year 2000, the people will surely be confronted with problems of their own DE GUIA v. GUINGONA, et al., G.R. No. 119525, April 18, 1995 CONGRESS HAS THE INHERENT POWER TO AMEND, MODIFY AND REPEAL ITS OWN LAWS FOR THERE ARE NO IRREPEALABLE LAWS FACTS: Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of RA No. 7887, enacted on February 15, 1995 insofar as it provides that elective members of the Sanggurnang Panlungsod and Sanggumang Bayan outside Metro Manila shall be elected at large. RA No. 7887 amended Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of BA No. 7166, enacted on November 26, 1991, which provides that said officials shall be elected by district on the May 8, 1995 election. He argued that RA No. 7887 is contrary to and inconsistent with the earlier law, RA No 7166" He urges the Court to strike down RA No. 7887 and to "reinstate RA No 7166" ISSUE: Is RA No 7887 contrary to or consistent with RA No 7166? HELD: It is of no moment that RA No. 7887 is contrary and inconsistent with RA No. 7166. HA No. 7887 was enacted precisely to amend Section 3[c] and [d] of RA No. 7166. Congress has the inherent power to amend, modify and repeal its own laws for there are no irrepealable laws Its perception of what is good for our people can change over time. This perception is reflected by them through the amendment or outright repeal of our existing laws. By the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court cannot supersede the wisdom of Congress in enacting, amending or repealing a law. It cannot strike down an amendatory law on the ground that the amended law is better for the people Petitioner's supplication that the Supreme Court '.reinstate" RA No 7166 betrays his basic ignorance of our constitutional system. CHAPTER II AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 115 PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS Repeals by implication is not favored. There are two requirements before a statute can be considered to have repealed a prior statute by implication, namely: 1. That the statute touch the same subject matter; and 2. That the later statute is repugnant to the earlier one. (Calderon v. Provincia Del Santisimo Rosario, 26 Phil. 164) In this connection, there are three basic rules to remember on the matter of repeal: 1. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. (Article 7 New Civil Code of the Philippines) 2. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless expressly so provided. However, when a law repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication only, its repeal revives the prior law unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. (U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5) 3. A general law does not repeal a special law unless it is so expressly provided, or they are incompatible. (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8) PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY It is presumed that the legislature designs to favor and foster rather than to contravene, that public policy which is based upon the principles of natural justice, good morals, and the settled wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of life. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Edition, p. 134) PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING LAWS In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have full knowledge of all existing laws on the subject. Hence, if there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, the latter law cannot be held to have abrogated the former law, unless the 116 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION repugnancy is clear, convincing and irreconcilable. (Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, et al.) PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner, and the lawmaking body made no move to alter or amend the said statute, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation. PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of superior courts, or to vest a new jurisdiction in them, unless there are express words or a necessary implication to that effect. (G.R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976; U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208) PRESUMPTION OF ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority. Hence, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that places the statute outside of legislative competence, and one that places the statute within the limits of legislative competence, the court should adopt the later interpretation. (Black, Interpretation of Laws. 2nd Ed., p. 138) PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW It is presumed that a statute is in conformity with the rules and principles of international laws, or with treaties, in line with Section 2, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows: "Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION I. DEFINITION OF LAW The term "law, "in its broadest sense, means any rule of action or norm of conduct applicable to all kinds of action and to all objects of creation. In this sense therefore, it includes all laws, whether they refer to state law, physical law, divine law and others. In a strict legal sense, law is defined as a rule of conduct, just and obligatory, laid down by legitimate authority for the common observance and benefit. (Sanchez Roman, p. 23) Based on this definition, law has the following elements: 1. IT IS A RULE OF CONDUCT - Laws serve as guides of an individual in relation to his fellowmen and to his community. 2. LAWS MUST BE JUST - The chapter on human relations is now precisely embedded in the New Civil Code in order to obtain stability of the social order. Laws, as guides for human conduct, "should run as golden threads through society; to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 39) IT MUST BE OBLIGATORY— If laws are not enforced, the purpose for which they are intended will not be served. 3. 4. LAWS MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY - If laws are not prescribed by legitimate authority, the people could not be expected to observe them. Authority to make laws is conferred upon those duly chosen by the sovereign will of the people. This is in consonance with Section 1, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution, which says that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." 117 118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5. LAWS MUST BE ORDAINED FOR THE COMMON BENEFIT - This recognizes the famous Latin Maxim of "SAL US POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX" - the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Laws should be applied not only to a particular group of citizens. They are supposed to be applied equally to all citizens regardless of their religion, political persuasion, or status in life. CLASSIFICATION OF LAW 1. NATURAL LAW This law derives its force and authority from God. It is superior to other laws. It is binding to the whole world, in all countries and at all times. 2. POSITIVE LAW Physical Law - Universal rule of action that governs the conduct and movement of things, which are non-free and material. Moral Law - Set of rules which establishes what is right and what is wrong as dictated by the human conscience and as inspired by the eternal law. Divine Law (a) Divine Positive Law i.e., Ten Commandments, (b) Divine Human Positive Law i.e., Commandments of the church PUBLIC LAW (a) Constitutional Law - is the fundamental law of the land, which defines the powers of the government. (b) Administrative Law - that law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of the administrative authorities and which regulates the methods by which the functions of the Government are performed. (c) International Law - body of rules, which regulates the community of ntion. CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 119 PRIVATE LAW: Body of rules which creates duties, rights and obligations, and the means and methods of setting courts in motion for the enforcement of a right or of a redress of wrong. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 24, 337) (a) Substantive private law - Those rules which declare legal relations of litigants when the courts have been properly moved to action upon facts duly presented to them. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 24, 337) (b) Procedural or adjective private law - Refers to the means and methods of setting the courts in motion, making the facts known to them and effectuating their judgments. H, SOURCES OF LAW Law is derived from different sources, namely: (1) legislation; (2) precedent; (3) custom; and (4) court decision. LEGISLATION - Before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972, the power to legislate laws is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives Upon the imposition of martial law and after the dissolution of the old Congress, the power to legislate law is vested in the President of the Philippines. This is the reason why the President issued presidential decrees and letters of instructions. When the Batasang Pambansa was organized, legislative power is principally vested in this body although the President, under and by virtue of what is known as Amendment No. 6, continued to issue decrees when the exigency of the situation requires and in case of other emergencies. Among many others, this is one of the dictatorial acts that was severely questioned by several lawyers and critics of the past regime. Now, after the People's Revolt on February 22-25, 1986, and in accordance with the wishes and the will of the sovereign Filipino people, the three branches of government operating under the doctrine of separation of powers are restored, with each department being committed to do its utmost share in bringing about a more democratic and efficient system of government that is responsive to the needs of the people. PRECEDENT •- This means that the decisions or principles enunciated by a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law do not only serve as guides but also as authority to be followed by all other courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction in all cases involving the same question until the same is overruled or reversed by a superior 120 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION court. In the Philippines, this doctrine of stare decisis is not applied and recognized in the same manner that it is applied and recognized in common law countries. However, our new Civil Code provides as follows: "x x x Judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. x x x" (Article 8, New Civil Code) Furthermore, although Supreme Court decisions are binding on inferior courts, there are many instances where the Supreme Court departed from its previous decision either wholly or partly. In any case, that which is the latest necessarily amends or reverses those previously rendered by the Supreme Court. CUSTOM - Customs have the force of law only when they are acknowledged and approved by society through long and uninterrupted usage. In the Philippines, there are several requisites before the court considers custom. They are as follows: (a) A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence (Article 12, NCC); (b) The custom must not be contrary to law (Article 11, NCC); (c) There must be a number of repeated acts and these repeated acts must have been uniformly performed; (d) There must be a judicial intention to make a rule of social conduct; and (e) A custom must be acknowledged and approved by society, through long and uninterrupted usage. COURT DECISION - Judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution and the laws are part of the legal system in the Philippines but they are not laws. However, although judicial decisions are not laws, they are evidence of the meaning and interpretations of the laws. In the Philippines, we adhere to the doctrine of STARE DECISIS which means that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same question or point of law should be decided in the same manner. This principle, however, does not necessarily mean that erroneous decisions or those found to be contrary to law must be perpetuated. On the contrary, they should be abandoned. CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 121 III. STATUTES Statutes are enacted by the legislature. They are actually the bills submitted to Congress for consideration and approval. Once approved finally by Congress and by the President of the Philippines these bills become statutes. (The rules on the approval of bills are found in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution) Other laws, which have the same binding force as statutes are the presidential decrees, issued during the period of martial law and under the 1973 Constitution. IV. KINDS OF STATUTES I. AS TO NATURE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. II. Penal statutes Remedial statutes Substantive statutes Labor statutes Tax statutes AS TO APPLICATION 1. 2. Mandatory Directory III. AS TO PERFORMANCE 1. 2. Permanent Temporary IV. AS TO SCOPE 1. 2. 3. General Special Local V. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS 1. 2. 3. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive A statute could either be a repealing act or an amendatory act A statute could either be a reference statute or a declaratory statute 122 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION V. IDENTIFICATION OF STATUTES HOW ARE STATUTES IDENTIFIED? The identification of a statute depends on the respective authorities that enacted them. Statutes passed and approved by the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Legislature from 1901 to 1935 are identified as Public Acts. Those enacted during the Commonwealth period from 1936 to 1946 are identified as Commonwealth Acts. Those approved by the Philippine Congress from 1942 to 1972 are identified as Republic Acts. Those approved by the Batasang Pambansa are identified as BP or Batas Pambansa Those that were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the martial law regime were identified as PD or Presidential Decree. All statutes are identified either by their respective titles or their serial numbers. VI. PARTS OF STATUTES SEVEN PARTS OF A STATUTE A statute has seven parts such as the following: 1. Title 2. Preamble 3 Enacting Clause 4. Body 5. Exceptions and Provisos 6. Interpretative, repealing, separability and saving clauses 7. Date of Effectivity TITLE - That part of the statute which gives a general statement of, and calls attention to, the subject matter of an act, so that legislators and the public may be appraised of the subject matter of the legislation, and be put upon inquiry in regard thereto. (Example: "An Act Enacting a Local Government Code") CHAFFER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 123 CAN A BILL EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT? Section 26(1) of Article VI of the New Constitution specifically requires that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PURPOSES OF SUCH REQUIREMENT The purpose of said requirement are the following 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and 3. To fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation being considered so that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, Coast Limitations, 6 Edition, p 172) WHAT IS A HODGE-PODGE OR LOGROLLING LEGISLATION It is a mischievous legislative practice of embracing in one bill several distinct matters, none of which, perhaps, could singly obtain the assent of the legislator, and then procuring its passage by a combination of the minorities in favor of each of the measure into a majority that will adopt them all (Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition p 1091) The object of such kind of legislation is to unite the legislators who favor any one of the subjects in support of the whole act. EFFECT OF VIOLATING SAID REQUIREMENT Statutes passed in violation of said requirement shall be declared void by the courts. However, this requirement shall be reasonably applied in order not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation (Sumulong v COMELEC, 73 Phil 283) TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF A TITLE The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation The main title of RA 1700 is Anti Subversion Act In addition however, to this title, said law states that it is "An act to outlaw the 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations, penalizing membership therein and for other purposes." The Supreme Court held that the said title is valid. The statute unequivocally indicates that the subject matter of the law is subversion in general which has for its purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies. (People v. Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. L-32613, December 27, 1972) IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE TITLE OF THE ACT When there is doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the act, the legislation should be sustained. The presumption is in favor of the validity of the acts. IS THE SAID REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO ORDINANCES OF DIFFERENT COUNCILS (MUNICIPAL, CITY, PROVINCIAL)? It is not applicable to said ordinances because they are not laws enacted by Congress, Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution mentions "Congress" only, thus: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title hereof." (Underscoring Supplied) II. PREAMBLE - It is that part of the statute following the title and preceding the enacting clause, which states the reasons for, or the objects of the enactment. EXAMPLE: 'WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the Agrarian Reform Program of the Government for the early attainment of the objectives set forth in [RA] No. 3844, as amended; WHEREAS, among such objectives is to achieve dignified existence for the small farmers free from the pernicious institutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded the agricultural development of the country but have also produced widespread discontent and unrest among our farmers, one of the causes of the existing national emergency; and CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 125 WHEREAS, it is believed that the lasting objectives of land reform may be sooner realized if the whole country is declared a land reform area." NOTE : There are three basic points to remember: A preamble does not create a right nor does it grant any right; 2. It is not a source of government power; and 3. It is not an essential part of the statute. IlL ENACTING CLAUSE - It is that part of the statute that indicates the authority that promulgated the enactment. The enacting clause is not essential to the validity of the law but this clause clothes the statute with a certain dignity because the specific authority that promulgated the law is therein stated. EXAMPLE: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled" IV. BODY - It contains the subject matter of the statute. The body of a statute should embrace only one subject matter as required in Section 26(1), Article VI of the New Constitution, thus: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." This requirement is not violated simply because it contains diverse provisions. For as long as those provisions are allied and germane to the subject and purpose of the bill, the said requirement is deemed complied with. EXAMPLE: "Presidential Decree No. 1612, Anti-Fencing Law of 1979" Sections 1 to 8. SECTION 1. TITLE. - This decree shall be known as Anti-Fencing Law. SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS. - The following terms shall mean as follows: a. 'TENCING"is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or 126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION shall buy and sell, or in any-other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. b. "FENCE" includes any person, firm, association, corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing. SEC. 3. PENALTIES. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated: a.) The penalty of pri.sion mayor, if the value of the property involved is more that 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, - the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. b.) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos. c.) The penalty ofprision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos. d.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period toprision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos. e.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos. f.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos. SEC. 4. LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS OF JUDICIAL PERSONS. - If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation, or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable. - CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 127 SEC. 5. PRESUMPTION OF FENCING. - Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. SEC. 6. CLEARANCE/PERMIT TO SELL/USED SECOND HAND ARTICLES. - For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence SEC. 7. REPEALING CLAUSE. - All laws or parts thereof, winch are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 8. EFFECTIVITY. - This Decree shall take effect upon approval Done m the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen and seventy-nine. V. PROVISO - It is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as a restraint upon or as a qualification of, the generality of the language which it follows. EXAMPLE Article 33 of the Family Code "Article 33 Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or- practices." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION VI. INTERPRETATIVE CLAUSE - That part of the statute where the legislature defines its own language or prescribes rules for its construction. EXAMPLE: Section 4 of the Local Government Code "Section 4. Rules of Interpretation: 1. Any power of a barangay, municipality, city or province shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned. 2. The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic uplift, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community. 3. Vested rights existing on the date of the effectivity of this Code arising out of contracts or any other source of obligation between a province, city, municipality or barangay and another party, shall be governed by the original terms and provisions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights became vested and in no case shall this Code infringe on them. 4. When in the resolution of controversies arising under this Code no legal provision or jurisprudence case be found to apply, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the controversy arose." VIL REPEALING CLAUSE - That part of the statute that announces the legislative intent to terminate or revoke another statute or statutes. EXAMPLE: Section 233 of the Local Government Code "Section 233. Repealing Clause; Metropolitan Manila and the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX and XII. (1) Except as otherwise provided herein, all laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 129 parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (2) Unless otherwise provided by law, nothing in this Code shall be understood to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions of PD No. 824 and B.P. 20, and all presidential decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila and the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII." VIII. SAVING CLAUSE - This restricts a repealing act and preserves existing powers, rights and pending proceedings from the effects of the repeal. EXAMPLE: Section 31 of the Social Security Law "Section 31. SAVING CLAUSE. - The Assembly hereby reserves the right to amend, alter, or repeal any provision of this Act, and no person shall be or shall deemed to be vested with any property or other right by virtue of the enactment or operation of this Act. (As amended by Section 2, RA No. 1792 and Section 20, PD No. 735, S-1975)" IX. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE - It is clause, which states that if for any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be unconstitutional or invoked, the other section or provision of the law shall not be affected thereby. NOTE: 1. A separability clause creates a presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. This means that if one part of the statute is void or unconstitutional, the other parts thereof which are valid may still stand. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE The general rule, however, is subject to the limitation that if the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected thereby creating a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity or unconstitutionality of one part may vitiate the rest. 130 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION VII. OTHER LAWS 1. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES (WHAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE TERM "PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES"?) Presidential issuances do not refer only to presidential decrees. They also include executive orders, administrative orders, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. These issuances, shall form part of the law of the land. (1976 Amendment No. 6) BACKGROUND Before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972, the power to legislate laws is vested in Congress, which consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Section 1 Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides as follows "Section 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representative Upon the imposition of martial law and after the dissolution of the old Congress, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, "assumed direction of the operation of the entire Government" under and by virtue of Proclamation No. 1091 dated September 21, 1972. On this basis, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued presidential decrees and letters of instructions. The prominent decrees that he issued are PD No. 2 "PROCLAIMING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS A LAND REFORM AREA" and PD No. 27 "DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR." Said decrees are herein quoted in full: MALACA1SEANG Manila PD NO. 2 PROCLAIMING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS LAND REFORM AREA WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the Agrarian Reform Program of the Government for the ear- CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION ly attainment of the objectives set forth in RA No. 3844, as amended; WHEREAS, among such objectives is to achieve dignified existence for the small farmers free from the pernicious institutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded the agricultural development of the country but have also produced widespread discontent and unrest among our farmers, one of the causes of the existing national emergency; and WHEREAS, it is believed that the lasting objectives of land reform may be sooner realized if the whole country is declared a land reform area; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, as amended, whereby I have assumed direction of the operation of the entire Government, do hereby proclaim the whole country as a land reform area. All agencies and offices of the Government are enjoined to extend full cooperation and assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform to insure the successful implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. The Agrarian Reform Coordinating Council created under Executive Order No. 347, series of 1971, is hereby directed to convene immediately to exercise its functions. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform shall take the necessary steps for the prompt and effective implementation of this decree. Done in the City of Manila, this 26th day of September in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. 131 132 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PD NO. 27 DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR. Inasmuch as the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and social tension, The redress of such legitimate grievances being one of the fundamental objectives of the New Society, Since Reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller of the soil from his bondage. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of the day, October 21, 1972; This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not; The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed an owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated; In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it; For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree; CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) percentum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations; In case of default, the amortizations due shall be paid by the farmer's cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with the cooperative having a right of recourse against him; The government shall guaranty such amortizations with shares of stock in government-owned and controlled corporations; No title to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under this Decree shall be actually issued to a tenantfarmer unless and until the tenant-farmer has become a full-pledged member of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative; Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations; The Department of Agrarian Reform through its Secretary is hereby empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Decree. All laws, executive orders, decrees and rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed and or modified accordingly. Done in the City of Manila this 21st day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventytwo. Under the 1973 Constitution, legislative power is vested in a Batasang Pambansa. (Section 1, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution) The 1973 Constitution was amended in 1976 principally to provide for an interim B.P. Extraordinary legislative power was given to President Ferdinand E. Marcos by the 1976 Amendment No. 6 which reads: 133 134 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION "Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister) there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land." I *Y I á m Memorandum Circular of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in relation to PD Nos. 2 and 22 November 25, 1972 TO: Secretary Conrado Estrella Department of Agrarian Reform, Secretary Cesar Virata Department of Finance We shall postpone promulgation of the Rules and Regulations pending the studies in the pilot projects in order that we can incorporate the lessons we learn in such pilot projects. However, the following guidelines will be adopted: 1. No tenant will be ejected or removed pending the promulgation of the Rules and Regulations. 2. Landowners will be encouraged to sell or swap their lands to the following arrangements: a. Swap with government lands, whether virgin or otherwise; b. Swap with government stocks in governmentowned or controlled corporations or private corporations where the government has holdings; C. Sell for cash with the arrangement that government shall extend them priority in the purchase of government lands or government stocks; CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 3. d. Government to offer in lieu of the payments by the tenants, annuities with guarantees against inflation, and/or medical insurance or pensions of any class or nature; e. Government to help in every way possible, including credit financing. 135 Pilot projects may be set up not only in Nueva Ecija but anywhere else in the Philippines in accordance with my original instructions. 4. The Secretary of Finance will now set aside such fund, including at least P50 million from the general fund, as are available to be utilized for this purpose. 5. Loans from other countries, like the Japanese Commodity and Project Loan, shall be used primarily for: a. Infrastructure of tenanted lands as well as infrastructure for government virgin lands to be swapped or sold to landowners or cooperatives. b. The next Commodity and Project Loan totalling P75 million shall be used primarily for land reform. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President Republic of the Philippines EXAMPLE OF A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION Letter of Instructions No. 140 Restructuring Loans of Farmers Affected by Calamities. To: The Governor, Central Bank The President, Philippine National Bank The Administrator, ACA Typhoons "Luming" and "Narsing," the floods and locusts in Cotabato, and the brown planthopper disease have damaged a considerable number of farms in Cotabato, Central Luzon, Laguna and the Bicol region. Damages to farms mean that farmers affected will be unable to pay their production loans borrowed from the rural banks, the Philippine National Bank, or the Agricultural Credit 136 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Administration. Further, farms which can still be replanted will need additional loans for land preparation, seeds and fertilizer. You are hereby directed to take the necessary steps to restructure the loans of the farmers affected and, in addition, to provide new loans to farmers who would like to replant and are capable of replanting their farms. Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three. 2. ORDINANCES The respective legislative bodies of the Sangguniang Barangay, Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panglungsod, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan can enact ordinances and resolutions. Under the rules and regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, particularly under Article 107 to 114, Rule I thereof, the pertinent provisions related to ordinances and resolutions are as follows: ARTICLE 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. - The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions: (a) Legislative actions of a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those which are of temporary character shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to proprietary functions and to private concerns shall also be acted upon by resolution. (b) Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall be in writing and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption, an enacting or ordaining clause, and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinance shall be accompanied by a brief explanatory note containing the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the author or authors and submitted to the secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunian at its next meeting. (c) A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through a third reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian members. (d) No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second reading in any regular meeting unless it has been reported out by CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 137 the proper committee to which it was referred or certified as urgent by the local chief executive. (e) Any legislative matter duly certified by the local chief executive as urgent, whether or not it is included in the calendar of business, may be presented and considered by the body at the same meeting without need of suspending the rules. (f) The secretary to the sanggunian of the province, city or municipality shall prepare copies of the proposed ordinance or resolution in the form it was passed on second reading, and shall distribute to each sanggunian member a copy thereof, except that a measure certified by the local chief executive concerned as urgent may be submitted for final voting immediately after debate or amendment during the second reading. (g) No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purpose shall be valid unless approved by a majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian members for its passage. (h) Upon the passage of all ordinances and resolutions directing the payment of money or creating liability, and at the request of any member, of any resolution or motion, the sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Each approved ordinance or resolution shall be stamped with the seal of the sanggunian and recorded in a book kept for the purpose. ARTICLE 108. Approval of Ordinances. - ( a) Every ordinance enacted by the sanggunian shall be present to the local chief executive. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. (b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. 138 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by a majority of all its members, be signed by the puriong barangay. ARTICLE 109. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - ( a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the saugguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefore in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner as provided in the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned. ARTICLE 110. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall transmit to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and resolutions approving and adopting the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sanggumang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from the receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations which may be considered by the sauggumang panlalawigan in making its decision. CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 139 (c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with the law and, therefore, valid. ARTICLE 111. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected. ARTICLE 112. Enforcement of Ordinances or Resolutions After Disapproval by Reviewing Authority. - Any attempt to enforce any disapproved ordinance or resolution adopting the local development plan and public investment program. After disapproval by the local chief executive or by the reviewing authority shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned. ARTICLE 113. Effectivity of Ordinances and Resolutions. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is 140 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hail, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the LGU concerned. VIII. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS WHEN SHALL A LAW TAKE EFFECT? Before the ruling in Tafiada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), this question is answered by the express provisions of Article 2 of the Civil Code and the old ruling in A5kay v. Cosalon (46 Phil. 17.9) and in Balbuena v. Secretary of Education. (G.R. No. L-14283, November 29, 1960) Hence, if a law provides for its own effectivity, or "upon approval," the publication in the official gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character. This is no longer applicable. In accordance with the ruling in Tafiada v. Tuvera (ibid.), all laws, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published first and this requirement shall be a condition for their effectivity. Reason: Lack of publication is a violation of the due process clause of the constitution. Due process of law contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered against anyone. SCOPE OF TANADA v. TUVERA Taflada v. Tuvera (ibid) applies to all laws, including to those of local application. It does not apply, however, to interpretative regulations and to those merely internal in nature. EFECTIVITY OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES Publication is also a prerequisite for their effectivity. Hence, they take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general publication. However, those which are treated as interpretative regulations or which are internal in nature, and not concerning the public, need not be published. EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCE Under 3ection 11 of the Local Government Code, an ordinance enacted by a local government shall take effect after the lapse of CHAPTER III LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION 141 ten (10) days from the date a copy of it is posted in a bulletin board located in a conspicuous place at the provincial, city, municipal or barangay hail, at the public market, and/or at the church or chapel. In highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance must, in addition thereto, be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city. (Section 11[2], B.P. 337, or the Old Local Government Code) IX. WHO ARE SUBJECT TO PHILIPPINE LAWS? Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Article 15, New Civil Code) Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Article 16, New Civil Code) Matters respecting remedies, such as the bringing of suit, the admissibility of evidence, and the statute of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. (Government v. Frank, 13 Phil. 236) CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES I. VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES The three branches of our government have their respective functions and responsibilities. The persons entrusted with power in any one of those branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the power confided to the others, but that each shall, by the law of its creation, be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other. There must be independence and equality of the several departments. The completeness of their separation and their mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the other, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, 108 U.S. 168, 190 251. ed. 377, 386; Abveua v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612) There is, however, no absolute separation of the three departments of government. Each department is given certain powers by which it may definitely restrain the others from exceeding their constitutional authority. Hence, from time to time, the Supreme Court is called upon to make a determination if a law is constitutional or not. It is in such cases when the Supreme Court, as final arbiter, asserts its power of judicial review and makes a final judgment. As the ultimate guardian of our Constitution, the Supreme Court is indeed the court of last resort on petitions to declare a law unconstitutional. As much as possible, however, it will try to avoid going into the issue of constitutionality, if there is any available ground to decide a case. There will always be a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. It will be presumed that the law has been the subject of study and careful deliberation before it was finally enacted. 142 CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 143 In this jurisdiction, no constitutional question will be heard unless the following requisites of judicial inquiry are. complied with, to wit: 1. There must be an actual case or controversy; 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. II. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY There must be an actual conflict, which needs judicial determination. It is not a dispute, which is hypothetical, or one that is moot or academic. It must be a concrete case that is real, one that admits of specific relief and definite determination of the legal rights of the parties III. PROPER PARTY A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. IV. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY As a general rule, a constitutional question must be raised in the pleadings, otherwise, they cannot be considered during the trial. This rule is subject to the following exceptions: 1. In criminal cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court. 2. In civil cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself. 3. In every case, except where there is estoppel, the constitutional question can be raised at any stage if it involves jurisdiction of the court. (Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Mangune, G.R. No. L-24902, November 26, 1970; Uypuanco v. Leuterio, G.R. No. L-22706, March 1969) 144 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION V. DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE CASE ITSELF A constitutional question may have been raised but the Supreme Court may not find it necessary to resolve it on the ground that the matter brought before it is a political question, or that the petitioner was estopped from impugning the constitutionality of the law. The Supreme Court will finally act on the constitutional question before it only when there are no other available grounds which it can base its decision. In any case, the requisites of a judicial inquiry should be complied with. VI. EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE The effects will depend on whether the statute is totally or partially declared unconstitutional. VII. IF TOTALLY DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL First View - An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as though it has never been passed. Second View - An unconstitutional statute is nevertheless a statute; that is, a legislative act. Such a statute is commonly spoken of as void. The Supreme Court cannot set aside a statute as it can a municipal ordinance, it simply ignores statutes deemed unconstitutional. A similar ruling was enunciated in Shepard v. Barren (194 U.S. 553). Here, the court also refused to recognize the statute and to recognize the rights of the parties as if the statute has no existence. In ignoring the statute, the court may give its reasons, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. VIII. IF PARTIALLY DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL When a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Organic law, while another part is valid, THE VALID PORTION, IF SEPARABLE FROM THE INVALID, MAY STAND AND BE ENFORCED. When is a valid portion separable? It is separable when it can stand independently as a separate statute. In this case, it may be fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it has supposed that it could constitutionally do so. CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 145 IX. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A STATUTE WHICH IS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL? There are two (2) schools of thought on this question. 1. ORTHODOX VIEW— Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern," represents the orthodox view. Under this view, an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. This view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and provides for the validity of legislative or executive acts. For this reason, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, or the judiciary has the power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null. (Fernandez v. Cuerva, 21 SCRA 1095, 1106 [1967]) 2. THE SECOND VIEW— Under this view, the Supreme Court simply ignores statutes deemed unconstitutional. (Allisan v. Corker, 60 L.R.A. 564) It does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The orthodox view has been applied as early as the case of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, (297 U.S. 189) but this was expanded with more vigor in Fernandez v. Cuerva (21 SCRA 1095, 1106) by no less than former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando. It is in this case where this ruling was enunciated. "Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no 146 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and particularconduct, private andofficial." The orthodox view finds support in the wellsettled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null. The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a egislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox view would dny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical then than • to consider it as "azoperative fact." X. WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF1 JUDICIAL POWER TO DECLARE THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ASSAILED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTS? As a rule, our courts, particularly. our Supreme Court, have the power to declare said acts to be unconstitutional if indeed they are contrary to the Constitution. Out of respect, however, to the principle of separation of powers, our courts have shown restraint in dedaring the.ame to be totally unconstitutional, if it is still possible, for instance, to salvage the valid portions of a statute from those CHAPTER IV VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 147 which, in their assessment, should be declared illegal and unconstitutional. In this manner the will of the legislature is given effect, and the cardinal rule that the legislature intended right and justice to prevail, is given importance. In Ty v. Trampe, (250 SCRA 500) it was held that the constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. XL REQUISITES FOR DECLARATION OF PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY Declaration of partial unconstitutionality is valid only if two conditions concur, thus: That the legislature is willing to retain the valid portion even if the rest is declared illegal; and 2. That the valid portions can stand independently as a separate statute. The legislature manifests its willingness to retain the valid portions if the law itself contains a separability clause. This clause contains a proviso to the effect that if a provision in the law is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the act shall not be affected by such declaration of invalidity or unconstitutionality. But even without such clause, the remaining provisions of the law which are valid must express the legislative will independently of the void part since the court has no power to legislate. (Barrameda v. Moir, 25 Phil. 44) EXAMPLES: In Lim v. Pacquing (240 SCRA 649) Section 3 of PD No. 771 is violative of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Reason: Section 3 offends the Constitution, which demands faithful compliance with the requirement of due process, equal protection of the law, and non-impairment of contracts. 2. The Bar Flunkers bill was sustained insofar as it amended the Rules of Court prospectively but the part thereof which retroactively reduced the passing average in the bar examinations was declared unconstitutional, the same being an encroachment to functions belonging to the judiciary. CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES I. STATUTES MUST BE READ AND CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE It is basic that a statute must be read and construed in its entirety. Hence, each provision of the statute should be construed in relation to the other provisions of the statute. Parts of a statute are not to be viewed in isolation because a statute is passed and approved as a whole, and more than this, there is a precise purpose why it was enacted. It is this purpose of the statute as a whole that is subject of ascertainment. In trying to ascertain legislative intent, courts should first be guided by intrinsic aids, or those found in the law itself. There is no need to make use of extrinsic aids, or those found outside of the written language of the law, if the legislative intent could be ascertained by merely making use of intrinsic aids. (Casela v. CA, G.R. No. L-26754, October 16, 1970) These intrinsic aids are the title, preamble, the words, phrases and sentences, context, punctuations, headings and marginal notes, legislative definition, and interpretation clauses. All these must be read and construed as a whole, instead of viewing them in isolation. II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT MUST BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE OPTIMA STATULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Hence, in the construction of statutes, what is of prevailing importance is to discover the legislative intent why the law is enacted. This intent is primarily determined from the language of the statute. 148 CHAPTERV GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 149 The court's honest belief that the legislature intended to enact a law different to what it actually enacted is of no moment. Neither can the courts determine whether the statute is wise for that is not its duty. Its duty is to find out the legislative intent, and this can be done by construing the statute as a whole, by considering one part of the statute in relation to the other parts, and by harmonizing all the provisions of the statute whenever possible. It is to be presumed that the purpose of the legislature is to make every part of the statute effective. The basis of this rule is the Latin Maxim - UT R.ES MAGIS QUAM PEREAT. This means that it is not enough that a statute should be given effect as a whole but that effect should be given to each of the provisions in the statute. This rule applies to amendments because it is presumed that the legislature, in making changes in the law, finds that there is a necessity for said amendments. This is a legislative function which is beyond the domain of the courts. The cases below illustrate the principles herein discussed. New Case: LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., et al., G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013 FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal with a claim for the payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired term of the contract, damages and attorney's fees filed by Lorenzo Tangga-an against the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Universe Tankship Delaware LLC, and Carlos C. Salinas. It was alleged that Tangga-an entered into an overseas employment contract with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC. Under the contract, he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief engineer of the vessel S.S. "Kure" with US$5,000 as basic salary, vacation leave pay of US$2,500 per month, and US$700 tonnage bonus a month. On February 11, 2002, he was deployed. On or about Mar. 13, 2002, the vessel berthed at a port in Japan to discharge its cargo. 150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Thereafter, it sailed to the U.S.A. While the vessel was still at sea, the master required him and the rest of the Filipino Engineer Officers to report to his office where they were informed that they would be repatriated on account of the delay in the cargo discharging in Japan. Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorney's fees and interest. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision finding the peti- tioner to have been illegally dismissed As regards to the claim for back salaries, it ruled that he is not entitled to four months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months, inclusive of vacation leave pay, and tonnage bonus pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA modified the NLRC decision, as to monetary awards, it considered only basic monthly salary and disregarded the monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus and likewise held that the "unexpired portion of contract" for which he is entitled to back salaries should only be three months pursuant to Section 1017 of RA No. 8042. Petitioner filed a Motion for (Partial) Reconsideration, but was denied. Thus, he filed the instant Petition. ISSUE: Whether the indemnity awarded by the CA in petitioner's favor consisting only of three months basic salaries conforms with the proper interpretation of Section 10 of RA No 8042 RULING: The Supreme Court held that in resolving petitioner's monetary claims, the CA utterly misinterpreted the Court's ruling in Skippers Pacific, Inc v Skippers Maritime Services, Ltd., using it to support a view which the latter case precisely ventured to strike down. In that case, the employee was hired as the vessel's Master on a six-month employment contract, but was able to work for only two months, as he was later on illegally dismissed. The Labor CHAPTER GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 151 Arbiter, NLRC, and the CA all took the view that the complaining employee was entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract, but limited to only three months pursuant to Section 1024 of RA No. 8042. The Court did not agree and hence modified the judgment in said case. It held that, following the wording of Sec. 10 and its ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, when the illegally dismissed employee's employment contract has a term of less than one year, he shall be entitled to recovery of salaries representing the unexpired portion of his employment contract. Indeed, there was nothing even vaguely confusing in the Court's citation therein of Marsaman In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, involving Section 10 of RA No. 8042, it was held: "[The Court] cannot subscribe to the view that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Section 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the [wording] "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the [wording] "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the wellestablished rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat." (Emphasis supplied) It is not disputed that private respondent's employment contract in the instant case was for six (6) months Hence, no reason to disregard the ruling in Marsaman that private respondent should be paid his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract. Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract, 152 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package. These benefits were guaranteed to be paid on a monthly basis, and were not made contingent. Old Case: MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. DAYRIT G.R. No. 1-59154, April 3, 1990 FACTS: In a suit by the First Western Bank and Trust Company against Atlas Timber Company, et al., the trial judge rendered judgment ordering Meridian Assurance Corporation to pay First Western the sum of $21,933.38 or its equivalent in pesos at the rate of P3.9390 to a dollar, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint. Thereafter, Meridian wrote First Western offering to pay the amount of the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237. First Western rejected the offer, its view being that the rate of interest should be 12 % per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416. Meridian then filed with the trial court a motion manifesting its deposit with the court of the amount of P170,061.03 representing the principal indebtedness, the 6% interest on the principal debt at 6% per annum, and costs of the suit, praying that the deposit be allowed, that it be considered full satisfaction of the judgment, and that enforcement of the writ of execution be restrained. The trial court denied the motion stating that Central Bank Circular No. 416 had changed the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per annum. ISSUE: The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided by Article 2209 of the Civil Code; or 12% conformably with Central Bank Circular No. 416. HELD: 1. The issue has already been passed upon and resolved by the Court in two earlier cases. In one case, the Court held that CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 153 the "judgments spoken of and referred to are (only) judgments in litigation involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits." It declared that any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (PD No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Bank may not tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. 2. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended, which, as distinguished from Section 1 of the same law, appears to be the actual and operative grant of authority to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to prescribe maximum rates of interest where the parties have not stipulated thereon, in excluding mention of rates allowed in judgments, should, at the least be considered as limiting the authority thus granted only to loans or forbearances of money, etc., and to judgments involving such loans or forbearances. III. COURTS HAVE THE DUTY TO RECONCILE OR HARMONIZE THE DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE INCLUDING THE CONFLICTING PROVISIONS THEREOF Each provision in a statute is inserted for a definite reason. The one who drafted the law may have a good reason for inserting provision, which the reader may not see or appreciate. The courts therefore have the duty to reconcile or harmonize so far as practicable the various parts and provisions of a statute, including the conflicting provisions thereof, so as to make them consistent, harmonious and sensible. It is only through this that the statute will be given effect as a whole. IV. AS A RULE, THE STATUTE OF LATER DATE PREVAILS Where two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date prevails. The statute of a later date is presumed to be the latest expression of legislative will on the subject. Hence, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 should give way to the provisions of the 154 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tariff Customs Code and to HA No. 1937, which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Besides, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property that is subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. (Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966) V. GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT Special provisions prevail over the general provisions. (Black in Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 328-329) However, if it is possible to harmonize the general and special provisions, said rule shall not apply. Special provisions prevail regardless of the position it occupies in the statute, and whether it comes earlier or later than the general one. VI. A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL LAW In Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990, the mortgagor sought the nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on the ground that the mortgagee (DBP) cannot acquire by purchase the mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 1491 and paragraph 7 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given. The Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition mandated by paragraph 2 of Article 1491 in relation to Article 1409 of the Civil Code does not apply where the sale of the property was made under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Act No 3135, as amended As between a specific statute and a general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. The Civil Code (RA No. 386) is of general character, while Act No. 3135, as amended, is a special enactment and therefore the latter must prevail. CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 155 UnderAct No. 3135, as amended, a mortgagee creditor is allowed to take part in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions as any other bidder. Section 5 of Act No. 3135, as amended, creates and is designed to create an exception to the general rule that a mortgagee or trustee in a mortgage or deed of trust which contains a power of sale on default may not become the purchaser, either directly or through the agency of a third person, at a sale which he himself makes under the power. Under such exception, the title of the mortgagee creditor over the property cannot be impeached or defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own sale. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE The said rule is subject to the following exceptions: (1) The general law prevails over the special law when it treats the subject in particular and the special law refers to it in general; (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, December 17, 1976) (2) The general law prevails over the special law when the legislature intended the general enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith. (Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 43 SCRA 670) VII. PARI MATERIA RULE Under this rule, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read and construed together as if they constituted one law. (C.J.S. pp. 803-806) They shall then be construed and harmonized with the existing law. This rule is founded on the assumption that in enacting a law, the legislature has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment the new statute is deemed enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in the previous statutes that it enacted. This rule is subject to two qualifications: If two or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at different times and under different conditions and cir- 156 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION cumstances, THEIR INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR CONDITIONS PECULIAR TO EACH. (This rule is based on the Latin Maxim DISTINGUE TEMPRA ET CON- CORDABIS JURA) 2. A statute will not be construed as repealing prior act or acts on the same subject unless the new law is evidently intended to all prior laws on the matter. In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied amendment or repeal and in favor of harmonization of all laws on the subject. VIII. IN INTERPRETING REENACTED STATUTES, THE COURT WILL FOLLOW THE CONSTRUCTION WHICH SUCH STATUTE RECEIVED WHEN PREVIOUSLY IN FORCE A reenacted statute is a statute, which reenacts a previous statute. In reenacting the provisions of a previous statute, it is presumed that the legislature has the intention of adopting the construction and the language of the previous act. Hence, when a provision in the City Charter of Manila regarding prosecution of crimes by the City Fiscal was incorporated in the charter of the City of Bacolod, it was ruled that the framers of the charter of the City of Bacolod has reproduced the provision of the City Charter of Manila with the intention of adopting also its settled interpretation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of the City Charter of Manila to the effect that ("the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and municipal courts of the City of Manila. He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of ordinances and prepare the necessary information or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused, and discharge all other duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals"), means that criminal complaints filed by offended parties directly with the courts without the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila cannot legally be done. This is the same interpretation that was applied with respect to a criminal complaint filed by an offended party directly in the City Court of Bacolod City. (Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228) CHAPTER V GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 157 IX. IN THE CASE OF ADOPTED STATUTE, THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE FROM WHICH IT IS ADOPTED SHOULD BE CONSIDERED Adopted statutes are those which are patterned after, or copied from the statute of another country. For purposes of construing an adopted statute, our courts will necessarily be guided by the interpretation and construction of the courts of the country from which such statute is taken. The due process clause and the equal protection clause, which are still found in our Constitution, are of American origin. It is not strange that in numerous cases, our courts were guided by American doctrines and principles, which are applicable, and by interpretations that were made in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), is an example. In this case, the Supreme Court made reference to decisions of the United States Supreme Court when it pronounced that the guarantee in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution protects liberty. The pertinent portion of the decision is as follows: "Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes that right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be drawned into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any vocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief 158 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right to locomotion." Our law on corporation and insolvency is of American origin. Hence, American decisions may, if applicable, be cited in cases brought to our courts for decision. X. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN A COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE AND A STATUTORY PROVISION, THE LATTER PREVAILS In Alvendia v. Intermediate Court, G.R. No. L-72138 and Bonamy v. Justice Paras, G.R. No. 72138, January 20, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that equity applies only in the absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. The Supreme Court denied the plea of Alvendia that equity be applied in his favor and ruled that: "The Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground for reopening the case and making the payment of the judgment in cash possible, where they had all the opportunity to make such payments on four occasions but failed. These are: (1) from the time they got the building and construction materials worth P107,461.50 from the petitioner (from June 26 to August 12, 1975) up to the time they agreed to a compromise agreement on January 6, 1978; (2) from the compromise judgment to the time execution was ordered by the respondent court (Order dated December 6, 1979); (3) from the Execution Order to the Execution Sale (on January 15, 1981); and (4) from the execution sale up to the end of the redemption period, finally ending in the final deed of sale. There may be a moral obligation but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action for reconveyance must fail." On the point that statutory law prevails as against equity, the Supreme Court said: "Equity is justice outside legality. It applies only in the absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. "Equity follows the law" but where the law gives a particular remedy and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would CHAPTER GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 159 be improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control against any well-settled rule of law or public policy." In Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation (G.R. No. L-82670, September 15, 1989), the Supreme Court laid down this ruling: "Principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law specifically applicable to a case. The common law principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the New Civil Code, specifically Article 559 Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction" XI. IMPLIED REPEALS ARE NOT LEGALLY PRESUMED IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE SHOWING OF SUCH INTENTIONS BATANGAS CATV, INC v THE COURT OF APPEALS, et at., G R No 138810, September 29, 2004 In the resolution of this case, the Supreme Court cited the historical background regarding NTC's regulatory power over the CATV industry. FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a Community Antenna Television (CATV) system in Batangas City, which provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod." Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sanggumang Panlungsod. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 160 Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. After trial, the trial court enjoined the respondents from canceling petitioner's permit to operate a Cable CATV system in the City of Batangas. Upon respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's decision; hence, this petition. ISSUE: Is Executive Order No. 205 impliedly repealed by RA No. 7160? HELD: At any rate, [the Court] find[s] no basis to conclude that RA No. 7160 repealed Executive Order No. 205, either expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that RA No. 7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not include Executive Order No. 205. Neither is there an indication that Executive Order No. 205 was impliedily repealed by RA No. 7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions. CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES SPECIFIC STATUTES There are several kinds of statutes and each statute has its own rules of construction. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE FOLLOWING STATUTES I. AS TO NATURE 1. Penal statutes 2. Remedial statutes 3. Substantive statutes 4. Labor statutes 5. Tax statutes II. AS TO APPLICATION 1. Mandatory 2. Directory III. AS TO PERFORMANCE 1. Permanent 2. Temporary IV. ASTOSCOPE 1. General 2. Special 3. Local V. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS 1. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive 161 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 162 2. A statute could either be a repealing or amendatory act 3. A statute could either be a reference statute or a declaratory statute VI. OTHER STATUTES CONSTRUCTION OF EACH STATUTE I PENAL STATUTES Those, which impose punishment for an offense, committed against the State. Statutes, which command or prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation, are considered as penal statutes. HOW ARE PENAL STATUTES INTERPRETED? Penal statutes are interpreted against the State and liberally in favor of the accused (People v Purisima, G R Nos L 42050 66, 46229 32 46313 16 and L 46997, November 20 1978) This rule should not, however, be unreasonably applied as to defeat the true intent and meaning of the enactment found in the language actually used (People v Padilla and Von Arend 71 Phil 261) The language of a penal statute cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. Only those persons, offenses and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the operation of the statute II. REMEDIAL STATUTES Those designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. (In Re: School Dist. No. 6, etc. 278, N. W, p. 792) HOW ARE REMEDIAL STATUTES CONSTRUED? Remedial statutes should be liberally construed because they were enacted by the legislature precisely to improve the law and so that they will be in harmony with new ideas and conceptions of justice and proper conduct of men (Crawford Stat Const p 494) III. SUBSTANTIVE STATUTES These are laws, which establish rights and duties. (Bstos u. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640) CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 163 What the law grants, the court cannot deny. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67) Therefore, the first duty of the judge is to apply the law, whether it is just or unjust, provided that the law is clear and there is no doubt. In case of doubt, the judge should presume that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (Article 10, New Civil Code) Substantive laws create rights and duties. When these rights and duties are therefore stated in clear and categorical language, there is no more room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. (Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relation Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 30, 1990) Even equity cannot be set up against clear provisions of law based on public policy. Thus, a sale of a homestead within 5-year prohibitory period is void ab initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity through the passage of time. (Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46955, February 27, 1989) Equitable reasons will not control against any well-settled rule of law or public policy. (Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-72138; Bonamy v. Justice Paras, G.R. L-72373, January 22, 1990) In Llamado v. Court of Appeals (G.R. L-84850, June 29, 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in any way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. (Underscoring Supplied) 1V. LABOR STATUTES Those laws that govern the rights and obligations of employers and employees, providing as well for the rules by which such rights and obligations may be enforced. HOW ARE LABOR LAWS INTERPRETED? Article IV of the New Labor Code answers this question: It says: "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 164 the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of Labor." (Underscoring supplied) V. TAX STATUTES Those, which impose rules and regulations, related to taxation or to creation of particular sources of revenue such as taxes, fees, and charges that are needed for the support of government and for all public needs. In case of doubt, statutes levying taxes and duties are to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, et al., G.R. No. L-30644, 9 March 87, Second Division, Paras, J.) HOW ARE TAX STATUTES INTERPRETED? They are construed strictly against the taxing power and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. (In Re: Arbuckle's Estate, 18, A. 758) This is because tax laws seek to impose burdens upon persons and property. The following rules of construction apply to tax laws: a. The real purpose of the legislature, if that purpose is discernible from its statute, will prevail over the literal import of the words used. (3 Sutherland, Stat. Const. p. 42) b. The spirit, rather than the letter of an ordinance, determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its word and more to the context, subject matter, consequence and effect. (Manila Race Horse Owner's Assn. v. De La Fuente, G.R. No. L-2947, January 11, 1951) C. The history of the statute should be considered as an aid in the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature. (Greenfield v. Meer, CA G.R. No. 156, September 27, 1846) d. However, tax exemptions, are construed strictly against taxpayers and in favor of the taxing power. Moreover, exemptions cannot be claimed unless they are expressly CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 165 provided for in the law. (Collector v. Manila Jockey Club, 98 Phil. 670) VI. MANDATORY STATUTES Those which contain words of command or of prohibition, and non-compliance with the same renders the proceedings to which it relates illegal and void. VII. DIRECTORY STATUTES Those which are permissible or discretionary in nature and merely outline the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained. In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, intention of the legislature must be ascertained. The determination of this intention must not depend on the statute itself. However, the following tests, while not conclusive or controlling, have often been used to determine the mandatory or directory nature of statutes and statutory provisions: 1. TERMINOLOGY - The words or phrases regarded as making a provision mandatory include "shall" and "must, "while the word "may" and the phrase "it is lawful" are usually regarded as permissive or directory. 2. MATERIALITY OF THE PROVISIONS - Statutory provisions which relate to matters of substance or which affect substantial rights, and are the very essence of the thing required to be done, are regarded as mandatory. Provisions which are not material or which do not affect any substantial right, and do not relate to the essence of the thing to be done, so that compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, are considered to be directory. 3. CONSEQUENCES —A statutory provision is mandatory where a failure of performance will result to the injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons. If such failure or performance will not result to the injury or prejudice of the substantial rights of interested persons, then the provisions is generally regarded merely as directory. 166 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 4. PENALTY - It is a general rule of construction that where a legislative provision is accompanied by a penalty for a failure to observe it, the provision is mandatory. Otherwise, it is directory. As already stated, the said tests are not conclusive or controlling. Hence, while the word "shall" is a word of command and generally considered as mandatory, it shall be considered as permissive when it can be gathered from the context as well as from the language of the statute that such is the apparent intention of the legislature. The word "may" may, at times, be construed as "shall" if the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it vests a public body or office with power and authority to take such action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals. Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines is an example of a mandatory provision. It provides as follows: "Article 3. Declaration of Basic Policy. - The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employ ment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work." Section 28, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is an example of a directory provision. It provides as follows: "x x x (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." In Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608, the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase 'x x x shall subject to avaihbiity of funds discretionary meaning. 3r x x" implieg nota m9ndtory, but n CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 167 On this basis, the second sentence in Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, implies that although the word "shall" is used, it is directory. It provides as follows: "Section 4. The state shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners The State shall further provide incentives of voluntary land sharing" (Underlining Supplied) On the other hand, the use of negative or prohibitory words in a statute is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. The words "shall not," "cannot," or "ought not" indicate positive prohibition. Examples: Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution "Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected." Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution "Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives, a registered voter 168 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election." Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution "Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." VIII. PERMANENT STATUTE It is a statute whose operation is not limited to a particular period of time but which continues in force until it is duly altered or repealed. Example: New Labor Code IX. TEMPORARY STATUTE It is a statute whose life or duration is fixed for a specified period of time at the moment of its enactment, and continues in force, unless sooner repealed, until the expiration of the time fixed for its duration. Example: PD No. 851 granting 13th Month Pay It is a statute which relates to persons, entities, or things as a class or operates equally or alike upon all of a class, omitting no persons, entity, or thing belonging to a class. Example: The Family Code M. SPECIAL STATUTE It is a statute, which relates to particular persons, entities or things of a class. Example: Child and Youth Welfare Law XII. LOCAL STATUTE It is a statute whose operation is confined within territorial limits other than that of the whole state, or applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole, or to property and persons of a limited portion of the state, or is directed CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 169 to a specific locality or spot, as distinguished from a law which operates throughout the state. Example: Law granting autonomy in Southern Philippines XIII. OTHER STATUTES 1. STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS - Price control laws are in derogation of common or general rights. They are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope of purpose. 2. STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILEGES - Those who invoke a special privilege granted by a statute must comply strictly with its provisions. In the case therefore of a legislative franchise granted to a firm to operate electric light and power, on condition that it should start operation within a specified period, the failure of said firm to start operation within the specified period is a ground for forfeiture of the franchise. 3. NATURALIZATION LAWS - These are strictly construed against the applicant because the right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is merely a statutory right. The desire of an applicant to become a naturalized citizen will still require the filing of his formal petition and he has still to prove by satisfactory evidence that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified by law. In case of doubt, the doubt is resolved against the applicant (Cu v. Republic, 115 Phil. 600). 4. STATUTES IMPOSING TAXES AND CUSTOM DUTIES - Generally they are construed strictly against the taxing power and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. (In Re: Arbuckle's Estate, 188 A. 758) The reason for this is because tax laws impose burdens on the public. The scope of tax laws cannot be enlarged as to include matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt, they are construed most strongly against the government (Goulds v. Gould, 62 L. ed. p. 211). 5. STATUTE AUTHORIZING SUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT - A statute whereby the state gives its consent to be sued is strictly construed, and the waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (Equitable Ins. & Casualty Co., 170 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Inc. v. Smith, Bell & Co. [Phil.], Inc., G.R. No. L-24383, August 26, 1967) To justify a suit against the state or any of its agencies, the statute conferring the right to maintain the action must be plain and positive, and its meaning should not be left to doubt (Compania General de Tabacco de Filipinas v Government 45 Phil 663) Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution declares that the State may not be sued without its consent. When this consent therefore is given, the State can be sued but this does not necessarily mean that it concedes to liability. This only means that the one bringing the suit is merely given the opportunity to prove that the State is liable. The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. The first may be given through a general or special law. The second is given when the state itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. Here, the state devolves into the level of an ordinary citizen. 6 STATUTES PRESCRIBING LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS - They are strictly construed against the national government and liberally in favor of the local government units. Any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power will be resolved in favor of the local government The reason for this is that local government units are now granted the power to create its own sources of revenue. Under the 1973 Constitution, the local government units have no inherent power of taxation 7 STATUTE IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAX - They are liberally construed in favor of the government and strictly observed and interpreted against the taxpayer The reason is obvious, this facilitates the collection of taxes and penalties and tax evasions will be avoided 8 ELECTION LAWS - They should be construed liberally to give effect to the expressed will of the electorate Technicalities should not be allowed to prevail against the true will of the people 9. ADOPTION STATUTES - They are liberally construed in favor of the child to be adopted in order to promote the CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 171 noble objectives of the law. Adoption is not merely an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows a child with a legitimate status. (Prasnick v. Republic, 98 Phil. 665) They also supply solace to those who have no children or to those who have lost them, so that the void, which exists in a childless home, may be filled (Yfkigo u. Republic, 93 Phil. 244). 10. AMNESTY PROCLAMATIONS - They should be construed liberally in favor of those who are given amnesty. The reason for this is to encourage those who have not yet applied for amnesty to return to the fold of the law and have normal lives once again. 11. VETERAN AND PENSION LAWS - They should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by such law in order to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law. 12. GENERAL WELFARE LEGISLATIONS - They are construed liberally in favor of those intended to be benefited. This construction is more in consonance with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice. Examples: Labor Code of the Philippines, Social Security Law, and Agrarian Reform Law 13. PROBATION LAW - It should be liberally construed to achieve its objective, which is to give another chance to first offenders to go back to normal life. 14. LAWS ON ATTACHMENT - They are liberally construed in order to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. 15. RULES OF COURT - Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows: "Section 6. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 16. STATUTES PRESCRIBING QUALIFICATIONS FOR AN OFFICE - Statutes prescribing the qualifications of persons to a public office is, as a rule, regarded as 172 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION mandatory. This means that a person, who is not eligible or qualified at the time that he assumed office, may be ousted from office at anytime upon discovery that he is not indeed qualified and eligible. 17. ELECTION LAWS ON QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION - These are considered mandatory even after the elections. Hence, a candidate who filed his certificate of candidacy beyond the period required by law is disqualified to run for office, as his certificate is void. This is true even if the disqualified candidate wins the election. He still remains unqualified for his election and does not validate his certificate of candidacy (Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102). XIV. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS I. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive PROSPECTIVE STATUTE - It is one which operates upon or regulates acts or transactions taking place after it takes effect. As a rule, laws operate prospectively, not retroactively, except in the following cases: (a) If the law itself provides that it will be retroactive (Article 4, New Civil Code); (b) If the law is remedial in nature; (c) If the law is penal in nature provided it is favorable to the accused or the convict, and that the accused or convict is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22, Revised Penal Code); (d) If the law is curative; and (e) If the law is of an emergency nature and authorized by the police power of the government. Article 4 of the New Civil Code provides as follows: "Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." In general, laws are prospective, not retroactive, and no court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. In other words, statutes are to be construed as having only CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 173 prospective operation, unless the legislature intends that they will have retroactive effect. This could either be made expressly in the law itself or it could be implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws (Montilla v. Agustinia Corp., 24 Phil. 229). RETROACTIVE STATUTE - It is one which creates a new obligation, one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already passed (Castro v. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210). As mentioned earlier, there are times when laws are precisely made retroactive. When the law itself provides that they shall apply retroactively, or when the intention to make the law retroactive is implied from the words used, the problem that may arise is whether the said law is violative or not of the constitutional provisions on impairment of obligation and contract, ex post facto law, and bill of attainder, thus: "Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." (Article III, 1987 Constitution) "Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted." (Article III, 1987 Constitution) A good example of a provision, which expressly provides for the retroactive effect of the law, is Article 256 of the Family Code to wit: "Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." The retroactive effect of the Family Code, however, is qualified by the proviso, thus: "x x x insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws" should be respected. II. A statute could either be a repealing act or an amendatory act. REPEALING ACT - It is one which revokes or terminates another statute, either by express language or by implication. (Crawford, Statutory Constitution, p. 110) 174 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REPEAL Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones (Article 7, New Civil Code) and laws are repealed either expressly or impliedly. However, implied repeals are not looked upon with favor. (U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208) Hence, if both statutes can stand together, there is no repeal. (Lechoco v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138) The Civil Code repeals the Old Civil Code of 1889. The Family Code has expressly repealed Title III on marriage; Title IV on legal separation; Title V on rights and obligations between husband and wife; title VI on property relations between husband and wife; Title VII on the family; Title VIII on paternity and filiation; Title IX on support; Title XI on parental authority, and Title XV on emancipation and age of majority. Article 254 of the Family Code provides as follows: "Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XV of Book 1 Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." This article specifies the provisions of the Civil Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code that were expressly repealed by the Family Code. The closing sentence in Article 254 which states "x x x all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed," indicates that the repeal referred to is merely an implied repeal. THE REPEAL OF A STATUTE IS EITHER TOTAL OR PARTIAL A statute, which is totally repealed, is rendered revoked completely. When the repeal, however, is partial, the portion or portions not affected by the repeal continue to exist. Repeal is a question of intent. Express repeal of a statute or any of its provisions is accomplished by a direct and express provision or declaration in a subsequent statute so there will be no doubt as to CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 175 what statute is intended. In this case, the courts should respect the specific intent of the legislature to repeal what it has so specified. Article 254 of the Family Code specifically enumerates the provisions of the Civil Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code that were repealed by the Family Code Repeals by implication can be done in two ways (1) By covering the whole subject matter so that it is intended as a substitute for the earlier statute, and (2) By containing provisions which are inconsistent and irreconcilable with the earlier statute. The courts are slow to hold that a statute has repealed another by implication If the courts cannot avoid doing so through the use of a fair and reasonable construction, they will not make adjudication that a statute has repealed another by implication. This is in accordance with the established principle that repeals and amendments by implications are not favored (Quisimbing v Lachica G B No L-14683, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 182) The second sentence in Article 254 of the Family Code which says "x x x and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed," gives rise to this question Will that be considered a repeal? If so, what is it? It is not an express repeal, unlike the first sentence of Article 254 which states specifically the provisions, and the titles, which are repealed It is merely an implied repeal because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. AMENDATORY ACT - It makes an addition to the original laws or it operates to change it An amendment of a statute is effected through the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of the statute. The amendment could either be express or implied. There is an express amendment when the amendatory act specified the provisions of a statute that are amended. There is an implied amendment where a part of a.prior statute embracing the same subject has become inconsistent with the new provisions as amended How should the amendment be construed? 1. A statute and its amendment should be construed in its entirety. The amendment becomes part of the original statute as if it had always been contained therein; 176 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2. Provisions of the original act which are not affected by the amendment shall remain in force; 3. The amendment made indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning. The court therefore give effect to such intent; 4. As a rule, the amendatory act operates prospectively unless otherwise provided or if it could be implied from the language used that the legislature intends to give it a retroactive effect. Even in the latter case, however, the amendment cannot be construed retroactively if doing so will impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts (People v. Buttler, 120 SCRA 281). III. A Statute could either be a reference statute, a supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an adopted statute. REFERENCE STATUTE - It is a statute, which refers to other statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of legislation. A reference statute should be construed as to harmonize with, and, give effect to, the adopted statute. This statute is often used to avoid unnecessary repetitions. By simply making reference to a particular provision in an existing law and without the need of introducing another law, the rule, provision or term/s intended to be applied is stated in the reference statute. Hence, the provision which states that the terms legal or regular Holiday and Special Holiday, as used in Article 94 of the Labor Code shall now be referred to as a regular Holiday and Special day, respectively, indicates that this is a reference statute. SUPPLEMENTAL STATUTES - They are intended to supply deficiencies in an existing statutes and to add to, complete, or extend the statute without changing or modifying its original text. The original statute and the supplemental act should be construed together in its entirety. REENACTED STATUTES - They reenact provisions of an earlier statute. The provisions in the earlier statute are reproduced in the same words or substantially the same words. The courts will therefore follow the construction, which the adopted statute previously received. CHAPTER VI RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES 177 ADOPTED STATUTES - They are statutes patterned after, or copied from a statute of a foreign country. The construction given to them by the courts of the country from which they were taken will be considered by the courts. Such construction, however, will not be conclusive to our courts. Our laws on voluntary and involuntary insolvency is in great part a copy of the Insolvency Act of California, enacted in 1895, which, in turn, was based upon the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1867 though it contains a few provisions from the American Bankruptcy Law of 1638 (Sun Life Assurance Co. u. Ingersoll, 42 Phil. 81). CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE I. IMPORTANCE OF LATIN MAXIMS Latin maxims are used not only in interpreting statutes. They are also used by judges and justices in their decisions to add elegance to their language and to give emphasis to the legal points therein discussed. This is so because Roman legal literature is noted for originality and the style of Roman jurists is simple, clear, brief and precise. Likewise, our New Civil Code is Roman in origin. Modern laws and concepts of persons and family relations, parental authority, marriage, divorce, concubinage, legitimation, emancipation, adoption, guardianship, property, avulsion, alluvion, traditio brevi manu, traditio longa manu, constitutum possessorium, obligations and contracts, nominate and innominate contracts, sale, lease, agency, pledge, deposits, wills and successions, quasi-delicts, quasicontracts, negotiorum gestio, solutio indebiti and many others are Roman in origin. Notwithstanding the modifications and the enormous improvements that have been made, the Philippines and its citizens cannot remove the great influence that Roman law still exerts in our day to day life, whether it is in the city or in the remote barrio. The same thing is true to the rest of the world affected by the Roman legal system. Roman law is of enormous value to modern nations. It is at hand, ready for use and able to shed copious light in the solution of the numerous complex problems which confront the modern civilized world. (Sherman, Section 6) 178 CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 179 II. LATIN MAXIMS APPLICABLE TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT LAWS SHOULD BE PROSPECTIVE, NOT RETROACTIVE Prospicit, Lex Respicit Non The law looks forward, not backward. Lex de Futuro. Judex de Praterio The law provides for the future, the judge for the past. This principle is still found in Article 4 of our New Civil Code, which provides as follows: "Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." The general rule has not changed. In this jurisdiction, all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. Besides the exceptions to this rule, the Supreme Court in MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-86675, December 19, 1989), enunciated the ruling that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage It is in that sense and to that extent that procedural laws are retrospective. In said case, the plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of the court" or "to be proven during the trial." Invoking the decision of the Supreme Court in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, (149 SCRA 562) the 180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it. Plaintiff argued that since the decision in the Manchester case had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance: the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled as follows: (1) Plaintiffs argument regarding the need for publication of the Manchester's ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be applied to other cases is not well taken; (2) The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. V. Asuncion, et al., (G.R. No. L-78993738, February 13, 1989), a case that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated; (3) The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988 or ten months after Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence, Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that the court may allow payment of the proper filing fees "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the trial court, and ordered the complaint reinstated and directed the trial court to allow plaintiff to amend the complaint by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants and to pay the proper filing fees therefor as computed by the clerk of court, in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion. B. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, WHAT THE COURTS SHOULD DO IS TO APPLY IT, NOT TO INTERPRET IT Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Optima Statuti Interpretatix The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Est Insum Statutum CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 181 This principle has been used and applied in a long line of cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, it is well-established in this jurisdiction that where the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it (Go Ka Toc & Sons Co. v. Rice & Corn Board, G. R. No. L-23607, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 147). The old ruling in People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164, is still unchanged. The Supreme Court said: "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demoiistrated that applicationi is impossible or inadequate with them. It is not within the power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision." The ruling in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-84850, June 29, 1989, although basically the same as the ruling in People v. Mapa, is more articulate. The Supreme Court said that "the words to be given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion." C. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS NOT THE LETTER OF THE LAW THAT KILLETH, IT IS THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW THAT GWETH LIFE Ratio Legis Est Anima The reason of the law is its soul. Ratio Legis Interpretation according to spirit Cessante Ratione Cesat Ipsa When the reason for the law Lex ceases, the law ceases also to exist. From time to time, this question has been asked: What if the letter of the law conflicts with its spirit, which prevails? There are two schools of thought on this matter. In the case of People v. Sales, et al., G.R. No. L- 66469, July 29, 1986, Justice 182 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Isagani Cruz articulated his thoughts in this manner: "A too literal reading of the law is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the 'letter that killeth but in the spirit that giveth life,' which is not really that evanescent or elusive. Judges must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover by their own lights the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That they may properly apply it according to its ends, they need and must use not only learning but also vision." The thinking of Justice Isagani Cruz is more in line with Article 10 of the New Civil Code which says: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This is also the gist of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the old cases of Torres v. Limhap, 56 Phil. 141; De Castro v. Olondriz and Escudero, 50 Phil. 725; and in the celebrated case of Dominador Aytona v. Andres Castillo, et al., G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962. Former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino, on the other hand, finds it risky to rely on the "so-called spirit of the law". He said: "It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and about which we do not know very much." (Villanueva v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985) The author thinks that it is safer to be guided by the ruling in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, G.R. No. L-44717, August 28, 1985. In the said case, this ruling was pronounced. "If the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, then read the law to mean exactly what it says. If not, look for the intention of the legislature." D. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THOSE ENUMERATED ARE DEEMED EXCLUDED Expresio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - Express mention is implied exclusion. This principle has also been used and applied in a litany of cases. The rule has not changed. The enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed, as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. In Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48468, November 22, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the maxim "expresio unius est CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 183 exclusio alterius" is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. E. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT SPECIAL PROVISIONS PREVAIL OVER GENERAL PROVISIONS Generalia specialibus non derogant - A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169202, March 5,2010 FACTS: Maria Virginia Remo is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R Rallonza, whose Philippine passport was then expiring on Octo ber 27, 2000 Prior to its expiry, she applied for renewal with the DFA and requested to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport while her marriage still subsists 4 The DFA denied the request. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. She then filed an appeal with the Office of the President which the latter dismissed and ruled that Sec 5(d) of RA No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of nullity of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office of the President denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition was denied. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition ISSUE Whether petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 184 HELD: The petition lacks merit. Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. The law governing passport issuance is RA No. 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Sec. 5(d), which states: "Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. - No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x (d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x" Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239. Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume using her maiden name in the replacement passport. Even assuming RA No. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA No. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, thus: CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 185 "[l]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage." Old Case: In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, G.R. No. L-84811, August 29, 1989, it was held that B.P. Big. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act) is the general law, and PD No. 1344 (Decree empowering the Na tional Housing Authority to issue writs of executions in the enforcement of its decisions under PD No. 957 is the special law. The conflict sought to be resolved in that case is this: B.P. Big. 129 was promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978. In case of conflict between the two, which prevails? It was held that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that "the fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remarking an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case." The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act, and where the general law is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessarily implication. In Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-80593, December 18,1989, it was held that whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will. Thus, the Supreme Court uphold the preference accorded to the employees in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The phrase "any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding" indicates that such preference shall prevail despite the order set forth in Articles 2241 and 2245 of the Civil Code. No exceptions 186 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION were provided under said articles. Furthermore, the labor code was signed into law decades after the Civil Code. F. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHILE THE LAW MAY BE HARD, IT IS THE LAW THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED Dura Lex Sed Lex - The law may be harsh but it is still the law. When the law is clearly worded there is no room for interpretation. It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor. It is not for the courts to decide that the law is unwise. The duty of the courts is apply the law, whether it is wise or unwise. (Gonzales u Gonzales 58 Phil 67 U S v Allan 2 Phil 630) ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G R No 192330, November 14, 2012 FACTS The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSW DO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated .a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction. When construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy a, Baran gay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families This worried Lolita Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio,. an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom which could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries Garcia and Pohmo explained the situation to Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, and sought his approval. Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth 113,396.00 to CSAP. He instructed Garcia and Pohmo, however, to consult the accounting CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 187 department regarding the matter. Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountants Office, signed the withdrawal slip on the view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWIO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules. Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed a complaint against Ysidoro for technical malversation, when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beuef1ciarie. The Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandliganbayan held that he applied public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. The Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration. He appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court. ISSUE: Whether good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation. HELD: The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime. But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punibhes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public 188 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because a positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The Law and th[e] Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine. G. ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT WITHOUT INTENT, THERE CAN BE NO CRIME Cogitationis Poenam Nemo Emeret No man may be punished for his thought. Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. Actus Me Invito Factus Non Est Meus Actus An act done by me against my will is not my act. These principles are still applicable. Under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the first element of a felony must be that the act or omission is voluntary. Hence, if the alleged criminal act is committed by an insane person, he is not criminally liable but he may be civilly liable. (Article 12, Revised Penal Code) H. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE BUT IGNORANCE OF FACT MAY BE AN EXCUSE Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excusat Ignorance of the law excuses no one. Ignorantia Facto Excusat Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is an excuse. CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 189 The first maxim is still found in Article 3 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows: "Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith." Article 3 applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; U.S. v. Allan, 2 Phil. 630) and whether substantive or remedial. (Article 12, Revised Penal Code) The maxim, however, does not apply to the following: 1. Ignorance of foreign law is not ignorance of the law but merely an ignorance of fact; 2. In Tuvera v. Tafiada, a law should first be published before it becomes effective. I. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distiguere Debemos - Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. The constitutional guarantee of due process is granted to every Filipino, rich or poor, learned or ignorant, and regardless of his religious belief or political persuasion. Article III, Section 1 of the constitution provides as follows: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." III. LATIN MAXIMS AND PHRASES RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION MENS LEGISLATORES The courts should give the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. In Prasnick v. Republic (98 Phil. 665), the petitioner likes to adopt his own acknowledged natural children. He has no other children except the said acknowledged natural children. The said petition was opposed on the ground that if a person has at least one child, legitimate or illegitimate, he can no longer adopt, and that only an unacknowledged natural child may be adopted. The court held that the opposition is without merit and applied Article 338 of the New Civil Code as an exception to Article 335 190 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION saying that this will be more in keeping with the trend that adoption is not merely an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied the contention that there "should be no adoption of an acknowledged natural child because there is already a relationship of paternity and filiation," and ruled that in adopting his own acknowledged natural child, the father is precisely raising such child to the category of a legitimate child. (The law on adoption is now governed by Article 183 of the Family Code) REDDENDO SING ULA SING ULIS Each word or phrase or clause must be referred to their proper connection in order to give it proper force and effect, rendering none of them useless or superfluous. Literally, the maxim means, "referring each to each." A good example is the wording of Article 31 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which reads as follows: "Article 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call." The phrase "may also be solemnized by the ship captain" refers to the phrase "while the ship is at sea." The phrase "or the plane is in flight" refers to the "airplane pilot." The more appropriate connection, however, would be "may also be solemnized" by the airplane pilot "while the plane is in flight." The phrase "but also during stopovers at ports of call" refers to the ship captain and airplane pilot. CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABBENDUS EST Literally, this means a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted. The cassus omissus principle means that if a person, object or thing is omitted from an enumeration in the statute, it must be held to have been intentionally omitted. As a rule, therefore, the court cannot insert in a statute that which has been omitted. The court can only do so if it is necessary CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEW MEANING AND IMPORTANCE 191 to obviate repugnancy or inconsistency, or where the omission was made through clerical error, accident or inadvertence, or where it is necessary to complete the sense of the statute. Hence, under Article 7 of the Family Code, a mayor is no longer authorized to solemnize marriage he being no longer included in the enumeration of those who may solemnize marriage. Under Article 56 of the New Civil Code, he is one of those enumerated as one who may solemnize marriage. The omission is therefore intentional. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Where a particular word or phrase in a statute is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. Example: Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates those that are considered as property of public dominion. It provides as follows: "Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." A question arises: Is a riverbank a property of public dominion? The Supreme Court ruled that it is a property of public dominion (Hilario v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, April 27,1967) because the bed of a river is of public dominion, and the bank being a part of the bed, is also a part of public dominion. The enumeration shows that the words "banks" and "rivers" were mentioned separately. It did not mention "river banks," and yet it was ruled that river banks are of public dominion. The interpretation is influenced apparently by the company of words enumerated, which the law considers as properties of public dominion. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 192 EJUSDEM GENERIS When general words follow the designation of particular things, or classes of persons or subjects, the general words will usually be construed to include only those persons or things of the same class or general nature as those specifically enumerated. Section 185 of the implementing rules and regulations of the Local Government Code enumerates the property that shall be exempt from distraint and levy, attachment or execution. It provides as follows: "Section 185. Personal Property Exempt from Distraint or Levy. - The following property shall be exempt from distraint and the levy, attachment or execution thereof for delinquency in the payment of any local tax, fee, or charge, including related surcharges and interests; a) Tools and implements necessarily used by the delinquent taxpayer in his trade or employment; b) One (1) horse, cow, carabao, or other beast of burden, such as the delinquent taxpayer may select, and necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation; c) His necessary clothing, and that of all his family; d) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping and used for that purpose by the delinquent taxpayer, such as he may select, of a value not exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); e) Provisions, including crops, actually provided for individual or family use sufficient for four (4) months; f) The professional libraries of doctors, engineers, lawyers and judges; g) One (1) fishing boat and net, not exceeding the total value of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), by the lawful use of which a fisherman earns his livelihood; and h) Any material or article forming part of a house or improvement of any real property." Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the last para- graph (h) "Any material or article forming part of a house CHAPTER VII LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE or improvement of any real property," necessarily apply to any material or article similar to those specifically enumerated for as long as they form part of the house. This may include therefore a wall clock, a painting, a Singer sewing machine used by the wife in her home for barong business, but this will not include the guns, bullets, and ammunitions found in the house. 193 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE I. HOW ARE WORDS AND PHRASES IN A STATUTE INTERPRETED? It depends. If the words and phrases used are defined in the statute itself, such definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense If there is no such definition, the words or phrases in the statute should be interpreted in accordance with its well-accepted meaning and they should be construed in the light of the context of the whole statute. II. IS THE STATUTORY DEFINITION CONCLUSIVE TO THE COURTS A statutory definition is not necessarily conclusive to the courts in the following cases: 1.) When such definition creates obvious incongruities; 2.) When it contravenes the major purpose of the statute; and 3.) When it becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis. In such cases, the words will be given a meaning that will serve the purpose of the law, or which will make the law logical and free from incongruities. III. RULES THAT GOVERN THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS 1.) When a word used in a statute has a general meaning; 2.) When the word used has a technical meaning; 194 195 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE 3.) When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the legislative intent; and 4.) When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute. IV. WHEN THE WORD USED IN A STATUTE HAS A GENERAL MEANING The general word should not be given a restricted meaning unless it is otherwise indicated. This is founded on the Latin Maxim - GENERALIA VERBA which means that what SUN GENERALITER INTELLIGENCIA, is generally mentioned shall be generally understood. EXAMPLES: The word "hospital" is known to the general public as a place where sick persons are treated or confined either for medical treatment, medical examination or operation. In PD No. 1519, otherwise known as the New Medical Care Law, the word "hospital" is defined as "any medical facility, government or private, accredited in accordance with rules and regulations by the commission." (The word "commission" in PD No. 1519 is understood to be the Philippine Medical Commission) The word "medical practitioner" is understood to be a doctor who is engaged in the general practice of medicine. Under said PD No. 1519, however, the word "medical practitioner" is defined as any doctor of medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines who is a member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association and accredited in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission." And yet, PD No. 1519, Section 4(a) thereof, defines that the word "individual" applies only to cases involving natural persons.. (Vda. De Borrorneo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 207) V. WHEN THE WORD USED HAS A TECHNICAL MEANING When the words or phrase used have a technical meaning, they are considered to have been used in their technical sense. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 196 EXAMPLES: The word "marriage" has a very special meaning and technical meaning under Article 1 of the Family Code of the Philippines which provides as follows: "Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of perma- nent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code" The term "negotiable instrument" has a technical meaning under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It provides as follows: "Section 1. Form of negotiable instrument. - An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer; b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money; c) Must be payable on demand or at fixed or determinable future time; d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty." MACASAET v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989 FACTS: Under a contract for Project Design and Management Services for the Development of the Proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club, petitioner was to be entitled to seven (7%) percent of the "actual construction cost." Also, periodic payments were to be based 197 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE on a "reasonable estimated construction cost." Finally, the contract provides that the balance of the professional fee was to be computed on the basis of "the final actual project cost." Pursuant to the schedule of payments, the Philippine Tourism Authority made periodic payments of the stipulated professional fees to petitioner. And, upon completion of the project, the PTA paid petitioners what it perceived to be the balance of the latter's professional fees. It turned out, however, that after the project was completed, PTA paid Supra Construction Company, the main contractor, the additional sum of P3,148,198.26 representing the escalation cost of the contract price due to the increase in the price of construction materials. Upon learning of the price escalation, petitioner requested payment of P219,301.47 additional professional fee representing seven (7%) percent of P3,148,198.26. The PTA denied payment on the ground that "the subject price escalation" referred to increased cost of construction materials and did not entail additional work on the part of petitioner as to entitle it to additional compensation. The COA sustained the PTA. ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to additional professional fees, i.e., should the price escalation be included in the "final actual project cost?" HELD: 1.) The Supreme Court set aside the COA's ruling, ordered the PTA to pay petitioner the additional amount of P219,302.47 to complete the payment of its professional fee. 2.) The very terminologies used in the contract call for affirmative relief in petitioner's favor. The use of the terms "actual construction cost," graduating into "final actual project cost" is significant. 3.) The real intendment of the parties was to base the ultimate balance of petitioner's professional fees not on "actual construction cost" alone but on the final actual project cost. By so providing, the contract allowed for flexibility based on actuality and as a matter of equity for STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 198 the contracting parties. For eventually, the final actual project cost would not necessarily tally with the actual construction cost initially computed. The "final actual project cost" covers the totality of all costs as actually and finally determined and logically, includes the escalation cost of the contract price. 4.) It matters most that the price escalation awarded to the Construction Company did not entail additional work for the petitioner. As a matter of fact, neither did it for the main contractor. The increased cost of materials was not the doing of neither contracting parties. 5.) That an escalation clause was not specifically provided for in the contract is of no moment either for it may be considered as already "built-in", and understood from the very terms "actual construction cost," and eventually "final actual project cost." 6.) The terminologies in the contract being clear, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, their literal meaning control (Article 1370, Civil Code). The price escalation cost must be deemed included in the final actual project cost and petitioner held entitled to the payment of its additional professional fees. Obligations arising from contract have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in a good faith." VI. WHEN THE WORD USED HAS NO MEANING IN HARMONY WITH THE LEGISLATWE INTENT When the words used have no meaning in harmony with the legislative intent, they can be treated as surplasage and they may entirely be ignored. Before resorting to this, however, the courts should construe the statute in its entirety 'and find out if the words used can still admit a reasonable construction which will give them force and meaning. In the absence of any reasonable construction, then the said words can be ignored. Hence, in Montenegro v. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882), the petitioner argued that the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was void on the ground that it included sedition which is not a ground provided for in the Constitution. The Supreme Court considered the word "sedition" in said proclamation as a mistake or CHAPTER VIII 199 INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE surplasage but its inclusion in the proclamation does not invalidate the entire proclamation. VII. WHEN THE WORD OR PHRASE IS REPEATEDLY USED IN A STATUTE A word or phrase used in one part of a statute shall receive the same interpretation when used in every other part of the statute, unless a different meaning is intended. Likewise, when a word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute, it will, as a rule, bear the same meaning throughout the statute. (Kriuenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461) VIII. PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES 1.) The words "OR" and "AND" 2) The terms "AND/OR' 3.) The words "SHALL" and "MAY" 4.) The words "ALL," "EVERY" and "ANY" 5) The phrase "AND SO FORTH" 6.) The phrase "AND THE LIKE" 7.) Negative words and phrases like "CANNOT," "SHALL 8.) Affirmative words and phrases like "THE FOLLOWING MAY," "THE FOLLOWING SHALL" Nor' THE WORD "OR" As a Rule The word or is a disjunctive term which indicates an alternative. Hence, when "or" is used, the various members of the sentence are to be taken separately. As a rule therefore, it should be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, that it is a disjunctive word The Word "OR," is not disjunctive in the following cases 1. When the spirit or context of the law warrants it; and 2. Although the persons who can pardon the offender under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code are STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 200 mentioned disjunctively, the said provision should be construed to mean that the right to institute criminal proceedings in said cases is exclusively and successively reposed in said persons in the order in which they are named. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents. grandparents. or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be x x x" (Underscoring supplied) In connection with Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the following rules and jurisprudence are applicable: 1. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to ifie the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardians, may file the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided. (Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; Article 344, R.P.C.) 2. The fact that she is a minor (being only 12 years old) is not an impediment for her to sign the complaint (People v. Medina, CA, 45 O.G. 338). 201 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE 3. But if the offended party is insane or physically disabled, the father can sign the complaint. If the father is dead, the mother can do it. If both are dead, then the grandfather should sign the complaint, etc. (U.S. v. Bautista, 40 Phil. 735) 4. It is exclusive, because if the parent of the girl for instance, refuses to file the complaint, the grandparent cannot file the complaint. The Word 'SAND" As a Rule The word "and" is a conjunctive term, and if it is used in a sentence, it means that the members of a sentence are to be taken jointly. Exception The word "and" may mean "or" if this is the plain intention of the legislature which could be gleaned from the context of the statute. The Term "AND/OR" The use of the term "and /o?' means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or' depending on which one will serve the legislative intent. New Case: ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 193643 and FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 193704 January 29, 2013 FACTS: On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under HA No. 7941 202 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns. After the requisite publication, verification and hearing, and without any apparent opposition, LPGMA's petition was approved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010. Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA's registration. They were later on joined by Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) as a complainant-in-intervention. The COMELEC dismissed the complaint since the ground for cancellation cited is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of RA No. 7941 and the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA's petition for registration which has long been approved with finality. COMELEC denied the petitioners' motions for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' complaints and motions for reconsideration respectively HELD: Section 6, RA No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz: Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: 1 It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; 2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; 2 It 4. It is receiving support from any foreign govern- ;Q a fortgit party or organzatzon, 203 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE ment, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; 5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; 6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition; 7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or 8. It [ails toparttcipate in the last two (-?)preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2 01o) of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists. Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into the law that which it does not provide. Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration proceedings which involves the COMELEC's power to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the entirely separate power invoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel. The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn down, while to cancel is to annul or remove. Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of registration happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a registered 204 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after the petition has been approved. A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion. The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in its ordinary significance - "refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or "refusal or cancellation." It has been held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation" according to how Section 6 intended them to be employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with," "along or together with." The use of "and" in Sec. 6 was necessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation of party-list registration share similar grounds, manner of initiation and procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal" and "cancellation" must be taken together. The word "or," on the other hand, is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. As such, "refusal or cancellation," consistent with their disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate instances when the COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the qualifications of party-list organizations for purposes of participation in the party-list system of representation. The clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word "or" in the first sentence of Section 6 that "[T]he COMELEC 205 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition." Old Case: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SATURNINO DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 It is well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term "andlor"means that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify. FACTS: Respondent was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO) when he was promoted to the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Annabella A. Calamba of the ATO Aviation Security Division filed with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) a protest against respondent's promotional appointment on the ground that respondent did not meet the 4-year supervisory requirement for the position. DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia found the protest to be without merit. Calamba appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC-NCR). After CSC-NCR Director Nelson Acebedo had requested ATO Executive Director Manuel Gio to comment three times to no avail. On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered a decision upholding the protest of Calamba on the ground that respondent did not meet the requirements of the contested position and hence recalled his appointment. Thereafter, ATO Director Gio asked the CSC-NCR to suspend the order recalling the appointment of respondent and then, subsequently manifested that Calamba had no legal personality to 206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ifie the protest because she was not a qualified next-in-rank; that the protest was filed out of time, and that respondent was qualified to the position. On January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo denied the requests of Director Gil. However, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, Director Acebedo granted the request of Director Gilo and affirmed the approval of respondent's appointment. Calamba asked the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998 ruling of Director Acebedo. When asked by the CSC to clarify his conflicting rulings, Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling is unofficial and inexistent. Thus, the CSC treated Calamba's request as an appeal. On November 13, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 98-2970 granting the appeal of Calamba, disapproving respondent's appointment, and directing his reversion to his former position. The CSC having denied his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA granted the petition by setting aside the CSC resolutions and approving respondent's appointment. Petitioner CSC's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Civil Service Commission tenable? HELD: Petitioner's insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year managerial and supervisory experience requirement is misplaced. It is well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term "and/or" means that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify. The Word "SHALL" The word "shall" is imperative. When used in a statute, it operates to impose a duty, which may be enforced. (Dizon v. Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-18615, December 24, 1963) 207 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE The rule, however, is not absolute. The word "shall" may be construed as "may" when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute. (Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608) THE MANDATORY EFFECT OF THE STATUTE AND THE APPARENT INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS ILLUSTRATED IN REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 79582, April 10, 1989 In said case, the Free Patent was issued on April 14, 1967 In 1970, the widow of the patentee bartered a portion thereof with Seranillo. After Seranillo acquired the property, he caused the same to be subdivided into small lots and announced himself as owner. On September 29, 1970, he sold a portion of the lot in favor of Jamila. Another lot was sold on November 29, 1970, in favor of Poliquit. In other words, the widow of the patentee disposed of the land within the prohibitory period of five (5) years, as mandated in Section 118 of the Public Land Act. HELD: The provision of the law, which prohibits the sale, or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory. The purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is to preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the public land, which the State has gratuitously given to them. The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within five years from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales. It would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader the piece of land that the State had gratuitously given to them "Section 124 of the Public Land Act provides that 'Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of Sections 118, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit, originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and 208 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION cause the reversion of the property and its improvement to the State."' It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. The State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, through its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, through the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. The Word "MAY" The word "may" is permissive and it operates to confer jurisdiction. The Word "ALL," "EVERY," and "ANY" The word "air may be used in its universal sense or in its comprehensive sense. The phrase "all laws inconsistent with or contrary to this act are hereby repealed," refers not only to laws that are existing at the time the repealing law is enacted but also to all rules and regulations intended to implement them. The phrase "all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications" found in the petition for naturalization and as required by CA 473, means that the applicant possesses all the qualifications prescribed in the said law, and that the applicant must not have any or all of the disqualifications provided in the law. (Ly Hong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14630, September 30, 1960, Section 5, CA No. 473) This necessarily means that every ground of disqualification or any of the grounds for disqualifications is sufficient to deny the application for citizenship. The phrase "all citizens, 18 years of age, must register and vote" includes all Filipino citizens, male or female, who are eighteen years of age, and not suffering from any disqualification to vote. The Words "AND SO FORTH,' and "AND THE LIKE" The words "and so forth" refers to those similar to what is enumerated or mentioned preceding the words "and so forth." 209 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE This is similar to the phrase "and others of similar character." Example: "Article 420. The following are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character x x x" (Underscoring Supplied) Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT," and "NO" The use of these words in a statute indicates the intention of the legislature to make the law mandatory and prohibitive. EXAMPLE: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it." (Section 15, Article III, 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring Supplied) "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution) "Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner." (Section 10, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution) The right to "due process of law" is a constitutional guarantee, which need not be the subject of government grant. They may not be unduly taken by the government but the government has a duty to protect its citizens from being unlawfully deprived of such rights. IX. DUE PROCESS OF LAW Due process of law has procedural and substantive requirements. From the procedural point of view, it simply means that the procedure to be observed should be fair or as Daniel Webster puts it, it is a "law which hears before it condemns." A substantive requirement of due process is actually a provision against oppressive or arbitrary laws. In other words, while the 210 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION first portion of the requirement refers to the proper procedures to be observed, the second portion of the requirements goes to the very substance of the constitutional provision that life, liberty or property cannot in any way be arbitrarily taken away even if there are proper, procedures made and observed. REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS The due process clause should be interpreted both as a substantive and as a procedural guarantee. Hence, the requirements of due process are: (1) Substantive due process; and (2) Procedural due process. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - is a guarantee that life, liberty, and property shall not be taken away from anyone without due process of law. If a law is invoked to take away one's life, liberty, and property, the more specific concern of substantive due process is not to find out whether said law is being enforced in accordance with procedural formalities but whether or not the said law is a proper exercise of legislative power. This will necessarily require the following: 1. There must be a valid law upon which it is based; 2. The law must have been passed or approved to accomplish a valid governmental objective; 3. The objective must be pursued in a lawful manner; and 4. The law as well as the means to accomplish the objective must be valid and not oppressive. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - refers to the regular methods of procedure to be observed before one's life, liberty or property, can be taken away from him. Simply stated, it means that the procedure to be observed must be fair. Procedural due process therefore is a guarantee to obtain a fair trial in a court of justice according to the mode of proceeding applicable to each case. Now, this includes not only any court of justice but also any and all administrative boards, bodies or tribunals. TWO ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 1. Procedural due process in judicial proceedings; and 2. Procedural due process in administrative proceedings 211 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS The requirements of due process in judicial proceedings, as laid down in Banco Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil. 921), are as follows: 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and 4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS The requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, as laid down in Ang Ti bay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635), are as follows: 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; 2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. The decision must have something to support itself; 4. The evidence must be substantial; 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. 212 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION X. COURT'S POWER TO CONSTRUE STATUTES ARISES ONLY IF THE STATUTE IS NOT CLEAR A statute, which is clear and free from ambiguity, need not be interpreted by the courts. They must be applied to give effect to the intent expressed in the language of the statute. This principle is based on the Latin Maxim DURA LEX SED LEX (The law may be harsh but it is the law) and in another Latin maxim ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET (When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required). When the law, however, is not clear, or when it is ambiguous, the court is justified to interpret or construe the statute and to resort to all legitimate aids to construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of the statute. XI. IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUING A STATUTE, WHAT ARE THOSE THAT THE COURT CAN DO AND CANNOT DO What the court can do? Primarily, the court's duty is to ascertain the true intent of the statute. 2. In the pursuit of this duty, the court can resort to all legitimate aids to construction. These aids are those found in the law itself, known as intrinsic aids, and those extraneous facts and circumstances outside of the statute, known as extrinsic aids. 3. It can depart from the language of the statute if by so doing, the legislative purpose could be carried out. 4. It may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints, which, if not corrected, would render the statute meaningless. 5. It can issue guidelines in applying the statute in order to delineate what the law requires. What the court cannot do? 1. The court cannot speculate as to the intent of the law. 2. The court cannot supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. 3. The court cannot assume a purpose, which is not expressed in the statute. 213 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE 4. The court cannot change the meaning of the law, especially if the meaning will defeat the purpose of the law. 5. The court cannot rewrite the law and invade the domain of the legislature (This is known as JUDICIAL LEGISLATION). 6. The court cannot interpret into the law a requirement, which the law does not prescribe. 7. The court cannot enlarge the scope of the statute and include transactions or situations not provided by the legislature. MI. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE STATUTE IS NOT CAPABLE OF INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION? When a statute is not capable of construction or interpretation because it fails to express a meaning, or if the absurdity in the law cannot be reconciled despite resorting to all aids in construction, it becomes inoperative (Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107 Phil. 151). XLII. CAN THE SUPREME COURT ABANDON OR OVERRULE ITS EARLIER DECISION? The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, may abandon or overrule its earlier decision, if it is right and proper to do so but the new decision modifying or overruling a doctrine or principle should only be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is illustrated by the stand of the Supreme Court on the issue of whether the courts can inquire on the presidential suspension of the privilege of the court of habeas corpus and whether there is right to bail during the suspension of the said writ. The first two leading cases on this point are the cases of Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87) and Montenegro v. Castaileda (91 Phil. 882). In both cases, the Supreme Court decided that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons." The Barcelon rule was enunciated in this jurisdiction in 1905 whereas the Montenegro rule, which reiterated the Barcelon rule, 214 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION was enunciated in 1952. This ruling continued to prevail until 1971 when our Supreme Court came out with another. ruling in the case of Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448). In the said case of Lansang v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled that courts are allowed to inquire whether or not a presidential suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is arbitrary in order to determine its constitutional sufficiency. The ruling is premised on the assumption that the courts can effectively determine whether the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is arbitrary or not. The Lansang doctrine, however, was abandoned on account of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in cases docketed as G.R. No. 61388 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dra. Aurora Parong, et al., Josefina Garcia-Padilla, petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen Fabian C. Ver, Fidel V. Ramos and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel, respondent." Decided on April 20, 1983, and G.R. No. 61016 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Horacio R. Morales, Jr., petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian Ver and Col. Galileo Kintanar, respondents." Promulgated on April 26, 1983, or 6 days after the Padilla decision was promulgated. In the Padilla case, nine justices voted to abandon the doctrine in the Lansang case and these justices are as follows: Justices Pacifico de Castro, Efren Plana, Juvenal Guerero, Felix Makasiar, Venecio Escolin, Conrado Vasquez, Vicente Abad Santos, Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., and Lorenzo Relova. Two justices voted to retain the doctrine in the Lansang case and they are Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Justice Claudio Teehankee. The majority decision reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro rule, as above-mentioned. In the Morales case, the justices who previously voted in the Padilla case in favor of abandoning the doctrine in the Lansang case maintained their position. Three justices voted to retain the Lansang case maintained their position. Three justices voted to retain the Lansang doctrine and they are Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Justices Claudio Teehankee and Hermogenes Concepcion. 215 CHAPTER VIII INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE Xlv. IF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN A PARTICULAR CASE IS NOT CORRECT, SHOULD IT BE FOLLOWED BY THE INFERIOR COURTS? Unless and until that decision of the Supreme Court is reversed by itself, sitting en banc, it shall be binding not only upon the inferior courts but also upon all branches of the government The basis for this is Article 8 of the new Civil Code, which provides as follows: "Article 8. Judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines a contract as "a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service." I. CAN THE CONTRACTING PARTIES ENTER INTO ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISH SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT THEY MAY DEEM PROPER? The contracting parties may enter into any kind of agreement and establish such terms and conditions that they like provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. (Article 1306, New Civil Code) Examples: 1.) An undertaking in a letter agreement premised on the termination of a marital relation is not only contrary to law but also contrary to Filipino morals and public policy. As such, any agreement or obligation based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void. (Lichauco de Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80965, June 6, 1990) 2.) An agreement to work, as a servant without pay is immoral and void since this would amount to involuntary servitude. (De los Reyes v. Alojado, 16 Phil. 499) 3.) An agreement exempting a carrier from liability for gross negligence (Heacock v. Macondray, 32 Phil. 205) is contrary to public policy. 4.) The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school that the students scholarship is good only if he con216 CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS 217 tinues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of his scholarship, is contrary to public policy and therefore, null and void (Gui v. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961). 5.) Deed of Sale over a parcel of land within five years from the date of issuance of a patent is null and void because it violates Section 118, Commonwealth Act 141 (Sala u. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-47281, April 27, 1990). II. WHO ARE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT? As a rule, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs," and therefore generally, its terms cannot determine the rights of third persons. The exceptions to this rule are the following: (a) Where the obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their NATURE, by STIPULATION, or by PROVISION of LAW (Article 1311); (b) Where there is a STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI (a stipulation in favor of a third party.) (Article 1311); (c) Where a third person induces another to violate his contract (Article 1314); (d) Where in some cases, third persons may be adversely affected by a contract where they did not participate (See Articles 1312, 2150, 2151; Act No. 1956 the Insolvency Law: R.A. No. 875); and (e) Where the law authorizes the creditor to sue on a contract entered into by his debtor ("Accion Directa'). III. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY AND NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT? When Necessary When the terms of the contract are not clear and there is doubt regarding the intention of the contracting parties, it becomes necessary to resort to interpretation. This becomes the duty of the court when the parties decide to seek judicial intervention. 218 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The Supreme Court explained in the case of Marquez v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-168387, August 25,2010, to wit: "When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements." When Not Necessary When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, interpretation of the same is not necessary. The first paragraph of Article 1370 provides as follows: "If the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control" The Supreme Court explained in the case of Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation, G.R. No. L-162523, November 25, 2009, to wit: "The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code: "[I]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave nodoubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." This provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement" It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows courts in some cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A court's purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS 219 a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the interpretation of the contract is left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the intrinsic evidence. In our jurisdiction, the rule is thoroughly discussed in Bautista v. CA: "The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not." IV. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE WORDS OF THE CONTRACT AND EVIDENT INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, WHICH PREVAILS? The second paragraph of Article 1370 answers the question. It provides as follows: "If the words -appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former." V HOW TO JUDGE THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES Article 1371 of the New Civil Code provides as follows: "In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered." 220 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In Ramos v. Sarao, G.R. No. L-149756, February 11, 2005, it was held that although the parties in the case denominated their contract as a "Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro," the "sellers" have continued to possess and to reside at the subject house and lot. This evident factual circumstance was plainly overlooked by the trial and the appellate courts, thereby justifying a review of the case. This overlooked fact clearly shows that the petitioner intended merely to secure a loan, not to sell the property. Thus, the contract should be deemed an equitable mortgage. VI. RULES GOVERNING THE FOLLOWING: (1) Effect of the use of several terms (2) Effect of stipulations that admit of several meanings (3) Effect of words which may have different significations (4) Effect of usage or custom of the place (5) Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract VII. USE OF GENERAL TERMS However general terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. VIII. STIPULATIONS THAT ADMIT GENERAL MEANINGS If some stipulations of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual. IX. USAGE OR CUSTOM OF THE PLACE The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations that are ordinarily established. X OBSCURE WORDS OR STIPULATION The interpretation of obscure words or stipulation in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS 221 XI. RULE IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT AND AS TO THE INCIDENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests. XII. OTHER RULES OF INTERPRETATION Other rules of interpretation are found in Sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines. Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills. Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. - The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. - In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. 222 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Section. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. - In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. - For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. - The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which the case the agreement must be construed accordingly. Section 15. Written words control printed. - When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. - When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understands the language, is admissible to declare the characters of the meaning of the language. Section 17. Of two constructions, which is preferred. - When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made. Section 18. Construction in favor of natural right. - When an instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. - An instrument be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character. may CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS 223 IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES THAT PREVAILS, FOR THE INTENTION IS THE SOUL OF A CONTRACT, NOT ITS WORDING WHICH IS PRONE TO MISTAKES, INADEQUACIES, OR AMBIGUITIES. SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ v. ELOISA ESPEJO, et al., G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010 FACTS Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land in Bagabag, Nueva Viscaya, One is located at Barangay Lantap, tenanted by Nemi Fernandez, and the other in Barangay Murong, tenanted by Marquez and Dela Cruz. The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc (RBB1) to secure certain loans Upon their failure to pay, the properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI Eventually title to the properties were issued in the name of RBBI TCT No T-62096 was issued for the Murong property and TCT No T-62836 for the Lantap property. Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite, K-27," without any reference to either Barangays Lantap or Murong. On February 1985 respondents bought back one of their lots The Deed of Sale did not mention the location but mentioned the TCT winch corresponds to the Murong property. However, respondents never took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the tenants of the same, or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the and land On the contrary, Nemi continued workmg on the Lantap property without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994 Meanwhile, on June 1990, R]3B1, pursuant to Section 20 and 21 of RA No 6657 executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and Dela Cruz Both VLTs described the subject land is located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No T-62836. After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAa) on optenibor 5, 1091. Both CLOAa stated that parcekof agricultural land were situated in Barangay Murong 224 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On February 10, 1997, respondents filed a Complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAI)) for the cancellation of CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of VLTs by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi based on theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property. ISSUE: Whether the admitted contents of the documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. HELD: No. Admitted contents of the documents do not adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements. The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9. Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. It described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap), and also said that the location is in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents' Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule because it referred to 'PCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), however RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties. Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the case necessitates an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine CHAPTER IX RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS 225 the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements. In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts: Article 1370.11 the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the cont racting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening: Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. The Supreme Court is convinced that the subject of the 1985 Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property because after its execution, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership to show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the same. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the reopondento. Moreover, petitioner3 paid 1eaeho1d rentzLIB for uirLg the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents. 226 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aside from respondents' neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong, respondent Nemi is the farmer actually tilling Lantap, without turning over the supposed landowner's share to RBBL This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBB1) as the owners of the Lantap property. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs which explicitly refer to land in Barangay Murong in petitioners' favor. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murox proper(y, midisturbed by axiyoxie for several 1-I years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997 All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties' actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay, where the property is located Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land Hence, were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very smiilar. CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 189755, Jtily 4, 2012 PRINCIPLE: WHERE A GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE FOLLOWS AN ENUMERATION OF PARTICULAR AND SPECIFIC WORDS OF THE SAME CLASS, THE GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE IS TO BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE - OR TO BE RESTRICTED TO -THINGS AKIN TO OR RESEMBLING, OR OF THE SAME KIND OR CLASS AS, THOSE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include - or to be restricted to - things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of PD No. 1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar facilities and amenities" should be interpreted in like manner. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010 PRINCIPLE: EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that 227 228 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Because the law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning. BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION vBATANGAS CITY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 152675; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, et at., G.R. No. 152771, April 28, 2004 FACTS: Batangas Power Corporation (BPC) was registered with the Board of Investments (BOl) on September 13, 1992. On September 23, 1992, the BOl issued a certificate of registration to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a tax holiday for 6 years. The BPC began operating the power plant in Batangas City. On October 12, 1998, Batangas City, through its legal officer, demanded from the BPC payment of business taxes and penalties from 1994 as provided for in Ordinance XI or the Batangas City Tax Code. BPC refused to pay, citing its tax exempt status under Section 133(g) of the Local Government Code (LGC). On April 15, 1999, the City Treasurer modified the City's tax claim and demanded payment of business taxes from BPC only for 1998-1999 on the ground that BPC enjoyed the 6-year tax holiday but such exemption period expired on September 22, 1998 or 6 years after the BPC registered with the BOI. BPC refused to pay and claimed that its commercial operation commenced on July 16, 1993, the date designated by the BOT as the start of its tax holiday on account of its failure to operate immediately on account of a force majeure. BPC claimed that the local tax holiday is concurrent with the income tax holiday and asserted in the alternative that tax should be collected from the NPC under the BOT Agreement. Because the BPC and Batangas City refused to budge from their respective positions, the NPC intervened. While it admitted CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 229 assumption of BPC's tax obligations under the BOT Agreement, the NPC refused to pay BPC's business tax as it allegedly constituted an indirect tax on NPC, a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter. Consequently, the BPC ified a petition for declaratory relief with the Makati RTC against Batangas City and the NPC, and it prayed for a ruling that it was not bound to pay the business taxes imposed by the City. Pending the resolution of the case, the City refused to issue to BPC a permit to operate business unless business taxes amounting to around P29 Million were paid. The BPC, which has its principal office in Makati City, then filed a supplemental petition with the Makati RTC to convert its original petition to an action for injunction to' enjoin the City from withholding the issuance of its business permit and closing its plant. The City opposed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action; The Makati RTC' admitted the supplemental petition but on February 27, 2002, it dismissed the injunction, holding that: (1) BPC is liable to pay business taxes to the City; (2) NPC's tax exemption was withdrawn with'the passage of HA No. 7160 (LGC); and (3) the 6-year tax holiday granted to pioneer business enterprises starts from the date of registration with the BOl under Section 133(g) of the LGC, and not on the date of actual business operation. Hence, BPC and NPC filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The petitions were consolidated. HELD: The effect of the LGC on the tax exemption privileges of the NPC has already been extensively discussed and settled in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan. In said case, this Court recognized the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Specifically, [the Court] stressed that Sec. 193 of the LGC, an express and general repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes, withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by the NPC under its Charter. We explained the rationale for this provision, thus: In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of the state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even 230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 5. - Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments. This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country's highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also "dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders. The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, x x x the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x" To recall, prior to the enactment of the x x x Local Government Code x x x, various measures have been enacted to promote local autonomy. x x x Despite these initiatives, however, the shackles of dependence on the national government remained. Local government units were faced with the same problems that hamper their capabilities to participate effectively in the national development efforts, among which are: (a) inadequate tax base; (b) lack of fiscal control over external sources of income; (c) limited authority to prioritize and approve development projects;-..(d) heavy dependence on external sources of income; and (e) limited supervisory control over personnel of national line agencies. Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by LGU. It widen tax base of LGUa to includc taxes which were prohibited by previous laws x x x CHAPTER OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 231 Neither can the NPC successfully rely on the Basco case as this was decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when there was still no law empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national government. Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed NPC's tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for six (6) months. Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business in said City, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991 Local Government Code Hence, the petition of BPC and NPC were dismissed. LUCIOMORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G R No 145226, February 6, 2004 Liberal construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused FACTS: Lucia Barrete and Lucio Morigo were married on August 30, 1990 in Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol A week later, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. Barely a year thereafter, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant, which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992 On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed in the RTC Bohol a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed with the RTC Bohol. After trial, appellant was convicted of bigamy, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition. HELD: In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, bigamy, thus: we laid down the elements of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 232 1. the offender has been legally married; 2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; 3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and 4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Applying the forgoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. SO ORDERED. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage 1. ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. xxx The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6620, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. 2. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 233 speak of The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished 3. from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a 5ubsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first mar4. riage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all 5. was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, need no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The last issue involves the subject of statutory construction. In this connection, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: "The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statue in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic." Hence, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and the appellant is ACQUITTED of the offense of bigamy. 234 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSN. OF THE PHILS., INC. v. ASSN. OF INT'L SHIPPING LINES G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002 FACTS: In 1985, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued an Administrative Order on the payment of additional charges for pilotage services on Sundays and Holidays referring to "nighttime and overtime pay." In 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 1088 providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services without mentioning nighttime and overtime pay. The Executive Order contains a repealing clause that all orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and issuances inconsistent with it are repealed or amended accordingly. ISSUE: Whether the Executive Order repealed the Administrative Order. HELD: No, the Executive Order did not repeal the Administrative Order The Executive Order provides a general repealing clause, the effect of which fails under the category of an implied repeal, as it does not identify the orders, rules or regulations it intends to abrogate. Repeal by implication is frowned upon in this jurisdiction. It is not favored, unless it is manifestly intended by the legislative authority enacting it or, unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is because the legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal is intended, the proper step is to express it. NOTES In 1922, the Supreme Court in Lichauco & Co v Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 ruled that: "x x x Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of a later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 235 effect. However, before repeal by implication will be decreed, there must be a sufficient revelation of the legislative intent to repeal; the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general rule, the latter act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak so far as the acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment. x x x" 1992 CASES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. G.R. No. 101724 SUPREME COURT PRINCIPLES: B.P. BLG. 195 WHICH AMENDED SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT 3019 CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION THE DATE OF THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW BECOMES THE OPERATIVE DATE FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION "[B.P.] 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec[tion] 11 of RA No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Sec[tion] 11, RA [No.] 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it." "Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of limitation as to the prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment of information be actually filed within the time prescribed." (22 CJS 574) 236 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION "Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense." (People v. Allen, 118 P. 2d, 927) "Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously committed." (22 CJS 576; People v. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine u. State, 24 Tex 61) (Underscoring supplied) To apply B.P. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that has already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as: "A law passed after the occurence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art[idle] 1, Sec[tion] 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass any ex post facto law. Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than what was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. (Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 57' (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520) Since an ex post facto law is prescribed by our Constitution (Section 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan corn- CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 237 mitted no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA No. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195." (2) The date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription." (Rollo, p.34) Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend approval of his application for free patent (which both of them denied doing), the date of violation, for the purpose of computing the period of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976. The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "It is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land x x x other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof' (Rollo, p. 30). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description; (3) the regional director who assessed the application and determined the land classification; (4) the director of Lands who prepared the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was nondisposable public agricultural land. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of Paredes' application for a free patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late. The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that: 238 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION "Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes, a reasonable time after completion, when no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity." (22 CJS573-574) "In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of Limitations begins to run on the commission of an offense and not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the crime is complete." (22 CJS 585) (Underscoring supplied) Even if ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the registration and issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989, by the filing of the information therein. 1991 CASES TUPAS v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 89571, February 6, 1991. PRINCIPLE: AEQUITASNUNQUAM CONTRA VENIT LEGIS (EQUITY CANNOT PREVAIL OVER LAW) Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. All abstract arguments based only on eq- CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 239 uity should yield to positive rules, which preempt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals to justice, while they may ring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists - and is now still reverently observed - is "aequUas nun quam contravenit legs" On June 26, 1991, The Supreme Court made an additional pronouncement in Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-93401, thus: "The application by the trial court of its equity jurisdiction is misplaced Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. All abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules (judicial rules of procedure), which preempt and prevail over such persuasions Moreover, a court acting without jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction." JOINT MINISTRY OF HEALTH-MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ACCREDITATION COMMITTEE FOR MEDICAL CLINICS v. COURT OF APPEALS G R No 78254, April 25, 1991 PRINCIPLE: LAWS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is so enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature i.e. , regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative 240 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. This ruling amplifies the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446. MACEDA v. MACARAIG G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991 PRINCIPLE: REPEAL BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED; STRICTISSIMI JURIS (STRICT INTERPRETATION); ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION HAS WEIGHT Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier. The first effort of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions. The law did not intend that the provisions of PD No. 938 should be construed strictly against the National Power Corporation. On the contrary, the law mandates that it should be interpreted liberally so as to enhance the tax-exempt status of the National Power Corporation. Hence, the rule on strictissimi juris with respect to the interpretation of statutes granting tax exemptions to the NPC cannot be invoked. The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the government itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by government in the course of its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of nontax liability of such agencies. CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 241 In the case of property owned by the State or a city or other public corporations, the express exemption should not be construed with the same degree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the State, since as to such property, exemption is the rule and taxation the exception. The construction of PD No. 938 by the office charged with its implementation should be given controlling weight. PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION v MUNICIPALITY OF PILILIA G.R. No. 90776, June 3, 1991 PRINCIPLE: EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS MUST BE IN HARMONY WITH STATUTES Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former prevails. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991 PRINCIPLE: TAX STATUTES ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYERS In case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (e.g. PD No. 213) expressly and clearly declares. BASCO v. PAGCOR G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991 PRINCIPLE: ALL PRESUMPTIONS ARE INDULGED IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY One who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. That a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. If any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld 242 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION and the challenger. must negate all possible basis. The. courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute. A liberal interpretation of the Constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 44007, March 20, 1991 PRINCIPLE: THE FRANCHISE IS THE LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEY ARE BOUND BY THE TERMS THEREOF A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract. Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private citizens made upon valuable considerations, for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. The obligation vesting upon the grantee to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes sufficient consideration. The benefit to the community may constitute the sole consideration for the grant of a franchise by the State. Such being the case, the franchise is the law between the parties and they are bound by the terms thereof. DE VILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991 PRINCIPLE: LEGISLATWE, PROCEEDINGS MAY SERVE AS GUIDES IN DETERMINING THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE OF DOUBTFUL MEANING Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning. Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill shall be adopted. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 PRINCIPLES: A DOUBTFUL PROVISION WILL BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORY OF THE TIMES CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 243 NO PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION IS TO BE SEPARATED FROM ALL THE OTHERS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE. 1987 CONSTITUTION SEEKS TO IMPOSE A STRICTER PROHIBITION ON THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, CABINET MEMBER, THEIR DEPUTIES AND ASSISTANTS WITH RESPECT TO HOLDING MULTIPLE OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT DURING THEIR TENURE THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS DEMANDING THE IMPRACTICABLE DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION GIVE NO LIGHT AS TO THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY WHO DID NOT TALK On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII, is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Whenever the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Sec. 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided. While it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow 244 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. It is safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONATO G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991 PRINCIPLE: PENAL LAWS SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT INSOFAR AS THEY FAVOR THE PERSON GUILTY OF A FELONY WAIVER IN DEROGATION OF A STATUTORY RIGHT IS NOT FAVORED Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the State, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived. Those of the second may be. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. JUDGE DE LA ROSA G.R. No. 95122 BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. JUDGE CAPULONG G.R. No. 95123 GATCHALIAN v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991 PRINCIPLE: LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS The Philippine law, following the lex loci celebratioais, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 245 laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country..." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Article 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts lean towards the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parenth over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." Bearing in mind the "processual presumption," he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. 1990 CASES ALVENDIA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990 PRINCIPLE: EQUITABLE REASONS WILL NOT CONTROL AGAINST ANY WELL-SETTLED RULE OF LAW Equity is justice outside legality. It applies only in the absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules or procedure. "Equity follows the law" but where the law gives a particular remedy and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control against any well-settled rule of law or public policy. MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. DAYRIT G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 PRINCIPLE: IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR CONTRARY INTENTION, WORDS AND PHRASES IN STATUTES SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN ISOLATION FROM ONE ANOTHER 246 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THE MONETARY BOARD CANNOT REWRITE OTHER LAWS. THAT FUNCTION IS VESTED SOLELY WITH THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY In a suit by the First Western Bank and Trust Company against Atlas Timber Company, et al., the trial judge rendered judgment ordering Meridian Assurance Corporation to pay First Western the sum of $21,933.38 or its equivalent in pesos at the rate of P3.9390 to a dollar, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint. Thereafter, Meridian wrote First Western offering to pay the amount of the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237. First Western rejected the offer, its view being that the rate of interest should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416. Meridian then filed with the trial court a motion manifesting its deposit with the court of the amount of P170,061.03 representing the principal indebtedness, the 6% interest on the principal debt at 6% per annum, and costs of the suit, praying that the deposit be allowed, that it be considered full satisfaction of the judgment, and that enforcement of the writ of execution be restrained. The trial court denied the motion stating that Central Bank Circular No. 416 had changed the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per annum. ISSUE: The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided by Article 2209 of the Civil Code or 12% conformably with Central Bank Circular No. 416. HELD: 1. The issue had already been passed upon and resolved by the Court in two earlier cases. In one case, the Court held that the "judgments spoken of and referred to are (only) judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits." It declared that any kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (PD No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite other CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 247 laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. 2. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended which, as distinguished from Sec. 1 of the same law, appears to be the actual and operative grant of authority to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to prescribe maximum rates of interest where the parties have not stipulated thereon in excluding mention of rates allowed in judgments, should, at the least be considered as limiting the authority thus granted only to loans or forbearances of money, etc., and to judgments involving such loans or forbearances SONGCO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 23, 1990 PRINCIPLE: • LABOR LEGISLATION AND LABOR CONTRACTS SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE SAFETY AND DECENT LIVING OF THE LABORER In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code' s provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provision of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor, and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer." FIESTAN v COURT OF APPEALS G R No 81552, May 28, 1990 PRINCIPLE: A SPECIFIC STATUTE PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL STATUTE The mortgagor sought the nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on the ground that the mortgagee (DBP) cannot acquire by purchase the mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of paragraph (2) of Article 1491 and paragraph (7) of Article 1409 of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 248 the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 54470, May 8, 1990 PRINCIPLE: FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE IS ONLY PERSUASIVE RESORT TO FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE IS PROPER ONLY IF THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE LOCALLY TO SETTLE A CONTROVERSY Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States "that" the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter." HELD: Resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no 1. law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. 2. For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206[1] of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. BRENT SCHOOL, INC., et at., v. ZAMORA, et at., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990 PRINCIPLE: A LITERAL INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE REJECTED IF IT WOULD BE UNJUST OR IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 249 It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. The fact that the construction placed upon the statute would lead to an absurdity is an argument for rejecting it. Where the true intent of the law is clear and calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 54305, February 14, 1990 PRINCIPLE: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1281 IS A REMEDIAL STATUTE. ITAPPLIES TOALLACTIONS PENDING AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT EXCEPT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THOSE CASES WHICH HAD ALREADY ATTAINED THE CHARACTER OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT PD No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or take away rights that are already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already in existence. It does not come within the purview of prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively independent of the general rule against the retrospective application of statutes. Being procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment except only with respect to those cases that had already attained the character of a final and executory judgment. Were it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by granting jurisdiction to a body 250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION or agency adopt to the technical complexities of mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants in a mining controversy cannot be permitted to choose a form of convenience. Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings 1989 CASES LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989 PRINCIPLE • WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT ANY STATUTORY LANGUAGE THAT APPEARS TO FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE GIVEN A "LIBERAL INTERPRETATION," COURTS, HOW.EVER, HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO INVOKE "LIBERAL INTERPRETATION" OR "THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW" WHERE THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE THEMSELVES LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT OR INTERPRETATION. Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes, the court notes that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. The Court, however, understands petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be given a "liberal interpretation" Courts, however, have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves and as illuminated by the history of that statute leave no room for doubt or interpretation. The spirit of the law may not be legitimately invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and implementation of a statute The spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the words actually used by the lawmaker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the legislature. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives, which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning that the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 251 that the court must apply. The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, confusion and uncertainty in application will follow, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve. Where the language is plain, subtle refinements, which tinge words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory, are not only unnecessary but also decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter is in considerable measure the unwarranted inter- ference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meaning which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advice their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and construction. The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute define and therefore limit the authority and description of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the lawgiver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and description. Once the judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of the legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In a policy like ours, which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting power through the separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly careful least they substitute their conceptions or preferences of policy for that actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge believes passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have said on a particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the conclusion that the law-making authority was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat ineptly. Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 252 society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gain say that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power that our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptation the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in any way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. JANDUSAY, et al., v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989 PRINCIPLE: ONE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST HIMSELF BE DESERVING OF EQUITY The laches of one nullifies the laches of the other. One who seeks equity must himself be deserving of equity. When parties are in culpability similarly situated (in eodem loco), one may claim no advantage over the other. This is a principle of law applied in the 'ari delicto" rule embedded in our legal system. MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT v. NLRC G.R. No. 80586, May 3, 1989 PRINCIPLE: IMPLEMENTING RULES OF THE LABOR CODE ARE NOT LAWS AND THEY NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED Petitioner's argument that the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code are not effective since it was not published in the Official Gazette is without merit. Said rules are not "laws" within the meaning of Article 2 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Department of Labor and Employment had published said Rules in book form printed by the government's printing office and made available to the general public since 1975. CHAPTER X OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 253 REGIDOR v. CHIONGBIAN G.R. No. 85815, May 19, 1989 PRINCIPLE: REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CANNOT ALTER, AMEND OR CONTRAVENE PROVISION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of the Local Government Code. The implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. A rule or regulation that was issued to implement a law may not go beyond the terms and provision of the law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 PRINCIPLE: GENERAL LEGISLATION MUST GIVE WAY TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION General legislation must give way to the special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. A specific statute prevails over a general statute. Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail. FRANCISCO v. PERMSKUL G.R. No. 810061, May 12, 1989 PRINCIPLE: TO JUSTIFY THE NULLIFICATION OF A LAW, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH, OF THE CONSTITUTION IN CASE OF DOUBT, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE JUDICIARY TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT THE INVALIDATION OF THE LAW When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption in favor of its constitutionality is employed. To justify the nullification 254 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. Courts will bend over backward to sustain that presumption. LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989 PRINCIPLE: WHEREAS CLAUSES ARE NOT PART OF A STATUTE Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking. They are not part of the operative language of the statute. Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment (e.g. an enactment which drastically but clearly change the substantive content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of PD No. 1990). Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute. In the instant case, the whereas clauses of PD No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as amended. SM AGRIJAND GENERAL MACHINERIES v. NLRC G.R. No. 748061, January 9, 1989 PRINCIPLE: • THE TEN-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 223 OF THE LABOR CODE REFERS TO TEN CALENDAR DAYS, AND NOT TO TEN WORKING DAYS When the last day for filing an appeal falls on a legal holiday, the same can be filed on the next business day following said legal holiday. The Revised Administrative Code, specifically, Section 1, Article VIII provides that: "where the day or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next business day." REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 PRINCIPLE: LEGISLATIVE INTENT MUST BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE WHOLE STATUTE DOCTRINE OF NOSCITUR A SOCHS • CHAPTER OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 255 Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUY G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989 PRINCIPLE: LAW IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL The basic principle pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. Where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. The rule is that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
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